

INHABITING ETHICS
Educational Praxis in the Design Studio, the Music Class and the Dojo

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Abstract

‘Ethics cannot be taught,’ asserted Plato in one of the first steps of Western philosophy, an argument that was reconfirmed also by Wittgenstein in the twentieth century. Against this background, this thesis argues for the prospect of acquiring Ethics in architectural design education. In doing so, it utilises two intertwined tactics of inquiry: a practice-led study and a philosophical exploration.

The practice-led study examines three educational case studies: an *architectural design studio*, a *music class* and a *dojo* (the place of education in the traditional Japanese martial arts – here *Aikido*). Through the tactics of ethnomethodology the thesis investigates the way that participants in each practice produce situations of Ethics in each of the three cases. Simultaneously, the philosophical analysis divides the wider discourse of Ethics into two sub-themes: *morality* and *ethics*. *Morality* is characterised by normative evaluations, based on the application of external rules and rational reflection exercised by humans seen as ‘rational animals;’ while *ethics* is characterised by practical judgements, based on internal customs, habits and dispositions that reveal a notion of ‘human animality.’ The thesis argues against the privileging of the popular, and hegemonic sub-theme of *morality*, in support of the need to inhabit the largely neglected and underestimated area of *ethics*. The concept of ‘inhabitation’ deriving from habit, repetition and the every-day, proposes a dwelling *in* the inherently ineffable discourse of *ethics*, which can be acquired through habituation.

In demonstrating this distinction between *morality* and *ethics* in the three educational case studies, human conduct (discussed as the trinity of *theory*, *poesis*, *praxis* by Aristotle) is analysed, and *praxis* is found to be the fundamental activity that inhabits *ethics*. There, in the mere doing of the most mundane and everyday educational activities, where means and ends conflate, *ethics* thrive. Furthermore, two complex terms are employed to analyse the production of *morality* and *ethics* in the case studies: *reflective disruption* as a generative mechanism of *morality*; and *repetitive mimesis* as a generator of *ethics*. The thesis concludes that the currently dominant quest for constant innovative reflection, needs to be replaced by a focus on the repetition of mimetic actions; arguing that students are educated in *ethics* by inhabiting this largely unknown, but uncannily familiar area of Ethics.

By signing this declaration I certify that:

- This thesis was composed only by myself.
- The thesis comprises only my original work towards the degree of PhD, except when clearly indicated differently in the case of co-authored publications
- This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

The author

Leonidas Koutsoumpos

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Not only is there beauty and order in the world,
but there is no beauty and order apart from the world.

Eric Rohmer

Prolegomena to any future archit-ethics: the educational impossibility



When the child was a child
It walked with its arms swinging
wanted the brook to be a river
the river to be a torrent
and this puddle to be the sea.

...

Peter Handke
Song to Childhood

.1 Pro-thesis¹

Ethics is upsurge, Alciviades barging in to break up a nice symposium on love.²

David Appelbaum, *Disruption*

.1.1 Can Ethics be taught in the Schools of Architecture?

On 16 of June 2006, the popular weekly *Observer Magazine* published an issue dedicated to Ethics, appointing awards to practices, organizations and individuals that according to a jury panel of experts and celebrities demonstrated Ethical excellence. Andrew Simms, chair of the New Economics Foundation, described this project with the following words: “The great thing about the Observer Ethical Awards is that it will highlight best practice and good examples of how people can live more ethically in their day-to-day lives.”³ Three out of the six award-winning schemes involved architectural projects (not only buildings –as I will show later on), indicating that for the public there is a strong connection between Ethics and architecture.



Figure 1: The logo of the awards

If the public rates so highly the involvement of architecture in Ethics then the students of architecture should definitely learn all about it. This thesis, though, asks a fundamental question: ‘*is it possible for Ethics to be taught in schools of architecture?*’⁴ The thesis is a clarification process towards understanding *what do*

¹ Note that the subtitles of this chapter do not originate from the Hegelian evolution of ideas (thesis-antithesis-synthesis), but rather to the titles of a series of projects that were developed in the design studio of MArch during the years 2005-2007. See more details in Chapter 2, p. 129.

² David Appelbaum, *Disruption*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 67.

³ "And the Winners Are...", *The Observer Magazine*, 18 June 2006, p. 13.

⁴ I would like to acknowledge Wang’s paper for influencing my research Hongyu Wang, "Aporias, Responsibility, and the Im/Possibility of Teaching Multicultural Education," *Educational Theory*,

we mean when we ask whether Ethics can be taught. The importance of this question needs little introduction after the above example. It appears almost self-evident that something concerning Ethics *has to* be important. It is like trying to prove why something already accepted as good *is* good. Although later on this will be examined closely, for the time being we have to accept that “good is good, and that is the end of the matter.”⁵

So, what is Ethics anyway? Throughout this thesis I will tactically *avoid* answering this question that appears fundamental, in order to start approaching the topic. The reason for this paradoxical tactic is that from the side of philosophy there is a strong warning arguing that *Ethics cannot be defined!* Nevertheless, not being able to define it does not mean that Ethics does not exist. This thesis will describe Ethics and it will show it to the reader, but it will not pin down a definition of this elusive term. At the very same time, though, the popularity of the Observer Ethical Awards shows that everyone pretty much understands what Ethics is about. For this reason, I ask for the reader to utilise her or his understanding of Ethics and actively project it on this text. This tactical request is the first step towards revealing the actual thesis that argues for a neglected area of Ethics lying exactly in this habitual pre-understanding of Ethics. This particular area, which I will come to call *ethics*,⁶ I invite the reader to inhabit.

.1.2 Popular notions of Ethics about architecture

This call to inhabit the habitual pre-understanding of Ethics, acknowledges that there exists other notions of Ethics that are well known. One such important notion in architecture has been associated with notions of clarity, purity and honesty, as they have been defended by the proponents of the modern movement in architecture. But before dealing with this understanding in further detail I would like to discuss first two notions of Ethics are widely popular even beyond architectural circles. One

55, no. 1: 44-59. This paper lead me to Jacques. Derrida, *Aporias: Dying--Awaiting (One Another at) The "Limits of Truth" [Mourir--S'attendre Aux "Limites De La Vritu"]*, translated by Thomas Dutoit, Edited by Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993.

⁵ George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962/1903, pp. 6-7. See more details in Chapter 4, p. 170

⁶ Note the small first letter and the italics.

notion relates architecture with ecological and humanitarian aims, the other with professional codes of conduct. Two examples may help identify these popular views:



Figure 2: The cover of the Observer Magazine (left) and the AIA 2004 Code of Ethics (right)

The first notion of Ethics can be easily illustrated by the abovementioned Observer Ethical Awards (Figure 2, left). The category entitled ‘innovation of the year’ was won by the ‘not-for-profit’ organisation *Architecture for Humanity* that uses volunteers to provide design services for communities in emergency, disaster and conflict zones.⁷ The category ‘building of the year’ was won by the Jubilee Library of Brighton, designed by Bennetts Associates and Lomax Casidy Edwards, for its ecological approach: rather than focusing on the ‘carbon neutral’ tag in terms of construction, the designers aimed to reduce the running costs of the building in order to use a third to a half less energy than a conventional public building.⁸ The category entitled ‘DIY project of the year’ was awardee to the 73-year-old Averil Stedford who sold her old and ‘wasteful’ house, bought a smaller one and had the knowledge

⁷ "And the Winners Are...", p. 15.

⁸ Ibid., p. 17. Note also Andrew Ballantyne's radical comment that most of the masterpieces of world architecture are neither sustainable nor cheap. "If we look at this story from the point of view of sustainability, then what we see is a story of one reckless extravagance after the another, and it will look like a catalogue of awful warnings, not of fine examples to emulate." Andrew Ballantyne, "Architectures in Plural," in *Architectures, Modernism and After*, ed. Andrew Ballantyne, Malden, Oxford & Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 1-32, p. 14. See also in the same volume: Robert and Brenda Vale, "Steps toward a Sustainable Architecture," in *Architectures, Modernism and After*, ed. Andrew Ballantyne, Malden, Oxford & Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 101-117. Moreover, Adam Sharr discusses the issue of sustainability in architecture through the example of Heidegger's hut in Todtnauberg: Adam Sharr, *Heidegger's Hut*, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press, 2006, p. 111.

to demand eco refits that her architect found “a challenge to keep up.”⁹ Moreover, in an earlier article the same newspaper, in answer to the question ‘how to make a difference,’ suggested that ‘adapting your home’ deserved an ‘Ethical Rating’ of 5/5.¹⁰ These examples show the most popular view of Ethics in relation to architecture that connects it with the pop-words ‘green,’ ‘eco,’ and ‘humanitarian NGOs’.

The other popular understanding of Ethics in architecture, focuses on the duties and responsibilities of architecture as profession and consequently on the *Professional Ethics* of the architects (Figure 2, right, illustrates 2004 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct established by the American Institute of Architects). In order to define the rights and the duties of architecture, codes of practice are constituted. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations construct Canons, Rules of Conduct and Ethical Standards¹¹ in order to formalise an ethical behaviour within the profession. Such codes require their members to be “...dedicated to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and competence. This Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct states the guidelines for the conduct of the Members in fulfilling those obligations.”¹² This kind of formalisation, even though it forms a law itself, is beyond the laws that prescribe a building’s technical details, regulations about the fire escapes, or the minimum standards of a corridor. ‘Professional Ethics’ try to define an Ethically ‘good’ or ‘right’ way of practising architecture – as opposed to a ‘bad’ or a ‘wrong’ one – by describing the responsibilities and the obligations that the architect has to the public, the clients, the profession and architectural colleagues.¹³ Principles like “honesty, integrity and competency, as well as concern for others and for the environment”¹⁴ are expected to form the values for ‘good’ practice.

⁹ "And the Winners Are...", p. 15.

¹⁰ Lucy Siegle, "How You Can Make a Difference," *The Observer*, 05. 03. 2006, pp. 24-25.

¹¹ The American Institute of Architects (AIA), *2004 Code of Ethics & Professional Conduct*, 2004. Available from: <http://www.aia.org/SiteObjects/files/codeofethics.pdf> [Accessed 19. 06. 2005].

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), *Code of Professional Conduct*, 2005. Available from: http://www.riba.org/fileLibrary/pdf/code_of_prof_conduct.pdf [Accessed 19. 06. 2005].

.1.3 The theme of Ethics in modern architecture

Beyond the above mentioned two popular notions of Ethics and architecture, there is another notion of Ethics that is shared especially amongst architects. This has to do with an understanding of clarity, honesty, truthfulness etc as it has been known to be promoted by modern architecture. It appears to be common knowledge nowadays that architects during modernism were consciously and deliberately choosing to invest in the concept of functionality (as opposed to other concepts of historicism, eclecticism, ornament) by loading the term with Ethical value. Their buildings were not just ‘different’, compared to those of previous periods, they were ‘better’ because they were ‘true,’ having disposed the ornamental ‘crimes’¹⁵ of the past.



Figure 3: Horizontal Column Section, Mies van der Rohe's *German Pavilion*, Barcelona¹⁶

¹⁵ Adolf Loos, "Ornament and Crime," in *Crime and Ornament: The Arts and Popular Culture in the Shadow of Adolf Loos*, ed. B. & Ward Miller, M., Toronto: YYZ Books, 1908 (2002).

¹⁶ 1929. Ink and dot pattern on illustration board, 20 x 30" (50.8 x 76.2 cm). Mies van der Rohe Archive. © 2009 Artists Rights Society, New York / VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn
<https://www.moma.org/collection/browse_results.php?object_id=782> [Accessed 02. 05. 2009]

Modern architecture distanced itself from any decoration that was the fundamental basis of different styles. “The contemporary [modern] movement is not a style...”¹⁷ proclaimed Sigfried Giedion, because ‘style’ opens the door to formalism. Mies Van der Rohe was setting the base of his functionalism on exactly this ground, by saying that “[w]e refuse to recognise problems of form but only problems of building.”¹⁸ Another aspect of associating Ethics with architecture was proposed by Le Corbusier’s purism who was arguing that “the House Machine ... [is] healthy (and morally so too).”¹⁹ Another aspect of modernism associated with Ethics was been described by a social call for providing decent housing and public facilities to everyone.

It is beyond the scopes of this introduction to go into further details, but it is important to note that the above sets of ideas that relate Ethics with architecture are deeply rooted in the history of architecture. A key point to understand this relationship has been the shift of paradigms from the Medieval to Renaissance architecture. Arguably, almost every historical movement that tried to challenge established orthodoxies has gone back to revisit the meaning of this shift. Maybe the most obvious example being the way that Ruskin conceptualized romantically ‘The Nature of the Gothic’ both as outward form and as the character of the builders.²⁰ What is important for this thesis is the connection of such appropriations of Ethics with architectural education. For example one can also note the chain of influences that John Ruskin’s thought caused to William Morris’ challenging the industrial production and the division of labour and Lethaby’s establishment of schools of ‘practical architecture’ like the Central School of Arts and Crafts.²¹ One can also see

¹⁷ Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture*, 5th ed, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. xxxiii. Quoted in: David Watkin, *Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and the Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 13-14.

¹⁸ P.C. Johnson, *Mies Van Der Rohe*, 2nd ed, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1953, p. pp. 188-189. Quoted in: Watkin, *Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and the Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement*, p. 37.

¹⁹ Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*, translated by Frederick Etchells, London: Architectural Press, 1946, p. 13. Quoted in: Watkin, *Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and the Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement*, p. 38.

²⁰ Mark Swenarton, *Artisans and Architects : The Ruskinian Tradition in Architectural Thought*, Basingstoke & London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1989, p. 30.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

the continuation of this influence, through Muthesious, to Gropius and the establishment of Bauhaus, the paradigmatic school of modern architecture for having touched the fundamentals of doing and making.²² Finally, I would like to emphasise a quote by the memories of a young student of late modernism:

There was furious debate as to the validity of the modern movement, tempers were heated and discussion was intense. Some staff resigned and a few students went off to other schools; at any rate I was left with a deep conviction of the *moral rightness of the new architecture*.²³

This young student was James Stirling, an architect who, despite his strong moral convictions, did cross the boundary between modernism and postmodernism.²⁴ As we are going to see further on the basis of modernism's moral sureness is no longer sitting on a firm ground and "[u]ncertainty has spilled over into our schools of architecture."²⁵

From all the above, one can see that the previous popular views show a rising awareness of very important aspects of Ethics across the wider public; and an existing theme in the recent history of architecture. Nevertheless, here, I would like to argue that all the above notions constitute only a partial view of the subject as it has been dealt with in philosophy and as it will be explored here. For this, while asking from the reader to utilise a pre-understanding of Ethics, I also invite her or him to be ready to move beyond the popular views sketched here.

²² Andrew Saint, *The Image of the Architect*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983.

²³ James Frazer Stirling, *James Stirling : Buildings & Projects, 1950-1974*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1975, p. 14. Quoted in: Watkin, *Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and the Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement*, p. x.

²⁴ Note that interestingly, both modernism and postmodernism have accused each other on moral grounds. For example Giedion has early enough described postmodernism as "a kind of playboy-architecture...: an architecture treated as playboys treat life, jumping from one sensation to another and quickly bored with everything." Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture*, p. xxxii. Quoted in: Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, p. 6. On the other hand a summary of the postmodern critique on modernism is offered in Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 8.

²⁵ Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 10.

.1.4 Asking the question again (once more, with feeling)²⁶

A *thesis* is an affirmation, not a question. It is common that a pro-thesis should reflect the affirmative assurance of a thesis to come. The *prothesis* of this thesis, though, starts with a doubtful query that persists: ‘*is it possible for Ethics to be taught in schools of architecture?*’ The thesis is the decisive stamping down of the foot or the lowering of the hand in the beating time of the prosody, referring to a stressing (of a note or a word).²⁷ The prothesis then accordingly should indicate the firm downwards gesture-to-come that designates the closing of the subject. Indicating intention, prothesis should show devotion and dedication to the thesis, predicting the end.

Nevertheless, the prothesis declared here – a question! – is rather an *arsis*. It is an upward gesture opening things up; making them public.²⁸ It is the raising of the voice in higher pitch (almost a cacophony in order to be noticed). Prothesis as a question is disturbing and revealing; especially when it comes unexpected and disruptive. *Arsis* sounds light, but it is also strong and sturdy –an oppositional antistixis, a contra-tempo. Raising a question means also the responsibility of carrying a load, which in terms of Ethics can be a heavy one. The prothesis posited here: ‘can Ethics be taught in Architecture?’ sounds plain, almost naïve. But it aims to produce a gut feeling, to leave one wondering; open the appetite.

The origin of the persistent uncertainty is an *antithesis* that seems to stop the research before it can even start. This antithesis argues for the ineffability and impossibility of teaching Ethics not just in the narrow field of architecture, but also in the vast field of philosophy. Two major philosophers, Plato and Wittgenstein, covering the span of

²⁶ ‘Once more with feeling’ was the title of a popular album by Placebo, released in 2004. Nevertheless here I rather refer to the repertoire of cunning tactics of *metis* in educational contexts: Mark Dorrian and Adrian Hawker, *Metis: Urban Cartographies*, London: Black Dog Pub, 2002, p. 11.

²⁷ thesis, Oxford English Dictionary Online, Second Edition 1989

²⁸ prothesis: The action of placing before or in public. In Greek Orthodox Church prothesis is the placing of the elements and other necessities in readiness for use. Oxford English Dictionary Online, Draft Version 2007, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50190756?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=prothesis&first=1&max_to_show=10 [Accessed 10. 02. 2008]

Western philosophy,²⁹ stop this research before it can even begin! That said, the prothesis has an intention; here, that intention is to give a positive answer to the above question. Like having an itch on the feet, the prothesis does not allow the feet to stay down on the ground; a characteristic of the thesis. By raising the question, the prothesis asks restlessly: is it really not possible? if not, why? and if yes, under which terms? In any case, the prothesis is not a substitute for the thesis; the thesis will come. It just opens the way, raises interest, provokes the reader, prompting her or him to think for themselves. It is a welcoming gesture to join the investigation.

In the following sections, this introduction presents successively Plato's and Wittgenstein's arguments that Ethics cannot be taught, and also establishes the connection between the two philosophers. It then visits the existing scholarship of architecture and Ethics to see how the question of this prothesis has been dealt with so far. This way it draws a map of the various responses and demonstrates at the same time a gap in the field. Finally, this introduction comes to present the hypothesis that this thesis defends: inhabiting a notion of Ethics that lies in the habits, the customs and the dispositions of everyday life.

²⁹ The arguments of Plato and Wittgenstein concerning the ineffability and impossibility of Education of Ethics are *not* unique in the history of philosophy worldwide. It is only possible here to touch on one further case, from a non-Western context, that arguably is closely comparable to the impossibility of expressing Ethics. Lao Tzu's opening line of his famous *Tao Te Ching* states the ineffability of the *Way*: "The Way that can be told of is not an unvarying way" Arthur Waley, *The Way and Its Power, a Study of the Tao Te Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought*, New York: Grove Press, Inc, 1958, p. 141. Note also that arguably, the ineffability does not refer only to the naming, but points also towards the practice of walking the way since, "[t]here is no constant (correct) way to interpret that practice/dao into action." Chad Hansen, *Taoism*, 2003. Available from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/> [Accessed 21. 02 2006]. This becomes apparent in the translation as the "[d]ao that can be dao-ed is not constant dao." Hansen, *Taoism*.

.2 Anti-thesis: the impossibility of the education of Ethics in philosophy (Plato and Wittgenstein)

.2.1 Plato's *Meno* (and *Protagoras*)

Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?

Socrates: ...If then you want to ask one of us [the Athenians] that sort of question, everyone will laugh and say: "Good stranger, you must think me happy indeed if you think I know whether virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any knowledge what virtue itself is."³⁰

These are the abrupt³¹ opening lines of the Platonic dialogue *Meno*, where Meno,³² a young aristocrat from Thessaly who visits Athens,³³ asks Socrates about the way of acquiring virtue. The *Meno* is one of the early dialogues in Plato's oeuvre and arguably the last of this period.³⁴ Written soon after Plato's first visit in Sicily, a possible date for its composition may be during or just after 385 BC.³⁵ This question was not new in antiquity,³⁶ and one way to understand what it should mean for the Ancient Greeks is summarised nicely by Alexander Nehamas: "Can one be taught what it takes to have a justifiably high reputation among one's peers?"³⁷

There is evidence to suggest that the *Meno* made a great impression even in the Antiquity, contributing greatly to a wider discourse about virtue.³⁸ In brief, the

³⁰ Plato, "Meno," in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. M. John Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, 870-897, 70a, p. 871.

³¹ R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Meno*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 199.

³² Note that, from now on, 'the *Meno*' in italics will refer to Plato's dialogue, while 'Meno' without italics will refer to the historical or fictional person.

³³ We know that Meno later offered his services to Cyrus in his attempt to gain the Persian throne and for this he was executed by the Persian king in 400 BC.

³⁴ Jane Mary Day, ed., *Plato's Meno in Focus* New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 9 & 11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁶ Alexander Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, ed. Jane Mary Day, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 222 and Bluck, *Plato's Meno*, p. 1.

³⁷ Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," p. 223.

³⁸ Reuter suggest the following connections with other works of the antiquity that form the wider context: cf. Isoc. *C. soph.* 14-18.21; *De permut.* 186-192,274-275; Alcidas *Soph.* 3-4; Democritus, DK 68 B33, B56, B183, B242; Critias, DK 88 B9; Xen. *Mem.* 3.9, 1-3; Arist. *Eth.*

dialogue starts with the opening lines above, where Meno asks about the acquisition of virtue and Socrates admits complete ignorance about virtue. Socrates asks Meno to define virtue (according to his teacher Gorgias) and with a series of contradictions he leads him to *aporia*. Meno then wonders how is it possible to look for something that one does not know, since even if it is found it cannot be recognised (this is known as ‘Meno’s paradox’). Socrates responds with a theory that knowledge is the recollection of immortal truths, which people come to know before their birth. He then demonstrates an example by using one of Meno’s young slaves to prove a geometrical problem. Meno then returns back restating his original question about whether virtue can be taught, and Socrates continues by using a method borrowed from geometry, that of hypothesis. In doing so he assumes that virtue is good and a kind of knowledge, which then means that it is teachable. Socrates proves this, but he also points out that there must be something wrong with this syllogism (for this reason, a new person is introduced: Anytus who becomes Socrates interlocutor for this part): Socrates posits that if something is teachable then there should be teachers and students of it, but there are no teachers of virtue and therefore virtue cannot be taught. The dialogue then leads to the conclusion that virtue is not knowledge, but ‘true belief’, which cannot be taught, but comes through divine intervention. Finally, Socrates points out that they still have not given an adequate definition for his original question of ‘what is virtue?’ and for this reason they cannot be sure about the right answer to Meno’s question.

Plato wrote another dialogue,³⁹ the *Protagoras*, which is generally admitted to be earlier⁴⁰ than the *Meno*, but deals with the same question. There, Socrates came to discuss with the famous sophist about whether virtue is teachable, with Socrates initially taking the negative stance, while Protagoras argued for a positive one. The

Nic. 1.9, 1099b9-11; 2.1, 1103a23-26; 10.9, 1179b20-31; *Pol.* 7.13, 1332a38-40; ps.-Plato *De virtute*. Mark Reuter, "Is Goodness Really a Gift from God? Another Look at the Conclusion of Plato's "Meno"," *Phoenix*, 55, no. 1/2, 2001: 77-97, pp. 79-80..

³⁹ *Acibiades I*, *Euthydemus*, and *Laches* also deal with similar topics. Dominic Scott, *Plato's Meno*, Edited by Mary Margaret McCabe, Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato, Cambridge, et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 15. About Protagoras scepticism see also David Carr, "Cross Questions and Crooked Answers: Contemporary Problems of Moral Education," in *Education in Morality*, ed. Mark J. Halstead and Terence H. McLaughlin, London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999, 24-43, p. 26.

⁴⁰ Bluck, *Plato's Meno*, p. 110.

end of the dialogue found the two philosophers having changed their standpoints, each of them holding the opposite stance he had held in the beginning. The *Protagoras* also concludes by suggesting that before answering whether virtue can be taught, virtue should first be defined, which is the starting point of *Meno* (erroneously, it is the final point as well).⁴¹ *Protagoras* and *Meno*, in contrast to other earlier dialogues that deal with the virtues separately, share a common view of virtue as being one thing.⁴² Despite these similarities, I choose to focus on *Meno* because of the transitional⁴³ place that it holds in the development of Plato's oeuvre between his early and his later thought.⁴⁴ More specifically, in this dialogue – possibly for the first time⁴⁵ – there appears a primitive version of the theory of forms. This theory is developed later on, in the dialogues of *Phaedo*, *Symposium* and mainly the *Republic*, distinguishing between the world of ideas and the world of appearances and claims that knowledge cannot come from the senses.⁴⁶ But at the same time, *Meno* does not exclude knowledge that comes from the perceptible world.⁴⁷ *Protagoras*, although even less metaphysical, is the very first attempt to deal with the question of the acquisition of virtue, and for this reason it can appear to be premature or even as a failure⁴⁸ to solve problems initiated by Socrates, before Plato. Furthermore, as Gregory Vlastos notes, the passing from the first Elenctic dialogues to the Transitional, opens out the theme of Plato's enquiries from moral philosophy,

⁴¹ "The *Meno*, inherits from *Protagoras* the Socratic argument for the unteachability of virtue." Gilbert Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 201.

⁴² Day, ed., *Plato's Meno in Focus*, p. 10.

⁴³ According to a number of developmentalists philosophers, *Meno* is 'the' transitional dialogue. Scott, *Plato's Meno*, p. 6. See also Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Cambridge, et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 46-47. Moreover Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, Second ed, London: Routledge, 1998/ 1967, p. 26.

⁴⁴ For more on the difference between *Meno* and *Protagoras* see Robert Sternfeld and Harold Zyskind, *Plato's Meno, a Philosophy of Man as Acquisitive*, Edited by George Kimball Plochmann, Philosophical Explorations, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978, p. 22.

⁴⁵ If we accept Day's chronology of Plato's dialogues. See Day, ed., *Plato's Meno in Focus*, p. 9. See also Terence Henry Irwin, "Theories of Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues," Thesis for the PhD Supervised by: Gregory Vlastos, Princeton University, 1973, p. 8.

⁴⁶ Day, ed., *Plato's Meno in Focus*, p. 11.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Irwin, "Theories of Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues," p. 327. Generally Irwin presents Plato as writing against Socrates and not against *Meno* or the Sophists. See for example his views on the *Meno's* Paradox in p. 352. See also Scott, *Plato's Meno*, p. 7.

to a vista that took in “the whole encyclopaedia of philosophical science.”⁴⁹ Moreover, the *Meno* is a turning point in Plato’s method of inquiry that moves,⁵⁰ in this dialogue, from the Socratic *elenchus* (negative refutation), to a dialectic (a more “evenly open-minded”⁵¹ approach of philosophy), and from a ‘destructive’ to a ‘constructive’ way of thinking.⁵² The destructive character of the early Platonic treatises is justified by Gilbert Ryle through their genealogy from the *eristic* matches (dialogical quarrels), whose objective was not the solution of a problem, but the demolition of the thesis, thus bringing the interlocutor into *aporia*.⁵³ The transitional status of *Meno*, brings this impasse forth, since Socrates *duly*⁵⁴ demolishes Meno’s arguments, but at the same time does not have satisfactory answers himself. The theory of recollection appears for the first time in *Meno*, as Plato’s attempt to find a way out of an *impasse*.⁵⁵ In the flow of the dialogue, Meno offers three definitions of virtue, which should be borne in mind during the following discussions:

1. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe; she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of the child, whether male or female, is different again, as it is of a slave. And there are many other virtues, so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us...⁵⁶ 71e-72
2. ...to be able to rule over people, if you are seeking for one description to fit them all.⁵⁷ 73d
3. ...virtue is, as the poet says, ‘to find joy in beautiful things and have power.’⁵⁸ 77b

⁴⁹ Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, p. 48. See also Blumenberg’s comment that Socrates was the first to distinguish the human/ethical from the cosmological/theological themes. Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, Cambridge, Mass & London: The MIT Press, 1983, p. 246.

⁵⁰ Irwin, "Theories of Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues," p. 9.

⁵¹ John E. Thomas, *Musings on the Meno*. Vol. I, Marinus Nijhoff Classical Philosophy Library, The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980, p. 11.

⁵² R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 122.

⁵³ “For them a good argument is a knock-down one.” Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, p. 202.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁵⁶ Plato, "Meno," p. 872.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 873.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 877.

In the original text, for what is usually translated as ‘virtue,’ Plato uses the term *aretē*. *Aretē* is a very broad term in ancient Greek language that goes beyond human qualities, referring also to animals, as well as objects (such as a knife, or soil).⁵⁹ Sometime *aretē* is also translated by the vague⁶⁰ term ‘excellence’⁶¹ (whenever a being excels at the work that is constituted by nature),⁶² but in the context of *Meno*, the term is used to refer to the “qualities most to be valued in human beings.”⁶³ *Aretē* seems to derive either from *Ares* the god of war, or from the verb *arariskein*,⁶⁴ which means to ‘fit together’ and generally refers to a notion of properness. The definition of *aretē*, in this instance, is not a marginal issue, since Socrates’ immediate response to Meno’s question is that he does not know whether virtue can be taught or not, because he admits that he does “not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is.”⁶⁵ Being aware that this is a highly controversial issue,⁶⁶ and keeping in mind that earlier views from the sophists referred to virtue not only as moral qualities,⁶⁷ I will focus on the connection between *aretē* and Ethics.

First of all, a justification for this connection is made by some scholars who translate *aretē* directly as ‘goodness,’ making in this way an explicit connection to Ethics.⁶⁸ Moreover, Vlastos mentions that Socrates was using a rather narrow moral construction of *aretē*, that although was innovative it was not eccentric, since it was based upon popular usage of the term.⁶⁹ In this very direction, Socrates asks from Meno to give *one* unitary definition of virtue,⁷⁰ instead of an account of the virtues for men, women, young and elderly that Meno firstly attempts to provide. Some

⁵⁹ George Anastaplo and Laurence Berns, *Plato's Meno*, Edited by Albert Klein Whitaker, The Focus Philosophical Library, Newburyport: R. Pullinds Co., 2004, p. 47.

⁶⁰ Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," p. 223.

⁶¹ For example R. W. Sharples, *Plato: Meno*, Warminster, Chicago: Aris and Phillips Ltd. & Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, p. 4.

⁶² Anastaplo and Berns, *Plato's Meno*, p. 47.

⁶³ Day, ed., *Plato's Meno in Focus*, p. 18.

⁶⁴ Anastaplo and Berns, *Plato's Meno*, p. 47.

⁶⁵ Plato, "Meno," 71a p. 871.

⁶⁶ See for example the discussion of the chapter “Happiness and Virtue in Socrates’ Moral Theory” in Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, p. 200.

⁶⁷ For example in the *Protagoras* 319-23 Plato mentions political effectiveness as part of virtue.

⁶⁸ Reuter, "Is Goodness Really a Gift from God? Another Look at the Conclusion of Plato's "Meno"."

⁶⁹ Vlastos mentions also the term *more Socratico*. See footnote 6 in Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, pp. 200-201.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

scholars also emphasise the distinction between the overall moral part of the inquiry of the dialogue and the mathematical one, in the incident with the slave boy. However, Julia Annas argues that virtue is not just one more good amongst the variety of others, “but a good which makes an *unconditional demand*.”⁷¹ Another important issue for the definition of *aretē* is that it is not something that one has once and for all. According to Kathleen Wilkes, *aretē* when translated as excellence goes beyond the resting on one’s ‘moral laurels,’ to a thirst for attaining new ones. “*Aretē* is not only a product, it is also a process of inquiry.”⁷² This process of inquiry as a dialectical elenchus has been also emphasised,⁷³ and it has been even suggested that “elenchus takes the place of teaching, *when teaching is an impossibility*.”⁷⁴

Another argument for associating *aretē* with Ethics has to do with the paradox presented in the *Meno* and especially at the point when Socrates comes to argue that “No man desires evil, all men desire good.”⁷⁵ Through the dipole of good and evil, it becomes prominent that the Ethical decision making regarding virtue, and also that the core of the paradox is that one can desire something that is actually bad only “in the mistaken belief that the thing is good”.⁷⁶ Moreover, Crombie argues that the problem of the definition of virtue is actually the basis of “the distinction between the good life and the bad, with a view to the identification of the former,”⁷⁷ later mentioning that “Socrates and Meno take for granted that *aretē* is a matter of living well.”⁷⁸

⁷¹ Julia Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*, Edited by Frederick M. Ahl et. al. Vol. LVII, Cornell Studies in Classical Philosophy, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 35 [emphasis added]. This demand for the good in some dialogues like *Crito* becomes deontological, from which one cannot escape but obey. More about Socrates Ethics and Plato’s metaphysics in: Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*, p. 98.

⁷² Kathleen V. Wilkes, "Conclusions in the *Meno*," in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, ed. Jane Mary Day, New York: Routledge, 1994, 208-220, p. 216.

⁷³ Sternfeld and Zyskind, *Plato's Meno, a Philosophy of Man as Acquisitive*, p. 33 & 108. See also Norman Gulley, "Ethical Analysis in Plato's Earlier Dialogues," *The Classical Quarterly*, 2, no. 1/2, 1952: 74-82, p. 78 & 81.

⁷⁴ Roslyn Weiss, *Virtue in the Cave, Moral Inquiry in Plato's Meno*, Oxford et. al.: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 7. [emphasis added].

⁷⁵ George Nakhnikian, "The First Socratic Paradox," in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, ed. Jane Mary Day, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 129.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁷⁷ I. M. Crombie, "Socratic Definition," in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, ed. Jane Mary Day, New York: Routledge, 1994, 172-207, p. 176.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

A different argument that shows the Ethical standpoint of the dialogue arises from the choice of the persons involved in the dialogue. Meno, as it is historically recorded, became notorious for cooperating with the Persians (*meidism*) and betraying his fellow patriots,⁷⁹ while Anytus (an extremely conventional, democratic and anti-intellectual⁸⁰ politician) was the very person who later accused Socrates of corruption of the youth and prosecuted him in the trial that cost Socrates his life. By using these persons, notorious amongst the Ancient Greeks for their immorality, Plato was giving a vivid example of Ethics, thus revealing the mundane side of key political persons and their *becoming* towards what they came to be notorious for. The same attitude is also prominent in *Protagoras*, where the topic is, as we saw, exactly the same. In that dialogue there are nineteen participants, all enthusiastic followers of the famous sophist, but again, according to David Wolfsdorf, they are all notorious for spending their fortunes, and suffering from either death, exile or confiscation of property because of antisocial behaviour. This *de facto* undermines and is a great contrast with Protagoras' claim that he can teach *aretē*.⁸¹ In the case of the *Meno*, the only person that is not accountable for his Ethical stance is, erroneously, Meno's slaveboy. In this sense, the person in the worst position of all (note that the slave for the Ancient Greeks was almost non-human) and definitely completely uneducated,⁸² appears to be more helpful for the dialogue and more able to learn than the free, noble, but at the same time arrogant and corrupted men.

Despite these arguments that prove the connection between *aretē* and Ethics, there are scholars who challenge various aspects of the dialogue, arguing, for example, that neither the *Meno* nor the previous Platonic dialogues provide a proper definition of *aretē*.⁸³ Crombie further suggests that "... we ought to see that there is no real argument in the dialogue for the proposition that virtue cannot be taught, and that such argument as there is rests on the misidentification of teaching with laying down

⁷⁹ Bluck, *Plato's Meno*, pp. 121-124.

⁸⁰ Scott, *Plato's Meno*, p. 169.

⁸¹ David Wolfsdorf, "The Historical Reader of Plato's Protagoras," *The Classical Quarterly*, 48, no. 1, 1998: 126-133, p. 130.

⁸² Bluck, *Plato's Meno*, p. 128.

⁸³ Charles H. Giblin, "Meno's Fundamental Weakness," *The Classical Journal*, 48, no. 6, 1953: 201-207, p. 207.

the law, of the like.”⁸⁴ Moreover, the relationship of *aretē* with Ethics becomes somewhat problematic in 87d3 when Socrates makes the hypothesis that *aretē* is *agathon* (good), which seems to be a tautology.⁸⁵ Additionally, the conclusions of the *Meno* have been challenged in one sense or another by scholars. Wilkes for example finds the conclusions self-referential or self-reflecting, since they return to the theory of recollection redirecting knowledge, teaching and learning to reminding and remembering. Moreover she goes as far as seeing some passages (87c-89c) as actually proving that *aretē* is teachable and that Socrates purposefully leaves Meno in doubt in order to make him think further and contemplate virtue as a quest rather than a destination. Terence Irwin also challenges the serious foundation of the argument that if anything is teachable then there are teachers of it,⁸⁶ as it is presented to undermine the previous argument that virtue is knowledge.⁸⁷

But even if the above claims are correct, one can still ask ‘what is the role of Socrates if *aretē* cannot be taught?’ It is critical to note that Socrates never claimed to be a teacher of any kind, especially of virtue.⁸⁸ At every possible turn he explicitly distanced himself from the Sophists, who considered themselves professional teachers (and charged exorbitantly for their classes). On the other hand, Socrates warned all the people that came to him about the possible harm that the sophists could cause to them.⁸⁹ Nehamas puts it this way: “For practical and ethical reasons, Socrates had never wanted to tell his students (for students he certainly wanted, and had no less than any of the distinguished Sophists) anything about the subject which they wanted to learn from him.”⁹⁰ And then again, what is the role of Plato? Here, it is crucial to distinguish the early from the later Plato, and to emphasise again the transitional character of *Meno*. It is rather widely acknowledged that Plato, in his early dialogues, refrains from taking an explicit position, having Socrates argue only

⁸⁴ Crombie, "Socratic Definition," p. 198.

⁸⁵ Wilkes, "Conclusions in the *Meno*," p. 208.

⁸⁶ Wilkes makes a similar argument: "...the ‘irrelevant argument from the absence of (orthodox) teachers and learners of *aretē* does in fact provide a sensible answer –an answer that Plato probably thought valid- to the question of the teachability of *aretē* as Meno intended it: *aretē* cannot be taught by orthodox means." Ibid., p. 215.

⁸⁷ Irwin, "Theories of Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues," p. 369.

⁸⁸ Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," p. 232.

⁸⁹ See for example the way that Socrates warns Hippocrates in *Protagoras* (313c4-5).

⁹⁰ Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," p. 244.

from the claims of the interlocutor,⁹¹ and for this reason the early dialogues have sometimes been accused of not being productive enough, or of not providing a real suggestion of how things should be. According to Irwin, in terms of Ethics this means that Plato did not believe that the final good is pre-known and defines the scope of morality, as Socrates did.⁹² Although this appears to be a non-productive attitude, philosophically it is more interesting for the scope of this study, particularly because it is based upon the dialectic as *method* of enquiry⁹³ and because it avoids the metaphysical system that Plato established later on (of which the theory of recollection is only the first step), by transforming the mystery of Socrates to his mysticism.⁹⁴

In the latest study on the topic, Christina Ionescu interprets the dialogue by suggesting first of all that there emerges an overall positive message wherein virtue is wisdom or some sort of knowledge.⁹⁵ Secondly, she suggests that the answer to the original question posited by Meno should be that the acquisition of virtue requires a combination of all three factors: teaching, nature and practice.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, on this point, I prefer to take the opposite stance, as is expressed by Roslyn Weiss: she takes a rather more murky⁹⁷ view of moral enquiry, concluding that *virtue is not knowledge and that it cannot be taught*. Keeping in mind the previous analysis and the (sometimes conflicting) commentary of various scholars, I propose the above

⁹¹ Julia Annas, "Ethics and Argument in Plato's Socrates," in *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*, ed. Burkhard Reis, Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 32-46, p. 33.

⁹² Irwin, "Theories of Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues," p. 32 & 323.

⁹³ Mary Margaret McCabe, "The Virtue of Philosophical Conversation," in *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*, ed. Burkhard Reis, Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 70-98, p. 75.

⁹⁴ Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," p. 245.

⁹⁵ Christina Ionescu, *Plato's Meno, an Interpretation*, Lanham, et. al.: Lexington Books, 2007, p. 153.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 154. Note that despite the fact that I find Weiss' view more thought provoking, I am sceptical of the title of her book that suggests that virtue exists in a cave, especially because of the illusive promise of what is above the cave (as it appears in the famous Allegory of the Cave in the seventh book of the *Republic*). On the contrary, the murkiness of moral enquiry allows us to imagine a constantly murky place (for example Edinburgh in Scotland), without the refuge of a dialectic opposite, and thus the false promise of enlightenment (note that Edinburgh during that time was called the Athens of the North). Note also Ballantyne's comment in: Andrew Ballantyne, "Architecture as Evidence," in *Rethinking Architectural Historiography*, ed. Dana Arnold, Elvan Altan Ergut, and Belgin Turan Oskaya, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Book, 2006, 36-49, p. 42.

⁹⁷ Weiss, *Virtue in the Cave, Moral Inquiry in Plato's Meno*, p. 6.

statement as a hypothesis that pushes Socrates' scepticism to the limits.⁹⁸ In favour of this hypothesis, stands Plato's 'childlike' or 'less serious' argument that, even today, there are no teachers of virtue, and that if some of the later philosophers had given a different definitive answer, we would have all stopped our inquiries on the topic. On the contrary, today we are all still teacherless students looking in vain for instruction about Ethics. Furthermore, another philosopher came to argue in favour of this hypothesis. Ludwig Wittgenstein writing in the twentieth century took a stance, not very different from Plato, as will now be discussed.

.2.2 Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

Approximately two thousand three hundred and three years after⁹⁹ the *Meno* was written,¹⁰⁰ Ludwig Wittgenstein, in a prisoner of war camp in Italy during the last year of the First World War, was finishing a philosophical essay that was later given the title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The reason for my interest in this logico-philosophical treatise is the following five sentences/propositions that I would like to see in juxtaposition with the concluding argument presented in the *Meno* that virtue is not knowledge and that it cannot be taught.

- 6.42 Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.
- 6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.)
- 6.44 Not *how* the world is, is the mystical, but *that* it is.
- 6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible. This *shows* itself; it is the mystical.
- 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Before attempting a thorough justification for connecting *Meno* with the *Tractatus*, I will briefly discuss the theme of *Tractatus*, as well as its connection to Ethics. The

⁹⁸ "The *Meno* postpones moral knowledge to the indefinite future..." Ibid., p. 4.

⁹⁹ In a letter to Russell, written by August of 1918, Wittgenstein was announcing the completion of a book "that had solved our problems finally." G. H. von Wright, ed., *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, no. 35. as quoted in: James C. Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life*, Tampa: University Presses of Florida, 1982, p. 24.

¹⁰⁰ There is no need to mention how great the risk the author runs in comparing two philosophical works that are so distant from each other (chronologically, stylistically, and, in one way even philosophically). Nevertheless, if one decides to sin, it should be done boldly.

Tractatus is an unusual treatise that consists of a series of numbered¹⁰¹ propositions (many of which include complicated formal logic) which are structured around seven fundamental sentences: “1- The world is everything that is the case. 2-What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. 3-The logical picture of the facts is the thought. 4-The thought is the significant proposition. 5-Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.) 6-The general form of truth-function is: $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$. This is the general form of proposition.” And it concludes with the enigmatic: “7-Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”¹⁰² This account, which has been described as “a synthesis of the theory of truth-functions and the idea that language is a picture of reality,”¹⁰³ presents a logical (in its apotheosis)¹⁰⁴ theory of meaning, as representation. Wittgenstein argues that every proposition can be analysed into elementary ‘atomic facts,’ which are ‘pictured’ by these propositions (and language in general).¹⁰⁵ This ‘picture theory’¹⁰⁶ by seeking the “necessary conditions for something’s being a proposition,”¹⁰⁷ aligns itself with the Western philosophical tradition that sees rational knowledge as some sort of representation (*rationality-as-representation*)¹⁰⁸ that arguably has its starting point in the *Meno*¹⁰⁹ (more about this connection later).

¹⁰¹ “The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions...” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, p. 5.

¹⁰² The translations, unless otherwise mentioned are taken from the first English edition: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, London, New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD., 1922, [emphasis in the original].

¹⁰³ G.H. von Wright in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 205.

¹⁰⁵ Cahal. B. Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, Blackrock: Four Courts Press, 1996, pp. 200-201.

¹⁰⁶ John Lee, "Similarity and Depiction," proceedings from the conference: *Interdisciplinary Workshop on Similarity and Categorisation (SimCat97)*, Edinburgh, 1997, <http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/jlee/mac-john/SimCat/SimCat.html> [accessed 04. 07. 2008].

¹⁰⁷ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ A term coined by Edwards. *Ibid.*, p. 19. Note also the problem of this view: the thinker becomes the seeing eye, which like a camera represents things as they are. But the subject then attempts to “transcend its own perspective, to become the limit of the world, not a part of it.” Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 22. This problematic leads to solipsism: “I am the world’s necessary limit” Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁹ “The Socratic-Platonic answer to the question of human being stressed our capacity for thinking, conceived as accurate representation of the real: knowledge is (our) virtue; and knowledge is knowledge of universal definition, re-presentations of the eternal Forms of which we here and now

Even before the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein gives an illustration of his view of propositions as pictures, in his notebooks of the period 1914-16. There he drew a sketch that illustrates the basics of his ‘picture theory’ through an example of two pin-men fighting with swords (Figure 4), a situation that very much resembles the case study of martial arts that will be introduced later on.¹¹⁰ Wittgenstein makes the following remarks on this sketch:




Figure 4: Wittgenstein's sketch of two pin-men fighting with swords¹¹¹

If the right-hand figure in this picture represents the man A and left-hand one stands for the man B, then the whole might assert, e.g. ‘A is fencing with B’. The proposition in picture-writing can be true or false. It has a sense independent of its truth or falsehood. It must be possible to demonstrate everything essential by considering this case.

It can be said that, while we are not certain of being able to turn all situations into pictures on paper, still we are certain that we can portray all logical properties of situations in a two-dimensional script.¹¹²

From the two ‘hieroglyphs’¹¹³ we can assert that A and B are indeed fencing, but this assertion may be true or false (for example, they could be teaching each other or performing in the theatre or executing a ritual ceremony or testing their swords etc). Nevertheless, the picture does make – what Wittgenstein calls – ‘sense’ (*Sinn*), exactly because of its true or false *possibility*.¹¹⁴ But at the same time it is not

see only the shadows. Our characteristic excellence is our capacity for such accurate representation and for the kind of action that must (on the Socratic conception) inevitably follow from that knowledge.” Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 20. See also p. 27.

¹¹⁰ See Chapter 2.

¹¹¹ The figure is my re-drawn from the original.

¹¹² Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 7e.

¹¹³ Wittgenstein's term, see *Ibid*.

¹¹⁴ Cyril Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, Oxford & Cambridge Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1991, p. 4.

affected by the fact of whether A and B are actually fencing or not: it makes sense regardless. A later section of the *Tractatus* comes to elucidate this early example in its general form.¹¹⁵ But does this picture theory of language have anything to do with Ethics?

As it will become apparent hereafter, the *whole point* of this logico-philosophical treatise is Ethics and yet the word ‘ethics’ appears only four times in the whole text.¹¹⁶ In defence of this argument, first of all, Wittgenstein himself acknowledged that “the book’s point is an ethical one”¹¹⁷ in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker. There he also revealed a sentence that he ultimately decided not to include in the final version of the published preface: “My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all I have *not* written.”¹¹⁸ The part of the book that has not been written is its metaphysical meaning (expressed throughout Wittgenstein’s life),¹¹⁹ while the part that is written has to do with his criticism of all metaphysical philosophy¹²⁰ as the outcome of a mistake. Metaphysics and Ethics assert that ‘is’ (e.g. “A *is* fencing with B”) represents something, “whereas it only serves to connect things that are represented.”¹²¹ Wittgenstein uses three words to describe *seeming* propositions: ‘meaningless’ (*bedeutungslos*); ‘senseless’ or ‘lacking sense’ (*sinnlos*); and ‘nonsensical’ (*unsinnig*).¹²² Ethics have meaning, but no reference to facts and for this reason they are senseless;¹²³ they try to say what can only be shown. In order to be Ethical, propositions would have to be necessary for everyone, but the only

¹¹⁵ For example, there he says that “a proposition *shows* its sense” [4.022]. See also propositions: 2.131, 2.15, 2.71, 2.151, 2.16-161, 2.21, 2.22 and 2.221. Also see *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹⁶ 6.42, 6.421, 6.422, 6.423.

¹¹⁷ G. H. von Wright, *Wittgenstein's Prototractatus*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, p. 16. The letter is translated by B. McGuiness.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16 [emphasis in the original].

¹¹⁹ There is a long list of incidents in Wittgenstein’s life that show his deep concern with Ethics and religious belief, such as the fact that he donated the biggest part of his inheritance to artists of his time; the fact that his favourite book while he was a soldier (simultaneously finishing the *Tractatus*) was Tolstoy’s *The Gospel in Brief*; the fact that he abandoned professional philosophy to teach low class rural Austrian children; the advice that he often gave to his students to abandon professional philosophy; the fact that during the Second World War he worked in a hospital, etc.

¹²⁰ Also, ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, all non-natural philosophy including the philosophy of logic. See Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. ix.

¹²¹ Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, p. 201.

¹²² Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. 12. Propositions of mathematics and logic are *sinnlos*. Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. 13.

¹²³ Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, p. 202.

necessary propositions are that of logic. Hence, there can be no ethical propositions and every attempt to express Ethics is senseless.¹²⁴ Ethics changes nothing but the attitude with which one views the world. The world is happy or unhappy according to one's attitude or will, which is an 'aesthetic view of Ethics.'¹²⁵ This, according to Cahal Daly, resembles subjectivism; and according to Paul Edwards it resembles solipsism.¹²⁶ For this reason the ethics of the *Tractatus* support a certain acosmic or idealistic metaphysics, which as we will see later on, Wittgenstein came to see as the great error of his early work.¹²⁷

Going back to Wittgenstein's early *Notebook*, the notes preceding the example with the two pin-fighters analysed above were as follows: "Let us think of a hieroglyphic writing in which each word is a representation of what it stands for. Let us think of the fact that actual pictures of situations can be *right* and *wrong*."¹²⁸ In the same sense, within the context of Ethics, if something is good or bad it has nothing to do with the true or false possibility of what *can* or *cannot* happen, but it is all about what *must* happen.¹²⁹ Ethics pertains to will and not to thought as such.¹³⁰ "So in Wittgensteinian terms, if one says that it is false that murder is a good thing to commit, one is not using 'false' in the same sense as when one says that it is false that the Romans captured Hibernia."¹³¹ The first one is nonsense (*unssinning*) and the second is senseless (*sinnlos*), because the Romans *could* have captured it, but they actually did not. Obviously there is a thin line between the nonsense used in the everyday sense of the term and the use of the term by Wittgenstein.¹³² Despite the fact that one can say the most impossible things (e.g. "Cow's green is sweeter than

¹²⁴ Note the eloquent title "Not 'just Gassing'" of Roger Paden's book: Roger Paden, *Mysticism and Architecture: Wittgenstein and the Meanings of the Palais Stonborough*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007, p. 71 & especially p. 95.

¹²⁵ Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, p. 205.

¹²⁶ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 36.

¹²⁷ Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, p. 206.

¹²⁸ But obviously such thing does not make sense. Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, p. 7e, [emphasis added]. See also the correspondence to the proposition 4.016 in the *Tractatus*

¹²⁹ Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. 52.

¹³⁰ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 50.

¹³¹ Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. 20.

¹³² The blurring of this thin line, arguably caused the warm welcome of Wittgenstein's work by the Logical Positivists and the Vienna Circle, that was proved to be wrong *Ibid.*, p. 23 & 26.

the square of the hypotenuse”),¹³³ sentences like this are utterances and for this they are only ‘said.’ Propositions of Ethics (e.g. ‘Thou shall not kill’), on the other hand, are pseudo-propositions, picturing nothing, despite their appearance of depicting something profound.¹³⁴ Since Ethics picture nothing, they lack ‘sense’ and as such they cannot be negated or affirmed: They *cannot be said* and for this reason they must be passed over in silence. Only propositions of natural science can be said (TLP 4.11). In this sense, the moralist is trying to get his audience to *see* what she or he is talking about, in a particular way. What is said can, like a poem, be the vehicle for showing something that itself is unsayable. Propositions of Ethics, according to Edwards, try to convey a sort of practical knowledge, and for this “they are attempts to show how to *do* something.”¹³⁵ What Ethics points to is the *mystical* (*das Mystische*), which is the only possible thing that can connect the thought with the will.¹³⁶ In this sense, the *Tractatus* is nonsensical overall because it tries to show the world *properly*. Ethical statements are not *saying* anything and they do not *show* their sense (at least not in the same way that the picture with the two swordsmen does), rather they are used to make the reader see the world *aright*.

Before proceeding to some more explicit connections between the *Tractatus* and *Meno*, a potential objection must first be addressed: the continuity of Wittgenstein’s work. Undoubtedly, nowadays the philosopher’s most widely known and influential book is not the *Tractatus* but the later *Philosophical Investigations*, and what is even better known is the great contrast between his early and later thinking and way of writing. As John Koethe summarizes, the most common views of this difference sees Wittgenstein’s early work on language as a medium of representation, while viewing his late work as a family of activities, focusing on the conditions that govern its use.¹³⁷ To make things even more complicated, in the introduction of his later book

¹³³ Ibid., p. 11.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 57 [italics in the original]. See also p. 54.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

¹³⁷ Koethe attributes these popular notions mainly to Michael Dummett and Saul Kripke in John Koethe, *The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 4-5.

Wittgenstein appears to find some of his early thoughts mistaken.¹³⁸ Why do I bother then to focus on the early work that the author himself has ‘disavowed’? My focus on the *Tractatus* is based on a series of significant studies on Wittgenstein’s oeuvre that see a fundamental continuity in his work, and, despite his later silence about it, he never stopped ‘doing’ Ethics.¹³⁹ For example, Koethe suggests that “language’s semantic aspects – what a word means, what a sentence says, what its truth conditions are – are shown or manifested by its use” is one of the fundamentals that runs through Wittgenstein’s work, especially in the way that “these semantic aspects cannot be described or characterised discursively in informative or explanatory ways,”¹⁴⁰ but they show themselves in the use of the language.¹⁴¹ H. A. Knott argues that the concept of ‘showing’ – which as we saw is central to his early conception of Ethics – also remained central in Wittgenstein’s later thinking (though reconstituted in important ways), a fact that has been largely ignored by later thinkers.¹⁴² ‘Showing’ in Wittgenstein’s later work was connected with grammar and the rules of language and its ineffability; since we cannot justify our usage of language, *we are used by it*.¹⁴³ Cyril Barret goes even further to suggest that in his later work, Wittgenstein did not abandon his earlier views on ethics.¹⁴⁴ Finally, James Edwards’

¹³⁸ “...I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed, Oxford: B. Blackwell, 2001/1953, p. x. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein also states clearly that he would have liked to “publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.” Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. x.

¹³⁹ Duncun Richter, “Nothing to Be Said: Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian Ethics,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XXXIV, no. 2, 1996: 243-256, p. 251.. Quoted in Kostis Kovaivos, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: On Ethics, Selection of His Corpus and Notes*, Athens: Ekdoseis Kardamitsa, 2000, p. 34.

¹⁴⁰ Koethe, *The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought*, pp. 1-2 & 37-40. Koethe also states in his Preface: “The main conception of this book is that Wittgenstein’s philosophical word is informed throughout by a certain broad theme: the semantic and mentalistic attributes of language and human life are shown or manifested by our verbal and nonverbal conduct, but they resist incorporation into the domain of the straightforwardly factual.” Koethe, *The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought*, p. ix.

¹⁴¹ Note also that “If meanings were always distinct and clearly bounded, we could not use a word in new situations. We could not project our language into them... We would have to give up speaking of ethics” John W Danford, *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, a Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science*, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 105.

¹⁴² H. A. Knott, *Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy: A Dialogue*, Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 10.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 54. An opposite view held by Kathleen Emmett can be found in p. 56.

¹⁴⁴ Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. xiii. Moreover Barrett states that: “...Wittgenstein’s notion of ethics, whether in his earlier or later writings, was somewhat eccentric, in the literal sense of ‘departing from the center’, though much of it, the most important part, was

book *Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life* suggests that the fundamental undercurrent of Wittgenstein's oeuvre is actually Ethics. According to Edwards, the same question 'where and how is the sense of life to be found?' (the very question the we saw in *Meno*), anchors Wittgenstein's early and later work:¹⁴⁵ "Both the early work and the late are fundamentally ethical in intention; both are Wittgenstein's responses to the Socratic question of human being."¹⁴⁶

.2.3 Connecting Plato and Wittgenstein

The connection between Plato and Wittgenstein becomes surprisingly apparent in the very first lines of *Philosophical Investigation*.¹⁴⁷ Wittgenstein's opening quote in the *Philosophical Investigations* is more famous, and apparently more understandable than the closing line of *Tractatus*. In this opening quote Wittgenstein borrows some lines from Augustine's *Confessions*, seemingly describing how he was taught language as a child.

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples; the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.¹⁴⁸

central and eloquently underlined what is central to ethics." Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, p. 247.

¹⁴⁵ A very similar standpoint is being made by Kostis Koveos when he states (in agreement with Kelly and Barret) that "...ethics is transcendental, in the later period *too*; but not in contrast to his earlier views, but in harmony with them." [my translation from Greek] Κωστής Κωβαίος, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Περί Ηθικής, Επιλογές Από Το Corpus Και Τις Σημειώσεις Του*, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Καρδαμίτσα, 2000, p. 35. [I translate this title as: Kovaivos, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: On Ethics, Selection of His Corpus and Notes*, p. 35.]

¹⁴⁶ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 103.

¹⁴⁷ Note that Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* makes some critical references to the *Theaetetus* (paragraphs 1, 46, 518).

¹⁴⁸ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 2. Note the possible connections with vicarious learning: John Lee, "Vicarious Learning and Multimodal Dialogue," proceedings from the conference: *Sixth International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies (ICALT'06)*, 2006, <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/10997/34637/01652693.pdf> [accessed 15. 02. 2008].

M. F. Burnyeat, in a revealing paper, showed that in the few lines preceding the quote that Wittgenstein selected from the *Confessions*, Augustine was actually saying that ‘he had been teaching himself,’ and furthermore that Augustine’s wider philosophical thesis, as it is summarised in his previous work *De Magistro*, was that “no man ever does or can teach another anything.”¹⁴⁹ Burnyeat makes explicit references to Augustine’s Platonic influences and discusses the issue in regard to *Meno*’s paradox and *Meno*’s mathematical knowledge.¹⁵⁰ Burnyeat also suggests that Augustine was Plato’s admirer and that he often made references to *Meno*, although there is evidence that he had only partial access to it, through Cicero.¹⁵¹ Burnyeat finally argues that Wittgenstein omitted the preceding lines deliberately, leaving the metaphysical and divine connotations out of the picture, in order to solve the problem in “naturalistic, purely human terms.”¹⁵² Although Burnyeat is interested mainly in epistemic knowledge and ignores the moral question that the *Meno* posits, it is not difficult to extend the argument to cover Ethics as well.

In connecting Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* with Plato’s *Meno*, one could focus on the distinction between *epistēmē* and *aretē*. As Nehamas discusses, by juxtaposing the *Meno* with Bernard Williams’s writings on knowledge in general, it is easier to forget whether it was raining three years ago, than to forget the definition of a circle that we learned at primary school. Nevertheless, although one could have forgotten more detailed mathematical propositions, such as the quadratic equations, it is “almost totally absurd to claim to have forgotten what *aretē* is.”¹⁵³ Knott also suggests that both Plato and Wittgenstein, despite their differences, share the position that the possession of concepts through the acquisition of language is a *constitutive*¹⁵⁴ part of human nature. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein is more interested in words and in language in their ordinary sense than Plato is. Wittgenstein intends his inquiry to be

¹⁴⁹ M. F. Burnyeat, "The Inaugural Address: Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 61, 1987: 1-24, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22 n. 30.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁵³ Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher," p. 242.

¹⁵⁴ Knott, *Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy: A Dialogue*, p. xiii.

about things and situations and not just about words.¹⁵⁵ Wittgenstein is tolerant to contradictions and complexities of meanings, while Plato was dissatisfied and sceptical about them.¹⁵⁶

Danford, furthermore, cross-examines Meno's first definition of virtue which is an account of various virtues, with Wittgenstein's view on definitions. He then suggests¹⁵⁷ that the former, despite the Wittgensteinian account of the everyday usage of the terms, is lacking a more thorough examination of the similarities between the 'grammar' of the compared cases.¹⁵⁸ Overall, Plato, by having Meno deliver this account, shows that he is also interested in "beginning from the phenomena as they come to sight for us in speech;" and he then seeks the grounds for them. In Danford's words: "Exploring the grammar of a thing, for Wittgenstein, is similar to what Plato means by giving an account of a thing: both are undertaken in order to reveal the place of something in the whole..."¹⁵⁹ Danford also makes a comparison between the Platonic Allegory of the Cave and Wittgenstein's self-imposed task of finding to "escape from the linguistic cave."¹⁶⁰ According to Norman Malcom, Wittgenstein had read and enjoyed Plato, recognizing "congenial features, both in Plato's literary and philosophical method and in the temperament behind the thoughts."¹⁶¹ He even made a public acknowledgement of the similarities of his method and the Socratic doctrine that knowledge is reminiscence.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁵ Danford, *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, a Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science*, p. 196.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹⁵⁷ Contrary to the view supported by Martin Andic, "Inquiry and Virtue in the Meno," in *Plato's Meno*, ed. Malcom Brown, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1971, pp. 291-292.

¹⁵⁸ Danford, *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, a Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science*, pp. 157 & 161.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198. and Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 71. Nevertheless I am again sceptical about this comparison. See Footnote 84. Danford also suggest the dialectic spirit, the tentative character and the lack of compulsion as common characteristics of the two thinkers, but he refers to Wittgenstein's later work. Danford, *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, a Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science*, p. 197.

¹⁶¹ G.H. von Wright "A biographical Sketch" in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 19.

¹⁶² Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, p. 51.

Finally, in the discussions that Wittgenstein had with Bouwsma, at Cornell on the 22nd of August 1949, Wittgenstein mentioned Plato's attempts to define 'good' (mentioning amongst other dialogues *Protagoras*, but not *Meno*), concluding that "[t]he use of the word "good" is too complicated. Definition is out of the question."¹⁶³ In their next meeting in Smith College on 11th October of the same year, Wittgenstein started talking about teaching Ethics. "Impossible!" Bouwsma commented, "[h]e regards ethics as telling someone what he should do. But how can anyone counsel another?" Wittgenstein replied to his objection "Oh, no, not quite that. I can only imagine a teacher who is in some way higher than those he teaches and who suffers with those in respect to whose suffering he is to give counsel."¹⁶⁴ A few days later, Wittgenstein was shaking his head over Plato and the idea of teaching Ethics, and said "Now when it comes to those early dialogues, one on courage for instance, one might read and say, 'See, see, we know nothing!' This would, I take it be wholesome."¹⁶⁵ Later though, contemplating on Socrates' external ugliness and internal beauty (as mentioned in the *Symposium*)¹⁶⁶ he said: "Now there is something which I think I understand."¹⁶⁷ Although it is not clear what exactly Wittgenstein understood through these words, the following two quotes illuminate further his thoughts about the *impossibility of teaching Ethics*:

If you wanted to bring someone up ethically while yet teaching him such a doctrine [Christian belief about heaven and hell] you would have to teach it to him *after* having educated him ethically, representing it as a sort of incomprehensible mystery.¹⁶⁸

If anybody offers me a theory, I would say: No, no, that doesn't interest me. Even if the theory were true that would not interest me –it would not be what I seek. *The ethical cannot be taught*. If I needed a theory in order to explain to another the essence of the ethical, the ethical would have no value at all.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ O. K. Bouwsma et al., *Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949-1951*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986, p. 42.

¹⁶⁴ "Who was this teacher, but Jesus Christ?" Comments Bouwsma Ibid., p. 45-46.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁶⁶ Note that here Bouwsma corrects Wittgenstein's reference to the *Phaedrus*. Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 81e

¹⁶⁹ Friedrich Waismann and B. F. McGuinness, *Wittgenstein Und Der Wiener Kreis*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967, pp. 116-117 [emphasis added]. Quoted in: Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 98.

From the above quotes and the preceding analysis, it could be concluded that Wittgenstein held the view that *Ethics not only cannot be expressed, but also it cannot be taught*. This argument is very similar to, if not identical with the proposed hypothesis asserted in the *Meno*. This similarity between the two philosophers does not mean that their overall philosophy is identical or that they reached the same overall conclusions. On the contrary there are numerous asymmetries between the two. For example, in terms of education, Plato argued that education is a process of remembrance, while Wittgenstein came to suggest that education is something that is acquired through engaging in practices (and what he later on described as language-games), climbing the ladder and then throwing it away.¹⁷⁰ In particular, Wittgenstein's argument that Ethics and Aesthetics¹⁷¹ are one and the same thing proposes that actually none of them can be taught, which makes the original question of the prothesis even more pressing. If neither Ethics, nor Aesthetics can be taught, what then remains to be done in architectural education?

Despite these asymmetries and the opening of new questions, an intertwine between the *Meno* and the *Tractatus* becomes apparent. This intertwine between the two works regarding the teachability of Ethics, as I have shown, has been hinted at by various researchers (and Wittgenstein himself). Nevertheless, no such argument has been explicitly pursued in the literature of philosophy, opening the opportunity for speculation. In what follows, I will focus on the literature of architecture in order to examine the way that it has dealt with the general question of whether Ethics be taught, and the specific impossibility suggested both by the intertwine of Plato and Wittgenstein.

¹⁷⁰ "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, prop. 6.54.

¹⁷¹ This is a huge topic that I deliberately resist to tackle, choosing to focus only on Ethics. Nevertheless the implications of this discussions are very important. See for example: David Carr, "Moral Values and the Arts in Environmental Education: Towards an Ethics of Aesthetic Appreciation," *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 38, no. 2, 2004: 221-239. See also Andrew Ballantyne, "The Nest and the Pillar of Fire," in *What Is Architecture?*, ed. Andrew Ballantyne, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2002, 7-52, pp. 8 & 19.

.3 Parathesis:¹⁷² Mapping the existing literature of Architecture and Ethics

The architectural scholarship that deals with issues of Ethics is apparently enormous. Research that indicates engagement with issues of Ethics include themes like politics, domination and power, social, ethnic and gender exclusion, accessibility, sustainability, technology – especially in its virtual/digital dimension – and professional codes of conduct. A full account of the scholarship in these fields is definitely beyond the scope of this thesis.¹⁷³ Despite this plurality though, it is striking that the literature dealing with the meaning of *Ethics as such* is actually very infrequent, numbering less than a dozen monographs (Figure 5). Within this small group, those that discuss issues of Ethics and architectural *education* are even more rare, making research on the topic a pioneering expedition into unknown territories. Characteristic of the situation is the fact that from 1947-2008 the *Journal of Architectural Education* – arguably, the most authoritative journal on architectural education – published only a couple of articles whose titles included the words ‘ethics,’ ‘morality’ or their derivatives,¹⁷⁴ and only half a dozen articles used these words in their abstracts. This does not mean that issues of Ethics were not raised in general, under themes like the above mentioned. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the fact that *Ethics per se* has not been a favoured or fashionable discourse in

¹⁷² parathesis: to place beside, juxtapose, denoting comparison, mentioning of names, citation of instances. Oxford English Dictionary Online Version, Draft Version 2007, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50171380?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=parathesis&first=1&max_to_show=10 [Accessed 10. 02. 2008].

¹⁷³ I can only mention that such an account should not ignore the following: Jane Rendell, *Critical Architecture*, London: Routledge, 2007.; Iain Borden and Jane Rendell, *Intersections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theories*, London: Routledge, 2000.; William J. Lillyman, Marilyn F. Moriarty, and David J. Neuman, *Critical Architecture and Contemporary Culture*, New York, N.Y. ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.; Jennifer Bloomer and Beatriz Colomina, *Sexuality & Space*, Princeton Papers on Architecture ; 1, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992.; Louise Durning and Richard Wrigley, *Gender and Architecture*, Chichester: J. Wiley, 2000.; Leslie Weisman, *Discrimination by Design: A Feminist Critique of the Man-Made Environment*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992.; Norman Crowe, *Nature and the Idea of a Man-Made World : An Investigation into the Evolutionary Roots of Form and Order in the Built Environment*, Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 1995.; V. Papanek, *The Green Imperative: Ecology and Ethics in Design and Architecture*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1995.; James Steele, *Ecological Architecture: A Critical History*, London: Thames & Hudson, 2005.; Kim Tanzer and Rafael Longoria, *The Green Braid: Towards an Architecture of Ecology, Economy, and Equity*, Acsa Architectural Education Series, London: Routledge, 2007.

¹⁷⁴ This observation was originally made by Bary Wasserman et. al. for the years 1993-1999 which had no contributions at all. Barry Wasserman, Patrick Sullivan, and Gregory Palermo, *Ethics and the Practice of Architecture*, New York et. al.: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2000, p. 43.

architecture. In this section, I map the major research on architecture and Ethics, taking as my specific focal point the original antithesis about the impossibility of education of Ethics, and looking for the answers that have been given so far from various researchers. This review shows that the fundamental question whether Ethics can be taught or not in architectural education has not been adequately examined, demonstrating a substantial gap in contemporary literature on the topic.



Figure 5: A timeline of the most important monographs on architecture and Ethics

The first book to bring together Ethics and architecture in an explicitly close relationship was David Watkin's *Morality and Architecture* published in 1977. This is despite the fact that practitioners, theorists and historians of architecture have always dealt with issues of Ethics (Ruskin, Pevsner, Loos etc). Watkin's book is a short attempt to analyse, through the lens of Ethics, the architectural production and its historiography from the middle of nineteenth century until the late modern movement, by analysing the writings of some key architects and historians. Watkin, though, makes no comment on architectural education or if it is possible to teach Ethics in architecture. It was not until two decades later, that the thorough philosophical/historical work of Karsten Harries and Alberto Pérez-Gómez had some considerable impact (analysis of their work to follow); this led at the turn of the millennium to a wider production of treatises on Ethics in the context of architecture. The turn of the millennium was also 'celebrated' with the Venice Biennale exhibition

entitled ‘Cities: Less Aesthetics, More Ethics,’ although without any substantial contributions on education.¹⁷⁵

Harries’ book¹⁷⁶ *The Ethical Function of Architecture* is perhaps the most widely known treatise on the topic. Harries has been criticised by a number of scholars for his commitment to Heideggerian metaphysics and the emphasis on dwelling.¹⁷⁷ But in some cases this can be an unfair dismissal of an important work that is itself critical of Heidegger’s stance.¹⁷⁸ In the introduction of his book Harries brings forth the uncertainty that has spilled over architecture schools in relation to Ethics. Quoting Christian Norberg-Schulz’s claim that “the schools have shown themselves *incapable* of bringing forth architects able to solve the *actual tasks*,”¹⁷⁹ Harries goes on to ask: “Do we know what these tasks are? Is the prevailing uncertainty not at bottom uncertainty about *how this question is to be answered*?”¹⁸⁰ These ‘tasks’ for Harries are undoubtedly connected with Ethics, or what he calls the ‘ethical function’ of architecture, which he defines as the “task to help articulate a common ethos”;¹⁸¹ while ‘ethos’ “names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling.”¹⁸² Trying to find a way to answer these questions, Harries turns to philosophy and asks further: “What does philosophy have to do with what concerns the architect? Such questions inevitably lead to another: what is philosophy?” At this point Harries turns to Wittgenstein’s observation in *Philosophical Investigations* that

¹⁷⁵ “The instructions for Use advise you not to look for etymological or philological explanations for LA, ME; not to think that we are somewhere between the origin of the world and its future and not to spend months debating whether it is aesthetics that includes ethics or vice versa. I sincerely hope that no one has the bright idea of dusting off Kant’s three theories.” Massimiliano Fuksas and Dorian O. Madrelli, *Città: Less Aesthetics, More Ethics*. 2 vols, Venezia: Marsilio, 2000, p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ Note that Harries published a short paper with the same title back in 1975: Karsten Harries, “The Ethical Function of Architecture,” *Journal of Architectural Education*, 29, no. 1, 1975: 14-15.

¹⁷⁷ For example see: Tom Spector, *The Ethical Architect: The Dilemma of Contemporary Practice*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001, p. 145. See also: Neil Leach, “Less Aesthetics, More Ethics,” in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, 135-142, p. 136.

¹⁷⁸ For example see Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, pp. 165-168.

¹⁷⁹ Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Intentions in Architecture*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965, p. 219. Quoted in: Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 10 [emphasis added].

¹⁸⁰ Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 10 [emphasis added].

