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**The politics and practises of refugee self-reliance in  
trifurcated states of north-western Tanzania**

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*For Milo, my goober.*

## Abstract

The Tanzanian government, led by President Magufuli, has implemented a series of shutdowns, which have severely constrained opportunities for livelihoods and self-reliance in refugee camps in North-Western Tanzania. These shutdowns, which flatten class and socio-economic stratification, include the closures of camp markets, a cancellation of a popular cash transfer programme, and sudden pull-out of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), a UN push to loosen restrictions for refugees. This thesis examines these shutdowns and their effects from above and below, which were purposefully designed to impel refugees to return to Burundi and Congo. These heavy-handed tactics are not new but follow the impulse to contain and manipulate mobilities of refugees and migrants, which follows a colonial genealogy. I argue against popular conceptualisations of camps as communities, cities, or 'surrogate states'. Instead, I speak with Mahmood Mamdani's theorisation of the 'bifurcated state' of indirect rule and its continuities after independence. Camps compare in many ways as a third, 'trifurcated' space which functions similarly to indirect rule. Simultaneously, I argue power and authority in camps is best understood as 'trifurcated' through a Foucauldian approach where governance is shared, contested, and entangled between the state, the humanitarian government, and refugees. The three tiers are not equal, as the state shutdown politics demonstrate. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and implementing partners repeatedly fail to protect refugees and are relegated to practising 'pithy development' projects in the camp. The story does not end here, however, as camp residents' daily mobilities circumvent and co-opt the humanitarian violence of containment. Thousands participate in illegal 'invisible' displacement agriculture outside the camp and sell food rations through networks of *madalali*, or brokers, which stretch across Tanzania and East Africa. Despite these inspiring agential practises of self-reliance, I am not hopeful for the future of refugees in Tanzania. Many camp residents are involuntarily leaving due to the impossibility of self-reliance or are bracing for a repeat forced return to Burundi.

## Lay summary

This thesis, broadly speaking, explores the shrinking space of asylum and humanitarians' inability to ensure protection in refugee camps in Tanzania from 2017 until early 2020. However, I situate this in a longer history of containment and manipulation of people movements by the state since the colonial era. The thesis centres around a series of shutdowns of refugee programmes and initiatives, such as a popular cash transfer project funded by the World Food Programme (WFP). I examine these actions from a macro global perspective comparing to other refugee cash transfer programmes throughout history, as well as from a micro view from within the camp. From below, I see how these affect the livelihoods of refugees, and how it affects their perceptions of the Tanzanian state. I label these abrupt closures by the state as 'shutdown politics' designed to impel refugees to return to their countries of origin.

Despite the severe constraints of 'shutdown politics' as well as food ration reductions, refugees in camps enact agency by circumventing the state and co-opting humanitarian structures to establish livelihoods in the camp. These actions include illegally leaving the containment of the camp to work on Tanzanian farms or by renting farmland from Tanzanians and other refugees. Additionally, refugees sell their food rations to brokers who move large quantities of food to major cities in Tanzania and across East Africa. Finally, I project forward the prospects of refugees in the camp, which I am not hopeful that their rights of asylum in Tanzania will be protected long-term.

## Declaration

I declare that the thesis has been composed by myself and that the work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. I confirm that the work submitted is my own, except where work which has been formed part of jointly authored publications has been included. My contribution and those of the other authors to this work have been explicitly indicated below. I confirm that appropriate credit has been given within this thesis where reference has been made to the work of others.

The work presented in Chapters 3 was previously published in *Refuge* journal under the title, 'The "worthy" refugee: Cash as a diagnostic of "xeno-racism" and "bio-legitimacy"'. The work was slightly altered to fit the flow of the thesis.

The work presented in Chapter 7 is a forthcoming chapter entitled, 'Sufficiently visible/invisibly self-sufficient: Recognition and displacement agriculture in western Tanzania' in the edited anthology, *Invisibility in African Displacements: From Structural Marginalization to Strategies of Avoidance* edited by Jesper Bjarneson and Simon Turner. The work was slightly altered to fit the flow of the thesis and the last submitted version can be found in the Appendix.

The work presented in Chapter 5 has been submitted to the *Journal of Refugee Studies* on 9 March 2020 but has yet to be reviewed. The title of the article is 'Class in camps or the camped class? The making and reshaping of socio-economic inequalities in the refugee camps of north-western Tanzania' The article was written by myself, Clayton Boeyink, and my supervisor, Jean-Benoît Falisse. This study was conceived by all of the authors. I carried out the first draft version of this article (at the exception of the sections on class in Burundi and DR Congo, some elements of the methodology, and the quantitative analysis, which was done primarily by Falisse). The most recent draft was then reviewed jointly by the two authors. The draft can be found in the Appendix of the thesis.

Clayton Boeyink

Signed:

Date:

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## Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan
ACHPR	African Court on Human Rights and People's Rights
BIF	Burundian Franc
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution)
CCTs	Conditional cash transfers
CIREFCA	International Conference on Refugees in Central America
CHADEMA	Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party for Democracy & Progress)
CHS	Community & Household Surveillance Survey
CNDD	Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defense of Democracy)
CNTB	Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens (National Commission for Land & Other Goods)
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Network
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East Africa Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAP	Forces Armées Populaire (People's Liberation Army)
FDD	Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Forces for the Defense of Democracy)
FNL	Front National de Libération (National Liberation Front)
FRODEBU	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi)
ICARA	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
IDP	International Development Programme
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LWF	Lutheran World Federation

MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NAPB	National Agricultural Products Board
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NMC	National Milling Corporation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCS	Officer Commanding the Police Station
PALIPEHUTU	Parti pour la Libération due people Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People)
PO-RALG	President's Office, Regional Administration & Local Government
RAD	Refugee Aid and Development
RCO	Refugee-led Community Organisation
RCT	Randomised Control Trials
RFP	Rwandan Patriotic Front
ROSCAs	Rotating Savings & Credit Associations
RWC	Refugee Welfare Committee
TANCOSS	Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TRA	Tanzanian Revenue Authority
TZS	Tanzanian Shilling
UCTs	Unconditional cash transfers
UN	The United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPDH	Union pour le Progrès et la Délivrance Humanitaire (Union for Progress & Deliverance of Humanitarian Aid)
UPRONA	Union pour le Progres National (Union for National Progress)
USD	United States Dollar
VICOBA	Village Community Banks
VSLAs	Village Savings & Loan Associations
WFP	World Food Programme



# Part I:

Who, what, when, where, and why is a refugee camp?




Figure 1: Map of Tanzanian camps as of 30 April 2017 Source: UNHCR 2017a



# Introduction



*Figure 2: Blurred photo of Viola at the Common Market. Credit: Boeyink 2017*

Meet Viola, a Burundian woman in her early 30s who lives in Nyarugusu refugee camp. She is a single mother with seven children. Viola fled to Tanzania in 2015 along with nearly 200,000 other Burundian refugees:

I came to Tanzania first before my children. After I settled, I walked all the way from Nyarugusu to Nyanza-Lac. It took two days. Local Tanzanian police caught us at the border and beat us and we had to pay TZS 60,000 [USD 26.14]. Then I went back, and they were not in the same place. My older sister took them to Tanzania. We met on the ship to Kigoma. I was surprised to see them on the ship.

Many Burundians come south to Tanzania by boats across Lake Tanganyika. The first refugees, similar to Viola, were brought to Nyarugusu, with later arrivals being placed in camps Nduta and Mtendeli. These camps were resurrected after being first created in the 1990s during the Burundian civil war. The beating and bribe Viola was forced to pay by the Tanzanian police are common occurrences for those who leave the borders of the camps. The police who act as the hands and feet of the state are in place to ensure that refugee populations are contained.

This event is illustrative of structural violence inherent to camp life, which is enforced by acute violence to the body by the Tanzanian state. I introduce Viola, not because she is extraordinary—she is not a thriving outlier in the camp; a hyper-successful entrepreneur ‘super-refugee’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2017). Nor is she destitute and barely getting by on humanitarian aid like others in the camp; a quintessential ‘vulnerable victim’ (Horst 2006). I briefly tell the story of Viola because she is representative of many people I met in the camps. The same events enacted by state and non-state actors that have caused her displacement and containment, as well as decisions she made as responses to these affairs, were told to me time and time again during interviews with other encamped refugees. So many aspects of Viola’s life intersect with strands of the story of encampment in Tanzania that I am trying to tell. This is a story of the Tanzanian state constraining the camp economies and livelihoods, and refugees enduring and circumventing these restrictions. Although the Tanzanian state is still actively inflicting restrictive and violent ‘shutdown’ politics on refugees as I write today, these actions and strategies are best understood when we zoom out historically and geographically across post-colonial contexts, particularly

in Africa. The politics of refugee containment and expulsions; manipulations of labour and mobilities are cyclical occurrences continuing from colonialism through to the present. Refugee camps, I argue, constitute a third, 'trifurcated' space holding many of the same functions as 'bifurcated' rural areas in Africa under indirect rule during colonialism, which largely continued under post-colonial state structures analysed by Mahmood Mamdani (1996) in *Citizen and Subject*. Although camps operate in parallel function of indirect rule and the colonial impulse to control mobilities, I diverge significantly from Mamdani's binary analysis by arguing that the actors governing the camps form a three-tiered, trifurcated state where power and authority is contested, shared, and intertwined among the state, humanitarians, and refugees.

## **Contributions**

Tanzania has been the site of exemplary research within forced migration studies from multiple disciplinary angles. These works have provided pioneering analysis including themes and academic disciplines centred around humanitarianism and development (Daley 1989; Whitaker 2002b; Rutinwa 2005; Landau 2008), identity (Malkki 1995a), politics (Turner 2010), citizenship (Gasarasi 1990; Milner 2014; Kuch 2016), urban refugees (Sommers 2001); and history of refugee policies (Van Hoyweghen 2001; Chaulia 2003; Miller 2011). Nyarugusu specifically has hosted researchers who have explored politics (Betts 2013), resettlement (Thomson 2012), and education (Fresia and Von Känel 2015). I feel privileged to join this talented pool of scholars and contribute to the field in different ways.

First, I offer an empirical update to the state of asylum in Tanzania since the election of President Magufuli and the most recent displacement of Burundian refugees in 2015. I explore the consequences of hosting two different nationalities of Congolese and Burundians in the same camp space of Nyarugusu. In Part III, I explore refugee de facto local integration (Hovil 2014) in the Kigoma region by focusing on strategies of mobility outside of the camp. I look at displacement agriculture in Chapter 7 through a visibility and invisibility framing that is shifting and fractured over time. In Chapter 8, I demystify the 'black market' of post-distribution food aid by meeting with the brokers who buy and sell WFP rations and distribute them across the region.

These topics lack analysis in Tanzania specifically, and in forced migration studies in general.

Secondly, though I am not a historian and do not use historical methods, history is fundamental to my analysis of encampment. Using secondary analysis, I illuminate historical continuities and ruptures since colonialism through the introduction of the concept 'trifurcated state' building off of the work of Mahmood Mamdani (1996) and other historians of colonial and post-colonial Africa. I argue that camps share many functions and continuities to indirect rule and other colonial containment strategies. This is followed by a closer examination of the historical context of development, displacement, and migration in Tanzania in Chapter 2. I recall the transnational genealogies of refugee cash transfers in Chapter 3; the brief histories of class and displacement in Burundi and Congo in Chapter 4; the failure of refugee self-reliance and UN 'big pushes' in Africa and Tanzania in Chapter 6; and a history of food and agriculture policy in Tanzania in Chapter 8.

Finally, I introduce novel approaches and terms to critically analyse camps and protracted refugee situations. In Chapter 5, I analyse the population of Nyarugusu through the conceptual lens of class and socio-economic stratification, which has been underdeveloped and under-utilised in forced migration studies. I conclude that food ration cuts and government shutdowns have a pronounced flattening of class in the camps. Despite this flattening of class, there is still socio-economic stratification, which means that some households are better able to withstand the humanitarian failure of self-reliance and the states assaults on markets and livelihoods. Beyond the framing of the 'trifurcated state', I also create the terms 'shutdown' politics, 'pithy development', and '(in)visibility sufficiency' to capture the imposed realities for refugees under encampment. Overall, this interdisciplinary thesis presents the case that encampment inherently produces 'humanitarian violence' (Branch 2009) through containment, which follows a long lineage since colonialism of decentralised management and manipulation of mobilities and peoples' livelihoods. Despite these severe constraints, many refugees defy encampment through mobilities enabling them to get by financially. A minority of refugees, such as WFP resale traders, even thrive economically.

## Structure of the thesis

In a new edition of *Citizen and Subject* (C&S), Mamdani (2018) explains the format of the book: ‘One way of reading C&S is as an account of an unfolding dialectic between structure and agency, between colonial power and response of the colonized’ (p.xiv). The first part of the book analyses ‘the structure of power’ and the second, ‘the anatomy of resistance’. In doing so he was making the point, ‘that if the mode of rule introduces and builds on specific difference among the ruled, then the point of political activism must be both to recognize the starting point of resistance as shaped by the nature of power and to transcend its limits’ (Mamdani 1996 p. 219). My thesis is also structured in in this same dialect format to C&S. In Parts I and II, I lay out the histories and structures of power of encampment in Tanzania and how they are inflicted and endured in everyday camp life. The latter half of C&S examines examples of organised political resistance in both rural and urban areas. While Chapter 4 recalls the failure for camp refugees to collectively organise resistance in Tanzania, Part III of this thesis explores resistance through daily practises of mobility through agriculture surrounding the camp (Chapter 7) and selling WFP food rations and extensive systems of brokerage (Chapter 8). In camps, the mode of rule is structured around the colonial impulse to contain refugee mobility through encampment and force undesired repatriations by assaulting markets and livelihoods. It follows that the resistance—though not recognised as organised movements by the actors involved—includes participating in livelihood strategies through illicit mobilities, which inherently undercut the colonial practice to containerise populations and groups of people through borders and tribal mapping. In the concluding chapter, I more fully argue that these mobilities constitute micro-acts of decolonisation.

I begin the thesis by asking what many scholars of camps have asked before: *what is a refugee camp?* Part I essentially addresses the five basic interrogative pronouns of encampment: who, what, when, where, and why is a refugee camp? More specifically, Chapter 1, the theoretical foundation of the thesis, answers the question: *how can we conceptualise refugee camps in ways which take into account local, national, and transnational histories and politics?* While Viola may have a ‘typical’ story within Nyarugusu, she is not ‘normal’. Following the Oxford dictionary’s definition of

normal—'typical, usual or ordinary; what you would expect'—encampment is not 'normal' compared to the Tanzanian society surrounding it. Encampment shows many continuities with the colonial impulse to manipulate and contain populations. Whereas others imagine refugee camps as communities, cities, or 'surrogate states', I argue that a more apt conceptualisation of camps are as 'trifurcated states'. This builds on Mamdani (1996) who theorised that the legal structures and institutional legacies of colonial indirect rule divided rural and urban spheres in Africa to create the 'bifurcated state'. The bifurcated structure continued after the colonists ceded independence. Encampment rose in the 1990s as a combination of mass displacements and the dismantling of the state due to Structural Adjustment Policies. Speaking with Mamdani and other post-colonial scholars' work, I argue that camps parallel indirect rule in function through meagre self-reliance strategies and policies of violent containment and re-displacements and repatriations. However, I break with Mamdani's strict binaries of customary and civil; rural and urban, in order to also zoom in on the trifurcated configurations or forms of the camp—the rhizomic entwinements of the actors who govern these spaces—which include the state, the 'humanitarian government', and refugees.

Like the majority of Burundian refugees in Nyarugusu, when Viola fled in 2015, this was the second time in her life to be encamped in Tanzanian exile. She lived in Mtabila camp from 1997 to 2010 and returned to Nyanza-Lac province in Burundi with her husband and children. She returned after the civil war had ended and the Tanzanian state was pressuring refugees to leave the country. Though the war had ended, nearly 40,000 Burundian refugees remained in Mtabila until 2012. It was then that, at gunpoint, the Tanzanian military forced all the camp residents to return to Burundi. Viola avoided that violent expulsion, but the reintegration to Burundi for Viola and so many others did not go smoothly. This was due to disputes over land and lack of livelihood opportunities, which tragically resulted in intimate violence and conflict between neighbours and family. This ultimately led to Viola's second displacement to Tanzania. Viola is a Tutsi and her husband a Hutu. When conflict stirred in 2015, her husband and family forced her to leave: 'My husband didn't want me to have the land. They rejected me and I will not have freedom if I will be there'. She arrived at

Nyarugusu, which had been populated by Congolese refugees since 1996. Chapter 2 accounts for these events and beyond by taking a historical approach to answering: *When and why did encampment become entrenched in Tanzania? Why have these policies remained?* I begin with a colonial history of controlling movements of migrants and refugees at, and within, its borders. The state in Tanzania has shown continuities and ruptures of this colonial-era mobility manipulation. I recount Tanzania's founding father, Julius Nyerere's 'open door' policies, the rise of encampment in the 1990s, the causes of displacements in Burundi and Congo, and the recent constriction of asylum under President John Magufuli. Moreover, in this chapter, I weave the shifting notions of 'self-reliance' which has had a prominent role in the political economy of Tanzania as a colonial territory, an anti-colonial vanguard, and host to millions of refugees for decades.

Viola was chosen to be part of a pilot cash transfer programme funded and organised by the WFP, which substituted traditional food aid for cash to pay for their household needs at the market. In our first meeting, I asked her what she used the cash for. She replied, 'last time I bought beans, shoes for kids, maize flour, cassava flour, and fish meat. All bought at different times as I needed them.' This programme was immensely popular because people could vary their diets apart from the unpopular WFP food and even purchase non-food items or start new businesses. Chapter 3 takes a top-down, macro approach to ask: *why did the Tanzanian state shut down the cash programme?* Building on chapter before, cash transfers have been a key pillar in the current 'self-reliance' paradigm of the global refugee regime and in Tanzania. The course changed on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 2017, two weeks after meeting with Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza when President Magufuli suddenly shut down the cash programme. This cash shutdown was a pivotal moment in the current refugee hosting era as it marked the opening salvo from President Magufuli against refugee self-reliance in the camps. Situating this within my theory of the trifurcated state, the cash-shutdown was event which mirrors the colonial desire to exploit mobilities and to impel refugees, particularly Burundians to leave the country. This chapter was born out of a response to a special issue in *Refuge* journal, entitled 'Racialized Refuge' where I examine the brief history of refugee cash transfers since

the Cold War (Boeyink 2019). I take a closer look at the 'travelling model' of cash transfers (Olivier de Sardan 2018) and how cash became ubiquitous to refugee care and maintenance aid systems since its inception in for Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan in the 2000s. With the rapid proliferation of cash, which has spread nearly every humanitarian situation around the world in various forms, it demands attention to look more closely at the refugee situations, such as Tanzania or in African cities, where cash is prohibited by the state. I argue that where cash transfers are not allowed, or in the case of Tanzania, suddenly shut down, refugees are deemed not 'worthy' to reside.

The state's decision to shut down the cash programme in particular, and the strategy more broadly to attack livelihoods in the camp has been effective in forcing refugees to leave the country. The cash shutdown devastated economic prospects for recipients such as Viola: 'Since the shutdown, this has caused malnutrition for my family. Before, I could vary my food but now I can't. I took out loans that I would pay back with the cash we received from WFP. Now I have to use capital from my business to pay.' The cash shutdown, its reasons, and implications are the central focus of Part II. This section asks: *what is the state's role in encampment, and what is the state's logic of containment and manipulation of refugee movements?* In other words, whereas Part I looked at the historical continuities and parallels to indirect rule and migration control, Part II is zooming in on the forms and configuration of trifurcation—the actors managing and controlling the camps. These actors simultaneously act as the means of enforcing the goals and functions of the trifurcated space, which is to containerise and govern through a self-reliance development philosophy which uses as minimal resources as possible. Chapter 4 looks from below at the same cash shutdown, the resultant angry fallout, and rampant rumours of violence to answer: *what is the role of the state in the camp? And how do refugees perceive the state?* The chapter describes the violent gatekeeper role of state actors in the camp and constructs an 'ethnographic vignette' of a planned food protest that was rapidly shut down by the Tanzanian state. Though the state is the violent enforcer of encampment, the humanitarian government is deeply ensnared and mutually constitutive of this violence (Branch 2009).

Viola largely relies on humanitarian aid such as food aid or previously through cash transfers before the programme was shut down. She supplements this income through a business selling fish and onions in the Common Market. The market is shared by refugees and local Tanzanians. It includes shops and stalls built by the traders as well as and large storage facilities and market structures built by UNHCR and implementing partners. Viola also makes and sells mud bricks used to build and repair houses in the camp. As previously mentioned, she is neither the richest nor poorest in the camp. Chapter 5 asks: *who lives in Tanzanian refugee camps? What types of livelihoods do they participate in? Is class an accurate marker of stratification in camps?* This chapter is based on a co-authored paper with Jean Benoît Falisse for a workshop organised by the Max Planck Institute entitled, 'Forced Migration, Exclusion, and Social Class'. This workshop offered a prompt to think about whether class is an apt explanation for social stratification in the Nyarugusu camp. Class markers are more salient in their countries of origin, but displacement to Nyarugusu largely happens within a single, lower class. Burundians refugees in Nyarugusu are mostly rural Hutu farmers who came from the bordering southern provinces. There are outliers from this displaced group and socio-economic stratification does occur in camps. Three socio-economic categories emerge in the camp: 'ultra-poor', 'poor,' and 'non-poor'. Though socio-economic differentiation occurs in the camp, the shutdown politics and food aid reductions flatten class significantly in the camp space. Although the chapter zooms in on individual households' incomes and livelihood strategies, when situated within the broader history of trifurcation, the socio-economic stratification shows that some households are able to withstand or even thrive amidst the effects of failed humanitarian self-reliance programmes and the state's shutdown politics. There are some outliers, such as incentive workers or WFP food resale brokers, who are beginning to emerge as an elite class in a Bourdieusian sense due to their accumulation of social and cultural capital. However, due to the volatile nature of the camp, it is unclear how enduring and cemented this class formation will be. For the rest, the majority of camp residents are impelled to return to their countries of origin before they are ready to, move to third destinations in Eastern and Southern

Africa if they have the assets, or are forced into immobility in the camps enduring and waiting until their fate is decided for them.

Chapter 6 accounts for the question: *what is the role of the humanitarian government in Tanzania?* The refugee regime sustains care and maintenance of aid, however, their attempts at development and refugee self-reliance are largely ineffectual due to intentional restrictions by the Tanzanian state. This chapter adds to the recently swelling critique of the current neoliberal paradigm of refugee self-reliance by centring the heretofore absent genealogical history of development and self-reliance in Africa and Tanzania since colonialism (introduced in Chapters 1 and 2). Despite the various philosophies underpinning self-reliance strategies in colonial, post-colonial, and refugee contexts, they can all be reduced to strategies of minimalist governance through self-rule and self-help. From this baseline continuity of cost-saving ideologies, I look more closely at Tanzania's failures to implement self-reliance for refugees. 'Big pushes' from the international community to drum up funding in exchange for host states to open up their asylum policies have had very little lasting changes. This is true at the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) I and II in the 1980s and the more recent shutdown of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Network (CRRF) in 2018. Where these big pushes fail to change encampment systems, UNHCR and implementing partners are only left with options to start savings and vocational groups, which amount to what I consider to be 'pithy development'. In this chapter, I check back in with Viola who was assigned to a vocational group of strangers. The group ended in dispute and a disbanding, which is all too common with these groups. While the self-reliance strategy of UNHCR and the global refugee regime runs parallel to the functions of indirect rule, the Tanzanian state is instrumentalising the failure of self-reliance to force the unwanted and 'unworthy' refugee population to leave the country.

To this point, I have belaboured the violence Viola and other refugees have encountered, and the severe and intentional constraints to building a life in the camps through containment and assaults on livelihoods by the Tanzanian government. This is only part of the story, however, because every day refugees defy encampment through illegal daily mobilities outside of the camp. Whether this is to seek further

livelihood opportunities or other life events such as funerals and weddings in their countries of origin. In addition to selling food at the Common Market and making bricks, Viola invested TZS 40,000 (USD 17.42) to rent land from a Tanzanian landowner from a nearby village, which is illegal for refugees to do outside of the camp. She paid an additional TZS 30,000 (USD 13.07) to a Burundian migrant who comes seasonally to Tanzania to seek wages not available in Burundi. With this land, she grows maize and beans to further supplement her household diet and income. While Parts I and II analyse the violent constraints of encampment, Part III illuminates the question: *how do refugees assert agency and evade the constrictions of the camp or divert humanitarian aid to improve their lives?* Inspired by the work of Amanda Hammar (2014), this section answers: *what 'displacement economies' are produced by encampment? How do refugees locally integrate into the host community?* Despite the inadequacy of the global humanitarian model of self-reliance, refugees are enacting daily mobilities to attain bare minimum levels of sustenance. If the colonial impulse was and is to keep groups of people separate and contained and to manipulate these populations to suit the desires of the hegemonic controlling states, it naturally follows that mobilities which resist these controls constitute micro acts of decolonisation.

I was prompted by a forthcoming edited collection to inquire: *how do refugees enact invisibility or have invisibility imposed on them through encampment?* This book, edited by Jesper Bjarneson and Simon Turner, is entitled, *Invisibility in African Displacements: From Structural Marginalization to Strategies of Avoidance*. Chapter 7 elucidates the agricultural system surrounding the camp that Viola participates in, which is integral to the local economies of the region. Viola is somewhat fortunate to rent land because Burundians carry negative stereotypes relative to Congolese in Tanzania. This is because Congolese refugees have had far longer to socially and economically integrate into the region. Renters and labourers leaving the camp to Tanzanian farms must walk a fine line balancing being 'sufficiently visible' to negotiate these sources of income, while attempting to be 'invisibly self-sufficient' apart from inadequate humanitarian aid and development as well as from the violence of police patrols. While these practises are defiant of the encampment structure, most people

who participate in these farming networks are doing so to barely get by rather than achieving a sustainable level of self-reliance.

The final empirical section, Chapter 8, explores the well-known practise of selling food rations, which Viola and all refugees take part in. This analysis goes beyond consumption to demystify the actors in the post-consumption 'black market', which extends across Tanzania and East Africa. Whereas the mobilities present in the agricultural systems surrounding the camps are decentralised, unorganised, and enacted spontaneously by hundreds of participants, the food aid system is highly organised by a traders or *madalali* in a pyramid shape, which enriches those at the top. I situate these entrepreneurs—the heroes of the present neoliberal self-reliance strategies—within the large literature in anthropology and African studies on political brokerage in colonial and post-colonial context. Though these entrepreneurial brokers are largely ambivalent in their moral stance toward humanitarianism, they occupy crucial functions to transfer liquidity of food to cash in the camp and ensure minimum levels of self-reliance to many. These vital *madalali*, who subvert the humanitarian system and entrenches the power of state actors through a system of bribes, imbed themselves in positions of prestige and authority in the camp.

Finally, in the Conclusion, I synthesise the thesis through Albert O. Hirschmann's simple, yet effective lens of exit, voice, and loyalty to respond to the questions: *what are the prospects for refugees in Tanzania moving forward? What responses are available to humanitarian actors to enact change? What responses are available to refugees to enact change?* I include a fourth category, mobility, which is an amalgamation of all three responses that refugees have to encampment. In conversation with Katy Long's work, I discuss migration or mobility as a possible fourth durable solution to displacement. Finally, in order to upend the trifurcated structure, which parallels colonial rule in so many ways, I briefly outline the monumental decolonial reforms that would be needed in all three tiers of the trifurcated state. I am unfortunately unable to offer hope that these changes will happen in the near future. I do not foresee refugees or humanitarian actors being able to convince the Tanzanian state to stop ratcheting up the hostile environment it is creating. Only time will tell if

the Tanzanian state will enact a violent, forced repatriation as it has done in the past, which is what many refugees in Tanzania fear the most.

## **Methodology**

Actions from the Tanzanian state, which brought deep harm and fear to refugees in the camps, also drastically changed the scope of my research. My original intent for this doctoral project was to explore in-depth the new cash transfer programme that was in the process of being scaled up in Nyarugusu. I was interested in situating this project within the wider global proliferation of cash transfers for social protection and humanitarian purposes described as a 'travelling model' by Olivier de Sardan (2018) or the 'politics of distribution' by James Ferguson (2015). However, the cash shutdown on 4 August 2017, just two weeks after I began fieldwork in the camp, changed everything for the project. It forced me to entirely rethink my research questions and methodologies.

Paling in severity to the damage of livelihood possibilities that the WFP cash transfer programme wrought on Viola and others, the proverbial rug was pulled out from under my research design that revolved around the cash programme. The research questions and plans I had spent a year preparing for were made as instantly invalid as the *taptap* cards that refugees used to access their cash from WFP. What I had in my favour were the 70 households that were onboarded for the 'financial diaries' project, which I describe below. I was listening to a myriad of narratives from refugees (often repeat refugees) on how they were experiencing encampment now and in the past. I was also learning many strategies they were utilising to make a living in the camp through and beyond the humanitarian government. I intuitively filtered these stories through what I found most interesting and what I knew was most under-researched in refugee camps. For example, as I learned about the extensive agricultural systems and WFP food resale networks detailed in Chapters 7 and 8, my research assistants and I would allocate time to investigate these aspects of camp life as we could. Rather than being decided before research, the questions guiding this project were developed during and after fieldwork in Tanzania.

Furthermore, I was originally planning to do a comparative study of refugee cash transfer programmes between Nyarugusu camp in Tanzania and Kalobeyei refugee settlement in Kenya, but I unexpectedly found out a day before leaving for fieldwork that my partner was pregnant. As a result, I scrapped research plans in Kenya and shortened fieldwork from more than a year to around seven months to be present for the birth of our son, Milo (a decision I will never regret). During doctoral fieldwork, I conducted more than 200 interviews, primarily with refugees. I had more than 30 interviews with aid workers from organisations such as UNHCR, WFP, and implementing partner NGOs. I also took a short trip to Geneva in July 2017 to interview UNHCR officials who were influential in the design of refugee cash transfer programmes. I interviewed 28 Burundian labour migrants who are featured in Chapter 7. Additionally, including the biweekly follow-up visits from the research assistants or myself, there were more than 1,000 added meetings with camp residents. This is where financial data and a record of other important events for around 70 households were collected. I interviewed the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) camp commandant and his colleagues, as well as some Tanzanian village and district leaders surrounding the three camps. However, I explain below how I mostly avoided state actors to best protect my research assistants and informants. I returned to Kigoma for short-term fieldwork in conjunction with two paid research consultancies. One for UNHCR (Masabo et al. 2018) and another for an organisation working in the camps and with smallholder farmers surrounding the camps. These were conducted in February and May of 2018 respectively. The two consultancies agreed to allow us to use the data we collected in our publications. The consultancies added 40 focus group discussions and nearly 200 additional interviews from all three Tanzanian camps in Kigoma (Nyarugusu, Nduta, and Mtendeli) as well as villages and towns in each of the hosting districts of Kasulu, Kibondo, and Kakonko.

## **Financial Diaries**

I met Viola in August 2017, when she agreed to take part in the ‘financial diaries’ programme, the bedrock methodology of this thesis. I borrowed this methodology from the influential book within international development academics and practitioners,

*Portfolios of the Poor*. This book uses a longitudinal study creating diaries of the financial lives of people living in poverty in India, Bangladesh, and South Africa (Collins et al. 2009). These authors claim that anthropological studies explore depth well, but do not find quantified evidence of financial activities. However, on the more quantitative end of the research spectrum, economic studies of markets and households only offer snapshots of peoples' finances (Collins et al., 2009 p. 3). Additionally, these studies rarely capture the multitude of informal finances people employ such as rotating savings groups or savings with neighbours (p. 186). Financial diary methodology takes a middle road by visiting informants every two weeks to record their resources, incomes, consumption, and financial flows for a year. During these biweekly visits, quantitative data is not only collected, but extensive questions and exchanges elucidate sources of income and debts that are overlooked by traditional surveys. Our project collected a year of financial diaries from more than 70 Burundian and Congolese households in Nyarugusu. This methodology proved to be immensely effective, yet also frustratingly difficult to implement.

The reason I was drawn to this methodology was for the possibility of building relationships and rapport with informants like Viola, which can only result through repeated visits. As the project went on, informants got used to recording financial data and became more consistent in reporting all forms of income. This also occurred for Collins et al. (2009 pp. 205-209). One of the informants, a Congolese woman named Rusi, remarked, '[the financial diaries] are good trainings because they are all about keeping and saving money. What you are doing is like the training that Mobutu's soldiers were taught. If we had been given projects like this and given money in camp, then it would make changes in the camp.' At the time that she told me this, the Mobutu reference was lost on me. However, upon further research, for all the harms Mobutu inflicted upon the country, he was successful in significantly increasing the training and professionalism of military officers in comparison to the preceding *Force Publique*, which was responsible for enforcing harsh colonial rule (Emizet 2000). In other words, Rusi and other households expressed appreciation for the financial diaries in helping them budget and manage their household and business finances, which was an unintended positive consequence of the project.