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

philosophical problems have the form, “I do not know my way about.”¹⁸³ Harries then goes on to suggest that “[i]n this broad sense all philosophy fundamentally is ‘ethical reflection,’ reflection concerning the ethos.”¹⁸⁴ This stance is actually very close to Wittgenstein’s view of Ethics as the ‘actual task’ required in order to fulfill human life, and that all philosophy is actually about Ethics. From this viewpoint, the problem that architecture faces is a philosophical one; but at the same time, Harries argues that any suggestion to include ‘philosophical reflection’ as “part of any well constructed program of architectural education,”¹⁸⁵ only confirms the uncertainty about how architects ought to build and live.¹⁸⁶ “Where do we find ground or measure in the infinite realms opened up by reflection? How can we justify the way we live? Reason alone has no answer.”¹⁸⁷ He also points out the etymology of the word ‘edify’ that can have the meaning of ‘moral instruction,’ but can also mean ‘to construct’ (from the Latin *aedificare* (*aedes* ‘dwelling’ & *fiacre* ‘to make’)).¹⁸⁸ Harries here gets as close as possible to Plato/Wittgenstein’s view of the impossibility of education of Ethics, since he seems to be skeptical about the edifying role of philosophy. Nevertheless, this approach becomes less clear when he concludes that philosophy *can* play a role in showing the way:

What then does philosophy have to contribute to architecture and to architectural education? In one sense very little: no clear direction; perhaps a few pointers; mostly questions, putting into question presupposition of our approach to architecture that are often taken for granted and thereby opening up new possibilities. But by putting into question maps on which architects and architectural theorists have long been relied and which have been the source of continuing confusion, philosophy can contribute to the drawing up-inevitably tentative-of new maps.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸³ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, proposition 123 Quoted in Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁴ Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

Furthermore, Harries makes an allusion to the ineffability of Ethics during historical times when the symbolic significance¹⁹⁰ of things (e.g. the gothic ornamentation) in its relation to Ethics, was not discussed because there was not such need: "... 'Gothic builders have been tight-lipped about the symbolic significance of their projects.' Nor did they need to say much: an understanding of the spiritual significance of things was *so much part of the medieval worldview that it could be taken for granted.*"¹⁹¹ Harries makes a further comment on later Wittgenstein, in reference to Ethics and the way that it holds the society together. For Harries, members of a society need to share a common life that can be achieved by entering into a language game, "a game understood with Wittgenstein as a "whole, consisting of language and actions into which it is woven."¹⁹² To enter into such a game is rather like learning to play a certain part: it presupposes opportunities to see others in the same role."¹⁹³ Later on, Harries quotes Hegel referring to Descartes as the *ultimate teacher* (with whom thinking and education begins, since he shows the way out of the labyrinth of our world). Harries then goes on to contrast Descartes with Nietzsche who shows the way back into the labyrinth,¹⁹⁴ by pointing the inescapability and ultimately the *silence* of (architectural) form.¹⁹⁵ Harries also points out that this problem is not an epistemological problem, but indeed one of Ethics.¹⁹⁶ Harries, in his latest book *Infinity and Perspective*, emphasises the temporal condition of humanity that is expressed as restless motion and the role of Ethics into satisfying it,¹⁹⁷ a fact that is expressed in the tension between contemplation and creation (a theme that I explore in detail in Chapter 4).

¹⁹⁰ "I agree that architecture needs this dimension [of cultural symbolization, argued by Norberg-Schulz] to meet what I have called its *ethical function*... Different buildings tasks now claim something of the dignity that once belonged only to sacred architecture, giving voice to that claim by representing the sacred architecture of the past and thus usurping its place. Such usurpation reflects the *compartmentalization of our life*, the splintering of the old value system, *each splinter now claiming something of the dignity that once belonged to the whole.*" Ibid., p. 102 [emphasis added].

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 107 [emphasis added].

¹⁹² Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, par. 7.

¹⁹³ Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 325.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 343.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 345. Harries here makes a reference to Tafuri's "The Wicked Architect" p. 40.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 346.

¹⁹⁷ Karsten Harries, *Infinity and Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 2001, p. 210.

The topic of Ethics is a prevailing theme in the work of Pérez-Gómez and his contribution is dispersed in a wide number of publications. Frequently underlying his work is the conviction that “[i]ssues arising from the relationship between architecture and the technological world are the crucial theoretical problems for an ethical practice...”.¹⁹⁸ Through a thorough and innovative combination of the history of architecture with the history of the sciences and epistemology, Pérez-Gómez identifies the rapid development of modern science in the seventeenth century¹⁹⁹ as the fundamental root of the problems of Ethics in contemporary architecture. In terms of education, Pérez-Gómez connects the issue of Ethics with the problematic mentality of globalised techno-capitalism, which he sees as a threat. To this end he argues for the revaluation of the tacit values of architectural education suggesting the need for radical alternatives.²⁰⁰ “It is simply *impossible* to educate an architect for our “real” world through the instrumental theories that are now provided in schools around the world.”²⁰¹ Although this statement sounds similar to what I am arguing here, Pérez-Gómez is discussing the overall education of architecture, not Ethics specifically. This becomes apparent when he emphasises the possibility for “true education through dialogue and debate.”²⁰² Pérez-Gómez has also written a paper entitled ‘Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education.’ There, Pérez-Gómez emphasises that ‘real knowledge’ is the “ethical capacity to respond for our actions in view of our total life experience, here and now,”²⁰³ but the indication that such education is possible seems to be taken for granted. This paper will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, in an attempt to identify the area of architectural conduct where Ethics are made manifest.

¹⁹⁸ Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Louis Pelletier, eds., *Architecture, Ethics and Technology* Montreal et. al.: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994, p. 6.

¹⁹⁹ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science*, Cambridge -Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1983, p. 167 & 195.

²⁰⁰ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, "Architecture and Ethics Beyond Globalization," proceedings from the conference: *Architectural Research*, Montreal, European Association for Architectural Education, 2002, pp. 13-22, p. 22.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, "Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education - I," *SCROOPE- Cambridge Architecture Journal*, 16, 2004, p. 25.

In his latest book, *Built upon Love* Pérez-Gómez shows very eloquently, that the primordial Eros is the only way to grasp this otherness that cannot be approached as a method or a theory, but is “always encountered in action.”²⁰⁴ Architecture in its relation to love provides a point that merges ethics and poetics: the desire to create beautiful buildings with the imperative to provide a better place for society.²⁰⁵ Pérez-Gómez argues for a pre-reflective ground for human consciousness that simultaneously goes beyond both the Cartesian disparagement of sensory experience and the contemporary post-structural views that see the world as a mere cultural construction.²⁰⁶ He also makes a comment that I would particularly like to discuss in relation to the question of effability of meaning in architecture, as pertains to Ethics: “We may be certain of architecture’s significance, but what we can say about its meanings (like what we can say about death) indicates that they remain *out of reach*.”²⁰⁷ Pérez-Gómez also makes a reference to architecture’s connection to the invisible²⁰⁸ - which in some senses is not very far from the ineffable - as part of the extralinguistic part of thought, referencing the later work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. All of the above instances would suggest that Pérez-Gómez agrees with the ineffability of Ethics. Nevertheless, in another instance he hints in the opposite direction. He comments on a quote by Eugene Ionesco:

The fact is that words say nothing, if I may put it that way. ... There are no words for the deepest experience. The more I try to explain myself, the less I understand myself. Of course, not everything is unsayable in words, only the living truth. Eugene Ionesco (*diary*; quoted in George Steiner, *After Babel*).²⁰⁹

After this quote, Pérez-Gómez points out that “no form of human discourse can be absolutely private. This is, of course, the central paradox of twentieth-century art and of *linguistic philosophies such as Wittgenstein’s*.”²¹⁰ Although Pérez-Gómez makes

²⁰⁴ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love, Architectural Longing after Ethics and Aesthetics*, Cambridge Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press, 2006, p. 29.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 190 [emphasis added].

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 196 [emphasis added]. Note that actually Wittgenstein says quite the opposite, by arguing that private language is impossible; language is a public practice. “But could we also imagine a

no further comments on this reference to Wittgenstein, he is in disagreement with Ionesco's suspicion "that language does not enable us to convey our transformative experiences"²¹¹ as characteristic of the artistic production of the last one hundred and fifty years. Pérez-Gómez also gives an important hint about the human nature as being able to desire the other, the unknown (which, in our case, could be the unknown Ethics). In a sentence that resembles existential and especially hermeneutic philosophy he states: "The unknown, therefore, is familiar; and thus it is possible for us to know, with the knowledge of *embodied memory*, where inspiration comes from."²¹² Pérez-Gómez's overall argument is to re-posit architecture in its oral trajectory as a 'critical poem'²¹³ (a term borrowed from Octavio Paz), in order to reconcile poetics and Ethics after the disruptive 'crisis' of modern science. According to his argument, the first symptom in terms of education, is identified in the institution of *Ecole Polytechnique* and especially by Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand who transformed architectural pedagogy into an "applied science, unconcerned with question of philosophy or theology."²¹⁴ This imperative not only became dominant in France, but it was also spread all over the world through France's colonial power. Since then, modern humans "remain determined to exclude what ever *cannot be articulated* through logical reason."²¹⁵

Tom Spector in his book *The Ethical Architect*²¹⁶ revisits moral philosophical theories through a thorough analysis of a series of case studies of real building projects and codes of professional conduct. The focus of the book is on the

language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences –his feeling, moods, and the rest--- for his private use?... But this is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensation. So another person cannot understand the language" Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, par. 243. Candlish & Wrisley argue that "[t]he conclusion is that a language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is impossible. The reason for this is that such a so-called language would, necessarily, be unintelligible to its supposed originator too, for he would be unable to establish meanings for its putative signs." Stewart Candlish and George Wrisley, *Private Language*, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. Available from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/> [Accessed 14. 04 2008].

²¹¹ Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love*, p. 197.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 198 [emphasis added].

²¹⁶ Spector, *The Ethical Architect: The Dilemma of Contemporary Practice*.

professional agenda and the architect's legal responsibilities, but does not deal at all with architectural education. There is in this book an emphasis on the analysis (and sometimes criticism)²¹⁷ of utilitarianism through its connection with architectural 'function' (mainly through the Vitruvian *utilitas*), while a favourite metaphor of the book is seeing Ethics as resolution of conflicts between different parts. Also characteristic of the book is the marginal examination and easy dismissal of Virtue Ethics as inadequate moral theory.²¹⁸ Spector makes an explicit connection between Plato's assertion that the beautiful must be good (*Republic* and *Gorgias*) and Wittgenstein's statement 6.421 in the *Tractatus* that "Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same."²¹⁹ Nevertheless, this connection is not directly relevant to the question of the possibility of education in Ethics that is the main concern of this thesis, or at least it is not treated as such by Spector.

The book *Ethics and the Practice of Architecture* by Barry Wasserman, Patric Sullivan and Gregory Palermo identifies itself²²⁰ as a contribution to 'applied ethics': "the application of meta-ethics and ethical theory to everyday situations."²²¹ It focuses on the architectural profession in the USA and serves as an introductory handbook for practitioners dealing with issues of legal and professional conduct, or in their words: as "a reference work for educators and practitioners who are looking for guideposts in the exploration of ethical issues in architecture."²²² Numerous case studies are analysed at the end of the book, as examples of choice-making (for example the hypothetical conflict between an architectural firm, the school board and the local mayor).²²³ Despite the programmatical statement that architecture is inherently ethical in all of its manifestations *including* education,²²⁴ the book actually makes only one marginal comment about the institution of internship of students in architectural offices.²²⁵

²¹⁷ For example in *Ibid.*, p. 207.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-194.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

²²⁰ Wasserman, Sullivan, and Palermo, *Ethics and the Practice of Architecture*, p. 11.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

The book *Ethics and the Built Environment*, edited by Warwick Fox has a clear focus on environmental Ethics putting under the spotlight “questions that arise with respect to a moral agent’s interactions with any and all aspect of the world and her or him.”²²⁶ With a general theme of challenging the anthropocentric focus of other notions of professional ethics it adopts a wider ecological approach. Nevertheless, this approach aims to the creation of a theory by Fox which is revealed at end of the book to be the concept of *responsive cohesion* (how a design fits with its context).²²⁷ The contributors of this volume do not deal with the question about the impossibility of teaching Ethics. It worths mentioning that Bob Fowles comes very close to ask the possibility of participatory design, but he does not question architectural education as such.²²⁸ Saul Fisher also argues for an analytical philosophical examination of Ethics dismissing at the same time any attempt to solve the problem through continental philosophical approaches (Karsten Harries), Critical regionalism (Keneth Frampton), or Codes of Ethics. Nevertheless, he makes no reference to Wittgenstein, or Plato, nor to the question at stake here.²²⁹ Nigel Taylor finds three ethical absurdities in the current discussions of architectural aesthetics: that a building can be honest or deceitfull; that a style can have moral superiority over others; and the claim that a ‘spirit of the age’ should be followed.²³⁰

Architecture, Ethics and the Personhood of Place, edited by Gregory Caicco is a collected volume originating from some presentations from the conference *Ethics in Place* that took place in Arizona at 2004. Caicco makes a comprehensive introduction recognising four main strands of Ethics: self-regulating utilitarian techno-capitlism; postmodern resistance; phenomenology and hermeneutics; and finally what he proposes as the ‘personhood of place,’ which is referring to a native or tribal understanding of the Ethics of place –of which the touching native Indian

²²⁶ Warwick Fox, ed., *Ethics and the Built Environment* London, New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 1.

²²⁷ Warwick Fox, "Towards and Ethics (or at Least a Value Theory) of the Built Environment," in *Ethics and the Built Environment*, ed. Warwick Fox, London, New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 211.

²²⁸ Bob Fowles, "Transformative Architecture: A Synthesis of Ecological and Participatory Design," in *Ethics and the Built Environment*, ed. Warwick Fox, London, New York: Routledge, 2000, 102-114, p. 106.

²²⁹ Saul Fisher, "How to Think About the Ethics of Architecture," in *Ethics and the Built Environment*, ed. Warwick Fox, London, New York: Routledge, 2000, 170-182.

²³⁰ Nigel Taylor, "Ethical Arguments About the Aesthetics of Architecture," in *Ethics and the Built Environment*, ed. Warwick Fox, London, New York: Routledge, 2000.

Hogan Song that opens the book is emblematic. The volume is divided in two parts the second of which is entitled 'The Teachings of Place.' Pérez-Gómez's contribution is dedicated to architectural education, but does not ask the question about the possibility to teach Ethics implicitly accepting a positive answer.²³¹ This essay shares many common themes with the paper that I will be discussing in Chapter 4. Karsten Harries' essay is a very eloquent attempt to give answer to the pessimistic view that sees architecture as pure simulacrum. The answer for him is the connection of aesthetical meaning with Ethics. Interestingly, Harries makes two references to the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's quest for value in relation to objectivity²³² and his world-picture theory.²³³ Stacy Alaimo makes interesting connections between humanity and animality of which I will be discussing later on. Moreover at the postscript of her essay she suggested that architecture can 'seduce' humans towards environmentally ethical practices, that one could see as possible answer to the question of the possibility to teach ethics.²³⁴ Sebnem Yucel-Young exploits the postcolonial distinction between the 'West' and the 'Rest' (of the world) in order to discuss issues of Turkish architectural identity. In terms of education the essay concludes by calling for renovation of educational practices related to history writing, allowing the Rest to speak for itself.²³⁵

The proceedings of the conference *Ethics in Architecture: Architectural Education in the Epoch of Virtuality* summarise the current interests in architectural education with relation to the digital era, bringing forth some arguments that could be seen as related to the question of the possibility of the education of Ethics. Mahesh Senagala, for example, suggests that the present epistemological crisis that digital technology

²³¹ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, "Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education," in *Architecture, Ethics and the Personhood of Place*, ed. Gregory Caicco, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2007, 119-133.

²³² Karsten Harries, "The Ethical Significance of Beauty," in *Architecture, Ethics and the Personhood of Place*, ed. Gregory Caicco, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2007, 134-150, 138-139.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 147.

²³⁴ Stacy Alaimo, "This Is About Pleasure, an Ethics of Inhabiting," in *Architecture, Ethics and the Personhood of Place*, ed. Gregory Caicco, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2007, 151-172, p. 169.

²³⁵ Sebnem Yucel-Young, "Identity Calling: Turkish Architecture and the West," in *Architecture, Ethics and the Personhood of Place*, ed. Gregory Caicco, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2007, 204-229, p. 221.

posits in architectural education has to do with the fact that, according to Lyotard, often a ‘technical move is taken for granted as ‘good.’²³⁶ David Porter argues that ethos shapes the mode of thought, which operates on a body of knowledge, and he goes on to wonder: “So should teachers concentrate on transmitting this difficult body of knowledge? Or should we focus on teaching the modes of thinking that can synthesise them [sic] ?”²³⁷ He then goes on to provide a series of different views and he concludes that “...if we cannot teach a body of knowledge, we can teach students to think like architects.”²³⁸ Porter here comes very close to the core argument of this thesis by distinguishing between the object of thought and the way of thinking. At the same time though, Porter’s question misses the possibility that ethics itself may actually generate both the object and the way of thinking. In this sense, by forcing to choose between the one or the other, one misses the opportunity to surpass the dichotomy overall. Helene Stub, furthermore, makes a brief comment that one possible way to have ethics (which she relates to personal and embodied experience), is through an Aristotelian notion of nurturing ‘bodily appetites.’²³⁹

Philippe Boudon, in the same volume, makes quite a complicated argument that emphasises the distinction between logos and ethos and leads him to ask a series of parallel questions: “I think that an important ethical question in matters of architectural education is to ask “*what should we teach?*” ... For on one side we do have to teach *values*. But is the term “to teach” the right one here? Should we rather say *transmit values?*”²⁴⁰ Boudon’s work is based upon a schema that distinguishes architecture from architectural ‘discourse’ or what he calls *architecturology*:

²³⁶ Mahesh Senagala, "Digital Technology, Systemic Flexibility and Epistemological Crisis of Architectural Education Systems," in *Ethics in Architecture: Architectural Education in the Epoch of Virtuality*, ed. Anne Elisabeth Toft, Aarhus: Aarhus School of Architecture, 1998, 41-48, p. 45.

²³⁷ David Porter, "Why Do Architects Wear Black? Thinking Beyond the Ethos Trap," in *Ethics in Architecture: Architectural Education in the Epoch of Virtuality*, ed. Anne Elisabeth Toft, Aarhus: Aarhus School of Architecture, 1998, 25-34, p. 31.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Helene Stub, "Bridging Lived Experience and Modelled World with Personal Experience," in *Ethics in Architecture: Architectural Education in the Epoch of Virtuality*, ed. Anne Elisabeth Toft, Aarhus: Aarhus School of Architecture, 1998, 85-94, p. 92.

²⁴⁰ Philippe Boudon, "Architecture, Ethics and the Education of Architects, the View of Architecturology," in *Ethics in Architecture: Architectural Education in the Epoch of Virtuality*, ed. Anne Elisabeth Toft, Aarhus: Aarhus School of Architecture, 1998, 57-72, p. 66.

logos / ethos
 theory / doctrine
 “teaching” disciplines / “doing” projects
 architecturology / architecture

“The point of view of architecturology is as one can imagine to aim at enunciating an architectural knowledge in such a way that it can be “taught.” Such knowledge has to be produced before it can be taught.”²⁴¹ The closest that Boudon comes to giving an answer is when he says that “[t]he answer to the question of a “teachable” knowledge presupposes a deliberate work, which is not limited to the special values of such or such an architecture ... a false answer would be to teach doctrines or to teach this or that doctrine.”²⁴² According to the above schema, this means that ethics and architecture cannot be taught, while logos and architecturology can (a standpoint not different from the one we saw in the *Meno*). Nevertheless, he goes on to temper the boldness of the previous statement by saying “... teaching any doctrine which certainly has to be done is again a question of ethos, of values, not of logos.”²⁴³ A similar distinction with the one proposed by Boudon will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The proceedings of a later conference *Changing Architectural Education: Society’s Call for New Professionalism*,²⁴⁴ tries to envision a new architectural education for the turn of the millennium, but does not make any reference to Ethics, apart from some implicit notions. Ruedi places an interesting emphasis on the role of habit in the political issues raised by a case study in the Citylab project in Illinois, but she does not draw a definite conclusion as to whether there is an question of teachability of these issues.²⁴⁵ Robert Brown and Denitza Moreau Yates raise issues about the

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 68.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ David Nicol and Simon Pilling, *Changing Architectural Education: Towards a New Professionalism*, London: E & FN Spon, 2000.

²⁴⁵ Katerina Ruedi, "Habits and Habitats, Interdisciplinary Collaboration in a Community Architecture Studio," in *Changing Architectural Education: Towards a New Professionalism*, ed. David Nicol and Simon Pilling, London: E & FN Spon, 2000, 119-127, p. 120 & 123.

isolation of the design studio from the community.²⁴⁶ Hannah Vowles makes an interesting argument about the ritualised and almost mystified²⁴⁷ character of the ‘crit’ in the design studio.

The edited volume *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas* includes contributions about Ethical impasses that architects face today. For example, Andrew Saint raises some interesting questions: “But for students and lovers of architecture, and among a fair proposition of architects in practice, a separate undertow of issues affects their thoughts and action. What is architecture for? Why am I doing it? ... These are the big questions. ... Typically their answers have an aesthetic dimension. But ethics is inevitably bound up with them.”²⁴⁸ Gilles Oliver notes the lessons that can still be learned from the collectivist moral consensus of the 1940s and the 1950s, acknowledging at the same time the dangers of such romanticism.²⁴⁹ He also emphasises the role of the young architects and their educational place in the studio: “Ethically this cannot be asked for without their [younger architects] been given responsibility. Historically this was taught in the studio –and more of this still goes on. This is the transmission of ‘know-how’ skills and with it the tacit ethics of the particular professional enterprise.”²⁵⁰ Moreover, Jane Collier emphasises the importance of the moral imagination for the acquisition of ethics through empathy, the creation of ‘moral scenarios’ and acquisition of habits, by referring to what Dewey calls the “genesis of the moral self.”²⁵¹ Finally, Andrew Ballantyne emphasises the notion of habit as a constitutional aspect of the self: “my *ethos* – my habits, from which my system of values can be inferred – is what I am,”²⁵² and he

²⁴⁶ Robert Brown and Denitza Moreau Yates, "Seeing the World through Another Person's Eyes," in *Changing Architectural Education: Towards a New Professionalism*, ed. David Nicol and Simon Pilling, London: E & FN Spon, 2000, pp. 49-57, p. 50.

²⁴⁷ Hannah Vowles, "The 'Crit' as a Ritualised Legitimation Procedure in Architectural Education," in *Changing Architectural Education: Towards a New Professionalism*, ed. David Nicol and Simon Pilling, London: E & FN Spon, 2000, 258-264, p. 264.

²⁴⁸ Andrew Saint, "Practical Wisdom for Architects, the Uses of Ethics," in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, p. 8.

²⁴⁹ Giles Oliver, "Responsive Practice," in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, p. 64.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁵¹ Jane Collier, "Moral Imagination and the Practice of Architecture," in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, p. 96.

²⁵² Andrew Ballantyne, "Heart and Horizon," in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, 115-122, p. 116 [italics in the original].

goes on to suggest that Ethics are related to the ‘architecture’ of our patterns of behaviour. “Our habits of mind, and our habits in deed, generate our world.”²⁵³ Ballantyne also suggests that rule and rational thinking is an important means of reforming Ethics and he makes references to the strict monastic rules of Saint Benedict’s monastic community.²⁵⁴ But with the question of how architectural ethics is formed, he points towards a tacit way of understanding the world that lies beyond rational thinking:

And how is such an architectural ethic formed? Partly of course it will be formed from pre-architectural concerns, *learnt* as very basic lessons in growing up and from experience in other parts of life. Some of it is *formed* in the studio and in practice, where we *learn* that some sorts of judgement meet with approval and win the respect of the people we can’t to impress. *It is not always clear that this is what is being taught*, as the exercises that are set tend to have other objectives as their declared purpose ... but the architect’s value system built up somehow along the way and is in the end the most important part of the education, even if it has been inculcated *without anyone quite noticing*. These *undeclared lessons* are the most thoroughly absorbed, and continue as *unconscious and unexamined habits*.²⁵⁵

I finish this mapping of the existing research concerning the impossibility of Ethics in architectural education, by keeping in mind Ballantyne’s tacit mode of undeclared lessons. This map confirms only that we are lost. It shows that despite the (limited) recent research about Ethics and architecture, not only is there no clear answer to the possibility of education of Ethics in architecture, but that the question itself has not been explicitly raised. Most of the scholars seem to take for granted that such an education is possible, but they do not give an explicit and clear statement of how or why this is the case. This map also proves that although some sporadic references to Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s work are being made, no connection has been made so far with their proposal that *Ethics cannot be taught*.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 122.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 116.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 119.

.4 Hypo-thesis: The aim, the outline and the paradox of this thesis

This thesis defends the hypothesis that both the *Meno* and the *Tractatus* point towards an area of Ethics which has the characteristics of a paradoxically ineffable discourse, which is implicit, which cannot be expressed, and which cannot be put in words. This is contrasted with another area of Ethics, which assumes an expressible normativity. The first area of Ethics I am going call *ethics*²⁵⁶ in order to distinguish it from the second one, *morality*.²⁵⁷ This thesis argues that although Ethics in general cannot be taught, *ethics* in particular can be taught through what Ballantyne called above ‘*a tacit mode of undeclared lessons.*’ *Morality* loses this opportunity because it disguises its unspeakableness under a costume of normative rationality presuming logical order. This normative costume of *morality* concerns propositions of Ethics that appear to be logical but they actually are not. Arguably, the popular views of Ethics associated with ecology, humanitarianism and professional codes of conduct, as presented in the pre-thesis of this introduction, fall in this second category of *morality*. As discussed earlier, these types of propositions (e.g. ‘Thou shall not lie’), despite their appearance of depicting something profound are actually pseudo-propositions picturing nothing, since they cannot be logically negated or affirmed.

Arguably, the thesis proposed here is exactly what Logical Positivism²⁵⁸ got wrong in Wittgenstein’s early work investing the idea that a full understanding of the logic of grammar could solve the problems of language and subsequently all the problems of the world. On the contrary, this thesis adopts the viewpoint of later Wittgenstein who pursued the practices of language games, instead of the structure of the grammar in an abstract or ideal form. In this sense, by emphasising *ethics* instead of *morality*, this thesis chooses to deal with the issues of Ethics as a practical matter that can be studied by the examination of specific games. These games though, are not just

²⁵⁶ Note the small e in the term ‘*ethics*’ and the italics.

²⁵⁷ Note the italics.

²⁵⁸ Schlick for example appears to say that “[i]f there are ethical questions which have meaning, and are therefore capable of being answered, then ethics is a science” Quoted in Oswald Hanfling, “Logical Positivism,” in *Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Stuart Shanker, London: Routledge, 1996, 193-213, p. 208.

language-games since the focus of *ethics* lies almost always beyond language. These games are practice-games that seek to challenge the dominant logo-centric, enlightening, rational, humanistic, and revealing notions of Ethics, in order to prioritise its mute, murky, disguised, animal, and concealed aspects.

In the chapters that follow, this thesis will examine the descriptive term *ethics* and will examine its relationship with *morality*. The paradoxical nature of this hypothesis will be approached with an unconventionally interdisciplinary way that combines the philosophical inquiry in an extensive investigation of concrete practice-game ‘situations’ from three educational places (an architectural design studio, a music class, and a class of martial arts) using an *ethnomethodological* approach. Chapter 1 and 2 introduce these situations, sketch their connection with Ethics in general and provide the foundations of the methodology used. There, it is argued that this unorthodox mode of inquiry is not a pre-given, off-the-shelf methodology that can be pre-described *before* the thesis. Rather the methodology continues to develop in the following chapters in such a way that the method of inquiry and the thesis are not two different things: the method *is* the thesis (and the thesis *is* its method). Chapter 3 establishes the distinction between *morality* and *ethics* in two ways: one is based on the association of *morality* with humanism and *ethics* with animality; the other associates *morality* with a notion of externality and *ethics* with a notion of internality. Chapter 4 is an attempt to identify the specific area of human conduct where *morality* and *ethics* become manifested in architecture and argues that *praxis* (in contrast to *theoria* and *poesis*) is the underestimated, but fertile ground in which *ethics*, in particular, can flourish. Finally, Chapter 5 makes extensive use of situations from the case studies in order to analyse the ‘formation’ of *morality* and *ethics* in education. Two compound concepts are used as keys to understand this formation: ‘repetitive mimesis’ as a generator of *ethics*, and ‘reflective disruption’ as a generator of *morality*. The primordially ‘animal’ character of *ethics* is contrasted with the ‘human’ character of *morality* in what will be described as a ‘strife.’ There, is also proposed a relationship between the two that views *morality* as revealing and *ethics* as concealing.

Admittedly, there is something paradoxical with this thesis in the way that, as we saw in the *Meno*, it grapples with something that is not known and cannot be known, and moreover, should *not* be discussed (according to the *Tractatus*). As this introduction has shown, Ethics cannot be defined, communicated or taught according to the original antithesis held by Plato/Socrates and Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, I will continue to discuss it, cunningly²⁵⁹ and avoid defining what I am talking about. The two terms that I introduce above, *morality* and *ethics*, are described rather than defined. In analysing the definitions of *aretē* in the *Meno*, Crombie suggests that there are generally three types of definition: *conceptual*, *real* or *linguistic*.²⁶⁰ These depend on whether one defines the conceptual environment of a concept; whether some *res* or thing *is*; or how a word is used. Then Crombie argues that Plato in the *Meno* seeks a real definition (in contrast to the linguistic one that Meno initially provides),²⁶¹ or in his words “what is sought is the ground of the relevant disposition, and not the definition of the disposition itself.”²⁶² On the other hand, it can be argued that Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, seeks a conceptual definition of Ethics to clarify the environment of the concept; and in his later work one can identify a shift towards a process of linguistic definitions²⁶³ that goes beyond the conventional notion of ‘definition’ overall, arguing that the meaning of a word is its use.

Now I hope it becomes apparent why I refused to define Ethics in the *prothesis* of this introduction, and why I asked the reader to actively project her or his pre-understanding of Ethics. This thesis consciously avoids all three types of definition precisely because the topic *cannot be defined*, as Plato and Wittgenstein point out. Nevertheless, this research engages – with the playful attitude of practice-games – with all three types of definition. But this playful attitude is not a meaningless folly; on the contrary, it is the *nonsensical* attempt to position the thesis on firm ground

²⁵⁹ Here I mean the cunningness as *mētis*. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Rendall, First Paperback Edition ed, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988, p. xix. Moreover, note Dorrian and Hawker, *Metis: Urban Cartographies*, p. 8. Moreover their reference to Marcel Detienne and Jean Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, University of Chicago Press ed, Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 20.

²⁶⁰ Crombie, "Socratic Definition," p. 172.

²⁶¹ ‘Linguistic’ was the first definition offered by Meno in the beginning of the dialogue.

²⁶² Crombie, "Socratic Definition," p. 206.

²⁶³ Nevertheless, no explicit references to Ethics are made in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

(the firmest possible, according to Wittgenstein). This nonsensical but solid ground is embodied in the fact that there *is* something that directs us to see the *Tractatus* as an Ethical treatise at heart, despite – or perhaps *because of* – its nonsensical character. On the same ground, there is something that holds the dialogue of *Meno* together and helps us to identify it as connected with Ethics, what Crombie calls “a ground of disposition.”²⁶⁴ Otherwise *how can we be sure that Meno and Socrates talk about the same thing* (Ethics) when they discuss *aretē*?²⁶⁵ This ‘ground of disposition’²⁶⁶ is the one that I have trusted in the prothesis, by asking the reader to utilise her or his disposition towards Ethics, in order to start reading and to engage in the interpretative understanding of this thesis. I close this introduction of *prothesis*, *antitheses*, *parathesis* and paradoxes with this ‘ground of disposition’ that is the ground of the land of *ethics*. This land, the title of this thesis invites the reader to inhabit.

²⁶⁴ Crombie, "Socratic Definition," p. 201.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 194.

²⁶⁶ “After some time, however... we seem to have got away from this and to be considering something that might be the ground of the disposition under investigation, but that hardly looks like what Socrates wanted – a criterion with which to tell genuine from spurious instances of the exercise of the disposition. The ground of the disposition is identified in such a way that the disposition itself, we feel, is no more identified than it had to be at the beginning of the conversation if that conversation was to have a determinate topic.” Ibid., p. 201.

Looking for Ethics in Everyday Education Activities

– Practice-games Part I:

The ‘Ethno-’ and the ‘-methodology’



...
When the child was a child
it didn't know that it was a child
everything was soulful
and all souls were one.
...

Peter Handke
Song to Childhood

1.1 Introduction

The best place to start is in the sphere of typical situations close to everyday experience.¹

Dalibor Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation*

1.1.1 A situation of Ethics in the Design Studio



Figure 6: Tutorial in the design studio

On a relatively warm² winter morning of Tuesday 24 of January 2006, at approximately at 12:17am (GMT), on the fourth floor of the building of Architecture at the University of Edinburgh, in the room that is allocated as a design studio for the Masters of Architecture (MArch1) a tutor (John) and a group of students (amongst them Peter and Mary) were having a tutorial. They were all sitting around a big table where drawings, models and a laptop lay on top (Figure 6). Dorian, the course organiser, came by and having attended part of the tutorial-discussion between John and the students, he made a long (>30 min) intervention. The intervention eventually came to the point of discussing what constitutes an architectural ‘section’ (Figure 7):

¹ Dalibor Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, the Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production*, Cambridge Massachusetts & London: MIT Press, 2004, p. 376.

² The temperature was 7°C and the wind speed 2.03m/h. According to the National Severe Storms Laboratory Historical Weather Data Archives, Norman, Oklahoma, from their Web site at <http://data.nssl.noaa.gov> [accessed 23. 03. 2007]




Figure 7: A model consisting of sections

Dorian: Think of this, what the section is all about? A plan is a section isn't it?

Peter: Yes, sort of, but...

D: Everything is a section, every view is a section

P: The plan is an above view of a section, while an elevation....

D: Every view is a section and if you are into maps and you start sectioning the maps you are responsible for territorializing it. Because you section off 'this' from 'that' making distance by creating walls. So that if you are a Jew in the sixteenth century in Venice, you have been sectioned to be in a ghetto: you are in the ghetto section of the city. If you are mad in eighteenth or nineteenth century in Europe you are 'ghetto sectioned'.

P: Ok, I think I understand that.

((Dorian makes a specific comment to the model in front of him and goes on))

D: Conventionally, we are very positivistic, we are over-organising things, ordering things, 'neating' things, tidying things. But in that tidying up we 'section off' our shirts from our jumpers, our underpants from our socks, our 'mad' folk from our 'not-mad' folk; our intelligent folk, from our stupid folk; blacks from the whites. It's this sort of order and tendency that we have, and the city is not any different to our chest of drawers in its impetus to order, that is impetus to section and we as architects are organisers.

((The discussion goes on in similar terms and ten minutes later Mary asks a question)):




Figure 8

- Mary: (Figure 8) I just wanted to ask, sometimes I need to figure out some kind of purpose in order to concretise the question that I try to answer with my design (in relation to the decision to section off as you described it before).
- Dorian: Ok
- John: I think this was part of our initial discussion when the students were trying to describe their project.
- D: So what is your purpose?
- M: That is what I am trying to figure out. What questions I have and what seems to be interesting to deal with.
- D: But you just already answered the main aim. Your purpose is to investigate. And in investigating here, with all the skills and the techniques that you have as an architect, which include the fact that the project makes interventions, it is all just an experiment isn't it? We are drawing and maybe in the process of doing that, the purpose of your endeavour is to establish difference. But we know that the difference that drives all purposes is the interest in reconsidering the traditional notion of limits and architectural limitation and that's already driving you, because you found that one of your project's lines goes out quite far and it has traditions and conventions being already revealed. There are new techniques further underlining that line so there are all sorts of purposes. Is this not good enough purpose?
- M: Yes, maybe.
- D: I don't think we need purpose in the sense of: 'your purpose is to design a museum', 'your purpose is to design an archive', 'your purpose is to make a primary school' etc. Maybe the purpose might be a programmatic value of plan that could rise from this investigation of limits of the city. I think that's where we are quite useful to the city authorities, in the sense that they would probably have an agenda which may be much more driven by the scientific technological advancement program, while we

may want to look at the fantastic and wonderful context of the city and show architectural language as it comes out of the re-evaluation of its historical limits. Simple isn't it?

J: But I guess the students have to give an answer, on how they understand these limits. They have to have a proposition against how they ...if they would have to transform it and this is I think the job of the architect.

D: I agree.

J: Then they need to have a tendency and this is what the thesis is.

D: Well if you take that slowly, you need to have an understanding of the limits. Because, what do we do as architects? We draw! But all the drawings are limits. These drawings are all wonderful limits born out of techniques of representations. Your sections draw limits. That's the main key about sections, that's why we do them all the time that's why it's difficult as architects to realise sometimes that what we are doing in principle is limiting. And this is why it is interesting to invert that picture of our sections as connectivity rather than separation. It is difficult to imagine such a thing, given our normal lexicons, but how do you draw an 'in-relation' as opposed to a 'section'? Because, under the Ethics of borderlands you would have to draw an in-relation; you'd have to change the title of our orthographic tradition to draw in-relations.

The above discussion³ gives a first hint that beyond the theoretical obstacles raised against the communication and education of Ethics (as described in the previous chapter), students and tutors in the design studio *do* discuss notions of Ethics in architectural contexts. These notions of Ethics are not just abstract or theoretical reflections about goodness or badness in general, but are actually deeply rooted in architecture. The whole discussion evolves around the concept of *section*, one of the most fundamental tools of architectural representation. According to the above dialogue, every architectural view is a section (including plans and elevations) and not just those drawings that conventionally we call 'sections'. As Dorian explains, the section is an action of separation, distantiation and 'ghettoing,' or organization, 'neating' and tidying, according to ones standpoint. By drawing or creating walls

³ Note that this dialogue has minor adjustments in order to provide a relatively fluid text as introduction. Nevertheless, the data will be provided again later on ('properly' transcribed in extensive detail), when this case study will be thoroughly analysed (p. 203). Methodological details about the recording and transcribing will be provided later on, in this chapter.

architects continually take ethical decisions that establish boundaries of various forms. Historically, at the urban scale, this fact has led to the ‘ghetto-sectioning’ of Jews ‘in the sixteenth century in Venice’, and the ‘sectioning’ of mad people ‘in eighteenth or nineteenth century in Europe’. “Your sections draw limits”, says Dorian to the students, and “what we as architects are doing in principle, is limiting.” This leads him to speak explicitly about the “Ethics of Borderlands”⁴ despite the arguments for the ineffability of Ethics from the previous chapter.

The realistic scenario of this vivid dialogue also provides a first glimpse of the fact that the students and the tutors were not just exchanging logical propositions or pure statements about Ethical issues as passive agents. On the contrary, Mary appeared to ask for advice with explicit Ethical consequence. When asking for a ‘purpose’ to understand her own questions and therefore choose ‘what is interesting to deal with’ she is acknowledging an impasse, a lack of aim (or *telos*), in her work thus far. Although Mary is not expressly clear whether this is a moral impasse or a general question about the brief of the building that she is designing, Dorian deliberately opens the discussion to Ethics by introducing the aim as being ‘the establishment of difference’ and that ‘the difference that drives all purposes is the interest in reconsidering the traditional notion of limits and architectural limitation.’ The ‘purpose’ according to this standpoint is to read beyond the brief, which defines the conventional category of the building (museum, school, archive). Furthermore, Mary is encouraged to experiment with overcoming the limits of the conventional section through drawing ‘in-relations.’ In this sense, it is obvious that the teacher engaged into conveying moral education by providing examples and suggestions on how an Ethical architecture should be approached. He made this more explicit by employing the term ‘the Ethics of Borderlands.’

Despite the specificity of the incident described above, the *general character* of this dialogue could be recognised in most, if not all, Architecture schools round the

⁴ One starts to recognise a Deleuzian underlying theme behind Dorian’s words, which is going to be discussed in the following chapter.

world.⁵ Here, I deliberately omitted the parts of the discussion that refer to the specific project under examination. If one could temporarily forget the temporal and spatial specificity that I offered in the introduction of the dialogue, one could imagine the discussion taking place in virtually any contemporary design studio. Without being restricted by the level of study or the kind of project under examination, the same or similar words could be applied to the design of a small domestic project or an urban plan, to a first year student who is just being initiated into the fundamentals of design or a senior student who is completing a thesis project. Nevertheless, as I am going to show the specificity of this example is extremely important for the methodology of this research. For this, the situation of the ‘Ethics of Borderlands’ will be revisited later on addressing further its specificity in greater detail.

1.1.1 Looking for Evidence:⁶ Aims and Tactics

This and the following chapter offer complimentary ways to address a common question: *Can we find evidence of education of Ethics in everyday educational activity?* This inquiry takes place despite the acknowledgement of the antithesis presented in the previous chapter that argues for the impossibility of communication and teachability of Ethics. In order to answer this question, while taking into account this impossibility, two tactics are developed throughout the whole thesis:

The first tactic is a ‘forensic’ search for primary evidence by looking back to what *actually* happens during the educational practices (what I called before practice-games). This evidence will be investigated empirically through examples, like the one just presented, which draw from situations of mundane educational activity. The

⁵ Here I emphasise that only the ‘general character’ of the discussion could be found across the world. At the same time though, the Deleuzian undercurrent described in the previous footnote gives a very particular ‘cutting edge’ that is characteristic of a very specific and ‘different’ school of thought, and is very far from being the canon. More about this topic has been discussed in: Anastasia Karandinou and Leonidas Koutsoumpas, "Performing Mimetic Mapping; a Non-Visualisable Map of Suzhou River Area of Shanghai," *Footprint*, no. 2, 2008.

⁶ Note the way that Andrew Ballantyne addresses architecture as evidence in relation to Ethics: Andrew Ballantyne, "Architecture as Evidence," in *Rethinking Architectural Historiography*, ed. Dana Arnold, Elvan Altan Ergut, and Belgin Turan Oskaya, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Book, 2006, 36-49, pp. 36, 40 & 48.

focus in these examples is in the level of practice, the detailed analysis of what *actually* is being said and what *exactly* is happening during the teacher-student interaction.⁷ This chapter reflects the methodological aspects of this forensic exercise and presents an introduction to the methodology of the overall thesis.

The second tactic consists of looking for this kind of evidence *not only* in the architectural design studio, *but also* in other educational places. This is done in order to challenge, problematise and enrich the common understanding of what is considered to be Ethics in architecture. In order to achieve this, examples will be provided from two educational activities that are very different from that of architecture and for this unfamiliar to architects. These two different settings are a music class, and a *dojo* – the place for the education of Japanese martial arts – (Figure 9). For the music class I will use the course, *Music in the Community*, that runs in the Department of Music at the University of Edinburgh and the centre *L'Art du Chi*, in Edinburgh and its *Aikido* classes (Japanese Martial Art) as an example of *dojo*. The following chapter introduces the three educational practices by presenting the necessary background of the *dojo*, the music class and the design studio. It also provides an introductory example of the educational activity from the music class and the *dojo*, similar to the one already given for the design studio identifying evidence of Ethics in each educational practice.



Figure 9: The three case studies -the design studio, the music class and the *dojo*

⁷ Note that due to the great degree of detail in the examples to follow, a rather different nomenclature of data presentation will be adopted in comparison to the introductory simplified one (see also footnote 2).

I should preliminary clarify that these two complimentary chapters will *not* exhaust the analysis of the examples. Their aim is to provide the framework that supports the two, abovementioned tactics and to provide a pilot study for each educational case. The pilot studies from the three educational places (the design studio, the music class and the *dojo*) offer an overall idea of the potential of this method of work, and they also provide concrete examples upon which the theoretical elaboration of the chapters to follow will be grounded. For this, Chapter 1 and 2 weave the basic threads of the fabric of the thesis upon which a series of further examples will be woven later on. The first of these threads is the example from the design studio that opened this chapter and already offers evidence of a possible discourse of Ethics in the design studio. In this sense, there is a first hint of a positive answer towards the question of ‘whether we can find evidence.’ However this answer resists the temptation to be final or definite. Its strength and power stands not in defining and closing down, but rather in widening and opening up the horizon of the study. It offers some clues, hints and indications that can guide the rest of this analysis of Ethics of the routine activity that takes place in the familiar design studio with that in the unfamiliar music class and the *dojo*.

Before proceeding to the examples given in the next chapter, there is a need here to answer two basic questions: 1) Why are the mundane examples juxtaposed to the abstract theoretical statements described in the previous chapter, and 2) why are the examples of the music class and the *dojo* chosen in relation to the design studio? In answering these questions, this chapter will also start providing the methodological clarifications necessary to explain the way that the data was collected and analysed.

1.2 Why juxtapose the everyday examples to the theoretical impossibility of teaching Ethics.

The following studies seek to treat *practical* activities, *practical* circumstances, and *practical* sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study, and by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as *phenomena in their own right*.⁸

Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*

1.2.1 Practice-led studies of concrete situations

In returning back to incidents of everyday life in educational places, I wish to find more than just the practical examples that argue against the theoretical impossibility of communicating and teaching Ethics. Beyond that, I wish to challenge the categorical distinction between a practical and a theoretical way of thinking about Ethics as autonomous discourses, and especially I wish to scrutinise the intellectual dominance of theoretical Ethics. In the architectural literature on the topic (as we saw in the previous chapter), there seems to be a separation between philosophical/theoretical and applied approaches to Ethics. The former usually find case studies only in the history of architecture, while the later find just ‘applied’ case studies, that depend on a pre-existing theory. On the contrary, this chapter not only introduces examples of practical counter-evidence against the theoretical scepticism of Ethics, but also seeks to establish a practical understanding of Ethics and ultimately a practical wisdom that is sufficient in its own right.

The use of everyday examples to dissolve theoretical problems is actually not different from Wittgenstein’s later suggestion of philosophising: inquiring into ethics *without*⁹ philosophy. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein (as we already saw in the introduction of the thesis), adopted a much more diffuse and humble style

⁸ Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 1. [emphasis added].

⁹ James C. Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life*, Tampa: University Presses of Florida, 1982.

of writing, “showing his unsayable answer to an unutterable question. *Here*, in a life exemplified by this sort of writing, by this kind of attention to things, is found ‘the sense of life’.”¹⁰ Although his later work still talks about the limits of language, these limits are not literal, as illustrated in the *Tractatus* (through the representation-as-rationality). Rather they are deliteralised¹¹ and are to be found with a different method; not by philosophical theorising, but “by the vision of sound human understanding.”¹² Representation-as-rationality, from being a fundamental undercurrent in the *Tractatus*, became “the ultimate *target* of philosophical therapy”¹³ in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Edwards has summarised the twist in Wittgenstein’s thought in three areas: the nonliteralizing sensibility, the end of philosophy and the restoration of direct, unimpeded action.¹⁴ Edwards also argues that by giving an image its own integrity it becomes a way of seeing the world: a way to *see through*. In our ordinary encounter with such images, we do not see through what we see. “Because they are powerful, familiar and useful, we use them utterly unconsciously. To take an image literally is just this sort of failure to see it at work...”¹⁵ The use of the concrete examples in the wider context of social sciences, has been also emphasised recently by Bent Flyvbjerg, as a fundamental generator of knowledge. Flyvbjerg even goes back to the *Meno*, and argues that the first given definition of virtue is the starting point of a case study.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the practice-game examples that I use here are not just random fragments¹⁷ of teaching activities, nor are they accounts of quantitative or positivistic

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 104 [emphasis added].

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 149-150.

¹² Ibid., p. 155.

¹³ Ibid., p. 209 [emphasis added].

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 212.

¹⁶ Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter, Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again*, Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 67-70. Flyvbjerg mentions also the role of ethnomethodology as an ‘especially interesting’ view within the wider hermeneutic-phenomenological strand of sociology.

¹⁷ In the context of cubist collage Weston argues that “[t]he fragments used to structure the non-perspectival space of analytical cubist collage are not chosen or combined arbitrarily. Rather they are used to articulate a world...” Dagmar Motycka Weston, "Le Corbusier and the Restorative Fragment at the Swiss Pavilion," in *Tracing Modernity: Manifestations of the Modern in Architecture and the City*, ed. Mari Hvattum and Christian Hermansen, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2004, 173-194, p. 174. Weston also argues that the ability of the fragment to act in this articulating way “is the result of the essential rutedness of all things we

case studies seeking to impress by their number. The extract of the discussion between Dorian, John, Mary, and Peter is a *situation* that reveals the cosmos of the educational activity, taking place within the design studio in its relation to Ethics.¹⁸ Hermeneutic philosophy has emphasised the role of the ‘situation’ as key to address human understanding and interpretation. “We always find ourselves within a situation”¹⁹ says Gadamer, and he goes on to suggest that understanding a situation is always an incomplete action: “The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it.”²⁰ Nevertheless, situations are “the *most complete way* of understanding our experience of the surrounding world and the human qualities of the world.”²¹ Situations are not meaningless events; on the contrary, being bound by a horizon and finding their place in history and tradition, they act as “receptacles of experience and of those events that endow them with meaning.”²² A situation is the result of synthesis that hints towards a structured order achieved not by reason and reflection, but by implicit notions like the metaphoricity of language (more about this at the end of the chapter).²³ *Praxis*, finally, in its classical understanding, is a constitutive part of the way that human beings come to recognise themselves as always being situated in the world²⁴ (Chapter 4 deals this issue in great detail).

perceive in a world of interconnected meanings.” Weston, “Le Corbusier and the Restorative Fragment at the Swiss Pavilion,” p. 175.

¹⁸ In a quite different context, that of primitivism, Adam Sharr suggests that: “...a professional architect who is sensitive to the ethics of building for others will always find themselves bound-up in the paradox associated with expertise.” He then goes on to propose that: “It is a situation that remains an almost inevitable consequence of education and institutionalization.” Adam Sharr, “Primitive and the Everyday, Sergison Bates, Lefebvre and the Guilt of Architectural Expertise,” in *Primitive, Original Matters in Architecture*, ed. Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel, and Adam Sharr, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006, 240-250, p. 249.

¹⁹ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall (Revised Translation), Second Revised Edition ed, London, New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 301.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, the Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production*, p. 368.

²² Ibid., p. 369.

²³ Ibid., p. 370.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 372.

1.2.2 Ethnomethodology

Wittgenstein, in his later work, came to suggest that “[t]here is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.”²⁵ One²⁶ such ‘method’ or therapy²⁷ that is strongly influenced by Wittgenstein’s thought is *ethnomethodology*.²⁸ Developed by Harold Garfinkel²⁹ in the late 60s, ethnomethodology still remains today one of the most unconventional ways of doing sociological analysis. This is because of the radical way of deliteralizing the common understandings of the way that people accomplish their actions, through a painstaking focus on the practical horizon of everyday situated practices. The following provocative words from his early book *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, are indicative of Garfinkel’s approach: “Procedurally it is my preference to start with familiar scenes and ask what can be done to make trouble.”³⁰ In the same book he defined³¹ the *atheoretical theory*³² of ethnomethodology:

Ethnomethodological studies analyze *everyday activities as members’ methods*... Their study is directed to the tasks of *learning* how members’ actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make *practical* actions, *practical* circumstances, *common sense* knowledge of social structures, and *practical* sociological reasoning analyzeable; and of discovering the

²⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed, Oxford: B. Blackwell, 2001/1953, paragraph 133 [emphasis in the original]. See also Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 114.

²⁶ Here, I am indebted to Eric Laurier who argues that there is not ‘one’ ethnomethodology but ethnomethodologies. Nevertheless, I still keep the singular ‘one’ in order to distinguish ethnomethodological approaches from other ways of sociological research.

²⁷ “Ethnomethodological studies are not directed to formulating or arguing correctives. They are useless when they are done as ironies. Although they are directed to the preparation of manuals on sociological methods, these are in no way supplements to “standard” procedure, but are distinct of them. They do not formulate a remedy for practical action, as if it was being found about practical action that they were better or worse than they are usually cracked up to be. Nor are they in search of humanistic arguments, nor do they engage in or encourage permissive discussions of theory.” Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. viii.

²⁸ Michael Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 20.

²⁹ “Harold Garfinkel is universally acknowledged as the “founding father” of the field, although he occasionally has joked that he has sired ‘a company of bastards’.” Ibid., p. 3-4.

³⁰ Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. 37.

³¹ There is a particular ‘anxiety’ in most ethnomethodological publications to define what is ethnomethodology. Nevertheless, Livingstone has emphatically warned: “Nothing is as hard, and nothing is as wrong as offering a definitive answer to question ‘What is Ethnomethodology?’”. Eric Livingstone, *Making Sense of Ethnomethodology*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p. 4.

³² Michael Lynch, “Silence in Context: Ethnomethodology and Social Theory,” *Human Studies*, 22, 1999: 211-233. p. 213. Lynch seems to suggest the opposite in: Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 38.

formal properties of *commonplace*, *practical common sense* actions, “*from within*” actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings.³³

The practice of analyzing concrete situations, such as the one described at the opening of this chapter, has gradually been part of the wider agenda of sociology since the turn of the second half of twentieth century.³⁴ A considerable aspect of this turning entails the expansion of its horizon to what can be called micro-practice;³⁵ the focusing on the minimal level of what people *actually do* when they perform their mundane activities, beyond the stereotypical ways that lead us to not see what people really do. For example, when we look at someone on the street tying their shoelaces we *just* see ‘a person tying his/her shoelaces’ and ignore the actual activities employed to accomplish this action.³⁶ In our case the focus will be on the way that Dorian, John, Mary and Peter make sense of notions of Ethics by accomplishing their everyday educational activities.³⁷ The ethnomethodological studies have been emphatically distinctive in giving an analysis ‘from within’ to

³³ Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. vii-viii [emphasis added].

³⁴ Twentieth century sociology developed a significant argument about the consideration and analysis of social phenomena as fundamental elements of study in a basis equal to that of natural facts analysed by natural science. In particular the Durkheimian early sociology argued that “the objective reality of social facts is sociology’s fundamental principle.” Ibid., p. vii. Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological view of sociology contrasts with Durkheim by adding that this ‘objective reality’ has to be seen as an “*ongoing accomplishment* of the concerted activities of daily life, with the ordinary, artful ways of that accomplishment being the members known, used, and *taken for granted*.” Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. vii [emphasis added]. Garfinkel’s emphasis on the study of people’s methods is not a standalone act. Together with Harvey Sacks’ systematic research on conversation analysis, Erving Goffman’s study of the expression of the self in the theatrical scene of mundane activities, and later Bruno Latour’s analysis and demythologization of scientific laboratory life, Garfinkel contributed significantly to the reformation of contemporary sociology.

³⁵ Kenneth Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning*, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2004, p. 31. See also Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 28-31. and Eric Laurier, Angus Whyte, and Kathy Buckner, "An Ethnography of a Neighbourhood Café: Informality, Table Arrangements and Background Noise," *Journal of Mundane Behavior*, 1. 2. 2001. <http://www.mundanebehavior.org/issues/v2n2/laurier.htm> [accessed 10. 06. 2005].

³⁶ “[W]hen we observe a person able to do any complicated action unconsciously, we may assume both that he must have done it very often before he could acquire so great proficiency, and also that there must have been a time when he did not know how to do it at all.” Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit*, London: Trubner, 1878, p. 18-19.

³⁷ Garfinkel used examples as diverse as a trial jury team, the records of a psychiatric clinic, or an ‘intersexed person’ before and after having a gender change operation, and focused on the way that these people accomplished their actions and the way they come to justify these actions, by making them accountable.

what is ‘actually’ going on in social activities, seen as situations. By focusing on practices, we rediscover the details that our habitual seeing of the world usually overlooks.³⁸ This fact does not mean that ethnomethodology ignores the wider context (social, political, economical) of the micro-practice. On the contrary, it argues that the context does not merely surround the activities, but the context and the activity co-exist by forming one another in a causal way.³⁹ Moreover, ethnomethodology as a tactic blurs the borderline distinguishing the visible totality of the otherness of any context that pre-exists.⁴⁰

The criticism of ethnomethodology has varied greatly from raising issues of style and professional conduct, issues of scale and context, issues of power and emancipation, as well as issues of meaning and self-reflection.⁴¹ It is beyond the scope of this study to offer a complete exposition of the various criticisms of ethnomethodology. There is, though, a particular point where I would like to differentiate my view from that of Garfinkel’s project. Garfinkel seems to somehow disparage overall theory when he polemically⁴² argues that: “... our study tasks cannot be accomplished by free invention, constructive analytic theorizing, mock-ups, or book reviews, and so no special interest is paid to them aside from an interest in their varieties as organizationally situated methods of practical reasoning.”⁴³ Although there is no doubt that theorizing cannot substitute the scope of the empirical analysis that ethnomethodology generally aims towards, the latter can, nevertheless, inspire, generate and provoke new theoretical contemplation that should not be seen as

³⁸ It is very interesting that Heidegger in his quest for the *Dasein*, the being that is *actually there*, he is asking for a similar view on the world “We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-world;... We shall seek the worldhood of the environment (environmentality) by going through an ontological Interpretation of those entities with-the environment which we encounter *as closest to us*.” Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquire & Edward Robinson, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1962/ 1927, H 66 [emphasis added].

³⁹ Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 29.

⁴⁰ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Rendall, First Paperback Edition ed, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988, p. xix. Note de Certeau’s influence from Ethnomethodology in p. xvi and p. 206 [endnote 20].

⁴¹ Here I follow Lynch’s headings of the main criticisms of Ethnomethodology. Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 26.

⁴² Arguably Garfinkel was reacting against his earlier training. His PhD thesis “The Perception of the Other: a Study in Social Order” was heavily influenced by the action theory of his supervisor Talcott Parsons. *Ibid.*, pp. 5 & 9.

⁴³ Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. viii.

separate from the analysis itself.⁴⁴ For this, I propose a simultaneity of practical and theoretical discourse that responds to what can be seen as a possible drawback of ethnomethodology. Ethnomethodological texts nearly always expend considerable energy in defining just what ethnomethodology is, and in this way theorising about it. Unavoidably, it is only by putting theory back in the game (revisiting its origins in Ancient Greek *theoria*) when practice (through *praxis*) or the provocative term *atheoretical theory* becomes meaningful anyway – more on this to follow in Chapter 4. With this objection I do not wish to align with political calls for injecting critical or emancipatory ‘theories’ into ethnomethodology, no matter how thought-provoking these are.⁴⁵ My argument is rather philosophical since it questions whether it is possible to challenge a theoretical discourse (theory) only by its negation (practice). For example, an ethnomethodological study that does not have to explain what ethnomethodology is and does not have to engage with its canonical texts.⁴⁶ This thesis is not such a case and for this, although I have argued from the beginning for a bottom-up approach through a practical, empirical, ethnomethodological study that does not need the encouragement of a permissive theory,⁴⁷ I will constantly engage with theorising in a dialectic play that allows the constant re-evaluation of both theory and practice. For this reason, this thesis will continuously use educational examples⁴⁸ to revisit theory and will theorise in order to understand the examples from practice.

⁴⁴ The point made here is not new in Ethnomethodology. There are different views that have discussed the connection of theory with ethnomethodology. For example Alan Blum and Peter McHugh have addressed the issue through the concept of self-reflection. Michael Lynch through the concept of epistemics; Wes Sharrok in relation to Wittgensteinian reasoning; Jeff Coulter and the concept of re-specification. I am indebted to Eric Laurier for this comment.

⁴⁵ See for example the very interesting debate between Bogden-Lynch and McHoul that takes place within the boundaries of ethnomethodology and mainly conversation/discourse analysis: David Bogen and Michael Lynch, "Social Critique and the Logic of Description: A Response to McHoul (1988)," *Journal of Pragmatics*, 14, 1990: 505-521. A. W. McHoul, "Critique and Description: An Analysis of Bogen and Lynch," *Journal of Pragmatics*, 14, 1990: 523-532.

⁴⁶ See for example the unexpected conclusion of Hugh Mehan and Houston Wood, "The Morality of Ethnomethodology," *Theory and Society*, 2, no. 4, 1975: 509-530, p. 526. See also David Sudnow, *Ways of the Hand : The Organization of Improvised Conduct*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.

⁴⁷ "[Ethnomethodological studies] do not formulate a remedy for practical action, as if it was being found about practical action that they were better or worse than they are usually cracked up to be. Nor are they in search of humanistic arguments, nor do they engage in or encourage permissive discussions of theory." Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. viii

⁴⁸ "In other words, can't we say that *to give an example, to instantiate, to be concrete*, are all examples of the magic of mimesis wherein the replication, the copy, acquires the power of the

1.2.3 Methodology and situated ethno-methods

According to the above, methodologically this is a practice-led research that is interacting with a network of philosophical ideas. By that, I do not support a dull reconciliation between practice and theory, but rather I pursue a strife between the philosophy that informs our theoretical understanding of Ethics and the practical understandings of Ethics provided by the key studies, as it appears in three educational places. Chapter 4 analyses in detail the distinction between practice and theory and provides the philosophical grounds of this methodological unorthodoxy,⁴⁹ but here, I would like to discuss the technical details of this practice-led methodology, its origins in some ‘pre-scientific’⁵⁰ ideas and its limitations.

As I have already mentioned, there is a practical aspect⁵¹ to the education of Ethics that seems to be absent in the initial theoretical anti-thesis of the impossibility of teaching Ethics. In terms of method, this means that instead of applying an already existing theoretical framework of Ethics in the three educational places, here, I am inquiring into the ways that Ethics is understood in the activities themselves.⁵² Theodor Adorno brings forth a fundamental methodological thesis when he says that: “Method cannot be posited as absolute in opposition to its subject matter; rather the method of sociology must stand in a living relationship to its subject matter and must, as far as possible, be developed from it.”⁵³ In these terms, the study of

represented? And does not the magical power of this embodying inhere in the fact that in reading such examples we are thereby lifted out of ourselves into those images?” Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*, New York, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 16 [emphasis in the original].

⁴⁹ See p. 178.

⁵⁰ “... survey analysis, social-psychological experimentation, ethnography, interviewing, and other typical research techniques necessarily rely on commonsense reasoning and ordinary interactional practices. ... Although such research techniques require researchers and subjects to understand and interpret vernacular discourse, social science researchers do not specifically examine these *prescientific procedures* of ordinary reasoning and social interaction.” Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 11-12 [emphasis added].

⁵¹ This practical understanding of Ethics lies beyond the mere “anthropological curiosity” of treating the fact that most humans are inclined to commit to principles or generally ethics, as described in Paul Johnston, *The Contradictions of Modern Moral Philosophy: Ethics after Wittgenstein*, Ethics and Moral Theory, London & New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 1999, p. 5.

⁵² “Instead of imposing an alien order of inquiry to organize the indigenous philosophical activities, the methods of the indigenous practitioners themselves direct the researcher about what to study.” Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 36.

⁵³ Theodor Adorno, *Introduction to Sociology*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. As quoted in: Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 35.

education of Ethics cannot take place outside of the educational places, nor out of the methods that the people who operate within them identify as referring to Ethics. Ethnomethodology, provides a fertile ground to understand the Ethics of the design studio, the music class and the *dojo*, as something to be found *in the methods* that the people of these places use (ethno-methods), in order to accomplish their activities. Kenneth Liberman describes this approach:

...for ethnomethodological research the only methods that are of interest are the ethnomethods employed by the people themselves, and the methods that ethnomethodologists employ are uniquely adequate to the particular ethnomethods that have been located. They are unique because they are identical with “What” the people are doing only there. ...And those methods are uniquely adequate for those occasions. They can only be discovered.⁵⁴

The notion of ‘method’ that is constitutive and an inherent part of Ethnomethodology, is very far from the positivistic notion of method as an application that is prescribed by a pre-existing theory. Method here connotes the *practical way* in which people organise their activities (everyday, mundane, but also scientific, architectural, musical, martial, etc) and form their practices. The term ‘ethnomethodology’ is similar to the term of ‘ethnoscience’ in social anthropology.⁵⁵ In the same sense that disciplines like ethnobotany or ethnomedicine elicit culturally specific taxonomies of plants or medicines against the formal scientific knowledge, ethnomethodology is “the study of the ordinary ‘methods’ through which persons conduct their practical affairs.”⁵⁶ Equally here, what I propose is a method of research that could be named as *ethno-architecture*, focusing, not on vernacular architecture or the way that ‘local’ people build their own homes, but rather on how the ‘ethnic’ group of architects learn what it is to be (and become) an architect, focusing especially on notions of Ethics.

The method of the practice-based ethnographic study proposed here observes, describes and compares empirical data that come from the design studio, the music

⁵⁴ Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 35.

⁵⁵ Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

class and the *dojo*. Nevertheless, the ethnomethods of the people in all the three places cannot be *invented* in advance, “even during one’s composition of applications for research grants, because they are only to be *discovered*.”⁵⁷ The orderliness of these methods is difficult to be realized because it is like the water in which a fish swims, but as soon as it is discovered “it is everywhere one turns.”⁵⁸ Nothing is hidden or concealed: “*everything is in plain sight*. The skill of the philosopher or ethnomethodologists is in revealing what is right before our eyes but we cannot see because we are blinded by its obviousness.”⁵⁹ Moreover, this ethnography should not be treated as merely a stage that leads to a theoretical speculation; meaning, a means to an end. Tim Ingold, in the 2007 *British Academy Radcliffe-Brown lecture* entitled ‘Anthropology is not Ethnography,’ went beyond just defining the distinction between the two terms. He proposed their equality by liberating Ethnography from the bonds that hold it under the tyranny of method.⁶⁰ One should not seek the assurance of using an already valid, off-the-shelf methodology (an argument often found in ethnomethodological studies as well).⁶¹ Actually, what Ingold proposed emphatically in walking the way of research (in his case anthropology), is to always be suspicious and open to what he called the ‘sideways glance’. “We should always [be] looking over our shoulder and be aware that things might be done differently. It is so as though there is a stranger on our heels.” This stranger, should be asking awkward questions like a small child and it should be found in the process of research itself, “in the everyday things as we observe the comings and goings of people around us and of course in our

⁵⁷ Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 33.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵⁹ Eric Laurier, "The Spectacular Showing: Houdini and the Wonders of Ethnomethodology," *Human Studies*, 27, 2004: 377-399, p. 383 [emphasis in the original].

⁶⁰ “But my real purpose in challenging the one way progression from ethnography to anthropology has not been to (finish) ethnography or treat it as an aftercourt, but rather to liberate it (of them all), from the tyranny of method. Each time I read about the ‘ethnographic method’ I get increasingly advocated. Of course Ethnography *has* its methods, but *it* is not a method. It is not in other words a set of formal procedural means designed to satisfy the ends of anthropological inquiry. It is a practice in its own rights, a practice of (aural) description. It (counts) and deals other people’s lives, a finished piece of work, not raw material for further anthropological analysis.” Tim Ingold, "Anthropology Is Not Ethnography," in *The 2007 British Academy Radcliffe-Brown lecture*, Edinburgh: 12. 03. 2007.

⁶¹ “Although ethnomethodologists do not aspire to produce exercises in “metascience” and they are not “antiscientific” in orientation, they are necessarily indifferent to the illusory security and preliminary justifications provided by a scientific program.” Lynch, *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action*, p. 25.

conversations with friends, colleagues and students,”⁶² and not in books of methodology.

For this, the following notes that describe some technicalities about the collection of the data and the Ethics of this research should be read not as methodological remedy, but as it is: technical information. These sections should also be read whilst keeping in mind that the only actual verification of the ‘scientific’ validity of this research is this ‘stranger on our heels.’

1.2.4 The collection and analysis of the data

The detailed activity of gathering the data for the three case studies took place during the academic year 2005-2006, with an emphasis on the second semester. Despite this focus, various degrees of engagement with all the three cases took place both before and after this period (2004-2008).⁶³

The main body of data consists of video and audio recordings of the educational activities.⁶⁴ This material helped when afterwards I revisited these activities in order to study in great detail specific incidents of the practices in each case. The examples that follow have been ‘translated’ by creating detailed transcripts. Following mainly the transcription techniques of Conversation Analysis,⁶⁵ the transcripts do not present only the teachers’ and students’ words, but also provide additional information about the context, the time framework and overlaps, as well as some stresses and emphases. Pictures are also extracted from key frames of the action to illustrate the incidents and provide visual evidence. These detailed transcripts reveal the complexity and plurality engulfed in these mundane activities.

⁶² Ingold, "Anthropology Is Not Ethnography."

⁶³ The time focus of the data gathering helped the simultaneous analysis and comparison of the three case studies, by making interrelations and cross-connections that otherwise would not be obvious.

⁶⁴ A detailed account of the gathered material can be found in the Appendix. See p. 359

⁶⁵ Here, I have used the transcript techniques offered by Emanuel A. Schegloff, in his online transcription project:

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/index.html> [accessed 23. 03. 2007] An account of the method’s symbols and annotation can be found in the Appendix p. 353.

Another kind of material that is used are notes taken during the sessions and notes taken after the sessions in the form of diary. This material helped in the formation of preliminary texts that reported the researcher's impressions *in situ*, or immediately after the events, of what was happening or what had just happened. These texts have been used here, in the analysis of the examples.⁶⁶ Finally a method of analysis that was found to be of great help was the participation in the Sensei Data Sessions and the Scottish Group of Conversation Analysis of the University of Edinburgh, where I had the chance to present the gathered material and discuss possible directions of analysis with colleagues from disciplines as diverse as geography, psychology, information technology, sociology and politics.

1.2.5 Participant observation *in the situations*

The very mimicry corrodes the alterity by which my science is nourished.
For now I too am part of the object of study.⁶⁷

Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*

A very important feature of this study is the experiential approach to the research. In all three cases I was actively present in the educational activity and due to this the main body of the data was collected through my participation and observation. Nevertheless, the role and degree of engagement in every case was slightly different, adapting to the context and the educational environment of each case.

In the case of the design studio, I participated as a tutor. Nevertheless, I still carried with me the experience of being a student for more than six years in the design studio of the Department of Architecture, of the National Technical University of Athens. In the music class, I was engaged as a 'special student' who participated in all the

⁶⁶ Another medium used to collect impressions of what happened during the activities were interviews of the student participants immediately after the events. The format of these were non-structured interviews to allow the interviewee flexibility in responding specifically to the content of the class that had just finished. Moreover, free discussion after or during the questions helped to reveal interesting points that could not be predefined. These interviews ended up to play only a minor role for this research, since the focus was finally decided to be on the educational situations as such. However, they were a valuable medium for the quick formation of a wider understanding of each practice in the early stages of this research.

⁶⁷ Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*, p. 8.

performance preparations and activities. Nevertheless, both the students and tutors were aware that I was not engaged with certain formal aspects of the course, such as most of the theoretical lectures or the assessment exercises. Apart from that, I played a full role during the rehearsals and I was instructed through exactly the same procedures and methods as the rest of the students. In the case of *dojo*, I participated as a ‘normal’ student. I was enrolled in the course, paid fees and went through exactly the same stages of assessment as every other student. Although the teacher and the students knew my special role as a researcher, this role was not obvious apart from the times that I was recording or taking notes when not being instructed on the mats myself.

The participant observation in all three cases did not just give an ‘extra’ method or tool to approach the educational activities, but mainly provided the deeper insight earned by being-there in the activity and ‘doing the thing.’ The ‘thing,’ in our case, is what the students and the teachers in every case do (and especially what they understand as Ethics while doing this ‘thing’), in the everydayness of their activity; the ‘thing’ that sometimes is exciting and interesting, but can be also extremely frustrating and sometimes very boring as well. Participation allows one to become a member of a community and sharing a pre-understanding that is fundamental in order to understand a culture. Dalibor Vesely gives a vivid example of a French café, whose “representational [and] ontological structure can be grasped through a pre-understanding that is based on our familiarity with what is being studied and with the segment of world to which it belongs.”⁶⁸ This pre-understanding,⁶⁹ Vesely suggests, is situated and can be only acquired *in* the events of everyday life; becoming “rooted in the habits, customs and rituals of French life.”⁷⁰ It is what Gadamer calls the

⁶⁸ Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, the Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production*, p. 77-78. See also Weston, "Le Corbusier and the Restorative Fragment at the Swiss Pavilion," p. 174.

⁶⁹ Vesely's views have been discussed in relation to Ethics and the Heideggerian worldview: "Vesely claimed that technical representations in architecture are divided in the contemporary world from the older ethical representations of shared meaning..." Adam Sharr, *Heidegger for Architects*, Edited by Adam Sharr, Thinkers for Architects, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, p. 103.

⁷⁰ Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, the Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production*, p. 77-78. Pushing this interpretation to the limits, one could argue that in order to be

horizon of a situation: “‘to have a horizon’ means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to *see beyond it*.”⁷¹ Finally, Liberman illustrates the importance of embodied engagement of the researcher in order to grasp the studied situation, with the following example about *yoga*, which is not different from my approach to the *dojo*:

Any competent social scientist would have been able to observe that one cannot define yoga, for example, exclusively by studying its texts. Yoga is a practice that leads to an experience; it cannot be reduced to its literary representation without inflicting some epistemic damage.⁷²

1.2.6 ‘Ethics’ of this research

Here I would like to stress a contradiction of having to describe the Ethical aspects of this research, seemingly in advance of the research itself. This contradiction lies in the wider standpoint that this research adopts concerning Ethics. It could be summarised by stating that Ethics cannot be separated and studied in advance, outside the context of the research *praxis*. The overall thesis argues that the Ethical problems of this research are inherent within the research itself and cannot be dealt out of the context of the research. So any account of Ethical issues that is been made here is only a post-rationalization that is doomed to be elliptical and will always provide an illusive image of the actual Ethical decisions that the researcher had to take while doing the actual research. The Ethics of this research and the conventional academic procedures set to inform and protect the subjects from participating against their will, were not preset and applied only as a general rule. So, as I will explain hereafter, although the subjects agreed to provide their permission for the completion of this research, I would like to argue that it was the careful *discovery* approach of the research, and of the subjects, that provides the ethical merit of this research and not the consent form itself.

French one has to appreciate the café culture. And in order to appreciate the café culture one becomes French.

⁷¹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 301 [emphasis added].

⁷² Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 6.

So, having the previous thoughts and Liberman's words in mind I shall continue by presenting the 'Ethics of Research.' Like any other conventional academic research, that is engaged with the study of other people's everyday life, this research faced issues of University Research Ethics.⁷³ For this reason, every possible measure has been taken to prevent any harassment of the subjects taking part in it (as well as securing the researcher from unethical requests for future benefits). The subjects were informed about the research and had the opportunity to ask questions about its details. All the subjects have agreed to participate in this research and the ones that can be identified by the images presented here have signed consent forms that permit the ethically correct usage of the produced material.⁷⁴

Having said that, I should also stress that the application of the abovementioned principles was not as straightforward as it seems. Firstly, the researcher (coming from a different cultural background) had to overcome his preconceptions and ways of dealing with these ethical issues and adapt to the established norms of the British academic system and society in general. In this sense, the Ethics of this research were formed together with the research itself. This means, for example, that in some cases, some subjects were informed after the recordings had already taken place and after their right not to be filmed at all had already been breached.⁷⁵ Furthermore it is

⁷³ A very special aspect of the Ethics of this research has to do with the study in the *dojo* against a possible accusation for orientalism. This is developed later on in the detailed analysis of the *dojo*. See p. 99

⁷⁴ The consent form was accompanied with a 'FAQ' sheet (the text of both documents can be found in the Appendix, p. 355) that could be kept for further reference, informing the participants about this research. They were made aware that they had the option to end their participation or to withdraw at any time. They also had the opportunity to decide where the research material that they were involved in could be presented: i.e. they could decide whether or not it can be used in publications, conferences, online, radio, TV, etc. The subjects were informed that due to the nature of the gathered data (i.e. video-recordings), it might not be possible to conceal their identity as participants. As a safeguard against this, the option was provided for them to review the material and have any segments erased according to their preference, as well as the fact that all their personal data (i.e. names, addresses and other revealing information) is held in confidence through the use of pseudonyms. Finally it was explicit that the subjects would gain no monetary benefits and that this is non-therapeutic research.

⁷⁵ Moreover, in each of the three case studies the approach was slightly different depending on the specificity of the educational case. In the design studio I was introduced at the very beginning of the year by the course organiser, both as a tutor and as a postgraduate student who was conducting research for the purpose of a doctoral thesis. In the case of the 'Music in the Community' class I was introduced to the other students, as a researcher that would participate in the project, during the first meeting about the community project. Finally, in the case of the *dojo*, although the teacher knew my role and identity from the very beginning, I was never formally introduced to the other

important to note that although Dorian signed the consent form, he was particularly worried that his words can be easily distorted (and misread as extremist right-wing) if read out of context or in a fragmented way.⁷⁶ This is noted here in order to stress, that there is no absolute way to reassure the subjects beforehand⁷⁷ (like in the case of Dorian) that their words will not be misunderstood. For the same reason I should remind the reader of Ingold's constant suspicion about the stranger being always on our heels.

1.3 Why choose examples beyond the Design Studio?

1.3.1 The 'strange other' that informs the familiar

In the introduction to this chapter, I have already characterised the design studio as a place familiar to all of the ethno- group of architects. For us then, the architects, the music class and the *dojo* represent unfamiliar spaces that, at first glance, resist our comprehension. If the design studio is for the architects some notion of 'home' then the other two educational places appear to "signify the dispossessed, the homeless, the traveller, the refugee and the alien."⁷⁸ The decision to juxtapose the design studio

students, due to the specific formal structure of each class in this educational place. Nevertheless, my role as a researcher became explicit through my personal interaction with the fellow students, and through my obvious research activities when not on the mats (video recording, taking notes etc). In the case of the *dojo*, due to its particular educational character, it was difficult to reveal my identity as researcher from the very beginning. Another contributing factor to this difficulty was the fact that the education of the *dojo* is not 'professional' and most of the students consider it as 'leisure' or a 'hobby.' Although ethnomethodologically the difference is insignificant, it should be noted that this affected the way that the collection of data was accomplished. Such, students do not attend the classes frequently, but rather randomly or arbitrarily. Also it is very common for students to start in the middle or even at the end of the term. As a result, it was occasionally necessary to adopt unorthodox means to announce the researcher's role; for example setting a sign stating that 'research is under progress', or by introducing myself in-person to new students. Furthermore, in the design studio I continually reminded the students of my dual role by asking their permission to record the tutorials or by occasionally asking them to record what they found interesting or important from the tutorials of their colleagues.

⁷⁶ For quite long time I worked this thesis by concealing the real names of the teachers as well as the students. Nevertheless due to the fact that I was often referencing the course's handouts that the teachers had written, I decided to acknowledge their authorship by revealing their identity –after having their permission.

⁷⁷ "When one *discovers* a people's world only after, and by means of, meeting with them, one is treating people in a just manner. In order to see what the Other is doing, one cannot presume that one already knows what they are doing better than the people themselves do." Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 39 [emphasis in the original].

⁷⁸ Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p. 147.

with the music class and the *dojo* is a conscious decision to bring together the familiar with the other; the known with the strange; the habitual with the weird; the accustomed with the peculiar; the routine with the bizarre. This attitude was a common practice for Wittgenstein, who, in the context of language, used extensively the juxtaposition of a particular picture, by putting it into contact with other, and even incompatible images, as a liberative technique of deliteralization.⁷⁹ As I am going to analyse in chapter 3,⁸⁰ there are specific characteristics of Ethics itself and its connection to the notion of habit that makes such a juxtaposition a fruitful tactic to re-think the things that we already understand about the design studio. Moreover, Garfinkel sees his ethnomethodological studies in a similar fashion of contrasting the familiar with strangeness.⁸¹

This technique of forcing together terms that appear to be strange and uneven engages us in a dialogical tension between the familiar and the unfamiliar that promotes speculation and re-evaluation of previously accepted and unchallenged meanings. Eventually, the outcome that is expected from this assembly of different educational places under one comparative examination is a re-understanding of the conformist conceptions that we maintain regarding the design studio. In order to achieve this re-conceptualization of our homeliness in the design studio, we need to go away from it, to leave it, in order to see something different that is not 'home'. Returning home after going afar changes our understanding of home itself. While nothing has literally changed in it, it is the journey that has changed our understanding of home. This metaphorical journey is in some sense a very interesting interpretation of the concept of education overall. As Snodgrass and Coyne put it:

Giving oneself over to something other is a going out to the other, so that *Bildung* [that roughly corresponds to 'education'] involves the notion of leaving home, the locus of what one already understands and is at home with, and going out into a new place that is strange and unfamiliar. As

⁷⁹ Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 211.

⁸⁰ See p. 140

⁸¹ A word of reservation. Despite their procedural emphasis, my studies are not properly speaking experimental. They are demonstrations, designed, in Herbert Spiegelberg's phrase, as "aids to a sluggish imagination". I have found that they produce reflections through which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar world can be detected. Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, p. 38.

one comes to understand this other place, as it becomes familiar, it comes to be a new home. You now feel at home in the place that was previously alien. This new homeliness has changed who you are. Returning to your starting point, your original home, it is changed. You see it in a new way, and understand it differently. As Heraclitus says, when the traveller returns home, he is different from and more than when he set out.⁸²

Nevertheless, the two ‘other’ educational places do not have equal value of otherness. The music class is a ‘familiar other’ that is still operating within the norms of Western academic educational tradition, as we know it at the university level. On the contrary, the *dojo* is an ‘exotic other’⁸³ that operates at a level of education that seems foreign to our ‘western eyes,’ especially at the beginning. If the three educational places were fruits, then (for a person from Greece) the design studio would be an orange. Something so common that one wouldn’t even notice in her everyday encounter with it. The music class would be a banana. Something that doesn’t really come from ‘around here,’ but still one knows about it and can buy it in some markets and, due to the fact that it is not very expensive, pretty much everyone has probably tried some. On the other hand, the *dojo* is like a *papaya*; an exotic and uncommon fruit. One may have heard of it in a question at Trivial Pursuit or in a geography class in high school, but hasn’t really seen it and even if she had been to places where one could buy it, she would pass it by for fear of the unknown.

In these terms, there is no specific reason for choosing the music class and the *dojo* to be juxtaposed to the design studio. Virtually any educational place that fulfils the requirements of ‘otherness’ explained above would serve a valid source of information and analysis. Nevertheless, the choice of the two ‘other’ places was not a random decision. The original motivation for researching the subject of Ethics in architectural design education resulted from a preliminary interest in the Ethical aspects of bodily conflict. Principally in the way that this conflict appears in the

⁸² Coyne and Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, p. 244. Moreover they also argue earlier on that: “...the alien other is no longer seen as a static and passive object from which we can extract a monosemic meaning to be used for our own purposes of manipulation, but is seen as an inexhaustible source of ever-changing and polysemic possibilities for changing not only our understanding of the other culture, but of our own.” Coyne and Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, p. 177.

⁸³ Renos Papadopoulos, "The Other Other: When the Exotic Other Subjugates the Familiar Other," *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 47, no. 2, 2002: 163-188?

Japanese culture in general, and the Japanese martial arts specifically. The music class became the third element of the triangle quite early in this study, in order to bridge the gap of otherness between the design studio and the *dojo*. Inspiration for this was the extensive music lessons that I had as a child and teenager, where I studied classical guitar for almost a decade. So although the connection between the three places is loose in their causal relationship, it makes sense in the personal level of experiences that were ready-to-hand for the purposes of this research.

My personal acquaintance with the two ‘other’ case studies may at first seem to be in contrast to the levels of otherness, strangeness and alienation that I suggested previously. One could say that all the three places were equally familiar for the researcher and because of this, the positive outcomes of such a comparison might be suspect. This argument would be valid only if we conceive the ‘other’ as a fixed, static and remote object from any interaction of the approaching subject. If we use Gadamer’s analysis of the *I-Thou* relationship during the dialogical situation, this is the first and most inappropriate way of interaction between ‘I-Thou’, where the ‘I’ fails to see the ‘Thou’ as a subject. In the second way, the ‘I’ recognises the ‘Thou’ as a subject that has a will and variable responses, but keeps itself closed to ‘Thou’ by applying dogmatic interpretations of it that stop the dialogue. In the third and appropriate way according to Gadamer, the ‘I’ sees in the ‘Thou’ a subject that is another ‘I’ and opens itself to it, experiencing a real dialogue and interaction. This approach takes place with the a projection of expectations and prejudices, but also lets the ‘I’ open to be affected by the ‘Thou.’ In this view the other is never a total alien and it is always the subject of preconceptions that one always has about the other.

To recall again the example of the fruit, our Greek fellow who encounters the papaya for the first time, would still appreciate that this strange thing must be a fruit, particularly if she would see it labelled as such. This would trigger a memory from a Trivial Pursuit game or a Geography class. She could also bring to mind the time that she tried a pineapple (a bit less exotic for a person from Greece) and the strange and delightfully sweet taste that she experienced might offer her the courage to try it. Or

conversely, being discouraged by the inflated price, would go to the cheaper banana section or even just to the familiar oranges. In these terms, the music class and the *dojo* can never be completely alien. Even if one has never experienced or participated in these places or activities, she or he carries prejudices about them, formed by the flux of information encountered in everyday life. My familiarity with the case studies should not be seen as a closure of the horizon for the observed experiences, or as mere practical research convenience, but rather as experiences that informed the content of this study. Actually, in some senses all three places were new to me, since my previous experience of them was in Athens, Greece. Therefore the data gathering and concretising of the material took place in the completely new geographical and cultural environment, in Edinburgh, Scotland.

1.3.2 Concluding remarks about the ‘other’ case studies as metaphors for the Design Studio

So far, I have extensively used metaphorical language to describe the familiar situation of the design studio *as* ‘home’, with the music class and the *dojo* as conditions of estrangement or ‘homelessness.’ Also I have metaphorically associated the three places with fruits in order to make this relationship more explicit. Nevertheless, this juxtaposition of the various terms is just a comparison where one sheds light onto the other; the fruits’ familiarity helps us to understand the familiarity of the three educational places. But if one would use the metaphorical terms “...not simply comparing one with the other, as in a simile, when we say that one thing is like something else. This later is the form of trope.”⁸⁴ Metaphor by contrast, reveals qualities that are unfamiliar in both terms of the trope. Metaphor has been used extensively throughout postmodernism as a technique to reveal forgotten characteristics and to enhance understanding, not through seeking clarity, but rather seeking to enrich them, and to make them flourish by celebrating their difference.⁸⁵ Metaphor has also been emphasized in order to oppose the domination of method as

⁸⁴ Coyne and Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, p. 253.

⁸⁵ Ballantyne describes metaphor through Deleuze and Guatari as a nomadic restlessness or a ‘moving on.’ Andrew Ballantyne, *Architecture Theory, a Reader in Philosophy and Culture*, London & New York: Continuum, 2005, p. 10.

part of the Enlightenment project. Especially in the Hermeneutic philosophical tradition, the metaphor itself appears to be (again), a journey; leaving from home to go to the ‘other’ – the unknown – in order to come back again wealthier and enriched.

A different and radical way to re-conceptualise the design studio through metaphors, according to the above, would be to force oneself to see the *design studio as a music class* or the *design studio as a dojo*.⁸⁶ This different view of the metaphor focuses on bringing to light the unfamiliar and uncommon characteristics of both terms. In bringing the music class and the *dojo* ‘next to’ the design studio I do not handle the two ‘other’ educational places as something fixed and known, rather they become liberated, moving and mysterious. This is the position from which I seek to approach the design studio; through this understanding of the ‘other’ situations. These two terms are then exploited for their different degree of ‘strangeness’ in order to reveal characteristics of Ethical discourse in the design studio that are also new, unfamiliar and different.

Before, I start the detailed analysis of the three key studies, where I will also present the historical framework in which they operate; I need to state at the outset that there is something oddly *ahistorical*⁸⁷ in the metaphorical use of language. When I framed the *design studio as home* for architects, this was a closure for the historical notion of what different people understand as home to be in different cultures (different people

⁸⁶ This was the aspiration for my paper: Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio: 1+3 Ahistorical Metaphors," *EAR (Edinburgh Architecture Research)*, 30, 2007: pp. 63-71. An earlier version: Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Heterotopic Metaphors of the Design Studio: Bazaar, Agora Gymnasium or Dojo?," paper presented at the conference: *XXII World Congress of Architecture 'Cities: Grand Bazaar of Architectures'*, UIA (International Union of Architects), Istanbul 3-7 July 2005.

⁸⁷ Koutsoumpos, "Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio: 1+3 Ahistorical Metaphors," p. 63. In the earlier version of this paper mentioned above, I had described these places as heterotopias. Foucault describes these places with the following lines "There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places - places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society - which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality" Michele Foucault, *Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias (Des Espace Autres)*, 1967. First published by the French journal *Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité* in October, 1984, based on a lecture given by Michel Foucault in March 1967. Available from: <http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html> [Accessed 10. 07 2006].

understand different things as home). Nevertheless at the very same time, there is an openness that allows different people (virtually everyone) to understand the metaphor beyond its disclosed details. The ahistorical understanding of the design studio that I am implying here, does not attempt to substitute the historical review⁸⁸ of design education that I am going to present in the following chapter. The ahistorical metaphors require for a need to *forget* history temporarily, in order to *create new* understandings of Ethics in the design studio.⁸⁹

So far, I have presented reasons why I have chosen to juxtapose the practical and everyday examples with the theoretical antithesis that argues for the impossibility of teaching Ethics. Ethnomethodology, deeply rooted in the Wittgensteinian philosophy, has emerged as a fruitful means of approaching the case studies and will be a guide for the analysis of the following examples. Furthermore, I described the methodology by which the data was collected and analysed. I have also argued that the *dojo* and the music class, through their otherness, can inform and enrich our customary understanding of Ethics in the design studio. The following chapter is an introduction to these educational places and provides a preliminary situation of educational activity (similar to the one of the design studio), pointing out its relation to Ethics. This initial framework will allow the addition of further situations that will come in the following chapters.

⁸⁸ “[T]he antidote to the historical is called- the unhistorical and suprahistorical. ... With the word ‘the unhistorical’ I designate the art and power of *forgetting* and of enclosing oneself within a bounded *horizon*; ...” Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations, Texts in German Philosophy*, Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 57-123, p. 120 [italics in the original]. The ahistorical, according to Nietzsche is not without history but is beyond history. It is *suprahistorical*, and its role of concealing things under the veil of forgetfulness, is as important as the need to root them in the historical and the *remembrance* of being as part of the world. For this, the ahistorical notions of the three educational places when seen as parts of metaphors, are not caricatures of places. Instead they are representations of paradigmatic places deriving from a common understanding of the terms, despite their concrete present existence. In this sense, metaphor here is used as an *ahistorical tool* to force the production of new meaning. See also: Richard and Snodgrass Coyne, Adrian, "Problem Setting within Prevalent Metaphors of Design," *Design Issues*, 11, no. 2, 1995: 31-61, p. 31 & 46.

⁸⁹ For example, we read Shakespeare’s words through Romeo’s lips when he says “Juliet is the sun.” In this case we can understand the metaphor without necessarily referring to the shift between the Aristotelian and the Copernican universe, or the whole discourse about heliocentrism, that took place at the same historical time that the play was written. Such an interpretation would be very interesting, but one can understand a palpable and poetic metaphor of love, when Juliet was compared to the sun, despite the fact that she has nothing physically in common with a glowing star and despite our historic knowledge of the order of the universe. For more details see Koutsoumpou, "Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio: 1+3 Ahistorical Metaphors," p. 64.

Looking for Ethics in Everyday Education Activities
— Practice-games Part II:
Introducing the *Dojo*, the Music class
and the Design Studio



...

When the child was a child
it had no opinion about anything
had no habits
it often sat cross-legged
took off running
had a cowlick in its hair
and made no faces when photographed.

...

Peter Handke,
Song to Childhood

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the methodology for approaching the key studies and presented the design studio as a familiar place for architects. The example of the educational situation that opened the previous chapter takes this familiarity for granted. But how does one introduce the studio to someone unfamiliar with it? Can an architect reader remove herself or himself from this studio culture in order to see it with new eyes? This chapter attempts to estrange the architect-reader by presenting the two other case studies first: the *dojo* and the music class (by degree of otherness). Then, it returns with a fresh mind and new insights to review the education that takes place in the design studio. Procedurally, I will present each case by offering an educational situation, followed by a brief discussion of its relations to Ethics. Then I will proceed to present the history of the education of each practice, as well as the syllabus of the courses under examination.

2.2 The Dojo

2.2.1 What is the *dojo* and what happens there?¹

Dojo is the place for practising the Japanese martial arts. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that *dojo* is “a room or a hall in which judo is practised”, but this is a rather narrow, if not inaccurate, definition. Actually the *dojo* is not necessarily an enclosed space; it could be any site or physical location where such practice takes place. Furthermore, in Japanese language, the word *dojo* is not restricted only to the practice of *judo* (or indeed any other martial art, like *kendo* or *aikido*), but rather is used to describe the practice of other kinds of art as well. The word *dojo* in Japanese consists of two characters: *do-jo* (道-場), which literally mean ‘way-place’ or ‘the place of the way’. The two characters are borrowed from the Chinese script (pronounced *dao-chang*), and have the same meaning as in Japanese.² *Dojo* is every

¹ An earlier version of this description of the *dojo* was included in my publication: Leonidas Koutsoumpas, "Ethics and the Architectural Design Studio: 1+3 Ahistorical Metaphors," *EAR (Edinburgh Architecture Research)*, 30, 2007: pp. 63-71, p. 67.

² Furthermore it seems to correspond to the Sanskrit word *bodhimanda*, the “place where one cultivates the Way, or one's spiritual Path. The original Wayplace was the spot under the Bodhi tree

place where a particular martial *way* is cultivated (*ken-do*, the way of the sword; *ai-ki-do*, the way of the balance of the spirit etc). Nevertheless, the term is used also in non-martial practices that extend from the famous tea ceremony (*sa-do*, the way of the tea) to the art of calligraphy (*sho-do*, the way of writing). We can see that in all these cases the notion of *do* or way forms the last constituent of the name of each practice. “A speciality (e.g. studies, arts), a *manner according to a field*”³ is constitutive part of the *dojo*. In this sense, *dojo* is both the physical location of the school and the name of the general school of thought. In the same sense that ‘the school of the Bauhaus’ is both the physical space of the school in Weimar, as well as the general school of thought that, beyond Weimar, continued to develop in Dessau, in Berlin and in Chicago. It is also important to know that “a *dojo* is a practical kind of place, used not only to foster lofty ideas, but to realize them in some physical or at least palpable way”⁴.




Figure 10: Order and messiness in the dojo:
The opening ceremony (left) and a moment of practice (right)

The key study of this research is a private *dojo* in Edinburgh named *L'Art du Chi* (also often referred to as *Art-of-Chi*), run by Laurent Haquin (a Frenchman) who offers education in two different types of martial arts: *Aikido* and *Tai Chi*. The focus of this study will be on *aikido*, because of my previous familiarity and intimate interest about this martial art (even so, the same or similar study could have been

where the Buddha became fully enlightened. The term 'Wayplace' includes monasteries and other auspicious sites where people, either singly or together, put the *Buddhadharma* into practice.”
<http://online.sfsu.edu/~rone/Buddhism/BuddhistDict/BDW.html>

³ *Dictionary of Japanese (Nihon Kokugo Daijiten)* [translated by Dr. Yuka Kadoi]

⁴ Davis Winston, *Magic and Exorcism in Modern Japan*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1980, p. 1.

done with every other martial art). It is important to note that the *dojo* of *L'Art du Chi* does not have any permanent premises and, in fact, meets in different community centres as training space. As such, the *dojo* is constructed every evening. Before every session, the students pull out and arrange the mats that form the '*dojo*' and at the end of each class they return them to their storage space. This pre-class ritual is completed with the placement of an image of Morihei Ueshiba (M), the founder of *aikido* at one of the walls (Figure 10). This wall establishes a hierarchical direction recognised as the 'top,' with students sitting opposite and facing it. A very brief description of the class itself should include a formal ritual (Figure 10, left) in the beginning with a very short time of meditation and a bow towards the teacher and the founder followed by some stretching and warm up exercises. The course itself consists of a number of exercises which the teacher, with the help of a senior student, demonstrates each time, after which all the students repeat, most commonly in pairs (Figure 10, right). The sessions end again with brief meditation, the formal bow towards the teacher and the founder, and a ritualistic way of thanking each other.

2.2.2 A situation of education of Ethics in the *dojo*: 'losing the technique'

Jyu-waza means free technique. One then looks for the technique that is the best response to an attack, or even renders it impossible. This type of training favors freedom of movement.⁵

Nobuyoshi Tamura, *Aikido- Etiquette and Transmission*

Laurent (L), the instructor has shown a set of exercises and has asked the students to practice them in random order; which in *aikido* terms is *jiyu waza*. The class consists of a mixed group of 13 students (female and male) of various levels including three senior (wearing black trousers, *hakama*) and a complete beginner without uniform (*gi*). One of the relatively junior students is Susana (S), with only a few months experience. Laurent stands on the left side of the mats observing the way the students perform the exercise. His gaze scans the whole area of the mats (Figure 11 & Figure

⁵ Nobuyoshi Tamura and Translation by J.R. David, *Aikido- Etiquette and Transmission*, Available from: http://www.aikidoonline.com/Archives/2000/feb/feat_0200_tmra.html [Accessed 14. 04. 2008].

12). Suddenly he decides to intervene. He makes a first small step forward and then a second more decisive one and says:



Figure 11



Figure 12

L: o::ke:::y (now) (0.75)=⁶
 ((L starts moving towards the centre of the mats))
 ((L points towards Susana, a very junior student, sign that he wants to demonstrate an exercise with her)) (Figure 13)
 ((Susana approaches Laurent))
 ((the rest of the students start to retreat towards the edge of the mats))




Figure 13

⁶ Note the difference in the nomenclature of transcribing, which I will adopt from now on. Here, I have used the Conversation Analysis transcript techniques offered by Emanuel A. Schegloff, in his online transcription project: Available from: <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/index.html> [Accessed 23. 03. 2007]. An account of the method's symbols and annotation can be found in the Appendix p. 353.

- L: =there is a... (study) (steady) situation:n where we (0.5)=
 ((L makes a gesture by hitting the edge of his one palm on the other))
 (Figure 14)



Figure 14

- L: =we are here (proof) (0.5) see how we have place our feet::t (0.5)
 ((L lifts up his *hakama* so that the students can see his feet and makes a step back, aligning his feet in the formal posture)) (Figure 15)



Figure 15

- L: we (decide) the attack (0.5)=
 ((while still holding his *hakama*, L attacks Susana slowly with a strike above the head (*shomen uchi*) and she responds by protecting herself))
 ((only now all the students have sat down on their knees (*seiza*) in a semicircle around Laurent))
 ((L gestures with his hands on circular movement indicating 'and so on'))
- L: =there is a formality (.) that is necessary when we study a technique (0.5)
 when we do what we call *ji:yu: waza::* (.) which is throwing practice (.)
 ((gestures in a circular way))



Figure 16

- L: like this (0.5) we lo:::se all this technique (see) (*ici*) (2)=
 ((gestures like ‘throw away’))
 ((L starts to demonstrate an exercise but Susana is a bit confused since she doesn’t know if she is suppose to attack or defend. L grabs her hand and performs the exercise gently))
- L: =(try to stay with the partner) (8)
 ((L offers his arm so that S would start an attack since already on the ground))
 ((L continues performing 3 more variations of the attack))
- L: Hm (0.5) You (receive) the partner when the partner stands up (10)
 ((Clearing his throat))
 ((L speaks without interrupting his execution of the exercises))
 ((In his last demonstration L deliberately pushes Susana much harder than all the previous times, when he was gentle and slow. This causes Susana to fall down in a clumsy way and this makes the other students laugh)) (Figure 17 & Figure 18)



Figure 17



Figure 18

Students: Hhhhhhhh
 ((Laugh))

L: All over the place (1)=
 ((L speaks smiling))
 ((L gestures circularly))

L: =Please hh (2)=
 ((laughing))
 ((L gestures towards the centre of the mats, so that the students will start practicing again))
 ((the students bow formally towards L (Figure 19) and start to stand up in order to start exercising again))



Figure 19

L: =and keep the same (role) (0.75) the same partner and the same (role)
 ((L moves towards the right side of the mats)) ((the students start to perform the exercise again)) (Figure 20)



Figure 20

This example of the education activity in the *dojo* comes from the everyday practice; a routine class during the week. So how does the above incident have anything to do with Ethics? First of all, Aikido, being a martial art, is principally about handling human conflicts between two persons. The martial aspect of the art brings forth an encounter with the other, in the most explicit and directly confrontational way, similar to that in architecture and music. The Ethics of martial arts in this sense could be seen as a paradigmatic relationship of Ethics in everyday situations. Westbrook and Ratti have codified different Ethical responses to the martial confrontation, and especially in its relation to self-defence (Figure 21).⁷ The first three panels have the same result: a man is killed either without provocation (Panel A); with provocation (Panel B); or in self-defence (Panel C). Panel D is described as “the ultimate in ethical self-defence,”⁸ since it leaves the one who attacked disarmed but not injured. One cannot resist mentioning the similarity of the sketches below with the pin-men drawing from Wittgenstein (Figure 4) and ultimately with the educational situation between Laurent and Susana in the *dojo*.




Figure 21: Ethical responses to the martial confrontation⁹

⁷ Adele Westbrook and Oscar Ratti, *Aikido and the Dynamic Sphere, an Illustrated Introduction*, Rutland & Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1970 Reprint, 14th, p. 34.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Figure by Ibid.

However, despite such attempts to codify Ethics in this abstract way, the students that practice in the *dojo* are not introduced to any theoretical notions of Ethics before the practice. The Ethical aspects of this educational practice are embodied in the demonstration of the exercise. For example, we saw that Laurent used Susana to demonstrate some aspects of the *jiyu waza*. Aikido, by its very nature, has to do with grasps and throws, and its practice almost exclusively happens with a partner. Here, we can see that Laurent deliberately chose a junior student to demonstrate the technique (although senior students were present), because he wanted to emphasise the ‘losing of the technique,’ and a junior student would make a better example of illustrating the ‘absence’ of technique.

But even after Laurent’s demonstration with Susana we saw that the students rushed to form pairs in order to start practicing the technique. Before and after a pair of students start practicing an exercise that has been demonstrated, they should perform a ritual bow towards each other (an explicit rule of *dojo etiquette*).¹⁰ According to David Appelbaum, the bow has an explicit Ethical reference: “Bowling, one feels the mighty’s response to the exigence of creation, its need for enlightenment. In the bow, the paradox expresses how subordination becomes might without recourse to the gesture of meaning.”¹¹ In this particular situation, Laurent asked the students to keep the same partner and perform the same roles, and most of the students started practicing without performing this ritual. Nevertheless, Jennifer did invite her partner Michael by bowing (Figure 22, left) and he returned the gesture (Figure 22, right).



Figure 22: Jennifer invites Michael to practice (left) and he responds (right)

¹⁰ See p. 374 of the Appendix.

¹¹ David Appelbaum, *Disruption*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 160.

This type of bowing is quite different from the bow that took place in front of the teacher at the end of the demonstration (Figure 19), or the bow that takes place in at the opening and the closing rituals of the class (Figure 10, left), which are more explicitly hierarchical (more about this will be discussed in Chapter 5). The bowing between Jennifer and Michael is not only an embodied gesture that invites the other to start practicing, but also means ‘thank you,’ a quite common way to show respect for the other in Japanese culture. It can also be seen as a theatrical gesture that cultivates an understanding of the exercise itself as something abstract. It shows the awareness that what is going to take place is an imitation; there should not be real hostile feelings and real anger since this is exercise – a *mimesis of a praxis*.¹² Nevertheless, the *praxis* itself is a martial conflict full of Ethical implications of an abstract notion of an attack and a defence.

Even so, in the above situation, the roles of the attack and the defence were quite ambiguous. For example, when Laurent explained about the ‘losing of the technique’ he extended his arms indicating that he wanted to demonstrate a technique. However Susana was not sure whether she was supposed to attack Laurent or whether his gesture itself was an attack, on which she would have to defend herself. Susana finally raised her hand, although still hesitating, in a sign of ambiguous defence. A reason for this reaction could have been that Laurent’s gesture was itself somehow ambiguous, or possibly because Laurent had performed an attack on her just a few seconds before, demonstrating to the students the ‘formality’ of the usual way of performing the exercise. Finally, Laurent gently grabbed her arm, demonstrating the defence, despite the fact that Susana was not actually attacking. So, contrary to the conventional way that distinguishes the Ethical role of the attack and the defence (usually prising the Ethically correct stance of defence), we see here that the roles of the *nage* (the person that performs the attack) and the *uke* (the person that performs the defence and executes the technique) both have to be learned. But even beyond this, the indecisive seconds where the attack and defence were blurred for Susana, demonstrate how these roles are performed after an ineffable negotiation, and that

¹² This expression comes from Aristotle’s definition of tragedy (*Poetics* 49b 24), which is going to be dealt with in Chapter 4. Moreover, Chapter 5 deals in great detail with this notion of *mimesis*.

understanding the role that one plays is also something puzzling especially for the junior students. At the same time though – especially because the roles of the *nage* and the *uke* are both equally necessary for the practice of Aikido – any such Ethical association between the attack and the defence have been removed from the everyday practice. Furthermore, this can be reflected in *aikido's* overall philosophy that blends attack and defence, utilising the force of the opponent; a fact that maybe can be understood better through the popular *ying* and *yang* principle.¹³

The scope of the analysis in this chapter is far from being extensive or definite. Nevertheless, the diversity of the topics raised here is an attempt to open up possible discussions about Ethics. Also it starts to become apparent that through the degree of detail this analysis reveals a whole cosmos of Ethics in the educational process waiting to be explored. Still though, in order to provide a wider understanding of the education of the *dojo*, there is a need to visit the historical context of martial arts education as it came to evolve in what we just saw in the *dojo* of the *L' Art du Chi*. Moreover, I will also show how the concept of the *way* in the far East countries, and Japan in specific, has an inherent Ethical basis. Finally, I will address the methodological issue of *Orientalism*, as inherent problem in dealing with the exotic 'otherness' of the *dojo* in the light of postcolonial studies.

2.2.3 The *dojo* in the history of the education of martial arts

It goes without saying that the main issue when teaching Aikido is to be a good teacher. The teacher must work technically but must also strive to progress spiritually and morally. The teacher must correctly open the heart's eye and thus become a good example to his students.¹⁴

Nobuyoshi Tamura, *Aikido- Etiquette and Transmission*

¹³ Herzog & de Meuron have stated about their award winning project of the Tate Gallery of Modern art, that utilised the existing building of a power-house and its existing 500 foot turbine: "This is a kind of Aikido strategy where you use your enemy's energy for your own purposes. Instead of fighting it, you take all the energy and shape it in unexpected and new ways."
http://www.ArchitectureWeek.com/2001/0404/news_1-2.html [Accessed: 11. 04. 2008].

¹⁴ Tamura and David, *Aikido- Etiquette and Transmission*.

Although *aikido* is one of the newest established martial arts – created in the first half of the 20th century in Japan, by Morihei Ueshiba (1883-1969) – education in the martial arts in general has a long history and usually every *dojo* is very proud of exhibiting the genealogy of its historical background. Especially in Asia, many people from different social classes practice martial arts since early historic times.¹⁵ There are records before 1000 B.C. that an ancient forms of combat known as *jujitsu* was staged before the Emperor of Japan.¹⁶ In Japan, as in Europe, the class of professional warriors – the famous *samurais* – emerged with the rise of feudalism. The word *samuarai* means ‘guard’ or ‘attendant’, similar to the old English *cniht* (*knecht, knight*).¹⁷ The “Sinico-Japanese word *Bu-ke* or *Bu-shi* (fighting knights)”¹⁸ emerged also to identify the military class, which began to play a determinate role from the 10th and 11th century,¹⁹ as a result of the strong system of class distinction in Japan. Nevertheless, the farmer-warrior which was also common, has actively participated in the formation of the ethos of martial arts: “[the farmer-warrior being a] traditionalist by nature he also adopted the stern code of Ethics which had inspired the *buke*, and steeped as he was in the territorial tradition of the clan, he was particularly influenced by the Confucian ideal of loyalty to father and lord.”²⁰

Records compiled by scribes of the military clans from the 11th century onwards refer to the schools dedicated to learn the different weapons both in theory and in practice, as ‘schools of martial skills’ (*bujutsu-ryu*).²¹ By naming these places *dojo*, it reveals the usage of religious elements to substantiate the martial ethos of the feudal Japan, since the name is “borrowed from the Buddhist nomenclature for the halls set aside for meditation and other spiritual exercises in virtually every monastery and convent.”²² Despite the general term *dojo*, different kinds of schools can be identified

¹⁵ Robert Crego, *Sports and Games of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Sports and Games through History, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁷ Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*, translated by Tokuhei Suchi: Bilingual Books, (1900), p. 37.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Oscar Ratti and Adele Westbrook, *Secrets of the Samurai: A Survey of the Martial Arts of Feudal Japan*, Rutland, Vermont & Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1973, p. 49.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 161.

depending on the following: whether it was referring only to *samurais* as part of the military clan, or if it was referring more openly to developing the martial skills of peasants, or if it was random classes of wandering warriors (*ronins* –masterless *samurais*), or whether it was part of a monastic activity in a religious complex.²³ In any case, there was a continuous attempt from the central government to control the foundation and running of the different schools, and even then there was always space for illegal improvisation:

However, the mansions of certain merchants who had martial (hence, political) ambitions did provide ample room in their architectural designs for possible adaptation to and often illegal use of space for training in martial arts, such as spearmanship and swordsmanship, under the guidance of a private teacher belonging to an acknowledged *ryu* of *bujutsu*.²⁴

A very important shift for the Japanese martial arts happened during the Tokugawa Dynasty (1603-1868), when the social classes became extremely strict (divided into samurais, peasants, artisans and merchants) and the carrying of swords was prohibited to everyone, apart from *samurais*. During this time, codes of *samurai* conduct were formed and the samurais were prohibited from committing *seppuku* (committing suicide in respect of their lord –also known as *harakiri*). This period though was relatively peaceful and many samurais found that they had no real role in the society. The government tried to help unemployed samurais by stressing the importance of education. During this period many samurais turned to various scholastic activities: writing, poetry and arts, manifested by the advancements of various forms like *kabuki*, *haiku*, and woodblock printing. At the same time many samurais became teachers of martial arts. A complicated system of official and unofficial schools like *terakoya*, *gôkô* and *shijuku* were established leading to “the transformation of a largely illiterate warrior class at the beginning of the Tokugawa period, to a fully literate and well-disciplined class of loyal bureaucrats with generally shared intellectual culture by the end.”²⁵ Moral education was a

²³ Ibid., p. 158-159.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 160.

²⁵ Richard Rubinger, *Private Academies of Tokugawa Japan*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 7. See also about the education of “practical arts” like the military *juku* in pp. 174-182.

fundamental part of the study in these schools, mainly through the study of Chinese scholarship and especially Confucian Ethics.²⁶

Jujitsu declined in Japan with the total collapse of the feudal system during the second half of the 19th century and various different styles became sports. *Judo* is such an example, whose admirers “regarded the sport as symbolic of Western rationalism and culture.”²⁷ Very soon some of these sports became engulfed in higher education and still remain so today.²⁸ In the case of *judo*, Dr. Jigoro Kano, president of the University of Education in Tokyo, codified its methods and techniques in 1882. Despite the rationalization that occurred later in higher education, in the 19th century most of the modern schools of martial arts were also founded. This caused a shift from the *-jutsu* to the *-do*, which nevertheless claim to have inherited the practices of the traditional *bujutsu*, “often linking themselves to martial *ryu* of ancient or extinct lineage.”²⁹ Moreover, as I will show in the following section, the shift from the *-jutsu* to the *-do* has marked the understanding of Ethics in martial arts.

2.2.4 Ethics as the ‘way’ in martial arts: *Bushido*

Dr. Nitobe Inazo, a Japanese Foreign Minister who has also served as Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations, in 1899 wrote a book re-examining the concept of *bushido* in Japanese culture. *Bushido* is the code of conduct of the *samurais*, and it is recorded in Japanese history much before Nitobe.³⁰ His

²⁶ R.P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*, London: Routledge & Hegan Paul, 1965, p. 34. See also Rubinger, *Private Academies of Tokugawa Japan*, p. 7 and about Chinese studies pp. 41-98.

²⁷ Crego, *Sports and Games of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, p. 14.

²⁸ “On July 7 in Showa 18 (1943), Japan Ministry of Education banned the student judo competition and commanded the students of departments of Liberal Arts to battlefields. Many students departments of Kyoto University Judo Club were forced to make a military service and died in vain. Kyoto University Judo Club was obliged to be absent because of the loss of members.” From an essay titled “History of Kyoto University Judo Club” originally written by Kojima Shinpei, Translated by Okumura Koshi, in 1990, Modified a little by Taguchi Ken in 2000 <http://www.kusu.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~judo/history-e.htm> [13. 02. 2007].

²⁹ Ratti and Westbrook, *Secrets of the Samurai*, p. 162.

³⁰ Maybe the most interesting example is the *Hagakure* written in the early 18th century: Tsunetomo Yamamoto, *The Hagakure: A Code to the Way of Samurai*, Toyko: Hokuseido Press, 1980. See also the contemporary interpretation of this book in Yukio Mishima, *Yukio Mishima on 'Hagakure': The Samurai Ethic and Modern Japan*, translated by Kathryn Sparling, A Condor Book, London: Souvenir Press, 1977.

contribution though, for purposes of this research, is important because of his explicit emphasis on relating *bushido* to Ethics. It is also notable that Nitobe makes a direct reference to John Ruskin, the ‘father of Ethics’ in arts and especially architecture. In the following quote, Nitobe makes an explicit connection between martial arts and the ethos of war in general, as a means to ‘learning the truth of word,’ ‘strengthening the thought,’ ‘nourishing,’ ‘teaching,’ and ‘regeneration’:

Ruskin was one of the most gentle-hearted and peace-loving men that ever lived. Yet he believed in war with all the fervour of a worshipper of the strenuous life. “When I tell you,” he says in the *Crown of Wild Olive*, “that war is the foundation of all the arts, I mean also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men. It is very strange to me to discover this, and very dreadful, but I saw it to be quite and undeniable fact... I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted by peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace; in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace.”³¹

As previously discussed in the situation in the *dojo*, the connection between martial arts and Ethics is explicit; martial arts operate conditions of fight and scenarios of ‘war’ *in practice*. No matter how ‘peaceful’ or violent these practices are, they all after all, address conflicts between humans. Moreover, war, being the ‘foundation of all the arts’ according to Ruskin, promotes the martial arts to the highest artistic rank. It is exactly this notion that intrigues Nitobe to make such a clear connection between the East and the West. Martial arts, in this sense, not only encompass ‘all the high virtues and faculties of men,’ but also actually educate them and form them. But Nitobe’s argument goes far beyond this obvious connection with Ethics and war. His main argument was that the Ethics of the martial arts, or *bushido*, derive from the way of practicing it. “Bu-shi-do means literally Military-Knight-Ways – the ways which fighting nobles should observe in their daily life as well as in their vocation.”³² In other words, *bushido* were the moral principles that the samurais were “required or instructed to observe.”³³ However these principles were not a written code. Most commonly they were “handed down from mouth to mouth or coming

³¹ Nitobe, *Bushido*, p. 39.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³³ *Ibid.*

from the pen of some well-known warrior or savant.”³⁴ The fact that *bushido* is not an explicitly written text does not reduce its Ethical importance for the Japanese.³⁵ On the contrary, its value comes from practicing the martial art, not only as a professional vocation, but also in ‘everyday life.’ For this very reason, Nitobe argues, despite the fact that it emerged through the feudal period in Japan, grew beyond its mother institution to influence the future of, not only modern Japan, but of every other nation.³⁶ *Bushido* and Ethics can be understood as a way of living that extends the practice of martial arts, an understanding which originates from its practice. This understanding is also present in the historical shift from *-jutsu* to *-do*, mentioned before. According to Ratti and Westbrook:

The use of terms such as “martial ways” or “martial Ethics” (*budo*) rather than “martial skills” (*bujutsu*) was indeed ancient, for it is found in chronicles of the early Edo period. But it became almost absolute during the late Tokugawa period and afterward, when almost all the schools involved with the systematic teaching of specializations derived from feudal *bujutsu* referred to them primarily as *budo* specializations, that is, educational ways of achieving purposes other than those sought by the ancient *ryu* of *bujutsu*.³⁷

Arguably, these other purposes are not connected with the different activities that the samurais adopted while ‘resting’ from fighting during the Tokugawa period. Their main purpose was to imbue every activity of everyday life, by passing from the ‘skill’ (*jutsu*) to the ‘way’ (*do*). For this reason one can finally argue that Ethics appeared in martial arts in two forms: both as an explicit manipulation of human conflicts, and as an implicit way of life.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁵ “It, perhaps, fills the same position in the history of Ethics that the English Constitution does in political history; yet it has had nothing to compare with Magna Carta or the Habeas Corpus Act.” Ibid.

³⁶ “...the light of chivalry which was a child of feudalism, still illuminates our moral path, surviving its mother institution.” Ibid., p. 30.

³⁷ Ratti and Westbrook, *Secrets of the Samurai*, p. 169.

2.2.5 After Orientalism: a post-colonial study of *dojo*

In my attempt here to describe the *dojo*, a possible criticism can be raised. My engagement with the Japanese martial arts, as well as any Western attempt to engage with concepts and civilizations beyond the Western norms, could be accused of suffering the taint of *Orientalism*. Orientalism today³⁸ is used as a charge for the assumption of understanding (and for this controlling) other cultures through pre-formed categories and uncritical representations.³⁹ Orientalism as a negative characterization was formalised⁴⁰ and became extremely influential with Edward Said's seminal book *Orientalism* published in 1978.⁴¹ In brief, Said raised issues such as the representation of other cultures, societies and histories; the relationship between power and knowledge; the role of the intellectual and methodological questions that are connected with the relationships between different kinds of texts, between text and context, between text and history.⁴² So, is my approach of the *dojo* 'orientalistic'? Can this case study be accused of suffering from the effects of my Western perspective and cursory understanding of the culture I claim to study? Furthermore, can one suggest that by speaking (or writing) about the other *dojo* that not only do I misrepresent it, since I am a Westerner applying my own concepts about this 'oriental' place, but that I also don't leave space for the real people who 'dwell' in the *dojo* to speak about it themselves and for this I suppress them? How can I avoid applying my Western European categorisations onto the *dojo* through my prejudices of the East? In order to answer these questions one has to understand not

³⁸ In the past the term Orientalism used to mean a school of painters (mainly from Western Europe) that visited and depicted the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore it was used to describe a branch of scholarship that was engaged into the study of Eastern literature. Bernard Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism," *The New York Review of Books*, 29, no. 11, 1982: pp.49-56.

³⁹ Bryan S. Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 21.

⁴⁰ Obviously others before Said had discussed similar issues: Jaques Berque, "Perspectives De L'orientalisme Contemporain," *Ibla*, 20, 1957: pp. 217-237. Also: Anouar Malek-Abdel, "L'orientalisme En Crise," *Diogene*, 44, 1963: pp.109-141.

⁴¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon, 1978.

⁴² Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," *Cultural Critique*, no. 1, 1985: 89-107, p. 89. Within the context of colonial dissolutions, Said's book formed the basis of Postcolonial Studies and the examination of the way that the West manipulated the rest of the planet by imposing on it, its own 'Old European' knowledge. In these terms the 'Orient' is "not an inert and passive object, but a human construction created through generations of intellectuals artists, writers and orientalists." Patricia Almarcegui, *Orientalism: Twenty Years On*, Quaderns De La Mediterrania, No. 4: Comparative Visions of the Mediterranean, 2003. Available from: <http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/quaderns/4/aalmarcegui.pdf> [Accessed 04. 06. 2008].

only the thesis of *Orientalism*, but also the criticism that it has received,⁴³ especially in its sociological and anthropological perception.

Said's book is extremely critical about anthropology and every research field involving ethnographic examination of 'other' cultures. The notion of having insiders and outsiders in the context of a particular culture, like in the case of the *dojo*, "is actually a standard form of all anthropological problematics."⁴⁴ Especially if we place Said in the wider Postmodern condition, he can be seen as dissolving the subject/object relationship. This "certainly cuts the heart of the anthropological project, since a relation of self to other is fundamental in anthropology."⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Said has been accused for ignoring⁴⁶ anthropological views and their accounts of the Orient. Moreover, he later revised what few references on anthropology that he made in *Orientalism*,⁴⁷ making his views even more controversial. These aspects can lead to criticism of Said's influence in contemporary anthropology and 'ring the bell' for a possible fear of encountering any notion of the otherness, in order not to mistreat it.⁴⁸

Contrary to this absurd fear, here I would like to argue that it is not the encounter with the 'Other' culture *per se* that is problematic, but rather it is the *uncritical* encounter

⁴³ Said's book, and especially his polemical tone, raised a huge debate and critics of his work have focused on a wide variety of issues ranging from attacking Said personally for his noble origins and educational background; accusing him as being a 'humanist'; for supporting fundamentalist interpretations of Islam; for his over-interpretative and manipulative reading of Foucault; for using only Anglo-Saxon and French texts in his analysis; for representing the Orient as something static and unmoving; for being ideological; and overall that if his thesis were applied to his own work it seemed unreflective and ambivalent.

⁴⁴ Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Michael Richardson, "Enough Said: Reflections on Orientalism," *Anthropology Today*, 6, no. 4, 1990: pp. 16-19, p. 18.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁷ In *Orientalism*, Said praises Clifford Geertz by saying: "the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, whose interest in Islam is discrete and concrete enough to be animated by the specific societies and problems studied and not by the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of Orientalism" Said, *Orientalism*, p. 326. Nevertheless in a later paper *Orientalism Reconsidered* he characterises Geertz's approach as "standard disciplinary rationalizations and self-congratulatory clichés..." Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," p. 94.

⁴⁸ "While we need to be aware also of the danger of turning the 'Other' into an ill-defined universal, we need at the same time to be conscious of the contrary danger of relativizing the 'Other' to the extent that the context of the ethnographic encounter in time and space is lost, and both observer and observed are reduced to a common denominator in which it becomes increasingly difficult to extricate one from the other." Richardson, "Enough Said: Reflections on Orientalism," p. 19.

with it that can lead to absurdities. One aspect of this uncritical notion has to do with the ‘journalistic’ covering of issues like Islam, where journalists “pop in and out of countries for a few days, talk to a few taxi drivers and then write a lead article about Arabic politics.”⁴⁹ Another aspect has to do with the fear of opening ourselves to the ‘other’ or the dismissal of the desire to know about it and get involved with its encounter.⁵⁰ The view that people should only discuss things they already know and are familiar with just because they are identical to themselves is an unsteady position.⁵¹ There is no such thing as absolute difference and for this reason one should not be discouraged to speak for the different and unknown. As I have presented before, in the Hermeneutic philosophical tradition, the engagement in a dialogical experience with an Other, alien culture presupposes not just my acknowledgment of its Otherness, but more importantly the expectation that it has something to say to me; or in Gadamer’s words: “Openness to the other, then involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.”⁵² Expecting that something ‘talks’ to me demands a critical openness that does not allow a retreat into my familiar patterns of understanding and thus “ignoring the differences that make you unique and denying that you have anything new to offer my understanding.”⁵³ From a hermeneutic point of view “an untainted understanding is unattainable, an impossibility,”⁵⁴ since the prejudices that one carries are the only ally that we have when encountering the

⁴⁹ Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, p. 6.

⁵⁰ “It is ignorance that disables us in our encounters with the East. On the one hand we lack the type of knowledge that has immediate practical application; and on the other we lack knowledge of Asian culture that would allow us to present ourselves to Asians as other than uncultivated and mercenary bumpkins. Both arguments are plausible; but both overlook the fact that knowledge, whether of practicalities or culture, is not alone sufficient to improve our skills in dealing with Asians. It is not only knowledge that we lack, but understanding; and lack of understanding does not equate to either a lack of knowledge of, as will be shown, a lack of good will, tolerance or the ability to sympathise or identify with the outlook of other.” Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p. 153-154.

⁵¹ Even from a logical point of view, as Leibniz’s law of the *identity of indiscernibles* shows, absolute identity is impossible. “If two things were absolutely identical they would not be different things but the same, they would not be two but one.” *Ibid.*, p.175.

⁵² Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall (Revised Translation), Second Revised Edition ed, London, New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 355.

⁵³ Coyne and Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, p. 179.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

Other, in order to understand it.⁵⁵

In these terms, my approach to the *dojo* has been informed by and has taken into account, the possible ways that an ethno-approach can fall in the traps of ‘orientalistic’ research. Furthermore, it should be clear that the encounter of the *dojo* presented here is not treating it as an abstract ideal entity that exists somewhere in oriental Japan. My approach encounters a contemporary *dojo* that has a specific temporal and spatial location: it is the aikido *dojo* of *L’ Art du Chi* that operates in Edinburgh during the years 2004-2008. Any references to the historic origins of the *dojo* going back to Japan are made only in order to understand the specificity of this ‘now’ as an extension with clear roots in history. At the same time, any generalizations that can be extracted from this very specific study are going to be deeply rooted in this specificity. In this sense, my research in the *dojo* has very little to do with a Westerner approaching the oriental culture of Japan and much more with the encounter with a contemporary western representation of a Japanese educational place. The *aikido dojo* of *L’ Art du Chi* is run by a French teacher, settled in Edinburgh, with students whose nationalities include Scottish, French, Polish, Italian, German, Russian and Greek. This fact, problematises the connection to its historic background: the Japanese *dojo*. Nevertheless, the Japanese origins of *dojo* are presented here, and should be studied, in order to understand its contemporary appearance as it stands in the club *L’ Art du Chi*.

⁵⁵ Of course the above point of view does not dismiss the importance of Said’s argument in total. On the contrary, it can inform and enrich the various ethno approaches by avoiding concealed traps. An excellent example of recent research that took Said’s (and other postcolonialist’s) work strongly into account, is Kenneth Lieberman’s ethnomethodological study on the *Dialogical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*. Kenneth Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning*, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2004. In the first part of this book Lieberman showed how orientalist discourse thus far, had misrepresented the real practice of Tibetan Dialectics. “Victorian anthropology was challenged by the problem of encountering a dark-skinned people who were civilized and possessed a fully developed philosophy” Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 10. and for this reason the first reaction was to control it by imposing western philosophical categories on to it (mainly Kantian) thus neutralising it as incompetent to address them. Consequently the terms ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Hinduism’ were controlled by disciplines like historiography and ethnology. After having dealt with the postcolonial encounter with Tibet, Lieberman then proceeded into an ethnomethodological study of the dialectical practice in the Tibetan monastic schools.

Finally, as I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, one cannot guarantee beforehand the just or ethical approach to the subject of study. “There are no *free passes*, no matter how compelled microsociological researchers may feel to seek security in some orthodoxy of methods.”⁵⁶ Nevertheless, ethnomethodology programmatically promises a sensitive and delicate analysis from the ‘inside,’ by “examining the phenomena in its own right,”⁵⁷ beyond idealizations of the Other. “When one *discovers* a people’s world only after, and by means of, meeting them, one is treating them in a just manner.”⁵⁸ Obviously, ethnomethodology is not immune from methodological arrogance. At the very end, maybe the only thing that one can do is try to “retain a reflexive attitude to one’s methodology and try to keep observing how one’s formulation of the local practices may be distorting one’s vision.”⁵⁹ Thus we must constantly keep an eye to the ‘stranger on our heels,’ as suggested by Ingold in the previous chapter.

2.2.6 Aikido in the school *L’ Art du Chi*: The course’s syllabus

No previous arrangement or preparation needs to be done in order to start practicing Aikido in *L’ Art du Chi*. One can simply show up and ask to participate in the class. No special clothing is required from them, although a loose outfit aids in free movement (this seems to be a common knowledge shared by everyone who comes to give it a try). The newcomer is not supposed to know anything about aikido or any notion of martial art at all. At the same time, no special instruction or theoretical knowledge is provided before crossing the threshold to the mats. The only formal engagement that takes place is that the newcomer has to fill in a very short insurance form releasing the instructor from responsibility in case of an accident. Newcomers are encouraged to participate, by offering the first class for free, so that they have the chance to give it a try before committing into a payment (in *L’ Art du Chi* the payments take place by term –usually three months). In a matter of moments one

⁵⁶ Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 42.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39 [emphasis in the original].

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

can step on the mats and start practicing, just by doing what the others do, literally mimicking the teacher and the other students.

Nevertheless, *aikido* in the *L' Art du Chi* does have a syllabus and an etiquette that is actually quite strict, but these need not be studied before the practice itself. The *dojo*'s website is an important locus for the students, since the booking for the terms happens on-line. There, under the 'information' link one can find documents concerning the grading syllabus and the etiquette. It is quite interesting that the teacher does not actually require the students to know these beforehand in order to participate in the class. One can actually practice the entire term without having to read about them. It is only when a student decides to participate in the exams (that happens usually at the end of each term) that she or he needs to find the syllabus and etiquette and study it.⁶⁰ Because Aikido is not a sport and it does not have any formal competitions, according to the syllabus, "gradings though not compulsory are an essential part of our practice."⁶¹ Grading is supposed to provide focus and authority to one's progression, by validating hers/his knowledge of aikido. The students who are wishing to prepare for a grading are asked to obtain the relevant grading syllabus and *dojo* etiquette, attend the weekly classes regularly, attend any mock grading class, undergo physical preparation at each class by performing a certain number of *ukemi* (rolling-overs), and finally take a more active role in the running of the *dojo*/classes/workshops.⁶² The evaluation takes in account the formal knowledge and the construction of the techniques (coordination with the partner and fluid execution of the stages of the technique), the understanding and respect of the etiquette as well as the physical fitness of the participants. Nevertheless, according to the syllabus, these criteria are only indicative and the decision for the pass or fail "rests with the jury based on their/his experience,"⁶³ with the decision being final and cannot be challenged. The grading system in aikido follows the system that is established in most Japanese martial arts starting from the 6th *kyu* going down to the 1st, and after that from the 1st *dan* to the 10th. The holding of the 1st *dan* means the critical point

⁶⁰ Laurent Haquin, *L'art Du Chi - Aikido Grades Preparation/Exam (up to 1st Kyu)*, Art-of-Chi, 2005, p. 1.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 2.

which is associated with the well known black-belt. In *L'art du chi* as well as in most *aikido dojos* no other colours of belts are in use, having only black and white. Another difference that shows the seniority of a student after the 2nd kyu is the wearing of the *hakama* (an extra pair of long trousers -almost like a skirt of black colour- to be worn above the practicing uniform, *gi*). A specific document titled *l'art du chi aikido - grading program 2005* defines the techniques required for each grade. An example of the grading requirements for the first grading is shown in Figure 23. There we can see that the names of the techniques are given in Japanese. At the end of this document there is only a very brief glossary that explains some terms; for example *ai hanmi katate dori* is described as 'same hand grasp.' But if we imagine how many different ways one can grasp the other's hand it becomes obvious that one cannot understand these terms unless she/he has attended the relevant session in the class.




Figure 23: The exam requirements for the 6th kyu

The *aikido* etiquette in *L' Art du Chi* starts with these words:

Aikido is not a sport. It is a discipline for training the mind, body, and spirit. Physical technique is not the true object, but a tool for personal refinement and spiritual growth. An Aikido *dojo* is not a gymnasium. It is the place where the teachings of Master Morihei Ueshiba are studied. The following rules are necessary to the maintenance of the proper atmosphere for this study.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Laurent Haquin, *Aikido Etiquette*, Art-of-Chi, 2005, p. 1.

The overall etiquette consists of the *dojo* etiquette, the practice etiquette and the visitors' etiquette. The first one defines the proper function of the *dojo* in terms of its maintenance, like setting the mats and cleaning the *dojo*, as well as defining the financial arrangements of the termly membership dues that “provide a place to practise and provide you [the students] with a way to show gratitude for the teaching received.”⁶⁵ Also, there is a very basic rule that defines the martial ethos of the school: “never use Aikido technique to harm another person or as a way to display ego.”⁶⁶

The practice etiquette consists of a list of twenty-one short, but precise rules that prescribe the practice in the *dojo*. The first rule refers to the bow that one is supposed to make upon entering or leaving the practice area and the second to the bow when stepping on and off the mats. The list continues by prescribing what should one wear (*keikogi* –training suit, *zori* –sandals outside of the mats) and what not (jewelleries, make up, perfume, long nails). The eighth rule stresses the importance of the opening and closing ceremony. The next ones describe how one should warm up before the class and how to sit during the class, how to show respect to the teacher during personal instruction and to those that are more experienced. Rule eighteen asks for talking on the mats to be kept to the absolute minimum, emphasising that “Aikido is experience.”⁶⁷ The last rules prescribe the conduct after practice, prohibiting any drinking or eating, smoking or gum in the *dojo* (on and off the mats) and finally rule twenty one prohibits the drink of alcoholic beverages while still wearing the *keikogi*. Another set of five rules applies to the visitors who, nevertheless, “are welcomed to sit and observe a class at any time.”⁶⁸ The visitors are asked to sit respectfully, without walking around or talking to anyone, especially if that person is on the mat, not to eat or drink during the class, and finally to sit formally during the opening and the closing of the class, and perform the ceremony with the class and remain seated until the Instructor has signalled the end of the class or has left the mat at the end.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

2.3 The Music Class

2.3.1 A situation of education in the *music class*: 'distributing responsibilities'

The case study of the music class focuses on the course *Music in the Community* taught in the University of Edinburgh. As I will explain later in detail, the students and teachers are preparing a musical performance in the Botanical Gardens of Edinburgh. Roxana (the director of the performance) and an assistant, are standing on a bridge 6 meters above the ground that crosses along the huge hall from where the audience is supposed to pass through. She is giving advice to the students who are on the ground level. There are two groups of students: a bigger group of female and a smaller group of male singers; the later have been asked to hide behind some bushes so that they are not visible from the bridge. Dee (the music teacher) is walking around the female group, observing them. The female students are holding the scores in front of their chest, pretending, for the sake of the performance, that it is a framed picture of their dead husband. Roxana addresses the female students, who are facing the opposite direction and they cannot see her, but only hear her.



Figure 24

R: I just want you to (.) just turn this time around and sing (.) and have the
 ((Roxana now uses her hands –that are always extended in front of her- to refer to the students' holding of the 'picture'))

manuscript a little bit further so we can hear the sound (.) excellent (.)
 and

((her hands fall down and then she touches her forehead in a gesture of thinking))

(2)

when YOU feel it I would like you to sta:rt moving as a group along
 the pa::th (.)

((points to the students))

((gesturing towards the direction to their left))

when you feel it in the song (.) it is for You to feel it (.) but I would like
 you to

((one student (S) looks over her shoulder towards the entrance and then further behind towards the bottle of water that lies behind them on the path))

move (.) yeah along tha:t way towards the
 (pavement)

((Roxana shows again the way to the left that the students have to take)
 ((S turns around and tries to kick the bottle out of the path))

S V1V2



Figure 25

D: Towards [(forward)]?

((Figure 25)) ((a visitor (male) V1 passes behind the students pushing a pushchair followed by a woman))

R: [still] No go that way and when you go that way you
 actually

((Roxana shows again the direction))

tu::rn So you are here (.) and you have to turn to your left to come around. Ok?

((turning herself and showing what the students should do)) ((tapping her left shoulder))

((the student turns behind again and smiles to the couple that passes by))

((a visitor (male) V3 passed behind Roxana))

So lets just try that (.) you are back to do it (.)

((gesturing to make them turn around again))

((the students turn around))

((Figure 26)) ((three more visitors V4, V5, V6 successively pass behind Roxana looking to what is happening down below))



Figure 26

and (1) em (.) You come up (.) and (1) imagine the first phrase of the song (.)

((Figure 26)) ((a visitor (young female) V7 passes in front of the students rushing a bit))

((one of the assistants moves away behind Roxana))

the manuscripts at your chest (.) hands on your chest, down your chest (.) ((Roxana gestures as holding the manuscript upon her chest))

and (.) sing the first verse of the song ((Roxana makes a gesture like 'start'))

- Ch: ((singing continuously)) Da:::dme::[:.....:](.)
Da:]:.....:
- R: [Start moving after the ‘Dad me’]
((Two visitors (children) V8, V9 followed by a woman V10 are successively passing behind Roxana))
- D: [(inaudible)]
(a student turns to see what Dee is saying))
- Ch: :::dme:[:.....:]:pa::ra: mi::: vi:.....: da:.....:
R: [((turning around))]
(the students start to move around)
(Dee gestures to show them the direction to turn)
(Figure 27) ((a visitor (male) V11 stands behind Dee, waiting to pass by. Dee moves back smiles to him and looks again back to the students))



Figure 27

- Ch: todas las vi:.....ida:[:.....:]:s: ((finish singing))
(V11 hesitates but moves on behind the students followed by a woman V12))
- R: [Up upon your faces] (0.2) just cover your faces (.)
(Roxana gestures the position she wants the students to take by covering her face with an ‘imaginative’ picture))
- R: I don’t want to see your faces.

This situation seems extremely lengthy and repetitive, especially because of the confusing messiness of the whole incident. Nevertheless, this is *exactly* what took place in the couple of minutes of footage presented here; and apparently, both the students and the teacher seemed to understand each other very well. At the same time, this educational process of the rehearsal breaks the common understanding of the music class as a quiet, static and an almost ‘religious’ place where the only thing that one can hear is students practicing scales and teachers rhythmically keeping tempo with a pencil. Contrary to the ideal image, this class takes place in an extremely messy environment that is dynamic and even bewildering. Here, the students are not executing a strictly predetermined performance which is already developed by the teachers or prescribed by the score itself, but they are participating in the development of a performance that is being configured during the rehearsal. Such an example, takes place here when Roxana decides when the students have to start moving along the path. It is obvious that Roxana’s idea to let the students ‘improvise’ when they want to start moving along the path was not predetermined. This impromptu decision becomes obvious by her gesture of dropping her hands down, since she didn’t know what to do next. The two seconds of pause combined with the bringing of her hand to her forehead shows hesitation and thinking, and her final phrase that externalises her idea ‘when YOU feel it!’ – like saying ‘Eureka!’ – illustrate this.

Furthermore, it is interesting the way that Roxana repeatedly emphasised the pronouns: “When *YOU* feel it”, “when *you* feel it in the song” “it is for *you* to feel it”. By emphasising again and again on the impersonal ‘You’, referring to all of the students, she brings the attention to the group spirit of the team that shares the responsibility to make it right. Everyone at this stage is equally responsible to operate in the team-mode. This part of the performance was not based on the expressional skills of an individual character, or on a charismatic figure (a soloist, a ‘prima donna’ or a leading actor), but it was based on the skill to become part of the team; the losing of ones individuality into the common ‘otherness’ of the team. So that the audience would not see a sum of individuals walking in the same directions but rather a herd, a flock or a swarm moving as one body. We can understand this

sharing of responsibility by counterexamples: For example, suppose that instead of sharing the responsibility, Roxana had made someone from the group responsible for giving a secret signal to the others to start walking; or had even set an absolute external parameter like time (5 seconds, or 2 time bars of the score). Contrary to these versions, during the two seconds of thinking, she decided to *distribute the responsibility equally* to all the students, an undoubtedly Ethics-related decision. I will analyse later⁶⁹ how this can also be related to a set of exercises that Roxana introduced to the students from the very first class, where they had to learn how to operate as a team and especially to walk as one body. These exercises were concluded by having the students walk all together, even with their eyes closed, so that they would understand the ‘feeling of the group’ through its energy and not just its visual presence.

A different point that I would like to emphasise has to do with the phenomenal messiness⁷⁰ and disorganised appearance of the educational activity in this class *Music in the Community*. It sounds like total chaos, a complete contrast to the ideal image of a *conservatoire* as described earlier. This inherent messiness relates to Ethics because it is the primary level of interaction between the public and the class. This fact is actually reflected in the very title of the course: *Music in the Community*. Through a specific reading of the title, music escapes from the sterile environment of the conservatoire and goes to the community, not as a top-down hierarchical application, but rather as an integrated part of the community. In this sense, the interaction between the music and the community does not just take place during the performance, where ‘community’ becomes just the passive audience of the ‘active’ music, but rather the performance is prepared *in* the community. All these twelve confused people that happened to visit the gardens during these two minutes of the rehearsals, in some sense ‘participated’ in it. Despite the inconvenience caused by

⁶⁹ See p. 272.

⁷⁰ In the transcripts from this footage, I represented this disorderliness, not only textually, but also visually on the images by indicating the persons and their activity – a student interrupts her performance to kick the bottle away so that a buggy can pass by, while twelve different visitors (in less than two minutes of footage) have to find their way through the paths of the Botanic Gardens that are packed with students and teachers that are rehearsing a show.

both the ‘music’ and the ‘community,’ they also both gain something from this very primary and messy level of interaction.

The messiness of this interaction between the ‘music’ and the ‘community’ before the actual performance, in some sense inverts Goffman’s distinction between backstage and frontstage performances of everyday life. In *The Presence of the Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman distinguished human actions that take place in order to be viewed as performances, for example a waiter’s actions while serving, and his actions when being in the kitchen. The backstage is the place where “suppressed facts make an appearance,”⁷¹ where problems of the frontstage performance can be fixed, where relationships are informal, where poor members of the team can be schooled or dropped from the performance, etc. By bringing ‘music’ and the ‘community’ together, the front and the backstage collapsed and the ‘music’ exposed the whole preparation of the performance to the ‘community.’ The fact that the Botanical Gardens could not close so that the performance could be prepared, I argue, is not unfortunate, but it is exactly the *point* of the interaction between the ‘music’ and the ‘community.’ Despite Goffman’s warning for the problems that performers face when they have insufficient control of their backstage,⁷² we can see that both the public and the students managed to perform their roles as visitors and musicians without any major interruptions, keeping at the same time an attitude of backstage informality –while being frontstage.

This patience and tolerance (undoubtedly virtues related to Ethics) can also be reflected in the overall educational activity. No matter how chaotic everything is, both the teachers and the students are very much focused on what they are doing, and they are trying to do it ‘well’. Despite the fact that people are passing by, enjoying their walk in the gardens, and despite that sometimes they stop and spend a couple of minutes to see ‘what is going on there,’ the students and the teachers are so focused and immersed that it is like everything is happening in an isolated room. But at the same time, there is a tacit awareness that everything takes place *in* the community

⁷¹ Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Woodstock & New York: The Overlook Press, 1973, p. 112.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 116.

and that they have to be careful about their interaction with it. So, how did a university music class come to interact with the community of the Botanical Gardens?

2.3.2 History of Music education: University VS Conservatoire

As is the case with most scholarship on education in general, research on music education has mainly focused on the primary and secondary education and apparently very little work exists on the level of higher education. Furthermore, the existing research emphasises the acquisition and development of performance skills, and learning in general, while relatively little attention has been given to the role of the teacher.⁷³ In this context, music has been characterised as the ‘Cinderella of education’.⁷⁴

No wonder that ‘school music’ still appears to many young people as a subculture, separated from music ‘out there’ in the world, abstracted by the constraints of classrooms and curriculum and subject to very curious arrangements for assessment.⁷⁵

One of the first texts about the importance of music education comes from Plato in his ideal state: “What, then, is our education? Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered –which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body, and for the soul, music?”⁷⁶ Furthermore, in *Politics* Aristotle praised music as leisure and for this reason he also promoted it as important part of education.⁷⁷ Since ancient times music has always been taught close to an expert, following the traditional

⁷³ Graham Welch et al., "Mapping Music Education Research in the UK," *Psychology of Music*, 32, 2004: 239-290, p. 246-248.

⁷⁴ Noel V. Hale, *Education for Music : A Skeleton Plan of Research into the Development of the Study of Music as Part of the Organized Plan of General Education*, London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 15.

⁷⁵ Welch et al., "Mapping Music Education Research in the UK," p. 242.

⁷⁶ Plato Republic II in Michael L. Mark, *Source Readings in Music Education History*, New York & London: Schirmer Books & Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1982. in Mark, *Source Readings in Music Education History*, p. 8.

⁷⁷ “The customary branches of education are in number four; they are (1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, to which sometimes is added (4) drawing. ...[Music] was included in education, because nature herself, as has been often said , requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure as well; for, as I must repeat once again, the first principle of all action is leisure.” Aristotle, *Politics*, Book VIII in Mark, *Source Readings in Music Education History*, p. 36.

apprenticeship scheme of education. This doesn't mean that there was no theoretical enquiry in music. On the contrary, texts like that of Boethius' *De Institutione Musica* from the late Roman and early Medieval times, came to be a key text for the education of music until the 18th century.⁷⁸ With the emergence of the academic scholasticism, music became subject of study in the universities after the Renaissance, and apparently, in Britain, degrees in music were offered at Oxford and Cambridge from the 15th century and onwards.⁷⁹ Nevertheless the system of apprenticeship in music is well established until our days in the form of the conservatoire.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the distinction of the university and the conservatoire was still quite sharp. As Edward Dent puts it in his overview *Music in University Education* – dated back to 1917 – “[t]he function of a musical conservatoire, generally speaking, is to train performers, with a view to their earning a living by playing an instrument or by singing.”⁸⁰ The focus there is on the efficiency and the mastery of the technique. On the other hand, “in a university music is studied for its own sake and not primarily as means of earning a livelihood.”⁸¹ He then goes on to suggest that the conservatoire ‘trains the fingers’ and for this provides food for the belly, while the university ‘trains the intellect’ and for this provides food for thoughts.

The conservatoire today has much changed compared to the past, incorporating more and more a variety of theoretical and complementary courses, but “what has *not* changed ... is its focus on performance”.⁸² Another interesting aspect in the education of the conservatoire is the emphasis on the individual instrumental tuition, the one-to-one relationship between the student and the teacher. Furthermore, it is

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

⁷⁹ J. Edward Dent, "Music in University Education," *The Musical Quarterly*, 3, no. 4, 1917: 605-619, p. 606.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 610.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² David Wright and Janet Ritterman, "Degrees of Choice, University or Conservatoire?," *The Musical Times*, 135, no. 1818, 1994: 522-525, p. 522.

very common that students apply for a place seeking the guidance of one particular teacher.⁸³

For example, we have good evidence that instrumental teaching groups can be at least as effective as individual teaching, including the development of technique (Thompson, 1984). Yet the 19th century model of conservatoire (i.e. 'private') teaching mostly prevails.⁸⁴

Still today, despite the blurring of the boundaries⁸⁵ between the conservatoire and the university,⁸⁶ there is a significant notion that can be summarised like this: "academics [go] to universities, performers and practical musicians [go] to conservatoires."⁸⁷

2.3.3 Community Music and the emergence of Ethics

A case that blurs the above categories is the university courses on community music. Here, I make a very brief introduction of the connection between Community Music and Ethics. The focus here is to show that by bringing the terms 'music' and 'community' together, interesting Ethical issues *automatically* jump out. In this sense, the juxtaposition of *this* music class with the *dojo* and the design studio, in terms of Ethics, starts to become more meaningful.

Music in the Community is a young discipline emerging under the common area that exists between different subject areas such as "cultural development, the advancement of creativity, education, creative arts therapies, health care, special needs, rehabilitation, performing arts outreach, community development, the promotion of social expression, identity and self-respect and conflict resolution."⁸⁸ Arguably, the university, by providing the meeting of such areas under one

⁸³ Ibid., p. 523.

⁸⁴ Welch et al., "Mapping Music Education Research in the UK," p. 242.

⁸⁵ "Institutions have been encouraged to be distinctive in terms of 'mission', so applicants are wise to check that there is a good match between the course's aims and their personal aims." Wright and Ritterman, "Degrees of Choice, University or Conservatoire?," p. 525.

⁸⁶ See for example the interesting analysis of music and society that Tia DeNora makes by naming one view as 'grand' and 'little' tradition: Tia DeNora, *Music in Everyday Life*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 1-7.

⁸⁷ Wright and Ritterman, "Degrees of Choice, University or Conservatoire?," p. 522.

⁸⁸ Nigel Osborne and Katie Overy, *M.Sc. In Music in the Community, Further Information*, Music, University of Edinburgh, 2006, p. 2.

institution, has played an important role on the development of Music in the Community.

Community Music is a term that comes to describe a variety of education in music that happens outside the conventional boundaries of school programs.⁸⁹ In this sense, Community Music creates an interface between institutional learning and the community.⁹⁰ Community music not only involves partnership with schools and universities, but also involves sponsorship by them, in a relationship that arguably evolves from passive sponsorship to active partnership.⁹¹ The university and the community appear to interact in different kind of relationships. According to Carruthers, there are three types of Community Music outreach activities: a) activities initiated by the university in order to meet their own needs b) activities that initiated by the community in order to meet their own needs, and c) activities initiated by the university to meet community needs. The fourth link, meaning activities originating from the community to meet university needs, are extremely rare and for this can be omitted.⁹² Apparently, combinations of these relationships can also take place.

Community Music for most people is easily identified as operating within an ‘aura of ethical practice,’ meaning that is a good thing to do; like donating to charities, or voluntary work. But here one needs to be more concrete in an academic, meaningful way about this notion of ‘Ethics’. An interesting debate exists in the literature around the notion of ‘elitism’ that community music is supposed to break, by promoting ‘other’ forms of music different from mainstream (for academia) classical or jazz.

⁸⁹ Kari Veblen and B. Olsson, "Community Music: Toward an International Overview," in *The New Handbook of Research in Music Teaching and Learning*, ed. Colwell R. and C. Richardson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 730-753.