Additionally, when discussing sensitive issues about finances, illicit livelihood strategies, and camp politics, the relationships we built through repeated visits fostered more open and honest communication. However, camp residents have seen years of war, poverty, and trauma from repeat displacements. With this in mind, I followed Malkki's (1995a) lead: 'the success of the fieldwork hinged not so much on a determination to ferret out "the facts" as on a willingness to leave some stones unturned, to listen to what my informants deemed important, and to demonstrate my trustworthiness by not prying where I was not wanted' (p. 51). In this regard, I did not pry into past traumas as this was not the purpose of the research. The financial diary lent itself to what Mackenzie et al. (2007) call an 'iterative model of consent':

Iterative models of consent start from the assumption that ethical agreements can best be secured through a process of negotiation, which aims to develop a shared understanding of what is involved at all stages of the research process. This process must be thought of as ongoing throughout the duration of the project, and so requires the researcher and all other parties involved to refine and re-negotiate the terms of the project, and their respective roles and obligations within it, as the project evolves (p.307).

The authors call to move beyond 'do no harm' by seeking to give reciprocal benefits through 'participant action research', which provides advocacy that benefits refugees. However, I was repeatedly asked by my informants how my research would help the households in extremely difficult circumstances. Like Horst (2006) and Harrell-Bond (1986) facing similar requests, I was honest and said that I would work to use their information toward affecting refugee policy, but in reality, I could do little to immediately support them. I could not help but feel that my research was fundamentally extractive in nature. This is because I was synthesising the data they provided, but this information was ultimately enriching my own career and providing little in return. Omata (2017) faced this same dilemma with Liberian refugees in Ghanaian camps:

What they needed was immediate access to some material assistance such as cash and food, not vague hints about potential benefits which might in the future be brought to them or others like them as a consequence of my research. This dilemma continued to afflict me throughout fieldwork. In fact, I breached this rule several times with some interviewees. I made charitable donations to some refugees when I saw the urgency of their situation, such as when their children

were suffering from severe malaria or typhoid but they did not have money for medical treatment (p. 15).

With this in mind, I decided before fieldwork that I would compensate each household with cash for each interview my research assistants or I conducted. For longer baseline interviews that lasted one and a half to two hours, I paid TZS 5,000 (USD 2.18). For each biweekly shorter follow-up interview that lasted around thirty minutes to an hour, I paid TZS 2,000 (USD 0.87). These were small, but not token or insignificant amounts as they were enough to pay for more than a meal for a family. These payments added up every two weeks over a year became more substantial. Like Omata, in consultation with my research assistants, I also paid extra cash on a case-by-case basis as poorer households faced acute health needs.

That said, there were significant downsides to the financial diary methodology for me. The main problem was that the original researchers who pioneered this methodology worked as a well-trained team and were able to monitor and clean the data throughout the project. I, however, am admittedly not an economist. Moreover, I had limited internet access in the village neighbouring the camp where I stayed and was not able to monitor the data as it was being collected. Ongoing data tracking is important because I did not realise until later that some research assistants were not collecting financial data for all members of the households. This is unfortunate because I had planned to use financial data to explore household gender dynamics in similar ways to the work of Jane Guyer (2004) in a chapter of her book, *Marginal Gains*. My quantitative deficiencies, in addition to the truncated timeline of research, led me to instead focus on seminal events in the camp. Therefore, my focus rests on the cash programme shutdown as well as under-researched activities such as illicit agriculture systems surrounding the camps and WFP food resale networks. This came at the expense of deeper explorations of gender relations in the camp, which is a significant limitation to this thesis. With the help of co-author, Jean Benoît Falisse, a more gifted statistician than me, we were able to salvage some of the data, presented in Chapter 5. Hopefully, if given more time, this data can be further analysed in the future.

It is also important to remark on my positionality as a white, male, American researcher and who I was affiliated with. This inevitably influences the types of responses informants gave me, and who I had access to speak with. Researchers in refugee camps have taken various positions on affiliations. McConnachie (2014) taught English with an international organisation, which allowed her to live in the camp. Agier (2011) gained access through *Medicins Sans Frontières* (MSF), which he claims was well trusted by the camp residents and helped him gain the trust of informants (p. 324). Jansen (2011) argued the opposite, that NGOs were untrusted by refugees and being affiliated with one can conflate the researcher as an aid worker (pp. 34-35). Instead, many researchers did intentional acts to distance themselves from UN and NGOs such as living in nearby towns instead of difficult to access NGO compounds, dressing as closely to refugees as possible, and using transport into the camp alone by foot, bicycle or motor vehicle instead of through an NGO (Turner 2001; Horst 2006; Jansen 2011). Marnie Thomson (2016), an anthropologist who also conducted research in Nyarugusu describes well how she approached her positionality:

As a *mzungu* [Swahili for 'white person'], I was careful to explain to everyone in the camp, but to refugees especially, that I was not an aid worker. I wanted to be clear with everyone I met that I held no sway with any of the organizations in the camp. But being a *mzungu* and a foreigner also positioned me as an intermediary among refugee, aid workers, and government officials [...] I can never transcend my skin colour, no matter how good my Swahili is or how long I stay in East Africa. My 'knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished... it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another' (Haraway 1988 p. 590). In my writing, I aim to situate myself among refugees, aid workers, and government officials, not by claiming to represent them but by understanding and interpreting what they have told me (p. 19).

During initial fieldwork, even though I lived at the Red Cross compound, I commuted into the camp each morning and evening by paying a Congolese refugee who transported me by motorcycle. On days where it rained too much to safely ride a motorcycle, I would ride the bus that took Tanzanian Red Cross healthcare workers to the camp hospital. During the two research consultancies, I did the opposite and was upfront with the informants about my affiliation with the various organisations who

lined up transportation and even most of the interviews and focus groups. This undoubtedly elicited biased responses, which I discuss further below.

### **Research Assistants**

The key people that made my project possible on many levels were the research assistants I paid to support my data collection and analysis. I speak an intermediate level of Swahili and can have casual conversations. However, when speaking in-depth, I do not comprehend well enough to do justice to what the informants are saying. For this reason, as well as having help in accessing participants, I hired research assistants. Like myself, research assistants bring their own positionality and biases that may influence how they perceive the informants and how we are perceived as researchers (Jacobsen and Landau 2003: p. 193). As I discuss in Chapters 5 and 7, there is a generalised distrust toward Tanzanians in general by Congolese and Burundian camp residents, which would have influenced the research significantly.

The researchers I hired were important for me because they were all camp residents and vouched for me that I was trustworthy. I met my head research assistant, Kaskil, a Congolese man, through a previous doctoral researcher who had worked with him before. I was the third doctoral researcher he had worked with, so he brought a wealth of experience and skill to the position. He is also an English teacher, and head of a refugee-led community-based organisation, so my affiliation with him was invaluable. He introduced me to the other Congolese and Burundian refugees who had the requisite skills to be research assistants.

That is not to say there was no bias in working with these researchers as well. Kaskil and the other Congolese researchers were from the Bemba ethnicity, which has a long history of conflict with Banyarwanda and other groups residing in Nyarugusu. As a result, these voices are not fully represented in this project. I had tried to mitigate sampling bias by meeting with a UNHCR biometric data specialist who was willing to give me a random sampling across the camp. However, after our first meeting, he was called out of the area for meetings and was unable to supply this data without drastically delaying my research. Instead, my assistants used a snowball

sampling technique by asking people to take part in the financial diary project at cash distributions or going to each zone in the camp and asking if they were recipients of the cash transfer programme. Jacobsen and Landau (2003) caution this sampling technique, however, in the circumstances this was the best method available at the time. Additionally, though I tried to find a gender balance to the researchers, the



*Figure 3: Research assistants training for data collection. Credit: Boeyink 2017*

networks I used were only able to recruit one woman researcher with the requisite level of English, which undoubtedly influenced the interactions and responses from interviews (Bahati 2019).

Just as the data collected from my informants can be extractive, so can working with research assistants. The Bukavu Series (Silent) Voices blog series has been instructive for my research now and will inform how I approach research partnerships in the future. Congolese researcher in Bukavu, Vedaste Cituli Alinirhu (2018), explains

that local research assistants can often be viewed as 'data collection robots.' The first way I tried to avoid this mentality was by fairly compensating them. This goes beyond just salary, but also paying for contingencies that I am afforded as a privileged scholar from the North. These expenses can include healthcare needs and other expenses that come up for research assistants (Cirhuza 2019). Refugees are notoriously exploited for their wages as 'incentive' or 'voluntary' workers for UNHCR and other NGOs (Morris and Voon 2014). This is how most enumeration such as nutrition surveys for policy research is done in camps. For example, refugees who are teachers are paid TZS 55,000 (USD 23.96) each month. To signal my appreciation, I paid my assistants nearly four times this amount. I heeded Molony and Hammet's (2007) advice in managing the complicated nature of working with research assistants by setting up the expectations of research remuneration upfront in a contract. I explained from the beginning that I had limited research funding. Therefore, when there came a time that I could not afford to pay at that same rate I had been, I gave the assistants the choice: they could stop researching or to be paid at a lower rate (still above incentive wages) until the research was completed. They chose the latter option. I also was constantly discussing and debriefing after interviews so that they could teach me local and cultural nuances that I would inevitably miss as an outsider. They helped me triangulate data in real-time as they would put out to me after interviews when they suspected somebody was giving me a false answer and why. I nearly always had unanswered questions after interviews that my assistants later explained such as Rusi's reference to Mobutu above.

Finally, research assistants were essential to me after I left Tanzania. As I was analysing and writing up this thesis, some gaps needed to be filled in. For example, as discussed in Chapter 7, after I left Tanzania, my research assistants conducted interviews with refugee land renters, refugee paid labourers, Burundian labour migrants, and multiple Tanzanian landowners participating in this system. I was able to send them a WhatsApp message or call them and explain the types of people we needed to speak with and a list of questions. They were able to conduct interviews, which I paid them for on a contract basis through M-Pesa mobile money. It is

impossible for me to overstate how crucial these individuals were to the research and how grateful for them I will always be.

## **On Ethnography**

Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2019 p. 250) acknowledge the difficulty of gaining access to sensitive realms of the state particularly for ethnographies:

Strict gate-keeping (often in the narrow sense of the term) creates a particular access problem for the researcher. Research needs to be done in explicit cooperation with the organisation, more specifically with its leadership, sometimes also with higher hierarchical levels. For example, a study of a police unit might require the permission of the Ministry of the Interior, a study of a public hospital from the Ministry of Health. This is the case because research constitutes high stakes for the organisation, as it might put the organisational ideology into question.

The official state actors within Tanzanian refugee camps *exclusively* include the types of gatekeepers described in the quote above. While it is not impossible to gain access to ethnographic research with these types of actors, I made the calculated decision to avoid the state. For example, exciting new research in Kenya by Hanno Brankamp (2019) and Claire Walkey (2019) conducted unprecedented ethnographies of security actors in Kakuma refugee camp as well as the Department of Refugee Affairs registration in Nairobi respectively. However, recently in Tanzania, under President John Magufuli, there has been closer scrutiny and harassment of research in the country (Amnesty International 2019). Moreover, I knew of other researchers in Nyarugusu who had to check-in each morning with the camp commandant. Due to my truncated timeframe for research, I strategically chose to circumvent state actors to avoid being monitored and to protect my research. More importantly, I did not press this issue in order to protect my informants and research assistants from scrutiny or harm from the state. This precluded any possibility for me to use the 'states at work' ethnographic methodology (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014b; 2019), which I discuss more in the following chapter. As a consequence, the Tanzanian state's voice is conspicuously absent in this project. However, the state always looms large and omnipresent in the camp for refugees. My access to the state instead of the actors employed by the state was through camp residents' perceptions extracted from

conversations, observations, and through the analysis of rumours and conspiracies, which I explore in Chapter 4.

Unlike other camp researchers such as Omata (2017), I was not allowed to live in the camp because the Tanzanian state does not allow researchers or aid personnel in the camp past 5 pm except for those providing essential services. This added to my limitations. Instead, I stayed in a tent at the Tanzanian Red Cross Society compound in Makere, the village neighbouring Nyarugusu. As Jean Benoît Falisse describes, I sought out 'privileged moments' through which I could analyse 'ethnographic vignettes' (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Examples of these vignettes include the Tanzanian state's shutdown of planned protests in Chapter 4, or arguments I witnessed amongst a women's savings group in the Common Market that I detail in Chapter 6. These moments, from visiting illicit farms outside of the camps to savings group meetings within the camp, illuminated camp realities that interviews can never fully capture.

Some of the deepest ethnographic data available to me were through the two UN research consultancies I participated in. They informed me of the multiple logics at play within these organisations and their fragile interactions with the Tanzanian state. The methodology for these consultancies was problematic in many ways, which is explicit in our report (Masabo et al. 2018). Due to the short-term nature of the consultancies, UNHCR and implementing partners were responsible for sampling the informants for the interviews and group discussions, which puts into question the randomness and bias of the informants. Moreover, any projection of impartiality that I had as an independent doctoral researcher was shed, as I was explicit that I was researching on UNHCR and others' behalf (though we still attained informed consent throughout). The consultancies were still extremely valuable, however. For instance, for the UNHCR project, I was able to do research in Nduta and Mtendeli camps, which I did not have access to on my own. Having Tanzanian, rather than refugee research colleagues, in both consultancies allowed access to interviewing Tanzanian host community members. This had previously evaded me as an independent researcher. Additionally, the second project focused on smallholder Tanzanian farmers around the camp. This provided me with immense amounts of knowledge about the agricultural

economy in Kigoma and around the camp, deepening my analysis of this thesis, particularly in Part III.

Finally, I was given deep ethnographic insight into the internal pressures the humanitarian government was under from the Tanzanian government. While drafting the final reports of the consultancies, we were explicitly told to withhold anything that would put the Tanzanian state in a negative light. The pressure became jarringly real and personal to me in a meeting in Dar es Salaam with my main point of contact for the consultancy. At this meeting, I was shown emails from a different partner organisation on the project they were implementing with. The email was expressing their concerns about me personally conducting the research. The email included direct quotes pulled from my Master's dissertation as well as from a blog post written about me from my small undergraduate school in Iowa. The quotes, found online, were critical of the Kenyan state's treatment of Somali refugees in Nairobi. I still vividly remember how this conversation made my heartbeat race and caused me to sweat in the obnoxiously frigid air conditioning inside the office on Dar es Salaam's 'ex-pat peninsula' of Masaki. The manager went on to tell me directly, 'do not be political'. This is the humanitarian dilemma made real to me. Chapter 6 gives examples of the inability for humanitarian actors to influence the Tanzanian state to further protect refugees. These organisations are on a razor's edge vis-à-vis the Tanzanian state, which could shut down their operations as fast as the state shut down the CRRF and the cash transfer programme. This paranoia by humanitarians is, in my view, a crucial reason for perpetuating what Simon Turner (2010) calls the 'politics of innocence'. The humanitarian government constructs and subjectivises refugee innocence and victimhood by denying and forbidding politics in camps partially as institutional self-preservation. What follows in this thesis, however, is inherently political; it is the politics of self-reliance. The Tanzanian state is presently and has historically assaulted self-reliance through encampment generally and through shutdown politics specifically.

# Chapter 1: What is a refugee camp?




Figure 4: Signs of organisations in Nyarugusu. Credit: Clayton Boeyink 2017.

## Introduction

I am often asked by friends and family who mostly live in Iowa and have never been to the African continent, let alone a refugee camp, ‘what is it like there?’ Before, during, and after researching in the space of the camp, I am still thinking this through. This chapter reckons with this oft-asked question by first thinking through the way other scholars and policymakers have conceptualised the camp. This includes imagining the camp as a community with potential to govern itself; the camp as a city; and the camp as a ‘surrogate state’. I argue below that camps are best understood as ‘trifurcated states’, which are spaces governed under the continuous logic of containment since colonialism resembling and functioning in ways similar to indirect and ‘bifurcated’ rule. However, this analysis differs and moves beyond Mamdani’s (1996) theory of the bifurcated state because the forms of rule are also trifurcated amid a complex interweaving and contestation of power and authority between the state, the humanitarians, and the refugee population. Moreover, I contend that Michel Foucault’s work—or more accurately, scholars who have engaged and repurposed his work—offer useful approaches to understanding the decentred and entangled nature of power in refugee camps.

The usual response I give to friends and family is a far less academic-sounding variation of what I mentioned above. I describe the *normality* of life in the camp. Normality in this sense, comes from Oxford dictionary’s definition: ‘typical, usual or ordinary; what you would expect’. In the camp you have rows of houses with people cooking or sweeping their doorway, daily scenes of commerce in the market, children in classrooms or playing by the main roads, and people everywhere coming and going by foot, bicycle, or motorcycle. I describe the long-term, protracted nature of displacement in Nyarugusu camp, my primary site of research. In the camp, events that occur in all societies are part of the fabric: weddings, divorces, births, and funerals. As Simon Turner (2016) aptly states, ‘life goes on in camps— albeit a life that is affected by the camp’ (p. 139). Yet simultaneously, the *abnormal* nature of a camp was and is always in the back of my mind when thinking of this space.