⁹⁰ Another wider definition of Community Music is given by the editorial board of the *International Journal of Community Music*: "Community Music" has many meanings and takes many forms depending on several variables. For example: (a) the people involved (e.g., "community music workers" and/or musicians, clients, or students); (b) the communities and institutions involved; (c) the aims, purposes, or needs that a Community Music program intends to achieve; (d) the relationships between a given Community Music program and its geographical, social, economic, religious, cultural, and/or historic circumstances; and (e) the financial support a Community Music program receives, or not." <http://www.intlcm.com/index.html> [Accessed 02. 02. 2007].

⁹¹ Glen Carruthers, "Community Music and the 'Musical Community': Beyond Conventional Synergies," *International Journal of Community Music*, C, 2005: 1-20, p. 3-4.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Therefore, “classical music is in some sense ‘evil’ because it is allegedly ‘elitist’.”⁹³ In a similar way, there is an argument for multiculturalism in music that pushes for the promotion and appreciation of different cultures. This argument, of course, raises issues of ‘lack of context’ that is necessary in order to appreciate some music.⁹⁴ A different aspect discusses issues of tuition fees in learning and whether community music means ‘free music learning for all’. Finally, community music raises Ethical issues since it has to confront common understandings (or misconceptions) on the hierarchical relationship between the academy and the community: “The academy teaches the community. The community learns from the academy. Universities comprise experts. Communities comprise lay people. Professionals work at the university. Amateurs live in the community.”⁹⁵ In contrast, more relaxed views can perceive the academy and the community in a more harmonious way.⁹⁶

2.3.4 ‘Music in the Community’: The course’s syllabus

The ‘Music in the Community’ is an MSc course in Music, School of Arts Culture and Environment, of the University of Edinburgh. It has a clear orientation towards the advancement of the practitioners’ practical skills,⁹⁷ as well as their acquaintance with “applied methodologies, new bases of knowledge and methods of research, development and assessment for practitioner of Music in the Community.”⁹⁸ The emergence⁹⁹ of the course aims to offer students a programme of advanced personal

⁹³ Against this notion argues Marissa D. Silverman, "Community Music? Reflections on the Concept," *International Journal of Community Music*, C, 2005, p. 4. See also Estelle Jorgensen's *Transforming Music Education* (p. 33) and Carruther's (p.15) and Silverman's (p. 4) responses.

⁹⁴ See Paul Woodford, "Preface," *International Journal of Community Music*, 2, no. 1, 2003. And also Silverman's response in Silverman, "Community Music? Reflections on the Concept," p. 4.

⁹⁵ Carruthers, "Community Music and the 'Musical Community': Beyond Conventional Synergies," p. 11.

⁹⁶ It is now recognized that community musicians are crucial to a healthy musical community. They work alongside professionals paid to create and re-create music, professionals paid to train others to create and re-create music, and bureaucrats and administrators who create and manage infrastructures so that composers can compose, performers can perform and teachers can teach. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹⁷ Osborne and Overy, *M.Sc. In Music in the Community, Further Information*, p. 2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ The course acknowledges its emergence through the following: an award winning undergraduate course (Thorn-EMI Award 1994, Queen's Anniversary Prize 1996); work with traumatised children in conflict and post-conflict areas; the innovations of the Institute for Music in Human and Social Development, including research groups in Music and Medicine, and Music and Child

creative development; to familiarise students with current theories and models of Music in the Community and encourage critique of its current methodologies; and also to equip students with the know-how to plan, design, finance and implement community music programmes.¹⁰⁰ The ‘programme outcomes’ account for the development of personal musical/creative resources; the ability to practice the communicative, motivational, inspirational, educational, therapeutic, social and organisational skills of a community music *animateur*/workshop leader; and also the means to access the outcomes of programmes in a scientific manner.¹⁰¹

The teaching of the course is mainly practical¹⁰² (similar to that of the design studio and the *dojo*), supported by set of lectures and seminars would deliver an overview of current methodologies for Community Music activities; a working knowledge of the applicable theory emphasising on the “emerging bio-psycho-social paradigm;”¹⁰³ and the ability to prepare and initiate programmes of research in the domain of Music in the Community.¹⁰⁴ The lecture-based and practice-based classes aim overall to

Development; networks of collaborative relationships with departments of Health, Education and Social Services and Local Authorities in Scotland. The full text of the Course Handout can be found in the Appendix, p. 378.

¹⁰⁰ Osborne and Overy, *M.Sc. In Music in the Community, Further Information*, p. 2.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰² These skills will be taught through *practical workshops* and supervised *placements*. They will be assessed by the grading of creative presentations, by the evaluation of the basis of the success of its design and implementation, its documentation and the quality of the scientific assessment of its outcomes. *Ibid.*, p. 3 [emphasis added].

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ The programme unfolds into three parts: two taught semesters and a supervised community placement project, with a related dissertation. The taught courses consist of Creative and Professional Development that prepare the students for the Community Project and a Music Mind and Body set of lectures focusing on physiology, neurology, psychology and sociology. These two courses were spread over the two semesters. Moreover, semester two had a Research Methods course joined with the MMus (Masters of Music). My research has focused on the *Creative and Professional Development* course, organised by Dee Isaacs, consisting of two main parts. The first is a set of workshops aiming to develop students’ personal creative resources and their ability to communicate and motivate as music *animateurs*/workshop leaders. This culminates in a large-scale community project, that takes place at the end of second semester, implemented collaboratively by the students. The second part consists of supervised placements where students go to various institutions like schools or prisons in order to design and execute a project. The reason for choosing the *Creative and Professional Development* course instead of that of the *Music Mind and Body*, is the fact that the latter is a lecture based course that has nothing to do with the practical culture of the design studio or the *dojo*. On the contrary, the enthusiastic and creative character of the Creative and Professional Development allows a much more interesting and fruitful juxtaposition to the other two case studies. For similar reasons, I have focused on the workshops and the common large-scale project, since they are taught courses with very high interaction between the tutors and the students, contrary to the placements, where the students were actually improvising alone, receiving only ‘high supervision’. Another interesting aspect of this course is the fact that it could be chosen as a

develop the students' intellectual skills "to apply profound, focused reflection to wide-range creativity and *useful* human action,"¹⁰⁵ as well as the ability to relate and apply this knowledge to specific practice.

The final project for the academic year 2005-6 that I am focusing here was a music, theatre and puppet performance entitled '*Suppose Life*, a Musical Journey through the Glasshouses of the Royal Botanic Gardens of Edinburgh'. The actual show took place during the evenings of the 8th until the 11th of March 2006 where the visitors were guided through the glasshouses of the Botanic Garden, watching a short performance in every hall. The overall show was representing the "journey of everyman from birth to death and beyond."¹⁰⁶




Figure 28: The flyer of the performance (front and back side)

What was very interesting about the show, for the purpose of this research, is that the students were not instructed only in music, but also in theatrical movement. The catalogue of the show makes this explicit by saying that "...our performers are not just musicians, but carry the drama of our story in their body". The students were instructed in music by Dee Isaacs, who also composed most of the music, and in

'selection' module from undergraduate students in Music, which allows an interesting mixture of younger and senior students that is quite similar to the education in the *dojo*. In the case of Music, the senior students are supposed to have leading roles of organising in the placements and higher expectations of performance in the workshops and the final project.

¹⁰⁵ Osborne and Overy, *M.Sc. In Music in the Community, Further Information*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ From the flyer advertising the show.

movement by Roxana Pope, the director of the performance.¹⁰⁷ Another aspect that made the educational process intriguing was the fact that the instructors were actually participating in the show by singing and performing themselves, breaking in this sense the conventional notion that wants the teacher/instructor/director to be away from the spotlights during the actual performance. In this sense the education had a much more practical character, involving as we will see the presence of the teacher in the field of action.




Figure 29: The acknowledgement of the performance's contributors from the booklet

¹⁰⁷ Julian Furtuna designed the scenes and the puppets with the assistance of students of the Edinburgh College of Art, while Martin Parker with his students managed the sound design and Kare Bryce the lighting design.

2.4 The Design Studio

2.4.1 The contemporary Design Studio



Figure 30: The First year design studio in Edinburgh

Returning now to the design studio after the introduction of the other educational places, we can start by saying that it definitely holds the most central place amongst the other modules in contemporary architectural education. It is reputed to be the ‘core’¹⁰⁸ around which all other modules and subjects are building the knowledge of architectural design. The design studio today is the dominant in the education of architecture. As such, every architect is accustomed to some of the variations of styles that exist around the world. The studio forms the locus where tutorials, crits, reviews and discussions about to-be-designed projects take place. Despite various local differences, it seems that a certain uniform studio culture has been formed. The Studio Culture Task Force Report uses the following words in describing design studio culture:

Those who have studied architecture undoubtedly have vivid memories that characterize this experience. Late nights, exciting projects, extreme

¹⁰⁸ See for example: Yasser Mahgoub, "The Architectural Design Studio Pedagogy: From Core to Capstone," in *Design Studio Pedagogy: Horizons for the Future*, ed. Ashraf M. Salama and Nicholas Wilkinson, Gateshead: The Urban International Press, 2007. Arguably, the notion that the studio is the ‘core’ of learning for the architect originated with the *École Royale des Beaux Arts* and the atelier (studio) being the place of intense learning by the apprentices working under the direct tutelage of a Master.

dedication, lasting friendships, long hours, unpredictable events, punishing critiques, a sense of community, and personal sacrifice all come to mind. Those aspects are not usually written into the curriculum or even the design assignments, but they are likely the most memorable and influential. The experiences, habits, and patterns found within the architecture design studio make up what we have termed 'studio culture'.¹⁰⁹

Our architectural background through the culture of the design studio that nurtured us, establishes a certain un-noticed background that is shared by the 'tribe' of architects. Leonie Milliner, Director of Education of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), in his keynote address at the 2003 Studio Culture conference, emphasised the UNESCO definition of 'culture' by suggesting that architects are all part of the "complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or social group."¹¹⁰ Being part of this group architects share "modes of life, fundamental rights of human beings, value systems, traditions and beliefs"¹¹¹ that make their common experiences familiar.

This description of the design studio does not include alternative forms of studio teaching. For example, the non-profit volunteer organization *Architects Without Frontiers* was established when Esther Charlesworth, one of the founding members, led a group of design students from Melbourne University to Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹² This example shows that in architecture there *are* initiatives that have similarities with the course Music in the Community, as described previously. Nevertheless, this study focuses on the more conventional studio education that takes place in the University of Edinburgh.

The educational procedure as it was described in the situation of 'Ethics of Borderlands' nowadays is pretty much the same all around the world: The teacher(s)

¹⁰⁹ AIAS, "Redesign of Studio Culture," in *AIAS Studio Culture Task Force Report* American Institute of Architecture Students, November. 2002 p. 1.

¹¹⁰ Leonie Milliner, "Architectural Education; Studio Culture," paper presented at the conference: *Studio Culture, Who Needs It?*, St Catherine's College, Oxford, 17-18 December 2003, http://www.cebe.heacademy.ac.uk/news/past_events/concrete/leonie.pdf [Accessed 02. 06. 2008].

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Architects Without Frontiers, *Without Frontiers, Architecture with Consequences, Australian Designers Helping Communities in Need*, Leaflet of exhibition, 2007. Available from <http://www.dicksonrothschild.com.au/catalogue.pdf> [Accessed 06. 06. 2008].

set a design program or an imaginary project for which the students make design proposals. The tutors and the students meet in the design studio to discuss the work in various formats: tutorials, crits, reviews etc. Depending on the customs, availability and students/staff ratio of each school, these meetings vary in their frequency and length, but it seems that the standard lies somewhere between once or twice in a week of full day educational activity (12 hour days are not uncommon). The students usually work on the project individually, but working in groups is also common practice in some schools. A very important aspect of the design studio is whether each student is allocated his or her own working space; this contrasts with schools who employ a 'hot desk' policy. Equally important is whether the students can work in the studio beyond the regular tutorial times. Very often the students have access to the studio 24 hours, 7 days a week. But how did we arrive in the formation of this 'studio culture'?

2.4.2 The place of the Design Studio in the history of architectural education

Formal architectural education and the design studio in particular is a very young institution, especially if would one consider the depth of history of architecture. It is only after the Renaissance that architectural education becomes gradually systematised and some first forms of studios emerge. Prior to that, in ancient Greece "we must assume for the beginning architect some kind of apprenticeship alongside of a master."¹¹³ In one of the first texts about architecture, Vitruvius makes a special mention on architectural education, asking for a wider education for the architect:

Let him be educated, skilful with the pencil, instructed in geometry, know much history, have followed the philosophers with attention, understand music, have some knowledge of medicine, know the opinions of the jurists, and be acquainted with astronomy and the theory of the heavens.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Spiro Kostof, "The Practice of Architecture in the Ancient World: Egypt and Greece," in *The Architect, Chapters in the History of the Profession*, ed. Spiro Kostof, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 3-27, p. 22.

¹¹⁴ Vitruvius, *The Ten Books on Architecture*, cited in: William MacDonald, L, "Roman Architects," in *The Architect, Chapters in the History of the Profession*, ed. Spiro Kostof, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 28-58, pp. 38-39.

Despite this call for a broader education according the humanistic scopes of Roman architecture, still the master-apprentice system prevails.¹¹⁵ Moreover, this humanistic need seems to become obsolete during the early Middle Ages, together with the general need for architects, “leaving the building to be conceived by bookish clerics and realized under able masons.”¹¹⁶ Later on in the Gothic period architects slowly revive their difference from the master masons in the fact that they could handle the “theoretical implications of geometry.”¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, apprenticeship was still the main model of education,¹¹⁸ while the education was strictly confined within the lodges. The Regensburg Convention of 1459 is characteristic example:

...no workman, nor master, nor journeyman shall teach anyone, whatever he may be called, not being one of our handicraft and never have done mason work, now to take the elevation from the ground plan.¹¹⁹

It is only after the Renaissance, that the design studio emerges out of an explicit need for teaching and learning that was taking place in didactic places beyond the construction site or the lodges. *Accademia Platonica* in Florence and especially the gardens of San Marco constituted by Lorenzo de Medici can be possibly seen as the first form of studio, gathering the best examples of ancient art, not just for display, but mainly for educational purposes. This opened the way to a series of Art Schools in Italy, like the *Accademia del Disegno* promoted by Vasari and the famous Rome academy reformed by Pope Urban VIII in 1633.¹²⁰ Still though it is only after the establishment of an explicit academic institution *dedicated to architecture* that the studio starts to form its contemporary understanding. This took place in France where *Académie Royale d' Architecture*, was established in 1671 as part of the wider

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 37.

¹¹⁶ Spiro Kostof, "The Architect in the Middle Ages, East and West," in *The Architect, Chapters in the History of the Profession*, ed. Spiro Kostof, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 59-95, p. 60.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

¹¹⁸ “The usual apprenticeship was for seven years, beginning at age thirteen or fourteen. This was followed by three more years of improvement as a journeyman, a time spent on the job gaining practical experience in different types of work. It was also time to travel and observe. To be qualified, one had then to present, at least in Europe, a masterwork, which would be either an actual job completed satisfactorily or else a model demonstrating the skills required of a master.” Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹²⁰ Stuart Macdonald, *The History and Philosophy of Art Education*, London: University of London Press, 1970, pp. 24-25.

royal project of establishing academies of art (following the Italian examples). Instigated by Colbert and François Blondel the new institution aimed into elucidating the “beauty of buildings and to provide means for the instruction of young architects.”¹²¹ Nevertheless, the two systems of education (apprenticeship and school) were infused for quite long since, still during the eighteenth century, the architect was apprenticed as a builder.¹²² The Academy was initially offering only theoretical courses twice a week (something like a discussion group)¹²³ and it was only later that Blondel started a private school that full-time education was offered.¹²⁴ Apparently this happened because the Academy was offering only lectures and no design studies in the school. “Students learned drawing and design in the studios of their masters.”¹²⁵ Nevertheless, the masters here are not the master-builders of the Medieval Times, but architects who distanced themselves from the constructor. Fundamental role for the formation of the studio culture played the school’s competitions (e.g. *Grand Prix*), that prevailed until the end of the nineteenth century, where the students had to design in en-lodged conditions.¹²⁶ After the suspension during the French Revolution, the Royal Academy was merged with the other academies forming, thus, the *École des Beaux-Arts*. During the Revolution a rival institution was established, *École Polytechnique*. At that time, the two schools polarized what is still nowadays commonly perceived as the schism between *art* and *engineering* in architecture.¹²⁷ This mode of education dominated architectural education until the 1919 when Bauhaus presented a new scheme. The radical reconsideration of architecture during modernism was been reflected upon its education in this school that became modernism’s paradigmatic educational institution. Although not offering architectural courses in the beginning, Bauhaus

¹²¹ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science*, Cambridge -Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1983, p. 195.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹²³ Geoffrey Broadbent, "Architectural Education," in *Educating Architects*, ed. Martin Pearce and Maggie Toy, London: Academy Editions, 1995, 10-23, p. 13.

¹²⁴ Mark Crinson and Jules Lubbock, *Architecture, Art or Profession? : Three Hundred Years of Architectural Education in Britain*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, c1994, p. 11.

¹²⁵ Broadbent, "Architectural Education," p. 14.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹²⁷ Pérez-Gómez, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science*, p. 184. See also: Joseph Rykwert, *The Dancing Column: On Order in Architecture*, Cambridge, Mass ; London: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 11-12. Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture*, 5th ed, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 212-213.

was very much studio based, especially since its original scope was to reunite all arts *in* the craft of building. When finally in 1928 a nine semester architectural course started to be offered, this studio-based culture pervaded architecture as well, despite the fact that its director, Hanes Mayer, was rather hostile to the painters who had formed the core of the school's identity. The studios of Bauhaus have been the prevailing example in contemporary schools of architecture. Since then, various formal forums on architectural education, from the Oxford conference in 1958, until the recent 2004 UIA congress,¹²⁸ architecture schools and institutions have been emphasizing this important tradition of studio based architectural education. Nowadays, the pique of contemporary concerns about this tradition seem to be occupied by the enlarged numbers of students that reduces the teacher/student interaction as well as the integration of digital media and information technologies in the traditional design studio.

As I have already mentioned, my case study for the design studio is going to be from the design studios of Architecture, School of Arts, Culture and Environment of the University of Edinburgh. More specifically I am going to focus on the first and the fifth year studio, that are formally called Architectural Design 1 (AD1) and Masters of Architecture 1 (MArch1) in Design.¹²⁹ The first year studio has been chosen for its special task to initiate the students in the practice of architecture, while the fifth year, for its potentiality to give examples of advanced architectural discourse that is much more likely to happen between the mature students and their tutors. Hereafter, I offer some basics from the syllabus of the AD1 and MArch 1 course that are necessary to contextualize and understand the examples that will follow. The full text of the Course Handouts can be found in the Appendix.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ The UIA congress in Istanbul had a separate strand dedicated to 'New Forms of Architectural Profession and Education.'

¹²⁹ There are also three other Masters of Architecture that follow only some of the programme structure of March (Design): The MArch (Studies), the MArch (Digital Media) and the MArch (Digital Media Studies). Their differences have to do with the accreditation system followed, the entrance standards and the emphasis on Digital Media. From now on by MArch I will mean the MArch in Design, which is the broader and more general category.

¹³⁰ See pp. 387 & 409 of the Appendix.

2.4.3 AD1 course's syllabus

The first year design studio has a clear orientation towards the practical understanding of architecture by emphasizing the processes of *doing*, *making* and *constructing*. “Designing through these processes is central to the activities in the school, and is at the core of the curriculum.”¹³¹ The learning outcomes for the students include skills and abilities such as the visualization of architectural space through models and drawings, an understanding of architectural drawing conventions, the exploration of architectural ideas ‘from intention to proposition,’ the communication of these ideas effectively both visually and verbally, the responding to a given brief and the understanding of basic notions of technology, environmental design and construction.

The course was divided into two semesters (11 weeks). The first semester seeks to “encourage an enthusiastic approach to knowledge and skills appropriate to the practice of architectural design.”¹³² The students were supposed to work both individually and in groups, focusing mainly on the relationship between imagination and architecture through a series of simple exercises and projects. These were, in brief: the ‘interpretative transgression’ from a photograph, to a two-dimensional black and white representation of it, to a bas-relief model and finally to a three-dimensional model; a casting exercise; a precedent study; a computer modeling and a mapping exercise for a retreat project that would follow in the next semester. The second semester, on which this research focuses, elaborated design issues of increasing complexity that involve the design of two small buildings. The first project followed on from the mapping exercise in the previous semester and it involved the design of a small retreat on a remote island. The second was the design of a family house in urban context and it included an office space. The overall aim of this semester was the development of skills connected with the “representation of architecture through scale drawings and models, the visualization and manipulation

¹³¹ Keith Ballantyne, *Architectural Design I Course Handout*, Architecture, University of Edinburgh, 2006/2007, p. 3.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

of architectural space and the integration of basic systems of structure, construction and environmental control.”¹³³

Each project was introduced with lectures and/or seminars giving points of reference to the way that project should be handled. Nevertheless, in the handbook the studio-based character of the teaching and learning is clear and explicit. “The studio provides opportunity for collective discussion, and for students to develop their own design process. This includes individual and group tutorials, design reviews and workshops.”¹³⁴

2.4.4 MArch1 course’s syllabus

The MArch has a special characteristic of being a two-year (four semesters) course that deals with one single, large-scale project; the ‘thesis’. Formally the course is divided into MArch1 and MArch2. The first semester, formally called Architectural Design Opening, introduces the course; semesters 2 and 3 called MArch ‘Thesis’ form the main body of the course; the fourth and last semester allows ‘wrapping up’ and is named Architectural Design Thesis Closure, giving also the opportunity for the students to prepare an Academic Portfolio. Two further lecture-based courses run in parallel to MArch ‘Thesis’ are entitled ‘Studies in Contemporary Architectural Theory’ and ‘Architectural Practice Management’. My research is focusing on MArch1, mainly because of its coincidence with the period of data gathering. Nevertheless, some input from MArch 2 is also present in this study. According to the Course Handout “[t]he major locus of the programme is the design studio, where students work on projects (whether group- or individually- based)”¹³⁵. Nevertheless, the studio teaching was accompanied by seminars, discussions and lectures. The handout also encourages the students to make use of the workshop in developing and illustrating their design, describing it as “among the best equipped to be found in any

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

¹³⁵ Dorian Wiszniewski, *Master of Architecture Programme Handbook*, Architecture, University of Edinburgh, 2005-2007, p. 3.

school of architecture in the UK.”¹³⁶ Special emphasis was also given in the computing laboratories since “[t]he use of computers for processing written and drawn information is increasingly important.”¹³⁷ The overall programme outcomes include, amongst others: the students’ ability to scrutinize critically the context of a proposed design; to develop and present a major built intervention in urban context of increased complexity; to incorporate in their design accounts of building construction from the conceptual idea to the detail; to reflect upon history, theory and other cultural discourses of design; and to discuss the fundamentals of business management and administration in the context of contemporary practice, in accordance to the basic of professional duties, responsibilities and skills needed to be a member of the architectural profession.¹³⁸

Beyond the technicalities of the course the project was described by a series of handouts that progressively disclosed parts of the project. The project itself was titled ‘Architecture in Borderlands- Borderlands in Shanghai’ and its general aim was to design urban interventions in the city of Shanghai, China. In more detail, the project consisted of: a small conference introducing the city of Shanghai to the students and a visit to the city itself; a ‘Hypo-thesis’ of drawing maps of the city and fragment interventions that suggested a scenario of territoriality to be followed afterwards; a ‘Proto-thesis’ that tested the previous propositions by drawing sequences of oscillation between the concrete and the abstract in a variety of scales and by suggesting a ‘bridge’ that challenges some notions of borders; the ‘Thesis’ itself that mainly consisted of a building design (including “its own footprint and its technological imprint”¹³⁹), and also the development of a proposition through research and design, together with a technical report and drawings of some technical aspects of the building; finally the ‘Thesis Closure’ allowed a re-framing of the ‘Thesis’ by revisions, the creation of a Drawing Report and the presentation of the overall project. One of the last handouts given to the students, summarized the project with the following words:

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 20.

¹³⁹ Dorian Wiszniewski, *March, Architectural Design Thesis Closure*, Architecture, University of Edinburgh, 2007, p. 4.

Remember, the enquiry into Borderlands is a question of territoriality. Borderlands are in-between conditions – areas between areas of resolute difference, areas of territorial dispute or areas formed by utter indifference. They are understood through questions of limit, connection and discontinuity, inside and outside and, although they may be political or philosophical in character, they always have architectural manifestations that have circulatory possibilities and limits. A Borderland of course may be considered a threshold condition, but, under the specific deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation strategies that the enquiry of **Architecture in Borderland** initiates, **Tectonics in Borderlands** takes a positive outlook and **speculates into the possible architectural manifestations of new limits and thresholds** that emerge from renegotiating the political and philosophical tensions in Borderland.¹⁴⁰

As it becomes obvious from the above quote, the course had adopted, both implicitly and explicitly, a Deleuzian viewpoint, promoting mapmaking in the overall development of the course. The fact that mapping was not just an analytic phase of the design process leading to more ‘concrete’ design solutions, as we already saw, reveals interesting issues of Ethics, part of which was exposed in the situation that we visited during the ‘Ethics of Borderlands.’ The whole approach of design was *through* mapping until the very last processes of the design propositions. Even issues of tectonics are not dealt with separately, but become ‘Tectonics in Borderlands.’ Mapping as a generative process has become the central focus of this architecture, allowing the suggestion of a ‘cartographic turn.’¹⁴¹ Here I can only hint,¹⁴² that according to this view, Deleuze and Guattari provide the philosophical background that supports this turn and with it an ‘end’ of man, humanism and architecture as stable entities that have a fixed meaning that can be represented. Instead, the interest shifts to what representation *does*; how the representation changes the city itself. This view acknowledges that the cartographer can never master the map and cannot dominate the terrain.¹⁴³ At the same time, the strategy is not to implant architecture within the site, but rather to “unground it, to detach it from its accommodation to the

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 2 [bold in the original].

¹⁴¹ Mark Dorrian, "Architecture's "Cartographic Turn"," in *Figures De La Ville, Et Construction Des Savoir*, ed. Frederic Pousin, Paris: CNRS Editions, 2005, 61-72, p. 61.

¹⁴² More details can be found in: Anastasia Karandinou and Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Performing Mimetic Mapping; a Non-Visualisable Map of Suzhou River Area of Shanghai," *Footprint*, no. 2, 2008.

¹⁴³ Before controlling or understanding, things have to be internalized through mimetic actions (mimesis is a kind of autism).

dominant discourses within which the identity of the site is constructed.”¹⁴⁴ These radical views were arguably part of the specificity of the course and were underlying the situation of the ‘Ethics in Borderlands.’

With the methodological background established in the previous chapter, this chapter can be summarised as providing a first level of empirical situations that can be juxtaposed to the abstract and theoretical antithesis of the impossibility of teaching Ethics. These situations, as we saw, are deeply rooted into the practice of the everyday educational activity and came up by providing specific examples that show evidence of Ethics taking place in education. The three situations from the design studio, the music class and the *dojo* offered here, provide a primary framework that will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. Upon this framework further situations will be interweaved in order to provide an even wider spectrum of Ethics in education. More specifically, the question that this chapter tried to answer was: *Can we find evidence of education of Ethics in the everyday education activity?* After visiting the three educational places in detail, and having seen in each case one example of the educational activity that takes place there, we can give a positive response to the original question. *Yes*, there is evidence of Ethics in the education inside the design studio, as well as that of the music class and the *dojo*. Through the above analysis we have not just recognised evidence of Ethics in some sporadic incidents or in some rare cases; but mainly we have discovered that during the everyday educational activity the teachers and the students continuously operate within situations of Ethics. We have found that Ethics is ubiquitous in education, and this is exactly why we pay no attention to it. It is like the unnoticed water in which a fish swims, but as soon as it is discovered “it is everywhere one turns.”¹⁴⁵ The following chapter becomes more theoretical, aiming to establish a distinction between the wider discourse of Ethics into what I come to call *morality* and *ethics*. There, I argue for the need to inhabit *ethics*, the area of the wider Ethical discourse, which accommodates the habits and customs and the most mundane dispositions of educational practices.

¹⁴⁴ Dorrian, "Architecture's "Cartographic Turn"."

¹⁴⁵ Liberman, *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture*, p. 34.

Morality versus ethics: inside the animal



...
When the child was a child,
It was the time for these questions:
Why am I me, and why not you?
Why am I here, and why not there?
When did time begin, and where does space end?
Is life under the sun not just a dream?
Is what I see and hear and smell
not just an illusion of a world before the world?
Given the facts of evil and people, does evil really exist?
How can it be that I, who I am, didn't exist before I came to be,
and that, someday, I, who I am, will no longer be who I am?
...

Peter Handke
Song of Childhood

3.1 Introduction¹

If someone were to say ‘Look, your book is about moral philosophy, and it even has the word ‘moral’ in the title, so before going any further I’d like to know what ‘moral means’, and a philosopher were to reply ‘Just shut up about that, because what I try to do is to tell you how to live, or how words like ‘good’ and ‘ought’ work, or whether there is such thing as moral knowledge, or what the point of morality is, or whether morality pays,’ we might think it a bit steep. Yet nearly all moral philosophers implicitly do just that. Why is this so?²

John Wilson, *Preface to Morality*

Taking the above quote to heart, this chapter tries to answer what ‘moral’ and ‘ethics’ mean. The previous chapters presented the philosophical antithesis against the education of Ethics, explained the basic points of the methodological framework that constitutes this research, and offered situations where Ethics plays an important role in the education of the design studio, the music class and the *dojo*. In this current chapter, the three case studies are temporarily left aside as a background against which a distinction between the concepts of *morality* and *ethics* is established. This means that, although some references will be made here to the background of educational situations, the foreground of this chapter will be occupied by the differences between the normative, evaluations of *morality* according to external rule, and the internal character of *ethics* that is based on customs, habits and dispositions. The case studies will become active again in chapter 4 in order to

¹ An earlier version of this chapter has been published in Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Revealing Ethics through Architectural Praxis: The Example of a Student Design Project," proceedings from the conference: *Enhancing Curricula: Contributing to the Future - Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century in the Disciplines of Art, Design and Communication*, Lisbon, Centre for Teaching and Learning in Arts and Design (CLTAD), University of the Arts London, 2006, pp. 226-246. See p. 523 of the Appendix.

In a quite different form some arguments were presented in: Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Responsibility of Education/ Education of Responsibility: The Ambiguous Case of Architecture," paper presented at the conference: *Theorising and Performing Knowledge: Teaching, Learning and Research*, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, 25-26 November 2005, <http://www.gsah.arts.gla.ac.uk/TLRIndex.html> [Accessed 09. 06. 2008].

The thread of all the above arguments traces back to my postgraduate diploma thesis Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "The Revelation of Ethics through the Praxis of a Student Design Project," Thesis for the Postgraduate Diploma: Architecture- Spatial Design in the direction Architectural Design – Space – Culture Supervised by: Vasilis Ganiatsas, et al., National Technical University of Athens, 2006. My translation from the original Greek: Λεωνίδας Κουτσουμπός, "Η Αποκάλυψη Της Ηθικής Μέσα Από Την Πράξη Μιας Σχεδιαστικής Σπουδαστικής Εργασίας," Thesis for the Μεταπτυχιακό Πρόγραμμα 'Αρχιτεκτονική, Σχεδιασμός του Χώρου' στην κατεύθυνση Σχεδιασμός- Χώρος- Πολιτισμός Supervised by: Βασίλης Γκανιάτσας, et al., Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο, 2006.

² John Wilson, *Preface to Morality*, Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1987, p. 3.

explain the area of human conduct where *morality* and *ethics* become manifested. Here, the distinction between the two terms is constructed in two succeeding ways: firstly, with an etymological inquiry that is supported by definitions of Ethics from philosophy, and secondly, with a more analytical philosophical argument that connects *morality* with a notion of externality and *ethics* with one of internality.

3.2 *Morality and ethics*

3.2.1 Indeterminate Definitions

John Lawrence starts his book *Argument for Action: Ethics and Professional Conduct* with the following words: “Ethics or morality* is concerned with the evaluation of human conduct and human character.” In the place of the asterisk he puts his first clarifying footnote:

In accordance with ordinary language and the practice of many philosophers, *these terms will be used interchangeably*. Although they are sometimes distinguished, there is no standard distinction between them. ‘Ethics’ comes from Greek, and ‘morality’ (or ‘morals’) from Latin. Both origins mean ‘disposition’ or ‘custom’; the Latin giving more emphasis to *social expectations*, the Greek, to *individual character*. (Williams, 1985: 6) Some philosophers describe ethics as the philosophical study of morality: others, especially in Britain, call this ‘moral philosophy.’³

This very first sentence of the book and the footnote that accompanies it is a useful starting point, since it summarises the common notion of what the discourse of ethics or morality is about: the evaluation of human conduct and character. At the same time, this footnote introduces the unresolved indeterminacy of nominating this discourse. Is it a discourse of ethics or morality? What is the difference between these two terms?

“To be uninterested in the word is to be uninterested in the subject,” warns Warnock, because the name indicates “what it is that distinguishes this particular subject from

³ John Lawrence, *Argument for Action, Ethics and Professional Conduct*, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 1999, p. 5 [emphasis added].

other.⁴ Following this advice, though, and trying to find the difference between the words *morality* and *ethics*, one faces an extremely puzzling problem. The puzzle concerns the inherent circularity of the linguistic definitions⁵ of both terms. *Morality* is defined through *ethics* and *ethics* through *morality*. In its first definition, the Oxford English Dictionary suggests that *morality* is the ‘ethical wisdom’ and that *ethics* is the ‘science of the morals’. Following these definitions it is impossible to know the one if one does not already know the other and vice versa. Even by going deeper into the detailed definitions that the OED suggests for the word *morality*, it is always defined through ‘moral’ or ‘ethic.’⁶ Other derivative terms like the adjective *moral* are in the same state: one only finds an account of self-references and connections to *ethics* that is also unknown. Things are not so different with the detailed definitions of the term *ethics*.⁷ The same self-reference problem and the

⁴ G. J. Warnock, *Contemporary Moral Philosophy*, London: Macmillan, 1967. Cited in Wilson, *Preface to Morality*, p. 4.

⁵ Linguistic definitions are only one of the ways to define something. See again the three ways of definition in Chapter 1, p. 49.

⁶ Apart from the ‘ethical wisdom’ mentioned before morality is suggested to be: “**1.** the knowledge of the moral science, **2.** In plural: moral qualities or endowments. **3.** **a.** Moral virtue; behaviour conforming to moral law or accepted moral standards, esp. in relation to sexual matters; personal qualities judged to be good. (Occasionally used in Theology with reference to natural moral virtues as distinguished from the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity) **b.** humorous or ironic: A person who habitually assumes an air of virtue. Also used as a mock title with possessive adjective. **4.** **a.** Moral discourse or instruction; a moral lesson or exhortation. Also: the action or an act of moralizing. **b.** A moral of a fable, event, etc.; the moral interpretation or sense of a text or passage. **c.** Moral truth or significance. **5.** **a.** A literary or artistic work expounding or inculcating a moral lesson; a moralizing commentary, a moral allegory **6.** **a.** Conformity of an idea, practice, etc., to moral law; moral goodness or rightness. **b.** Theol. The property of certain enactments of the Mosaic Law by which they belong to the moral (as opposed to ceremonial, etc.) law and therefore retain their validity under the Christian dispensation. **c.** The quality or fact of being morally right or wrong; the goodness or badness of an action. **7.** **a.** The branch of knowledge concerned with right and wrong conduct, duty, responsibility, etc.; moral philosophy, ethics. **b.** In pl. Points of ethics; moral principles or rules. **c.** A particular moral system or outlook; moral thought or conduct in relation to a particular form of activity. **d.** The ethical aspect of a question. **8.** morality play now chiefly hist., a kind of drama popular in the 15th and early 16th centuries, intended to inculcate a moral or spiritual lesson, in which the chief characters are personifications of abstract qualities; also in extended use. **9.** attrib. Canad. Designating or belonging to a police unit dealing with crimes involving prostitution, pornography, etc. Esp. in morality police, squad.” Oxford English Dictionary online, Draft Version Dec. 2002, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00315602?query_type=word&queryword=morality&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=3aAk-8pabMo1112&hilit=00315602 [Accessed 11. 06. 2005].

⁷ Apart from the ‘science of morals’ already mentioned, *ethics* is suggested from the OED as “**1b.** A scheme of moral science. [for the singular form of the word], **2.** (after Gr. *τα ηθικά*). the department of study concerned with the principles of human duty. **b.** A treatise on the science; *spec.* that of Aristotle. **c.** As discrete plural: Ethical maxims or observations. **3.** In narrower sense, with some qualifying word or phrase: **a.** The moral principles or system of a particular leader or school of thought. **b.** The moral principles by which a person is guided. **c.** The rules of conduct recognized in

equal reference to ‘morals’ and ‘morality’ becomes apparent. The only definition that seems to be out of this rule is 2b “[a] treatise on the science; *spec.* that of Aristotle,” which actually means ‘a treatise on the science of *Ethics*’ since it is obvious from the quotations supporting this definition that they refer to the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the other treatises that Aristotle wrote about Ethics, and not science in general (more details on Aristotle and his treatises on Ethics will be provided in the following chapter).⁸

Going back to the etymology of the words ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’, Lawrence has indicated their different origins: ‘morality’ derives from the Latin and ‘ethics’ from the Ancient Greek language. Admittedly, there is the danger of comparing etymologies of languages that have flourished during different times and have followed different trajectories overall. Moreover, by pursuing the etymology of the terms from the contemporary to the classical world, it is possible to confuse them both by superimposing their meanings, without realising how they have come to gradually shift their common understanding through time.⁹ Having this in mind I shall examine further the etymologies proposed by Lawrence. The root for the word ‘morality’ is the Latin ‘mores’ meaning *custom*.¹⁰ The adverb ‘*mōrālīter*’ meant “in a characteristic manner, characteristically,” and the adjective ‘*moralis*,’ which meant “of or belonging to manners or morals, moral,”¹¹ was first formed by Cicero in his fragmentary text *On Fate*. In the opening lines of the part that we still have access to, Cicero writes:

certain associations or departments of human life. 4. In wider sense: The whole field of moral science, including besides Ethics properly so called, the science of law whether civil, political, or international.” Oxford English Dictionary online, Second Edition 1989 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50078466?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=ethic&first=1&max_to_show=10> [Accessed 11. 06. 2005].

⁸ See more in Chapter 4, p. 174.

⁹ For this observation I am grateful to Orietta Cordovana. Another such example in this thesis appears in the pursuit of the etymology of the word *ergon* that appears in Chapter 4, footnote 29, p. 175. Note also Heidegger’s warning: Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, London: Souvenir Press, 1975, p. 12.

¹⁰ Perseus Digital Library Project. Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, Tufts University <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2329656>> [Accessed 11. 06. 2005]

¹¹ Perseus Digital Library Project. Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, Tufts University <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2329656>> [Accessed 11. 06. 2005]

...because it relates to character, which they (the Greeks) call *ēthos*, while we usually call this part of philosophy ‘concerned with character’ (mores), but it is appropriate to enhance the Latin language and call (this) ‘moral’ (philosophy).¹²

So, we can see that the Latin word ‘mores,’ comes to stand as translation of the Greek word *ēthos*. The adjective ‘*moralis*’ is linked to the Latin word ‘mores’ and furthermore to the words ‘*moris*’ and ‘*mos*’ that refer to ‘customs, traditions.’ This relates to the contemporary understanding of Ethics because for the Roman’s way of thinking, ‘tradition’ equals to ‘good’ and ‘legitimate.’¹³ This means that a belief, for the ancients, could be accepted as good and legitimate only if rightly connected with the tradition. This understanding was rendered in Latin with the term ‘*mos maiorum*,’ meaning the ancestral traditions. In particular the political part of this term was codified within the famous Roman official law system during the later Republic,¹⁴ maybe reflecting the change from the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire. ‘Mores’ is still used in English to mean “the shared habits, manners, and customs of a community or social group; specifically the normative conventions and attitudes embodying the fundamental moral values of a particular society, the contravention or rejection of which by individuals or subgroups is liable to be perceived as a threat to stability.”¹⁵

The root for the word *ethics* is even more complicated. The OED suggests that ‘ethic’ derives from the ancient Greek ‘*ēthikos*,’ which is the adjective for the noun

¹² Marcus Tullius Cicero, Boethius, and R. W. Sharples, *On Fate (De Fato) & the Consolation of Philosophy (Philosophiae Consolationis)*, Classical Texts, Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1991, p. vi

Cicero quotes the ancient Greek term *ēthē* “quia pertinet ad mores, quos ēthē Graeci vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae de moribus appellare solemus. Sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare moralem” Cic. Fat. 1, 1 Cicero, Boethius, and Sharples, *On Fate (De Fato) & the Consolation of Philosophy (Philosophiae Consolationis)*, p. vi
<<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2329656>> [Accessed 11. 06. 2005]

¹³ Here I am grateful again to Orietta Cordovana for her open-minding suggestions.

¹⁴ E. Badian, "The Silence of Norbanus," *The American Journal of Philology*, 104, no. 2, 1983: 156-171, p. 162. Furthermore, for Cicero justice was embodied in Roman tradition “as expressed by the *mos maiorum* and certain additions the constitution as proposed by him (Leg. 2.61-62; 3.12; 3.37).” S.E. Smethurst, "Politics and Morality in Cicero," *Phoenix*, 9, no. 3, 1955: 111-121. p. 116. See also A.A. Long, "Cicero's Plato and Aristotle," in *Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers*, ed. J.G.F. Powell, Oxford et. al.: Oxford University Press, 1995, 37-62, p. 38.

¹⁵ Oxford English Dictionary online, Draft Version Dec. 2002.

<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00315743?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=mores&first=1&max_to_show=10> [Accessed 07. 09. 2005]

'*ēthos*' and means "custom, usage: in plural, manners, customs" and disposition, character, especially moral character as the result of habit¹⁶ and at the same time as opposed to *dianoia*,¹⁷ the conscious and rational mental activity. Liddel and Scott refer back to Homer and suggest that *ēthos* means first of all "*an accustomed place*; hence, in plural, *haunts* or *abodes* of animals."¹⁸ Concerning the character, *ēthos* used to stand for an 'outward bearing,' the 'delineation of character' or a '*dramatis persona*'. For the ancient Greeks, even animals could have *ēthos*¹⁹ and sometimes the term was also used to characterize a tactful action. The word '*ēthos*' (*ἦθος*) according to Émile Boisacq, derives from the word '*ethos*' (*έθος*),²⁰ which clearly means custom or habit. The verb *ethizô* is still used in the Modern Greek language to mean 'to make one an addict' and in passive voice 'to become addicted' (especially to drugs). From the same root also comes the word '*ēthnos*' (*έθνος*), which means 'a body or band of men'²¹ and today in Modern Greek stands for 'nation.' Arguably, what holds together this body of men or a nation is the customs and the habits that they share, their common *ēthe* and *ethe*.²² Jodie Nicotra argues that although some scholars²³ have tried to separate the terms *ethos* and *ēthos*, giving to *ethos* a 'moral neutrality,'²⁴ this is usually done to support a stance towards "preserving a true,

¹⁶ "For because of the force of habit, it is in infancy that the whole character is most effectually determined" Plato, *Laws*, translated by R.G. Bury. Vol. 10 & 11, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd, 1967. book 7, 792e. From the Perseus Digital Library Project <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plat.+Laws+7.792e>> [Accessed 14. 02. 2008]. See also Aristotles' *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103 a17.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139 a1.

¹⁸ Perseus Digital Library Project, Liddel, Henry, George and Scot Robert, *A Greek-English Lexicon* <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3D%2346783>> [Accessed 07. 09. 2005].

¹⁹ It is characteristic that the discipline examining animal behaviour is called *Ethology*.

²⁰ Émile Boisacq and Helmut Rix, *Dictionnaire Étymologique De La Langue Grecque Étudiée Dans Ses Rapports Avec Les Autres Langues Indo-Européennes*, 4e. éd ed, Heidelberg: Winter, Carl, 1950.

²¹ Richard Cunliffe, John LL.B., *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*, Glasgow and Bombay: Blackie and Son Limited, 1924, p. 106.

²² A common Modern Greek expression deriving from the two terms and means the customs and habits of a place, their traditions. In Greek Script: 'ἦθη και έθιμα'

²³ Thomas E. Corts, "Special Report: The Derivation of Ethos," *Speech Monographs*, no. 35, 1968: 201-202. George Yoos, "A Revision of the Concept of Ethical Appeal," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 12, no. 1, 1979: 41-58.

²⁴ Jodie A. Nicotra, "The Force of Habit: Rhetoric, Repetition, and Identity from Darwin to Drugs," Thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy Supervised by: Richard Doyle, The Pennsylvania State University, 2005, p. 11.

authentic, self,”²⁵ that potentially keeps everything under control. On the contrary, *ethos* as habit destabilises the self by gaining control over it. A habit does not *stick to* an individual, in a sense that a self pre-exists and then a habit comes to join it. Habit *happens to one*,²⁶ in a sense that is beyond one’s free will and at the same time is constitutive of the self; the self is a collection of habits. Gilles Deleuze describes the constitution of the self like this: “[w]e are habits, nothing but habits: the habit of saying ‘I.’”²⁷

Although in their practical and common usage the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ have similar meanings in the modern English language, their etymological genealogy implies that ‘morality’ is associated with normative conventions or rules – maybe through the standardization of Roman Law – while ‘ethics’ is characterised by a reference to more mundane notions of habits or addictions. Bernard Williams, who is cited by Lawrence, further suggests that ‘morality’ in Western culture has a unique significance in “developing a special notion of *obligation*”²⁸ based on some ‘peculiar presuppositions’ that should be treated with scepticism. For this reason, Williams comes to call ‘morality’²⁹ a narrower system of the wider discourse of ‘ethics’. Later on in this chapter, I pursue this etymological difference further (especially its Homeric precedence) in order to discuss these presuppositions suggested by Williams. Nevertheless, for the time being, it suffices to emphasise the connection between ‘morality,’ normative obligation and external rule; and the connection between ‘ethics,’ habitual action, pre-accepted customs and dispositions.

According to the above, I expand Williams’ categorical distinctions by introducing another ‘narrow system’ that focuses on habit, which I name ‘*ethics.*’ *Morality* and

²⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, European Perspectives, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. x. As quoted in Nicotra, “The Force of Habit: Rhetoric, Repetition, and Identity from Darwin to Drugs,” p. 1.

²⁸ Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, London: Fontana Press/Collins, 1985, p. 6 [emphasis added].

²⁹ “There is indeed a word for what it is that they [the Greeks] supposedly did not have, the word “morality, and it is a sure sign that we are in the world of the progressivists when we are told that the Greeks, all or some of them, lacked a *moral* notion of responsibility, approval, or whatever it may be. This word is supposed it seems, to deliver in itself the crucial assumptions that we enjoy and the Greeks lacked.” Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993, p. 8.

ethics (note the italics) then will be two distinct areas of the overall discourse of Ethics, which for the sake of clarity, I am going to call ‘Ethics’ (note the capital E).³⁰ Although the two sub-areas can already be understood as different, by their reference to obligation and habit, their distinction still remains ambiguous.³¹ This ambiguity, however, is part of the tactical refusal to define what – according to Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s original antithesis, as seen in the introduction of the thesis – actually cannot be defined and remains indeterminate.

The distinction between *morality* and *ethics* is not new in philosophy. Apart from Williams and Wilson, other philosophers have used similar distinctions between the two terms, even in different contexts. For example, Jürgen Habermas has pointed out the limitations of his theory of Discourse Ethics in relation to a Hegelian embodiment of morality in ethical life.³² More explicitly however, Paul Ricoeur has distinguished between the two terms by attributing to *ethics* the “domain of that which is taken to belong to human life,”³³ which aims towards a life of action, while to *morality* the expression of this “aims in terms of norms that are regarded as somehow obligatory.”³⁴ But although a distinction between the two terms has been proposed by several philosophers, their difference has not been widely adopted in the scholarship of philosophy. Nevertheless, *morality* and *ethics*, as presented here, do not aim to replace the variety of definitions that already exist. Their distinction, although it comes from a subtle etymological difference, it clearly pushes the

³⁰ Often I have been tempted to suggest the equation: Ethics = *morality* + *ethics*. Nevertheless, I am quite sceptical whether *morality* and *ethics* are the only members of the right-hand part of the equation.

³¹ Here I agree with Wilson, that the discourse of Ethics can be ambiguous but not vague. “*Words* cannot be imprecise or sketchy [vague], though of course they may have very general applications... they mean what they mean. ...Even statements are vague or not vague (precise, specific) only in terms of a particular context or set of demands.” Wilson, *Preface to Morality*, p. 6.

³² “Because morality is always embedded in what Hegel called ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), discourse ethics is always subject to limitations...” Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p. 99.

³³ Bernard Dauenhauer and Edward N. (ed.) Zalta, *Paul Ricoeur*, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005. Available from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/ricoeur/> [Accessed 09. 06. 2008]. Dauenhauer refers mainly to: Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

³⁴ Dauenhauer and Zalta, *Paul Ricoeur*. See also as an example Dorian’s description of moral rightness of the Platonic ideal forms in the context of English colonialism in Ireland: Mark Dorian, “On Some Spatial Aspects of the Colonial Discourse on Ireland,” *The Journal of Architecture*, 6, 2001: 27-51, p. 29.

everyday language to its limits. In spite of this, it exploits the fact that modern English has two terms to describe ambiguously similar concepts.³⁵ It is also important to indicate that the two systems are not normatively defined, but descriptively depicted, pointing towards an insinuating and cunning distinction, at the same time escaping and being constrained by the inherent indeterminacy of the overall discourse of Ethics.

But despite this inherent indeterminacy and despite the fact that their etymological difference is subtle, the argument of this thesis is that *morality* and *ethics* are fundamentally different in the way that they are acquired and for this reason should be treated differently in terms of education. *Morality* refers to rules and obligation and nowadays is the dominant way of approaching Ethics in architecture, in terms of policy documents, codes of conduct and ‘health and safety’ imperatives. While *ethics* – being formed by the mundane notion of habit – has been understated in architectural education, while the overall role that it plays in our Ethical constitution has been underestimated. By attributing different roles to *morality* and *ethics* a different vista opens that allows us to imagine a trajectory of Ethics based on habits and dispositions, beyond any obligations and rules.

3.2.2 An example of *ethics*

“How am I able to obey a rule?”—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”³⁶

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*

As already mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the common notion of Ethics is usually identified with the concept of *morality*. Both the professional codes of conduct and the conventional demands for ‘green architecture’ provide an easy grasp of *morality* as having to do with Ethics because of its normative character. On the

³⁵ This is not the case with all the languages. For example, modern Greek has only one word (namely *ηθικία*) to describe both the notions of ethics and morality.

³⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed, Oxford: B. Blackwell, 2001/1953, prop. 217.

contrary, the concept of *ethics* seems to resist our common understanding of Ethics. In order to explain *ethics* further, I offer a short story, as an example:

In a remote rural location, a local man (non-architect) was building an extension for his house by adding a small room to one side of it, or in practical terms adding a small volume to a bigger one. A student of architecture who happened to pass by stood for a while watching the man building, trying to understand the decisions that led him to put the small room on the particular side of the house, at the particular height and so on. Having spent quite some time thinking about the possible solutions that one could have chosen taking into account static, environmental, aesthetic and other parameters, the student approached the man and asked him finally why he had decided to build the extension in that particular way. The response of the man was ‘How else could it be done?!’ with real surprise.³⁷



Figure 31: An extension to a small house

³⁷ This story is a real incident, experienced by Associate Professor Vasilis Ganiatsas in Pilio, Greece. In the above story keep in mind that this man was both the architect and the dweller: “...once the pattern has been understood and assimilated, it can be seen to be at work everywhere, all the time, as differently acculturated groups come into contact with buildings. As a practice it is normative, whereas the extraordinary and exceptional cases are those where the architect’s own interpretation is adopted by the people into whose lives the building enters.” Andrew Ballantyne, “Misprisions of Stonehenge,” in *Architecture as Experience, Radical Change in Spatial Practice*, ed. Dana Arnold and Andrew Ballantyne, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004, 11-35, p. 33.

But how does this story have anything to do with Ethics? This short story³⁸ shows that “a building takes place in an ethical milieu.”³⁹ It reveals a cosmos that during the mundane action of building a small room was *concealed*, but nonetheless, it was practically working fine. Until the moment of the question the man was absolutely sure about what he was doing and that it was *good*, because it incorporated all his unchallenged beliefs about what a house is and how an extension should be built. The question itself *revealed* these preconceptions (revealed the fact that they were *pre-conceived*) just because, at that moment, other options came up, broadening the man’s horizon. Pushing this interpretation of the story to its limits, I would like to suggest that the notion of *ethics* that I have suggested refers to this notion of preconception, habitual manner, custom, and the way that things usually take place in practice. On the other hand, the student’s rational analysis of the building according to rules (static, environmental, aesthetical) that led to a chosen option as good is related to *morality*. In these terms, *ethics* provided an un-challenged and *un-chosen* identity to the building that the man was constructing and ultimately to the man himself.⁴⁰ On the contrary, the student’s input in this case was a chosen one, that had gone through a process of deliberate contemplation. Nevertheless, I do not want to suggest that only ‘primitive’ builders have this notion of *ethics*, while every educated architect engages only with *morality*, when concerned with Ethics. Rather, this notion of preconception and prejudice that can lead to a practical and *phronetic* way of doing things, as well as the rational elaboration of things, appear in every aspect of the life of every person.⁴¹

³⁸ Note the connection of this story and the historical evidence that we have about two houses ‘designed’ by two philosophers who are important for this thesis. The one is Heidegger’s hut at Todnauberg, and the other is Wittgenstein’s hut in Norway (the latter in contrast to Wittgenstein’s design of the Palace Stonborough, the house of his sister, in Vienna). See: Roger Paden, *Mysticism and Architecture: Wittgenstein and the Meanings of the Palais Stonborough*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007, Adam Sharr, *Heidegger’s Hut*, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press, 2006, p. 76. Also Andrew Ballantyne, “The Nest and the Pillar of Fire,” in *What Is Architecture?*, ed. Andrew Ballantyne, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2002, 7-52.

³⁹ Andrew Ballantyne, “Architecture as Evidence,” in *Rethinking Architectural Historiography*, ed. Dana Arnold, Elvan Altan Ergut, and Belgin Turan Oskaya, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Book, 2006, 36-49, p. 36.

⁴⁰ “[R]elying on a code, they communicate a particular way of standing in the world, a *particular ethos*” Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, p. 89-90 [emphasis added].

⁴¹ As I am going to discuss later on, according to the Hermeneutic philosophy, the whole life is a circle of breaking prejudices and building new ones, at the very same time.

Furthermore, there is one more way that the above story can be related to Ethics. The distinction of *morality* and *ethics* proposed here has often been identified with distinct periods in the history of architecture. In particular, it is very common to identify the practical, un-chosen notion of *ethics* with medieval architecture. Harries writes quoting von Simson: “‘Gothic builders have been tight-lipped about the symbolic significance of their projects.’ Nor did they need to say much: an understanding of the spiritual significance of things was so much part of the medieval worldview that it could be *taken for granted*.”⁴² This view sees a distinct change during the Renaissance, towards an emphasis on theory and rational elaboration that shifted the paradigm in architecture from practical craftsmanship to a fine art. It is also characteristic that ever since, all discussions about Ethics in architecture were tied up with an eye looking back to medieval times (or ancient Greece)⁴³ either in terms of style (neo-gothic and neo-classicism), or in terms of creative processes (Arts and Crafts). These later views of Ethics that look back to history, usually romanticize certain periods, aiming to criticize the contemporary “compartmentalization of our life, *the splintering of the old value system, each splinter now claiming something of the dignity that once belonged to the whole*.”⁴⁴ Architecture, according to Harries, is exemplary in the way that it represents this wholeness which inherently embodies Ethical values:

...the building [here a church] acquires quite specific connotations that tell us a great deal about those who built it, their *values*, and their *faith*. And it does so not incidentally, in the way any useful object connotes countless secondary functions, but *by asserting these connotations*. Representation is here used self-consciously to endow the church with a specific significance. A different model or a different form of representation *would communicate a different understanding of what a church should be*.⁴⁵

⁴²Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 107 [emphasis added].

⁴³ “In the nineteenth century there was a fierce debate about architectural style, with outlandish claims made for the merits of classical or Gothic architecture. ...the idea that the ethos of ancient Greece had a high cultural value, and drew together the artefacts and way of life in that society in an ideal way that should be emulated if at all possible.” Andrew Ballantyne, “Architectures in Plural,” in *Architectures, Modernism and After*, ed. Andrew Ballantyne, Malden, Oxford & Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 1-32, p. 10.

⁴⁴Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 102.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 102 [emphasis added].

Nevertheless, Harries also argues that understanding Ethics in architecture cannot be based only on a return to the past as it has been understood so far: “After the Enlightenment has done like a vacation from the serious business of life, unless for pedagogical reasons we find it useful to wrap independently established moral maxims in an artistic dress.”⁴⁶ Here I see these moral maxims as referring to the normative character of what I call *morality*. On the contrary, later on there is a connection with ethics when Harries argues that “such a subjection of art to some *preestablished morality* only underscores that ‘the fair days of Greek art, as also the golden time of the later middle ages, are over,’ never to be recovered.”⁴⁷ In this sense, the chapters to follow aim to identify which parts of the three case studies are ‘rational’ and conscious and which parts are ‘irrational’ based on preconceptions and prejudices, looking for evaluations that derive from ‘logical’ contemplation and evaluations that derive from a ‘how else could be done?!’ response.⁴⁸ But before that, I will investigate further into the genealogy of this strange term *ethics* that resists our understanding, deliberately pushing the limits of language and wishing to exploit to the maxim this slight difference in the meaning of the words.

3.2.3 Abodes of Animals: The first appearance of the word ‘ethics’

Pursuing this etymological difference further, one finds Liddel and Scott suggesting, by referring back to Homer,⁴⁹ that *ēthos* means first of all “*an accustomed place*; hence, in plural, *haunts* or *abodes* of animals.”⁵⁰ Furthermore, Richard Cunliffe in the *Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* emphasises that *ēthos* was the accustomed haunts of animals⁵¹ or the sties of swine,⁵² while *ethos* meant ‘after one’s wont,’ or of a

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 354 [emphasis added].

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Note the connection between *morality* and what Deleuze’s term active synthesis or Mnemosyne (“reproduction and reflection, remembrance and recognition, memory and understanding” Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London: Athlone Press, 1994, p. 102., as well as between *ethics* and passive synthesis or Habitus (“these thousands of habits that we are composed” Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 100.).

⁴⁹ Note that Alasdair MacIntyre refers to Homeric period as ‘prephilosophical,’ in Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, Second ed, London: Routledge, 1998/ 1967, p. 5.

⁵⁰ Henry Liddell, George and Robert Scott, "A Greek-English Lexicon," Perseus Digital Library Project. <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3D%2346783>> [Accessed 07. 09. 2005].

⁵¹ Homer *Illiad*, Book 6, 511 & Book 15, 268.

beast, after the manner of its kind.⁵³ Let us take for example the line 511 of the sixth book of the *Iliad*, the importance of which becomes obvious by the fact that it is repeated also in line 265 of the fifteenth book.⁵⁴

Paris did not remain long in his house. He donned his goodly armour overlaid with bronze, and hastened through the city as fast as his feet could take him. As a horse, stabled and fed, breaks loose and gallops gloriously over the plain to the place where he is wont to bathe in the fair-flowing river - he holds his head high, and his mane streams upon his shoulders as he exults in his strength and flies like the wind *to the haunts and feeding ground of the mares*.⁵⁵



Figure 32: *Mycenaean vase depicting horses in nature*⁵⁶

⁵² Homer, *Odyssey* Book 14, 41.

⁵³ Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*, p. 106.

⁵⁴ Homer *Illiad*, Book 15, line 268: “As he spoke he infused great strength into the shepherd of his people. And as a horse, stabled and full-fed, breaks loose and gallops gloriously over the plain to the place where he is wont to take his bath in the river - he tosses his head, and his mane streams over his shoulders as in all the pride of his strength he flies full speed to the pastures where the mares are feeding” Homer and Samuel Butler, *The Iliad*, Available from: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Hom.+Il.+6.390> [Accessed 04. 03. 2008]. Note also versions of the word *ethō* in the following passages of the *Iliad*: 9.540, 16.220, 5.766.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* book 6. 511 [emphasis added]. Here I am using Butler’s translation in order to draw a connection with Butler’s book *Life and Habit*. A more authoritative translation from Murray reads: “Nor did Paris tarry long in his lofty house, but did on his glorious amour, dight with bronze, and hastened through the city, trusting in his fleetness of foot. Even as when a stalled horse that has fed his fill at the manger breaketh his halter and runneth stamping over the plain – being wont to bathe him in the fair-flowing river – and exulteth; on high doth he hold his head, and about his shoulders his mane floateth streaming, and as he glorieth in his splendour, his knees nimbly bear him to the haunts and pastures of mare;...” Homer and A.T. Murray, *The Illiad*, The Loeb Classical Library, London & Cambridge, Massachusetts: William Heinemann LTD & Harvard University Press, 1924 Reprint, 1965. p. 299. The Greek original writes: “Οὐδὲ Πάρις δὴθυεν ἐν ὑψηλοῖσι δόμοισιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ γ’, ἐπεὶ κατέδου κλυτὰ τεύχεα, ποικίλα χαλκῶ, σεύτ’ ἔπειτ’ ἀνὰ ἄστῳ, ποσὶ κραίπνοϊσι πεποιθῶς: ὡς δ’ ὅτε τις στατός ἵππος, ἀκοστήσας ἐπι φάτνῃ, δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας θεῖῃ πεδίω κροαίνων, εἰωθῶς λούεσθαι ἐυρρείος ποταμοῖο, κυδιῶν: ὑποῦ δὲ κάρη ἔχει, ἀμφὶ δὲ χαῖται ὤμοις αἴσσονται: ὁ δ’ ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθῶς, ρίμφα ἐ γούνα φέρει μετὰ τ’ ἡθέα καὶ νομὸν ἵππων.” Homer and Murray, *The Illiad*. p. 298 [emphasis added].

⁵⁶ My sketch of a jar from *Mycenae* after Figure 2, Plate VII in J. L. Benson, *Horse, Bird & Man: The Origins of Greek Painting*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1970. Originally in:

Here, Homer associates Paris with a horse, and his house with a stable where the horse is accommodated, fed and provided with all the ‘facilities’ that it could rationally need; namely shelter and food. Nevertheless, this is not enough to fulfil the horse’s needs, and it breaks loose in order to go and meet the others of its kind in their haunts and feeding grounds. The literal escape refers to its quest for freedom to be with its herd, but also to experience again old habits, that is bathing in that particular ‘fair-flowing’ river.⁵⁷ The animality of the scene is further emphasised by the connotation of the promiscuous sexual encounter with the female mares to come. Moreover, the ‘feeding grounds’ that Homer refers to are not the random locations where the horses come to find their food if they were nomads; on the contrary, they are the accustomed places with which they are well acquainted and which through a repeated occupation have habitually become their haunts.⁵⁸ From the above example it becomes obvious that in the Homeric use of the words *ethos* and *ēthos* there is a strong connection to *animality*⁵⁹ and particularly to its spatial dimension: it is the place that the animals live. But why is this fact of any importance?

Archaeological Reports 1964-5, 11, fig. 12. “...an important pictorial vase vase of the IIc period was also found: a very large four handled, jar of which the greater part is preserved, decorated with hordes a foal and birds.” p. 11

⁵⁷ Note the possible connections between this passage of Homer and the part of *Gulliver’s Travels* that take place in the land of the Houyhnhnms, ruled by horses. Note especially the Ethical context of both stories. This association was triggered by the introduction of the book: Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel, and Adam Sharr, *Primitive, Original Matters in Architecture*, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006, p. xvii.

⁵⁸ Note the connection between Homer’s horse and the good and bad horse of the chariot allegory proposed by Plato in *Phaedrus*: “In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this division. Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; ...[254e] Now when the bad horse has gone through the same experience many times and has ceased from his unruliness, he is humbled and follows henceforth the wisdom of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one, he is overwhelmed with fear; and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe.” Plato, *Phaedrus*, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd, 1925. Available from: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Plat.+Phaedrus+253a>. Note especially the association of the bad horse with the id in psychoanalytic context. See also Richard Coyne, *Technoromanticism: Digital Narrative, Holism, and the Romance of the Real*, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press, 1999, p. 53.

⁵⁹ “An animal, what a word! The animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and the authority to give to the living other.” Jacques Derrida and Marie-Louise (ed.) Mallet, *The Animal That Therefore I Am* translated by David Wills, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, p. 23.

3.2.4 InHumanism: Connecting *ethics* with animality⁶⁰

The distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, after considering the Homeric etymology, takes on a completely different connotation, because of the potential association with another classical distinction between *humanity* and *animality*. It transforms from a metaphorical to a literal question about ‘ourselves.’ The study of animal behaviour is called *ethology*, a term that does not cover human behaviour that traditionally has been studied by psychology.⁶¹ Tim Ingold summarises the common understandings of this distinction: “[e]very attribute that it is claimed we uniquely have, the animal is consequently supposed to lack; thus the generic concept of ‘animal’ is negatively constituted by the sum of these deficiencies.”⁶² In particular, the very first notion of Roman humanism constitutes man to be *animal rationale* that arguably has its origins in Aristotle’s definition of the human as ‘rational animal.’⁶³ According to this view, the boundary separating humans and animals is reason, in a very similar sense to Descartes identifying his existence with his ability to think (*cogito ergo sum* = I think therefore I am). Reason and thought is the wall that keeps us humans *in* humanity. The scheme below shows two parallel ways of representing this opposition between humanity and animality:

⁶⁰ Some of the arguments of this sub-chapter were developed in: Leonidas Koutsoumpas, "Inhumanities: Ethics in Architectural Praxis," paper presented at the conference: *The Role of the Humanities in Design Creativity*, Lincoln, 15-16 November 2007, <http://www.lincoln.ac.uk/home/conferences/human/index.htm> [Accessed 09. 06. 2008].

⁶¹ The recent branch of human ethology actually challenges this very distinction: “According to two of its most prominent founders, Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen, the field of ethology can be defined as ‘the Biology of Behaviour’. It places emphasis on the notion that the behaviour of animals and its physiological basis has evolved phylogenetically and should be studied as one aspect of evolution. The success of this endeavour led to the further attempt to apply ethological methods and the evolutionary perspective to psychological and sociological phenomena of human behaviour.” M. von Cranach et al., eds., *Human Ethology: Claims and Limits of a New Discipline* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. <http://evolution.anthro.univie.ac.at/ishe/ethology.html> (Accessed 11. 06. 2008)

⁶² Tim Ingold, *What Is an Animal?* Vol. 1, One World Archaeology, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 3.

⁶³ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings From "Being and Time" (1927) To "The Task of Thinking" (1964)*, London: Routledge, 1993, 213-265, p. 226.




Figure 33: Animality as *domain* and as *condition*⁶⁴

The top part of the above scheme shows exactly this mutual exclusion that associates animality with nature and humanity with culture and reason. In this sense, *morality* is part of the cultural realm that is associated with humanity: “‘Becoming human,’ then, is tantamount to the process of enculturation which virtually all children of our species undergo in their passage to maturity...”⁶⁵ The rational part of this enculturation is usually based upon the conscious,⁶⁶ rule-based foundation of *moral* obligations. Nevertheless, what is even more important in this scheme, for the argument of this thesis, is the shaded area of ‘human animality’⁶⁷ to which *ethics* belongs and is based on the customs to which one becomes habituated unconsciously. For this, *ethics* is very similar to the abodes of the animals, what Homer called their ‘haunts and feeding grounds.’ Furthermore, Martin Heidegger, in the *Letter on Humanism*, refers to Heraclitus’ fragment 119: ‘*ēthos anthrōpōi daimôn*’; and its usual translation “a man’s character is his daimon.” Heidegger emphasises that this translation is not accurate enough, since “ethos means *abode*, dwelling place.”⁶⁸ Although Heidegger points out the etymological connection

⁶⁴ “Two views of animality: as a domain (including humankind) and as a condition (excluding humanity). The shaded area represents human nature or ‘human animality’.” Ingold, *What Is an Animal?*, p. 4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶⁶ “The question of animal consciousness, of doing and feeling, must therefore be separated from that of animal thinking.” Tim Ingold, “The Animal in the Study of Humanity,” in *What Is an Animal?*, ed. Tim Ingold, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 96.

⁶⁷ Balaji Mundkur, “Human Animality, the Mental Imagery of Fear and Religiosity,” in *What Is an Animal?*, ed. Tim Ingold, London: Routledge, 194, 141-184, p. 141.

⁶⁸ Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 256 [emphasis added].

between the word ‘ethos’ and a dwelling place, he does not emphasise the connection with animality; he goes on to suggest, that “the word [*ēthos*] names the open region in which *man* dwells.”⁶⁹ With this remark, *ethics* come very close to architecture and the role that it plays in accommodating our dwelling in this world, providing us with existential identity: “‘ethics’ ponders the abode of *man*.”⁷⁰ However, philosophers like Derrida and Agamben have criticized Heidegger’s view of the concept of animality as not being radical enough.⁷¹ Moreover, Catherine Ingraham, in architectural context, has used the term ‘post-animal’ to distinguish the understanding of human life as it stands before and after modernity.⁷² Hereafter, I would like to investigate further on the relation of *ethics* to habit and animality, which, in any case, is not dissimilar to Heidegger’s overall criticism of humanism that in the same essay it questions the centrality of the rational self.⁷³

As I have already mentioned, Jodie Nicotra in *The Force of Habit*, argues that habits do not *stick to* a pre-existing self, but they *happen to one*,⁷⁴ meaning that the self is a collection of habits. So, although Homer’s horse breaks free from the stable in an act of *moral* emancipation, it does so in order to return back to the *ethics* of its habits and customs and dispositions; the place where the other of its kind are ‘trapped’ although they are free. This also shows the impossibility of a total escape from any

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 258 [emphasis added].

⁷¹ “This is Derrida’s primary critique of Heidegger’s definition of animals as “poverty-in-the-world.” “Yes, animal, what a word!” he exclaims. “[A]nanimality in general” opposes human life in the specific. “Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give.” There are, in other words, vast and multiplicitous differences between a donkey and a spider.” Catherine Ingraham, *Architecture, Animal, Human: The Asymmetrical Condition*, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007, p. 194.

⁷² “The phrase “post-animal life,” which I use to label both human and animal life since the Renaissance, simultaneously stands guard over and disallows the animal qua animal, the autonomous animal. “Post-animal life” denotes animal life that has been divested of any autonomy it ever had, and human life after its animal aspect, has for the most part, been put under the supervision of science and psychology. But “post-animal” also refers to the historical slippage between architectural modernity, which I argue (with Manfredo Tafuri) began in the Renaissance, and biological modernity, which began in the late eighteenth century. Generally, post-animal human life has lost much of its animality but gradually acquired a biological identity that is now given equal, or even advanced, status compared to human intellectual and spiritual life. Post-animal life, on the other hand, has lost biological status and a complex identity, as well as, in many cases, life itself.” Ibid., pp. 16-17.

⁷³ Arguably the borderline between this animality and humanity is the monstrous: Mark Dorrian, “On the Monstrous and the Grotesque,” *Word & Image*, 16, no. 3, 2000: 310-317, p. 312.

⁷⁴ Nicotra, “The Force of Habit: Rhetoric, Repetition, and Identity from Darwin to Drugs,” p. 8.

possible constraints in order to find a 'real freedom' or a 'real self.' The custom of familiarising ourselves by creating habits is necessary in order to do all the other things that are necessary for accomplishing the activities of everyday life, since "[s]o much of what we learn consists of learning *not* to think about what we are doing, so that we can concentrate on other things."⁷⁵ Walter Benjamin has emphasised the role that habit plays in the tactile appropriation of the built environment as opposed to the touristic perception of buildings through sight, which is associated with contemplation.⁷⁶ Furthermore, Nicotra describes the animal base of the habituation in the space:

...like the way dogs trot around a new place, accustoming themselves through repetition (literally running in circles) to unfamiliar smells and new configurations of space. We learn, through repeated experience, how to interpret the creaking sound in the hall and the way the light tends to slant through the windows in late afternoon. Through repeated encounters with a new place (and one could extend this idea of the 'dwelling' to any new experience or set of actions as well), one learns its contours, how it works, the sticking points and the places that attract one, thereby creating a sense of familiarity that eventually doesn't just 'free up' one's attention for other things, as James described it, but actually creates a deeper level of attention, one that resonates in the body as well as in the consciousness.⁷⁷

It is exactly in the repetitive nature of the every-day⁷⁸ that the fundamental mechanism of acquaintance takes place, through the creation of habits and dispositions.⁷⁹ Habit is fundamentally related with place and architecture through *inhabitation*.⁸⁰ Habitat then becomes the dwelling place characterised by a certain locality in which animals or plants live and grow.⁸¹ Humans inhabit places through

⁷⁵ Ingold, "The Animal in the Study of Humanity," p. 95.

⁷⁶ Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, London: Fontana Press, 1992, 211-244, p. 233.

⁷⁷ Nicotra, "The Force of Habit: Rhetoric, Repetition, and Identity from Darwin to Drugs," p. 15.

⁷⁸ Richard Coyne, *The Tuning of Place: Sociable Space and Everyday Digital Media*, (unpublished draft).

⁷⁹ Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit*, London: Fifiield, 1910.

⁸⁰ "...but most often what we need from a building is for it to give an appropriate frame and support for our everyday habits. These habits make the structure of our lives and our identities..." Andrew Ballantyne, *Architecture Theory, a Reader in Philosophy and Culture*, London & New York: Continuum, 2005, p. 33.

⁸¹ habitat. Oxford English Dictionary. Second Edition 1989

the repetitive mundane activities that constitute everyday life.⁸² “Building as dwelling, that is, as being on the earth, however, remains for man’s everyday experience that which is from the outset “habitual” –we inhabit it,”⁸³ suggests Heidegger in *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*. In this sense *ethics* becomes the sub-area of Ethics that habitually our animal nature *inhabits*.

The importance of the mundane character of *ethics* becomes apparent in a short story that Heidegger narrates in the *Letter on Humanism*, in which a group of foreign visitors visit Heraclitus, and are disappointed to find him sitting in front of his stove, in his humble home. “They believe they should meet the thinker in circumstances which, contrary to the ordinary round of human life, everywhere bear traces of the exceptional and rare and so of the exciting.”⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the philosopher invites them in with the words ‘here too the gods come to presence’ (*einai gar kai entautha theous*). Heidegger explains Heraclitus words, like this: “*Kai entautha*, ‘even here,’ at the stove, in that ordinary place where every thing and every condition, each deed and thought is intimate and commonplace, that is familiar [*geheur*], ‘even there’ in the sphere of familiar, *einai theous*, it is the case that ‘the gods come to presence’.”⁸⁵ This quotation is one more reason for justifying the forensic inquiry for Ethics in the most mundane and everyday situations of educational activities.

⁸² As this thesis goes to the printer I find this excellent quote by Ballantyne that worths quoting for long: “These unconsidered, more or less automatic responses, play a very significant role in our lives. If we live entirely within the repertoire of our accustomed ways of behaving, our familiar spatial practices, then we will feel securely ‘t home’ – we will not be faced with puzzles which we have to figure out before we can get on with our lives; we will not feel challenged, and we will not really have to ‘think’ at all, but will be able to deal with each situation as it arises on the basis of the ingrained and unconscious memory of other simealr experiences. This is the basis of ‘common sense,’ which feels perfectly normal and everyday. The everyday environment in which we live is constituted through repetition and recognition. We know how to behave because we have successfully behaved in that way before; our havits can become entrenched, and when they do so then they shape our behaviour as firmly as sloid walls. Our habitat is habt-generated: there are things we do, and things we don’t – barriers we respect and other which some people seem to repect but we don’t. Indeed not only our surroundings but also our identities are constituted by habit: ‘we are habits, nothing but habits –the habit of saying “I”’ (Deleuze, 1953: x) We have a habit of forming habits. At a personal level we would describe habitual behaviour as routine – and we need ot have some elements of our lives as routine, so that we ar not exhausted and disorientated by ever-shifting circumstances in which we would never be able to act with confidence.” Ballantyne, "The Nest and the Pillar of Fire," pp. 27-28.

⁸³ Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in *Basic Writings From "Being and Time" (1927) To "The Task of Thinking" (1964)*, London: Routledge, 1993, 343-363, p. 349.

⁸⁴ Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 257.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

To summarise, this ‘inhuman’ view of *ethics* is a fundamental argument in this thesis. The definition of ‘humanism’ as a ‘reasonable faculty’ that distinguishes humans from animals is a necessity⁸⁶ and *ethics* through its etymology can play a fundamental role in doing so. In this respect, *morality* that characterises actions, or attitudes as good/bad or right/wrong in a conscious and rational process is very different from *ethics*, which embodies the concepts of addiction, *custom*, or disposition of a character in relation to a pre-human or animal nature. From this point of view *morality* seems to have a normative evaluative character, which judges things according to rules with the aid of calculation. At the same time, *ethics* has an evaluative character based on a pre-reflective and pre-narrative⁸⁷ way that things are taking place in practice, when considered *apriori* as good, like Homer’s horse’s impulse to go to the its haunt. An inquiry about *ethics* is therefore a quest to what is *inhuman* in wo/man. It needs more than pure logic to understand architecture as a ‘humane’ activity and even more to transcend it and perceive its divine aspects.⁸⁸ However, the way to arrive there is not by focusing on reflection (or thinking as Heidegger argues), but by examining the notion of practice.

Hereafter, I leave aside this human/animal association with Ethics – an association that I will pursue further in Chapter 5 – and I proceed by establishing further the foundations of the difference between *morality* and *ethics* in a more analytical way. In doing so, I present Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of *practice* as the main concept that allows the manifestation of Ethics through virtue. This understanding of Ethics in human conduct introduces a relationship between Ethics and human activities seen as *praxis*, that will be exploited in further detail in the following chapter. Here, I elaborate MacIntyre’s distinction between goods that can be *internal* or *external* to a practice, I compare it with Maurice Lagueux’s *internal* and *external* Ethical problems in architecture, and I go on to create a link between *externality* and morality, and between *internality* and *ethics*.

⁸⁶ “It ought to be a bit clearer now that opposition to “humanism” in no way implies a defence of the inhuman but rather opens other vistas.” Ibid., p. 250.

⁸⁷ More about the narrative notions of ethics as discussed by Paul Ricoeur will be discussed in Chapter 5. See p. 289.

⁸⁸ Arguably, for Heidegger, the human Being operates in between its animal appearance and its divine potential.

3.3 External morality and internal ethics

3.3.1 External and internal goods to a practice

MacIntyre, in his book *After Virtue*, presents a particular view of Ethics, which follows the philosophical branch of modern Virtue Ethics initiated by G.E.M. Anscombe,⁸⁹ that claims an Aristotelian origin. Virtue Ethics may be identified as emphasizing “the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism),”⁹⁰ or in other words, as opposed to Kantianism and utilitarianism.⁹¹ Like other Virtue Ethicists, MacIntyre argues that *virtue* is a key concept in understanding Ethics. What distinguishes MacIntyre from other writers about virtues is his suggestion that virtues are embedded in *practices*.⁹² The ends, goals and purposes around which all human endeavour, ambition and fulfilment turn, are embedded in practices, in relation to which individuals or groups may excel or fall short. *Practices* “provide the arena in which the virtues are exhibited.”⁹³ MacIntyre famously defined the concept of *practice* in the following words:

By ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.⁹⁴

For MacIntyre the range of practices is wide, including important and highly respectful activities of human life like arts, sciences, politics, but also more simple

⁸⁹ G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy*, 33, no. 124, 1958: 1-19.

⁹⁰ Rosalind Hursthouse, *Virtue Ethics*, 2003. Available from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/> [Accessed 14. 06 2005].

⁹¹ David Carr and Jan Steutel, *Virtue Ethics and Moral Education*, Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy of Education, London & New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999, p. 5.

⁹² Although MacIntyre considers virtues as being overall embodied in practices, more than once he states that virtues are not restricted only to the context of practice. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, p. 187 & 201. Nevertheless, this contradiction seems to remain unresolved in the book.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.187.

ones like games and making and sustaining family life. Nevertheless, not every activity is a practice. In MacIntyre's examples, although football as a game is a practice, kicking a ball is not; farming is, while digging the ground is not. What characterises these examples is the fact that farming or football is a practice that can be fully understood only through a historical perspective, or a connection to certain institutions and their social implications, all of which are not present if one merely digs a hole in the ground, or if one finds a ball in the street and kicks it (no matter how skilfully). In this sense, the educational situations in the design studio, the music class and the *dojo* should be understood as practices within institutions, in a historical perspective and as having certain social implications. The discussion between Dorian and the students about the Ethics of the Borderlands and the ghettoing of Jews in Venice is not a tourist guide in the city of Venice (no matter how accurate); when Roxana was giving advice to the students on how to turn and sing, it is not similar with a singing in the shower (no matter how skilfull one sings); and Laurent's demonstration of the free technique (*jyu waza*) with Susanna is not similar to a fight outside a pub (no matter if the opponents use aikido techniques). In all three cases the institutional background creates a necessary horizon in order to understand the activities that take place. This institutional background can be confined to very specific spaces (in the MArch design studio on the fourth floor of the building of Architecture at the University of Edinburgh), or be 'out there' in the community (in the Botanic Gardens of Edinburgh in the case of the music class). Nevertheless, this institutional, historical and social understanding is necessary in order to understand the actions that take place in each case, as situations bounded within a horizon.



Figure 34: The three case studies as practices within institutions

In the following chapter, I give a further account of what distinguishes a practice from a mere action. But already from these first examples I can establish that for MacIntyre practice is closely related to the Aristotelian notion of *praxis*, which implies a concept of aim or *telos*, which cannot be understood without the practice itself (more on this to follow in the following chapter). MacIntyre attempts to clarify what he means by the term practice by giving a very detailed definition and sufficient examples, however considerable criticism of his work has been focused on this definition and the exclusive way in which he leaves out particular activities.⁹⁵ But in our case, concerning architecture, things are quite straightforward, since MacIntyre states clearly that *architecture is a practice* and contrasts it with laying bricks which is not.⁹⁶ In this way, MacIntyre distinguishes the art of architecture, seen as a concrete activity, as having a historical perspective and as being connected with specific institutions, with the mere activity of laying bricks on top of one another, as would be done by a child playing with Lego, or even an adult as a hobby. Nevertheless, it is arguable that MacIntyre would not have had problem in accepting the craftsmanship of building as a practice; it has a historical perspective and it possesses goods internal to the practice of building that are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, what 'building a good wall' means.⁹⁷

Moreover, MacIntyre makes a crucial distinction for the argument of this thesis in defining virtues by reference to goods that are *internal*, versus those which are *external* to a practice. Let's take for example a practice like chess (MacIntyre's example). Goods external to the practice of the game are things like fame, money, status and prestige, which can also be acquired in alternative ways which can be completely unrelated to the playing chess (e.g. playing football, practicing medicine, writing books). On the other hand, *internal* goods for the game of chess are those which can only be acquired by playing chess (or possibly by a limited range of very

⁹⁵ A great controversy has been created in the circles of education because of MacIntyre's claim that teaching is not a practice. See for example Joseph Dunne, "Arguing for Teaching as a Practice: A Reply to Alasdair MacIntyre," *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 37, no. 2, 2003: 353-369.

⁹⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 187.

⁹⁷ See also Jane Collier, "Moral Imagination and the Practice of Architecture," in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, p. 91.

similar kind of games). The internal goods also have the characteristic that they can be recognized only by the experience of participating in the particular practice and for this reason it is very difficult for someone outside of this practice to recognise them and to justify their value.

All the above can be summarised by saying that *goods* are *internal* to a practice if they cannot be achieved except by participating in it, and if they can only be identified and recognized through that participation. *External goods* are only contingently related to practices, and could in principle be obtained independently of actually practising them. An important outcome of this distinction is that *external* goods are property and a possession of one individual only, while the *internal* goods are achievements shared by all members of the relevant community. So the money or the fame that one gets from her or his excellence of practicing architecture are only her or his possessions, while the invention of a new way designing (for example Le Corbusier's five points of modern architecture, or Mies van der Rohe's free plan) is something that all the other architects are able to share and use (a fact that can be confirmed by the wide adoption of those principle by modern architecture). This fundamental distinction is central to MacIntyre's definition of virtue:

Virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.⁹⁸

This definition allows MacIntyre to claim that without the virtues as such, only a notion of external goods could be understood, while what he describes as internal goods would remained veiled. Such a society would be highly competitive, based on individuals, without any notion of sharing a common life.⁹⁹ "The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and

⁹⁸ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 191. MacIntyre also claims that: "The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain is in the relevant kind of quest for the good." MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 219.

⁹⁹ An example of such a society for MacIntyre is Hobbes' account of the state of nature. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 196.

enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain it in the relevant kind of quest for the good.”¹⁰⁰

Finally, practices, as defined by MacIntyre, are not ideal, isolated activities disconnected from ‘real’ life. On the contrary, they have history, they are interrelated and they form authoritative institutions: “To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them.”¹⁰¹ In terms of education this means that one cannot be ‘initiated’ into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards achieved so far, which, being accepted as axioms through the history of this practice, actually define the practice itself. These standards, of course, are and should be criticized and changed, but for this reason should be at the same time acknowledged and accepted, not necessarily as valid, but as historically present. At the same time however, MacIntyre suggests that practices should not be identified with institutions. His main argument for this is the fact that institutions are primarily focused on external goods. It is an inherent characteristic of the institutions that in order to sustain themselves, they get involved in earning money, acquiring status and prestige in a way that is fundamental to their existence. In order to acquire these goals they bear on practices as the only way to extract these external goods: “institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution...”¹⁰² Entering a practice is also to constitute a relationship, not only with the other members who share the same practice, but also with all those who previously practised it, and especially with those that formed the standards of the practice as we see them today. These relationships and interactions amongst the members of a practice have been described through the notion of ‘community of practice’ coined by Etienne Wenger and Jean Lave.¹⁰³ This term originated from the study of educational situations of apprenticeship that are not

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 219.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 194.

¹⁰³ Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*, Learning in Doing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.. See also: Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*, Learning in Doing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

different to the educational situations that I present here.¹⁰⁴ Finally, Karsten Harries has emphasised that the relationships established amongst the members of a practice and which extend to the wider society play a fundamental Ethical role, especially for architecture. It is a “meditation provided by a shared way of life,”¹⁰⁵ which he assimilates with an introduction into a Wittgensteinian language game which is “a whole, consisting of language and actions into which it is woven.”¹⁰⁶ Harries concludes that “[t]o enter into such a game is rather like learning to play a certain part: it presupposes opportunities to see others in the same role.”¹⁰⁷

3.3.2 External and internal Ethical problems in architecture

A distinction similar to MacIntyre’s *internal* and *external* goods within a practice has been proposed by Maurice Lagueux, who uses the same polar terms (*internal – external*) in order to describe Ethics in the context of architecture. In his paper “Ethics versus Aesthetics in Architecture”¹⁰⁸ he makes the distinction between internal and external *problems* that a practice can create, referring to situations where one can identify clear Ethical statements, or which need the use of Ethical discourse in order to solve them. Lagueux does not provide a very strict definition of what practice is, since he is primarily focused on architecture, but nonetheless, he also makes references to the arts, sciences of various disciplines and other concrete human activities. Moreover, Lagueux states clearly that his work concerns “the ethical problems raised (at least partially) *by the practice* of disciplines such biology medicine, physics, engineering sociology painting or architecture.”¹⁰⁹ For this it would not be wrong to suggest that Lagueux uses the term *practice* essentially in the same way that MacIntyre does in *After Virtue*.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ See also an understanding of ‘practice as learning’ in Collier, “Moral Imagination and the Practice of Architecture,” p. 310.

¹⁰⁵ Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 325.

¹⁰⁶ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, par. 7.

¹⁰⁷ Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, p. 325.

¹⁰⁸ Maurice Lagueux, “Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture,” *The Philosophical Forum*, XXXV, no. 2, 2004: 117-133.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.120 [emphasis in the original].

¹¹⁰ It is interesting that Lagueux does not make any cross-reference to MacIntyre and despite the fact that he is using the same dipolar terms there is no evidence that he has borrowed them from MacIntyre. I discuss this connection later on, p. 163.

Lagueux distinguishes those problems that are *external* to a practice from those problems which are *internal* to it, by making a very simple observation: if a biologist acknowledges that he is not capable of solving the Ethical problems that his discovery raises, his scientific credibility would remain unaffected; he could even be awarded a Nobel prize and the problems would be discussed by bio-ethicists. On the contrary, if an architect were to admit his inadequacy in solving the Ethical issues involved in designing a project, (e.g. a school, a hospital or a prison), his credibility would be dramatically affected; he would lose the commission and probably his licence would be withdrawn. Through such examples, Lagueux categorises the problems that various practices face: they are *internal*, if they are inherent in the practice and would be expected to be solved by its practitioner; and *external* if the problems can be separated from the practice and are not expected to be solved by them. If they can be solved at all, this would be from someone outside the specific practice.

Furthermore, in a very simple and clear way Lagueux specifies the case of architecture, by stating that it raises Ethical problems because it “*produces the obligatory framework for social life.*”¹¹¹ Most of the other arts raise Ethical problems internal to their practice only through *narrative* (describing human relationships or political situations).¹¹² On the contrary, although architecture is an abstract art, it makes the Ethical problems inherent to it, not because it suggests, describes or narrates Ethical problems, but because it *creates* them. In other words, architecture *continuously* affects the life of each inhabitant or user by forming the way that people come together. In Lagueux own words:

Architects who are not concerned with the best ways to improve the lives of their building’s users or inhabitants are very poor architects indeed. Architecture continuously raises ethical problems, which, however, are *nothing more than normal problems that architects must solve in*

¹¹¹ Lagueux, "Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture," p. 122 [emphasis added].

¹¹² A slightly different version is given by Best: “...it is obviously mistaken to assert that the arts have no meaning or value other than serving an external purpose; and on the other hand, it is obviously mistaken to assert that artistic meaning is exclusively intrinsic, and therefore isolated from moral, social, and other issues.” David Best, "The Arts, Morality and Postmodernism," in *Education in Morality*, ed. Mark J. Halstead and Terence H. McLaughlin, London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999, pp. 223-224.

practicing their art. It is for this reason that these ethical problems can be called *internal* to their discipline.¹¹³

According to Lagueux, the distinction between internal and external Ethical problems differentiates the three case studies. For example, architecture's Ethical problems are clearly defined as internal to its practice, while in the case of music, the Ethical problems appear to be external to it, since they use narrative mechanisms to convey their Ethical meaning. Aikido, on the other hand, seems to be closer to architecture, since the Ethical issues are internal to the practice and are to be dealt by practitioner. This fact becomes obvious in extreme cases where practising the martial art involves risk to human life (see again Figure 21 in the previous chapter: p. 90).

For the case of architecture, a similar notion of internality and externality concerning the Ethics of design has also been suggested by Pérez-Gómez when he states that “[o]ften, ethics is still regarded as external to architecture (and to the other design disciplines) – as ultimately subjective and therefore inconsequential.”¹¹⁴ He also goes on to suggest that architecture's Ethical concerns are usually difficult to identify, exactly because of this internal relationship which resists any “external adjunct to some formalistic or technical activity.”¹¹⁵ He also emphasises the external role of the program, when he says that “...architecture must adequately resolve the internal conditions generated by a “program” that is external to the architect's discipline.” He then goes on to suggest that since “ethics was assumed to be autonomous, external to those formal concerns of the “ornamental builders,” it was deemed to be practically subsumed by the paradigmatic technological values of efficiency and economy.”¹¹⁶ Pérez-Gómez's arguments juxtaposed with those of Lauguex justify a strong position that posits that Ethical problems can be clasified as either internal or external to a practice and that the Ethical problems raised by architecture are internal to it.

¹¹³ Lagueux, "Ethics Versus Aesthetics in Architecture," p. 119 [emphasis added].

¹¹⁴ Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Louis Pelletier, eds., *Architecture, Ethics and Technology* Montreal et. al.: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994, p. 4.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.


¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

3.3.3 Connecting externality with *morality* and internality with *ethics*

We meet with another indication of the wide functions of indwelling when we find acceptance to moral teachings described as their *interiorization*. To interiorize is to identify ourselves with the teachings in question, by making them function as the proximal term of a tacit moral knowledge, as applied in practice.¹¹⁷

Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*

So far, I have proposed a distinction between the terms *morality* and *ethics*; I have overviewed MacIntyre's definition of practice and the distinction that he makes between *goods* that external and internal to the practice; and I have examined Lagueux's distinction between external and internal Ethical *problems* to a practice. The following scheme shows the three areas:



Scheme 1

Here, I establish a relationship between the terms on the left and on the right part of the scheme, suggesting that *morality* refers to goods and issues of Ethics that are external to the practice, while *ethics* refers to those that are *internal* to it. Obviously, these notions of *externality* and *internality* come from combining MacIntyre's and Lagueux's arguments, a connection which has not been established so far, since Lagueux's recent paper does not make any reference to MacIntyre's work.

If this connection¹¹⁸ were based on the *possession* of goods, one could argue that the evaluative character of *morality* can be related to social environment, because it

¹¹⁷ Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, Reprint by arrangement with Doubleday & Company, Inc ed, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1966 Reprint, 1983, p.17 [emphasis in the original].

¹¹⁸ In previous versions of this argument I have used the characteristic emphasised in the opening quotation from Lawrence (and Williams) that connects *morality* to social expectations and *ethics* to individual character. Here, I avoid this association, as well as that between normative/descriptive,

constitutes and uses codes of judging human interaction, and also to individual persons, since they are the agents of the evaluation. At the same time, *ethics* can be related to the social environment, creating the tradition and the mechanisms that determine the ways that things take place; and to individuals, since they are the ones who carry the dispositions and the pre-accepted customs that form their life. However, it has been discussed before that according to MacIntyre, *external* goods are only one individual's property, while *internal* goods are achievements shared by all members of the relevant community. Does this not mean then that *external* goods should refer to what I call *ethics*, and that *internal* goods should refer to *morality*?

It is true that if one compares these concepts on the grounds of the notion of *possession* – either of a social community or of an individual – then the concepts appear to form a schema of *internality–morality* and *externality–ethics*. Nevertheless, this association is not correct, since I argue the relation of the terms should be established in terms of *constitution* and not in terms of *possession*. ‘Constitution’¹¹⁹ is an active term that gives form to things and for this reason is widely related to the creational role of doing a practice. On the other hand, ‘possession’ appears to have mainly passive characteristics that tend to conserve something which has been already created. Especially in terms of education, the terms ‘constitution’ and ‘possession’ show two completely different attitudes towards knowledge: one is engaging and creative, while the other is receptive and conservative. According to MacIntyre (as I already discussed), fame, money and prestige are goods that are formed by the social environment, or more specifically by various social institutions as conventional rules that justify behaviour between individuals. On the other hand,

because of some complications that it causes in the overall argument. I am grateful to Lagueux, for pointing out these discrepancies, in our personal correspondence. For details, see p. 415 of the Appendix.

¹¹⁹ constitution n. “The action of constituting, *making*, establishing, etc.” Oxford English Dictionary online, Second Edition 1989, [emphasis added]
 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50048134?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=constitution&first=1&max_to_show=10> [Accessed 19. 08. 2005].

The verb ‘constitute’: “to set up, post, establish, appoint, ordain.” Also definition 7 suggests “*To make (a thing) what it is; to give its being to form, determine.*” Oxford English Dictionary online, Second Edition 1989 [emphasis added]

<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50048129?query_type=word&queryword=constitute&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2&search_id=5VBg-b23mE5-1539&hilite=50048129> [Accessed 19. 08. 2005].

the goods that are internal to the practice of architecture such as ability in representation, compositional skills, design ingenuity, patience through the evolution of the project, management and organizational skills between the different participants (other architects, structural, mechanical and electrical engineers, workers on the site, and so on) are formed by the specific individual every time that he/she is involved in practising architecture. Obviously, the same principles apply in the case of music and aikido too. This means that the correct association is that between *morality-externality* and between *ethics-internality*, as shown in Scheme 1. So, *morality* in the context of this thesis is related to goods that are external to educational practices of architecture (in the design studio), to music (in the music and the community) and to *aikido* (in the *dojo* of the *L' Art du Chi*); and at the same time, the Ethical problems that arise are also external to each practice. At the same time, *ethics* is also related to goods that are internal to each practice and so the Ethical problems should be dealt with by the practitioners themselves.

This association between the two terms, however, is not unproblematic. In my personal correspondence with Professor Lagueux he at first seemed to disagree with combining his internal/external distinction with MacIntyre's.¹²⁰ Lagueux points out that in his view the *moral* goodness of a practice is something internal to the practise itself. In these terms, being *morally* good as an architect is not something external to the practice of architecture. However, later on he admitted that there could be a point of reconciliation, because if a solution to an Ethical problem could be characterised as a good in itself, then that good is indeed internal to the practice of architecture.¹²¹

¹²⁰ “Finally, I would like to come back to the internal/external distinction. I thank you very much for having drawn my attention to MacIntyre views that I just had time to examine very summarily during the last days. I found them quite interesting, but not really identical to my use of a similar distinction. For MacIntyre, it is the good, or one could say, as far as I can see, the value which is targeted by a practice which is internal or external to it. As he said, prestige, monetary gains to be obtained by an adequate practice of an activity are external to it, whereas the perfect mastery of this practice is internal. From this point of view, for the reasons briefly evoked above when I referred to the end of chapter 14 [of *After Virtue*], *I am far from being sure that considerations about the moral goodness or badness of a practice would be considered by him as external to this practice.*” Lagueux, Maurice, email, 25/7/2005 5:11 am.

¹²¹ “If my point of view is transposed at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, where the solution of an ethical problem is characterised as a good (in MacIntyre's meaning of this word), and where architecture an[d] other arts are characterised as practices, it would be possible to say, in the wording of MacIntyre, that such a good is internal to the practice of architecture since architecture correctly understood requires it.” Ibid.

Lagueux makes a point that brings our focus to the borderline between internality and externality, since his argument sees a form of external *moral* goodness as becoming part of *ethics*, which he admits to be internal. So, there is potential for a movement that crosses the boundary distinguishing external *morality* from internal *ethics*. This movement, for which evidence exists in other points of this thesis,¹²² will be discussed in detail in the conclusion.

In trying to overcome the above problem, let us give voice to ethnomethodology – the silent background of this chapter – which is also engaged in this distinction between internality and externality, especially in context of Ethics. Garfinkel, for example, argues that any rational properties of practical activities¹²³ should be approached by considering the properties that the activities' members use themselves and not according to an external rule that comes from outside the settings of action.¹²⁴ This fact does not mean that some process of internalization of external rules (a movement that crosses the boundary, again) can not happen when “matters which at the level of talk might be spoken of as ‘production programs,’ ‘laws of conduct,’ ‘rules of rational decision-making,’ ... *in the actual situation* were taken for granted and were depended upon to consist of recipes, proverbs, slogans, a partially

¹²² Note a potential connection of the internality of *ethics* with the turn towards the interiority of architecture and especially the artist's studio, in contrast to the “ethical dimension as the theatre of community life,” as it has been discussed in the case of André Breton by Dagmar Weston: “Finally, a consideration of Breton's atelier brings into focus the museal nature of contemporary culture. Although his own collection must be understood as a critique of the decontextualization of works within the conventional museum, it nevertheless manifests the problematic need in the twentieth century for an introverted, private culture, gathered within the private home-museum. *In this vision, the traditional public and ethical realm of the city is reinterpreted as an agglomeration of private domestic worlds.*” [emphasis added] Dagmar Motycka Weston, “The Situational Space of André Breton's Atelier and Personal Museum in Paris,” paper presented at the conference: *The Role of the Humanities in Design Creativity*, Lincoln, UK, 15-16th November 2007, <http://www.lincoln.ac.uk/home/conferences/human/papers/Weston.pdf> [Accessed 10_12_2007].

¹²³ “It thus fell to Garfinkel to effect an integration of the ‘moral’ with the ‘cognitive.’ This he accomplished through a series of ingenious experiments and with brilliant interpretations of their results. His conclusions are intellectually compelling and they permit us to remove the scare quotation marks from the term ‘moral’; for the are consistent with the mundane actors’ treatment of one another's actions as the chosen products of knowledgeable agents. It is this view of action treated as the product of accountable moral choice which, in turn, Garfinkel places at the centre of his analysis of social organization.” John Heritage, *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*, Social and Political Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p. 76.

¹²⁴ Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 33.

formulated plans of action.”¹²⁵ But the members of a practice consider such internalised notions of morality ‘natural facts of life,’ which nonetheless have an Ethical value. Garfinkel also argues that “[f]or members not only are matters so about familiar scenes, but they are so *because it is morally right or wrong that they are so.*”¹²⁶ This moral right to see something as right when it is taken for granted should be translated into my term of *ethics*. To take things for granted is to keep them inside the boundary, of a pre-understanding; and ethnomethodology appears to be interested in exactly this interiority and the way that things that are ‘taken for granted’ and make sense for the members of the various practices. This concept is expressed by Garfinkel in this quote:

...the practices are done by parties to those settings whose skill with, knowledge of, and entitlement to the detailed work of that accomplishment – whose competence – they obstinately depend upon, recognize, use, and take for granted; and *that* they take their competence for granted itself furnishes parties with a setting’s distinguishing and particular features, and of course it furnishes them as well as resources, troubles, projects, and the rest.¹²⁷

In this sense, the universality of an external rule does not make sense as an absolute value, but there is always a notion of *ad hocing* that makes the members of every situation creative actors and moral agents.¹²⁸ Although ethnomethodology looks for some structural articulation or patterns inside this *ad hocing*, it does not wish to reduce the situations to mere theoretical remedies that replace the situations themselves. Nor, it wishes to moralise about them, by extracting rules of Ethics that can be then applied to other general situations.

In summary, I conclude by restating the argument that *morality* has been the privileged way of seeing Ethics through its associations with human reason, obligation and normative rules that are universal and should be applied to every aspect of human life without exception, and are based on goods that are external to

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 12-13.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 35 [emphasis added].


¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 1-2 [emphasis in the original].

¹²⁸ “*Ad hocing* occurs (without, I believe, any possibility of remedy), whenever the coder assumes the position of a socially competent member of the arrangement...” Ibid., p. 22 [emphasis in the original].

the practices where people operate. Against this view, I argue for the importance of *ethics*, this forgotten area of Ethics, which is lost in the human animality, habits, dispositions, and prejudices of everyday life; and is so uncunningly familiar, but so difficult to grasp; it is based on the goods that are internal to human practices; which is so intimate and humane that brings into question the essence of being human, bringing forth its animal nature. This internal/external distinction between *morality* and *ethics* (together with its human/animal nature) ended up focusing on the line/boundary that separates them and the movement that crosses this threshold. For this reason, the following chapter aims to locate in greater detail the area of human conduct where *ethics* (and with it, *morality* and their separating borderline) becomes manifested. This borderline will be located in the Aristotelian categorical distinction between *theoria*, *poiēsis*, and *praxis*.

Ethics and the *Energieiai*:

ethics in praxis



...
When the child was a child
It choked on spinach
on peas, on rice pudding
and on steamed cauliflower
and eats all of those now
and not just because it has to.

...
Peter Handke
Song to Childhood

4.1 Introduction: Ethics and Human Conduct

My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.¹

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *A Lecture on Ethics*

Wittgenstein gave only one public lecture dealing explicitly² with Ethics. It was delivered to a society of Cambridge called ‘The Heretics’ sometime between September 1929 and December 1930 (what is known as the middle period of Wittgenstein’s thought, after the *Tractatus* and before the *Investigations*). Wittgenstein opened that lecture by offering a first definition of Ethics taken by G. E. Moore: “I am using it [the word ‘Ethics’] to cover an enquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: *the general enquiry into what is good*.”³ The emphasised words were the ones quoted by Wittgenstein. Moore clarified that he used this definition in contrast to the disposition of many philosophers to accept as an “adequate definition of ‘Ethics’ the statement that it deals with the question of what is good or bad *in human conduct*.”⁴ He added that the enquiries of Ethics of these philosophers “are properly confined to ‘conduct’ or ‘practice’.”⁵ Moore clarified further that ‘good conduct’ is a complex notion where both ‘good’ (and/or ‘bad’) as well as ‘conduct’ needs to be defined. Moreover, he followed on that “*we all know pretty well what ‘conduct’ is*”⁶ so the focus should remain on the term ‘good’.⁷

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," *The Philosophical Review*, 74, no. 1, 1965: 3-12, pp. 11-12. This text is actually a transcript of shorthand notes made by the Friedrich Waismann. See Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," p. 3.

² By this I mean a treatise that deals explicitly with Ethics. Nevertheless, as I have already discussed in the introduction, all of his work and especially the *Tractatus* is dealing with Ethics. See also James C. Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life*, Tampa: University Presses of Florida, 1982, p. 81.

³ George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962/1903, p. 2 [emphasis added].

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶ Ibid., p. 3 [emphasis added].

4.1.1 Aims of this chapter

What is good? and What is bad? and the discussion of this question (or these questions) I give the name of Ethics...⁸

George Moore, *Principia Ethica*

This chapter analyses the activities of architecture and architectural education through the Aristotelian Ethics that identify three areas of human conduct: thinking, making and doing (*theoretical*, *poetical* and *practical*). In doing so, this chapter revisits the educational situations that have been introduced in the previous chapters. This analysis shows that so far, ‘thinking’ and ‘making’ have been the conventional ways of seeing architectural Ethics as *morality*. On the other hand, ‘doing’ which is associated with *ethics* has largely been underestimated in the role that it plays within the wider Ethical discourse. For this reason, here an argument is constructed that supports *ethics* through ‘doing’ and *praxis*.

Having already established the distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, here, I will temporarily return to the examination of the wider discourse of Ethics by doing exactly the *opposite*⁹ of what Moore suggested above. I will start by challenging the fact that we all know ‘pretty well’ what ‘human conduct’ is and I will focus especially on defining this term in its relation to architecture and especially to its education. The reason for this is because my aim and Moore’s are dissimilar. Moore’s aim, as he clearly stated above, is to define Ethics and find ‘what is good (and/or bad)’. My aim is different, since I deliberately do not define Ethics, but rather discuss it through its manifestations of *morality* and *ethics* in concrete situations.¹⁰ My strategy is to trust the fact that everyone understands a concept of

⁷ Moore actually showed that there are non-moral uses of the concept of good, which Wittgenstein also uses. See also Anthony Quinton, "The Bounds of Morality," in *Ethics and Social Justice*, ed. Howard E. Kiefer & Milton K. Munitz, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968, 122-141, p. 125.

⁸ Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 3.

⁹ Note that there is a contradiction here with Moore’s non-naturalism, that “good is good, and that is the end of the matter” Ibid., pp. 6-7. Compare also with the statement: “Nothing can be said about ‘good’ except that is good.” Cahal. B. Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, Blackrock: Four Courts Press, 1996, p. 31.

¹⁰ This is a conscious decision that is aware of the contradiction of “wanting to support ethics but rejecting its defining them.” Johnston discusses this in Paul Johnston, *The Contradictions of Modern Moral Philosophy: Ethics after Wittgenstein*, Ethics and Moral Theory, London & New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 1999, p. 167.

good or bad (in its manifestation as *morality* or *ethics*), despite the fact that this concept can be different amongst different people. In these terms, I invert Moore's approach and by suggesting that 'we all know pretty well what Ethics is,' I focus instead on the question of '*what human conduct is*' or in other words '*where can we find Ethics?*', or else, 'in which area of human life does *morality* and *ethics* become manifested?'. This question comes after having already identified some situations of Ethics in the three educational case studies: the design studio, the music class and the *dojo*. So, since situations of Ethics do actually exist in education, this chapter aims to identify the area of human conduct in which *morality* and *ethics* are manifested.¹¹

4.1.2 (Further) Ethno- Methodological Clarifications

The theme of this chapter that negotiates practice against theory and making, reflects notions of the 'methodology' of the overall thesis, as has been introduced in chapter 1. In particular the struggle between the classical dipole of theory/practice as manifested in the methodology of this research that uses two simultaneous approaches, philosophy and ethnomethodology, as methods of the (de)construction¹² of Ethics. Ethnomethodology in this sense is the 'atheoretical theory' (*praxis*) that problematises and subverts what could be a conventional philosophical enquiry (*theoria*) on the nature of Ethics. Michael Lynch in his essay "Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Practice" addresses the relationship of Ethnomethodology with *praxis* in this way:

Ethnomethodology is the study of *practical* action and *practical* reasoning. ...So when described ethnomethodologically, discourse becomes a *practically* organized phenomenon: a coordinated assembly of

¹¹ Note the contrast with Daly when he says that "ethical value cannot reside in my action or in the world." Daly, *Moral Philosophy in Britain, from Bradley to Wittgenstein*, p. 204.

¹² "The three fundamental elements of phenomenological method: reduction, construction, destruction are intrinsically dependent upon one another and have to be founded in their mutual belonging together. Philosophical construction is necessarily destruction, that is to say, de-construction..." Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975ss. p. 31 as it is quoted in Franco Volpi, "Dasein as Praxis: The Heideggerian Assimilation and Radicalization of the Practical Philosophy of Aristotle," in *Critical Heidegger*, ed. Christopher Macann, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, 27-66, p. 33. See also the deconstruction of the categories of Richard Coyne, "Deconstructing the Curriculum, Radical Hermeneutics and Professional Education," *EAR (Edinburgh Architecture Research)*, 23, 1996.

what is said, and by whom, in particular circumstances. When treated in this way, social order becomes an array of *practical*, self-organising and self-investigating phenomena. What is at stake is *not the theoretical problem* of order, but the substantive *production* of order on singular occasions.¹³

In a similar way (paraphrasing Lynch), this thesis examines the substantive production of *morality* and *ethics* (in what I have called ‘situations’) and not the theoretical problem of Ethics, as such. Not what Ethics *is*, but how it is *produced* amongst the members of the three educational places at stake. In the context of ethnomethodology though, the accounts that the members create about practice are not ‘pure’ or ‘innocent,’ but should be the “subject of practical inquiry.”¹⁴ Ethnomethodological studies, although they are not looking for a universal ‘logic of practice,’ are situated in and engage with other disciplines and bodies of theories. And although this thesis engages with theory and explores the understandings of *morality* and *ethics* in philosophy, it uses ethnomethodology as *pharmakeia*,¹⁵ (drug and medicine at the same time) to heal its own weaknesses, in a homeopathic process of establishing equilibrium. This tactic is very close to Wittgenstein’s later understanding of philosophy,¹⁶ and part of the cunning attitude of this thesis.¹⁷

Furthermore, the method of this thesis is not separate from the development of the thesis itself and cannot be pre-determined, or described at its outset. On the contrary, it develops within the thesis and is spread amongst its chapters, not only as a sign of its process, but mainly as a vehicle of experiencing the method *in* the thesis (and not

¹³ Michael Lynch, "Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Practice," in *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, ed. Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, London, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2001, 131-148, p. 131.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 147. Lynch makes an explicit reference to Wittgenstein’s argument that his investigations were a remedy “for the ‘craving for generality’ that pervaded scientific philosophy.” Lynch, "Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Practice," p. 148.

¹⁶ The basis for this therapeutic view is Wittgenstein’s notion of therapy of philosophy. “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed, Oxford: B. Blackwell, 2001/1953, par. 133. For and against this view see: Daniel D. Hutto, *Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 90-98. See also Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*, p. 133 & 150.

¹⁷ See also: Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Rendall, First Paperback Edition ed, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988, p. xxiv & 9.

the method *of* it). So although I will start by pursuing the philosophical understanding of the terms *theoria*, *poiēsis* and *praxis*, I will soon return back to the situations of the educational places, to investigate further their connections to *morality* and *ethics*. Having already in mind the situations of the design studio, the music class and the dojo, I will proceed by providing some philosophical background of the theories of human conduct.



Figure 35: The three educational places as *pharmakeia* to Ethics

4.2 Ethics and the *energeiai* (theory, *poiēsis*, *praxis*)¹⁸

The aim of this chapter is to identify the area of life where Ethics become manifested, and is very similar to the structure of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle's major treatise on Ethics.¹⁹ According to Deborah Achtenberg, before Aristotle proceeded to define human good, he first tried to identify its field of exercise, what he calls the human *ergon* (translated by Bradshaw as 'deed' or 'thing done',²⁰ and by

¹⁸ An earlier version of this part of the chapter has been published as: Leonidas Koutsoumpas, "Actions and the *Energeiai*: The 'Ethics of Borderlands' in the Educational Praxis of Architecture," *e-Sharp*, 11. 2008 [forthcoming]. <http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/esharp/issues/> [accessed 13. 06. 2008].

¹⁹ Aristotle has also written *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, but *Nicomachean Ethics* is the main source of reference for the work of Aristotle on Ethics. Note also the controversy about the connection of *Meno*'s opening question (70a1-4) and *Nicomachean Ethics* i 9, 1099b9-ii and x9, 1179b20-I Dominic Scott, *Plato's Meno*, Edited by Mary Margaret McCabe, Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato, Cambridge, et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 18. Note also Annas' criticism of Aristotelian Ethics in contrast to Platonic in Julia Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*, Edited by Frederick M. Ahl et. al. Vol. LVII, Cornell Studies in Classical Philosophy, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 50-51.

²⁰ David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 1.

Heidegger as ‘what is accomplished in action,’ or ‘what is effected in working’²¹). Then he tried to find what completes it, namely virtue and happiness²²: “...Aristotle claims that virtue *is derived from our ergon...*”²³ This is a rather bottom-up process for the enquiry of Ethics, (that explains my procedural starting from the concrete situations instead of theory), contrary to the top-down approach suggested by Moore. Aristotle used this approach deliberately in contrast to Plato,²⁴ in order to avoid the impasses that his teacher had come to.²⁵ Consequently, from Aristotle’s arguments, *ergon* becomes the field for the exercise of Ethics and this leads us to the term *energeia* (‘in’ the *ergon*), which most probably was invented by Aristotle.²⁶ The definition of *energeia* appears to give great pains to contemporary philosophers, mainly because of the frequency²⁷ and the inconsistency²⁸ of its use by Aristotle in his various treatises, and also because of the problematic language/culture shifts of the translations through the ages.²⁹ Going into further details is beyond the scope of this thesis, so, here, I will use Heidegger’s definition of ‘*ergon*’ and extend it to define *energeia* as ‘what is accomplished *in action*,’ emphasising the *inner* and

²¹ Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, London: Souvenir Press, 1975, p. 12.

²² Deborah Achtenberg, "The Role of the Ergon Argument in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Anthony Preus, George L. Kustas, and John Peter Anton, Albany: State University of New York, 1991, 59-72, p. 62.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 60 [emphasis added].

²⁴ See Aristotle’s account of the problems of the Platonists’ (whom he respectfully calls “friends of our own” 1096a 12) pursuit of the universal idea of good in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, Chapter 6. 1096a 9 - 1097a1 14. On the same topic see also Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall (Revised Translation), Second Revised Edition ed, London, New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 310.

²⁵ For the contrast between the *Meno* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* see, Mark Reuter, "Is Goodness Really a Gift from God? Another Look at the Conclusion of Plato's "Meno"," *Phoenix*, 55, no. 1/2, 2001: 77-97, p. 82. In defence of the Platonic method of enquiry see Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*, p. 96.

²⁶ Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* p. 1.

²⁷ “It [the word *energeia*] occurs 671 times in Aristotle’s works, about once for every other page of the Berlin edition. Unfortunately Aristotle discusses its etymology only once, remarking briefly that *energeia* is derived from “deed” or “thing done” (το ἔργον) (Met. ix.8 1050a22).” *Ibid.*

²⁸ Chung-Hwan Chen, "Different Meanings of the Term *Energeia* in the Philosophy of Aristotle," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 17, no. 1, 1956: 56-65.

²⁹ For example, Heidegger argues that the translation from the ancient Greek *energeia* to the Latin *actualitas* and the modern actuality is deceptive. In his words: “The literal translation is misleading. In truth it brings precisely another transposition or misplacement to the word of Being.” Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, p. 12. Heidegger argues overall that with the translations of the words through historical time, and the shift of the historic paradigms (Ancient Greek, Latin, modern world) the fundamental concepts of metaphysics do not remain the same but change, losing every time something of their original meaning. *Ergon* and *energeia* is for Heidegger maybe one of the first and most fundamental concepts as shown in his opening words that “Being is actual.” Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, p. 1.

‘active’ relationship with the action itself. From these definitions we can conclude that human conduct is demonstrated through the activities that constitute human life and is revealed *in action* (or *en-ergon*).³⁰

In the context of Ethics, human conduct usually means the “[m]anner of conducting oneself or one's life; behaviour; usually with more or less reference to its moral quality (good or bad).”³¹ In other words, human conduct is the ‘way of life’ and according to Oakshott it appears as “*inter homines*”³² because in its development it engages *inter-action* between people’s lives. The word ‘conduct’ means the action of leading or guidance,³³ which nowadays is almost identical with the origin word ‘duct.’ The con-duct, though, should rather emphasise a meaning of *inter-action* that is fundamental for the Aristotelian understanding of the human being as political animal; while, according to Oakshott, “what joins agents *in conduct* is to be recognized as a ‘practice’...”³⁴ In this sense, my overall argument supports an understanding of Ethics through *ethics* that appears *in* a narrower notion of practice, that of *praxis*. For the educational situations, this means that the conduct of Ethics appears not only *in action*, but more specifically *in* the exercise of the actual process of education; the educational *praxis*, in its most mundane level of everyday life.

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defined three prominent ways of life. The first one, ‘the life of enjoyment,’ Aristotle dismissed as ‘vulgar,’ since it is the way of life that identifies “the good or happiness, with pleasure.”³⁵ The other two ways of life are the ‘political’ and the ‘contemplative.’³⁶ According to Nicolaus Lobckowicz, the

³⁰ Hans Georg Gadamer, "Artworks in Word and Image," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23, no. 1, 2006: 57-83, p. 70.

³¹ ‘conduct’ n. Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition 1989
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50046731?query_type=word&queryword=conduct&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=nnxo-o7FcMc-8297&hilite=50046731
 [Accessed 26. 11. 2007]

³² Michael Oakshott, *On Human Conduct*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 35.

³³ Conduct is also important in the context of this research because of its implicit educational connotation of the interaction between the teacher with the student, or a student with a colleague.

³⁴ Oakshott, *On Human Conduct*, p. 55 [emphasis added].

³⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by David Ross Revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 1095b 1014, p. 1096.

³⁶ An earlier version of this tripartite distinction is attributed to Pythagoras who described the human conducts through a metaphor of a festival: Some people join in it in order to sell their merchandise and gain money; some to display their physical force; and some only to admire the beauty of the

‘political life’ is the origin of our contemporary notion of *practice* and the ‘contemplative life’ is the origin of our understanding of *theory*. “In fact Aristotle seems to have been the first Greek thinker to reduce the many different walks of life to three and in a sense to two, thus becoming the first to explicitly contrast “theory” and “practice”.”³⁷ Since Aristotle, the distinction between the equivalent Greek terms of ‘*theoria*’ and ‘*praxis*’ has been central to the Western philosophical tradition forming a fundamental opposition for the understanding of our worldview.³⁸ Furthermore, very often Aristotle “introduces a more refined distinction between ‘*poiēsis*’ and ‘*praxis*’,”³⁹ a difference that is rendered in English as ‘making’ and ‘doing’. A characteristic example of the above distinction is the title of the Architectural Humanities Research Association (AHRA) conference, *The Politics of Making: Theory, Practice, Product* that took place in Oxford in November 2006. Its subtitle, in particular, appears to have adopted the established Aristotelian categories; a fact that is also apparent from the correspondence of the conference’s three strands, that were divided into Theory, Practice and Product, with the three basic types of Aristotelian knowledge.⁴⁰

In what follows, this chapter discusses the origins of these affiliations, challenges the above categories and argues for the possibility of seeing architecture *as a form of praxis* or ‘doing’. By revisiting Aristotle’s Ethical writings, I primarily focus on the relationship between ‘thinking,’ ‘making’ and ‘doing’ and their connection with *morality* and *ethics*, in the context of the educational situations that I have already presented. Procedurally, I am going to analyse the three terms through two dipoles: *theoria/praxis* and *poiēsis/praxis*.⁴¹ By dealing with each dipole separately I

displayed things as well as the speeches and the performances. Nikolaus Lobkowitz mentions this story accrediting Cicero and Jamblichus, who refer to a lost treatise of Heracleides of Pontus. Nikolaus Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 5.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁸ Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, p. ix

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ “Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is of three main kinds – theoretical, practical, or productive...” David Ross, *Aristotle*, 5th ed, University Paperbacks; up 65, London, New York: Methuen and Barnes & Noble, 1964/1923, p. 187.

⁴¹ Aristotle in *Metaphysics* claims that “every intellectual activity is either practical or productive or speculative” 1025b 25 (*ei pasa dianoina ē praktikē ē poiētikē ē theôrētikē*) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*,

emphasise the importance of praxis or ‘doing,’ and its connection with *ethics*. In each case I start by exploring the place of architecture amongst the dipoles; I then explore architectural design education in-between the two terms,⁴² and finally, I revisit the situations from the educational places in order to see how *morality* and *ethics* become manifested.

4.3 Praxis and Theoria⁴³

4.3.1 Doing and Thinking; Practice and Theory; Professional Practice and Academia

In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.
Anonymous⁴⁴

The distinction between practice and theory, as I already mentioned, has been fundamental to Western philosophy, forming an opposition that, since Aristotle, has been dealt with by almost every major philosopher.⁴⁵ Lobkowitz’s *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, is one of the first and most authoritative historic reviews on the topic and opens with the following words: “When today we oppose “practice” to “theory” we usually have in mind lived life as opposed to abstract ideas, or else man’s acting as opposed to his “mere” thinking and reflecting.”⁴⁶ In this sense, ‘theory’ is commonly understood as relating to reflection,

Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd., 1933/1989. Available from: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052> [Accessed 27. 11. 2007].

⁴² For a connection between the two different kind of praxis see the end of this chapter p. 211.

⁴³ Earlier versions of this part of the chapter have been published as: Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "The Switch of Ethics and the Reflective Architect: In-between Practice and Theory," in *Reflections on Creativity: Exploring the Role of Theory in Creative Practices*, ed. Hamid Van Koten, Dundee: University of Dundee, 2007. [Originally presented in an international conference that took place in Dundee at 21-22 April 2005 under the title “Ethics between Practice and Theory: The Reflective Architect”]. Also as: Keith Ballantyne and Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Architectural Practice and Academia: The Praxis and Theoria Continuum," proceedings from the conference: *Changing Trends in Architectural Education*, Rabat, Morocco, CSAAR- The Center for the Study of Architecture in the Arab Region, 2006, pp. 267-279.

⁴⁴ This quote has been attributed to so many people (Yogi Bera, Albert Einstein, Confucius), that shows exactly what the mask of anonymity means: the *common understanding* of the relationship between practice and theory.

⁴⁵ Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, p. ix

⁴⁶ Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p. 3.

thinking about things, abstract ideas and contemplation in general. ‘Practice’, on the contrary, is usually related with action, doing things, concrete applications and the wider notion of politics. Gilbert Ryle describes this common understanding as a fundamental legend that has its roots in modernism. According to this common view, in order to think about what one does is to do two things: first it requires the consideration of some kind of thinking, which is then consecutively put into practice, or in Ryle’s words: “It is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice.”⁴⁷ The temporary precedence of theory *before* practice is of great importance in this analysis, since it expresses the hegemonic domination of theory over practice. Donald Schön, who uses Ryle’s ideas, in his book *The Reflective Practitioner*, aims to transgress the boundaries between theory and practice through the term *reflection-in-action* and goes even further to describe the origins of the common understanding of the terms by what he calls ‘technical rationality’⁴⁸ of positivism. According to Schön, the epistemology of positivism is based on three fundamental dichotomies that separate means from ends; research from practice; and knowing from doing.⁴⁹ The separation of means from ends will be discussed in the next part of this chapter as the dipole of *poiēsis / praxis*. The other two separations are dealt hereafter.

Already from these sketchy descriptions one can identify a connection between *morality* and ‘theory,’ since *morality* is all about reflection, conscious deliberation, and judgment, according to an external rule. On the other hand, *ethics* is related to ‘practice,’ since it refers to pre-reflective dispositions, habitual actions, customs, and practical judgements, that are being made on the way of action. Moreover, *ethics* appears to have strong connection to Michael Polanyi’s notion of *tacit knowledge* when he claims that “Tacit knowing is seen to operate here on an internal action that

⁴⁷ Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, England: Middlesex, Australia: Victoria: Penguin Books, 1973 (1949), p. 30. Note also the way that Ryle uses the concepts ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ in the same book (p. 26) and Psathas’ take in: George Psathas, "Approaches to the Study of the World of Everyday Life," *Human Studies*, 3, 1980: 3-17, p. 11.

⁴⁸ Donald A. Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*, London: Temple Smith, 1983, p. 21.

⁴⁹ “The Positivist epistemology of practice rests on three dichotomies. Given the separation of means from ends, instrumental problem solving can be seen as technical procedure to be measured by its effectiveness in achieving a pre-established objective. Given the separation of research from practice, rigorous practice can be seen as an application to instrumental problems of research-based theories and techniques whose objectivity and generality derive from the method of controlled experiment. Given the separation of knowing from doing, action is only an implementation and test of technical decision.” *Ibid.*, p. 165 [emphasis added].

we are quite incapable of controlling or even feeling in itself.”⁵⁰ This relates back to the connection that I have already made in the previous chapter between *ethics* and internality that now becomes manifested in practice.⁵¹ “To interiorize [moral teachings] is to identify ourselves with the teachings in question, by making them function as the proximal term of a tacit moral knowledge, as applied *in practice*.”⁵² In this direction, Schön, who generally does not deal with the wider Ethical discourse, does make an explicit comment (and if I am correct, it is the only one in the whole book), pointing towards the relation of reflection-in-action with *ethics*: “His [the reflective practitioner’s] ability to do this [arrive at a deeper and broader coherence of artefact and idea] depends on certain relatively constant elements that he may bring to a situation otherwise in flux: an overarching theory, an appreciative system, and a stance of reflection in action which can become, in some practitioners, an *ethics for inquiry*.”⁵³ At the same time, Ryle makes a more puzzling comment where: “...*moral knowledge* [*ethics* using my definitions], if the strained phrase is to be used at all, is knowing how to behave *in certain sorts of situations* in which the problems are neither merely theoretical nor merely technical.”⁵⁴ Ryle here points towards a notion of Ethics that is neither theoretical nor technical, a notion which is exactly what I call *ethics*. The fact that he is not sure whether he can connect the word ‘knowledge’ to Ethics (he uses the word ‘moral’) shows the importance of introducing a term to express precisely these internal and practical Ethical qualities that cannot be described by theory or any technical knowledge.

To return back to architecture and its education, I revisit Schön’s dichotomies, focusing on the separation of ‘research’ from ‘practice’ and of ‘knowing’ from ‘doing.’ These separations that are fundamental for the conventional distinction between practice and theory become manifested in architecture as a separation of

⁵⁰Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, Reprint by arrangement with Doubleday & Company, Inc ed, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1966 Reprint, 1983, p. 14.

⁵¹Note also Girton’s comment in relation to Polanyi: “There is a difference between that body of knowledge, as a coherent unity, and the art which it is directed toward developing, improving, or merely sustaining.” George D. Girton, “Kung Fu: Toward a Praxiological Hermeneutic of the Martial Arts,” in *Ethnomethodological Studies of Work*, ed. Harold Garfinkel, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, 60-89, p. 64.

⁵²Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, p.17 [emphasis added].

⁵³Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*, p. 164 [emphasis added].

⁵⁴Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 297 [emphasis added].

architectural education from professional practice. In its general development, the architectural discourse has been trapped in an inflexible view of those two terms, forming a dichotomy that has been constitutive for the common understanding of architectural professional practice and its education. Geoffrey Broadbent offers a typical example that expresses the tension between the two terms.

Architectural education has always been in *tension* with architectural practice. That is how it should be; practice sometimes gets complacent and education is there as a kind of conscience, trying to correct what seems to be going wrong. So from time immemorial the architect has been subject to *learning in two quite different ways; theory in a classroom of some kind and practice, on the job or in the office.*⁵⁵

The common understanding of the ‘tension’ mentioned by Broadbent, sees these two domains as separate, disconnected and in a privileged relation to each other. Broadbent’s quote suggests also the separation that we have already seen between practice and theory; the architect learns to practice on the job or in the office and learns theory in the ‘classroom’. According to this view, the architectural profession (*practice*) is related with a ‘general notion’ of practice, while architectural education (*academia*) relates to some notion of theory. Through this line of thought, we continue by relating *academia* to the realm of thinking, while on the other hand relating *practice* to the realm of acting. In this way *academia* relates to a life dedicated to contemplation, while *practice* relates to a life of political engagement (in the broad sense of the term, meaning the active engagement with the social condition). Furthermore, one could argue that *academia*, through theory, deals with abstract ideas, while professional *practice*, through practice, deals with concrete application. While it is clear that this division exists between these two realms of architectural conduct, it is not enough to accept the authority of such a scheme, nor that it is a historic, chronic, or perpetual fact.

Broadbent contends that a role of *education* is to ‘correct’ *practice*. In such a position, there is inherently a privileging of education over practice demonstrated by the fact that clearly education holds a higher ground over the practice, and thus

⁵⁵ Geoffrey Broadbent, "Architectural Education," in *Educating Architects*, ed. Martin Pearce and Maggie Toy, London: Academy Editions, 1995, 10-23, p. 10 [emphasis added].

rightly sits in a position to make judgment as to its correctness or rightness. While perhaps little more than a statement of fact as he sees it, Broadbent does not offer a suggestion for how to bridge the divide between practice and academia, but instead (inadvertently perhaps) adds to the problem by suggesting that one mode of architectural operation has such an authority over the other: academia (theory), over professional practice (practice). In this sense, *morality*, like theory and academia seems to hold the rules of Ethical judgement that can be applied to *ethics* and practice, in order to manage it and ultimately control it. But *ethics*, as we shall see, resists any notion of application and subverts this hierarchical relationship.

4.3.2 The genealogy of the polarity: *praxis* and *theoria*

The distinction between architectural *practice* and *academia*, as was presented by Broadbent, reinforces the common understanding that separates and prioritises *theory* over *practice* (and *morality* over *ethics*). Nevertheless, in order to fully understand the exact meaning of the two terms, we need to pursue their genealogy, which take us again back to Aristotle.⁵⁶ As I have already indicated briefly in the introduction to this chapter, the contemporary terms ‘practice’ and ‘theory’ derive from the Ancient Greek ‘*praxis*’ (πράξις) and ‘*theoria*’ (θεωρία). Nevertheless, the exact translation of the terms is problematic mainly because of the distorted vision that we already have about practice and theory, as described before.

The term ‘*praxis*’ today would be translated as ‘doing,’ but for Aristotle it takes a distinctive and quasi-technical meaning.⁵⁷ Aristotle uses the expression in a general way to refer to a variety of biological life activities, but he also uses ‘*praxis*’ to indicate that there is a way of life open to a free man, and to signify the sciences and arts that deal with the activities characteristic of man’s ethical and political life.⁵⁸ Following this view, we can see that in ancient Greece the term *praxis* did not have the same meaning as it has in our times. Nowadays, *praxis* is usually affiliated with the mere application of abstract ideas, rules and principles preconceived by theory.

⁵⁶ Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p. 3.

⁵⁷ Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, p. ix.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. x

However, in ancient Greece, such a meaning would have been signified by the term *technē*. *Praxis* was in fact an autonomous activity concerned with accomplishing the very action in itself, without aiming at a goal that is distinct from the action. As Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass put it: “For the Greeks, *praxis* in contrast to *technē*, is an activity involving judgment. It is the making of ethical decisions by the exercise of *phronēsis*..., that is, ‘practical reasonableness’, acting by way of tacit understanding gained from the experience and within a context of ethical behaviour, by which was meant behaviour that is conducive to the well-being of oneself and others.”⁵⁹ *Praxis* was the activity achieved in *accomplishing the very action itself*, without aiming for a goal that is distinct from the action (*poiēsis*, or ‘making,’ however was the term to indicate an action that aims for a distinct goal, and it will be examined later on). An example of *praxis* usually given by Aristotle is the action of playing the flute, which is an end in itself, without the production of an obvious outcome. The aim of playing the flute is being achieved while the *praxis* is taking place and there is no further outcome to be expected after playing. The focus, in this case, slips from the *mere doing* to the *doing proper*, “where the end or *telos* of the activity is not primarily the production of an artefact, but rather performing the particular activity in a certain way, i.e. *performing the activity well*: ‘*eupraxia*’.”⁶⁰ At this point there appears a direct connection between *praxis* with *ethics*. *Eupraxia* is not waiting for a confirmation from theory or *morality* to justify the well-done of an action. It is a matter of doing good *during* the process of doing, and not firstly thinking and then doing, as the technical rationality of positivism suggests according to Schön. “The very name ‘ethics’ indicates that Aristotle bases *aretē* on practice and ‘ethos’,”⁶¹ argues Gadamer.

⁵⁹ Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p. 112.

⁶⁰ Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, p. ix-x

⁶¹ “The very name ‘ethics’ indicates that Aristotle bases *aretē* on practice and ‘ethos’.” Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 311.



Figure 36: *Praxis* (playing the flute) and *theoria* (contemplation)

In this context, Aristotle contrasts ‘*praxis*’ with ‘*theoria*’ since the latter signifies those sciences and activities that are concerned with knowing for its own sake. *Theoria*, in this sense, was not just a passive way of thinking. *Theoria*, being related to contemplative life, was considered to be related with the Gods, because it meant reflecting upon ‘eternal truths.’⁶² In particular, the philosopher, more than anyone else in Ancient Greece, was the man who acted in the realm of contemplation, and was considered to be the one walking a sublime way of life: “... the philosopher is removed from the agitation and transitory character which life has for ordinary man: he contemplates the divine order and takes part in its eternity, thus somehow succeeding in transcending... his mortality.”⁶³ Despite this respect for reflective life, *theoria* was originally considered a more active participation in an event, although ‘of the stage’:

It is well known that the expression ‘*θεωρός*’ means “spectator at games”; ‘*θεωρία*,’ then, would mean what a spectator at games does, namely, watching. However, ‘*θεωρός*’ originally referred to the envoy sent to consult an oracle; ‘*θεωρία*’ was the official title of the group of state-ambassadors which a city-state delegated to the sacral festivals of

⁶² “One should not follow the advice of those who say ‘Human you are, think of human thoughts’, and ‘Mortals you are, think mortal’ ones, but instead, so far as is possible, assimilate to the immortals and do everything with the aim of living in accordance with what is highest of the things in us; for even if its is small in bulk, the degree to which it surpasses everything in power and dignity is far greater.” Aristotle and Sarah Broadie, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by Christopher Rowe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 1177b 1133, p. 1252.

⁶³ Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p. 7 [emphasis added].

another city-state. ... ‘*θεωρός*’ also came to refer to a traveler who visits foreign countries to learn something about their customs and laws.⁶⁴

Lobkowich’s quote gives us a quite clear explanation of the contemporary reduction of the term, into the passive way that we understand theory as merely ‘watching’, but rather as a wider participatory vision.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, for the ancient Greeks, *theoria* as well as *praxis* were inseparable parts of every human activity. “Thus “theory” and “practice” became two dimensions of human existence. But it is important to see what this polarity ultimately consisted of for the Greeks. It was certainly not an opposition between abstract knowledge and concrete application; nor was it an opposition between ‘theoretical’ endeavours, such as science, and ‘lived life.’ *Rather, it was an opposition (and tension) between what was strictly human and what was divine in man.*”⁶⁶ Subsequently, theory in architecture, deriving from *theoria*, does not come before architectural *praxis*, and it is clear that it is not a set of abstract rules, which govern the actions of the practitioner architect.⁶⁷ *Theoria* and *praxis* operate in an inseparable relationship, or in Coyne and Snodgrass’ words: “*theoria* is not something that precedes *praxis*, nor is it the repository of the rules and principles governing action. It is, rather, *a participation in practice.*”⁶⁸ This view allows a transformation of the hierarchy of theory over *praxis*, and *morality* over *ethics* by allowing a vista that sees that *ethics* and *praxis* as the primordial field in which *morality* and theory comes to participate. The participation of theory in practice does not mean the conflation of the two terms, but rather the fact that practice is a wider concept that allows theory to participate in it: theory is *a practice*.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁵ Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Louise Pelletier, *Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge*, Cambridge, Mass. & London: The MIT Press, 1998, p. 10.

⁶⁶ Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p. 26-27 [emphasis added].

⁶⁷ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love, Architectural Longing after Ethics and Aesthetics*, Cambridge Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press, 2006, p. 148. Pérez-Gómez here, shows in reference to Vitruvius a rather opposite point of view where theory guides *poiesis* toward truth and goodness. Later on though, by referring to Giambattista Vico, he comes to agree with the point made here: “... humans ‘know only what they make’.” Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love*, p. 145.

⁶⁸ Coyne and Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, p. 112 [emphasis added].

4.3.3 Revisiting the situation of ‘losing the technique’: the theory and practice of *jyu waza*




Figure 37: Laurent demonstrating the *jyu waza* -losing the technique

As we saw in the situation in the *dojo* that I offered as an example in chapter 2, Laurent asked the students to lose the formality of their technique. One can identify two phases in the structure of Laurent’s demonstration: the one was when Laurent described what the students should do, and the other when he performed the exercise with Susana. In the first phase, Laurent used the following words to describe the ‘losing’ of the technique: “there is a steady situation where we (0.5) we are here (proof) (0.5) see how we have placed our feet (0.5) we (decide) the attack (0.5) there is a formality (.) that is necessary when we study a technique (0.5)” As we saw, these words are used to contrast the formality of the usual way of practicing the aikido exercises with the free style of *jyu waza*. Nevertheless, what they also do is to create an account of the usual method of practice and, in some sense, theorise about it. This account breaks down into rigid steps the activities that in a usual demonstration Laurent would simply do (without explaining them): First, he would take position in correct stance; secondly, he would decide the attack; and thirdly, he would execute the attack. These three steps could be seen as a theoretical description of the common basis of all the aikido attacks. Laurent creates this theoretical account in order to summarise the formality of the technique and he justifies it as ‘necessary’ for the formal study of the techniques.

This theoretical account creates a background to be contrasted with the ‘theory’ of *jyu waza*, which Laurent summarised with these words: “we lose all this technique (see) (*ici*).” This is a negative definition, that explains *jyu waza* through what is *not*:

its dialectical opposite. *Jyu waza* as the ‘losing’ of the technique, it is the unlearning or the forgetting of what the students were trying to learn during the usual practice. Although *jyu waza* is a technique itself, by using the word ‘losing’ Laurent describes it as the technique that subverts every other technique. We can imagine for example an equivalent subversive attitude in the design studio when Dorian, in order to describe what he came to suggest as ‘inrelation’, contrasted it with all the other conventional notions of ‘sections’ that are already known to the students.



Figure 38



Figure 39

Although in a purely theoretical level the contradictory statement of ‘losing the technique’ appears to be senseless (*sinnlos* in Wittgenstein’s terms), in a practical level it does make sense, especially since it was an inherent part of the practical demonstration that Laurent made with Susana. Laurent showed to the students what he meant *by doing it*. The statement was embodied with a demonstration of the rigidity of the formal technique. For example, Laurent made a firm gesture describing the rigid exercise by hitting the edge of his one extended palm on the top of the other (Figure 38), or by lifting his long *hakama* so that the students can see his feet forming the formal stance (Figure 39). In this sense, it is not the case that he first theorised conceptually about the way of the usual exercise and the way of the *jyu waza* and then he went on to perform the exercise. The two phases resist a straightforward identification with the categories of theory and practice, since they were actually two different kinds of practice, in which theory was participating. A common misconception that leads the first phase being characterised as theory occurs because it involved ‘more talking,’ compared to the second phase. But if we

follow closely what exactly happened, we can see that the two phases were not separated into one part of talking and one part of doing. The theorising of the techniques (both the normal technique and the *jyu waza*) was taking place during the practice of demonstration where creating the theoretical account of formality was embodied in *praxis*. This becomes apparent when Laurent was performing the exercise with Susana, because he kept on providing verbal guidance: “try to stay with the partner” and “You (receive) the partner when the partner stands up.” Any theoretical explanation was not preceding practice, but it was *participating in it*.

Also, in this particular case, an Ethical issue unique to the specific situation appeared when Laurent deliberately pushed Susana harder than before, causing her clumsy fall. This incident led the rest of the students who were watching the demonstration to burst into laughter, a situation that seems to be morally embarrassing for Susana. This incident, though, is not irrelevant to the theory and practice of *jyu waza* as described before. From my participant observation I have noted similar incidents happening quite often in the *aikido* practice. It is quite common that during the demonstrations the teacher pushes the students to their limits. Arguably this happens in order to specifically point out these limits, both to the student who is demonstrating with the teacher, and to the students who observe. If this interpretation is correct then it seems that a theoretical proposition can be deduced: ‘the students should be pushed to their limits, and beyond; no matter if this ridicules them.’ This statement undoubtedly has Ethical implications and the common disposition is to judge it through a notion of *morality*. Is it right or wrong for the teacher to adopt such attitude? Moreover this way of thinking can lead to further questions: ‘is it right or wrong for the students to laugh with their colleagues suffering?’ This way of moralizing about issues of Ethics is contrary to the overall view of this thesis that welcomes the reader to inhabit *ethics*. Abstracting the *moral* rule from the situation itself is only distracting from the enquiry into Ethics. If we turn our focus in the situation itself we can see that there was no application of an abstract rule into practice. Laurent did not have a pre-existing plan in his mind that after executing the exercise three more (after his last words) he would push Susana harder in order to ridicule her. On the contrary, Laurent was improvising on the spot, showing exactly

the spontaneity of *jyu waza*. His instantaneous decision to push Susana harder was embodied in the *praxis* of the demonstration and did not have to do with any preceding theoretical account or justification. Moreover, the students' laugh is even more characteristic of the spontaneity of whole incident. Laughter is something that by definition cannot be pre-planned and pre-organised; showing an understanding of the specificity of the moment. The collective laughter of a group of people that takes place at the very same moment reveals a unique interpretation of the particular situation that the members of that very group share.⁶⁹ Arguably there is no essence in a joke. A joke is always specific to the situation in which is told, that is why the same joke can sometimes be funny and sometimes not. Moreover, it becomes apparent that Laurent improvised onstage by the fact that when he pushed Susana behind him, he did not turn his head to follow her trajectory, but he remained looking straight; for similar reasons why the comedian does not laugh after telling a joke – the laughing is for the audience. Another fact that demonstrates the specificity of the incident is Laurent's comment 'all over the place' accompanied by a circular movement of his hand. This comment and gesture can be simultaneously referring to both Susana's clumsy fall *and* to the fact that *jyu waza* requires one to be literally all over the place. At the end Laurent indicates that the joke is over by laughing and asking in a polite and almost apologetic way the students to go back to practice, by saying 'please' and pointing towards the centre of the mats, with a slight bow.

What becomes apparent from these examples is the fact that *ethics* manifests itself *in* the educational *praxis*. Theory does not precede *praxis* by leading the Ethical activity into the realm of *morality*; on the contrary, *praxis* embodies *ethics* and any account of *morality* comes to express this embodiment. This can lead to the conclusion that, although *praxis* is the underestimated part of the theory/practice dipole, in the situations of Ethics it is actually the most important pole embodying *ethics*. Any *moral* rule or principle that can be derived from the examples, like 'The teacher shall not ridicule the students' or 'The students shall not laugh when their colleague

⁶⁹ Of course this fact does not mean that people cannot plan jokes in the pub or attend whole sessions that are specifically about pre-planned laughing (e.g. stand-comedy). Nevertheless, the success of such occasions is not guaranteed which becomes obvious when an audience cannot connect with a comedian, or when in the pub one fails to grasp the joke, missing an important link. More about jokes and laughter in the educational situations will be discussed in Chapter 5, see p. 241.

suffers' is a *moral* reflection, a postrationalization of an already embodied *ethical* attitude. On the contrary, *ethics* is the inherent, pre-rational and habitual response that embodies an instinctive attitude towards Ethics. In what follows, I pursue the analysis of *morality* and *ethics* in the much more subtle difference of the concepts of *praxis* and *poiēsis* that confirms the need to inhabit *ethics* through *praxis*, in the entire span of human conduct.

4.4 Praxis and Poiēsis

4.4.1 Doing and Making; Praxis and Poiēsis; the Flute and the House⁷⁰

Earlier on in this chapter, I commented briefly about the subtitle of the AHRA conference, *The Politics of Making: Theory, Practice, Product*, as having adopted the Aristotelian categories. Here, I would like to continue the deconstruction of this title focusing this time on the main title 'The Politics of Making'. In a first glance, the main title does not seem to have direct relevance to this thesis, but after a closer examination, I will show that it is central to it, since it advances and promotes an understanding of architecture as 'making,' instead of 'doing.' But how does politics have anything to do with Ethics? According to David Ross,⁷¹ the science of Politics for Aristotle, is divided into two folds: Ethics and Politics. Ethics refer to the appropriate way of life for the individual, while politics refer to the social interaction between individuals. Nevertheless, Ross also suggests that the two folds in Aristotle's theory are intertwined: Ethics are social and politics are Ethical.⁷² As we already saw in the previous part of this chapter, Lobckowicz argues that Aristotle's philosophical analysis of political life is also responsible for the contemporary

⁷⁰ An earlier version of this part of the chapter has been presented in the above mentioned conference and has been published as book chapter: Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "The Flute and the House; Doing the Architecture of Making," in *The Politics of Making*, ed. Mark Swenarton, Igea Troiani, and Helena Webster, *Critiques: Critical Studies in Architectural Humanities*, London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2007, 105-116. See p. 425 of the Appendix. Moreover, in a slightly different version it has been presented as research paper in: Leonidas Koutsoumpos, "Reconciliatory Praxis: Bridging Ethics and Poetics in the Design Studio," paper presented at the conference: *Reconciling Poetics and Ethics in Architecture*, McGill University, Montreal, 13-15 September 2007.

⁷¹ Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 187.

⁷² *Ibid.*

understanding of the term *practice* as *doing* and subsequently to the understanding of theory as an opposing pole.⁷³ Under this light, the conference's title implicitly identifies *architecture as a form of 'making'*. Here, I discuss the origins of this affiliation; I challenge the above categories and I argue, again, for the possibility of seeing architecture *as a form of 'doing'*. By revisiting Aristotle's Ethical writings, I focus on the relationship between 'doing' and 'making' in the context of architecture and I examine the problems of this distinction. But is it both the making and doing part of *ethics*, as opposed to the theory that has been already identified with *morality*? As I am going to show *morality* is still manifested in the 'making,' while *ethics* appears in the *praxis* emphasising the importance of 'doing' in architecture and especially in architectural design education.

The distinction between 'making' and 'doing' has been made explicit by Aristotle in the line 1140a 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he makes a specific comment concerning *architecture as a form of making*:

Hence the rational quality concerned with *doing* is different from the rational quality concerned with *making*; nor is one of them a part of the other, for doing is not a form of making, nor making a form of doing. ...Now *architectural skill*, for instance, is an art, ... But as doing and making are distinct, it follows that Art, being concerned with making, is not concerned with doing.⁷⁴

In the original text one reads instead of 'doing,' the ancient Greek term *praxis* (πράξις) and instead of 'making,' the term *poiēsis* (ποίησις). The refined distinction between these two ancient Greek terms is not easily rendered in the English language,⁷⁵ but the difference between the words 'doing' and 'making' comes as close as possible. Several times⁷⁶ Aristotle opposes *praxis* to *poiēsis* basing his argument on the difference of the aim or end (*telos*) of each activity. In this

⁷³ Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p. 3.

⁷⁴ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd, 1934. Available from: <<http://perseus.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1177b+1>> [Accessed 15. 03 2003]. Note that in the original Aristotle uses the term '*oikodomikē technē*' which Raw translates as 'building' in: Aristotle and Broadie, *Nicomachean Ethics*.

⁷⁵ Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, p. 9.