TANZANIA - Kigoma - Kasulu - Basemap of Nyarugusu Camp (21th November 2015)



- LEGEND**
- Water Tank
  - Borehole
  - Structures**
    - UNHCR Tent
    - Mass shelters
    - 4 Family Shelter
    - Family Shelter
  - Health facilities**
    - Red Cross Hospital
    - MSF Medical Base
    - MSF ITFC
    - MSF Mobile Clinic
    - Health Center
    - Other
  - Landmarks**
    - Church
    - Entry point
    - Graveyard
    - Market
    - Mosquee
    - Office
    - Police station
    - School
    - Child-Friendly space
  - House
  - Office
  - Other
  - Roads**
    - Main Road
    - Road Tracks
    - Paths
  - Boundaries**
    - Camp limit
    - Bloc
    - Zone
  - Rivers
  - Lake
  - Wetland
  - Leisure
  - Pitch



**SOURCES**

Administrative borders : UNHCR  
 Buildings : OSM, UNHCR, MSF  
 Health Facilities : MSF  
 POIs : MSF, UNHCR, Red Cross  
 Roads : OpenStreetMap, MSF  
 WASH : MSF, Water Mission  
 Aerial Imagery : Pleiade 2015

**PROPERTIES**

Document name : MSF\_NyarCamp\_Basemap\_A1P\_EN  
 Creation date : 21/11/2015  
 Created by : msf-tanzania-gis@geneva.msf.org  
 Print format : A1 Portrait

**SCALE**

1:20 000 1 cm = 0.2 km



Figure 5: Basemap of Nyarugusu camp (21 November 2015). Source: MSF 2015.

The physical space of the camp feels like it does not belong in the area. In the Kigoma region, which has long been the poorest region in the country, there is low population density and houses are haphazardly scattered along roads and footpaths. Even larger towns and cities such as Kasulu and Kigoma largely do not follow a formal housing and municipal grid. Alongside the B8 road leading north to Rwanda and Mwanza, Tanzania's second-largest city on Lake Victoria, just a twenty-minute drive west of the small village of Makere, lies Nyarugusu camp. Maps of the camp display tightly organised rows of houses, various NGO buildings, and streets—a clear contrast to the spontaneous housing of the area. Additionally, the camp population of roughly 150,000 would be in the top 20 of the largest cities in Tanzania, the fifth most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2020). The densely populated, strictly designed, humanitarian layout of Nyarugusu and other camps would almost certainly not naturally spring up in the region. This reinforces a further sense of abnormality of the camps.

However, I was not alone in these feelings of the strangeness of the camp. A Tanzanian trader who buys and sells WFP rations, Earnest, who will be further introduced in Chapter 6, also explains how the camp is abnormal to him:

In the villages out of the camp, you are free, and you can load your products right at the place where you bought them. Except in the refugee camp, you are not much freer. You don't feel at home. We consider the product to be our own after we get them out of the camp. But when our products are still in the camp you feel like they are in another country, ruled by a different government different from the one that protects Tanzanians.

Earnest cuts to the heart of the essential difference between camp enclaves and the societies they are circumscribed within. Earnest's analysis is particularly instructive when he says that camps are 'ruled by a different government'. Similar phrases have been latched onto by other scholars. One article entitled, 'we live in a country of UNHCR' argues that refugees appeal to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as a transnational source of authority beyond the host country (Moulin and Nyers 2007). Along similar lines, there have been deeper theorising of UNHCR's role as a surrogate state in refugee camps (Slaughter and Crisp 2009; Kagan 2011;

Deardorff Miller 2017). Below we analyse these and other prominent conceptualisations of the camp. I argue that these comparisons fall short in capturing the colonial impulse to contain and manipulate mobility and migration, which lies at the bedrock of encampment.

## **Conceptualising the camp**

Any substantive study of the refugee camp must account for these expansive spaces of containment where governance and authority are interwoven, shared, and contested among the state, humanitarian actors, and refugees. Indeed, myriads of scholars have grappled with how to conceptualise a camp, and begin with the question, 'what is a refugee camp?' Kirsten McConnachie (2016) notes that this question, though simple, is not straight forward to define:

From the Algerian desert to the Thai forest, these camps vary in almost every dimension. Some are the size of cities, while others are more like towns. Some are fenced and guarded, while others allow free movement. Some have existed for generations, while others are newly created. Amid such diversity, what do these spaces have in common? What *is* a refugee camp? This is a deceptively simple question, and one that has never been satisfactorily answered (p. 397).

Scholars account for camp variances through typological approaches to encampment (Grbac 2013 pp. 11-12). These typologies include the spectrums of the type of assistance administered in camps such as rural settlements, unplanned rural settlements, and full-assistance settlements (Schmidt 2003). Another camp type is based on how spaces are managed by governments and humanitarians. These camps include self-organised camps such as ghettos or squats as places to hide, sorting or transit centres used in 'flow management', spaces of confinement, which predominantly include refugee camps, and finally, camps for internally displaced persons.

McConnachie (2016) accounts for a multitude of ways to conceptualise the camp and offers an excellent corrective definition of the camp by tracing a historic genealogy of refugee camps and their 'antecedents'. This genealogical work examines the function of camps, which is fundamentally about containment: 'This requires not merely acknowledging containment as the defining function of a refugee camp but

recognizing containment *as a particular type of encampment*' (p. 398). She argues there are three recent categories of 'camps of containment', which include prisoner-of-war camps dating back to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, internment camps, and camps for forced migrants. She posits the following definition of 'camps of containment':

A site that is spatially bounded (i.e., it is an identifiable site); temporally limited (i.e., it exists pending an end to conflict or an alternative durable solution); is biopolitical (i.e., is designed and administered for a category of population rather than for individuals); and segregates residents from a surrounding population by formal or informal restrictions (p. 399).

Simon Turner (2016) introduces a special issue of the *Journal of Refugee Studies* centred on encampment by analysing the temporal and spatial qualities of camps. He focuses on the contradictions of the camp. Camps are spaces of social fragmentation, transformation, and 'new beginnings'. They are meant to be temporary, though in practise, are often quasi-permanent. Camps are envisioned by host states and humanitarians to be depoliticised spaces, though in reality, are hyper-politicised.

There are many ways to answer what a refugee camp is, though I do not have the space to present them all. In this chapter, I will argue against a metaphorical approach to conceptualise refugee camps. This critique includes Earnest's assessment above about camps being a 'different government' or 'surrogate state' as other scholars. I also argue against the analytical turn to compare camps to cities (Agier 2002; Jansen 2011; Oka 2011; de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000; Grbac 2013). I make the case that both surrogate state and city metaphors are incomplete. Though these approaches capture essential aspects of encampment, both fall short of the full histories and realities of the camp. Before critiquing camps-as-cities or surrogate states conceptualisations, I will problematise the camp-as-community approach, which is more of a critique against humanitarians and policymakers than academics.

I share McConnachie (2016) and many others' analysis that camps are primarily about containment. I broaden her scope of analysis beyond focusing exclusively on camps to argue that encampment is the product of a more basic colonial impulse to contain and manipulate populations of people. Inspired by Mahmood Mamdani's (1996) influential work on 'bifurcated states', which traces the colonial continuities of indirect rule following independence, I expand his analysis to contend

that the rise of large-scale encampment situations in post-colonial societies since the retreat of the state in the 1990s, constitute a mutated and inverted trifurcation of the state in function and form. I apply more narrowly to the space of the camp Mark Duffield's (2005, 2006) genealogical analysis, which compares sustainable development to indirect rule aimed at rooting 'non-insured' populations of the Global South in place away from 'insured' populations in the North. On the one hand, the current paradigm of refugee self-reliance, as opposed to 'humanitarian dependence' through in-kind aid, is one of the 'caring' means of containment (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018). On the other hand, I argue that the Tanzanian state also enforces containment through violence. The coexistence and cooperation of the of humanitarian actors with the state, legitimises this humanitarian violence (Branch 2009). Moreover, state actors also manipulate the movements of people in ways parallel to the colonial powers by actively assaulting self-reliance and refugee livelihoods in order to impel refugees to repatriate and leave the country. In this functional formulation, these shutdown actions are justified because refugees resemble Mamdani's theorisation of colonial 'subjects' in that they do not have the rights of the citizen. Whereas rural areas under bifurcated rule are governed through 'customary' or 'tribal' authorities subservient to the hegemonic central state, refugees are governed by a mutated form of indirect rule through a combination humanitarian aid and limited and marginalised forms of 'self-government' through 'refugee communities'.

In the process of trifurcation, the state foisted the administration of camp registration and care and maintenance to the humanitarian government and refugees themselves. Similar to indirect rule, the state is far from absent in these spaces, however, and makes its presence known through the violent enforcement of encampment explored throughout this thesis. The trifurcated state approach offers a more holistic inclusion of historical trajectories of camps in the *longue durée*, while also providing the space to zoom in to the contested and intertwined interactions between the Tanzanian state and host communities, the 'humanitarian government', and refugee communities on the ground. Finally, I argue that post-structuralist approaches, exemplified by Michel Foucault's conceptualisations of biopower,

biopolitics, and governmentality, which have been recast by contemporary scholars are analytically productive to understand the decentred nature of power and governance that is diffused and entangled in the trifurcated state.

A theoretical giant whose analysis of the camp I will not include, however, is Giorgio Agamben. As I introduced this chapter, people living near the camp such as Earnest, and outside researchers such as myself, see the camp as abnormal. Moreover, theoretically and empirically, it is indeed 'exceptional' in comparison to most state and society configurations in Africa and beyond. I do not mean that refugee camps are the 'state of exception' in the juridical sense that Schmitt (1985) and Agamben (1998, 2008) propose, though this has been fruitfully taken up by some (Nyers 1998; Minca 2005; Agier 2011) and challenged and made more complicated by others (Ramadan 2013; Fresia and Von Känel 2016; Rygiel 2012). What I mean by camp as exception, is in the same sense as Earnest's interpretation: the camp is abnormal in relation to the society it is enclaved within. In line with the latter group of scholars, although I present camps as sites of strict confinement and violence, I offer dialectic empirical evidence that significant mobilities of money, goods, and people occur daily in camps. These camp mobilities lead to entrenchment and integration into the economic and social fabric of host community. This integration of multiple ethnicities and nationalities—which indirect rule was designed to oppose—constitutes micro-acts of decolonization and agency beyond 'bare life'.

### **Refugee camps as communities?**

It is common in refugee camps for legal systems to be transplanted from the refugees' countries of origin. These systems become hybridised and applied within the refugee camp. This form of law I will call 'refugee community law' because many of these initiatives take the verbiage of 'community self-government' by the humanitarian sector. However, the 'refugee community' is a problematic phraseology as scholars show there is no inherent 'community' in camps (Hyndman 2000; Bulley 2014). Refugee community law takes different forms depending on the camp. In Uganda, settlements elect Refugee Welfare Committees (RWCs) (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005 pp. 186-191; Crisp 2000). For Kenya, instead of a settlement

commandant, the NGO Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is in charge of security and refers cases to local police or community leaders (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005 pp. 191-192). McConnachie's (2014) offers insightful analyses of legal plurality among ethnic Karen Burmese refugees in Thailand. The Karen have had a history of self-management separate and in opposition to the state. In the Thai refugee camps, they have maintained continuous (yet constantly evolving) social values, institutions, and governance that are present in Karen State in Burma. Examples of this 'traditional justice' in Tanzania include the council of elders known as 'bashingantahe' among Burundians, and 'kiuno' among Congolese (Rutinwa 2005 pp. 33-34; Ingelaere and Kohlhagen 2012). In all of these cases, there are overlapping ambiguities between refugee and host country courts for who has jurisdiction over cases.

Closely related to law, security and policing has also been trifurcated. In Uganda, there are refugee *askaris* or security officers, armed with locally made weapons, who arrest suspects as directed by the RWC or settlement commandant (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005 p. 187; Brankamp 2016 p. 51). In Tanzanian camps, refugee community policing is done through recruits called *sungusungu*, which follows a tradition of community policing or vigilantism in Tanzania (Mamdani 1996; Abrahams 1987; Fleisher 2000). In Nyarugusu, *sungusungu* work under the Tanzanian police stationed in the camp, joining them on patrols, and responding to disputes and disturbances. However, as a Congolese *sungusungu* in Nyarugusu describes, they also act as judges: 'if there is a conflict, they bring the case to *sungusungu*. Both pay money to the *sungusungu*. The *sungusungu* then decides who is right or wrong in the case'. Like the courts, it is unclear where refugee security and host state police begin and end. Brankamp (2020) describes how refugee community police are 'torn between humanitarian conceptions of localised refugee protection and more illiberal forms of security work which bound them closer to the Kenyan state' (p.1).

In most camps there are also elected leaders who often function as unpaid subcontractors to troubleshoot or act as go-betweens for UNHCR or other organisations and the refugee population if issues arise or if information needs to be communicated. Often these leaders are disregarded or even dissolved by UNHCR

when they become too political or disagreeable to humanitarian logics. Some leaders are appointed by UNHCR without elections at all (Lecadet 2016; Holzer 2012, 2016; Turner 2010). Additionally, there is emerging research on refugee-led community organisations (RCOs) which encompass many different forms and include sectors such as education, health, livelihoods, finance, and housing. This research demonstrates that refugees often look inward amongst their own communities and relationships for social protection before seeking help from the state or humanitarians. However, RCOs are more than often bypassed by UNHCR and donors for funding and support (Pincock et al. 2018). In Chapter 6, I explore in greater depth how a refugee-led organisation successfully mobilises savings groups in Nyarugusu on a minuscule budget, while large amounts of money are being funnelled to international organisations to do the same thing. These inefficient and ineffective interventions amount to what I call ‘pithy development’.

Refugee community participation and self-governance may seem like positive developments for refugees on the surface, and to some extent, they can be. However, refugee-led organisations are severely underfunded and side-lined by the power structures of the international refugee regime. Furthermore, the concept of ‘community’ in a camp is fundamentally flawed. This is made evident through Jennifer Hyndman’s (2000) critique of a proposed ‘Refugee Self-Management’ programme coordinated by CARE and UNHCR. She argues the programme is flawed in three fundamental ways: first, a refugee camp is not a community; second, the transfer of camp governance from organisations to refugee leaders cannot exclude control of economic resources; and third, the proposed structures of Refugee Self-Management would not represent the interest of some segments of the camp population, notably women (p. 139). In reality, refugee camps—like most societies—are heterogeneous with many intersectionalities such as nationalities, races ethnicities, clans, genders, and classes that have competing interests. For example, Kakuma in Kenya alone has 18 nationalities present (UNHCR 2017b). Hyndman further contends, ‘if CARE and UNHCR are unwilling to relinquish any of the economic means that would enable refugee self-management to occur, they will defeat the proposed objectives of refugee self-governance and democratic process, and potentially reproduce a neocolonial

power structure' (p. 141). Bulley (2014) goes beyond Hyndman's critique in claiming that community in camps is used as a biopolitical apparatus of control: 'community has now also become a tactic of government used to secure life within the spatial technology of the refugee camp' (p. 64). Ilcan and Rygiel (2015) similarly label this as 'resiliency humanitarianism', where refugee self-governance, 'provides the experiences through which refugees are supposed to refashion themselves as resilient, entrepreneurial subjects' (p. 334).

These arguments problematising refugee community and self-governance are important points which I will return to below when I discuss the similarities between refugee communities and indirect rule. In sum, as long as encampment policies exclude fundamental rights such as freedom of movement and employment, camps will always prevent true community development and empowerment. In this regard, I agree with Hyndman's (2000) assertion that 'though camps-as-communities may be desirable, this notion of community is not viable' (p. 143).