⁷⁶ See: *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 4,1140 a 2 ff; 5,1140 b 3 ff.: *Magna Moralia* I, 34, 1197 a 3 ff.; II 12 1211 b 27 ff.; *Politics* I, 2, 1254 a 6.

perspective, *poiēsis* or ‘making’ aims for an end different from the act of ‘making,’ while the end of *praxis*, or ‘doing,’ is nothing else but the very act of “doing” itself. As I have already discussed, according to Aristotle, *praxis* and *poiēsis* are two of three kinds of activities (*energeiai*), which are in order of importance: *theoria*, *poiēsis* and *praxis*. Quite often *praxis* and *poiēsis* have been conflated and seen to be dual aspects of one side of a coin, the opposite side of which is considered to be *theoria*. So although in the previous part of the chapter the association of *moralitas* with *theoria* and *ethics* with *praxis* was straightforward, here, the common understanding of *praxis* and *poiēsis* as two conflated terms resists an easy association with the two Ethical terms, since they both seem to be part of *ethics*. Why then do I suggest that only *praxis* is associated with *ethics*? The answer to this question lies exactly in the difference in the aim or *telos* of the two activities. For this reason, I have to present in detail the distinction between *poiēsis* and *praxis* and focus on the common association of architecture with *poiēsis*. Since I have previously presented the concept of *praxis*, I will proceed here with some preliminary notions of the concept of *poiēsis* and I will continue with their cross examination.

Aristotle has dedicated a separate book to the analysis of *poiēsis*, the famous *Poetics*. A central concept in his understanding of the various arts is the term *mimēsis*, the idea that all arts are in some way a kind of imitation (more about *mimēsis* to follow in chapter 5). In short Aristotle suggests that *poiēsis* is a *mimēsis* of a *praxis* (or making is an imitation of doing). In this book, Aristotle refers mainly to tragedy, plays, music and the various kinds of poetry, making only minor comments about arts like painting and sculpture and unfortunately makes no single reference to architecture. In spite of this, Aristotle is often invoked in his various ethical treatises, the activity of building a house as an example of *poiēsis*. In *Magna Moralia*, his minor (despite the title) work on Ethics, he gives a very interesting example of the difference between *praxis* and *poiēsis*. In line 1211b 27 Aristotle suggests the art of building as an example of ‘making’ in contrast to flute-playing as an example of ‘doing’ (Figure 40):

...in some [sciences] the end and the activity are the same, and there is not any other end beyond the activity; for instance, to the flute player the activity and end are the same (for to play the flute is both his end and his activity); but not to the art of housebuilding (for it has a different end beyond the activity);...⁷⁷



Figure 40: Playing the Flute (here a recorder) –*praxis*; and Building a House –*poiēsis*

In this example, Aristotle suggests that the art of building is a form of ‘making’ because the end of the activity is something different from the activity itself. Building a house is a *poiēsis* because there is an aim – the production of the house – that stands beyond the building activity itself. Moreover, building a house cannot be regarded as a finished action before the outcome – the house itself – is finished. On the other hand Aristotle suggests that playing the flute is a form of ‘doing’, because there is no end beyond the activity of mere playing. The pressing of ones fingertips against the holes of the flute is *praxis*, because the activity produces no obvious physically tangible outcome, as is the case when building a house. For this reason Aristotle implies that one can stop playing the flute at any time without leaving something incomplete.

⁷⁷ Aristotle, "Magna Moralia," in *The Works of Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea*; by W.D. Ross, *Magna Moralia* ; by St. George Stock, *Ethica Eudemia, De Virtutibus Et Vitiis*; by J. Solomon, ed. W. D. Ross, London: Oxford University Press, 1915, 1211b 1227.

4.4.2 Architecture between making or doing

The above categorizations seem to provide a solid theory until the point that one tries to fit architecture (in its contemporary understanding) into this scheme. At first glance it appears obvious that, according to the established categories, architecture is on the side of *poiēsis*, as an art of ‘making,’ close to the activity of building the house. But upon closer observation things are not so straightforward.

First of all, architecture today is very far from being simply the activity of building a house. From the Renaissance onwards, the architect has increasingly come to be seen as operating beyond the level of the builder. The architect became an educated person whose skills and knowledge were acquired not in the construction site or the Lodges of the Free Masons, but in specialised schools.⁷⁸ I have already suggested that the historical line of institutions starting from the *Academia Platonica*, until the contemporary design studios, has consolidated and reinforced the differentiation of the architect from the builder. Architecture, during this journey, has developed its own theories; texts which try to find the appropriate language to narrate a meaning for the ‘building of houses’. More and more, architecture has been associated with the creation of spatial *representations*,⁷⁹ which will actually be built later by someone else, rather than the straightforward action of ‘building’ the house itself. But the question still remains: ‘is architecture a form of *praxis* or *poiēsis*?’. ‘Do we *do architecture* or *make architecture*?’, ‘Is the activity of architecture (as a verb) closer to building a house or playing the flute?’

According to the Aristotelian definitions, the answer should be found at the production of an outcome. As I mentioned above, if there is a production of an artefact, then this is not the building (or generally the space) itself, rather it is the representation of the space that an architect creates. The architect’s job is to create conventional drawings: plans, sections, elevations, as well as models (physical and,

⁷⁸ Broadbent, "Architectural Education." pp. 11-12

⁷⁹ A very interesting analysis of architecture as representation and symbol is made in Chapter 7 of Harries book *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, especially when he states “To understand the representational character of a particular building, we have to understand just how it pictures, that is, the form of representation employed... Works of architecture represent buildings.” Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, p. 99.

nowadays, digital) and images or videos that describe space. But beyond that, architects also produce texts, either to accompany their images or to create technical reports and sometimes they create texts narrating the history of the buildings of the past or even theories on how architecture should be built or how we should understand what architecture is. According to this description of architectural production, architecture appears to be a form of *poiēsis*, but still one could ask ‘is this not the case of the musician?’. Does the musician not produce artefacts like musical scores or texts about music or even material evidence of music such as tapes, LP’s or CD’s? An argument against this view could be that this is the job of the composer and maybe not of the virtuoso of the flute. In this case one could argue that the job of the architect is equal to that of the composer who is the ‘mastermind’ behind the music: both roles consist in creating something new, something that did not exist before it was thought and then put down on paper.

But if creation is simply the ideas that come into one’s mind, then the material artefacts that are the outcome of such a creative process are just coincidental appearances that simply help one to remember ideas. Indeed, it is perfectly possible to imagine an architect with a great memory and developed organisational skills having a vision of a building and being able to supervise the construction without having to draw up plans. In this case, the architectural outcome that is actually created is not the material products of the architect’s job, but the thoughts that he creates about the final product (the building or the real space generally). Consequently, this means that architecture is *praxis* and not *poiēsis*, since the products of its outcome are purely coincidental.

A more complicated argument, according to the Aristotelian definitions, has to do with the existence of an aim or *telos* that is beyond the activity itself. Again, in the case of architecture, it originally seems to relate to *poiēsis*, since it aims at an outcome that is beyond the mere thinking of it or the action of drawing lines on a paper (or, nowadays, clicking a mouse on a mouse pad, or maybe in the future, gesturing in front of a screen). One could say that this aim is the construction of the building that the architect imagines in a specific place where it will be erected.

Every drawn line represents more than the line itself, aiming to or inferring a wall, a window or a piece of specific technical information about the creation of the building. Similarly then, the playing of the flute aims at something that goes beyond the mere pressing of one's fingertips against the flute's holes. The flute player aims for the creation of a certain atmosphere, the re-creation of the whole of the piece of music. Contrary to what Aristotle argues, when the flutist finishes playing a concert, something has been created through the ears of the audience, in their heart or their mind and this thing they carry with them on their way back home⁸⁰. Moreover, if the flutist stops playing in the middle of the song then one feels the incompleteness in the same sense as when a wall is left half built.

Furthermore, suggesting that architecture always aims for spatial realisation is simply not true. Very often architectural projects are left as drawings without losing any of their importance or glamour. For example, most probably everyone knows Tatlin's monument tower for the 3rd Communist International (Figure 41), even though no one has actually really visited it, as it was never realised physically. Again, one could say that it *could* actually have been built in Petrograd, as originally designed, and certainly Tatlin would have been very happy to see his vision realised. But again, there are other architects who have never really intended or cared about the actual realisation of their projects. Etienne-Louis Boullée, Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, most of Futurists and Constructivists architects, as well as contemporary architects like Zaha Hadid and Greg Lynn, have an ambiguous relationship with making their spaces real. Does this mean that they are just *doing* architecture without *making* it?

⁸⁰ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968, 1968, p. 151. See also Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, Vol. I: Swann's Way*, translated by D. J. Enright, Edited by C. K. Scott Moncreiff & T. Kilimartin, London: Vintage, 2002, p. 262.



Figure 41: Model of Tatlin's *Monument for the 3rd Communist International*

Finally, turning to the common usage of the terms, one could wonder how playing the flute can be a mere *praxis* when it has a poetic affect on people; makes them feel inspired; it takes them to a world of emotions and dreams. Similarly, how can the building of a house be related to *poiēsis* when it is restricted by the mundane and practical implications of client needs, construction details and planning permissions? All these arguments and questions challenge the straightforward connection of architecture to *poiēsis* and the activity of *making*, providing at the same time an opening from where one could imagine architecture as *praxis* and the activity of *doing*. But can we find evidence of this opening in architectural education?

4.4.3 Architectural design education in-between *praxis* and *poiēsis*

In order to see the wider scene of architectural education, one should make a step backwards, for a moment, in order to observe that the question that underlies – as a pressing issue – most approaches of Ethics and architecture (like that of the AHRA conference) is ‘how shall we *make* an Ethical architecture?’. In most cases, though, the attention usually focuses either on the underlying theory or the product of architecture and rarely only on its purpose or aim and the agent/architect who

produces it,⁸¹ and even less often, the attention focuses on the *becoming* of this agent into an architect. Especially in architectural education – the place that carries the official responsibility to form the becoming of the architect – the wider question transforms into a more specific one: ‘how shall we *teach* Ethics in architecture?’ Undoubtedly, answering this question involves the reappraisal of the metaphorical journey of architectural education over time, as I have described in Chapter 2. In order to envision an education of Ethics for the future, one has to understand the architectural education of the past and even further back to meet the Aristotelian philosophical origins of the categorical distinctions; not as separate, disconnected stops, but rather as interlinked continuities. Nevertheless, such a detailed study is beyond the scope of this thesis, so here I can only give a hint, as an example, about the romantic revisiting of the Gothic by Ruskin and the influence that this had for the development of design education during the modern movement.⁸² Interrelations like this build a web whose threads allow us to grasp links and continuities in a wide spectrum of the history of design education, in order to project the future.

Having in mind this need for historic reappraisal, I will focus on Pérez-Gómez’s paper titled ‘Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education.’⁸³ Pérez-Gómez, in his overall theoretical work and in this paper in specific, emphasises the link of Ethics between architecture and its education, usually in historical perspectives, and argues against the traditional techno-romantic request for ready-to-work practitioners. His reference to poetics is made explicit through a metaphor that suggests that *architecture is like a poem*,⁸⁴ because it occurs *in* experience. A poem’s meaning, like architecture’s meaning, is inseparable from the experience of the poem itself. In another analogy that refers to poetics Pérez-Gómez says that “Architectural beauty, like erotic love, burns itself into our soul; it inspires fear and reverence through a “poetic image,” one that affects us primarily through our vision, and yet is fully

⁸¹ “All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence; and *to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence* a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which *lies in the maker* and not in the thing made...” Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a 1 [emphasis added]

⁸² See also: Koutsoumpos, "The Flute and the House; Doing the Architecture of Making," p. 115.

⁸³ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, "Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education - I," *SCROOPE- Cambridge Architecture Journal*, 16, 2004.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

sensuous, synaesthetic;...”⁸⁵ Subsequently, architectural theory is “rooted in mythic or poetic stories”⁸⁶ and its main concern is ethical, “with its purpose being to find appropriate language (in the form of stories) capable of modulating a project in view of ethical imperatives, always specific to each task at hand.” Theory in this sense is related to a critical thinking which is often underestimated by “pragmatic practitioners that prioritize training for work over critical thinking in school, ...[contributing] significantly toward denying architecture, from the inside, its potential ethical ground.”⁸⁷

The way that Pérez-Gómez uses the terms *poiēsis* and *praxis* deliberately lacks the established Aristotelian categorical distinction. This fact is even more explicit when he says that “[o]nce a modern philosophical theory is understood as being primarily driven by ethics, as practical philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle’s *phronēsis*, *techne* –*poiēsis* or practice appears as process, as a fully embodied, personal engagement with the crafts.”⁸⁸ Although one could read Pérez-Gómez’s overall argument as favouring *poiēsis*⁸⁹ over *praxis*, such a reading is misleading since his frequent reference to *phronēsis*, or practical wisdom, acts as a reconciliatory factor between *praxis* and *poiēsis*.

The connection between *phronēsis* and *praxis* is an important one, so it is worth explaining it in some detail. In ancient Greek philosophy, Aristotle was the first to define the term as ‘practical wisdom’ that is “a disposition accompanied by rational prescription, true, in the sphere of human goods, relating to action.”⁹⁰ For this reason *phronēsis* is a fundamental virtue that can lead to the fulfilment of *praxis*. *Phronēsis*

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

⁸⁹ For the dangers of the aesthetic aspect of creation that I think is usually related to *poiēsis*, Harries quotes Bullough, saying: “...aesthetic experience “has a negative, inhibitory aspect -the cutting out of the practical side of things and of our practical attitude to them- and a positive side -the elaboration of the experience on the basis created by the inhibitory action of distance.” [Edward Bullough, “Physical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Esthetic Principle,” in *A Modern Book of Esthetics: An Anthology*, ed. Melvin Rader, New York: Holt, 1952, p. 404.] Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, pp. 122-123.

⁹⁰ Aristotle and Broadie, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140b 1123, p. 1180.

is clearly practical⁹¹ and because of this it is related to *praxis*, as opposed to technical expertise that is productive (*poiētikē*) or theoretical wisdom or intellectual accomplishment that is theoretical (*sophia*).⁹² *Phronēsis* bridges the gap between the moral and the intellectual part of soul, because it works as instrument to achieve happiness (*eudaimonia*) which for Aristotle is the ultimate human goal. Contrary to *episteme*, which according to Aristotle, can be universally taught and learned,⁹³ *phronēsis* is a kind of knowledge that cannot be represented separately from the knower; it is rather a capacity to act.⁹⁴ In terms of education, this means that one should attend to the indemonstrable dicta and opinions of the skilful, the old and the practically wise men, no less than to those which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having gained their power of moral vision from experience.⁹⁵ Shaun Gallagher, referring to education, argues that *phronēsis* applies to situations that resemble a *mystery* rather than a *problem*,⁹⁶ in a way that the person cannot stand out of the situation in order to see it in an objective way. Knowledge of a situation is always imperfect knowledge gained *within* the situation, and the model for that knowledge is *phronēsis*.⁹⁷ Gadamer, in particular, clarifies the difference between technical and moral knowledge and claims that *phronēsis* involves a kind of self-knowledge that is not present in technological knowledge.⁹⁸ The hermeneutical situation appears to be a non-objective situation that assimilates to the situations of Ethics that one encounters in the every day life. Gadamer also argues that “[f]or moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objective knowledge- i.e., the knowledge is not standing over against a situation that he merely observes; he is directly affected by what he knows. It is something that he has to *do*.”⁹⁹

⁹¹ Ibid., 1140b1142-1145. See also p. 48 of the philosophical introduction.

⁹² Ibid., p. 46.

⁹³ “Again, all scientific knowledge is thought teachable and its subject matter capable learned. But all teaching proceeds from things already known.” Ibid., 1139b 1125, p. 1178. See also: H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle, the Nicomachean Ethics*, Edited by D.A. Rees, London: Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 192.

⁹⁴ Richard Halverson and Louis Gomez, "Phronesis and Design: How Practical Wisdom Is Disclosed through Collaborative Design," 2004? p. 3.

⁹⁵ Nicomachean Ethics, 1143b 13

⁹⁶ Referring to the definition of the terms given by Gabriel Marcel.

⁹⁷ Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, Edited by Dennis J. Schmidt, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p. 152.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 153.

⁹⁹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 314 [emphasis added].



Figure 42: The design studio as place of *praxis*

To return back to architecture, this thesis essentially concurs with Pérez-Gómez's overall argument that architectural education should go beyond the simplistic demand for professional practice. Pérez-Gómez has pointed out the direct connection of *phronēsis* with doing or *praxis*;¹⁰⁰ as well as the role that *praxis* can play in education, when he says: "... I want to illuminate connection at a deeper, more personal level that involves the architect's thoughts and deeds and define his or her grasp of reality. These issues, fundamentally defining a *praxis* (or practical philosophy), also affect the proper transmission and teaching of the discipline."¹⁰¹ *Praxis*, as Pérez-Gómez acknowledges it, is much more than technical expertise; "it concerns values, articulated through the stories that ground acts and deeds in particular culture. This *practical wisdom* is usually of the order of oral transmission, rather than of textual information."¹⁰² Finally, Pérez-Gómez argues for the role that *phronēsis* can play in the formation of *ethics*:

¹⁰⁰ "Though technology has already had a homogenizing effect, *praxis* involves much more than technical means –it concerns values, articulated through the stories that ground acts and deeds in a particular culture. This practical wisdom is of the order of oral transmission, rather than textual information." Alberto Pérez-Gómez, "Architecture and Ethics Beyond Globalization," proceedings from the conference: *Architectural Research*, Montreal, European Association for Architectural Education, 2002, pp. 13-22, p. 20 See also Pérez-Gómez, "Architecture and Ethics Beyond Globalization," p. 15.

¹⁰¹ Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love*, p. 12.

¹⁰² Pérez-Gómez, "Ethics and Poetics in Architectural Education - I," p.27 [emphasis added].

Once we move beyond eighteenth-century philosophical aesthetics, defined by the extrapolation of “truth as correspondence” from the natural sciences, taste must take its place among other forms of *phronēsis*. Aristotle used that term to denote a form of knowledge distinct from philosophy and science, a “*practical wisdom*” articulated in *everyday language and based on the habits and values that we share with others*. This is the discourse that frames *ethical action*, since it discloses values with utmost clarity and certainty.¹⁰³

In order to demonstrate this habitual articulation of *ethics* in the habits of the everyday language, I will go back to the design studio and the situation of the ‘Ethics of Borderlands.’ There I will practically demonstrate the argument that I have constructed so far, aiming to destabilise the hierarchical relationship that privileges *poiēsis* over *praxis*.¹⁰⁴ By suggesting that *praxis* through *phronēsis* provides a stronger armour to fight against techno-romantic views, there lies an opening of a possibility for seeing architecture, instead of *poiēsis*, as *praxis* or a form of ‘doing’.

4.4.4 Revisiting the situation of the ‘Ethics of Borderlands’: purpose-finding through propositions

It [architecture] may be better grasped *as a verb rather than through its heterogeneous products*; it is a process with inherent value. The presence of a well-grounded *praxis*, the trajectory of an architect’s words and deeds over time that embody a responsible practical philosophy, is far more crucial than the aesthetic or functional qualities of a particular work.¹⁰⁵

Pérez-Gómez, *Built upon Love*

The main difference between *praxis* and *poiēsis* – being that in the case of *poiēsis* there exists a goal beyond the activity itself – can be identified in the situation of the design studio that we saw in Chapter 1. The second part of the dialogue, as we can now see, exactly concerned the destabilization of *telos* or aim in architecture. In that

¹⁰³ Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love*, p. 115 [emphasis added].

¹⁰⁴ “It is not enough to simply address the poetics of architecture. For this will lead inevitably to a form of aestheticisation...” Neil Leach, “Less Aesthetics, More Ethics,” in *Architecture and Its Ethical Dilemmas*, ed. Nicholas Ray, London & New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005, 135-142, p. 141.

¹⁰⁵ Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love*, p. 205 [emphasis added].

context, the teacher and the student used the term ‘purpose’ that is very similar, if not identical, to that of *telos*. Below, I once again present an extended version of that dialogue, using a much more analytical representation of the transcripts that can allow some insightful details that were beyond the scope of the original introductory version.




Figure 43

Mary: I just wanted to ask (.) sometimes (we want to be) (0.5) that (1) e:m (0.5) I need to figure out (.) some kind of (.) pu:rpose in order to (prioritise)(concretise) (.) for example (.) my question (0.5) for the information (in each case)

Dorian: Ok

John: I think that was (.) part of (.) our discussion (.) our initial discussion (0.5) when they were trying to describe their project=

D: =So what is your purpose?

M: That is what I a:m trying to figure out fro:m (0.5) e::m what questions tha:t (I have) (0.5) and (.) wha:t (.) seems to be interesting to: (.) deal with [so this]

D: [but you already] answered the (.) (main aim) (0.5) your purpose is to investigate (.) here (2) that is your (purpose) isn't it? (0.5) em and in investigating he:re with all the ski::lls and the techniques that you have and (enschooled) as an architect (0.5) which inclu:de the fact that the project (makes) interventions (it is just experiment isn't it?) big interventions (.) and (.) we are drawing (again) as we like it (.) as we see

it (.) as we understand it and as we gather more and more information (in it) (1) maybe in the process of doing that (.) the purpose of your (endeavour) is: (.) to establish (further purpose) (.) to establish (further purpose) (1.5) but we know that the difference that drives all purposes (.) thus far is the interest (.) in (0.5) reconsidering (.) the traditional notion of limits (0.5) architectural limitation (.) and that's already driving your (intrigence area) because you found (.) this line (.) goes out quite far (0.5) the river is merely a line (when amount) (.) does not omit (.) and it has traditions (.) conventions (.) being (caused) already (1) there are (merely) new techniques further underlining that (.) line (1) I mean what (particularly) issue someone etc etc (0.5) so there are all sorts of purposes yeah? Is this not good enough purpose? =

M: ahm ((affirming))

D: I don't think we need purpose in sense of the use of your purpose is to design a museum (.) your purpose is to design and archive (.) your purpose is to make a primary school (.) your purpose is (.) you know (.) maybe that might be a programmatic value of plan that could rise from this investigation of limits of the city (1) I think that's where (.) we are quite useful to the city authorities (in the purpose that) they would have an agenda which may much more driven by the scientific technological advancement program (1) (while we) we may want to look at the fantastic (.) wonderful context of Shanghai (.) and show architectural language (.) as it comes out of the reevaluation of (.) its: historical limits (4) Simple isn't it?

Student: Hehh ((laughs affirming))

J: But I guess (.) they have to give an answer and (2) on how they understand these limits (.) they have to to ha(.) have a proposition against how they [would]

D: [but they]=

J: =if they would have to transform it and this [is I] think the job of the archit[ect]

D: [I agree]

J: =then they need to have a tendency and this is what a thesis is=
=[in my understanding]

D: [Well I think (.) if you take that slowly (.) you need to have (.) an understanding of the limits

J: Ahm ((affirming))

- D: and you say okay (.) lets do that (.) so what do we do: as architects (.) we draw (.) where all the drawings are limits (0.5) these are all wonderful limits (.) born out of techniques of representations (1) but they are not necessarily the limits of this thesis (.) what limits (.) that's clear limitation when you section you draw limits (.) that's the main key about sections (.) that's why we draw them all the time (.) that why it's difficult as architects to (.) eh (0.5) realise sometimes that what we are doing (.) (in principle) (intrinsically) (.) is limiting (1) is why (.) is interesting to (.) invert (.) that (.) picture (0.5) of (.) our sections as (.) em: (0.5) connectivity (...vity) rather than (2)
- J: separation=
- D: =separation. (3) A project of (.) I mean you don't hear this (.) in architecture schools (.) because this is difficult to imagine (.) given our normal lexicons (.) but (.) how do you draw (.) an inrelation=
- J: =hh ((affirming)) (1)
- D: as opposed to a section (0.5) because under the (0.5) ethics of borderlands (and our interest) (.) in borderlands you would have to draw an inrelation (0.5) (inaudible) (2) You'd have to change the title (.) of our (.) orthographic eh tradition (0.5) to draw inrelations. (1) It is quite good, [isn't it] John?
- J: [aha:] ((affirming))
- D: I know (.) I have to remember that (.) hhh[hh]hhhh ((laughter))
- J: [hh] ((affirming laughter))
- D: I have never said it that way before=
- J: =hhhh ((laughter)) (1.5)
- D: I have written it in all sorts of (0.5) (converting) ways but that is very clear (0.5) to draw an inrelation (.) Jesus.

In Chapter 1, I briefly mentioned the impasse that Mary acknowledged (when she asked about a 'purpose') pointing towards a lack of aim, or *telos*, in her work. Moreover, I pointed out that Dorian deliberately gave an Ethical twist to her question, by promoting 'the establishment of difference,' as an ultimate aim, going beyond conventional notions that see the purpose as the brief or the program that

leads directly to a building. For this reason the purpose of the project was not pre-given in a handout, but it was constructed in the design studio as part of the educational process. However, in the case of the *dojo* the etiquette stated that “Aikido is not a sport. It is a discipline for training the mind, body and spirit. Physical technique is not the true *object*, but a tool for personal refinement and spiritual growth.”¹⁰⁶ Here the purpose is expressed as an objective that although is not defined as such, it has been stated in order to avoid common misconceptions about the martial aspect of the art. In what follows I show how different ‘purposes’ are produced in the situation of the design studio.

First of all, Mary’s question came to initiate a new sub-theme in a discussion that considered issues of representation as sectioning, that of ‘purpose-finding.’ Nevertheless, very quickly Mary’s role in the discussion was superseded by Dorian’s long responses, and also by a secondary discussion between the two tutors. Dorian’s long responses, in particular, structure the above situation into three distinct parts. In some sense his responses can be described as ‘monologues,’ not only because of their length and the lack of interaction with the other parties, but also because of the fact each response has an internal structure that includes a start, middle, and end. The ending especially is made explicit each time with a rhetorical question: “Is this not good enough purpose?”, “Simple, isn’t it?”, “It is quite good, isn’t it John?”; which could be translated as ‘Now I have finished.’ These monologues convey explicit theoretical notions of *morality*. As Dorian was telling the students, just before the given extract, the section is an action of separation, distantiation and ghettoing, or organization, neating and tidying, according to which side of the coin one chooses to focus on. By drawing or creating walls and boundaries of various forms, architects continually make ethical decisions that historically, in the city level have lead to ghetto-sectioning of Jews ‘in the sixteenth century in Venice’, or of mad people ‘in eighteenth or nineteenth century in Europe’. “Your sections draw limits”, says Dorian to the students and what we as architects are doing “in principle is limiting.” Dorian was setting an external rule, that ‘limiting is bad’ and that what the students should do is supersede this by drawing ‘inrelations’ instead of sections. He even

¹⁰⁶ Laurent Haquin, *Aikido Etiquette*, Art-of-Chi, 2005.

titled this moral lesson as the ‘Ethics of the Borderlands.’ This understanding of Ethics is very similar to the concept of *morality*. No matter how Ethically correct and progressive the idea of drawing inrelations is, the way that it is delivered, through these kind of monologues which aim to stimulate the students through their reflective faculty, aim to point the students towards the ‘right way’ of *morality*. Nevertheless, Dorian did not actually give a lecture about the Ethics of Borderlands, and the monologues were actually part of a dialogue where the different parties negotiated the purposes of the project.

This negotiation becomes apparent in the way that the three parties use personal pronouns in the above excerpt, revealing very different interpretations of ‘purpose’ that have to do with the notion of aim or *telos* of architecture and of architectural education. First of all Mary makes her question in first-person singular, referring to a personal problem, a situation that she is facing right now “*I* need to figure out some kind of purpose.” Dorian’s first ‘monologue’ started with referring to Mary’s problem in particular, by using second person: “*Your* purpose is to investigate here”, “the skills and techniques that *you* have.” Very soon though he introduces the project, and from then on he switches to first-person plural: “*We* are drawing as *we* like it”, or “*we* know that the difference that drives all purposes”. By this fact he starts to include the demands of the project and those that are part of it, like an ideal group of students who are approaching this ideal purpose. When he has to make a specific comment on Mary he returns to using the second-person “That is already driving *your* area, because *you* found this line”. The second monologue (after Mary’s affirmation) starts with the repetitive use of the second-person again, but this time not to refer to Mary’s specific problem, but rather to emphasise an imperative voice that imposes a rule: “*Your* purpose is to design a museum” in the same sense that we understand a sentence ‘*You* shall not steal!’ This second paragraph emphasises Dorian’s personal view of the topic by saying “*I* think”. The second-person plural follows to show again a different category, the role of the architects, in contrast to the third person plural which shows the role of the commissioning authorities: “*We* are quite useful to the planning authorities, in the purpose that *they* would have an

agenda.” This is a distinction that is not very far from the practice/theory division as presented before.

John nevertheless intervened and started using the third person plural in order to refer to the students: “*they* have to give an answer, on how *they* understand these limits, *they* have to have a proposition,” which puts emphasises on the responsibility of the students to commit to an architectural proposition, that requires an aim. Finally in the third part of the Dorian’s monologue, he said: “*You* need to have an understanding of the limits and *you* say ok lets do that, so what do *we* do as architects? *We* draw!” Again, here, Dorian changes from the second-person singular to the second-person plural in order to distantiate, somehow, John’s views from his own that are part of what an ‘ideal’ group of architects do. Dorian also says: “that’s a limitation, when *you* section *you* draw limits, that’s the main key about sections, that’s why *we* draw them all the time.” In this case, the second-person singular is making a reference to the student’s work again, which becomes apparent by the fact that, while saying this, Dorian points towards the model and looks toward the student. The change to the second-person plural: “that’s why *we* draw them all the time” starts to refer to the totality of architects who admit of being sometimes unaware of “what *we* are doing.” Finally, after John’s affirmation Dorian changes back to the clear second person singular/plural distinction in order to emphasise the responsibility of the students in contrast to the ‘ideal’ standards of the project: “...under the ethics of borderlands (and *our* interest) in borderlands *you* would have to draw an inrelation...”.

From the above analysis we can see vividly the variety of purposes or aims that one can find in architecture, and how these are constructed through the discussion between the students and the tutors. There is the first-person singular (*I*) or personal purpose that here is identified with a need to set up the program of the brief for a building; there is the second-person singular (*you*) purpose that refers to the students and their responsibility to meet an imperative purpose in order to be part of ‘the project,’ or part of the ideal team that understands the purpose; there is the third-person plural (*they*) referring again to the responsibility of the students in order to

cultivate a tendency towards a thesis; and there is the first-person plural (*we*) that refers to either the ideal team of students that understand the ‘purpose,’ or sometimes the totality of architects that are misled but should go back to the ‘right’ purpose: *Drawing inrelations* (according to the Ethics of borderlands). As we already saw, in the case of *poiēsis*, the purpose is different from the activity itself, while in the action of *praxis* it is inherent in the activity. In terms of Ethics, this means that architecture as *poiēsis* has a purpose that is external to it and – as I argued in Chapter 3 – this externality is related to *morality*. On the other hand, architecture as *praxis* has a purpose that is internal to it and for this reason it is related to *ethics*. In this sense, the propositional purposes that were created through the situation can be distinguished: the *I-purpose* is internal to architecture since it is an inseparable part of the architectural practice. The same applies to the *They-purpose* that refers to a necessary tendency towards the creation of architecture. On the contrary, the *You-purpose* and the *We-purpose* both refer to an external imperative goal, an ideal team of students or architects that understand something that others do not: the moral stance of the ‘Ethics of Borderlands.’ The internal purposes appear to be inclusive of all examples since they seem to apply to every single student, while the external purposes refer to a particular Ethical stance that could be otherwise.

Nevertheless, when we see the above situation from the point of view of the educational practice, all these different purposes were constructed *in* the dialogue that consists of the educational activity itself. Even though some of the purposes were external or internal to the practice of architecture, for the practice of education they were all internal. Despite the fact that some purposes may reflect *moral* beliefs and opinions about how architecture is being done, the way that these beliefs were negotiated in the dialogue was not pre-given as a theoretical remedy or crystallised from the beginning. On the contrary, it was negotiated in a habitual construction of speech that assigned different personal pronouns to different purposes, manifesting in this way *ethics* in the dialogue. For this reason, the educational practice was not a form of *poiēsis* that lead towards an explicit aim, but it was a form of *praxis*, where the educational aim was inherent to the educational activity: the dialogue. The dialogue as *praxis* does not rely only on the succession of reflective responses that

aim to deliver a ‘monologue’ each time. Dialogue as *praxis* is the participation in a state of mind characterised by an openness towards the other, and this creates a horizon that is habituated during the educational *praxis*. The educational *praxis* if understood as *bildung* (cultivation or formation) it transcends the notion means towards an end.¹⁰⁷ The habituation in the dialogue happens beyond the means/end relationship or one’s free will.¹⁰⁸ The constitution of the self and the purposes in the above situation were a manifestation of this habitual self-expression. As I already mentioned, Deleuze has described the constitution of the self as “the habit of saying ‘I.’”¹⁰⁹ So when each party was conversing in the dialogue by delivering *moral* views about Ethics, at the very same time they were habitually using personal pronouns to communicate these Ethical ideas. This habitual response embodies *ethics* in the *praxis* of the dialogue and it was part of undeclared lessons of this course. This dialogical *praxis*,¹¹⁰ or doing, is inhabited within the educational activity that is so basic, humble and persistent that one tends to forget its importance, like the preparation of an everyday meal:

...*doing-cooking* is the medium for a basic, humble, and persistent practice that is repeated in time and space, rooted in the fabric of relationships to other and to one’s self, marked by the ‘family saga’ and the history of each, bound to childhood memory just like rhythms and seasons.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ “Bildung as such cannot be a goal; it cannot as such sought, except in the reflective thematic of the educator. In having no goals outside itself, the concept of Bildung transcends that of the mere cultivation of given talents, from which concept it is derived. The cultivation of a talent is the development of something that is given, so that practicing and cultivating it a mere means to an end. ... In Bildung by contrast, that by which and through which one is formed becomes completely one’s own. To some extent everything that is received is absorbed, but in Bildung what is absorbed is not like a means that has lost its function. Rather in acquired Bildung nothing disappears, but everything is preserved.” Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 10. The term *Bildung* is discussed further in Chapter 5, p. 214.

¹⁰⁸ Jodie A. Nicotra, "The Force of Habit: Rhetoric, Repetition, and Identity from Darwin to Drugs," Thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy Supervised by: Richard Doyle, The Pennsylvania State University, 2005, p. 8.

¹⁰⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, European Perspectives, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. x. As quoted in Nicotra, "The Force of Habit: Rhetoric, Repetition, and Identity from Darwin to Drugs," p. 1.


¹¹⁰ Keith Stenning et al., "Vicarious Learning from Educational Dialogue," proceedings from the conference: *Computer support for collaborative learning*, International Society of the Learning Sciences, 1999, <http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1160000/1150283/a43-stenning.pdf?key1=1150283&key2=9313715121&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&CFID=35530800&CFTOKEN=22393062> [accessed 04. 07. 2008].

¹¹¹ Michel de Certeau, Luce Giard, and Pierre Mayol, *The Practice of Everyday Life Vol. 2: Living and Cooking*, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 157.

The everydayness of this *praxis* encompasses the *ethics* of the educational activity, diluted in the repetitive nature of the dialogue in the context of the design studio. On the other hand, *morality* is part of a distilling process that refines argument about how things should be –here, the Ethics of Borderlands. During this process of dilution and distillation, although *ethics* and *morality* are connected (since they refer to evaluation of good/bad or right/wrong as part of the spirit of the overall Ethical discourse), they differ in something extremely substantive. *Morality's* nature is inseparably related to a normative evaluation external to a practice, while *ethics* has a descriptive character internal to it. This difference, as we saw above, is not just a difference in degree or value, but a difference of nature and for this reason should not be mixed, especially in the area of education. Moreover, I also showed that architecture and architectural education, are two different modes of *praxis*, that although they are related, they have significant differences. By focusing in this particular situation of the design studio, I showed that what appears to be *morality* in the case of architecture, can be seen as *ethics* in the case of architectural education, opening up a potential dialogue between the two practices and between the two modes of Ethics.

Having established the difference between *morality* and *ethics*; and having identified the manifestation of *ethics* in *praxis*; the following chapter proceeds into pursuing the way that *morality* and *ethics* are generated in educational situations. Specifically, I shall show how an understanding of ‘reflective disruption’ can produce *moral* reflection, while ‘repetitive mimesis’ ends up in habits of *ethics*.

**Producing *morality* and *ethics* in Education:
the strife of reflective disruption
and repetitive mimesis**



...
When the child was a child
it awoke once in a strange bed
and now does so again and again.
Many people, then, seemed beautiful
and now only a few do, by sheer luck.

It had visualized a clear image of Paradise
and now can at most guess
could not conceive of nothingness
and shudders today at the thought.

When the child was a child
It played with enthusiasm
and, now, has just as much excitement as then
but only when it concerns its work.

...
Peter Handke
Song to Childhood

5.1 Introduction

You show me the honour of calling upon me to submit a report to the Academy concerning *my previous life as an ape*. ... The first thing I *learned* was to give a handshake. The handshake displays candour. ... — but nonetheless it should demonstrate the line by which someone who was an ape was forced into the world of men and which he has continued there.¹

Franz Kafka, *A Report to the Academy*

The third [law] was to carry on my *reflections* in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another.²

Descartes, Discourse on method

5.1.1 Aims of this chapter

So far this thesis has been establishing the division of Ethics into *morality* and *ethics*, and has been arguing for the need to inhabit the neglected area of *ethics* as it manifests itself in *praxis*. The current chapter, has two aims: first of all to show how *morality* and *ethics* are produced, and second to explore the possibilities for a dialectic between *morality* and *ethics*. This dialectic is presented through a discussion of how the two concepts are formed and acquired by the students during the educational *praxis* and also how the two terms are related. The chapter shows how *morality* comes to obtain its explicit character that relates to the application of rules, its ‘conscious’ deliberation about Ethics, and its external character to the practice of architecture and its education. Equally, it shows how *ethics* comes to attain its implicit character that relates it to customs and habits, its ‘unconscious’ connection to Ethics and its internal relation to the practice of architecture and its education. Finally, a possible correlation between *morality* and *ethics* is proposed to

¹ Franz Kafka, "A Report for an Academy," <http://www.mala.bc.ca/~Johnstoi/kafka/reportforacademy.htm> [accessed 03. 07. 2007].

One of the major studies on mimesis *Mimesis and Alterity* by Michael Taussig, opens with a quote from the same short story of Kafka. Here, I choose a different quote than Taussig, focusing on the educational aspect of becoming ‘human.’

² Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, New York: Dover, 1955, pp. 79-130, p. 92.

be the relationship between *revealing* and *concealing*, as presented in the wider phenomenological tradition.

Education in this way is considered as the very place where this formation occurs and for this reason monitoring the emergence of *morality* and *ethics* in their very ‘birth,’ means to study them *in* educational situations. Education here is not a mere context that could be substituted with any other practice relating to architecture. Arguably, examining the formation of Ethics *in* education is actually the study of formation of Ethics itself. Formation understood as edification (*aedes*, ‘dwelling’ + *ficare*, ‘to make’)³ is the construction of a dwelling place, which later came to receive a negative connotation of moral correction. Furthermore, by understanding education as *bildung*⁴ (as I have already mentioned), reveals not only the deliberation of what it is to learn how to do architecture, but also gives a wider horizon of ethos to this action, in an inseparable link. For this reason, the case studies of the design studio, the music class and the *dojo* are the focus of this chapter providing new concrete situations in which the relation of *morality* and *ethics* is examined. There, in the educational places, I will show that Ethical education of both *morality* and *ethics* has is being produced through a performative aspect. In this view, learning becomes both a preparation for a performance that will take place later on, in ‘real’ practice, as well as a performance in itself.⁵ Performance here can be seen in three ways. First of all “to carry out in action, execute or fulfil”⁶ the actions that will be executed later

³ Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, p. 11.

⁴ “...but when in our language we say Bildung, we mean something both higher and more inward, namely the disposition of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character” Hegel, *Philosophical Propaedeutic* 41-45 quoted in Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall (Revised Translation), Second Revised Edition ed, London, New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 9. See also Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, Edited by Dennis J. Schmidt, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p. 50-51. Furthermore see: Richard Coyne and Adrian Snodgrass, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking*, London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p. 244.

⁵ Note Girard’s concept of ‘acting’ in: George D. Girton, "Kung Fu: Toward a Praxiological Hermeneutic of the Martial Arts," in *Ethnomethodological Studies of Work*, ed. Harold Garfinkel, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, 60-89, p. 71.

⁶ ‘perform’ v. Oxford English Dictionary (OED) Online Draft Version 2007 . http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50175365?query_type=word&queryword=performance&first=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha [29. 06. 2007].

on in the practice of the ‘real’ thing. Second, as the Old French (*per-furnir*) origin of the word implies, the furnishing with necessary provisions or supplies, useful or desirable material.⁷ In a third sense, as the Anglo-Norman form of the word implies, to *form*, “to give form or shape; to fashion, mould”⁸ to express by form, and mainly “to mould by discipline or education; to train, instruct”⁹ an education in Ethics.

Having identified *praxis*, in the previous chapter, as the fundamental activity for the study of Ethics, the current chapter works as a *praxiography* of the performance of Ethics as it can be seen in the three educational places. It writes down the transcripts, scores or annotations of this performance using the techniques of ethno-graphy and offers a dense visual and textual juxtaposition between the three case studies. At the same time, though, it is a *praxiology*¹⁰ since it analyzes these transcripts, by seeking to extract generalizations of the constructions of *ethics* and *morality* in all three cases. The praxiography and praxiology of this performance could be approached and examined through a wide variety of concepts and terms like: representation, interpretation, method, rhetoric, prejudice, rule, speech, gesture, habit, custom etc. Nevertheless, here I will focus on two complex terms, namely *reflective disruption* and *repetitive mimesis*, since by their very definition they incorporate the formation of *ethics* and *morality* as I have described them so far.

5.1.2 Introducing ‘reflective disruption’ and ‘repetitive mimesis’

In a first attempt to define the term of reflective disruption one could break it down to its constituent components: ‘disruption,’ according to Oxford English Dictionary, is the action of ending or bursting asunder; violent dissolution of continuity; forcible severance.¹¹ It is related to the verb ‘rupt’ which means to break or to nullify.¹² It is

⁷ ‘per-furnish’ v. OED Draft Version 2007.

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50175406?query_type=word&queryword=performance&first=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha [29. 06. 2007].

⁸ ‘form’ OED Second Edition 1989.

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50088509?query_type=word&queryword=performance&first=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha [29. 06. 2007].

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ See for example: Girton, "Kung Fu: Toward a Praxiological Hermeneutic of the Martial Arts."

¹¹ ‘disruption’ OED Second Edition, 1989.

¹² ‘rupt’ v. OED Second Edition, 1989.

generally a discontinuity in a flow or a process. ‘Reflection’, is usually associated with the function of the mirror or more generally the quality of surfaces “to cast or send back (heat, cold or sound) after impact.”¹³ It also means the turning or directing on a certain course or to bend, curve or fold back. But here, I am interested in the following meaning: “to turn one's thoughts (back) on, to fix the mind or attention on or upon a subject; to ponder, meditate on; think of.”¹⁴ The adjective ‘reflective’ is the attribute of exercising thought, being meditative or thoughtful.¹⁵ The opening quote by Descartes used in the original the plural form of the word ‘pensée,’¹⁶ which also exists in English, meaning a thought or reflection especially when put in literally form.¹⁷ In a more rare form it also used to mean the state of thoughtfulness, meditation and especially ‘anxious reflection;’¹⁸ while the verb ‘pense’ means to weight, to consider or to examine.¹⁹ In all these forms Descartes’ ‘pensée’ connotes a conscious and explicit reflection. Moreover, reflection has an Ethical connotation when it refers to persons, circumstances or actions, as to throw, cast, or bring blame, dishonour, credit, etc on or upon them.²⁰ “To cast a slight or imputation, reproach or blame, on or upon a person or thing; to pass a censure on.”²¹ This explicit evaluation and ‘conscious’ judgement that takes place, usually according to explicit rules, seems to form the basis of *morality*. Here, though, my interest will focus on reflective activity that is the product of a disruption. For this, I am going to show that reflective disruption is a fundamental mechanism to produce ‘conscious’ evaluations according to explicit norms and rules that are prevalent in the humanistic discourse.

¹³ ‘reflect’ v. OED Second Edition, 1989.

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50200804?query_type=word&queryword=reflection&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ ‘reflective’ a. and n. OED Second Edition, 1989.

¹⁶ The original writes: “Le troisième, de conduire par order mes *pensées*, en commençant par les objets les plus simples et les plus ausés à connaître, pour monter peu à peu, comme par degrés, jusqu’ à la connaissance des plus composés; et supposant même de l’ ordre entre ceux qui ne se précédent point naturellement les uns les autres.” Rene Descartes, *Discours De La Methode, Avec Introduction Et Notes Par Etienne Gilson*, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1970, p. 70. [emphasis added].

¹⁷ *pensée*, n. OED online, Draft Revision, December 2005.

<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50174697> [18. 06. 2008]

¹⁸ *pensee*, n. OED online, Draft Version, March 2008. <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00346259> [18. 06. 2008]

¹⁹ *pense*. v. OED online, Draft Version, June 2008. <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50174695> [18. 06. 2008]

²⁰ ‘reflect’ v. OED Second Edition, 1989.

²¹ *ibid.*

By following the same analytical approach towards the term ‘repetitive mimesis’ one comes to find that ‘mimesis,’ is the “imitation of another person’s words, mannerisms, actions”²² and especially in the philosophy of arts it refers to the “representation of the real world in (a work of) art”²³. The word comes from the ancient Greek word *μιμείσθαι* and the original verb ‘to mime’ means simply to copy or “to use gesture and movement, usually without words, in the acting of a play or a role; to perform in mime.”²⁴ From the same root in ancient Greek, *mimō* was the term used for the ape,²⁵ the animal that most of all has been associated with its ability to imitate. Mimesis is also used by a variety of disciplines ranging from biology to sociology as the imitative behaviour of one species, social group, class, individual etc. by another.²⁶ On the other hand, ‘repetition’ is the act of ‘saying or doing something again, fetch back, demand the return of,’²⁷ and also to ‘attack again’ because of its origins from the French *péter* that generally means to explode.²⁸ In a medical sense the adjective ‘repetitive’ refers to the notion of wear or tear, since it refers to “a syndrome of pain or impairment of function involving specific muscles, tendons, nerves, or joints, attributed to the prolonged performance of repetitive actions.”²⁹

Just from this preliminary lexicographical investigation we can see that *repetitive mimesis* is a concept closely related to the implicit formation of prejudices, customs, habits and dispositions that are the basis of the animal nature of *ethics* as I have already described it. As the two opening quotes illustrate, Kafka’s ape through mimesis (the most apish characteristic), learns to give a handshake and for this he ‘becomes’ a human in displaying ‘candour’. While in the second quote, Descartes –

²² ‘mimesis’ n. OED Draft Version June 2004.

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00309861?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=mimesis&first=1&max_to_show=10 [30. 06. 2007]

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ ‘mime’ v. OED Draft Version Mar. 2002

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00309854?query_type=word&queryword=mimesis&first=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha [30. 06. 2007].

²⁵ Henry Liddell, George and Robert Scott, "A Greek-English Lexicon," Perseus Digital Library Project.

²⁶ ‘mimesis’ n. OED Draft Version, June 2004.

²⁷ ‘repeat’ OED Second Edition, 1989.

²⁸ ‘peter’ v. OED Draft Version December 2005.

²⁹ ‘repetitive’ adj. OED Second Edition, 1989.

the most ‘humanist’³⁰ of all humans – through pure reflection, is able to understand ‘complex’ knowledge by creating or even ‘assuming’ order ‘even if a fictitious one;’ starting always from ‘the most simple and easy to understand’. A war starts to become obvious between repetitive mimesis and reflective disruption and the two quotes are emblematic flags of each side.

This chapter continues the study of *ethics* and *morality* by analysing their origins as they appear in the dialectic between repetitive mimesis and reflective disruption. Already from this short introduction, this analysis appears to be a strife between beasts and men, or between habits and reason. What follows is a presentation of concrete examples from the three case studies of the *dojo*, the music class and the design studio, each with a separate elaborate analysis for the concepts of *reflective disruption* and *repetitive mimesis*. It may seem odd that I start with the presentation of disruptive incidents first, since these are beyond the institutional ‘norms,’ and instructional events of educational practice, but this absurdity happens in order to facilitate an (anti)climax towards the rather mundane and phenomenally ‘dull’ incidents of repetitive mimesis. The presentation will lead in each case to a wider and contextual understanding of the two complex terms in philosophy. This does not happen because the philosophical parts reach a ‘conclusion’ or have the final word, but rather because the focus should be constantly on the case studies and any attempt to a/theorise is grounded (or stabilised) by them. Furthermore, the case studies simultaneously serve as evidence and parameters of destabilization and refutation to con-form and fit in any theory (no matter how well thought). Finally, and in a similar a/theoretical mode, the chapter will proceed into the comparative analysis of the two terms of repetitive mimesis and reflective disruption in relation to each other. Procedurally, I will be starting with the strangest place, the *dojo* and through the music class I will eventually discuss the main concern of this thesis: the ‘familiar’ design studio.

³⁰ Here I mean the fundamental role that Descartes has played in the development of Humanism, especially in France: “Largely through Descartes's influence, French philosophy has since maintained a humanist dimension.” He also explains the different and often incompatible readings of Descartes, where especially in the anglo-saxon tradition he is seen as an epistemologist. Tom Rockmore, "On Humanism and French Humanism," *The Philosopher*, LXXXVI. 2. 2000? <http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/wicker-humanism.htm> [accessed 09. 11. 2007].

5.2 Producing morality: Reflective disruption

[I]n order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, *we must break with our familiar acceptance of it* and, also, from the fact that from this break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world.¹

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*

As I speak of it, ethical obligation [*morality* -by my definition] is not an achievement or attainment (since it is not a choice) but an obedience to that which disruptively commands us to obey. Because the ethical does not consist of ‘doing’ but undoing.²

David Appelbaum, *Disruption*

It is hoped that from this different inhabitation of the everyday (which is always a social inhabitation) that perhaps possibilities for disrupting everyday, habits, norms, and conventions through various modes of social (inter-)action will emerge, (inter-)actions that may make the world—or aspects of it, at least for a time—strange, unfamiliar, and uncanny. It is also hoped that such disruptions and unfamiliarity might enable the releasing of new attunements to the world and the emergence of new possibilities for (communal) life.³

Daniel Smith, *Intensifying Phronēsis*

5.2.1 Reflective disruption and *morality* in the dojo: an accident

Laurent, the instructor, has already shown a set of exercises and has asked the students to practice them freely in pairs (Figure 44). He walks amongst the practicing students and corrects them individually. One can only hear the sound of the bodies that fall on the mats without any order, since each pair of students is practicing at their own pace. The class consists of a group of 10 students from various levels. Young, a junior student is practicing with a senior student, Tomas. What follows is a breakdown of one minute of action into groups of 5-second sets in order to show what takes place in the *dojo* during this minute (the red lines and the letters in the image correspond to the initial of each participant’s name and his or her relative position in the scene). Although this particular example of the education activity in the *dojo* comes from the everyday practice, a routine class during the week, I am

¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p. xiv.

² David Appelbaum, *Disruption*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. vii.

³ Daniel L. Smith, "Intensifying Phronesis: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Culture," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 36, no. 1, 2003: 77-102, p. 101.

choosing it for its special *disruptive* character, since it shows a very particular situation, that of an accident.




Figure 44

00:00-00:05 (Figure 44) The students are scattered around the mats practicing in pairs. Laurent is standing at the edge of the mats observing them. He focuses on Young and Tomas who are practicing together at the far right corner of the mats, while Quincy and Bob are practicing on the far left. Tomas (the experienced student wearing the *hakama* –black trousers) is attacking and Young performs the exercise. Laurent starts to move towards them.

00:05-00:10 (Figure 45) Young and Tomas are performing the exercise one more time. Laurent continues to move around them. At the moment that Tomas gets up and attacks Young, Laurent interrupts them and takes Tomas's place. Without saying anything Laurent performs the exercise (*somen uchi irimi nage*) the other way around becoming the defender in order to show to Young the same movements that he was executing just before. Tomas starts to move towards the edge of the mats.




Figure 45

00:10-00:15 (Figure 46) Laurent turns Young around his vertical axis while executing the technique. Tomas gets himself in sitting position on his knees, *seiza* (a common practice of the senior students when the instructor shows the technique to their partner). Laurent throws Young down on the mat in order to conclude the technique. Katherine laughs because her technique fails. Matt throws Rosa on the mat and she starts to play by attacking him imitating a dog, crawling.



Figure 46

At the moment that Young reaches the ground, Quincy is throwing Bob down (Figure 47 & Figure 46). Bob's foot hits Young's head. A voice is heard 'Ou::gh'. Young sits on the mat holding his head.




Figure 47



Figure 48

00:15-00:20 (Figure 49) Bob kneels over behind Young to see how bad he hit him. Laurent puts his hand on Young's shoulder he waves vaguely to the other students to continue practicing despite the fact that no one has actually stopped doing so. Laurent bends over Young and asks him how bad it is. Young responds with a wave showing that it is not very bad. Bob stands up, fixes his *gi* (uniform) and bends over in front of Young this time to see better how he is. Rosa stops chasing Matt pretending to be a dog and they look for two seconds towards the incident.




Figure 49

00:20-00:25 (Figure 50) Laurent waves to Bob to go back to practice. Bob does so and immediately starts to attack Quincy. Rosa stands up and starts practicing again with Matt; Katherine and George look instantly towards the incident and then they continue practicing. Laurent takes Young to the side of the mats with his hand over Young's shoulder.




Figure 50

00:25-00:30 (Figure 51) Laurent and Young are reaching the edge of the mats where Tomas has been already sitting during the whole incident. Laurent waves to Young to sit down for a while. He then turns to Tomas, touches him on the shoulder and points towards Quincy & Bob in order to join them. Tomas bows and stands up.




Figure 51

00:30-00:35 (Figure 52) Tomas moves towards Quincy and Andrew and immediately attacks Quincy, who has already just thrown Bob down. Young sits on his knees in *seiza* position and Laurent bends over Young and asks if he is alright. Young shows where exactly he was hit.




Figure 52

00:35-00:40 (Figure 53) Laurent straightens up his posture still looking at Young. Matt starts attacking Rosa unexpectedly from behind throwing her down.




Figure 53

00:40-00:45 (Figure 54) Laurent, standing the whole time next to Young, withdraws his look from him and focuses on what the other students are doing. Quincy throws Bob down and Tomas attacks Quincy without giving him the time to prepare. This leads to an unsuccessful technique and Tomas laughs. Matt attacks Rosa from behind again and this time she struggles to stand up and starts crawling.




Figure 54

00:45-00:50 (Figure 55) While looking at the students Laurent makes a step back. He then looks at Young again for a couple of seconds. Matt passes over Rosa who is crawling.




Figure 55

00:50-00:54 (Figure 56) Laurent makes one step forward and stands there paying attention to the students.




Figure 56

The above situation shows a very particular incident: that of an accident. Although *aikido* is considered to be a very gentle martial art and very often it is assimilated with dance, it can become very fast and dynamic, so that minor accidents, like the one described above, are not rare. Most commonly, accidents happen when two bodies meet while falling on the mats simultaneously. In this sense, there is a strong Ethical aspect that rises when one student hits the other, even by mistake.

One might think that in relation to *morality* a possible issue would be to find out *who is responsible* for the accident or who can be blamed for the accident. But obviously there is no clear answer to these questions and judging from everyone's reaction we can see that there was no interest to find someone to blame. Things take an interesting twist because the student got hurt while practicing with the teacher. Laurent threw Young on the mats at the very same time that Bob had been thrown by Quincy (Figure 47 & Figure 48). It is not easy to hold one person responsible of the accident, student or teacher. Obviously, there was no intention to cause injury from

any side, and from my participation I know that Young and Bob were good friends. This becomes also obvious, as immediately after the accident Bob showed interest and tried to take care of the ‘wounded’ fellow student. Quincy, who had thrown Bob down after realising what happened, made a gesture like ‘oops’⁴ or ‘sorry.’ This gesture was actually not referring to anyone in particular, since no one was looking at him, because everyone’s attention was turned to Young. Arguably, Quincy’s gesture was towards the situation in general, acknowledging that he played a role in what happened. Finally, Laurent took the responsibility to take care of Young, walking him out of the centre of the scene of the accident and staying next to him for some time.

In relation to the above, it is interesting to identify the way that people showed care or expressed their sympathy for Young. Immediately after the accident, Bob sat on his knees over Young to see what happened and how badly he had hurt him (most probably mumbling ‘sorry’ or ‘are you ok?’). Laurent stood still for a couple of seconds, but then bent over Young to see if he was ok, placing his hand over his shoulder. Laurent maintained this gesture of affection and protection, until he accompanied Young to sit down at the side of the mats. Quincy, as I already mentioned, apologised by waving a general gesture and stood standing by, bending towards the incident holding his knees with his hands. Tom (Young’s previous partner), at the very moment of the accident was just sitting on his knees in *seiza* position and although he watched the accident happening, he did not seem to be affected, most probably because he understood immediately that it was not something worrying, or feeling that he was too far from the spot of the action to be involved. Katherine and George, who were laughing at their unsuccessful technique, stopped for a couple of seconds and looked towards the incident before they continued. George especially seemed to be more ready to continue practicing. He realised that something was going on, by Katherine’s face, since he turned back to see what was wrong. He then turned again towards Katherine, made a step towards

⁴ For the ‘oops’ as a rule-governed act and not as behavioural response, see Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity, 1984, p. 81-82.. For example in p. 82 Giddens writes: “Hence ‘Oops!’, spontaneous and immediate though it may be, demonstrates care and attention to the implication of the sudden occurrence and therefore indicates overall competence which overrides what is thereby exhibited to be only minor slip.”

her, ready to attack her, but he realised that she was still focusing on what was going on with Young, so he turned back again to see better. After that he turned again towards Katherine and finally attacked her. Similarly, Rosa, who at the moment of the accident was playfully attacking Matt by crawling and pretending to be a dog,⁵ stopped this game for a couple of seconds and looked towards Young, realising that something serious had happened. Then, she quit that game and continued practicing with Matt properly, maybe in respect of the situation.

A different aspect of the incident has to do with the absorption of the disruption and the return to the normal practice. As we saw, Laurent made three different gestures in order to ask the students to continue practicing. First of all, while he was bending over Young to see how serious he was hurt, he waved generally to the students to indicate that they should continue practicing, despite the fact that no one had really stopped doing so. This gesture, though, did not refer to Bob who still remained in the centre of the scene. He was tacitly exempted from the teacher's gesture for continuing practicing, since he had played an important role in the accident. Bob stood up for a second, fixed his uniform that had become loose from the fall and bent again over Young to see whether he is well, showing care for a second time. It was only then that Laurent made a special gesture referring to Bob to go back to his practice. Similarly, Tom, who had retreated to the edge of the mats, sat there waiting for instructions until Laurent took Young to sit aside. Laurent then made a third gesture specifically to him to indicate that he should go and join Bob and Quincy. It was only at this point that the practice mode was recovered and all the students (apart from Young of course) had returned to a practice mode.

To summarise, one can claim that the interest of the teacher and the students was not focused in accusations, blaming or finding responsibilities. On the contrary, the

⁵ Note the following passage on playing the dog: "There is no reality of becoming animal, even though one does not in reality become animal. It is useless, then to raise the objection that the dog-child only plays dog within the limits of his formal constitution, and does nothing canine that another human being could not have done if he or she had so desired. For what needs to be explained is precisely the fact that all childfree, and even many adults, do it to a greater degree, and in so doing bear witness to an inhuman connivance with the animal, that than an Oedipal symbolic community." Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, translated by Brian Massumi. Vol. 2, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, London & New York: Continuum, 2004/1980, p. 302.

responsibility of the fault was dispersed and implicitly or tacitly it was shared more or less by all of the participants in the incident and the focus was rather the showing of care and sympathy. At the same time the teacher undertook the responsibility of taking care of the wounded student, showing also a good example to the rest of the students. We can also see that the role of the teacher was crucial to maintain the exercise atmosphere in the *dojo*. Nevertheless, this happened implicitly, by a network of gestures and tacit understandings that became meaningful only in this particular situation, and not by normative or external rules that can be applied universally.

5.2.2 Reflective disruption and *morality* in the music class: kicking the bottle

As an example of disruption in the music class, I will use a case that I have already preliminary discussed in Chapter 2. Some aspects of this incident have already been analysed there, connected with the inherent messiness of the class and the disperse of the responsibility to the students. But here I want to emphasise the power of disruption in the realm of *morality*, caused by the kicking of the plastic bottle, that I have previously only marginally mentioned. For this, I will present again the excerpt, focusing this time only on this part of the incident, enriching it at the same time with further descriptive details and images. I will also move slightly back in time in order to see how the bottle came to be there. Note that the difference in the nomenclature of the transcripts, compared to the previous case of the *dojo*, is due to the verbal communication that is absent in the situation of the *dojo*.



Figure 57

R: I want you very slowly to turn towards you:::r right (.) as you turn towards ((...))
 ((Figure 57)) ((Georgina throws a plastic bottle of on the ground))
 ((Dee goes and stands in front of the students for five seconds))
 ((Roxana hesitates while thinking about the direction))

((the class continues for 40 seconds where Roxana explains about the turning))
 R: ...when you feel it in the song (.) it is for You to feel it (.) but I would
 ((Mary looks over her shoulder towards the entrance and then further behind towards the bottle of water that lies behind them on the path))
 like you to move (.) yea along that way towards the (pavement)
 ((Roxana shows again the way to the left that the students have to take))
 ((Mary turns around and tries to kick the bottle out of the path)) ((Figure 58))



Figure 58



Figure 59

would cause any trouble, since any visitor coming by, could walk over it. But this time it was a family with a pushchair.



Figure 60: The teacher in front of the thrown bottle

The visitor's arrival can be regarded as a 'call from the other' for help. This notion has been described vividly by Kierkegaard (and later on by Levinas, Derrida and others), through the biblical example of Abraham: when God called Abraham he stepped out responding to the call by saying 'Here I am'⁶ only to be asked to sacrifice Isaac. Although in the case of the visitors the 'call from the other' is much more humble than in the case of Abraham, it still ultimately reflects a notion of moral agency. In every case, the call from the other comes always as a disruption to the self. The 'call from the other' is always unexpected and disruptive, as was the case for the 'smooth' flow of the perception of Mary's consciousness. For this dependence on chance Derrida uses the term *aleatory* emphasising the element of luck or the uncertainty of the outcome, which opens all the possibilities. "While a chance event by its very definition means that which is uncaused and unplanned, it is the principle of supplementarity which makes possible a chance event for the supplement quite literally is the disruption caused by the unnatural interruption of the Other."⁷ This chance event here, triggered Mary's response to the call of the other, who was carrying a pushchair.

⁶ Soren Kierkegaard, C. Stephen Evans, and Sylvia Walsh, *Fear and Trembling*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 18.

⁷ Leena Taneja, "Tracing Difference: The Subtext of Derridean and Gaudiya Vaishnava Theology," *Consciousness, Literature and Art*, 5, no. 2, 2004.

Mary was the only one to disrupt her performance, responding to the call from the other despite the fact that she was not the one closest to the entrance. Other students were closer, but they did not engage into action. On the other hand, Mary seems to have ‘gone out of her way’ to help the passing visitors. In the beginning she was facing the teacher, like all the other students attending to the explanations about how they should turn around (Figure 61). She looked over her shoulder towards the entrance (Figure 62), probably because she heard the door opening and saw the visitors coming; she heard the opening door as a ‘call from the other.’ Then she turned further back (Figure 63) to see the bottle lying on the path and immediately she turned around to take it out of the way. Interestingly enough, she made a first attempt to kick the bottle, but she could not reach it and so she made one more step away from the group and kicked the bottle away successfully this time. She looked towards the visitors again and she returned back to her position to participate in the turning that the students were already executing.



Figure 61



Figure 62



Figure 63

Mary turns towards the entrance and the bottle, while holding the scores in front of her.

All these actions that Mary performed were disruptive for the educational process, but they did not take her out of the educational activity. This becomes apparent from the fact that she continued to hold the scores/frame all the time in an upright position in front of her. She did not drop her hands, or abandon her role in the class in order to help the visitors’ pass, finish helping them and then return to the class. She continued to be present *both* in the educational activity *and* in the fact that everything took place in a ‘sensitive’ environment. Simultaneously, she responded both on her role as ‘good student’ and a ‘good person’ helping the others. The teacher, at the

same time did not interrupt the educational activity to put the student to ‘order’, but she continued to give the instruction on how *they* (the students) should take the decision when to turn, as we saw before.



Figure 64: Mary smiles towards the visitors

The fact that the disruptive action has a moral character becomes even more apparent by the fact that when the pushchair passed behind her, Mary turned around and smiled towards the visitors, making at the same time a vague gesture. This fact shows that she was conscious of responding to a moral obligation and she was happy to respond to it and fulfil her understanding of help towards the other. This smile – possibly responding to an inaudible mumbling ‘Thank you’ or ‘Cheers’— makes explicit a reflective attitude towards her action, and an aftermath deliberation, despite the fact that she never actually put it into words. In the following incident of architecture, we will see how the reflective power of the smile will be expressed this time with the disruptive force of laughter.

5.2.3 Reflective disruption and *morality* in the design studio: breaking the model

It is the first year mid-term review on a small house project. Two tutors (Keith and John) are talking with a student (Alistair) about his work (Figure 65). The student has pinned his drawings on the partition walls and he is sitting in front of them, describing his design. Next to him there is a table full of models and on a chair there is a laptop with 3d models. The tutors and a group of students (behind the tutors) are sitting opposite Alistair. The focus of this excerpt is at the point of disruption caused during the educational process when the teacher accidentally breaks the student's model.



Figure 65

- Keith: Where did this form (.) come from
 ((K points towards the plan))
- Alistair: A:mm (1)
- K: How did you generate that (.) floor plan
- A: (1) Firstly (2)
 ((A turns to the other side and grasps a model))
 I made (.) I wanted to have a cantilever over the thing (1) and so I originally had
 ((A puts the model back)) ((A turns back to the drawings and points to the plan))
 a square building with this projection was an entirely square projection and
 ((makes a square with the pencil over the plan))

when I started organising rooms in (.) I::: decided that I wanted to balance this by having the same shape on the other side (.) just a kind of (0.5) creates a kind of (1.5) hhhhhhhh I'm saying kind of and I promised myself I wouldn't do that

((A exhales violently))

K: I don't mi::nd

A: No (.) I think (.) that's just a (thing)

K: What I am not understanding is (0.5) thi::s:: (2)

((K bends over and takes in his hands the

model that A held just before))

A: That's the way up

((referring to the upright position in which the model should be seen))

K: At which way did we go (0.5) Hso:::y:::

((makes the gesture that imitates the cutting of the knife over the model (Figure 66))) ((K looks instantly at the drawing on the wall and makes a second gesture of cutting at the second angle of the building (Figure 67)))



Figure 66



Figure 67

A: Yeah am (.) no that was that was just em (0.5) I was bending metals downstairs

((A turns to his drawings)) ((turns to the tutors))

at the workshop (0.75) and the angle bender wouldn't bend all the way (.)

((A gestures imitating the movement of the angle bender (Figure 68)))

so I had to slight eh (.) come to this shape here (.) like this (.) I felt it

((turns to the drawings and points to an angle in his plan))

(would lead) more interest to (sign) just be (.) otherwise it would project

((gestures imitating the projected block (Figure 69)))

a block and I didn't want to project a block=



Figure 71

- K: (Shi:t)
- A: Hhhhh (.) don't worry I am not bo:thered (1) you taught me that (.) I am not
 not
 ((S laughs))
 ((Alistair wipes his nose with his hand)) ((T2 puts the model down))
 I am not bothered (you) (.) you can break (it more)=
- J: Can you see that we cannot communicate through the: the:: drawing (that we
 have here) ((T1 puts the model down))
- A: I understand (0.5) but (.) it's very much (.) I mean (.)
 ((turns and looks at his drawings)) ((turns back to T2))
 this is not the final thing=
 ((turns back to his drawings)) ((turns back to the tutor))
- J: I know but
 ((review goes on))

The disruption caused by the break, is interesting here exactly because of the reflective attitude that referred back to a similar past event. The disruption came to interrupt a flow of dialogue in which Alistair started defending his choices in response to Keith's question to justify 'where did the form of the plan come from?'. But his answer was quite vague, without being able to communicate all his ideas that lead him to the specific shape of the plan. In particular there was a difficulty in understanding because he described his ideas on a preliminary orthogonal model, while the plan that was pinned on the wall was not orthogonal. Keith pointed this out by taking the original model and asking to explain the angles in the form.

Interestingly, Keith pointed that out by using a gestural metaphor of a knife (imitating at the same time the sound of cutting) that cuts the orthogonal model into its current angles. Alistair's reply focused on the fact that he couldn't bend the metal model, putting at the same time the blame on the metal angle-bender that "wouldn't bend all the way". So Alistair, according to his words "*had to come to this shape*". When John asked to see that metal model, the model-broke interrupting the discussion about the shape of the overall plan.

In some sense, breaking a model can be seen as a strategy of re-representation or a way of re-structuring the existing elements of a project in order to arrive in a new outcome. Figure 72 show such an example, where at the left is students proposal and on the right the model after the tutor's intervention. But the above situation has rather different connotations that can be understood only through a familiarity with how delicate situation is the explicit interference of the teacher on the student's material work (drawings, sketches, models). Usually, the students are very much attached with the work that they produce and they cannot accept someone else to interfere in it. At the same time, teachers can be notorious for adopting disparaging attitudes towards student's work, especially by writing with permanent (red) pens on finished drawings or by using the scalpel to 'improve' a model; or even worse, by literally tearing apart 'unacceptable' drawings and breaking into pieces 'objectionable' models. Such situations often end up with students crying over the remains of their work and with tutors frustrated with the students' incompetence. This fact has to be contextualized in a specific 'culture of breaking' in the design studio that is (painfully) familiar to the members of this community. In contrast, tutors in other conventional lecture-type educational processes are much less engaging with students' material work (for example, tutors in the University of Edinburgh are advised not to lean over the student's notes in order avoid interfering in their 'private space'). It is quite common that tutors, in the latter case, go through some sort of training (Effective Tutoring) that provide such 'tips' or rules of conduct; while in the design studio, the tutors do not go through any type of training about teaching and they are merely based on their experiences of educational process since they were students themselves. In this cultural group, 'breaking' is a disturbing (for

the students), marginal practice, but nonetheless, it is part of the ‘studio culture.’ In this sense, the tutor-student relationship pertains to issues of Ethics since it raises issues of authority, authorship, censorship, and judgements of quality that reflect on people’s feelings.




Figure 72: A model that has been torn apart by a tutor -before (left) and after (right)

In the case under examination, we don’t see this issue happening in its possible extremes. On the contrary, the whole incident is quite amusing not only for the fellow students, who burst into laughter while watching the incident, but also for the tutors and even for Alistair himself. Nevertheless, the disruptive effect of the breakage of is still strong, since it actually interrupts the educational process. When Keith breaks the model, the dialogue that was taking place beforehand pauses and gives its place to an intervention of a reflection about the meaning of the breakage.

The interruption of the flow of dialogue towards the understanding of the shape of the floor-plan gave place to a reflection about the meaning of the model breakage. The passage from the one discussion to the other was unexpected and came suddenly with the sound of the breakage, a two-second pause and Alistair’s exclamation note: “Ha, you broke it!”. The shift in the dialogue was declared by a second bold statement by Alistair “That is NOT the first time!” causing the laughter of the other students who were sitting behind the camera.⁸ The amusing character of the whole incident, and especially the explicit laughter that erupts from the students and John when Keith is accused for the committing the ‘same crime’ twice, is a revealing

⁸ Note that the whole incident was recorded on video by Alistair’s fellow students.

scene. Laughter, as F. H. Buckley argues has an explicit reference to *morality*.⁹ Buckley explicitly defends a positivist *and* normative thesis on laughter as well as in Ethics, and for this reason it is obviously associated with my view on *morality*. Nevertheless, the disruptive character of the incident is revealed through the surprise that is expressed by the laughter of the students and the tutor towards Keith. “The need for surprise underlies incongruity explanations of laughter. We live in an orderly world and expect things to line up according to established patterns. When they don’t we might find the incongruity amusing.”¹⁰ Although, as Buckley shows, surprise is not a necessary or sufficient condition for the cause of laughter, we can see how important it is for our disruptive situation.

From Alistair’s accusation that this was the ‘second time’ we can understand that obviously Keith and Alistair had experienced previously a similar incident,¹¹ where most probably Keith must have broken Alistair’s model on purpose. This time, though, we can assume from Keith’s apologetic attitude that the incident was accidental, the specific piece of the model just fell apart in Keith’s hands. His apology, which is almost inaudible says something like “I wasn’t actually wanting to...” was interrupted by a third attack by Alistair who says: “Last time you actually did!” Emphasising on the word ‘LAST’, in order to make the reference to their previous incident even more explicit. This fact made John burst into laughter which made Keith feel that he had to emphasise once more that it was an accident by saying ‘shit,’ a casual expression to make the atmosphere even more relaxed, since it sounded like he was talking to himself although he was in public.¹²

⁹ “It is a precondition to ethical [Ethical, in my definitions] and aesthetic discourse that universal standards of morality and beauty exists. Someone who says “That is immoral but that is simply how we feel about things over here” shows that he does not understand how moral discourse works. And what is true of ethics and art is true of humour as well. Like ethics, comedy is a normative discipline that enunciates standards of behavior.” F. H. Buckley, *The Morality of Laughter*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003, p. 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹ “The breakdown of the immediate understanding of things in their truth is the motive for the detour into history.” Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall (Revised Translation), Second Revised Edition ed, London, New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 182.

¹² There is also a notion of shame and guilt in Keith’s response. According to Williams: “If guilt seems to many people morally self-sufficient, it is probably because they have a distinctive and false picture of the moral life, according to which the truly moral self is characterless.” Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, London: Fontana Press/Collins, 1985, p. 94.

We can see that the breakage of the model led to a new breakage; the disruption of the dialogue. In this latter case of breakage, the roles between the teacher and student were somehow inverted. Before the breakage, the tutors were somehow ‘attacking’ Alistair, asking him to justify his design decisions and rationalise his vague descriptions. During the disruption that occurred with the breakage, the roles changed giving the opportunity for Alistair to ‘attack’ Keith. After the return to the ‘normal’ discussion about the project, John once again ‘attacked’ Alistair for still being unclear with his presentation. Although, here, the usage of the terms ‘attack’ and ‘defence’ are exaggerated, they describe a twist in the ambience of the dialogue that is easily noticeable by everyone. For example, it is not trivial that the students actually started laughing after Alistair ‘accused’ Keith, actually enjoying the reversal of the roles with Alistair teaching Keith a lesson.

Nevertheless, the inversion of the roles did not last long, since the apologetic words of Keith made Alistair change his attitude from ‘authoritative teacher’ to ‘good student,’ reassuring Keith that he does not mind or that he is not bothered. By this fact he was showing to Keith that since the last time, when Keith broke his model, he had ‘learned a lesson.’ Actually, despite Alistair’s claim that ‘he is not bothered,’ this is not the case.¹³ On the contrary, one could speculate that the breaking makes him upset, which could be implied by the fact that when he made this statement he was rubbing his nose (a classic self-adaptive gesture that according to body language interpretations shows the disguise of a lie).¹⁴ But the important thing here is not whether or not he learned a lesson (a fact that we can never be sure of), but that he was able to discuss and be reflective upon the breaking, even in a comical situation like this. This ‘moral lesson’ was externalised explicitly when Alistair said to Keith ‘You taught me that’ emphasising the word ‘taught’. This makes clear that Alistair

¹³ Here, I am indebted to Carl Bagley for pointing out this aspect of the situation.

¹⁴ Nevertheless, according to Dr. Peter Bull "There is no Pinocchio's nose of lying. It doesn't mean that if you touch your nose in a certain way you are lying. "And if it did people would stop doing it." Common misconceptions about body language and its popular understanding can be seen here: "Liars 'too self aware to twitch'" BBC News 20 March 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4824426.stm> [Accessed 21. 10 2007]
See also Desmond Morris, *The Naked Ape, a Zoologist's Study of the Human Animal*, London, 1967.

tried to emphasise his understanding of the previous situation as a lesson with Ethical implications that fall on the category of *morality*, since it was externalised in a reflective way. In addition, in order to demonstrate the fact that he can endure the breaking of his work he invited Keith to ‘break it even more’.

The second incident of model breakage also allowed Alistair to re/flect (again) upon the past incident and express this reflection openly. Obviously, after the first (past) incident when Keith broke his model, Alistair must have given some thought about the whole issue and maybe he even discussed it with his classmates. The fact that he reacted immediately when the new breakage had happened, shows that he still had feelings about it. Nevertheless, the fact that he referred to the whole thing with humour, offering a funny take on the issue, reveals his appreciation of the previous ‘moral lesson’ that he had.

5.2.4 Comparing the morality of reflective disruption in the three examples

I put my hand, lets say, into my pocket to take my watch out. I discover that my watch is not there; but it ought to be there; normally my watch is in my pocket. I experience a slight shock. There has been a small break in the chain of my everyday habits. ...The break is felt as something out of the way; it arrests my attention, to a greater or a less degree.¹⁵

Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*

If we juxtapose the three cases of ‘breakdown’ of the everyday educational activity of the *dojo*, the music class and the design studio, we can see that *morality* is revealed through the disruption of each case. As I have already argued in each individual case, and as I will show in this comparative analysis, the education of Ethics in all cases refers to the category of *morality*, because it led to reflection and externalization of explicit judgements towards the Ethical problems raised by each practice. The theme of *morality* is based upon common principles arising from the disruptive nature of the specific examples.

¹⁵ Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, translated by G. S. Fraser. Vol. 1: Reflection and Mystery, South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2001, p. 77-78. I am indebted to David Appelbaum for this quote that he very eloquently analyses in: Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. 45.

Here, I start by examining the various possible understandings of disruption through the a common threefold character of the term proposed by Appelbaum.¹⁶ First of all there is generally the experience of being disrupted, ‘a shock,’ ‘a break’ or a discovery similar to the feeling when something is suddenly missing when it ought to be there (like Marcel’s watch in the above quote). Second, there is the disrupted, the routine of the educational practice that acquires habitual and automated characteristics since it is part of the everyday activity of teaching, “a state of preoccupation” about things. Thirdly, there is the disruptor, the incident that occupies the educational activity while it has stopped or paused “clothed as arrest, ‘felt as something out of the way,’ a jolt of force that reveals the moment without giving itself away –a nontransparent event.”¹⁷

The experience of being disrupted as a shock or break appears in a different way and varies in degree in the three cases. In the case of architecture the disruption is caught in the consciousness in a sudden, and unexpected way, mainly by the noise of the broken piece, but almost immediately it becomes light and even humorous; in the music example the disruption comes as a distant ‘call’ of responsibility to help the approaching other; while in the *dojo* the disruption for Young is perceived by the immediate pain and the somatic threat that makes the break exigent and immediate.

The disrupted, here, describes a discontinuity in the flow of an already established process that forms a routine. The flow of this routine, in the case of the *dojo* was the exchange of *gestures* between Laurent and Young as part of the process of *aikido* education; in the case of music it was the flow of mimesis between Roxana and the students in the process of directing them about the musical and theatrical performance; while in the case of the design studio it refers mainly to the exchange of *words* in the process of educating architecture. Actually, in all three cases this flow stands for a form of dialogue: a dialogue of gestures for *aikido*, a literal dialogue of words in architecture and something in between words and gestures in

¹⁶ Here I use the threefold characteristics that Appelbaum uses to analyse the incident of the missing watch in the opening quote of Gabriel Marcel. Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. 45.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

music. In the case of music especially, one may object to this excerpt as being a form of *dialogue*. On the contrary, one could argue that this is a sort of *monologue* where the teacher stands (in this case both literally and metaphorically) ‘above’ the student giving orders about the performance. Nevertheless, here, I want to emphasise the responsive exchange of the teacher’s advice and the student’s execution that is beyond a mere monologue from the side of the teacher. It was an exchange aiming to reach a common understanding; an understanding *with*¹⁸ each other referring to the execution of the performance. So in all three cases the flow is a sequence of responses of dialogical form of communication.

In this sense, the discontinuity of this flow appears to cause a temporary ‘breakdown,’ a malfunction of the dialogue that appears as an obstacle of the educational process. This breakdown caused a pause in the practice of the exercise *somen uchi irimi nage* in the *dojo*; the part of explanation about the turning around in the music class; and the discussion about the angles of the floor plan in architecture. Even in the case of the music class the teacher didn’t actually stop teaching. For Mary, the whole incident was a disruptive moment in her experience of the educational process. Equally in martial arts, despite the fact that after the accident Laurent and Young had stopped practicing, quite a few students continued their practice, as we saw, and were affected in a variable degree by the accident. In all the cases though, the dialogue between the teacher and the specific student, that I have focused on (Laurent and Young, Roxana and Mary, and Keith and Alistair), was not just affected; their dialogical communication was disrupted.

Nevertheless, the education of Ethics happened exactly *within* the disruption of the educational process. The ‘proper’ education of each practice (martial arts, music, architecture) gave place to *the education of Ethics in the practice*, which actually is (or should be) part of the overall education of the practice. The disruption that happened didn’t actually stop the education; the education continued, but it became an education of the Ethical understanding of each practice. The disruption functions as a bracket that parenthetically inserts an uninvited intervention. “The bracket is a

¹⁸ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 180.

textual or typographical mark [used to enclose matter] in a parenthesis, that is, to make an (insertion) by way of amplification, explanation or digression.”¹⁹ The bracket, in this way has opposite function to the hyphen, which is used to connect different terms and elements.²⁰ On the contrary, the bracket is disruptive in the text and allows a different, separate game to establish itself [temporarily] in the place of the overall dominant one.²¹ The rules of this new game are the rules of *morality* that (by contrast) force the revelation of the rules of the wider, dominant game.²² Nevertheless, the wider game is never fixed and absolute. What seems to be a wider game is actually another bracket for a different game, the totality of which can never be conceived, since it is life itself. [In the same sense that this bracket is a disruption of this paragraph, which disrupts this chapter about disruptions, which disrupts this thesis about Ethics in architectural education, which disrupts [with its physical size] the bookshelf with the rest of the other theses. But this bracket can never be conceived in its totality, since it extends beyond this library by potentially being part of other scholar’s footnotes and beyond the book format by being already part of the reader’s memory.]²³ The bracketing of disruption, although defines a space, it is not a closure of the educational process, but rather an opening to a wider understanding of what is architecture, music or *aikido*. The bracket of the disruption opens a metaphorical ‘space’ that can accommodate reflection about the practice that was just interrupted. At the same time, it provides the necessary time to reflect again on ‘the meaning of the practice’ or ‘what the whole thing is about’. This is easier to understand in the case of the *dojo*, where the disruption was caused by the

¹⁹ Appelbaum here makes an explicit reference to Husserl’s poetic description of brackets. Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. 81.

²⁰ See p. 550 of the Appendix.

²¹ A similar study is discussed by Baker & Jones, when they write: “The cake of academic custom and the comfort of professional habit have created a highly conventional system of teaching...” Paul Baker and Janet Jones, "Benign Disruption in the Classroom: A Case Study," *Teaching Sociology*, 7, no. 1, 1979: pp. 27-44, p. 29.

²² Arguably the new [bracketed] game is what Garfinkel seeks in his deliberate trouble-seeking situations that reveal the rules of the everyday life. “Procedurally it is my preference to start with familiar scenes and ask what can be done to make trouble.” Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 37.

²³ A notion that is similar to this widening of perspective is the call to think ‘outside the box.’ The argument here is that one can never be outside of all boxes. By setting her/himself outside the box one is automatically part of a different box, but simply is unaware of its existence. These boxes intersect to each other and are not similar to Russian dolls. Life is the totality of these intersecting boxes. One can only think ‘outside the box’ when she or he will stop thinking -after life.

‘breakdown’ of a student’s wellbeing. According to a Greek proverb, one contemplates on wellbeing, only when he or she does not possess it anymore. Having experienced myself at least three considerable²⁴ injuries during my aikido practice, I can remember that one of the very first things that came to my mind (after the first obvious struggle to understand *in my own body* ‘how bad is it?’), was the question ‘what if it would be worse?’. Moreover, during minor accidents (or even after some ‘clumsy’ or harsh falls on the mats), just before one puts their hands on the mat and stands up to repeat it one more time, one can find his or herself wondering ‘why do I actually do this to myself?’ Such disruptions that happen often in aikido cause a reflection on the meaning of the practice. Similarly, in the case of architecture, we can see that the disruption of the dialogue causes the explicit discussion about the meaning of the breaking of the model. As we saw in the example, Alistair was quite relaxed and enjoyed the accidental incident by finding an opportunity to make fun of his tutors and himself. At the same time though, we can imagine that the first time when Keith broke his model in purpose, Alistair must have been more anxious about the whole thing. That incident must have caused him much more deliberation and distress (it is not uncommon, as I already mentioned, to have students literally crying over the remains of their models or drawings, especially in combination with or after a harsh criticism).

5.2.5 Further reflections on reflective disruption

...stoppage is dissolved in the telling and becomes nonexistent. The monster at the gate, Cerberus, is illusory, untruth, fictive, and can be dismissed.²⁵

The disruption to the flow of educational practice, as we saw through the three case studies is very similar to Martin Heidegger’s expression: ‘a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully.’²⁶ Disruption in this sense is a section of an established continuity. Arguably, this notion of disruption as breakdown has

²⁴ By considerable I mean, injuries that prevented me from practicing for about three or four months.

²⁵ Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. 81.

²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquaire & Edward Robinson, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1962/ 1927, p. 88.

influenced much of the poststructuralist literature of the notion of ‘cut’ or ‘*coupure*’.²⁷ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this vast topic in detail. Instead I will focus on the way that Koschmann, Kuuti and Hickman²⁸ associated Heidegger’s expression with the general term of ‘breakdown’, since it refers to the disruption of ordinary ways of conducting our everyday activities that usually do not require our awareness. When these non-reflective practices are disrupted, the awareness focuses again back to the practice, by ‘lighting it up’ or offering ‘new views’ about it.²⁹ The three abovementioned authors also explained the connection between the Heideggerian notion of breakdown to that of Leont’ev³⁰ and Dewey. For Leont’ev every action that is practiced long enough in a stable situation, becomes a routinized operation which can nevertheless, breakdown into its original constitutive elements in cases of unexpected reaction. Similarly, for Dewey (using Darwinian observations on living organisms) ‘breakdown’ appears through the fundamental concept of *disequilibrium*, a state of unbalance that motivates living organisms to action in order to re-establish the desirable stability. In all these views the world becomes visible when some notion of function (equipment, routine, balance) is unusable, missing, or *in the way*; when its use is disrupted when things and their

²⁷ According to Rune Mølbak “Lacan understands the cut as the paradoxical rupture in the flow of desire (intensity/the Real) by which the subject discovers itself in a pure distance to what it is not.” Contrary to this Deleuze defined the cut “negatively as that of which the difference, produced by the Symbolic, is thought to rob us.” Rune L. Mølbak, "A Life of Variable Speeds: On Constructing a Deleuzian Psychotherapy," *Theory Psychology* 2007; 17; 473, 17, no. 3, 2007: 473-488, p. 482. Such understandings of the cut (apart from Heidegger’s notion of breakdown) appear to originate also in Valery: "It is an extraordinary fact that we talk to ourselves and that this discourse is indispensable to us ... Who speaks? Who listens? It is not exactly the same person ... This voice can become (morbidly) a complete stranger. The existence of this speech of the self to the self is the sign of a *cut*. The possibility of being *several* is necessary for reason, but also used by it. Perhaps we take the image as other to the impulse of the mirror", P. Valery, manuscript edition (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1918-1920, 1958), vol.7, 615. (1958) Further back the concept is found in Hegel "the piety of the children with regard to their parents is in its turn affected by the emotional contingency of their having become form themselves, or in themselves, in the form of an other who disappears so as to attain a being-for-itself and a conscience proper to itself through its separation from its source -- a separation in which this source dries up." *Phenomenology of Spirit*, VI, A, vol.II at 24. Both the last quotes were found in: Pierre Legendre, "Introduction to the Theory of the Image, Narcissus and the Other in the Mirror," *Law and Critique*, VIII, no. 1, 1997: 3-35, p. 13 & 14.

²⁸ Timothy Koschmann, Kari Kuuti, and Larry Hickman, "The Concept of Breakdown in Heidegger, Leont’ev, and Dewey and Its Implications for Education," *Mind, Culture and Activity*, 5, no. 1, 1998: pp. 25-41.

²⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 102 & 104.

³⁰ Alexei Leont’ev (pronounced Leontiev, 1903-1979) a developmental psychologist, who founded the activity theory and expanded Marxist psychology.

relative referential relation is revealed, contrary to everyday objects that become part of the background.

The common background of disruption in the three examples does not mean that everything that happened in each one of them is identical to the others. On the contrary, there are some asimilarities that should be noted. For example, in the case of architecture when the breakage came into awareness, the main emphasis was given to the notion of responsibility and blame for the breakage and the disruption. On the other hand, in the case of music the disruption passed by without comment from the teacher; and in the case of dojo the main emphasis was given to express care or sympathy. This difference has to do mainly with the nature of the disruption and the fact that in the case of *dojo* the cause of the disruption was the threat of disrupting or deforming the student's body: his health.³¹ Such feelings could have similarly arisen in the design studio, if a student would have cut his/her finger with the scalpel, or in the music class if a student twisted her ankle while trying to execute the turning. Another asimilar characteristic was the way that the disruption was absorbed in order to return to the normal routine. In the case of the design studio the returning was sudden and unexpected with John coming back to the original issue of unclear presentation. John almost interrupted the disruption in order to come back to what he thought was the main issue that they should be discussing. However, in the *dojo* the whole incident was absorbed smoothly during a wider period of time, when Laurent after the accident, first dismissed Bob by asking him to return back to practice and then later he encouraged Tomas to go and join Bob and Quincy who were already practicing. Still Laurent remained next to Young in order to check that he was alright until he gradually started to focus more on the practice of the other students. Again, in the case of the music class, the student kicked the bottle causing a disruption which was hardly perceived by the teacher and was not mentioned. It was her responsibility to come back to the routine of the class, which she did immediately after kicking the bottle, but she also kept an eye on the passing visitors behind her, when she actually smiled to them. From this final example we can also see that the

³¹ "Disrupted, reminded of its affinity to the soma, consciousness moves, develops tempo, sets a rhythm, follows a cadence –it rediscovers difference." Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. 55.

case of the disruption is perceived completely differently when it is seen from the teacher's or in the students' point of view. Furthermore, what is 'common' in the case of breaking models in architectural education, sometimes as a deliberate tactic by the teachers, is perceived very differently by the student who is experiencing the breakage of his work. On one hand, the disruption can be 'planned' and be part of an educational strategy, aiming to attack some preconception, while on the other, breakage is perceived in a state of surprise, and because of this it can hurt the student's feelings. But at the same time, this unexpected event that shakes the student's perception of the world allows for a reconfiguration of the game that has already being established as a routine. As Appelbaum notes: "Disruption anticipated, pre-labeled, and watched for, is disruption that cannot wound"³² or at least it doesn't hurt as much as the first time, as we can see from this particular incident.³³

Finally, maybe the most important difference has to do with the means used to handle and resolve the disruption. In the case of architecture, the whole issue was dealt with by talking about the meaning of the breakage. All the way from the announcement of the disruption 'Ha, you broke it!' until the sudden return to the normal practice 'Can you see that we cannot communicate through...' was dealt through externalising speech (verbalising): speaking out and talking over. However, in the case of the *dojo* apart from Young's hurt voice 'Ou::gh' almost everything else was dealt with silently; similarly in the case of the music class. And even if there were some words like 'sorry' or 'thanks', these were so quiet that they were not captured by the recording device. But this does not mean that there was no expression whatsoever. Far from that, a rich expression of feelings like care and sympathy was communicated through a network of gestures, ranging from Quincy's gesture to apologise from distance, to Laurent's gesture of protection and care on Young's shoulder while guiding him to the side of the mats, or Mary's smile to the visitors passing behind her.

³² Ibid., p. 19.

³³ See also the difference between the proverb 'Accidents happen' and Freud's suggestion that there is no such thing as an accident, meaning that every slippage of the language reveals something about the self. See for example chapter 8 (entitled *Erroneously Carried Out Actions*) in: Sigmund Freud, Alan Tyson, and James Strachey, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, London: Ernest Benn, 1966.

5.3 Producing ethics: Repetitive Mimesis

Seeing oneself altered before one's very eyes and now acting, as though one had really entered into another body, another character.³⁴

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*

Nature creates similarities. One need only think of mimicry. The highest capacity for producing similarities, however, is man's. His gist of seeing resemblances is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else.³⁵

Walter Benjamin, *On the Mimetic Faculty*

[I]mitation is given a *place* ...a locus the students are to inhabit to the extent that the practices begin to inhabit them...³⁶

Debra Hawhee, *Bodily Pedagogies*

5.3.1 Repetitive mimesis and ethics in the dojo: the 'drunken master'

In the excerpt below, Laurent shows an exercise (*ai hamni kote gaeshi*) to three students who are practicing together (because of the overall odd number of students). More specifically, he uses Katherine (beginner) to demonstrate to Peter (intermediate) who is sitting on his knees (*seiza*). Jeremy (senior) is standing next to them looking at the demonstration. Around them other pairs of students are practicing at the same time. Because of the very dense network of movements in this case a filmstrip of the footage has been placed on the left side of the transcripts, which hopes to illuminate the reader about the detailed action. The images of the filmstrip are taken approximately every second, represented by the numbers next to them. The number in brackets in the text stands for the exact second of each specific action corresponding to the filmstrip. The larger images in between the text focus on key frames that illustrate crucial moments of the educational process.

³⁴ This is for Nietzsche the 'process of tragic chorus,' as it has been translated by Samuel Weber in Samuel Weber, *Displacing the Body*, 1996. Available from: <http://www.hydra.umn.edu/weber/displace.html> [Accessed 19. 05 2007].

³⁵ Walter Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Peter Demetz, New York: Schocken Books, 1986, p. xliii p. 348, p. 333.

³⁶ Debra Hawhee, "Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists' Three Rs," *College English*, 65, no. 2, 2002: pp. 142-162, p. 154.




Figure 73

[001] Laurent is being twisted around clockwise by Katherine. (Figure 73) Jeremy starts to imitate Laurent's movement and makes one clockwise circle around himself.

[006] Laurent turning to Peter, unbalances himself, saying at the same time something like: "(boris)" He then puts himself in balance again and says '(no boris)'. [007] Jeremy makes one more circle around himself in a counter clockwise direction.

[009] Laurent makes a circle around himself in counter clockwise direction showing the same exercise that he was doing before with Katherine. His right hand gestures towards his 'centre' emphasising his im/balance. Katherine, who now is alone, imitates Laurent and makes a circle around herself in a counter clockwise direction. At the same time, Jeremy, who hasn't completed his previous circle rushes himself to follow Laurent and makes one more circle around himself in a counter clockwise direction.

010



011



012



013



014



015



016



017



018



Laurent finishes his circle, whilst looking at Peter, laughing at the same time for his imbalance. Peter bows formally to thank him [012]. While Laurent moves away his hand is hit, by the foot of a student who has just been thrown on the mats by his partner. He makes a sidestep to avoid a further accident, he smiles to the student since it was quite a minor accident and while he continues moving away he grabs his left hand with his right one (Figure 74) and makes a twist to it while Jeremy laughs.



Figure 74

[016] Peter approaches Katherine and she offers him her hand to start practicing again (Figure 75). Katherine pauses for 3 seconds and then starts to execute the exercise. Laurent, who is at the side of the mats looks at them and starts to approach them again.



Figure 75



[022] Laurent interrupts Katherine and Peter by saying “no, no, no, no...” and Katherine laughs. He goes close to them and at first reaches out Katherine’s hand with his own hand (Figure 76). Katherine responds, but then Laurent changes his mind and offers his hand to Peter. Jeremy performs a very short imitation of a ‘fragment’ of the exercise.



Figure 76

Laurent starts to perform the exercise and then he pauses for 1.5 sec. Peter relaxes his shoulders and lowers his centre of gravity [Can be seen in the difference of the distance between the two white lines in the images in Figure 77].



Figure 77




Figure 78

[032] Katherine performs the same fragment of the exercise while sitting. Jeremy performs the same exercise, but this time fully, by twisting around himself. Katherine stands up again and performs the whole exercise as well. [034] Laurent makes a few more steps unbalanced, as if he is drunk, and then takes some more steps unbalanced by being too tense and with his centre of gravity too high (Figure 79).





Figure 79

[037] Laurent makes a few more ‘drunken’ steps and at the same time Peter makes a gesture, releasing his arms downwards that makes explicit the relaxing of his shoulders and the lowering of his centre. Laurent then offers his hand to Peter to perform the exercise once again. Peter takes his hand and makes an explicit gesture of relaxing his stance and Laurent says an affirmative ‘Voilà’ (Figure 80). Katherine performs a gesture that imitates the beginning of an *ukemi* that she never completes.




Figure 80

[041] Laurent pauses the exercise and makes a gesture, letting his weight to drop, showing Peter that he has to relax even more. Peter does this, but when Laurent tries to pull him he is still too rigid. Laurent says: ‘See, I will show you what you do’.



045

[045] Peter who is still confused has his hand grasped by Laurent. With his free hand Laurent gestures to Peter that he (Peter) is to execute the exercise (Figure 81).



046



047



048



Figure 81



049

[048] Peter starts to move around Laurent, performing the exercise, but when he attempts to 'pull' Laurent with him, Laurent stays 'rigid' so that Peter cannot move him. Peter pauses for a second.



050



051

[050] Laurent says "This is what you do," moving at the same time his body backwards and gesturing with his hand towards his centre. Peter repeats again the movement of relaxation of 'releasing his weight'.



052

[052] Jeremy performs the fragment of the exercise that he was practicing before, but this time counter clockwise. Katherine performs the whole exercise clockwise. Jeremy then performs the whole exercise counter clockwise (Figure 82).



053




Figure 82

[055] Laurent starts explaining something to Peter, which is inaudible. He then grasps his hand again firmly, so that Peter will start to perform the exercise again. Peter starts to move his hand, but Laurent grasps it even more firmly returning him to the starting position. Laurent then leaves Peter's hand and he makes a movement that shows how the movement of his hands comes actually from his centre (Figure 83).



Figure 83

[059] Katherine performs continuously two more turns around herself. Jeremy finishes his try and moves towards a different pair of students who are practicing nearby and looks at them.

[061] Laurent grasps Peter's hand again in order to practice the exercise. When Peter is about to start, Laurent pulls Peter's hand unexpectedly which makes Peter lose his balance and fall towards Laurent (Figure 84). Laurent smiles.



Figure 84

[062] Katherine makes a half turn of the exercise and this time she performs an *ukemi*. Jeremy performs, one more time, the exercise alone.

[066] Laurent takes one step away and restarts the exercise with Peter. This time Peter performs the exercise fully, pulling Laurent with him and making him 'fall' onto the mats. Nevertheless, Laurent stops his fall before reaching the mats by slapping his hand into them (Figure 85).



Figure 85

[068] Jeremy performs the exercise one more time counter clockwise. Katherine performs the exercise clockwise.

[071] Laurent stands up, looks at Peter affirming his execution and then grasps his hand. They start to perform the exercise again.



[072] Katherine performs half a turn clockwise and then performs the whole exercise counter clockwise, performing as well the *ukemi* (Figure 86).



Figure 86

[075] While Peter turns Laurent around, he pauses again and is unable to 'pull' Laurent. Laurent then leaves Peter's hand and shows alone how the turning should be done. He unbalances himself and makes a few steps towards the direction that Peter should have lead him (Figure 87).



Figure 87

[076] Jeremy looks at Katherine who was doing the *ukemi* and then he looks at Laurent and Jeremy who are still practicing. When Katherine stands up he offers his hand to her so that they can start practicing.

081



[080] Having moved away from Peter, Laurent smiles to him. Peter performs a formal standing bow thanking him for the private demonstration. Laurent brings his hands close to his body as a connotation of an informal bow without actually bowing. Peter turns towards Katherine and Jeremy who have started practicing and gets ready to engage in their practice. Laurent starts to walk around the mats looking to the other pairs of practicing students.

082



From the above example of an ordinary one and a half minute of Aikido practice, it becomes obvious that there are various ways that mimesis is manifested within the education of the *dojo*. An attempt to record all these different ways soon proves that mimesis is embedded so intrinsically into the educational process that actually such a full account is impossible to accomplish in the given space. Nevertheless, what follows is a preliminary detailed description, which, having abandoned the aim to be exhaustive, aims to open the discussion on mimesis with concrete examples.

First of all, and maybe the most obvious appearance of mimesis, is the students' imitation of the teacher. From the very beginning [001], Jeremy, who is watching Laurent practicing with Katherine, starts to imitate the teacher's movements by performing the exercise alone (without partner). In this short excerpt, Jeremy actually performs this imitation 11 times consecutively. Very soon, when Katherine is dismissed and Laurent starts to demonstrate the exercise to Peter, she joins Jeremy [032] in imitating Laurent's movements, by executing fragments or the exercise in full (including the *ukemi* towards the end). Catherine repeats this imitation 9 times. The fact that they are imitating the teacher and not the student becomes apparent from the fact that they follow the same rotation movement with Laurent (clockwise or counter clockwise). Moreover, Peter imitates the teacher, since in the beginning (while practicing with Catherine) Laurent performs the role of the *uke* ('attacker' - person receiving the technique), in order to show the technique to Peter, who is

watching. When later Laurent shows the technique to Peter,³⁷ Laurent changes roles, becoming this time *nage* ('defender' or the thrower –person executing the technique), and giving Peter the opportunity to practice the movement that he was showing before to Catherine.

A second example of mimesis, that is also quite obvious, is when Laurent imitates Peter. Immediately after having complete practicing with Catherine [006], Laurent turns towards Peter and imitates Peter's previous unbalanced stance in order to show him what he was doing wrong, then he stabilizes his stance in order to show him the proper way. This 'correct' way is the one that Peter starts to imitate when beginning to practice with Catherine again [016]. In [029] when Laurent starts to practice with Peter again, Laurent pauses the exercise and mimics Peter's stance, but this time exaggerating the tension of his shoulders and his imbalance. He then relaxes his shoulders and lowers his centre of gravity. Later on, at [045], Laurent invites Peter to change roles again and imitates Peter's incorrect way of doing the exercise in order to demonstrate in practice the exact stage that he does wrong. This moment is [048] when Laurent stays fixed without following the flow of the movement that the exercise requires. Laurent makes this explicit by saying "This is what you do." Again in [075], Laurent pauses the execution of the Peter's exercise and imitates Peter's movement, but showing him this time the correct direction that Peter should have lead him. Another example of mimesis appears when Peter imitates himself. In [029] he follows Laurent who is showing him his imbalanced stance, but in this way he is actually imitating himself. By imitating Laurent he is imitating a caricature of himself that exaggerates what he understands to be a 'bad' stance. It is like seeing himself in an illusionary mirror that amplifies the faults of his stance.³⁸

³⁷ It is very interesting that in [022] Laurent hesitates about whether to practice with Catherine or Peter and although he offers his hand first to Catherine, he changes his mind and offers his hand to Peter. Most probably he does that because he doesn't want to repeat the same type of showing that he already performed before with Catherine.

³⁸ See the similarities with an ancient text that gives instructions for learning wrestling:
 "Set up in the middle and engage the head from the right.
 You envelop him. You get under his hold; you step through, engage [*plexon*].
 You throw him with your right hand.
 You are thrown; having attached from the side you throw left.
 You throw him off with your left hand.
 You turn him around. You entwine. You turn around.

A different manifestation of mimesis appears when Laurent imitates the ‘drunk’. Starting from [029] where Laurent imitates Peter’s stance by exaggerating his imbalance, he then relaxes his shoulders fully, lowers his centre of gravity and performs some of the steps of the exercise. Following [034], Laurent continues to make some steps, beyond the exercise, pretending to be a drunk³⁹ person who has lost the ability to coordinate his/her movements. He then makes a few more steps whilst being ‘over tensed,’ with the centre of gravity being high and becomes clumsy in the other extreme. In [037] Laurent makes a few more ‘drunken’ steps that lead to Peter’s imitation of this stance by making a gesture that explicitly lowers his ‘centre’ and relaxes his shoulders. In [011] while Laurent goes away from Katherine, having ‘temporarily’ finished his demonstration, he gets hit accidentally on the hand. This is due to the tight space and because of the ‘violent’ throw that is executed by a different pair of students who are practicing nearby. When this happens, Laurent makes a side-step (probably to avoid a further accident) and he turns and smiles to the student, since it was a minor and obviously unintentional accident. Whilst he is moving away he then grabs his own arm and makes a twist, imitating the grab *nikkyo*. The imitation of a grab that is not exercised at that moment by the students, is most probably an attempt to make fun of his sore hand, but it could be also that it imitates the pain that is usually caused by *nikkio*. It is also interesting that Jeremy, who witnesses the whole incident seems to understand ‘something’ of it, and laughs.

All of the above expressions of mimesis are explicit and obvious imitations that take place between the participants during the practice of the specific incident. Nevertheless there are other appearances of mimesis that are less obvious. For example, as I have already discussed in Chapter 2, the whole educational process can

You engage with a grip on both sides. (Oxyrynchus Papyri 466)"

Hawhee, "Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists' Three Rs," p. 148.

³⁹ The example of the drunk is a popular metaphor in the dojo of *L' Art du Chi*. Especially in *Taiji*, (a Chinese martial art that Laurent is also teaching), there is an exercise that Laurent calls it the ‘drunk exercise’ where the relaxation of the body comes to imitate the appearance of a drunk person. One movement of this exercise in particular includes the raising of the forearm towards the head and Laurent usually describes it as the failing attempt of the drunk person to bring the glass towards his/her mouth.

be seen as an imitation of a ‘real’ attack and a defence.⁴⁰ This becomes obvious from the roles of the *nage* and the *uke* that the students and the teacher perform. These roles require that one is attacking and one is defending and in this way they imitate a ‘hostile’ encounter. But they all know that there is not any ‘real’ hostility between the people when they come to perform the role of the *uke* and the *nage*. The performance of this hostile encounter is an unavoidable and inherent part of the education in order to learn and teach aikido. The awareness of this performativity becomes obvious especially by the formal bows that the students exchange between each other in the beginning and the end of each set of exercises.

The formal bows that we see in this excerpt reveal another level of mimesis that has to do with the awareness of the performance of another role: that of the student and the teacher. At [012] Peter bows from a sitting position towards Laurent, which is the formal way of thanking for the ‘private’ demonstration. Again at [080] when the whole demonstration has finished for good he repeats the bow, but this time from a standing position. Laurent is also supposed to return the gesture. The incident during which he is hit on the hand prevents him from responding, but at the very end he responds by bringing his hands close to his body as a connotation of an informal bow. Actually, this gesture of thanking should have been also repeated by the other students who participated in the private showing, but as we see this time it didn’t happen because of the disruption that occurred when Laurent was hit and the fact that at the end Jeremy and Katherine had already started practicing between themselves.

Performing the roles of teachers and student implies the extensive mimesis of educational experiences that must have taken place in the past. For example we can easily imagine that during this incident Laurent is imitating his previous teachers.

⁴⁰ Note Winnicott’s blurring of the distinction between dreaming, fantasizing and living and the fundamental role that ‘play’ has into facilitating this in-between condition. D. W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, London: Tavistock Publications, 1971, p. 26. Also note the disperse of this imitative behaviour in all mammals “The mammalian brain also allows for play, as you can see in the nature movies on public television of, say, lion cubs cuffing each other. All young mammalian males play: they rough each other up, jumping onto and tumbling over one another, pretending to bite, but not biting so as to hurt. With their larger cortex, they inhibit the hostile action programed in the reptilian brain. They can pretend, and surely pretending is the beginning of literature.” Norman N. Holland, "The Power of Literature: A Neuropsychological View," *New Literary History*, 35, no. 3, 2004: 395-410, p. 405.

Although this study does not provide evidence of such an imitation, it is impossible to conceive the teaching practice as operating in a realm of complete innovation. Most definitely, while teaching, he has in mind his own teachers and uses them as an example for his own practice. At the same time the students are definitely imitating each other mainly by following a hierarchical structure, with the junior students imitating the senior ones. At [032] when Katherine is dismissed to retreat and sits *seiza* next to Jeremy, we can see that she almost immediately starts practicing exactly the same fragment of the exercise that Jeremy had been practicing from the beginning of the demonstration. It is clear that at this point she is not imitating Laurent, who at this point is focusing on Peter's posture, but she is repeating Jeremy because she performs the rotation of the body around her own hand, a movement that Jeremy is focusing on. After having tried this once, she realizes that she cannot practise this movement from a sitting position, so she stands up and imitates fully what Jeremy was already doing. Whilst Laurent was demonstrating, Peter, in the beginning and Katherine after him sat in *seiza*. This is a practice that is usually performed by the senior students as sign of respect and silent observation from a distance. Interestingly enough, Jeremy who is a senior student does not do this, but nevertheless the junior students do perform in varying degrees, by imitating other senior students from their previous educational experiences. Another interesting aspect is that Jeremy, seeing that Laurent's demonstration with Peter will last longer, takes the initiative to invite Katherine to start practicing the exercise between them, without waiting for Peter to finish or attending Laurent's demonstration.⁴¹ Only senior students usually take such initiatives. Projecting in the future, one can imagine that when Katherine will become a senior student herself, she will equally be able to invite a junior student to continue practicing in imitation of Jeremy's initiative here and similar experiences with other senior students. At the same time, we can project in the past and imagine the numerous invitations that Jeremy must have had from his senior colleagues to continue practicing.⁴²

⁴¹ Note the possible connections with vicarious learning, despite the silence. John Lee, "Vicarious Learning and Multimodal Dialogue," proceedings from the conference: *Sixth International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies (ICALT'06)*, 2006, <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/10997/34637/01652693.pdf> [accessed 15. 02. 2008].

⁴² In the context of Kung Fu, Girton notes: "[T]his simple imitation does not turn out to be so simple, and it is not all there is to the leaning of the sets, or the leaning of Kung Fu. What is to watch

All the above aspects of the situation show very eloquently that *mimesis* is a fundamental *praxis* of the education that takes place in the *dojo*. Education in the *dojo* is primarily mimetic, since, as we saw, language and verbal communication is being kept to minimum. This mimetic praxis though, manages to communicate issues of Ethics like respect to the teacher and to the fellow students, notions of attack and defence, and a continuity of a narrative that starts from the past teachers of the teachers, to the potential teachers of the future. The repetitive nature of this mimesis forms directly the ethos of what it means to practice in the *dojo* generating thus an attitude of *ethics*. This attitude is neither explicit nor pre-given, but is being produced in-situ by mimetically participating in the specific situation. But are these notions still present in the education of the music class and the design studio that takes place in the Western university?

5.3.2 Repetitive mimesis and *ethics* in the music class: producing orderliness and messiness

The students are lying on the ground of the botanic gardens, while Roxana is talking to them from the bridge and Dee is standing next to them (Figure 88). The students are supposed to stand up and sing.



Figure 88

someone else doing a movement, and then to produce that movement so that although any other could see that it was in fact the same movement, from the standpoint of the person doing it, it would not look the same." George D. Garton, "Kung Fu: Toward a Praxiological Hermeneutic of the Martial Arts," in *Ethnomethodological Studies of Work*, ed. Harold Garfinkel, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, 60-89, pp. 73-74.

((It takes 15 seconds for the students to get up))

R: Ok try that again (1) this time (instebeala) so if you lie down use one hand (1) one hand on the ground to get up (.) ok? and you don't then step up forward (.) just stay where you are. ok? Try that again

((it takes 10 seconds for the students to lay down again))

R: While you are lying down, Ju: Julian is going to give everyone a frame

S:

mmmmm

J: Maybe there is not enough for everybody

R: That is ok (.) so if you put the manuscripts down take a frame (2) not the (hands)

J: (theis (.) the night frows up the build)

S:

mmmmmm

(2)

mmmmmm

J: Nei (2) hello

S:

[hello]

R:

[Thank you] very much

(1.5)

J: And we will have some more (1) for today

R:

Give them all a round of applause (inaudible) (5)

((students start applauding))



Figure 90

- D: Is there any more left? Please pass them over
 S: Just Katie, just one more
 D: (... around when you get up... line now it reminds you where you are next week) (3) ((students chatting and laughing)) Ok (2) When getting up one hand put it on the ground and take the frame (1) Yeah (2) (like this) ok (.) right (1) three (.) four
 SS: mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
 R: Holding the frame with you right (2) the gentlemen facing us, retreat behind the bushes (5) ((a student coughs))



Figure 91

- R: Ok, I am not gonna ask you to sing (.) I just want to block it (.) so::: (.) am:: (1) turning to front (.) face up (.) and AS you are turning the frames are coming up (.) lets try that again (.) so do that as a group (0.5) so following Mary (.) a:nd (.) the frames gently coming up as you turning (.) try to (...) at the sAme time (2.5) lovely lovely (2) o:k::: (.) now we will try it a bit different (.) as you turn front to walk down the path (0.5) yes (.) hhhh em (.) could you (0.5) as you turn front the frames here (.) as you start to walk to the path I want you to (put) (slide) them down.
 ((R performs the movement of sliding the frame down to chest height (Figure 92)))



Figure 92

In the above situation mimesis is expressed in a wide variety of ways, such as the singing of the students as an imitation of the annotation system of the scores, or rehearsal as a mimesis of the final performance. Nevertheless, here I would like to focus on two main issues of *ethics* that are revealed through specific notions of mimesis. One has to do with the learning of co-operating and moving as a group. As I have previously indicated in Chapter 2, the team-work in the class is not a mere coordination exercise of gymnastics, but pertains to *ethics* because of the distribution of responsibility to the whole group. Furthermore, I would like to discuss the ethics of bringing into order the messiness when the group rose from the ground. Another issue has to do with the change from the use of the scores, to the frame. Below are some notes taken during the data collection that emphasise the issues of order that impressed me at the time of participant observation:

Then we went to the main room for the ‘Canto’. It is quite interesting in this room the fact that Roxana can stay on the balcony in order to see us all from above and conduct us from there. Actually this is the place where the public will be. Roxana made some tries with the men hiding and finally she decided that we should lay down as well as the girls. At the middle of the rehearsal, while we were actually all lying down, some students and a teacher(?) from ‘animation’(?) came and delivered the frames that the girls would hold in front of their faces. We made some tries and Roxana asked all to be more structured and stand up at the same time using the one hand to rise [stand up].⁴³

Structuring the standing up procedure appears as a primary focus of the above excerpt. The students had already performed the exercise once and they were ready to repeat it one more time. In the opening of the footage, Roxana characterised the student’s previous performance as looking ‘a bit cranky and a bit messy’. These are negative comments, and everything that followed aimed to put an order in this messiness. A main argument to back up the need for structure and order was the fact that ‘they don’t want to understand’ the state of messiness. ‘They,’ here, stands for the audience, the people who are going to be standing where Roxana stood. This imaginary public who is going to be judgemental and critical has to be satisfied by putting things in order. Structuring, and ordering in this case, means the co-

⁴³ Notes from the journal written immediately after the participant observation. 22 February 2006

ordination⁴⁴ of the students' movement that can be compared with that of a flock of birds (Figure 93). A flock of birds moves in the sky like 'one body' performing unexpectedly disciplined manoeuvres that are actually the result of movements of individuals that mimetically obey to local behaviour. Mimesis, here, plays an important role in putting the 'one body' in discipline.⁴⁵



Figure 93: A flock of birds⁴⁶

First of all, the students are supposed become 'one body,' by imitating Roxana both in following her verbal descriptions, as well as in following her movements that describe the way they should stand up. For example, in the beginning, while the students were lying on the ground Roxana described verbally how they should 'get up in a spiral' (emphasising the spiral, and imitating with this sound the spiral movement), and she clarified further that it is their spine that should spiral in order to stand up. At the same time, though, she performed the body movement of standing up three times, showing the students how to do it. In this sense, the students were given a live example of how they should repeat this movement. Nevertheless, this movement is not a full performance of the whole movement, in the sense that 'I will show you how to do it and you should repeat this,' but rather a bodily adaptation of

⁴⁴ Note the connection between the verb 'order' and the verb 'coordinate,' with its derivative verb 'ordain,' and the classical Latin *ordinare* "to arrange in rows, to arrange in order, to draw up, marshal, to manage, direct, regulate, to institute, to organize, to appoint" OED, Draft version June 2007

⁴⁵ See for example the difference between Batesian and Mullerian mimicry in: M Moynihan, "Social Mimicry: Character Convergence Versus Displacement," *Evolution*, 22, 1968: 315-331. and C.J. Barnard, "Predation and the Evolution of Social Mimicry in Birds," *The American Naturalist*, 113, no. 4, 1979: 613-618, p. 614.

⁴⁶ Photo by Anthony M. (*antmoose*)
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/antmoose/91814895/in/photostream/> [10. 11. 2007]

Roxana's verbal description. Similarly, when Roxana asked them to use either their left or right hand, she projected her left and right hand equally, as a gesture that emphasised and clarified her talk. However, if Roxana would fully perform the movement in order for the students to see how they should do it, then she would have to come down from the bridge and they should stand up. On the contrary, the whole description was 'on the fly' advice of how to execute the movement in-action.

Another way to obtain the desired order is by having the students imitate each other. Roxana had invested a lot of effort into trying to create this 'group feeling' from the very first meeting (this took place in a room of the university and not in the Botanical Gardens). During this meeting she asked the students to perform a series of exercises in order to stimulate their solidarity such as walking and performing various movements as a group. These exercises were also repeated in various forms in the gardens as well, as a form of tuning or calibration of the 'group feeling' in every session. This imitative strategy is similar to the notion of vicarious learning as a form of education that involves the observation, retention and replication of a model. Nevertheless, there is an important difference between imitation and vicarious learning, as developed by Albert Bandura in his wider project of social learning theory.⁴⁷ This difference has to do with the fact that in observational learning one can end up performing the opposite actions to the model, because of reflective evaluation of the model.⁴⁸ In our case, it seems impossible to see the students performing something different from that suggested by Roxana, or from the model that the other students are performing. Moreover, the type of repetitive mimesis that we see in this example is different to the concept of *cognitive imitation* in psychology that is defined as "a type of observational learning in which a naïve student copies an expert's use of a rule,"⁴⁹ since here there is no 'naïve' student nor an 'expert,' but all the students are at the same level of skill. A different term of psychology, that of

⁴⁷ Albert Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*, Prentice-Hall Series in Social Learning Theory, Englewood Cliffs London: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

⁴⁸ Professor David Carr has been explaining how bad teachers can be as good examples as the good ones. In proving this he often recalled, that as a student in his encounters with bad teachers, he promised to himself that 'I do not want to be like him.'

⁴⁹ F. Subiaul, Cantlon, J., Holloway, R. L., Terrace, H. S., "Cognitive Imitation in Rhesus Macaques," *Science*, 305, no. 5682, 2004: pp. 407-410.
<http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/305/5682/407> [08. 07. 2008]

priming, can be of some important to understand our case study, since priming refers to the activation of representations or associations in memory (especially, implicit memory) just before carrying out an action or task. According to Pickering and Garrod,⁵⁰ automatic priming aims to a process of *alignment* that is very close to the student's performance as 'one body' or to that of a flock of birds. One such exercise especially became a ritual activity marking the end of each rehearsal, the Team-Clapping (Figure 94).



Figure 94: The team-clapping

Roxana asks us every time to form a big circle and to make a single hand clap all at the same time. The first time it didn't work (I didn't even know what I had to do, although she said I didn't get it straight away). The second time though it went very well; we all did it like one person. I guess that she does this in order to reinforce the solidarity of the group. It is very interesting. It is like the ritual at the end of the Aikido class. The previous time instead of the group clap we were again in the circle holding hands and we were trying to pass a squeeze of the hand received from the previous person, onto the next. It is difficult though; I tend to squeeze both hands!⁵¹

In a different exercise Roxana asked the students to form small groups of three and asked them to improvise a short coordination exercise, where each group had chosen one characteristic movement (lets say a twist and turn) and while the three were walking the person who was at the front would, each time, initiate the

⁵⁰ M.J. Pickering and S. Garrod, "Toward a Mechanistic Theory of Dialogue," *Behavioral & Brain Sciences*, 27, 2004: 169-226.

⁵¹ Notes from the journal written immediately after the participant observation. Wednesday 22 February 2006, 13:00-16:00.

movement while the others had to immediately join in a way that would look like coordinated movement from the whole group, despite the fact that it was not rehearsed before. In one particular case, when one group didn't do very well, Roxana had commented, speaking rhetorically to the rest of the students who were watching: "Was there one group, or one individual and two people following? So this is what it is all about. We need to know how to work as a group."⁵² Moreover, in a different case Roxana emphasised the responsibility and special role of the person who is in the front: "When you are going to be at the front, don't worry, people are going to follow you, so you should be sure about what you are doing and don't worry, because their job is to follow what you are doing."⁵³ The 'leader', or the person in front, becomes the person whom the rest of the group is supposed to imitate and for this she or he plays the role of the model to be copied. Nevertheless, in this set of exercises that I describe here, there is not one appointed 'leader' who is supposed to give the signal to the rest of the group; every time, as Figure 95 shows, the person who is in front changes, so the responsibility of the 'leader' is shared, consecutively.



Figure 95: An exercise where the 'person in front' takes the responsibility of making a move

Returning back to the original excerpt, the mimesis of the leader becomes quite vague, especially because the students are lying down and there is not a notion of a 'person in front'. By being disorientated and having lost the notion of 'front' the

⁵² Video from the tutorial: Music 08 02 2006_0001.AVI

⁵³ Video from the tutorial: Music 08 02 2006_0002.AVI

students had to follow their instinct and the group-feeling that had been cultivated from the constant repetition of exercises like the one described in the previous paragraph. Still though, Figure 96 shows that one student rises her head in order to look for a person to follow, or see whether the rest of the students have already started moving in order to follow them.



Figure 96: Looking for someone to follow

The ‘person in front’ appears again later on as an important role when the students were already standing up and they were asked to turn. At that point Roxana said: “lets try that again so do that as a group, so following Mary.... at the same time...” From this phrase we can see that executing the exercise as a group is very closely connected with following someone in front (here, Mary, a senior 4th year student). In this case, the appointment of the person to be followed, in some sense, contradicts the earlier distribution of the responsibility to the students. Since the group consists of a large number of students there is not just one person in front, but many more who have to coordinate between them so that the rest of students would imitate them. But arguably, Roxana in this case took this responsibility off of their shoulders by appointing ‘a leader’ to be mimicked, who would guarantee the order and the synchronization of the performance ‘at the SAME time.’

Finally, I would like to emphasise a mimetic aspect of this exercise connected with the movement that the students have been practicing and consists of standing up from the lying position and turning by rising their hands whilst holding a sort of picture. For a very long time this movement has been without any meaning for the

students since the instructors had not informed them about the overall narrative or ‘aim’ of this part of the performance. Nevertheless, the students have been repeating again and again, time after time in each session, and week after week during the rehearsals, this repetitive movement, aiming to achieve an order through mimesis. The instructions that have been given during the previous weeks varied and the object that the students hold has been given different names such as a ‘picture,’ ‘manuscript,’ or ‘score;’ now we can see that it has been substituted by a ‘frame’. It was only the previous week (and the three weeks before the performance itself) that Roxana explained to the students the overall narrative behind this part of the performance (Figure 97):



Figure 97: The teacher addressing the students

This has very much been taken by what is happening now, where a lot of women in the Middle East and across the world have pictures of their men that they lost: fathers, brothers, cousins, uncles. And you see them in documentary photographs; there are lots of women and they are holding the pictures forward. That’s (always going to be part of) their identity. But I also want to look at this thing of... we are going to try to make a frame that you are going to hold that will actually have a texture of cloth that takes an impression. You know what I mean, a material that goes like that. So the animation students are going to paint like the cheek bones, the outline of the face on the picture and during the solo, which is lovely you are going to go into the face and it will be your face inside that. So it will be a male version of your own face.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ In order to save some space I do not represent this excerpt in full detail. Nevertheless, the reader must imagine Roxana performing a lot of gestures (for example figure 9) in order to describe her words.

In this sense what the students have been doing was imitating ‘women from middle East.’ Nevertheless, for a very long time they performed repeatedly the same movements without being aware of this imitation that was actually revealed during the above clarification by Roxana. In the original excerpt the rehearsal was disrupted and the students were given a frame covered with a fabric,⁵⁵ and they were asked to ‘put the manuscripts down’ and ‘take a frame.’ But we can see that there were not enough finished frames with the fabric for everyone and so some students, like Jade, were given an empty frame (Figure 98). Jade nevertheless blurred the distinction between the ‘frame’ and the ‘score’ by superimposing the one on top of the other (Figure 99). Being aware of the mimesis of the ‘women from middle East,’ she interpreted that, for the time-being, the point was to cover the frame in order to show *something*, and not an empty frame (Figure 100).



Figure 98



Figure 99



Figure 100

⁵⁵ “It was very interesting when the frames turned out to have an elastic membrane. At the end of the song the girls holding the frames are pushing their faces into the membrane. The result is really scary!!! Very expressive. In the beginning I thought that it was one of the girls who came up with this trick but it seems that I am wrong, since the animation teacher and students had crayons with them and afterwards painted the shape of each particular face onto the membrane.” Notes from the journal written immediately after the participant observation. Wednesday 22 February 2006, 13:00-16:00.

5.3.3 Repetitive mimesis and *ethics* in the design studio: Victorian doors

The following is an excerpt of a tutorial with first year students about a project to design a retreat. Keith, the course organizer (from the USA) and John, a tutor (from Greece) are discussing Mary's project. Together with a group of other students (all British) they sit around a table, which is full of drawings and models.




Figure 101

- K: How does the door swing?
M: (its) I've never done that again
((gestures over the plan to the direction of the door))
- K: [Bu(t)]
((K, who is already holding a pencil, puts his hand on the plan ready to draw))
- M: [Whot]
((The student bends over the plan to see what K is pointing to))
- K: (Is it not) (.) would it not swing (1)
((talks while drawing with thin lines over the student's plan))
- M: (You know (.) I was looking at other bit) (1.5)
((K finishes drawing and takes his hand back)) ((the student goes back to a normal sitting position))
does it matter which way it swings=
((J nods affirming))
- K: =I don't know (.) does it?
J: Hhhh (2)
((laughing, looks at K and the student))

- K: I think it does (.) I think it does (1)
 ((the student performs the bodily movement of opening a door three times, first in the direction that she designed the door to swing, then in the other direction and then again like the first))



Figure 102

- K: I had this conversation with somebody last week I think (.) about em (.)
 doo:r swings (.) you know how in this country (0.5)
 ((K starts to draw a small diagram on a piece of paper))
 when you have a room [like this] (0.5)
 M: [(swing is like this)]



Figure 103

- K: you have the swing like that
 J: that's cra:zy=
 ((looking at K))
 K: I know
 J: That's a:bsolutely insa:ne=
 K: I know (.) you know why:: (.) its insane
 ((K stops drawing and looks at the student))
 M: is it not
 J: I know why it is insane (0.5) I don't know why they keep on doing it here

- K: ((looking at K))
Do you know why they did it in the first [place?]
((looking at J))
- J: [no]
- M: Isn't it for people in the room (having) privacy bef[ore the (others entry)]
((S performs the bodily movement of opening the door))
- K: [yes (0.75) it's this]
(0.5) Victorian fetish about p[rivacy]
- J: [really]=
- K: yes (1) it [absolutely is]
- M: [(all the do]ors open like this)=
((S makes the bodily movement of opening the door))
- K: =I know (0.5) I think its absolutely silly=
M: Why:: it looks stupid to be done (like that)
((M makes the bodily movement of opening the door))
- K: Look at how much room (.) look at how much room you do:n't have
because of it
((K draws back to the little piece of paper))
(0.5) look at how much room you have when it's open (0.5) the whole
room
((K stops drawing))
- M: I like it when (it boom)
((M makes the bodily movement of opening the door))
- K: [I kno]
- M: [I like it like this (.) ye[ah yea]h
((Sarah makes the bodily movement of opening the door))



Figure 104

- J: [such a] (.) such a door is
ru:ining my kitchen
((T points to K's little sketch))
(0.5) it is ruining it
((Students laugh))
- K: The first thing that I did when I moved into my flat was (.) cha:nge the
doors

- J: [Really]
- K: I flipped them all around cause I just could NOT get why you would make a small place (0.5) even smaller (1) by putting the doors all backwards (.) so anyway (.) yeah
- J: [Hhhh]
- K: does it matter (.) yeah it matters (.) but this is your place (.) and it's good of you to be aware (.) that the affect that this has (0.5) (or) the reason of that first of all (.) came
 ((K draws to the little sketch))
 around (.) it is a Victorian construct (0.75) and it remains (0.5) as a bit of a left over of Victorian influence (.) in your housing schemes here
- M: (Is it not ...)
- K: Ye:a::h which I cannot get cause the bed (.) the bedrooms are so small that you
 ((K points to his sketch))
 can't put a double bed in them (.) as it is (0.5) even in modern homes and again you crap it out so much by having this kind of door swing (0.5) but you are allowed (.) you are allowed to have this sort of things influence you (.) if you think that makes your entry
 ((K makes the bodily movement of opening the door))



Figure 105

- mo::re: (0.75) deliberated o:r celebrated o:r purposeful o::r whatever (.) I think that that's (.) fair enough (.) but you have to be aware of its impact (.) of what is (.) that is going on (0.5) I would never(.) I would never do that on a house (0.5) I wouldn't (1.5)
 ((students laugh))
- K: It would (.) it would be my mission (.) it would be my mission if I was a
- J: Hhhhhhhhhh ((laughing))
 practicing architect here to change that in the entire country
- J: Hhhhhhhhhhhh ((laughing))
- K: But its fair enough (.) I just wanted to know if that was a purposefully done (0.5) which it seem it is (1) ok

The dialogue of this excerpt pertains to *ethics* since it explicitly refers to notions of privacy in different cultures. It shows vividly how people have formed embodied habitual understandings of crossing architectural thresholds (here doors), and how they find themselves to be estranged by other such concepts that come from a different cultural background. In particular, the discussion focuses on the British cultural tradition of opening a door towards the open space of the room (see Figure 106), as opposed to the tradition of opening the door towards the wall, that conventionally here I will name ‘Continental’ (Figure 107). In this tutorial the students come to think, most probably for the first time in their lives, that there are other ways of opening (and thus designing) a door.




Figure 106: The ‘British’ door




Figure 107: The ‘Continental’ door

The issue of privacy that is discussed here has to do with the fact that in the ‘continental’ style of door design one can see the entire room even by a slight opening of the door. However, with the ‘British’ style of door design one can see the whole room only after having opened the door widely and having made a few steps inwards. This latter way provides more privacy to the people that are already in the room, ‘announcing’ the entrance of the newcomer and giving them more time to prepare (whatever this means) for the actual encounter. At the same time, though, the British way wastes more space, especially when the door is open, because it is always in the way, affecting the arrangement of the furniture in the room. On the other hand the ‘continental’ door, when open, becomes ‘part of’ the wall, allowing the free flow of motion in and out of the room. Architecture in this sense creates very

different kinds of threshold for performing exactly the same function: entering in a room.

There are two main expressions of mimesis that focus in the above situation: one has to do with the mimesis of each individual of his or her own cultural background and the other with the mimesis of the embodied physical movement of opening the door, by both the students and the tutors. What I primarily want to show is that the two aspects are extremely close to one another.

For the students this is the first time that they were asked to design an actual building (a small retreat). When Keith asked Mary to explain the opening of the door in her design, her first reaction was to defend herself by saying that ‘I have never done that before.’ This shows that her drawing was an immediate response towards the brief according to her predispositions and her perceptions of opening doors in her everyday life. When Keith started drawing on her plan to indicate the opening of the door, her second reaction was slight frustration and impatience on the focus on such details, by saying ‘Does it matter which way it swings?’ (emphasising the word ‘matter’). Most probably Mary would rather expect to focus on ‘more important’ aspects of her project like the form of the retreat and especially those curvy walls that have made her design really ‘wacky’. When Keith rhetorically threw back the same question to her, then John, the second tutor laughed, looking at both Mary and Keith indicating that something interesting was going on.

This disruptive moment of the discussion, initiated a breakage in Mary’s certainty about how a door opens. The disruption in some sense blocked her mind and she found herself unable to comprehend what the fuss was about and how it could be done differently. She had to retreat back to a more primordial and instinctive way of understanding the world by repeating the gesture of opening the door, as if she was actually in front of the door of her retreat wishing to open it. She had to utilise the knowledge of her body that had been opening doors dozens of times everyday, millions of times in her life, before this disruption took place. It is also very interesting that she did not perform this action just once, as an instantaneous return

back and forth to her embodied knowledge of door-opening. She actually performed this action three times consecutively, first with her right hand (Figure 108), on the direction that she actually drew the door; the second with her left hand (Figure 109), the way that Keith had proposed on his drawing; and one more time with her right hand again (Figure 110), just to make sure of the difference. But these were not the only times that she did so; Mary actually performed the same movement seven times in only one minute of the footage.



Figure 108



Figure 109



Figure 110

Mary's performance of this bodily gesture is actually a mimetic performance; Mary mimics herself in order to remember how she actually opens the door in her everyday encounter with them. Opening a door is such a mundane activity of everyday life that obviously one hardly notices. One becomes accustomed in doing it from a young age, and after overcoming the first struggles of opening because of lack of height or strength, it becomes part of the automatic routine under the tag 'door-opening'. We don't really think about what we do when we open a door; we just open it. The reason for this is also the fact that our aim in opening the door usually lies on the other side of it. When we do start to think about the opening, it is usually when some kind of disruption takes place and our automatic routine 'malfunctions' (for example when the key doesn't turn, when the handle is broken, or the door is stiff).⁵⁶

⁵⁶ A personal experience may further illuminate further the above example: at some point I suddenly realised that the way of opening a 'reversed' door is very similar to some particular movement from my aikido practice. This attitude emphasises the difference of using the movement of the hips in order to 'pull' something (or someone, in the case of aikido), instead of using merely the muscles of the arm/shoulder. Since that first thought, the reversed door in the corridor of my office became a challenging threshold and field of experimentation. Using my casual, but very often crossings, I was pausing for a second, drawing my attention to my action trying deliberately to think about what I actually do when I open the door; do I use my hips or arms? Opening this door is not the same any more: I have been mimicking myself drawing a fictional partner in the aikido practice. Only when

There is also a contrast in the way that Keith communicated the opening of the doors using the medium of the drawing while Mary persisted on performing the bodily gesture of door-opening. Actually both ways are kinds of mimesis. Obviously, Mary's gesture of opening the door imitates the actual gesture that she performs when opening the door. But Keith's way of drawing sketches of rooms and doors, similar to the ones that I have reproduced in Figure 106 & Figure 107, is also an imitation. By representing graphically the plans of the rooms Keith is mimicking his own teachers, and behind them the whole cultural tradition that represents architectural space through Cartesian drawings. Although both Mary and Keith are referring to the same space – Mary's imaginary retreat – they are using completely different representation techniques following different mimetic forces. Keith follows an abstract, rationalised system of representation that follows a set of explicit rules, while Mary follows a personal, primordial, knowledge through her body that has immediate connection to the actual movement of opening the door of her room. Mary imitates the physical movement itself, by repeating it, while Keith mediates the opening of the door through the pencil and the drawing. Architectural education, in its formal and institutional sense, aims to pass from the one type of mimesis to the other.⁵⁷ The above schema of showing two different ways of imitation is in some sense schematic for our specific example, since Mary has already created a Cartesian drawing of the space, and Keith actually performs the bodily movement of opening the door once (Figure 105) towards the end of the excerpt.

Finally, it becomes apparent that Keith and Mary come from different cultural backgrounds that differently evaluates the *ethical* issue of privacy. Moreover, this difference does not stay between them, but engages all the other students as well as John, the second tutor, in an amusing situation. The people around the table separated into two groups, the British and the foreigners (from the USA and Greece).

the attention is drawn to something else (the book that I forgot back in the office, the rush to the toilet, or the anxiety of the meeting that I am late) can I enjoy a 'forgetful door-opening'. In our studio example, Mary started to think about door-opening only after Keith broke her preconceptions of how a door should open. See also Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit*, London: Trubner, 1878, p. 9-10.

⁵⁷ In some other sense, though, architectural education should be the retainment or rediscovery of this type of 'naivety' in the way of experiencing and representing architectural space.

Despite the fact that the power relationship between the two groups was unequal, since the teachers formed one group and the students the other, it becomes obvious that the students were not ready to follow and adapt to the teachers' view. From the very beginning the tutors launched a fierce attack with an account of personal anecdotes and strong expressions like 'such a door is ruining my kitchen', 'that's crazy', 'it is insane' or 'absolutely silly'. But the students held their positions with statements like 'all the doors open like this', 'it looks silly to be done like that', 'I like it when it "boom" (indication of immediacy and straightforwardness), 'I like it like this, yeah, yeah.' Finally, Keith gave a solution to the argument by giving his rhetorical permission and approval, if this helps the overall design, in means of 'deliberation, celebration, purposefulness or whatever...' acknowledging at the same time that he deliberately pushed the discussion to its limits in order to draw the student's awareness to the topic. Nevertheless, at the end he launched his final attack making clear his missionary engagement with the topic to 'change that in the entire country' if only he would be practicing architecture 'here'.

Although, both the students and the teachers enjoyed challenging each other in this explicit formation of allies and verbal conflict, under the 'typical' power structure that wants the teachers to be opposing the students; the actual power relationship is much more complicated and we shouldn't leave it in this reductionist state. For example, it is very interesting that when Keith addresses Mary he asks her 'You know in this country when you have a room like this, you have the swing like that.' Then John joined the discussion leading to his admittance of ignorance about the topic, since, although he knows why he doesn't like it (because it is 'insane'), he doesn't know 'why they keep on doing it here.' It was actually Mary who gave the answer, teaching her tutor that the whole thing was about privacy, and then Keith who supplemented that it comes from the Victorian times, quickly characterised it as a fetish. In this incident the roles were inverted and the teacher was Mary and Keith and the student was found to be John. This shows that the roles of the teacher and the student are far from being fixed in a one-way hierarchical system.

5.3.4 Comparing the *ethics* of repetitive mimesis in the three examples

Mimesis is inherently and always already a repetition –meaning that mimesis is always the meeting place of two opposing but connected ways of thinking, acting and making: similarity and difference.⁵⁸

Arne Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*

By juxtaposing the three situations previously examined, a mechanism of *mimesis* becomes apparent, through which *repetition* generates judgements of *ethics*. The preceded examples revealed a wide variety of expressions of mimesis that go far beyond the stereotypical notion where the students dully imitate their teachers. Again and again, the teachers imitate the students, the students imitate their colleagues, the teachers imitate other teachers and all of them imitate methods of representation, models of ideal execution, professional aspects of each practice, or their cultural background in general. This repetitive mimesis forms prejudices, customs, dispositions and habitual responses of *ethics*. All three examples show a repertory of embodied and practical categories that make intelligible the mimetic actions taking place in each classroom. It is an education *in a 'knowing how'* of ethics that constitutes a common understanding between the teachers and the students, without the externalisation of an explicit set of codes that makes their actions intelligible. Nowhere in the *dojo's* etiquette is it written the *ethical* meaning that was conveyed through Laurent's mimesis of Peter. In 'Music and the Community,' the course's brief does not give any explanations about how notions of messiness and orderliness is affected by the 'person in front'; and similarly, in the design studio, no explicit reference has been made in the way that doors are drawn according to ones cultural background. There is no need for these things to become explicit, since the meaning of *ethics* embodied in these mimetic actions is commonly shared amongst the members of the community in every case. First of all, a list of all the conventions and customs that are necessary to hold together the meaning of each action would be impossible to compile and even if one could imagine its existence, it would be the

⁵⁸ Arne Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*, Edited by Richard Macksey and Michael Sprinker, Literature, Culture, Theory, Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995, p. 1.

oddest list of the world. It would be ‘silly,’ in the sense of ‘senseless’ or ‘lacking sense’ (*sinnlos* in Wittgenstein’s terms), trying to make explicit something that is obvious to everyone. Things need to be clarified only when a breakage on the pre-understanding of things occur, like in the case of the design studio where the tutor, John, becomes suddenly aware of the reason of having put the doors in this way. When things run within the conventions there is no need to make them explicit.⁵⁹

There is also a common way in which mimesis as found in the three examples convey a symbolism of *ethics* that is habitual. When putting these symbolisms into action mimesis mediates in a way that is implicit, but commonly understood. For example, in the dojo, the bow as a mimetic action conveys strong *ethical* meanings that show at the same time hierarchical subordination –when made towards the teacher in the opening ritual– and mutual respect towards each other, during the course of the class. In the music class, the ‘person in front,’ after going through all the training exercises, becomes ‘automatically’ responsible for being a mimetic model, while the other students habitually follow her or him, symbolising equally power and passivity in each case. Finally, in the design studio, the symbolic realm of privacy that, according to Keith, became a fetish during Victorian times, is mimetically appropriated, and habitually repeated, by the young members of this community that came to grow up in it. Symbols in this sense are internalised in the actions of the members of each group, and through the repetitive mimesis they become part of their prejudices about their world. These symbols become habituated customs to the encounter of the other, in the sense that they create automated responses, which nevertheless, as we saw, embody notions of *ethics*.

Furthermore, the three examples of *ethics* in education employ mimetic action that has a temporal basis. This temporal basis is revealed in the repetitive dimension of mimesis that becomes a catalyst for the formation of habitual *ethical* responses. The repetition of the mimetic action is most obvious in the dojo, where both the teacher

⁵⁹ Analytic philosophy claims the non-sensial character of the Continental philosophy on exactly this ground. By paraphrasing Glendinning one could joke: ‘Continental philosophy is like continental breakfast: There is no such thing.’ The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental Philosophy, University Press, Edinburgh. Note also the similarities to the joke that asks ‘How many Dadaists does it take to screw a bulb?’ in order to answer ‘To get to the other side.’

and the students constantly reproduce again and again the same movement (*ai hamni kote gaeshi*), dozens of times just in a couple of minutes, until it becomes second nature. Also in the case of the music class we saw how Roxana continuously emphasised on the repetition of similar exercises with an aim to acquire this ‘group feeling;’ following the ‘person in front,’ and becoming ready to take the responsibility of becoming the one leading. In the design studio one can not imagine that through the millions of times of opening a door has acquired an accustomed stance of *ethics* about the privacy issues of entering in a room; at least not before this is revealed by the explicit discussion. Furthermore, temporality in all three examples becomes a fundamental issue because in every case the mimetic action takes place *within* a specific time which localises *ethics* in this moment of time with its specific traditions and cultural context.

5.3.5 Further reflections on repetitive mimesis

The moment or instant of “repetition” is always an *after*. But not only an after. Since the movement of “repetition” also makes it new, makes “the new” (simultaneously with being a repeating reduplication), “repetition” suspends the temporal order of before-after in or by the *now* previously called “the instant.” The temporal dialectics of “repetition” suspends temporal sequence: the *now* that is always an *after* actually comes *before*...⁶⁰

The three characteristics of repetitive mimesis that were presented in the previous paragraphs (semantics or structure of common meaning,⁶¹ symbolism and temporality) are the fundamental concepts of what Paul Ricoeur calls mimesis₁. Although referring to a different context – that of narrative and textual hermeneutics – Ricoeur made a definitive threefold distinction of mimesis (mimesis₁, mimesis₂ and mimesis₃) the first of which is important, here, for our context of *ethics*. Ricoeur

⁶⁰ Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*, p. 137.

⁶¹ See the difference between Ricoeur’s book *Time and Narrative* and his earlier paper “Mimesis and Representation” on the way that mimesis₁ is presented in reference to the meaning as *semantics* in the earlier version and *structure* in his later work.
Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer. 3 vols. Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 (1983).
Paul Ricoeur, “Mimesis and Representation,” in *A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdes, New York et. al.: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 (1980).

introduced the three levels of his mimesis, aiming to re-address the problem of representation between the world of the novel and the 'real' world or life itself. According to his argument, mimesis₂ stands for the conventional understanding of poetics that has its origins in Aristotle;⁶² poetic imitation is the activity of arranging incidents in a plot (con-figuration).⁶³ Ricoeur extended this definition to mimesis₁, which consists of a pre-understanding that is the knowledge commonly shared between the writer and her or his readers allowing them to communicate (pre-figuration);⁶⁴ and to mimesis₃ that is the power of literature through mimesis to change the 'real' world (re-figuration).⁶⁵ In this way Ricoeur tried to "dissolve the opposition between inside [of fiction] and outside [of life], which itself arises from the representative illusion."⁶⁶

Mimesis₁ more than any of the other two concepts of mimesis, relates to *ethics* because it is based upon a sense of familiarity and prior acquaintance to the world. Ricoeur explicitly states that "[m]imesis₁ is the pre-understanding of what human action is, of its semantics, its symbolism, its temporality."⁶⁷ In explaining these three terms further, Ricoeur assimilates the notion of semantics or structure of meaning to a 'know how'⁶⁸ that constitutes a common repertory between the writer and the reader; that being members of this shared set are in a relation of 'practical understanding'⁶⁹. "To understand a story is to understand both the language of 'doing something' and the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology of plots."⁷⁰ For the symbolic aspect of mimesis₁, Ricoeur borrows an anthropological and sociological understanding of the term (not dissimilar to this research as well), which argues that symbolism is not a theoretical concept in the mind, but it is "meaning incorporated into action"⁷¹ In this sense, in order to understand a ritual act like the bow in the *dojo*, one has "to situate it within a ritual, set within a cultic system, and

⁶² Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation," p. 138-139.

⁶³ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, p. 64.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁶⁶ Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation," p. 151.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁶⁹ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, p. 55.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

by degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture.”⁷² Temporality for Ricoeur has a strong connection to repetition, which comes from an anthropological reading of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.⁷³ Ricoeur denies a partition between future, past and present time and substitutes it into “a threefold present: a present of future things, a present of past things, and a present of present things.”⁷⁴ In our examples, the ‘present of the future’ becomes manifested when Keith expressed his mission that from *now* on he would change the door-opening system throughout the entire country (if his commitment was true); the ‘present of the past,’ when John would commit from *now* on to drawing doors in the British style, because he *just* realised that it secures more privacy; and finally, the ‘present of the present,’⁷⁵ when in the music class, Mary took the decision *now* to start turning as the ‘person in front,’ because *now* she could do it. Finally, Ricoeur makes explicit comments on the *ethics* that create a second nature through mimesis₁ by referring back to Hegel, when he says: “Manners and customs, along with everything Hegel put under the title “ethical substance” the *Sittlichkeit* prior to any *Moralität* of a reflective order, thus take over from the genetic codes.”⁷⁶ As we saw in all three examples, the second nature is an embodied process that leads to a state of ceasing to be aware of ones way of doing things and this embodied process is connected with *ethics* because the second nature is pre-accepted as good.

The fact that mimesis creates a second nature (*physisn*), has been identified as a major philosophical problem from the very early treatises dealing with mimesis. Plato, recognizing the power of mimesis, privileged it as a fundamental way of educating the noble quality of men in his ideal city, since the mimesis of their

⁷² Ibid., p. 58.

⁷³ Temporality has also a connection to *ethics* through the notion of *care*, that is central for Heidegger, as a concept of temporal engagement with the world, implicitly, because the ‘day has come’ or “because it is ‘time to do something, where ‘now’ signifies ‘now that....’ It is the time of work and days.” Ibid., p. 63.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 60.

⁷⁵ There is an interesting connection of repetition with Ricoeur’s ‘present of the present’ and what Derrida calls the presence-of-the-precence: “The presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition, and not the reverse.” Jacques Derrida, *La Voix Et Le Phenomene* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, p. 58 Quoted in: Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*, p. 168.