### **Refugee camps as cities?**

The organisational top-down planning and aesthetics of sprawling refugee camps, replete with neighbourhoods and markets, lends itself to the comparison of a city. The refugee camp as city notion has permeated academic scholarship, taking on various urban monikers such as the 'naked' city (Agier 2002), the 'accidental' city (Jansen 2011); 'humanitarian urbanism' (Jansen 2017); 'unlikely cities in the desert' (Oka 2011); and 'urban dwellers in the making' (de Montclos & Kagwanja 2000). Michel Agier and Bram Jansen embrace the concept of a refugee camp as a city and create similar determining characteristics of the urbanity of camps. Agier (2002) understands the refugee camp to be a 'novel socio-spatial form... in which new identities crystallise and subjectivation takes root' (p. 318). These features are 'sketches of a symbolic of space, social differentiation and identify change' (p. 324). Jansen (2011) begins defining urbanity in Africa by articulating what a city is *not*. 'The city is more than a site of concentration, density, and multiplicity' (p.16). He also denounces studies that see African cities in crisis and are centred around a 'meta-narrative of modernisation' that looks at the rise of slums and informality that cities in

Africa are 'negative' space (p. 17-18). The closest he comes to defining the concept of city is also through subtraction: 'Instead of determining what a "genuine space of urban sociability" may look like, I analyse various processes of "production of locality," and the "creation of space" in the organisation of this insecurity.' (p. 18). Similar to Agier, he highlights the following concepts of urbanity in the camp: 'the social ordering of space; role repertoires; and connections and flux' (p.19).

Grbac (2013) makes the case for the refugee camp as city not only as a theoretical point of departure but as a way for refugees to claim rights. For him and other critical scholars, a city is defined by the belonging it imbues in a city-dweller. 'In essence, the city engenders and fosters citizenship, that "special status of being of the city"' (p. 23). Drawing from critical urban theory as posited by theorists, Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, Grbac calls for refugees to claim 'rights to the city'. To Lefebvre, the space of a city is political, rather than merely a neutral or technical space. To claim rights to the city means to occupy, define, and design cities. It can apply to the rights to housing, transportation, or natural resources (Grbac 2013 p. 24). In the context of a camp, this means the right to participate and appropriate. To participate means to become involved in decisions about the built environment of the camp and to centre the needs, demands, and desires of refugees into the planning processes. To appropriate means the refugees' right to access and use the space of the camp (pp. 24-25).

My critique of comparing the camp to the city follows the questions Liisa Malkki (2002) asked Agier (2002) in a debate in the journal, *Ethnography* more than 15 years ago: 'what are the analytical reasons and stakes in trying to conceptualise a refugee camp as a city? Why is this analytically productive?' (p. 355). Each of the aforementioned scholars ultimately self-describe why the camp-as-city comparisons fall short. For example, Agier (2002) explains:

The camp, then, is comparable to the city, and yet it cannot 'reach it'. [. . .] Everything is potential, yet nothing develops, in contrast to the townships of South African apartheid or the native encampments of the colonial cities, these other models with which the refugee camp shares an incomplete, unfinished, form of urbanity. Even when stabilised, the camp remains a stunted city-to-be-made, by definition naked (pp. 336-337).

Jansen too concedes this point. He acknowledges the incompleteness of urbanisation as a point of comparison:

The analogy between the camp and urban space is ambiguous. It acknowledges social and ethnic diversity, economic stratification, creative entrepreneurship, and forms of institutional multiplicity and hybrid governance, but it fails to come to terms with the routines of regulation and control that characterise the temporary permanence of the camp' (Jansen 2017).

This is a contradiction to his aims of research in Kakuma: 'I mean to study the social processes that occur in the camp on their own terms, viewing the camp as a place in the larger world, connected but also localized' (Jansen 2011 p. 19). To echo Malkki's earlier mentioned questions, if he means to study the social processes 'on their own terms' then why is the urban framework necessary at all?

One can study social processes without the contortions of fitting them inside an analytical prism that will not fit in all instances. Grbac (2013) describes 'the special status of being *of the city*' (p. 23). What is essentially urban about a sense of belonging to space, or the subjectivity that space conditions? Can one be *of* a village or in this instance be *of* a refugee camp? People hold multiple identities such as race, gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, and nationality. Being of a place such as a city may not be the most salient determinant. Moreover, is claiming one's rights inherently urban? Is an urban analysis necessary to claim rights? My response is no. Grbac's calls for refugee participation and appropriation are not novel to urban spaces. They could and should be done in any context of inequality and injustice if possible. The refugee camp is a space of control, containment and humanitarian biopower. The subjectivities refugee camps shape should be studied on their own; an urban analysis would only distract from this. The activism of critical urban theory furthered by Lefebvre, Harvey, and others was theorising the space of *actual* cities. While there is contention and disagreement about the essential qualities of a city, very few would disagree with the 'city-ness' of the sites such as Paris, the focus of their research.

Due to the sheer size of camps, as well as the livelihoods and everyday activities carried out in these spaces, refugee camps as cities have captured the imagination of scholars. Relating to the notion of the normality and abnormality of camps in the introduction of this chapter, Jeff Crisp (2015) points out that unexpected

normality makes the comparison of camps as cities enticing. Some examples he gives are spontaneous decorations of prefabricated refugee homes or the creation of vibrant markets where novel items such as wedding dresses and pizza delivery can be found. He cautions against this comparison in describing Zaatari refugee camp housing Syrian refugees in Jordan:

The notion that Zaatari is characterized by a 'new normalcy' is a very dangerous one. It is certainly true to say that the camp's residents are doing whatever they can to make the best of a very difficult situation. But it is not normal to be accommodated behind a barbed wire fence and to be deprived of freedom of movement. It is not normal to live in a situation where the entire population lacks the rights and entitlements of citizens. And it is certainly not normal to wake up each day without knowing when or even if you will ever be able to return to the place that you consider to be your home (Crisp 2015).

What I believe would be more analytically fruitful, however, would be to recognise the refugee camps for the exceptional spaces that they are. If a comparison is desired, then compare commonalities between different camps for forced migrants. While the refugee camp as city debate takes on a spatial analysis, others have looked at patterns of governance and power to form a refugee camp as state analogy.

### **Refugee Camp as Surrogate State?**

As the next chapter will explore more in-depth, refugee-hosting countries in East Africa, such as Tanzania, previously maintained 'open-door' or 'laissez-faire' approaches to Asylum after independence. These policies, following pan-African ideals of generosity and anti-colonial support (or at least mostly), left refugees alone and uncontrolled. States allowed for the freedom of movement and the right to work in the country (Verdirame 1999; Milner 2009; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). In the 1990s, however, as a result of conflict and war across much of East and Central Africa, large movements of refugees fled to neighbouring countries. Countries such as Kenya and Tanzania had limited state capacity to cope with these migrations due to austerity measures in the wake of structural adjustment policies from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As a result, camps were established in periphery regions, which have been historically marginalised by the central state. With limited state capacity, these countries abdicated responsibility for

governing the camps to UNHCR and local and national organisations were sidelined (Rutinwa 2002; Kagwanja 2002). Additionally, many restrictions on the freedom of movement outside of the camps or the right to work were enacted. UNHCR came to be known by some as a de facto or 'surrogate state' (Slaughter and Crisp 2009; Kagan 2011; Deardorff Miller 2017). This analysis largely captures the scope and processes of East African and Middle Eastern states' relinquishment of refugee governance. However, I argue that there is an overstatement of the UNHCR's role in the host countries and that conceptualisations of the role of humanitarians in camps must be further nuanced and historicised (Malkki 1996).

Slaughter and Crisp (2009) introduce the term 'surrogate state', focusing on the recent geopolitical history of how UNHCR has come to be the primary apparatus for governing camps. The term is only briefly described once in the article: 'the organisation was a surrogate state, complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, health care, water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community participation, gender equality)' (Slaughter and Crisp 2009 p.8). This was where the comparison to the state ends. Kagan (2011) borrows the concept to make policy prescriptions defending UNHCR's governance, rather than as an analytical tool:

When parallel structures are the most effective means to achieve functional rights for refugees, UNHCR need not apologise for them. There are some things that only states can do, but there are nevertheless some critical components of refugee protection that UNHCR often performs better than many governments (p. 22).

He recognises the limits to such a term, without abandoning the concept: 'A UNHCR surrogate state is not a complete substitute for an actual state, in large part because UNHCR ultimately has limited power to restrain a government determined to do ill to refugees' (p.19). State surrogacy as an analytical framework is more thoroughly developed in Sarah Deardorff Miller's (2017) book, *UNHCR as a Surrogate State*.

Using Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda as case-studies, Deardorff Miller's (2017) work is primarily situated within the International Relations discipline arguing for research in international organisations' roles *within* the state, which she calls 'domestication' (pp. 19-22). Working with Slaughter and Crisp's (2009) above

description of surrogacy, she highlights the marginalisation of the state's capacity and a 'shirking' of state responsibility and blame in governance that arises through surrogate statehood (pp. 31-33). On the other end of the spectrum opposite surrogacy, UNHCR at times works in partnership with the state, citing Uganda's recent history as an example. Her novel contribution is the argument that the deeper level of surrogacy UNHCR takes on, the less ability they have to influence the host state's asylum policies (pp. 27-29). We see this clearly in UNHCR's inability to prevent the Tanzanian state recent decisions to shut down a cash transfer programme, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and markets, despite the longstanding presence of UNHCR in the country.

What this surrogacy analysis lacks, however, is the complicated interplay of governance and power between actors on international, national, and local scales that occur beyond the sole dictate of UNHCR. Voutira and Harrell-Bond (1992) label these configurations as 'power grids in the distribution of aid' which consist of seven layers of lateral and vertical chains that manage governance. The power grid includes: 1) donors and host governments; 2) donors and intermediaries such as UNHCR and implementing partner NGOs; 3) the relationships among and between intermediaries such as UNHCR and NGOs as implementing partners, which are mostly dependent on UNHCR for funding; 4) relationships between intermediaries and host government; 5) relationships between intermediaries and refugees; 6) relationships between local host populations and refugees; 7) finally, the internal dynamics of relationships among the refugee heterogeneous camp populations, which include nationality, ethnicity, class, age, and other identity and group markers (pp. 210-219).

Also missing in these power grids are the other UN international organisations such as the WFP and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which account for sizeable aspects of service provision, governance, and competition for international donor funds (Parker 2017a, 2017b). Governance in humanitarian aid is further fractured and complicated under the UN cluster system (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015). While UNHCR is certainly the largest actor in this space, to characterise it as substituting the state is an overreach. It is more accurate to focus on the complicated webs of governance and where UNHCR or other actors fit in this space, rather than

totalising UNHCR's role as a state. In Chapter 6, I further analyse UNHCR's role in the frequent failures of self-reliance in the camps in recent years.

Moreover, as with the comparison of the refugee camp as city, there are too many instances where the analogy does not hold and falls short. There are countless circumstances where refugee host-states' sovereignty supersedes that of the UN. This includes the national refugee migration legislation in place since the 1990s, forced repatriations, camp closures, and other shutdowns. Taken further, if UNHCR-managed camps are states, then who is the head of state? The High Commissioner who primarily works diplomatically in Geneva? The Tanzania country director? The refugee camp manager? This line of scrutiny leaves the concept of refugee camp-as-state wanting. Turner (2010) best sums up the limitations of the refugee camp-as-state view and points to a different way forward in framing the governance of refugee camps:

Although UNHCR is not a state, it can act like a modern liberal state in its everyday practices of governing the camp through norms as it attempts to foster life in the camp [...] However, despite the similarities, there are also aspects that are strongly at odds with what we normally understand by the 'normal liberal democracy' [...] It might seem more appropriate to compare the camp with colonial governmentality where colonial subjects were not perceived to be fit to enjoy the full rights of citizenship (p. 8).

## **The colonial containment impulse**

Turner's quote above, suggesting to 'compare the camp with colonial governmentality', spurred me to take this quote seriously by building on and adapting Mahmood Mamdani's (1996), *Citizen and Subject*, in which he makes the case for the 'bifurcated state' in Africa. I argue that refugee camps in post-colonial settings are third spaces beyond bifurcation and represent a contemporary 'trifurcated state' in both function and form. However, before examining Mamdani's theory of bifurcation I will discuss the broader colonial project; its goals and strategies. The bifurcated state, and more recently, the trifurcated state, are by-products of the colonial impulse to contain and manipulate the mobility of people inside and outwith its territories.

The colonial project was not merely about plunder, although taxation, land appropriation, and natural resource extraction were key pillars of this era. What made

the extraction of wealth from Africa and the rest of the colonial world possible was manipulation, control, and the containment of movements of colonised people. The Transatlantic slave trade was the example of these forced migrations at its most sinister and devastating. However, this chapter focuses on the latter stages of colonialism, particularly British indirect rule through the mechanism of Native Authorities, generally across Sub-Saharan Africa. The next chapter contextualises Tanzania's specific colonial history of containment. Though mobility controls during this time were less violent than in times of slavery, the system was still inspired by a racialised ideology meant to containerise people along arbitrary primordial categories, while simultaneously enriching the metropole at the expense of African subjects.

A key reason for manipulating movements of colonial subjects was the need for labour on large construction projects, agricultural plantations, mines, and factories. In more brutal instances people were forcibly conscripted for labour. More commonly, however, they were impelled by onerous hut and poll taxes in rural hinterlands, which necessitated the need to move to cities and towns to earn wages (Bryceson 2000). 'In other words, controlling migration had bearings upon the profitability of the colonial project itself' (Chaulia 2003 p. 149). The colonialists did not want labourers to remain in these urban population centres, however, due to fear of unrest and uprisings, as well as a racist disposition to preserve the purity of cities where colonial authorities were concentrated. To do so, legislations were promulgated, which gave colonial administrations the power not only to determine entry requirements but also to forcibly remove immigrants in colonial cities. Vagrancy and (forced) labour laws became common features in the colonial arsenal of legislative ordinances. These laws controlled mobility and labour and criminalised idleness and homelessness – factors that mainly affected immigrants to the cities (Beier and Ocobock 2008).

These policies were also inspired from simplistic and racially influenced notions of 'tribal' homelands for internal migrants to circularly return to. James Ferguson (1999) captures this colonial logic well:

Colonial rulers were dismayed at the high mobility exhibited by villagers in Northern Province [of Zambia] and could not understand why people did not stay put in 'proper villages'. They were sure that such behaviour was not 'traditional' but the result of recent pathology brought on by industrial development and the

'migrant labour system'. Small temporary villages, with people moving about in an undisciplined manner between them, they felt sure, were a sign of the 'breakdown' of traditional institutions, a breakdown that government policy would have to check if 'detrribalization' was to be avoided (p. 39).

One way of enforcing circular migration was through pass and identification bureaucracies. The most (in)famous and dramatic of these cases were the pass laws and passbooks created in apartheid South Africa to ensure the apartheid state could benefit from the labour of black Africans, while keeping them segregated and contained in the rural peripheries. While South Africa took up Mamdani's main focus on migration between the rural and urban centres, a similar structure in Tanganyika and Kenya known as the *kipande* system required Africans leaving the 'native reserves' to carry identification cards when entering prized colonial realms (Berman 1990 p. 147; Lugalla 1989 p. 147). Furthermore, one of the most enduring legacies of colonialism was the creation of arbitrary borders at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, as well as additional re-borderings thereafter. This process split ethnicities and communities with close cultural affinities, creating borderlands in places where they did not previously exist. As the case of Tanganyika in the next chapter demonstrates, colonial authorities straddled the line between strictly maintaining the established borders to prevent the 'contamination' of the tribal purities they imagined, and opportunistically recruiting migrants and refugees from neighbouring colonies as additional labour.

### **Colonialism, development, and self-reliance**

Earlier stages of colonialism were guided by a logic of a European civilising mission as justification for colonial exploitation. However, these notions generally gave way to ideas of 'development' and 'trusteeship'. By the 1930s and 1940s development was 'a framing device bringing together a range of interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit goal of raising colonial standards of living' (Cooper and Packard 1997 p. 7). Without wading too deeply into the debates around the origins and definitions of 'development', the term is generally understood to have been conceived and grown during colonialism. Cowen and Shenton (1996) trace the

lineage of development as far back as the Saint-Simonians, situated in the earlier colonial stages of the 1820s. Contrasting Europeans' primary goals of expansion and plunder, this period in the colonies was marked by consolidation and 'constructive exploitation', which came about primarily through expanding infrastructure for extraction such as railways and ports, which would 'open up' the interiors. Some medical services were made available, but primarily in urban areas to benefit the European colonists (Hodge and Hödl 2014 p. 6).

Following the World War One, by the 1920s these development methods shifted to indirect rule. As before, the colonial state emphasised exploiting resources, though this period also focused on agricultural inputs and technologies. Additionally, under the same logic of indirect rule, which was born out of the desire to minimise dissent from indigenous populations while minimizing colonial expenditures as much as possible, modest health interventions were introduced during this period. Briggs (2002) describes these changes: 'In this period the possibility emerged for the operation of a different modality of power in relation to the decolonising countries—one which relies not predominantly on force, but on the mobilisation (including self-mobilisation) of human subjects and nation-states through the notion of development' (p. 424). Briggs' mention of 'self-mobilisation' is key because this phase of colonialism introduced corollary ideas of development centred around the 'self' such as self-sufficiency, self-help, self-government, or the most recent iteration used in refugee governance, self-reliance. An indirect rule apologist, J. A. Hobson (1938), cited by Duffield (2005) expands on this development theory:

[Indirect rule] was thought better to introduce new kinds of industry and encourage new wants among people settled on their own lands. By providing appropriate industrial methods suited to existing industries, ' . . . it can serve to educate them to self-help. Where native peoples are protected from the aggressive designs of white profit mongers, this salutary evolution operates' (Hobson 1938, p. 279). With the benefits of protection, intermediate technology and vocational training, it was argued that old social and religious institutions will decay naturally to be replaced by new forms (Duffield 2005 pp. 149-150).

Hodge and Hödl (2014) expand on the failures indirect rule and self-sufficiency, which fell under the strategies of *mise en valeur* and the 'dual mandate' by French and British colonialists respectively:

In truth, both *mise en valeur* and the dual mandate were more rhetoric than reality, largely because the necessary political will and financial resources were lacking. Such efforts were tightly constrained by the doctrine of colonial financial self-sufficiency. The severe spending limits imposed on the colonies under this doctrine meant that in the 1920s and 1930s neither the British and French, nor the Belgian and Portuguese imperial governments for that matter, were able to initiate and sustain major development projects. As a result, any development had to be paid for out of each colony's own revenues generated from taxes on Africans and from custom duties imposed on imports and exports (p. 11).

In Chapter 6, I analyse how these failures of self-sufficiency from the quote above still plague the current refugee self-reliance paradigm today. Furthermore, these minor investments in African well-being were simultaneously coupled with 'the use of forced labour, the raising of hut and poll taxes, the displacement and movement of populations, and in some areas, the forced cultivation of cash crops' (Hodge and Hödl 2014 pp. 11-12).

Following the Great Depression in the 1930s and World War II in the 1940s, which prompted growing labour and nationalist unrest and resistance in the colonies from Africans, as well as criticism of colonialism from within the metropolises, European colonialists transitioned to a more 'developmentalist' orientation. This shifted development interventions to larger schemes such as large-scale agricultural projects and greater funding such as the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This shift also included social investments in housing, utilities, schools, and healthcare (Cooper 2002 p. 31). Again, this change was never fully benign, as these investments were seen by colonial states as ways of returning financial flows to Europe during and after the war. Over time, this developmentalist colonial state neither appeased the Europeans or Africans. The colonial metropolises became disillusioned with the high costs of development and the low gains in economic rewards or suppressing Africans' claims for independence. For Africans, colonial-led development was not enough to stop the rising chorus calling for independence, which began in earnest in the 1960s. In the next chapter, I return to development and self-reliance as it was perceived and produced in Tanzania. In Chapter 6, I synthesise these practises and discourses around colonial and post-colonial notions of self-reliance with the current neoliberal

paradigm of refugee self-reliance. I explore the continuities, shared dilemmas, and differences in camps and the implications in camp governance today.

### **Indirect rule**

According to Mamdani (1996), the primary dilemma to colonial rule and control was 'the native question' (p. 3). The first solution was through direct rule or 'centralised despotism', which was totalising control from colonial authorities and recognised no native institutions. To gain European rights, the Africans or 'natives' would have to become 'civilised'. This form of rule completely controlled the market, appropriated lands, neutralised communal autonomy, and defeated and dispersed tribal populations (pp. 16-17). In part, lessons were learned from tumultuous moments during the 19<sup>th</sup> century in India, it was eventually realized that direct rule became untenable to the colonial authorities because of the costs and manpower needs for complete control in the face of resistance. Although occurring unevenly and at different speeds across the continent, most colonising regimes shifted to indirect rule or 'decentralised despotism' through the Native Administration, which became the preferred method of rule for European powers. According to Mamdani (1996), this shift began with the British in Natal, South Africa and then spread across its colonies. This was then followed to varying degrees by the French after World War I, the Belgians in the 1930s, and the Portuguese in the 1950s (pp. 86-88).

Beyond an economic calculus, the colonial project was also paired with a simplistic and primordial understanding of race and tribe and an overarching racist belief in the right to rule. For example, Sir Frederick Lugard, known as Lord Lugard, was the governor of colonial Nigeria and was the most influential advocate of indirect rule. In his book, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, he unequivocally claims: 'we hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonize, to trade, and to govern' (Lugard 1965 pp. 618-619). To keep 'natives' from leaving their designated areas, colonial officials had to first make these populations legible, or as James Scott (1998) argues, 'legibility is a condition of manipulation' (p. 183). With this goal, colonial officials made 'tribal' and 'ethnographic maps' informing how Native Authorities should govern the 'tribal lands' (Mamdani 1996, 2001; Iliffe 1979; Burton 2005). Mamdani

(1996) recounts an explanation from Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and part of the British war cabinet in 1929: 'The British Empire does not stand for the assimilation of its peoples into a common type, it does not stand for standardisation, but for the fullest freest development of its peoples along their own specific lines' (p. 151). This is coded language for maintaining a separateness and containment of 'tribal' identities. Chaulia (2003) further explains Smuts' reasoning: 'migrant labour leads to a snapping of the "tribal bond", "detachment of the native from his tribal connexion" and a decay of traditional African forms of jurisdiction and organisation' (p. 151).

In summary, in order to extract taxes and labour from subject Africans, the colonial administrators needed to impel movements of people through taxation and force labourers to travel plantations, mines, factories, and population centres. Simultaneously, they needed to contain native populations away from cities in circular patterns to their rural 'homelands', often through pass laws and identifications. This system aided the profitability of extraction, but also followed from racist understandings of tribe and tradition. Duffield (2005) describes the rationale of indirect rule, which makes colonial governance possible:

Of great importance for promoting this emergent life, was the protection and safe haven that indirect rule afforded it. At the turn of the twentieth century, for example, concerns over the negative effects of uncontrolled urbanization on social cohesion were widespread among colonial administrators. The fear was the emergence of a disorganized rabble ' . . . in a savage and semi-savage state, all acting on their own impulses, and making themselves a danger to society generally' (MacMichael, 1923, p. 2) (p. 149).

Mahmood Mamdani's (1996) pioneering work on indirect rule traces the lasting effect of bifurcated governance in Africa, which structured law and politics far beyond colonialism's formal demise. I argue that similar processes are made manifest in refugee camps today.

### **The bifurcated state**

Mamdani claims that the colonial state was, 'organised differently in rural areas from urban ones, that state was Janus-faced, bifurcated. It contained a duality: two

forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture' (p. 18). There then became a spectrum of citizens and subjects. There were the 'rights bearing colons', the 'subject peasantry', and the 'urban-based natives' who lived in cities in middle- or working-class areas and were not subject to customary law but were excluded from the colonists by racially discriminating law (p. 19).

Customary law for the rural peasantry was not uniform but took a 'tribal' form. Pre-existing chiefs or leaders were either affirmed by the colonial state or 'freshly imposed where none had existed.' This created a legal dualism whereby customary law regulated domains outside of the market such as land, family, and community issues (p. 17).

The African was containerised, not as a native, but as a tribes person. [...] Customary law was defined in the plural, as the law of the tribe, and not in the singular, as a law for all natives. Thus, there was not one customary law for all natives, but roughly as many sets of customary laws as there were said to be tribes (p. 22).

This form of legal pluralism was said to 'enforce custom' but ensured a unitary authority that allowed for the continuation of colonial rule (p. 18). Duffield (2005 sums up the functions of indirect rule:

Native Administration was based upon devolving appropriate administrative responsibilities, for example, public works, tax collection, rural courts, local police, primary education, and so on, to indigenous tribal or feudal authorities. Its aim was the measured achievement of self-determination [...] Native Administration, with its encouragement of social cohesion, was a way of mobilizing 'traditional' rural populations against this new and disruptive manifestation of the 'modern' (p. 150).

### **Post-colonial continuities**

After decolonisation, the newly independent states were able to dismantle the racist institutions of colonial rule, but not the despotic nature of the state. The bifurcated state was retained in post-independent Africa because the centre of power was still contained in the urban centres rather than the rural (Mamdani 1996 p. 8). After the state was deracialised, the government elites had to seal their power through

redistribution by way of patrimonialism or corruption. This occurred from the urban core to the rural periphery by reifying customary law in generally two forms: the conservative and the radical. Generally, with conservative states, local leadership virtually remained intact and maintained 'tribal pluralism' or 'decentralised despotism'. Radical states, such as Tanzania, attempted to institute a unitary customary law by force and superseding individual tribes, which led to centralised despotism. Conservative and radical states regimes succeeded in the deracialisation of the state, but they both failed in the democratisation of the state and the bifurcation between town and country remained (pp. 25-27).

Another enduring legacy of colonialism that remained in post-colonial Africa was the colonial urge to manipulate and contain migrations. Bakewell (2008) argues: 'While many of the newly independent states showed an urban bias in policies of industrialisation in the cities, many aid programmes focused on the development of rural areas, which was seen as essential to enable people to stay in their villages rather than try their luck in the ever-growing cities' (p. 1344). The desire to limit migration to cities was shared by international development actors and within development studies particularly: 'In general, within the development literature, migration has been framed as a problem: a response to crisis rather a 'normal part of people's lives' (Bakewell 2008 p. 1345). This continuation should not be a surprise as Kothari (2005) illuminates that many development practitioners in the independence decade of the 1960s were previously employed in the colonial services. Duffield (2005, 2006) argues more broadly that sustainable development from the Global North to the South is a biopolitical tool which fulfils a colonial genealogy or 'colonial present' of indirect rule. Duffield contends that these development interventions are encoded with the 'xeno-racist' goal of containing 'non-insured' populations away from 'insured' populations of the North. Similarly, I argue in Chapter 3 that in protracted refugee situations in Africa, there are certain areas such as cities, or in entire countries like Sudan and Egypt, where black African refugees are deemed not 'worthy' to reside. In the next chapter, I discuss how independent Tanzania under President Nyerere demonstrated radical breaks from colonialism through its 'open door policy' toward

anti-colonial refugees, while simultaneously maintained the impulse to contain and manipulate mobility.

## **The trifurcated state**

The 1990s was a volatile period for the state across Africa. Caused by a continent-wide and systematic 'rolling back' of the state under structural adjustment policies and a 'third wave' of democratisation, state authority shifted and left governance voids in many areas (Milner 2009). In the lacuna of the state, 'twilight institutions' often filled this void (Lund 2006). 'What characterizes this group of institutions is their movement in and out of a capacity to exercise public authority. They operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private' (Lund 2006 p. 678). Others have theorised these processes as 'polycephalous' (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003), 'modes of governance' (Olivier de Sardan 2011), 'heterarchy' (Bellagamba and Klute 2008), or 'hybrid political orders' (Boege et al. 2009). The aforementioned scholars analyse a diverse range of actors that fill this twilight characterisation such as chieftaincies, vigilante groups, associations and societies, churches, development projects, and many other manifestations (Lund 2006 p. 676).

In addition to the shifts in governance and authority, the 1990s also saw widespread internal wars. This was particularly true in East and Central Africa in Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan, which caused massive displacements and created the abdicated spaces of hybridised authority in refugee camps. Twilight institutions such as churches or development projects only fill a fragmented space of governance and authority in a given society. I contend that the twilight institutions framing is inadequate to fully capture the sheer size and scale of camps, many of which host hundreds of thousands of refugees. Moreover, despite relinquishing its service provision role in the camp, the presence, or violent 'idea of the state', pervades the camp space with its ability to shut down markets and humanitarian interventions or inflict acute violence to the bodies of refugees through the police stationed in the camp. I propose that Mamdani's theory of bifurcation is a

starting place, a framing, to think about camps as being trifurcated in purpose and configuration.

### **Trifurcation in function**

Mamdani's (1996) work was fundamentally about explaining politics and the modern state by tracing the post-colonial continuity of legal and authority structures of the past. The purpose of speaking with Mamdani is not to merely make a novel term or comparison. This is an irony that would not be lost on me considering the critique I apply above of the comparison of the refugee camp to a city or state. Mamdani (1996) is also critical of this pursuit:

I try to underline the specificity of the African experience, or at least of a slice of it. This is an argument not against comparative study but against those who would dehistoricise phenomena by lifting them from context, whether in the name of an abstract universalism or of an intimate particularism, only to make sense of them by analogy (p. 13).

Moreover, scholars such as Briggs (2002) caution the 'post-development' turn to extend the 'colonisation metaphor' to all post-war development driven by Western hegemony:

The reliance on the colonial metaphor and a sovereign conceptualisation of power leads some post-development writers to overly aggregate the operation of power, to ascribe intentionality to a singular historical force such as 'the Americans', and to take an untenable oppositional stance. The engagement with Foucault shows that the generation of overall effects through development need not be reduced to such simplistic terms (p. 433).

Heeding Malkki, Briggs, and Mamdani's warnings against analogy and metaphor, my usage of trifurcation shifts the gaze from the hegemonic 'West' or 'North' to the colonial practises of mobility control and indirect rule which have morphed and been reapplied by the post-colonial Tanzanian state through its encampment policy. The sovereign and violent power the Tanzanian state exerts—most forcefully through what I call 'shutdown politics'—is ever present in the trifurcated function of the camp. Additionally, in the latter half of this chapter, I also ally with Briggs' (2002) call to more closely engage with Foucault in setting out the trifurcated forms present in refugee camps.

The camp demonstrates many lines of historical continuity of processes since colonialism, particularly the policies of containment and manipulation of movements. However, when comparing indirect rule and modern encampment clear differences also rise to the fore. Following Lemberg-Pederson's (2019) delimitations, I am not claiming a clear genealogy from colonialism to present, but rather I am:

identifying reoccurring elements or practices in current and colonial displacement politics. Such a comparison accords with the ambition of genealogical inquiries for historical problematization of the present by disrupting pretensions of intact, linear lines through history. However, it also differs from genealogy by basing its conceptualization on comparative case studies rather than grand scale tracings of (dis)continuities (p. 250).

Foregrounding my aims from the quote above, I discuss how building on Mamdani's theory of bifurcation is productive. I also outline how my theory of trifurcation diverge from Mamdani and Duffield's analyses.

Mamdani was principally concerned with how 'natives' or 'subjects' are governed through customary law and authority separate from 'citizens': 'Both subject and citizen derive their rights, customary or civil, through membership in a part: a tribe for the subject, a nation for the citizen' (Mamdani 1996 p. 292). For subjects, as previously mentioned, they were ruled by decentralised despots accountable to the hegemonic colonial and later post-colonial central state centred in the city. Refugees embody a third, trifurcated population; not deriving their rights from customary or civil sources, but a conglomeration of trifurcated humanitarian actors, which I discuss in the next section. Refugees' lack of rights and inability to make claims to rights have been heavily scrutinized in forced migration literature. Hannah Arendt famously wrote that refugees lack 'the right to have rights'. Moreover, refugees have been labeled 'matter out of place' (Malkki 1992) or as 'undesirables' (Agier 2011).

In function, the 'refugee problem' poses similar dilemmas to the colonial 'native problem', or the post-colonial 'rural-peasant problem'. The central, hegemonic states do not have the resources to directly control and govern these spaces on the peripheries, which causes the need for parallel systems of governance through indirect rule or humanitarian care. This is particularly true after the societal changes and resource depletions following both World Wars or the tumult caused by

displacement on a massive scale and structural adjustment policies of the 1990s. Where I primarily diverge from Mamdani's theory of bifurcation, is that in the trifurcated state of refugee camps, as described in the section above on 'refugee communities', there is only a weak replica of indirect or customary rule by refugee populations contained in the camp. In the instances where refugees are given institutions to self-govern such as customary courts and leadership, community security through *sungusungu*, or in refugee community-led organisations, refugees are marginalised through lack of funding, decision-making power, or means of enforcement. Refugee self-government comes nowhere near approaching the power that decentralised despots such as chiefs and local leaders hold in Mamdani's analysis. Tribal powerbrokers through indirect rule had the substantial capacities of taxation and coercion. Instead, in camps there is a colonial inversion, where transnational humanitarian structures built by former colonial powers, such as UNHCR and implementing partners, fill in the governance void between refugee communities and the host state. Though this form of humanitarian indirect rule is not despotic in structure, it is a far-cry from the liberal democracy that Northern donors purportedly embody (Hyndman 1997). Similar to the bifurcated structure where the central state maintains hegemonic control, I argue throughout Part II, particularly in Chapter 4, that despite abdicating service provision in camps, the Tanzanian state periodically imposes its will on the trifurcated space through 'shutdown politics'. As Mamdani (2018) describes: 'the authorities in charge of enforcing custom, so-called customary authorities were sanctioned by the state and backed up by state violence' (p. xvi). This violence is paralleled in camps through the 'humanitarian-violence complex' (Branch 2009).