⁷⁶ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, p. 58.

outlook can “settle down into habits and second nature in the body, the speech, and the thought.”⁷⁷ In this sense, Plato implies that “mimesis can go through to habit and to human nature, also “in relation to body and tone and disposition.”⁷⁸ Nevertheless, for this same reason Plato prevented the poets from joining this state, because through the mimetic acts of poetry and theater “one forgets his own role or duty in the state, for if a guard always mimes foreign characters, his soul would be split up between these untrue lives.”⁷⁹ In another instance, Plato argues that in order for Ion to recite Homer, his *nous*, or his self awareness, is not with him anymore.⁸⁰ In other words the mimetic faculty is “the capacity to Other.”⁸¹ Aristotle’s concept of mimesis, on the other hand, engaged repetition in a different way. In contrast to the imitative character of Plato’s mimesis, which is close to image and imagination, Aristotle focused on mimesis through *mythos* and *praxis*, which is close to time and action.⁸² Arne Merlberg has argued extensively in her book *Theories of Mimesis* that Aristotle’s focus on *praxis* and time brings mimesis and repetition in close relationship with each other. In her words: “when Aristotle tried to create temporal order out of the paradoxes of Platonic poetics he did so with Time. And then he hit upon the most differentiating of all categories, the one that was transforming... *mimesis* into repetition.”⁸³

A major shift in the contemporary understanding of poetic creation was made by Nietzsche, who differed his view from the Greek philosophers (Plato and Aristotle), by focusing on the ‘performative’ aspects of mimesis, which becomes an orgiastic play as a “dramatic representation where the artist takes art personally.”⁸⁴ For Nietzsche art-as-play remains as the only way for humans to find the truth, a truth that is different from truth-as-correspondence. “Nietzsche’s notion of play was radical, since he ultimately understood it through a cosmic (rather than human)

⁷⁷ Plato *Republic* 395d1-3

⁷⁸ Kwok-kui Wong, *Nietzsche, Plato and Aristotle on Mimesis*, 2003. Available from: <http://dogma.free.fr/txt/KwokKuiNietzschePlatoAristotle.htm> [Accessed 9. 5 2007].

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ion* 534b5-6

⁸¹ Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*, New York, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 19.

⁸² Merlberg, *Theories of Mimesis*, p. 44.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁸⁴ Wong, *Nietzsche, Plato and Aristotle on Mimesis*.

disinterestedness.”⁸⁵ This disinterestedness is an important characteristic of any child’s attitude and becomes prominent in the ethnomethodological view of the study. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s distinctions between the Apollonian and Dionysian in the *Birth of Tragedy* and his emphasis on the latter is characteristic of this anarchic nature of the child game and the loose structure of the map. The liberation of the suppressed affects us through the mimesis and the transformation of fear and pain to orgiastic joy become a constitutive part of artistic creativity, especially because it allows for the extension of the artist’s self onto the entirety of humanity and the freeing of her or his subjectivity.⁸⁶ In Nietzsche’s words: “Seeing oneself altered before one’s very eyes and now acting, as though one had really entered into another body, another character.”⁸⁷

Finally, performing a mimetic action once is an instantaneous trip to the Other, becoming the other for a while and coming back again, changed only by the experience of being someone else (like being at a costume ball).⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the repetitive mimesis, by forming habits through an embodied and tacit understanding, reconstitutes the self by *becoming* an other, by using an addictive drag. Similarly to the transformation of Dr Jekyll to Mr. Hyde: “I was slowly losing hold of my original and better self, and becoming slowly incorporated with my second and worse.”⁸⁹ Michael Tausig, in his insightful book *Mimesis and Alterity* has argued, from a straightforward anthropological point of view, that habit is actually itself an instinctive way of tactile knowing, “because only at the depth of habit is radical change effected, where unconscious strata of culture are built into social routines as bodily disposition.”⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Built Upon Love, Architectural Longing after Ethics and Aesthetics*, Cambridge Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press, 2006, p. 24.

⁸⁶ Wong, *Nietzsche, Plato and Aristotle on Mimesis*.

⁸⁷ Nietzsche ‘Birth of Tragedy’ in Weber, *Displacing the Body*.

⁸⁸ Note Adorno’s comment on mimesis when he gives an architectural example: “H. B. Scharoun’s Philharmonic Hall in Berlin is beautiful because, in order to create the ideal spatial conditions for orchestral music, it assimilates itself to these conditions rather than borrowing from them.” Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, London & New York: Continuum, 1997, p. 56.

⁸⁹ Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Other Stories*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979, p. 89.

⁹⁰ Tausig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*, p. 25.

5.4 The Strife between Reflective Disruption and Repetitive Mimesis

5.4.1 Revealing and Concealing

For the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means, that is, by contemplation alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, under the guidance of tactile appropriation.¹

Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*

Having examined the three educational places through the complex terms of reflective disruption and repetitive mimesis, I would like to conclude this study by examining further the connection between *morality* and *ethics*. In chapter 3, I have already suggested a scheme that connects *morality* with a notion of externality and *ethics* with internality. Nevertheless, I have also hinted that there is a potential problem in this scheme since it excludes *morality* from *ethics* and *ethics* from *morality*. A boundary, a border or a wall keeps the two separate. Why is this bad? Why should there be any connection between *morality* and *ethics*, especially since the argument of this thesis aims to support the neglected area of *ethics*? Why not just keep them separate, close ourselves *internal* to *ethics* and fight what is *external* to it, namely *morality*?

The study of the abovementioned situations, however, shows that the demarcation of the distinction between the two areas is not so easily definable. If we go back to the three situations where I discussed the *reflective disruption* one can see that in all three cases of the design studio, the music class and the *dojo*, the teachers and the students were operating in a state of non-reflection. This does not mean that they were not ‘thinking’ at all, or that they were executing a mechanical activity as Leont’ev’s examples, but rather that they were operating *within* the standard ‘routine’ of the activity. The way that I use the term ‘routine’ here appears to have nothing to do with routinized procedures like hammering a nail, or looking for my

¹ Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, London: Fontana Press, 1992, 211-244, p. 233.

watch in my pocket, as in Marcel's opening example. Nevertheless, "[t]he routine (whatever is done habitually) is a basic element of day-to-day social activity."² Education as such is supposed to be a much more dynamic and unexpected practice that seems to leave little space for habitual responses. Nevertheless, institutionalised education in the academic environment can actually create automated procedures and responses that manifest themselves in the form of customs or prejudices. It is exactly this conformity that Baker and Jones refer to when they mention that "[t]he cake of academic custom and the comfort of professional habit have created a highly conventional system of teaching..."³ Moreover, for the ethnomethodological approach of this study, "treat[ing] the 'problem' as a matter of routine"⁴ is an essential step of the ethnomethodological respecification. In this sense, one has to 'see' the education of the case studies as routine activities, in order to reproblematised their flow. For example, in the design studio, before the disruption, Alistair, Keith and John were operating within the 'norm of a review': students and teachers discussing about the student's project where commonly teachers give feedback to the students. But this routine was disrupted by the (accidental) breakage of the model causing the reverse of roles (Alistair giving feedback to Keith for the 'previous breakage') and a 'wider' disruptive reflection about 'why it is ok sometimes to break things that we spend much time and effort to make'. Similarly, in the *dojo*, Laurent and Young were operating within the norm of a 'private demonstration' of the exercise *somen uchi irimi nage*, where the teacher is expected to show the student how to perform the exercise or how to cultivate his *ki* through the exercise. The disruption of this routine by Young's accident, this time caused the explicit show of feelings like care and sympathy by the teacher and the fellow students, and possibly a 'wider' reflection about the meaning of the 'martial' aspect of *aikido* ('this is not a game' or 'one can really bleed by practicing'). This brings *aikido* in contrast with, lets say, a dance such as ballet. Finally, in the music class, the norm was that the

² Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity, 1984.

³ Paul Baker and Janet Jones, "Benign Disruption in the Classroom: A Case Study," *Teaching Sociology*, 7, no. 1, 1979: pp. 27-44, p. 34.

⁴ Michael Lynch and David Bogen, *The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings*, Edited by Stanley Fish and Frederic Jameson, Post-Contemporary Interventions, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1996, p. 273.

‘rehearsal-mode’ of executing the director’s orders following and interpreting her instructions towards perfecting the turning around; this routine was disrupted by the student’s response the ‘call’ of the visitor that needed help to pass by. In all three cases, despite the fact that the participants were ‘thinking’ (they were intelligibly discussing about architecture; exchanging gestures of aikido; or perfecting the turning in the music class), the disruption opened a new field for reflection about the meaning of the practice, offering a ‘wider’ perspective of what it means to do architecture, aikido or music. This opening allows us to see the horizon of what Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world. This reflective view of the practice though, should not be prioritized over the formation of this horizon itself. The revelation of the ‘wider’ perspective is possible because some concealment takes place at the very same time. One can ‘see’ (as in revelation) and ‘think outside the box,’ only because one is bracketed inside a myriad of other boxes. This fact points towards a definite connection between *morality* and *ethics* that cannot be described by the metaphor of the wall that separates them.

Furthermore, by returning to the three situations that framed the concept of *repetitive mimesis*, I cross-examined the three case studies through three terms that were the constitutive of *mimesis*₁. Ricoeur’s *mimesis*₁ provides a convincing account about the connection of my definition of *ethics* with customs, prejudices and dispositions that hold our sensuous understanding of the world together. This understanding should not be limited only in literature and is equally valid in ‘real’ life, since as I already mentioned, Ricoeur’s aim was actually to overcome this distinction. But I would also like to emphasise that when Ricoeur says that “[m]imesis₁ is the pre-understanding of what human action is” he gives a fixed character to this pre-understanding, or at least the change comes only through the shift between the other two concepts of *mimesis*. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that *mimesis* through repetition actually *forms* this pre-understanding of the world. The habits that the students acquire in the design studio become habits through the repetitive *mimesis*, by performing mimetic action like the ones we saw, again and again. As we saw in all three examples, second nature is an embodied process that leads to a state of

‘ceasing to be aware of ones way of doing things’ and this embodied process is connected with *ethics* because second nature is pre-accepted as being good.

The above discussion of the situations points towards less analytical ways of establishing this connection between *externality-morality* and *internality-ethics*, through concepts like *consciousness*, *memory* and *truth*. For example, if one thinks of consciousness and memory as the space that lies outside of a sphere whose surface is the borderline of perception,⁵ then what lies inside is the unconscious and the forgotten. According to this scheme, *morality* belongs to the external field of consciousness, since this is part of a deliberative awareness; whereas, *ethics* on the other hand is inside the sphere, unaware of its own existence, tacit and implicit.⁶ However, David Appelbaum has pointed out that, “to locate the ethical within the frame of discourse of consciousness is to dislocate it from the disruptive other.”⁷ My division of Ethics into *morality* and *ethics* overcomes exactly this problem, by being primarily interested on what is *inside*. Appelbaum also argues that the content of Ethics cannot be reduced only to *morality* since it is not just “a set of principles that orders ‘the moral life’ like a syllogism, producing transparency and moral discourse. Nor is it a mode of judgment (a la Solomon) that weights desire and duty in quasi divine scales in order to arrive at enlightened action.”⁸ On the contrary, he points towards *ethics* by saying that “Ethics has no content other than a momentary summons in which an immemorable memory pricks the compassionate heart to recall the other’s exigency.”⁹ Furthermore, consciousness has great etymological connections with moral *conscience* which is the ‘consciousness of right or wrong.’ Deleuze argues that conscience can be conceived only with regard to an external law that exists in contrast to a more natural law based on habit as second nature.¹⁰

⁵ Note, Wittgenstein’s diagram of the eye that perceives the world in front of it.

⁶ This oversimplified metaphor is similar to Freud’s structure of the human psyche in the context of psychoanalysis.

⁷ David Appelbaum, *Disruption*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. ix.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ “Conscience, however suffers from the following ambiguity, it can be conceived only by supposing the moral law to be external, superior and indifferent to the natural law; but the application of the moral law can be conceived only by restoring to conscience itself the image and the model of the law of nature. As a result, the moral law, far from giving us true repetition, still leaves us in generality. This time, the generality is not that of nature but that of habit as a second nature. It is

Finally, it could be pointed out that these less analytical and more phenomenological ways of establishing this internal/external distinction are grounded on the fundamental concept of *truth*. According to Heidegger, truth derives from the Greek *aletheia* as opposed to *lethe*, which means forgetfulness.¹¹ *Aletheia* then is the opening of a space, or a clearing.¹² If a veil of forgetfulness covers everything forgotten, then truth is remembrance, a process of unveiling that brings them forth in the realm of the conscious. *Morality*, then, is this process of unveiling and making things explicit while *ethics* is a process of concealment, or retreat into the realm of habit. But Heidegger also warns that total revelation is impossible and that by bringing our attention to some things we withdraw it from others.¹³ For this reason, the emphasis lies in the constant movement between the *concealing* character of *ethics* and the *revealing* character of *morality*. Moving across this borderline means the constant formation of habits, customs, prejudices and dispositions that we are unaware of, and the constant revelation of such prejudices, the awareness of which forms normative rules. The truth of Ethics in the educational situations is then manifested through the primal “strife between clearing and concealing,”¹⁴ a strife between *morality* and *ethics* in the educational activity.

So, we can see that the analytic argument for the externality of *morality* and the internality of *ethics* comes to meet a more phenomenological line of thought. Both of them though meet at some point to discuss this borderline or veil between the

useless to point to the existence of immoral or bad habits; it is the form of habit –or, as Bergson used to say, the habit of acquiring habits (the whole of obligation)- which is essentially moral or has the form of the good. Furthermore, in this whole or generality of habit we again find the two major orders: that of resemblance, in the variable conformity of the elements of action with a given model in so far as the habit has not been acquired; and that equivalence, with the equality of the elements of action in different situations once the habit has been acquired.” Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London: Athlone Press, 1994, p. 4-5.

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquire & Edward Robinson, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1962/ 1927, p. 262 [H. 219-220]. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Basic Writings From "Being and Time" (1927) To "The Task of Thinking" (1964)*, London: Routledge, 1993, 143-206, p. 161.

¹² J. E. Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, p. 247-251.

¹³ “[T]he clearing is never a rigid state with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its course. Rather the clearing happens only a this double concealment. The unconcealment of being –this is never a merely existent taste, but a happening.” Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 179..

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

external and the internal, between *morality* and *ethics*. The borderline brings the emphasis to ‘crossing the border’ of the established categories and the veil to the movement during the process of revealing and concealing.

5.4.2 Of Beasts and Men

In chapter 3, apart from the establishment of the distinction between the external *morality* and the internal *ethics*, I also argued about the animal nature of *ethics* that fights against the humanistic characteristics of *morality*. To return back to Homer’s horse, reflective disruption is then the escape of the horse, the breaking loose from the stable. The horse rebels against the things that constrained its freedom despite providing shelter and food. Reflective disruption is the very incident or moment that triggers this mutiny; maybe a harsh treatment, an accident, the pain from the harness, or sparking memories of freedom such as bathing in the river and mating freely with mares. These possible incidents and memories caused reflection that lead to the flight. Nevertheless, the horse breaks free in order to go back to its accustomed haunts. It goes back to places that it has been used to. It does not choose to seek new places with possibly even more fair-flowing rivers, better feeding grounds and more promiscuous mares. It goes back to where repetitively it has accustomed itself to dwell, following mimetically the others of its own kind. In this way it breaks free from *morality* in order to submit in yet another prison, that of the *ethics* of repetitive mimesis because of its habits, its customs and its dispositions. Again, here, the emancipating character of *morality* through a reflective disruption is a bringing forth, a revealing process that operates the mechanism of memory, that withdraws the veil of *lethe*, and promises the escape from the stables and freedom of a total revelation. At the same time, though, this revelatory action is framed within yet another concealment, the submission to old habits and dispositions that repetitive mimesis has formed. The horse emancipates in order to find itself forgotten in habits. “To breed an animal with the capacity to make promises: is this not the paradoxical task of nature has set itself in the case of the human?”¹⁵ wonders Nietzsche, “Is this not

¹⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche and Keith Ansell-Pearson (ed), *On the Genealogy of Morality*, translated by Carol Diethe, Edited by Raymond Geuss and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge Texts in the History of

the real problem regarding the human?"¹⁶ The promise here can be translated as the promise towards a total emancipation. But the human, according to Nietzsche, is necessarily a "forgetful animal,"¹⁷ for which forgetting is a strength, a sign of health. Nevertheless, for keeping such promises the human has evolved 'memory' as a counter device to forgetfulness. Nietzsche reacts to a scientific method that refuses to accept eternal things beyond history and hates forgetting because it is the 'death of knowledge.' *Morality*, I argue, falls in this category, constantly being thirsty to reveal "seeks to abolish all limitations of horizon and launch mankind upon an infinite and unbounded sea of light whose light is knowledge of all becoming."¹⁸ This enlightenment is the peak of humanism that tries to overcome its animal nature. But Nietzsche reminds us that "a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine away slowly or hasten to its timely end."¹⁹ The ability to forget is a fundamentally in-human function that resembles sleep.²⁰ The person who wants to be constantly historical would be like one forcibly deprived of sleep.²¹ In order to continue and go through life the human has to cease being human and forget itself in its animal nature. In order to be *moral*, it has to inhabit *ethics*.

Heidegger has offered a different metaphor to express the animal state of human nature, the essence of 'boredom' of *being-left-empty* (giving the well known example of waiting for a train in a boring tasteless station of some lonely minor railway), or *being-held-in-suspense* (when possibilities lie in front of the human in total

Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 38. Deleuze also mentions that "[i]t is in repetition and by repetition that Forgetting becomes a positive power while the unconscious becomes a positive and superior unconscious" Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 8-9 & p. 358.

¹⁶ Nietzsche and (ed), *On the Genealogy of Morality*, p. 38.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations, Texts in German Philosophy*, Cambridge et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 57-123, p. 120.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁰ When the human sleeps the animal is awake. See also Jacques Derrida and Marie-Louise (ed.) Mallet, *The Animal That Therefore I Am* translated by David Wills, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, p. 148. Furthermore, Butler concludes his work on habit with this words: "As I have said, reason points remorselessly to an awakening, but faith and hope still beckon to the dream." Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit*, London: Trubner, 1878, p. 307.

²¹ Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," p. 62.

indifference). It is at these moments that Dasein discloses or refuses itself the opportunity of revelation and falls back to its animal nature; the possibilities are open but not revealed; “neither disclosed, nor closed off.”²² This ‘open’ space has been the central theme of Giorgio Agamben’s book *The Open, Man and Animal*. Although as I have already mentioned, Heidegger seeks to challenge the centrality of humanity in Dasein, and the hierarchical relationship of man over the animal,²³ at the same time, he excludes the animal from participating in the conflict between unconcealedness and concealedness,²⁴ by condemning it to be poor-in-the world.²⁵ Nevertheless, Giorgio Agamben suggests that Heidegger several times insisted on the primacy of *lēthē* with respect to unconcealedness, for the circle of revelation and concealment of *alētheia*.²⁶ Actually, this exact “struggle between disconcealment and concealment, which defines the human world, is the internal struggle between man and animal.”²⁷ In this sense, the relationship between *morality* and *ethics* that is generated through reflective disruption and repetitive mimesis is a relationship between concealment and revelation. This relationship is a struggle; a strife between what is human and what is animal in the human being. Finally, Agamben makes a suggestion that seems tailored for the Homeric horse:

“Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has awakened *from* its own captivation *to* its own captivation. This awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human.”²⁸

Inhabiting this open space of *ethics* has been the central argument of this thesis.²⁹

²² Giorgio Agamben, *The Open, Man and Animal*, translated by Kevin Attell, Edited by Werner Hamcher, Meridian, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 54.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, Studies in Continental Thought, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 159-160. Cited in: Agamben, *The Open, Man and Animal*, p. 58.

²⁵ “The guiding thread of Heidegger’s exposition is constituted by the triple thesis: “the stone is worldless [weltlos]; the animal is poor in the world [weltarm; man is world forming [weltbildend].”” Agamben, *The Open, Man and Animal*, p. 51.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70 [emphasis in the original].

²⁹ “[T]he animal possesses this being-open in its essence.” Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, Studies in Continental Thought, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, pp. 269-270. Cited in: Agamben, *The Open, Man and Animal*, p. 55.

Instead of a Conclusion: Inhabiting the Open



...
When the child was a child
It was enough for it to eat an apple, ... bread
And so it is even now.
When the child was a child
Berries filled its hand as only berries do
and do even now
Fresh walnuts made its tongue raw
and do even now
it had, on every mountaintop, the longing for a higher mountain yet
and in every city, the longing for an even greater city
and that is still so
It reached for cherries in topmost branches of trees
with an elation it still has today
has a shyness in front of strangers
and has that even now.
It awaited the first snow
And waits that way even now.

Peter Handke
Song to Childhood

.1 Meta-thesis¹

.1.1 Summary of the thesis

And here is my introduction, at the wrong end of thesis, so you've had to come out of your way to find it.²

Eric Laurier, *City of Glas/z*

This thesis dealt with one core question: Can Ethics be taught in the schools of architecture? This question was posited in the introduction of the thesis, indicating the importance of this inquiry and its increased popularity nowadays. These popular views point Ethics towards ecological and humanitarian aspects of architecture or the codes of conduct take the positive answer to this question for granted. The introduction, though, presented two philosophical positions that argued for the impossibility of teaching Ethics. The one argument came from Plato who argued in his dialogue *Meno* that Ethics (*aretē*) cannot be taught and more importantly it cannot be known at all. The second argument came from Wittgenstein who argued that Ethics cannot be even expressed and should remain in silence. The introduction of the thesis also presented how this question has been treated so far in the scholarship of architecture, pointing to a gap in the existing literature.

Chapter 1 of the thesis introduced the method of approaching the original question, through the usage of situations of case studies (practice-games). It presented an example of an educational situation from the design studio where issues of Ethics were discussed, such as the 'Ethics of Borderlands.' Ethnomethodology, with its strong connections with later-Wittgenstein's thought, was found to be a solid ground or starting point for framing the empirical analysis of the thesis. Nevertheless, specific issues were raised for the relationship between practice and theory as it has been radically challenged by various ethnomethodologists. This thesis adopted a double method of approaching the question, both through the ethnomethodological

¹ metathesis, n. "Change or reversal of condition" Oxford English Dictionary Online, Draft Version June 2008, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00307577?single=1&query_type=word&query_word=metathesis&first=1&max_to_show=10 [Accessed 28. 06. 2008]

² Eric Laurier, "City of Glas/Z," Thesis for the PhD, Univeristy of Whales, 1996, http://web.ges.gla.ac.uk/~elaurier/WWW_thesis/against_intro.html [accessed 27. 06. 2008].

studies and through philosophical inquiry. Apart from the design studios of the University of Edinburgh, this chapter also introduced two other educational places: the class *Music in the Community* from the same institution; and the *dojo* of *L'Art du Chi* with its teaching of the Japanese martial art *aikido*. The various degrees of exotic otherness was chosen in order to inform the familiar (to the architects) design studio in order to see it with 'new eyes.'

Chapter 2 presented examples of educational situations from the two other case studies and it presented their historical, cultural and philosophical background. There *Music in the Community* involved a very new way of interaction between the institution of the university and the community with very strong Ethical aspects. On the other hand, the *dojo* was found to have its roots embedded within the history of the East having explicit connections with Ethics through the 'prototypical' handling of human conflict. At the same time though it was acknowledged that the *dojo* of *L'Art du Chi* is a contemporary institution which challenges its oriental origins. There possible concerns were also addressed about the orientalist approach of this study.

With the educational situations in mind, chapter 3 established a difference between the terms *morality* and *ethics* following a twofold trajectory. The first trajectory, through an etymological research, associated *morality* with a notion of explicit rules, and *ethics* with a notion of addiction, custom, disposition and habit. Habit led to the concepts habitat, dwelling and *inhabitation of ethics* – the title of this thesis. Furthermore, from the Homeric example of the horse breaking loose from the stable, in order to return to the places where it used to live, *ethics* was associated with a notion of animality and *morality* was associated with a notion of humanism. The second trajectory presented two philosophical arguments by MacIntyre and Lagueux who presented different aspects of Ethics as external and internal to a practice. By combining these two arguments this chapter came to suggest that *morality* is related to a notion of externality while *ethics* with a notion of internality.

Chapter 4 explored the area of human conduct where Ethics becomes manifested. Starting from Aristotle's categorical division of human action into *theoria*, *poesis* and *praxis*, the chapter dealt with this triptych by breaking it down into two common pairs. *praxis* as contrasted to *theoria* and then *praxis* as contrasted with *poesis*. The early examples from the educational situations, introduced in the previous chapters, were discussed this time in greater detail. *Praxis*, the mere activity of doing something that does not have any other aim apart from the action itself, was found to be the main activity that operates in the realm *ethics*. *Praxis* is inhabiting *ethics*.

At last, Chapter 5 examined the way that *morality* and *ethics* are formed. It presented further situations from the key studies in order to find that *morality* is mainly formed through disruptions that lead to reflection. On the other hand, *ethics* is mainly formed through repetition of mimetic practices. The composite terms of 'reflective disruption' and 'repetitive mimesis,' thus, were found to be generators of *morality* and *ethics*. Finally, this discussion led to a possible relationship between the *morality* and *ethics*, through the notion of truth. In the phenomenological philosophical tradition truth has been discussed as *aletheia*, a process of revealing and concealing. *Morality* then was proposed to be a revelatory mechanism where aspects of Ethics become explicit,³ while on the other hand *ethics* is a concealing mechanism that draws a veil over their consciousness.

.1.2 Summary of the thesis (once more, with feeling)

And when we try to stop expressing it, words are successful.⁴
David Shapiro, *November Twenty Seventh*

A *thesis* is an affirmation, not a question. Yet the original question still remains raised: Can Ethics be taught in the schools of architecture? This thesis defended a

³ See for example the revelatory 'ethical imperatives' in Le Corbusier's early purist writings and the connections that Weston draws between the ville Radieuse and the Celestial city of Revelation. In: Dagmar Motycka Weston, "The Lantern and the Glass: On the Themes of Renewal and Dwelling in Le Corbusier's Purist Art and Architecture," in *Modernism and the Spirit of the City*, ed. Iain Boyd Whyte, London: Routledge, 2003, 146-178, pp. 148-149.

⁴ David Shapiro 'November Twenty Seventh' in John Hejduk et al., *Education of an Architect : The Irwin S. Chanin School of Architecture of the Cooper Union*, New York: Rizzoli, 1988, p. 128.

hypothesis that sought an affirmative answer to this question. Having established the distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, this thesis is now in position to suggest that it is possible only for *ethics* and not *morality*, to be acquired. This distinction—that has been suggested in some form or another by a number of philosophers—was proposed in order to cunningly surpass an obstacle that seemed to stop this research before it could even start. This obstacle was Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s antithesis that prohibits any chance for the knowledge, communication and teachability of Ethics. The two philosophers, covering virtually the entire span of Western philosophy, suggested that the problem in any attempt of teaching Ethics lies in the inherent incommunicability of Ethical propositions, since they are senseless (*sinnlos* in Wittgenstein’s terms). Nevertheless, this is exactly the problem of teaching *morality*, since this is the part of Ethics that is based on reflection, conscious evaluations and deliberation; all characteristics of humanism. This fact was confirmed by finding *morality* to be expressed in the activities of *theoria*, characterised by reflection, and *poiēsis* characterised by a *telos* that lies outside the activity itself. Both theoretical reflection and teleological justification give *morality* an appearance of rational logic, that by definition it does not have. For this reason, every attempt to teach *moral* values through a rationalised and systematic curriculum is doomed to fail. *Morality* is not geometry or mathematics and so any claim to *moral* teachings (like the Ethics of Borderlands) will always be questionable for being otherwise.

In contrast, *ethics*, having abandoned any claim to teach anything since it is based on unconscious evaluations, can do exactly this: teach Ethics. Customs, dispositions and prejudices, through habitual *praxis* come to find a home in the animality of *ethics* and communicate Ethical meanings (like the embodied concepts of privacy conveyed through the Victorian Doors).⁵ *Praxis*, the bottom ground of the Aristotelian activities, becomes then the bearer of such Ethical meanings. Through mere *praxis*

⁵ The call of this thesis to inhabit ethics, redefines architecture itself from drawing the attention from the pillar of fire to that of the nest as described by Ballantyne. “If what we want architects to do is to design mainly ordinary buildings, then an entirely different kind of history is needed involving reevaluation of all values – an ethics which would be new to architecture – which would see modest repetition as praiseworthy, and extravagance as something to be condemned.” Andrew Ballantyne, “The Nest and the Pillar of Fire,” in *What Is Architecture?*, ed. Andrew Ballantyne, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2002, 7-52, p. 48.

the animal human finds a place to dwell in *ethics*. Repetitive mimesis then is found to be a way that leads to the formation of *ethics*. By hijacking on activities of *praxis*, being parasitical to the aim that lies in the activity itself, then meanings of *ethics* are constantly acquired through the acquisition of habits. It is the background that is known by all parties and for this reason it is unnoticed, similar to the common repertoire shared between the writer and the reader. This common background inaugurates, according to Ricoeur, “between them a community of meaning preliminary to any entering onto fiction. This repertory attests to the fact that the condition of action and suffering, far from being ineffable is always already understood.”⁶ So, it is not strange that this practical education very often takes place in silence, or in-between the words that are exchanged during the dialogical processes of education. Dialogue itself as an attitude towards education, and not so much as the content of the words exchanged, was found to contain notions of *ethics*. As Appelbaum points out the background of speech is not silence: “The background of speech becomes audible only in the silence of speech.”⁷ In this background of the educational activity, *ethics* is communicated, and for this *inhabited*.

To give ear to inner speech weakens the drive to produce words. At the same time, receptivity grows aware of both an absence of meaning and the cause of absence. The void of meaning is due to lack of an arche name, an I who speaks. No one speaks in inner speech, yet speaking inaudibly goes on. Because an I who speaks is missing from inner speech it cannot be stopped –unless by an I who speaks.⁸

.1.3 Contribution of this thesis

So, how can this thesis be used and applied? What shall we do in order to teach Ethics more effectively? What shall we do in order to become better learners? What are the implications for architectural education? Is the whole popular discussion of architectural Ethics through ecological and humanitarian perspectives, and the discussion about Codes of Professional Conduct all wrong? Are the teachers in the

⁶ Paul Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation," in *A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdes, New York et. al.: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 (1980), p. 141.

⁷ David Appelbaum, *Disruption*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*

key studies good in their job? Are the situations of this thesis examples and models of good practice? How the situations could have been handled better?

Undoubtedly all these are valid and important questions. Nevertheless, this thesis is not in a position to answer them. This is because the above questions ask for a normative evaluation, judgement and proposal of new ways of action. This thesis, though, has been deliberately descriptive in the presentation of existing situations and has avoided taking a position. This thesis operates at the level of meta-ethics, challenging what we mean when we talk about Ethics, examining simultaneously how the members of the educational places perform and negotiate Ethics. This thesis is very similar to the work of an anthropologist who goes to a remote local tribe in order to study them, without performing judgments about their local customs. This kind of work seeks new understandings of the subject matter, here the education of architecture. Both the ethnomethodological⁹ and the philosophical¹⁰ character of this study affirm the same attitude of careful observation, leaving things intact. Having said that, the findings of this thesis that bring forth an *inhabiting* of *ethics* point towards a direction of action that is not insignificant and requires rethinking the current practices of architectural education. But this evaluation of current practices is part of a different study. The starting point of this new study will be the fact that this call to *inhabit ethics* identifies *morality* to be the privileged way of seeing Ethics rooted in theory and poetics.¹¹ In contrast, *ethics* is an action of *praxis*, where the aim is part and parcel of the activity itself. Due to this, the thesis resists the provision of a

⁹ “Ethnomethodological studies are not directed to formulating or arguing correctives.” Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. viii. Moreover, Laurier argues that “[l]ike Wittgenstein’s approach to language, ethnomethodology does not seek greater mastery of practice nor to correct practice. Its promises of leaving everything as it found it may be refreshing compared to the reductive explanations, a priori politics, or moral superiority of much critical theory.” Eric Laurier, “The Spectacular Showing: Houdini and the Wonders of Ethnomethodology,” *Human Studies*, 27, 2004: 377-399, p. 384.

¹⁰ Here I am aware of the difference of my stance with a particular philosophical view that originates in Marx’s famous claim that philosophy should change the world (*Thesis on Feuerbach*, No. 11). More about this view and the tradition of Critical Theory is discussed later on.

¹¹ Andrew Ballantyne accepting the thesis of Deleuze and Guatari (as bulletpointed by Foucault) proceeds into providing such a theory. “The idea of this book is not to promote a set of shapes for architects to use, but a set of ideas that can be brought into play. The overriding ideas that make the atmosphere in which decisions are taken make up a system of values – an ethos – and in this sense the book is a work of ethics.” Andrew Ballantyne, *Architecture Theory, a Reader in Philosophy and Culture*, London & New York: Continuum, 2005, p. 34.

theory for application, as the above questions request. The argument of this thesis is that *ethics* cannot be applied; they are inhabited in *praxis*. For this reason, the Ethical load is carried not by a theory, but by the shoulders of every single individual who acts and performs in the specific situations.

According to this viewpoint, this thesis contributes significantly to the existing scholarship of the topic. The limited research that has been conducted so far on connecting Ethics and architecture has only marginally discussed the fundamental role that education plays in the formation of architectural Ethics. The previous research has focused mainly on issues of Ethics that pertain the production (design processes, construction, sustainability) and the consumption (understanding, appreciation, conservation) of architecture. However, the two main contributors in the field, Karsten Harries and Alberto Pérez-Gómez have repeatedly pointed out the need to turn the attention to the education of the architects. This thesis is an attempt to address exactly this need. This thesis is also unique in the *way* that it has approached the issue of Ethics. This was done not only through an exploration of philosophy, but mainly through the way that the members of the educational practices produce and negotiate notions of Ethics in their everyday practices. For this, ethnomethodology has proved to be of invaluable help, not as a secondary tool, but as a primary approach towards the subject matter. Ethnomethodology allowed for the approach of the educational setting from the inside, without ignoring the wider context. At the same time, the juxtaposition of the design studio with the ‘exotic’ *dojo* and the Music in Community class achieved a desired estrangement that allowed the familiar to the architects design studio to be revisited with ‘new’ eyes. Although this study focused mainly on architecture, its findings transgress the disciplinary fields and most of its conclusions have relevance for virtually every educational activity. Moreover, one can imagine the potential of conducting similar studies in other educational environments that can deepen and enrich the understandings of Ethics in these fields.

This research contributes also to the field of philosophy by bringing together, for the first time, Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s comments about the impossibility of teaching

Ethics. As I have shown, a number of scholars have pointed towards a connection between the two philosophers, but no explicit connection has been drawn between their views of Ethics and its education. In philosophy again, this thesis brought together for the first time the arguments of two other philosophers, MacIntyre and Lagueux, arguing for the a connection between the way that they distinguish external and internal goods in a practice and external and internal ethical problems in a practice. Finally, although the philosophical distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, as we saw, has been already suggested by a number of different philosophers, it has never been exploited in architectural scholarship. This thesis though, did not merely borrow a ready-made scheme that was then applied to the discipline of architecture, but in some sense it invented the scheme from the beginning, by exploiting the slight difference in the meaning implied by the etymology of the words. Through this original research, *ethics* came to acquire the animal characteristics suggested by Homer through his insightful passage that assimilated Paris with a horse. This passage, which to my awareness is discussed for the first time here in connection to Ethics, supports the suggestion that *ethics* is the haunts of the animals, the place where they are accustomed to dwell. Within this place of *ethics*, this thesis welcomes the reader to dwell.

.1.4 Limitations of this thesis and thoughts for further research

Oh dear, this conclusion will never do; we must have made some mistake. What was it?¹²

I. M. Crombie, *Socratic Definition*

Despite the abovementioned positive contributions of this thesis to the body of existing scholarship, there are a number of issues that this research has not been able to tackle, but it is aware of their existence. One such issue is methodological and is connected with the unconventional way that this research used both ethnomethodology and philosophy to challenge Ethics. One can see a criticism arising from the side of ethnomethodology that some parts of this research –the more

¹² I. M. Crombie, "Socratic Definition," in *Plato's Meno in Focus*, ed. Jane Mary Day, New York: Routledge, 1994, 172-207, p. 199.

philosophical ones—have been applied to the empirical situations of the case studies. For example, it can be argued that even the fundamental distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, has not been derived from the situations themselves, but it has been applied to them. On the other hand, one can imagine the philosophers being bored by the detailed descriptions and the painstaking emphasis on what actually takes place during the situations; or even find that the case studies are not always very illustrative of the theoretical arguments, confirming them fully. Being aware of this potential problem, the response of this thesis has been a pursuit of right proportions rather than of absolute extremes. This does not mean that the answer lies in a boring and uninteresting ‘happy medium.’ On the contrary, this thesis has been to both extremes of the spectrum in an attempt to radicalise conceptions of Ethics in architecture. For this, some potential disjointedness is not necessarily a drawback. The fact that the case studies do not reaffirm a potential superstructure means that maybe the *praxis* does not correspond to *theory*. But after the preceded analysis of these terms, it would be a total correspondence that should raise more suspicions. After the weaving the rug is left with loose strings hanging around without an obvious way of a clean and polished finish. These strings though, could be seen as a gesture to welcome others to become engaged and participate in a dialogue, not necessarily to finish a pre-existing design, but to keep the weaving of this tapis going.

Another issue that I can see as needing further clarification has to do with the way that the term ‘consciousness’ has been used in the distinction between *morality* and *ethics*, in the context of this thesis. Often I have implied that *morality* consists of conscious evaluations, while *ethics* derives from an unconscious field. By that I referred to a notion of awareness, in its everyday meaning. Nevertheless, I am aware that the way this term has been used here lacks a theoretical depth adequate of the importance of the term in a vast variety of fields, and especially in philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis. At the same time, the vast diversity in the usage of the term has discouraged a thorough research in the context of this study. David Appelbaum in particular, whose little known philosophical work has been of great help for this thesis, has indicated very interesting ways to understand consciousness

in the realm of Ethics. For example, when he argues that “[to] locate the ethical within the frame of discourse of consciousness is to dislocate it from the disruptive other,”¹³ The unconscious as the Freudian *id* is also another huge topic closely related with this ‘undiscussed’ discussion. Appelbaum again argues for a somatic consciousness of the unconscious. “Disrupted, reminded of its affinity to the soma, consciousness moves, develops tempo, sets a rhythm, follows a cadence –it rediscovers difference.”¹⁴ Any further research should proceed with a thorough study of the term in its connection to the distinction between *morality* and *ethics*.

Finally, the most important issue that this thesis has puzzled over for long, without having dealt with it properly, has to do with the political consequences of the distinction between *morality* and *ethics*. If, as I argue throughout this thesis, what is needed in architectural education is to inhabit *ethics*, meaning to focus on the habits, the customs, the dispositions and the prejudices of everyday life, then what is the role of *morality* that aims to emancipate human being? In other words, what happens when these habits, customs, dispositions and prejudices lead to (architectural) actions that are Ethically bad? What should be the response when bourgeois architects who have been habituated (through a ‘Beaux Art’ type of architectural schooling) into sectioning off and ghettoing “our ‘mad’ folk from our ‘not mad’ folk; our intelligent folk, from our stupid folk; blacks from the whites,” as Dorian suggested in the very first situation in the design studio? Is it not, that Dorian’s response is an education in *morality*, which attempts to ‘awaken’ the students and make them politically active and aware of their design decisions? Is it not the reflective character of education in *morality* the proper response to such problems? Is it not though language and the dialectic of theses that can lead to an elevation towards a better and more just society? To express it as Adorno would: Is it not through an enlightenment, which is in possession of itself, that the bounds of enlightenment can break?¹⁵ How can *ethics* provide any substantial response?

¹³ Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. ix. See also pp. 54-55, 154

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁵ “Enlightenment which is in possession of itself and coming to power can break the bounds of enlightenment.” Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Verso Classics, London, New York: Verso, 1997, p. 208.

This very important issue that dialectically undermines this thesis is maybe the most significant criticism that I can see rising from this research. Although a thorough answer would require a new thesis being written, with a new set of references that could support an argumentation, here, I can only hint towards a possible response. First of all, I agree with the diagnosis of the problem that architects through their habits very often turn out to be mindless operators of a political strife, of which they are ignorant and most commonly, are not willing to know more about. Their interest being narrowly focused on playing with form, often neglects their political role. I also agree that architectural education has a huge role to play into forming the political identity of architects-to-be; their education in a large extent defines the way that they see architecture and the world in general. Nevertheless, reflection alone, I argue, cannot liberate the human being from the constraints of all hegemonic power.¹⁶ The problem actually is that the humanist promise for total emancipation and total enlightenment *is the very problem* that has caused so much inhumanity on the face of earth.¹⁷ What is needed is a common ground similar to that which Ricoeur pointed out between the reader and the writer in his definition of mimesis₁. Asking for a mimesis₃ that will change the world is not possible without this fundamental background of common dispositions. In this direction, the dialogue between Gadamer and Habermas is of invaluable importance to be pursued further. In brief, Habermas' criticism of Gadamer, is that any prejudice should be carefully examined and until then should be treated as suspect, which means without critical reflection there is no way to achieve emancipation.¹⁸ On the other hand, Gadamer criticises

¹⁶ "We must recognize that there cannot be any critique without some sort of affirmation, that we cannot avoid asking the question, 'critique in the name of what?'" Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 318. In educational context see: Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, Edited by Dennis J. Schmidt, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p. 262. Also Richard Coyne, "Deconstructing the Curriculum, Radical Hermeneutics and Professional Education," *EAR (Edinburgh Architecture Research)*, 23, 1996, p. 15.

¹⁷ "The essence of enlightenment is the alternative whose ineradicability is that of domination. Men have always had to choose between their subjection to nature or the subjection of nature to the Self." Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 32.

¹⁸ Jürgen Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," in *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method*, ed. Joseph Bleicher, Boston: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1980. See also the criticism of the wider Heideggerian philosophical tradition from Critical Theory in Adam Sharr, *Heidegger for Architects*, Edited by Adam Sharr, Thinkers for Architects, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, pp. 111-112.

Habermas for retreating back to Cartesian ideals and normative discourses and that what is needed is an ethical spirit of solidarity and ethical customs that are shared amongst a community.¹⁹

Obviously the disposition of this thesis is closer to the Gadamerian argumentation rather than to Habermas, and obviously this thesis is not in a position to give a final dissolution to this dialogue, if there is any. Nevertheless, I would like to point out here the possibilities of a quite different trajectory that utilises the findings of this thesis about the animal nature of *ethics*. This trajectory comes from the radical politicization suggested by Giorgio Agamben who argues that the problem of contemporary politics lies in the ‘total management’ of the human animality, through genome, global economy and humanitarian ideology.²⁰ In his words, “the decisive political conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of man.”²¹ By radicalising Aristotle’s definition of man and Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, Agamben comes to suggest that the distinction between human and animal, is based upon a constitutive political act.²² In this way, giving voice to the voiceless²³ is a fundamental Ethical act, which I would like to see extended especially in *ethics*. In some sense, this thesis was an attempt to give voice to the voiceless, animal part of *ethics*.

Nevertheless, there is a particular part in Agamben’s argument that is puzzling and undermines this thesis’ foundation of *ethics* on *praxis*. Agamben (based on Varro)

¹⁹ “...the proponents of the critique of ideology always appeal to psychoanalysis, the psychoanalytic overcoming of such losses of identity. ...By reflection, by the completion of enlightenment, and in a conversation free of coercion, the repressions and social deformations would be dismantled—with the aim, as, say, Habermas formulates it, of realizing communicative competence. ...But of course the model of psychoanalysis aims at the reinsertion of the disturbed individual into an already existing, communicatively interconnected society. This is evident in that psychoanalysis presupposes the patient’s insight that he or she is sick. A psychoanalytic treatment could never be successful if someone were to pursue this course with resistance and involuntarily and without any real sense of his genuine helplessness.” Hans Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press, 1981, p. 79.

²⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *The Open, Man and Animal*, translated by Kevin Attell, Edited by Werner Hamcher, Meridian, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 77.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

²² Rene ten Bos, "On the Possibility of Formless Life, Agamben's Politics of Gesture," *Ephemera*, 5, no. 1, 2005: 26-44, p. 33.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

extends the Aristotelian threefold division of human activities to a fourth one, that of *gesture*. In a puzzling quote, Agamben argues that if *poiesis* is a means in view of an end and *praxis* is an end without means, then gesture is *purely means without any ends*.²⁴ Although this proposition has a great potential for this thesis, in that *morality* is being paralysed, leaving open the field for *ethics*, I find the description of *praxis* as ‘end without means’ quite problematic. This is because *praxis*, as I have described in chapter 4, is *both means and ends* that are embodied in the same activity and not just ends as Agamben suggests. Despite this fact though, Agamben’s notion of gesture is extremely important in its potential to radicalise politics, since it stands on the other side of commodity²⁵ and in its potential to show what cannot be talked²⁶ about – here *ethics* — there is an explicit connection to Wittgenstein’s notion of the inexpressible or the mystic.²⁷ “Only, in an almost silent or, perhaps better, in a formless and night-to animal-like theatre are people able to go beyond representation and communication.”²⁸ So to return back to the original political question, of course it is important to try to teach an Ethical meaning of what architecture should be like, an architecture in the Ethics of the Borderlands. It is in vain, though, to try to establish this teaching in the rationalization of pure theoretical reflection. On the contrary, the challenge of such a teaching is to give form, realize and embody – literally and

²⁴ “What characterises gesture is that in it nothing is being produced or acted, but rather something is being endured and supported. The gesture, in other words, opens the sphere of ethos as the more proper sphere of that which is human. ... What is new in Varro is the identification of a third type of action alongside the other two: if producing is a means in view of an end and *praxis* is an end without means, the gesture then breaks with the false alternative between ends and means that paralyzes morality and presents instead means that, as such, evade the orbit of mediality without becoming, for this reason, ends.” Giorgio Agamben, Vincenzo Binetti, and Cesare Casarino, *Means without End: Notes on Politics*. Vol. 20, Theory out of Bounds, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 57.

²⁵ Bos, "On the Possibility of Formless Life, Agamben's Politics of Gesture," p. 37.

²⁶ “The gesture is, in this sense, communication of a communicability. It has precisely nothing to say because what it shows is the being-in-language of human beings as pure mediality. However, because being-in-language is not something that could be said in sentences, the gesture is essentially always a gesture of not being able to figure something out in language; it is always a gag in the proper meaning of the term, indicating first of all something that could be put in your mouth to hinder speech, as well as in the sense of the actor’s improvisation meant to compensate loss of memory or an inability to speak.” Agamben, Binetti, and Casarino, *Means without End: Notes on Politics*, p. 59.

²⁷ “The Wittgensteinian definition of the mystic as the appearing of what cannot be said is literally a definition of the gag. And every great philosophical text is the gag exhibiting language itself, being-in-language itself as a gigantic loss of memory, as an incurable speech defect.” *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁸ Bos, "On the Possibility of Formless Life, Agamben's Politics of Gesture," p. 41.

metaphorically — such conceptions of gesture, through the habits, the prejudices and the dispositions in its human-nonhuman intertwining²⁹ in order to inhabit the open field of *ethics*. “To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man” says Agamben, lies not into looking for “new — more effective or more authentic — articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that — within man — separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness...”³⁰



Figure 111: Homer's horse without the frame of the vase

.1.5 Releasing the Open

The openness of ethics is not like a door opening welcome or a field in readiness, but like the openness of a wound that would not heal. It is the openness of skin being open, of abrasion and incision, of inflammation that festers, of pain and injury, of invasion.³¹

David Appelbaum, *Disruption*

I shall leave this research open – instead of concluding it – with some thoughts about Peter Handke's poem *Song to Childhood*³² that embraces this thesis. The poem *opens* this thesis and accompanies the articulation of its chapters, that is, its disruptions.

²⁹ Stacy Alaimo, "This Is About Pleasure, an Ethics of Inhabiting," in *Architecture, Ethics and the Personhood of Place*, ed. Gregory Caicco, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2007, 151-172, p. 167.

³⁰ Agamben, *The Open, Man and Animal*, p. 92.

³¹ Appelbaum, *Disruption*, p. 116.

³² The poem was written specifically for the movie *the Wings of Desire (Der Himmel über Berlin)* that was released in 1987, where Handke co-authored the screenplay with the director Wim Wenders.

This poem can be associated with the context of this thesis through a variety of ways, like the mundane and everyday activities of a child; the explicit philosophical background of a child's questions about good and evil; or the educational aspects that intervene so that a child becomes an adult. Nevertheless, I will only briefly stress the twelfth line (here presented in the opening of Chapter 2) where it is stated that when the child was a child "it had no opinion about anything, *had no habits*." From this line, the poem appears to be nostalgic towards a pure childhood, an angel's desire to "experience the world with a childlike wonder."³³ No matter how poetically appealing, I will resist this interpretation. According to the argument of this thesis, one is inhabiting the habitual notion of *ethics* from the very moment of birth (or even before birth, through the repetitive patterns of sleep and awakedness of the first embryonic life). One acquires habits even before coming to be born.³⁴ Maybe this is why babies cry when their lungs are being 'burned' by the first contact with the air of this world.³⁵ So children do have habits and for this reason romanticising of childhood for its purity misses the point. Arguably this is indicated by the change of the nostalgic tone towards the end of the poem (the *opening* of this 'conclusion'). There, with less romanticism – but not less poetically – the grown up adult "even now" is described to await the first snow in the same way as when was a child. There is no Ethically neutral childhood. The child may often not have 'opinion' about things, in the sense of a structured argumentation or rational –that is *morality* – but it definitely has habits, even before it is born. The child inhabits the open area of *ethics* even before it comes to inhabit this world. Nevertheless, the child as an uneducated human can be seen as representative of the animal state of the human that has not been enculturated. So, the child is a reference to the area of *ethics* which remains open (like a wound), 'even now' for the mature adult.

³³ David Caldwell and Paul Rea, "Handke's and Wenders's Wings of Desire: Transcending Postmodernism," *Focus: Literature and Film*, 64, no. 1, 1991: pp. 46-54, p. 46.

³⁴ Malcom Forbes is famously quoted to have said that the purpose of education is to replace an empty mind with an open one. This progressive and open-minding view is illustrative of the potential of openness in the context of education. Nevertheless, there is something unsettling in the idea of substituting emptiness with openness. It starts with a conception of human, and especially a child, as having an empty mind.

³⁵ See also Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit*, London: Trubner, 1878, p. 59. Note also the similarities with Hanke's poem: "Can we show that all the acquired action of childhood and after-life, which we now do unconsciously, or without conscious exercise of the will, are familiar acts –acts which we have already done a very great number of times?" Butler, *Life and Habit*, p. 48.

All these and even more would be arguments to justify the placement of this poem in the major openings or cracks of this thesis. Because a thesis is supposed to justify everything, tie everything neatly together “in a unified body of work.”³⁶ Paradoxically, though, Handke’s poem and young Danai’s drawings resist this closure. They embrace the thesis by opening it up, letting fresh air to come in. This embracement is not bounding but releasing, like a hug from a long awaited lover. The poem and the drawings show what is inexpressible and still today remains open.

When the child was a child
It threw a stick like a lance against a tree,
And it quivers there still today.

Peter Handke, *Song to Childhood*



³⁶ *Postgraduate Assessment Regulations for Research Degrees*, The University of Edinburgh, 2007, p. 25.

.1.6 Prosthesis: Reflecting on a course of Ethics in an architectural curriculum

.1.6.1 Explaining the asynchronicity

This postscript discusses a possible course that deals with Ethics in architecture. As it has been already argued extensively, this thesis' ethnomethodological and philosophical approach to research was deliberate in not aiming to provide suggestions, nor correctives for architectural education. Its task was a rediscovery of the meaning of Ethics for the students and the teachers of architecture aiming towards a 'better' understanding. This prosthetic afterword is not aiming to undermine the attitude followed so far in the thesis. On the contrary, it is rather an afterthought that describes the forming of a course while still being under the strong influence of the ideas discussed in this thesis and concludes with some re-evaluating remarks. The course described hereafter is neither presented as a prescription to be followed nor as a logical necessity after the reader's acceptance of the preceded thesis. It should be clear that the course is not the *necessary* outcome of the thesis and the thesis is not the theory that was applied onto the course. On the contrary, as the reader will come to understand, this course has some fundamental flaws that, in some sense, make it an example to be avoided and thus learned from. Furthermore, the course is presented here as a next step of inquiry and research after the writing of the main body of this thesis. Thus, this subchapter is an add-on, a prosthetic member that indicates a possible way of evolution of the research that was done within the boundaries of this thesis, pointing towards the future. This disjointed member is aware of the risk of acceptance of the main body. Their separateness and their proximity, shows the asynchronic character of the two modes of inquiry (writing a thesis and setting up a course), and the possibilities of the transformation of the one into the other. This asynchronicity is the development of the ideas of the author in time (and space). For this, this prosthesis should be read as the author's quest to connect two subsequent steps in thinking and in life, that most often lack smooth transition. Nevertheless, the quest of a common thread in ones' thinking interestingly reveals various hidden knots and discontinuities that can be revealing for the preceding thesis. This is why it is herein included.

.1.6.2 The description of the course

The course was taught during the academic year 2008-2009 in the University of Patras, Greece, where the author was employed as an adjunct lecturer, immediately after having completed the writing of the main body of this thesis. The course was an optional module for advanced students, mainly in their 4th and 5th year of study in architectural design. Before knowing the general title, and the direction of the course that was going to be followed, my intention was to teach a ‘practical’ studio course where the students would have to design a small project (most likely a coffee shop), which would be ‘philosophically informed’ by the concepts of habit and addiction. Finally, I came to know just before the beginning of the semester that the general title of the module was ‘*Special Topics in Architectural Theory and Urban Planning*’ and it should be ‘theoretical’ and lecture-based. Having to set up a new course in literally no time, I decided to exploit the theoretical background of this thesis by breaking it down in its two methodological premises, (philosophy and ethnomethodology). The reason for dividing the two methods of inquiry, after interweaving them *in* the thesis, was in order to simplify the content of each course to suit undergraduate standards and to satisfy the academic need for the creation of two separate and subsequent courses for the two semesters of the academic year.

The second semester is taking place while these lines are being written and is titled “*Ethnomethodology and the Inhabitation of Architecture*” and since it is still under development it is not so easy to reflect upon and evaluate. So, here, I am going to focus on the course of the first semester, which I gave the specialized title “*Sections in the Ethics of Architecture*.” The title and the overall formation of the course are very much based on the first situation of the design studio –that opened this thesis– where Dorian discussed with the students the meaning of architectural section. More specifically, the course aimed at giving a possible response to the proposed phrase: “under the Ethics of borderlands you would have to draw an in-relation; you’d have to change the title of our orthographic tradition to draw in-relations.”¹ In order to concretise this conceptual view of section (and despite the ‘theoretical’ and lecture based character of the course), the students were given the practical task of drawing a

¹ See the situation ‘Ethics in Borderlands’ in Chapter 1, p. 52.

section in a part of the city of Patras. After each lecture throughout the semester, there was a discussion about the sections and the development of their drawing. As part of the examination process, the students were expected to hand-in this drawing together with a paper analysing the Ethical aspects of the drawing and the representation techniques, and supporting their design proposal. Here is how the course was described in an early handout:

The class sees itself as an anatomical theater in which the body of architecture is being dissected so that the Ethical aspects of design can be examined. The starting point to this series of sections becomes the philosophical proposition that the inherent social aspects of architecture raise Ethical issues. Architectural space envelops (and simultaneously is generated from) the con-frontation/co-habitation of the self with the Other. Especially in the city scale, the act of design expresses social and political clash. Through design (no matter the scale) the architect is expected to propose attitudes about the way that people come together and perform socially. Every drawn line corresponds to ‘realised’ limits, the handling of which is architectural issue of highest order.²




Figure 112: The emblem of the course (created by the author)

The introduced metaphor of the class as being an anatomy-theatre is not an arbitrary one. The course proposed a hypothesis that sees the first architectural drawings of sections as taking place in parallel with the birth of human anatomy in the era of scientific revolution in Western Europe. For this, the course was built around nine basic themes that seek to provide the students with a basic philosophical background of Ethics in philosophy, as well as the theoretical background of the premises that

² Koutsoumpos, L. (2008-2009). Special Topics in Architectural Theory and Urban Planning'. Architecture, University of Patras.

opened the era of modernity based on the fundamental concepts of humanism, enlightenment, and rationalism. These nine themes were as follows: 1- A general introduction to the notion of Ethics in architecture and an overview of the history of anatomy. 2- A first attempt to define Ethics and the distinction between *morality* and *ethics*. 3- The section as an analytical tool and categorising as a fundamental architectural activity. 4- Architecture as *praxis* (beyond *theoria* and *poiêsis*) and the architectural drawing as gesture. 5- The caesarean-section-birth of the nation-state during the 18th and 19th century and the Greek nationalism. 6- The state of exception: The refugee as the paradigmatic case of citizen and the concentration camp as paradigmatic case of the city. 7- The encounter of the Other on the border, as it has been described in the wider phenomenological tradition. 8- The concept of *aporia* and the Ethics of dwelling the borderlines. 9- The ineffability of Ethics and the importance for the architects of retreating into the silent gesture of the drawing. Although the curriculum seems heavily loaded into theory and philosophy the main aim of the course was to provoke the active dialogue of the participants. And although they were warned about the content of the course, they were also set at ease by stating that: “these provocations will refer often to philosophy, knowledge of which is neither taken for granted, nor is a prerequisite.”³



Figure 113: The area of study

³ Ibid.

As I have already mentioned the section was dissecting a part of the city centre of Patras on its coastal borderline. The section cuts through the Central Train station of Patras; Othonos-Amalias street, a main axis of Patras that runs along its coastline; Hotel Acropole that lies on the other side of the street opposite to the train station; and the port of the city behind the train station. So the drawing should start from the Hotel Acropole (including it) and should end up in the port including the sea. The section was to be drawn in an overall scale of 1:100, although it was left open to the students that the scale could be tweaked in specific points in order to make an argument. The media and representation techniques were left open for research and experimentation. The paper that would accompany the drawing was supposed to explain the decisions taken and to describe the overall thesis.




Figure 114: Illegal immigrants in front of the border

The site under examination was purposefully chosen to be in a ‘sensitive’ part of the city centre because of a prominent architectural boundary between the train station and the port. This boundary is being besieged everyday by hundreds of illegal political refugees (mainly from Afghanistan) who attempt to trespass it in order to get illicitly aboard to ships that depart to Italy and the rest of Western Europe. In order to analyse this phenomenon a considerable part of the course was dedicated to describe the origins of the contemporary nation-states and its border, identifying its historic origins and its criticisms during its development. The students were presented with the concepts of the ‘state of exception’ as it has been analysed in the radical politics of Giorgio Agamben who recognises the *refugee* as a paradigmatic figure of citizen and the *concentration camp* as a paradigmatic figure of the city.


The scope of the exercise was to experiment on the representational possibilities of section, by enriching a plain Cartesian drawing with the Ethical borders (in terms of geometry, geography, politics, economics, etc) that the students would choose to focus upon in this specific part of the city. For this, an essential part of the exercise was the careful examination of the area of study throughout several visits during different times of the day and different conditions. As it was explained to the students, this gradual understanding of the Ethical borders and the enrichment of the drawing starts to become meaningful only after a *necessary abstraction* that takes place after focusing on some specific spatial aspects and inevitably ignoring some others. This process of selection leads to the formation of a thesis, a standpoint, an attitude, or a point of view about the area of study. Arriving to such a thesis was the main aim of the course. This thesis was requested to be described equally by the drawing and the text or as it was described in the hand out: “the process of writing the text and drawing the section *construct* the thesis.” So the exercise could be divided into three separate steps, that most commonly follow this order: 1- the site visit and the tracing of the geometrical characteristics of the space; 2- the drawing of the section; and 3- the writing of the text. Nevertheless, the students were encouraged to break the linearity of this process and experiment with the asynchronicity of the three steps. Basic criterion for the evaluation of the handed-in material was the construction of a solid and enthusiastic thesis. Beyond this, other criteria that supported the thesis was the radicality of the representation; the artistic quality and craftsmanship of the drawing; the systematic and thorough bibliographic reference to other drawings and texts; as well as, the spectrum of ideas recruited to support the thesis.

.1.6.3 Examples of the handed-in material

Here are some selected examples of the handed in material, so that the reader can have a better grasp of the outcomes of the course. In each case the picture is the submitted section and the text that follows is my translation of some selected excerpts that summarise the argument of each drawing.




The Section Line: “What exactly is a section? Is it the process of cutting, is it the result of the cut, both of these or none of them? Performing a section creates two objects. Is it two new objects? Is it the same first object or just two parts of the same original object? ...Maybe this line itself has the answer of what is a section, in the sense that it has all the necessary information about its cause and what object derives from. Maybe the line itself bears the DNA of the object that before the violent separation was one and then became two... It is like our object was divided into three parts, and not in two, the third being the section itself. Lets pretend that the knife took with it an extremely thin slice of the object that was cut and this is the drawn section.”




The Familiar and the Strange: “This area of the city is the place that two worlds meet and coexist. The one just passes by, stops for a while, maybe for a couple of hours, the other continues. The other stays, is visible and the same time invisible. Two parallel worlds... Lives that pass by without the paying attention to each other. It is the Other, the strange the different, the one that stays on the margin and either estranges within the crowd, or passes by unnoticed... I use the sketch as a way to

render a certain moment in time. It is the most immediate mean of representing the first impression of space. ...I gradually start to recognise the user and the densities that they form. ...I add images so that the ones who sees the drawing will be able to travel in space. ...This double use of the medium hints for the existence of two worlds: the familiar and the other. It is a comparison. But still this relationship is somewhere lost, what is the familiar and which the Other? Is it the sketch or the photograph? Is it the immigrants or us, the passengers/inhabitants of this city? Who are the ghosts?"



Making an Urban Text: “An urban text can be a natural structure, like a building, a facade, a monument, or it can be a lived space, a neighbourhood, a park, a street. An urban text can also be some of the official or unofficial ways of representing the city like an architectural drawing, a sketch, a map, a movie. ...Boundaries help us understand our place in space and our personal standpoint in the world. Very often the identity of a space is being formed by something that lies beyond its limits... The city in its different pragmatic or imaginary versions, is simultaneously seen as cursed and accepted, manipulated and praised. Drawing a section in the specific part of the city makes an ‘urban text’ that is a place for contemplation and research of the complexity and fluidity of the city as an urban ‘type,’ aiming towards the possible drawing of future versions.”



Multilayered Section -a Construction: “The section that I built tries to take many different forms, according to the viewer’s perception. Maybe it is the limit between my Ethics and yours. I hope that this limit will bring things together and that it will not raise a wall... Wondering about what takes place under the city’s topography and why no one pays attention to this underground world –if not a world, then network— I realised that there is something that for some people is an important aspect of the city. So, there are some people that in their brief (or not) pass-through the city noted the element of dirt and this was imprinted in their memories. The Kingdom of Dirt could be seen as the city’s sanitary sewer. Through this thought, I came to conclude that the sewer is one of the only elements that runs along the section...”



The Symbols and the Other: “In the drawing I represent the influence of symbols in the life of a ‘stranger.’ ...I refer to symbols having in mind that they contribute in conforming social stereotypes. The social stereotype that in the beginning one has

acquired by an external force, is being reproduced inside him, subject to a self-imposure that functions even beyond ones conscious will. ...I have used two different representation techniques to show two different social realities: the inhabitants of the city who are part of its social body and the disintegrated immigrants that wander through the city. The first stands for rigidity and dominance and for this I used technical drawing ...for the case of the of the immigrant I used photographs that show a moment frozen in time... No one is interested in the immigrants' identity, one just cares to know that they are different from her or him. For this their faces are covered with flags that stand for their difference. ...The background of the city, is the flag that dictates and moves the strings of its life.”

.1.6.4 Re-evaluating the course

One of the first things that were made clear to the students was the fact that this was an experimental course that had not been taught before. This meant that the students were explicitly invited to join an investigation without a pre-established set of standards or a clear idea beforehand about the expected outcome of the handed-in material as it was presented above. I have already acknowledged the situation of ‘the Ethics of Borderlands’ from the MArch design studio as inspiring the premise for this course. Nevertheless, the spark was only the presented dialogue and more specifically, Dorian’s words that “you’d have to change the title of our orthographic tradition to draw in-relations” and not the overall structure, aim and educational attitude of that studio course. This insecurity about the educational aims was obvious from the side of the students during the development of the course. Moreover, very often questions remained unanswered because of the nature of the subject matter. The definition of Ethics was, straight from the beginning, such a topic that was deliberately left open for discussion in every session. During the development of the course, and while there was a need for the students to start to draw the sections, most of them felt that they did not know what to do and what was the task that they were to accomplish. In any case, they wondered, how could they draw something that there is not even a common agreement about what we talk about –a definition of Ethics? Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this explicit initial insecurity did not

prevent the students from joining the course, since I have already mentioned that it was an optional module. So the students were not discouraged by this initial complexity that was made clear before the beginning of the course. On the contrary the number of the students that finally enrolled indicates that they were rather attracted by the new course and the ‘mystery’ of the left-open questions. Moreover, this insecurity was explicitly shared not only by the students but also by the teacher. Even I could not be sure that the task of drawing the Ethical borders in this part of the city is something achievable and I didn’t have a clear idea of how it should be done. During the entire semester this insecurity was never veiled, nevertheless some tactics were developed in order to overcome the students’ hesitation to start working without waiting for a pre-given answer about the pending question. Such tactics were the commitment to midterm reviews of the sections so that the students would be pushed to start drawing no matter how sure they were about the outcome; the treatment of such insecurity as a ‘normal’ situation for education that is not hidden, but it is explicit and obvious to all.⁴ The focus on the development of the lectures that revealed a narrative, gave the students the necessary material to transform their insecurity into a creative source.

One of the very early findings, that should be noted in the context of this thesis, was the fact that the division between *morality* and *ethics*, which was fundamental for this thesis, was not a very helpful distinction for the students themselves into accomplishing the given exercise. Although they did not seem to have any problem in comprehending this distinction, it became apparent that they could not find points of connection between the distinction of *morality* and *ethics*, on the one hand; and the site that they examined and the drawing of the section, on the other. A possible explanation for this is the fact that the distinction between *morality* and *ethics* was fruitful in order to study the students’ *formation* of Ethics, but it does not appear to be helpful for the students themselves who are *producing* this formation. In this sense, although the distinction was helpful for the teacher to keep in mind, it was not necessary for the students. This can be compared to the case of having to make one acquire a habit and simultaneously talking to her or him about theories of habits.

⁴ See again Meno’s paradox in the introduction, p. 12

Habits and thus *ethics* require a certain forgetfulness that is integral part of their acquisition.

On the other hand, almost all of the students were very much intrigued by the situation of the refugees that was taking place in the area of study. The refugees and the specific architectural border between the train station and the port concretized for them an explicit notion of Ethics in architecture. Although all the students were previously aware of the problem that was going on in this part of the city, they had never thought of it as pertaining to Ethics *in terms of* architecture. For this reason, most of them came to be very interested about the theories of nationalism. In most cases, the idea presented by the course –that national identity can be seen as actively constructed and that this construction can be identified in architectural space– was revealing for the students, opening thus a new way of thinking. In order to emphasise this notion I invited a geographer to deliver a specific lecture about the birth of modern nation-states. Vasilis Koutsoukos presented the outcomes of his historical PhD thesis about the transformation of urban space in the cities of Xanthi and Komotini, in Northern Greece during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Greek State. Again, the students were amazed to see disciplines other than architecture, being interested in very similar topics and also to find out the tools and terminology that these disciplines had developed in order to describe such complicated phenomena. This became apparent by the gradual change in the way that the students were able to describe the phenomenon and especially in the way that they identified and described the immigrants. This finally led to some insightful papers at the end of the course. In one sense, during this course occurred a transition from a stance of *ethics*, to that of *morality*. Most of the students joined this course having rather conservative nationalistic views (that are still common sense in modern Greece and can be summarised by the dogma of ‘single’ nationality and ‘single’ religion, based on the continuity of Greek language since the antiquity). Towards the end of the course all of the students became aware that the situation is much more complex and contradictory; and the ones that chose to deal with the topic took onboard much more radical attitudes, following Agamben’s views on the topic, that was dealt in a separate lecture.




Figure 115: The border between the train station and the port

This transition from a stance of *ethics* to that of *morality*, shows vividly that *ethics* can very well hold stances that can be criticised as ‘bad’ from an Ethical point of view. In such a case, *morality*, through its revealing character, is a powerful tool into identifying such ‘bad’ practices and through moral deliberation and rational discussion transforming them into ‘good.’ Does this mean then that the thesis presented here, that invited the reader to inhabit *ethics*, has just been falsified? I would like to argue that this is not the case at all. The call to inhabit *ethics* is a call to revisit the habitual formation of Ethics as the fundamental place where the Ethical is being constructed through habituation. This call does not guarantee that the Ethical stances that dwell there are necessarily ‘good.’ But if one wants to see the whole spectrum of Ethics, then one has to inhabit a particular common ethos (which in the case of Greek common nationalism, is narrow-minded and historically uninformed). But at the same time, I as a teacher, came to be able to identify it as such, only because I became habituated in a different discourse that apparently is based on British multiculturalism throughout my study in Edinburgh. The revelatory character of the students’ view against national identity appears to be a one-way direction from ignorance to enlightenment, which, as I have argued in this thesis, is not correct to describe the transition between *morality* and *ethics*. Such a scheme promises (similar to the project of enlightenment) a pointing towards a total revelation and total emancipation of the human, a progress that this thesis has characterised as being illusionary. As Paris’ horse described very vividly, total freedom and emancipation is not possible. What this scheme misses is the second movement from *morality* to *ethics* again, from memory to forgetfulness, from consciousness to unconsciousness,

from *alethea* to *lethe*. Contrary to enlightenment which is violent and explicit, this part of the (hermeneutic) circle is much slower and much more subtle and difficult to be identified. Unfortunately the short time of an academic semester that this course lasted did not allow for such observations. Nevertheless, it became apparent that it would be very interesting to study the slow habituation of the new ideas in the students' bodies and souls.

The above issue came across in a different form during the final submission of the students' exercises. In a couple of cases, the students were presenting very strong theses, meaning explicit Ethical stances, without the support of any theoretical background or bibliographic references. For example a student wrote:

Spatial borders are created only by the people who live in the specific place. The borders that exist in their minds are the only borders that can keep people apart. Obviously a wall or any architectural element, can stop you, but not in the same way that we all stop these people [the immigrants]. Everyone has been an immigrant. ...I do not wish to change anything in the site. I like it exactly as it is right now. I find the existing situation 'convenient.' Just like all of us.

Such strong statements puzzled me very much especially because the particular student had not followed the requested submission criteria like the scale of the drawing or the length of the text. How should these very strong theses be evaluated when they lack the rigor that accompanied other less ambitious submissions. This problem can be a common case in any educational situation, regardless of the subject. Here, in the case of Ethics though, things are a bit more complicated. How can one declare of 'teaching Ethics,' and then evaluate the students according to hard work or text length, bibliographic referencing, and the scale of the drawing. Obviously a strong Ethical stance is far beyond these issues. Having acknowledged this contradiction, I finally decided to hold a rather moderate position by neither failing those students for not having submitted the requested material and neither give them a distinction for their strong thesis. I treated the issue similar to a studio case where a student has a strong concept that appears to be promising and fruitful, but finally remains underdeveloped - a promising and interesting concept, without having managed to be materialised in an elaborate way.

Finally, I would like to conclude these reflections about the course with some thoughts on its future development. If I would have the chance to teach the same course again, I would change the title and the obvious focus of the course and I would keep some distance from the topic of Ethics. I now sense that the decision to teach a course on Ethics was rather premature. The fact that I was very emotionally involved with the topic (having had just finish, at that point, the writing of the main body of the thesis) and being under great rush to set up a theoretical course, made the decision to 'teach Ethics' an obvious thing to do. But as I tried to prove throughout this thesis teaching Ethics and teaching *about* Ethics are two different things. Apparently the course '*Sections in the Ethics of Architecture*' was, to a large extent, teaching *about* Ethics: discussing definitions of Ethics, presenting moral theories and even talking about the silence of Ethics. But the course itself *was not silent about it*. When setting up the course, I am afraid that I did not fully follow my own suggestion to inhabit *ethics*. I treated the subject matter as a scientific body that could be dissected and delivered in consequent lectures.

Taking on board the experience of teaching this course once, and having now some necessary distance from it, in the future I would attempt to teach the course differently. A possible way to do this would be by removing all the explicit and straightforward references to Ethics from the title and the lectures of the course, leaving in their place only allusions. Now, I find that it would be wiser to talk about Ethics, *through something else*. In this case, the topic of the *section*, still seems to be a very fruitful and exciting topic for further investigation. This topic that permeates every architectural activity has not been adequately researched in architectural scholarship, and this reveals a great potential which remains underdeveloped. Section is not only a tool of architectural representation, but mainly a way of thinking *in* architecture. This way of thinking describes issues of Ethics through architectural language. Section is the handling of a knife and for this, it is important for the students of architecture to understand the manipulation of this important tool, *together* with its philosophical premises. The comparison with human anatomy, as I have already described it, gives a plethora of such opportunities to refer to the history of human thought and, of course, to hint towards Ethics. Despite these changes in

this new course I would continue the practical attitude that asked from the students to draw (here, a section) despite the fact that it is a course falls in the conventional category of ‘theory.’ As I have argued throughout this thesis, trespassing the boundary between theory and *praxis* is fundamental in order to reconceptualize Ethics. In particular what is important is to cease seeing *praxis* from the point of view of theory, and instead initiate a conception of theory from the point of view of *praxis*. The practical character of this course asked from the students to translate theoretical issues to their native language of architectural representation. Despite the fact that the students seem puzzled in the beginning the final outcomes show promising potential. Asking the students to make an architectural proposal for the existing area of study could evolve this aspect even further. Moving from pure observation to the architectural necessity of having to make a proposal is one more step for committing to an Ethical response towards the area of study. In this sense, *Ethics is being done* instead of being theorised.

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