While Mamdani focuses on the coloniality of rural-urban migrations, primarily in the heavily industrialised South Africa, other scholars such as Bakewell (2008) and Duffield (2005, 2006) focus on colonial and post-colonial mobility control and containment in Africa and across the post-colonial world respectively. Moreover, Mamdani was criticised for mostly eschewing a political economy methodology (Mamdani 2018 pp. x-xi; Aseka et al. 1997). Duffield (2005) foregrounds this analysis by making the case on a grand scale that sustainable development as a global process

is a genealogical fulfilment of colonial containment impulse. In this conceptualisation, development in the 'colonial present' bears striking similarities to indirect rule. While Duffield is importantly pointing to undeniable global systems of exclusion and xenophobia meant to keep 'non-insured' peoples out of the Northern states, his application of this theory to all processes of sustainable development is indiscriminately applied and inexact (Briggs 2002). There are multitudinous actors from donor states, international organisations, NGOs—international and local—which have many different logics and objectives that are not always neatly captured in this formulation. Instead, I propose a more modest application of comparison to indirect rule, which is more readily applied to the space of the camp.

Duffield (2006), claims that central to sustainable development today is the biopolitical fostering of self-reliance among non-insured people in the South. According to him, this has been the result of the transition away from post-World War Two development ideology:

Earlier modernist assumptions that the underdevelopment world would, after passing through various stages, come to resemble the developed. Sustainable development breaks this aspirational goal and, complementing moves to control international immigration, substitutes a relation of containment. Non-insured populations are now expected to live within the limits of their own powers of self-reliance (p. 74).

This process is functionally happening in refugee camps around the world with the current self-reliance paradigm informed by neoliberal development ideology and dwindling humanitarian budgets (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018). Throughout this thesis, such as Chapters 5 and 6, I argue alongside other critical forced migration scholars that self-reliance in trifurcated states is a near impossibility for the majority of camp residents. In the next chapter, I illuminate the irony that the post-colonial Tanzanian state under President Nyerere, which first attempted self-reliance strategies as a radical attempt to decolonise from neo-colonial dependencies, is now weaponising the inadequacy of refugee self-reliance strategies. Whereas the colonial state forced mobilities of subjects into key markets in cities, factories, and plantations economically through taxation in rural areas, President Magufuli today is reverse-engineering these movements by assaulting and further debilitating markets,

livelihoods, and humanitarian self-reliance interventions in order to once again evoke the colonial impulse to impel and move unwanted populations out.

Mamdani's analysis has been critiqued by Atieno Odhiambo and others for his usage of strict binaries: 'The author's prescription is to link the urban and rural, namely, the binary oppositions of rights and custom, representation and participation, centralization and decentralization, civil society and community' (Murray et al. 2000 p. 390). 'By taking the binary opposition between politics and economics for granted,' argues Martin Murray, 'Mamdani narrows the terms of his investigation and limits the scope of his analysis.' (Murray et al. 2000 p. 384). Moreover, Schneider (2006) argues against Mamdani's (1996) claims of institutional continuity between colonial and post-colonial states:

*Citizen and Subject's* use of selective official blueprints of legal-institutional structures as descriptors, and often explanations, of the nature of power is also problematic: it focuses too heavily on official blueprints to the neglect of actually emerging formal [...] A successful explanation of the nature of power must pay close attention to the practice of power and to the array of factors that shape it (p. 95).

My post-colonial analysis of the trifurcated state thus attempts to find a middle-ground between the overly expansive genealogy of indirect rule applied by Duffield (2005, 2006) and the narrow legal-institutionalist continuities examined by Mamdani (1996). As such, these scholars initiate a starting point, a framework to think through the colonial impulse to contain and manipulate mobility through encampment. The other aspect of trifurcation in the following section encapsulates the non-binary forms and configurations of power and authority of the camp, which captures the nuanced complexities of camp governance.

### **Trifurcation in form**

The trifurcated state as presented in the previous section, allows for a macro-analysis of the continuities and changes throughout the history of shifting paradigms: from colonial, post-colonial, and post-structural adjustment. This section explores the forms of trifurcated rule, which zooms in on the everyday governance and entwinements between and amongst all actors. Straying from Mamdani's bifurcated

analysis, refugees cannot fully appeal for their rights among customary or 'tribal' authority from within their own 'community'; nor can they appeal to the state as citizens. Instead, their claims must be aimed at the amalgamation of actors managing, governing, and enforcing the containment of the camp. In protracted refugee situations, an additional category must be included in refugee camp governance: the humanitarian government, which is the menagerie of UNHCR and other UN agencies and NGOs in the cluster approach it manages and subcontracts with (Agier 2011; Ilcan and Rygiel 2015). For example, in Chapter 4 I demonstrate the violent role the state plays in the camp. In Chapter 6, I argue that while the humanitarian government maintains the life of the camps through care and maintenance aid, they are mostly ineffective at promoting self-reliance and remain acquiescent to the Tanzanian state, which has cyclically repatriated camp refugees against their will.

The trifurcated state is not inhabited solely with a primary actor, UNHCR, as surrogate state theorists suggest, but rather is the conglomeration of the 'power grids' of the camp (Voutira and Harrell-Bond 1992) which include: the 'refugee community', the national and local Tanzanian state, UNHCR, WFP, international and national NGOs. These multivariate modes of governance, also known as the 'double chain of administration' (Colson 2004 p. 108) are fluid and negotiated. The trifurcated space of refugee camps demonstrates the fractured nature of governance. In different spheres or aspects of camp life, power and governance are splintered among refugees, state officials, and humanitarians. Of all these actors, refugee communities, which I problematised above, are the most marginalised and disempowered. They serve key functions such as maintaining security and economic resiliency. Foucault's theory of governmentality and antecedent scholars engaging with his work, heavily inform my analysis of trifurcated governance.

### **Anthropology of the (trifurcated) state**

To review, I have made the case that conceptualising camps as communities, cities, or surrogate states does not adequately capture the complicated nature of governance in camps. The camp-as-community approach to governing refugee camps is problematic because there is no homogenous community in camps. As in

any society, there are myriads of intersectional identities. Secondly, attempts by the humanitarian government to implement self-help or self-government in camps are woefully inadequate and merely act as free sub-contracting for humanitarian organisations. Additionally, camp-as-city framework will always have an analytical incompleteness as full urbanisation or normalisation are never completely realised in camps. UNHCR as a surrogate state also offers an incomplete view of the camp due to the shared governance between many humanitarian and development organisations and clusters. I propose that a more fruitful analytical lens to make sense of camp authority is the trifurcated state where camps are trifurcated in function (as a colonial continuity of mobility management and semblance to indirect rule) as well as in form (through shifting configurations between camp residents, the humanitarian government, and the state).

These three tiers do not wield equal levels of authority or ability to govern as they wish. Camp residents nearly always remain subordinate to humanitarian and state actors, and the humanitarian government is ineffective at protecting refugees at critical junctures against the state. The state looms large in every chapter of this thesis. I argue that the primacy of the nation-state system reigns supreme, and the state remains the dominant actor capable of low-grade structural violence and acute physical and material violence at a moment's notice. In what ways can we utilise critical analysis, beyond the mere description of events, to more closely examine how power is exerted upon and experienced by refugees in camps?

Bouchard (2011) asserts, 'anthropological analysis is most effective when studying power as experienced in daily life' (p. 193). Das and Poole (2004) add:

Ethnography is a mode of knowing that privileges experience—often going into realms of the social that are not easily discernible within the more formal protocols used by many other disciplines. As such, ethnography offers a unique perspective on the sorts of practices that seem to undo the state at its territorial and conceptual margins (p. 4).

In addition to conducting interviews, follow-up visits, and informal conversations with households in the financial diaries project, there were times I observed revelatory ethnographic moments in the camp. These helped parse new understandings of the dominance refugees feel by the Tanzanian state and the

inability for the humanitarian government to protect or foster self-reliance among refugees. In Chapter 4, I recall my observations of a planned protest and its demise by the Tanzanian state following the shutdown of a popular cash transfer programme for refugees. I also recount my encounters with international organisations' blasé experimentation with 'pithy' development projects in Chapter 6 that do little to assuage the restrictions on livelihoods and asylum.

Anthropology of the state offers valuable tools to parse the state's role in the trifurcated state. The state exerts its muscular sovereignty from above through shutdowns, and its disciplinary nature enforcing encampment from below through MHA and security forces. What follows is my attempt to frame the state's role in camps in dialogue with the work of select anthropologists situated within the anthropology of the state subdiscipline. For Das and Poole (2004) this involves a conceptualising of the margins, where they 'track the way power spreads its tentacles into the capillary branches of the social' (p. 10). Others explore how the state is changing due to globalisation and transnational circulations of people, ideas, and money, which are challenging the spatial nature of the state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Trouillot 2003; Sharma and Gupta 2006). Anthropologists in this camp decentre the state and call on the 'imagined state' (Gupta 1995), 'states of imagination', or the 'idea' of the state (Hansen and Stepputat 2001). These scholars take inspiration from Michel Foucault's concepts of governmentality, biopower, and biopolitics. Foucault was principally a social theorist, which I am not. Rather than directly applying his methods, I instead dialogue with those above who recast Foucauldian theory to post-colonial states and humanitarian interventions.

### **Reverberations of Foucault**

I will confess honestly that I have been hesitant to evoke the work of Michel Foucault. In my experience, mentioning Foucault among academics will either provoke eye-rolls and frustration or stimulate interesting and lively discussions. Anthropologists of the state who engage with Foucault are accused of 'a strategy of academic identity politics' by others in what I call the 'states at work' school, namely Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2014a p. 53). I am aware of

and will discuss the pitfalls of engaging with Foucault below, but first will articulate my rationale for choosing in. I will turn inward Malkki's (2002) incisive questions, which I applied to conceptualisations of the camp as a city or surrogate state: 'what are the analytical reasons and stakes in trying to conceptualise a refugee camp [through a Foucauldian lens]? Why is this analytically productive?' (p. 355). In other words, why do I *need* to invite Foucault to my analysis of the camp? Scott-Smith echoes similar concerns with 'biopower'. 'Scholars of humanitarianism [...] risk applying this term indiscriminately, failing to define it adequately, and using it as a substitute for detailed descriptions of power and control' (p. 22-23).

My response is that in one sense, Foucault is not required at all. I have heretofore described in this chapter, and will further contextualise throughout this thesis, that power and authority in the camp are decentred from the state in rhizomatic and trifurcated ways. In my view, there has been illuminating research on camps with and without Foucault's citation. I see Foucault's theories of governmentality, biopower, and biopolitics, not as substitutes, but as supplements; value added to my empirical analysis of encampment. I am not interested in the association of 'academic identity politics' associated with Foucault (though that may be out of my control), nor do I have particular hagiographic reverence for him. Moreover, I do not consider my work to be speaking with Foucault directly. I am not a social theorist, philosopher, or historian carrying out the same methods as him. Rather, what I find productive in understanding the state in refugee camps are the reverberations of his work recast by intermediary analysis. As I will show below, I am interested only in certain selections of Foucault's oeuvre, reapplied by others. In particular, I latch onto the concepts of governmentality, biopower, and biopolitics. Additionally, I offer a truncated genealogy of the history of refugee cash transfers in Chapter 3. I am not doing the same discursive work of Foucault and others, though I think a post-structural understanding best captures the trifurcated reality of power in camps. I ultimately decided not to shy away from Foucault because I want to give credit to his profound rupturing to understandings of the fractured nature of power. Foucault's conclusions, rather than his specific methods, can be applied to analyse the state generally, and the state in refugee camps

in particular. Next, I preview additional critiques within the anthropology of the state, which inform my engagement with Foucault's reverberations.

Bierschenk (2009) takes aim at the work of Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta's (2006) collection, *Ethnography of the State: A Reader*, a key text in the anthropology of the state subdiscipline. The states at work school closely scrutinise the influence of Foucault and charges these scholars with misplaced hermeneutics of Foucault and the aforementioned social theorists' historical analysis of Europe, applied to post-colonial contexts. They see these and other Foucauldian scholars' emphasis on contexts at the 'margins', 'beside the state', and the 'governmental and non-governmental continuum' of actors in governance effectively, 'renders the notion of the state co-existent with all political forces, if not society itself [...] We argue that in such an approach the notion of the state becomes a totalizing concept by which, in the final analysis, it is impossible to think "outside" of the state, or the "non-state"' (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014a p. 52). States at work anthropologists argue:

Foucault's totalizing concept of power is particularly resistant to operationalization for empirical research. One of the effects of the predominant reference to Foucault found in some of the recent 'anthropology of the state' literature has also been to reduce the notion of the state to its political regulatory and disciplinary practices as opposed to other functions like service delivery' (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014a p. 53).

Before addressing these critiques with an explanation of my understanding and usage of Foucault, I must return to the specificity and exceptional nature of the refugee camp to partially explain privileging a Foucauldian approach above the states at work. Immediately within the camp, the only state actors include the refugee camp commander and his colleagues with the Refugees Services Department under MHA, police, and occasionally, military officers. Outside the camp, refugees may be in contact with district-level judiciary and prisons (Rutinwa 2005 p. 14). Nowhere within the camp are there state-employed teachers, medical professionals, or any other Lipsky-inspired (1980) 'street-level bureaucrats' who deliver services that the 'states at work' ethnographies engage with. It follows that in the camp setting it is appropriate to distil the state to its 'political, regulatory, and disciplinary practises' because they provide so few services compared to other settings. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at

the 'humanitarian violence' (Branch 2009) that state actors sustain and enforce. For example, the elaborate rent-seeking systems of bribery paid to the police that resemble 'occupied enclaves' (Brankamp 2019) for refugees to be allowed to engage in illicit livelihoods. Moreover, I am also not arguing that a state at work approach in camps is invalid. For example, exciting new research in Kenya by Hanno Brankamp (2019) and Claire Walkey (2019) gives deep ethnographic insights into security forces in Kakuma refugee camp and the Department of Refugee Affairs registration in Nairobi. However, as I explained in the Introduction chapter, I made the calculated decision to avoid state actors. States at work methodology is better suited to be applied to the bureaucracies and individual actors within humanitarian government and refugee-led organisations, which take on state-like responsibilities of service-provision.

### **Biopower, biopolitics, and governmentality**

Bierschenk (2009) rightly points to the need for a proper hermeneutic of Foucault. The terms biopower and biopolitics first appear in the publication *The History of Sexuality* in 1976. Foucault notes a change in governance in the 17<sup>th</sup> and into the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries that moves away from the state's sovereignty over life and death: 'One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death' (Foucault 1980 p. 138). The government's ability to 'foster life' takes two forms: biopower and biopolitics. Biopower can be understood as 'an anatomo-politics of the human body' (p.139), where government disciplines individuals' bodies. Biopolitics is a 'series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population' (p. 139). Biopower and biopolitics are merely introductions to his analysis of liberal government.

Stephen Collier (2009) offers a clarifying analysis of biopower and biopolitics by examining how Foucault's theory evolved in his later work. He claims that Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*, and lecture in the same year, *Society Must Be Defended* (Foucault 2003), 'offers a surprisingly epochal, functionalist, and even totalising analysis' (p.84). Collier (2009) notes that this analysis 'is a confused initial statement of themes that Foucault later addressed with greater clarity and nuance' (p. 83). He

clarified this analysis in his lectures at the Collège de France between 1975 and 1979 when he introduces the concept of governmentality. In the 1977-1978 lecture series *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault moves away from vague epochal conclusions to one which has differing logics and technologies of power. Collier (2009) describes this differentiated form of government as a topology of power:

One technology of power may provide guiding norms and an orienting *telos*. But it does not saturate all power relations. Rather, it suggests a configurational principle that determines how heterogeneous elements – techniques, institutional arrangements, material forms *and* other technologies of power – are taken up and recombined (p. 89).

Governmentality, which gives a 'topological analysis' is crucial in understanding the nature of power and governance in the refugee camp because it 'brings to light a heterogeneous space, constituted through multiple determinations, and not reducible to a given form of knowledge-power' (Collier 2009 p. 99). Ferguson and Gupta (2002) similarly define governmentality as 'all the processes by which the conduct of a population is governed: by institutions and agencies, including the state; by discourses, norms, and identities; and by self-regulation, techniques for the disciplining and care of the self' (p. 989). Blundo and Le Meur (2009) in the collection *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa* are also instructive in how to apply governmentality to research on the state:

The analytical and interpretive power of governmentality could be combined with the exploratory and descriptive use of governance. Both concepts share basic similarities. They pay more attention to social processes than social structures. They advocate a decentred approach to the state and do not impose a priori boundaries between private and public, state and society, knowledge and power (pp. 8-9).

Finally, I also follow Scott-Smith's (2014) suggestion on how to approach Foucault:

We should instead think of it as an approach: a way of understanding how things act on each other in a particular kind of way, and an opportunity to study those interactions in depth. If biopower is to be used, therefore, it should be treated as a starting point: indicating an arena to be studied and described, and calling for greater analysis of all those ingredients from which power springs (p. 35).

## Conclusion

There have been many approaches to capture what a refugee camp is. Some attempts include comparing refugee camps to cities or surrogate states, although such framings fall short of capturing the trifurcated complexities of power. These conceptualisations do not give full credence to the historical continuities of containment and mobility manipulation since colonialism. Moreover, governing the camp as a community through self-government is flawed because it is rarely done in ways which adequately fund and transmute power and independence for refugees and refugee-led organisations to govern. In practise, refugee self-governing projects end up amounting to free subcontracting for international humanitarians.

This thesis is situating the current dominant paradigm in global refugee management by examining self-reliance and livelihood strategies in camps. In order to understand why refugee self-reliance is failing in Tanzania, it is not enough to examine how camp residents earn money—though I explore Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 many different income-generating strategies refugees employ in and around the camps. A deeper analysis of the complex governmentality of the trifurcated state is necessary as a baseline because in Tanzania and many other post-colonial histories, from colonialism until now, the state has had an impulse to contain and manipulate refugee and migrant movements, as well as mobilities of its own citizens and subjects. The primary apparatus for this containment is through indirect rule, which has led to a bifurcated state according to Mamdani. Refugee camps, constituting a third, trifurcated space apart from Mamdani's bifurcated state, encapsulates many similar functions and continuities of indirect rule such subjectification of self-reliant subjects and refugees and the active containment and manipulation of mobilities. Simultaneously, the trifurcated state emerges with many differences to bifurcation as well. Refugees have significantly different access to rights that subjects and citizens do. As such, they are governed by a conglomeration of trifurcated forms of power.

In addition to constituting a third space of rule beyond the customary or tribal in Mamdani's analysis, refugee camps are also trifurcated in forms of governance. A Foucauldian governmentality analysis allows us to explore the intertwining

humanitarian structures where care and control is shared and contested by the state, humanitarian government, and refugees. Mamdani's analysis was encompassed various forms and spectrums of bifurcation between British, French, and other European colonies; post-colonial federal structures such as Ethiopia and Nigeria; conservative states such as Uganda; settler states like South Africa; or radical states which include Tanzania and Mozambique. Similarly, there is a wide spectrum of refugee camps, which are more restrictive like Tanzania, others that allow for more freedoms of movement like in Uganda or Liberia, or somewhere in the middle like the integrated settlement of Kalobeyi in Kenya. What remains in all of these camps are the fundamental nature of exclusion and containment (McConnachie 2016) enforced through violence (Branch 2009) and varying degrees of trifurcated governance through the state, humanitarians, and refugees themselves. The concluding chapter lays out the case that a significant decolonising effort would be required at all trifurcated tiers in order to disrupt the violent containment structure of the camp.

# Chapter 2: The trifurcated state in Tanzania

United Republic of Tanzania

As of April 2000 




Figure 6: Map of Tanzanian camps as of April 2000. Source: UNHCR 2000.

## Introduction

Kezia is a 59-year-old Burundian woman who currently lives in Nyarugusu. With her life of displacements, repatriations, and re-displacements, she has lived the regions' history of conflict and displacement, the focus of this chapter. Born in Burundi in 1960, Kezia fled with her family to Tanzania in 1972 with hundreds of thousands of others during the 'selective genocide' under Tutsi President Michel Micombero (Lemarchand and Martin 1974; Russel 2015). She spent 21 years living in Katumba refugee settlement in south-western Tanzania. In 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye became the first Hutu elected leader in Burundi, her family was hopeful for the direction of the country. They returned to Makamba province only for four months until President Ndadaye was assassinated and hostilities began again. Kezia was exiled once again to Tanzania but she was forced by the Tanzanian government to live in Nduta camp in Kigoma region, where she lived until 2008. This 're-displacement' (Purdeková 2016) to Nduta rather than Katumba and the other 'old settlements' is significant because she missed the opportunity at Tanzanian citizenship that her former neighbours were offered in 2007 (Milner 2013; Kuch 2016). As a result, she and her family have experienced multiple further displacements.

In 2008, as the civil war in Burundi was over, many of the '1993 caseload' of Burundian refugees were repatriating once again. Kezia returned to Makamba but did not have access to land because her husband's sisters were occupying the vacated land. This intimate conflict led to the murder of her husband in 2009. Shortly after, she moved on to Kakuma camp in Kenya, where she lived from 2010 to 2014. Violence found her again in Kenya, where she explains that a Congolese refugee killed a South Sudanese boy, and Sudanese refugees began reprisal killings. As she describes, 'they were killing anybody in sight. When we tried to go to the settlement commander, he didn't protect us. Some went to Uganda, Nairobi, others to Burundi. We returned to Burundi.' Kezia lived for the third time in Makamba for less than a year before the 2015 political crisis and the third massive exodus of Burundian refugees following President Pierre Nkurunziza overstaying his mandate and cracking down on any perceived opposition. Kezia recalls her reasons for leaving again:

I didn't have a lot of problems, but the land conflict remained when I returned. We saw all our neighbours were leaving and thought it might be serious, so we decided to leave. The problem of land was the main reason to leave. There were political issues, but I didn't care about them. My sister-in-law didn't like that we came back and she did witchcraft to make my children sick. The political issues were just a reason to leave.

She moved to Nyarugusu camp in 2015, although the migration took its toll: 'The journey to Tanzania was hard. We walked on foot and it took us two days. When we arrived, I lost a grandson to cholera, he passed away very quickly. We had no money with us. It took over one year to start a business.'

Presently, the Tanzanian state is making it clear again that Burundian refugees are no longer welcome and may face forced repatriation. Kezia, understandably, is weary from these displacements. When I asked her if she was going to move on back to Kenya or Uganda like others she replied, 'myself, no, I will not go, but maybe my children.' When I asked why, she said, 'I am too old; too tired.' I tell Kezia's story, not to elicit empathy—though it is warranted—but because her biography intersects nearly every major event in Burundian Hutu refugees' history of exile since independence. These events in Burundi and Tanzania are necessary to retell in order to understand the present reality of the trifurcated refugee camps in Tanzania specifically, and the inherent violence in encampment generally.

Although Kezia was only born on the eve of Independence in Tanzania, the cyclical patterns and impulses of the colonial state to contain and manipulate migrant and refugee populations in Tanzania were set in motion long before. These impulses to control mobilities are present to this day. Moreover, the developmental ideology of self-reliance informing economic policies for refugees today, have strong links to indirect rule during colonialism and Nyerere's philosophy of *ujamaa* following independence. By recounting key events in Tanzania, I demonstrate the continuities and ruptures of containment that are still recurring. This chapter gives a history of the trifurcated state forming in Tanzania. Additionally, I provide brief contexts of the histories of violence and repeat displacements in Burundi and the Congo, which make up the population of Nyarugusu, Nduta, and Mtendeli camps today.

## Colonial Tanganyika

Modern Tanzania was part of German East Africa, which included modern Rwanda and Burundi until it came under British control following the end of World War One. Both colonial powers strived to prevent and manipulate movements of migrants from around the region and within the colony. In 1899, in Portuguese controlled Mozambique, thousands of African Mozambicans were displaced into Tanganyika Territory to flee forced labour conscription. Later, under similar enslaving labour rules as well as famine and mass illness, more Mozambicans fled into British Tanganyika. In both colonial regimes, the state made orders to stop these movements of people entering the territory. However, in both cases, Tanganyikans resisted these orders to allow their neighbours to migrate. The German and British colonists feared these forced migrations because they did not want their own subject populations to run away from their heavy-handed labour tactics. Containment was a primary objective. If Tanganyikans fled, this would lead to a loss of production of crops as well as a loss of taxable bodies (Chaulia 2003 pp. 148-149; Kibreab 1983 pp. 90-91).

The resistance of population inflows eventually shifted into encouraged migration through labour recruitment in the 1930s. Chaulia (2003) explains, 'colonial immigration policies in Tanganyika were thus predicated upon remote-controlled inflows and outflows. Population influxes, if managed and redistributed like transferable commodities to suit agricultural need, were the panacea to perennial labour shortages' (p. 151). By this time, Western Tanganyika became a 'labour reserve' for large sisal plantations. The colonists employed British Labour Officers who were tasked with recruiting Tanganyikans, as well as Burundians fleeing forced labour from Belgian authorities and were drawn toward wages in Tanganyika. The Labour Officers created reception camps at the borders to ensure that 'wandering hordes, at present dispersed over numerous tracks, will be concentrated into a well defined channel' (Orde-Browne 1946 p. 49 quoted in Chaula 2003 p. 152). Chaulia (2003) argues, 'independent Tanzania's ubiquitous refugee Settlement Commandants share the controlling traits of the Labour Officers of yore, albeit with modified functions and a quasi-military purpose' (p. 152). Following World War Two, the need for migrant labour devolved back into anxiety to once again block inflows of people. This led to

the creation of the Defence War Evacuees Regulations Act (1946) and the Refugee Control Ordinance (1949), which expanded powers for the colonial state to evict refugees and further control movements. These laws form the foundation of refugee law present in Tanzania today (Daley 1989 p. 111).

The colonial state was not only concerned with controlling external movements but with containing and minimising internal migrations within Tanganyika as well. If colonial subjects were allowed to freely move, then the state could not impose cash crop production or collect taxes for the Native Authority (Chaulia 2003 p. 149). It was particularly problematic for the colonists when Africans moved to cities. As discussed in the previous chapter, for the colonial project to work, internal labour migration to cities and towns needed to be circular with mostly male labourers maintaining contact with their 'tribal lands'. There was also an understanding that urban centres are often the most concentrated sites of anti-colonial dissent. While not going as far as South Africa's infamous pass laws and passbooks, the colonists in Tanganyika were suspicious of Africans in Dar es Salaam and blamed them for the prevalence of crime in the city. In response, they created identity documentation, carried out rural repatriations, and spread propaganda about the dangers of rural Africans living in the city (Burton 2005). These same anxieties about movements into the city remained under Nyerere following independence and persist to this day concerning its restrictive refugee policy.

### **Indirect rule**

Like much of Africa, in Tanganyika the primary means to minimising dissent in cities and managing the native population in rural hinterlands was through indirect rule, which arrived in Tanzania by Governor Sir Donald Cameron in 1925. This policy diverged from the German-established rule which appointed civil-servants who were trained by the German colonialists. These administrators were known as *akidas* (Mamdani 1996 p. 80). Historian John Iliffe (1979) describes the arbitrary construction of indirect rule: 'Although conservative in origin it was radical in effect because it rested on historical misunderstanding. The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans

belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the colonial framework' (p. 318). Iliffe (1979) goes on to explain:

Much effort was devoted to 'finding the chief' by recording the genealogies which African contestants invented. 'Each tribe must be considered as a distinct unit. Each tribe must be under a chief,' one provincial commissioner told his staff in 1926. But most administrators knew that many peoples had no chiefs, and the construction of conciliar systems for stateless peoples was Cameron's chief contribution to indirect rule (p. 323).

This method of minimalist indirect rule continued until the 1940s, when Britain was facing huge debts and a poor economy from World War Two, the loss of its empire in Asia, and resistance by Africans within Tanganyika. In the late 1940s indirect rule was being replaced by a pyramid structure of councils from village up to provincial levels, which would add 'commoners' as well as white settlers and Asians to governmental structures rather than exclusively tribal chiefs. This was met to varying degrees of acceptance and tension across Tanganyika (Iliffe 1979 pp. 482-484). This transition and resulting racial tensions continued until independence.

### **Development and *maendeleo***

As described in the previous chapter, colonial Britain shifted to a new 'developmentalist' phase. This brought colonial state marketing of crops and large-scale development projects. The most infamous of these development schemes was the East African Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika designed to produce groundnuts to supply the global dearth in oils and fats through mechanised agriculture. This project, like many others across colonial Africa, ended in monumental failure despite huge investments from the metropole. The project began in 1947, however, by 1949 when it was shut down the project only planted 50,000 of the 3.2 million acres in the original plans of the project (Hodge 2007 p. 211). Moreover, '£35,870,000 had been spent, equal to the Tanganyika Government's total expenditure between 1946 and 1950' (Iliffe 1979 p. 441). While scholars focus on the colonial logics and reasons for failure of developmentalism during the waning stages of colonialism, Emma Hunter (2014) explores how development was perceived by Tanganyikans in public discussions. In Swahili, development was often understood as progress or

*maendeleo*, but also as a progress toward an end goal of civilisation, *ustaaribu*, which fit the earlier civilising mission of colonialism (p. 92). After 1945, notions of *maendeleo* began to change and 'was used increasingly to signify new forms of social services and new types of economic arrangements,' such as healthcare, education, and other Western associations of modernity (p. 93). Finally, Julius Nyerere and other nationalists began using promises to bring *maendeleo* as a critique against colonialism's failures to do the same (p. 100). *Maendeleo*, can mean many things to many people at different times: 'We now know that in the period after the First World War a language of development became increasingly important, first as a means of legitimising the colonial project, later as a means of critiquing the claims of colonial rulers to rule, and finally as a route to establishing new ties of belonging in the post-colonial state' (Hunter 2014 p. 102). Like *maendeleo*, self-reliance can also have shifting meanings in relation to anti-colonial development or refugee management, while also facing many of the same dilemmas.

## **Post-colonial Tanzania: Colonial ruptures and continuities**

### ***Ujamaa* and self-reliance**

Under founding father, Julius Nyerere and his political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which later became the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Tanzania was radical in opposing colonialism across the continent and within the country. Despite these oppositions, independent Tanzania inherited or reapplied the colonial desire to manipulate and contain populations within and outwith the country. Additionally, although Tanzania was more radical than most African states in reducing the political power at the 'tribal' level, the bifurcated structure of rule in rural area remained, although controlled by 'centralised despotism' of the state (Mamdani 1996 pp. 170-178). The colonial continuities were most clear with President Nyerere's famous *ujamaa* and 'villagization' policies in the 1970s and, following his reign, the strict refugee encampment policies enacted in the 1990s. While encampment's primary goal is containment, the Tanzanian state also relinquished and abdicated

responsibility to rule in camps through the process of humanitarian trifurcation described in the previous chapter.

Tanzania was radical in abolishing the salience of tribes as a political force and homogenised Swahili as the *lingua franca* and a source of pride for the country. They were successful in this regard due to a wide coalition within the party by drawing in leaders from rural, urban, conservative chieftaincies, and white and Asian immigrant communities. Moreover, 'TANU escaped [fragmentation], partly because no ethnic group was large enough to contemplate a separate future, partly because Swahili bridged ethnic differences, and partly because the party machine was already strong before most people obtained the vote' (Iliffe 1979 p. 571). Introduced in the previous section, part of Nyerere and TANU's anti-colonial rhetoric was the promise of development, or *maendeleo*, that the colonial state was not providing (Hunter 2014). Schneider (2006) argues that the post-colonial elites stance toward development offered a clearer continuity of colonialism than Mamdani's (1996) legal-institutional bifurcated state lineage. Schneider (2006) argues that the Nyerere and TANU leaders justified their heavy-handed actions—often closely echoing actions by the colonial state, which they vociferously opposed—by the will to bring development to the country:

That ordinary Tanzanians often became 'subjects' particularly insofar as they were the targets of the state's developmentalist undertakings was, of course, not a totally new phenomenon at independence [...] The developmentalist political imagination thus connected the late colonial and the postcolonial state; in both cases, it also underpinned and energized authoritarian rule (p. 109).

Introduced in 1962, and expounded upon through the Arusha Declaration in 1967, one of Nyerere's most enduring legacies was the development policy of *ujamaa*, meaning 'familyhood' or 'brotherhood' and his brand of 'African Socialism'. There is a rich academic literature analysing this period of Tanzanian history and economic policy, however, for the sake of brevity, I will only briefly analyse the discourse of self-reliance as well as the implementation of 'villagization' policies. Self-reliance, commonly referred to in Swahili as *kujitegemea*, was a central organising principle of *ujamaa*. However, like *maendeleo*, self-reliance was rife with variances and contradictions. Priya Lal (2012) argues:

During the *ujamaa* era, self-reliance could be understood as a literal developmental strategy or an idealized developmental outcome; it could refer to individuals, families, villages, regions, or the Tanzanian nation as a whole; and it could be affixed to competing constructions of national citizenship entailing substantive material rights or mandated local austerity (p. 213).

The *ujamaa* community was to encompass different registers, at the level of the village, nation, African continent, and the entire Third World, which was part and parcel of its anti-colonial desire to be self-reliant apart from colonial powers. The anti-imperialist orientation was exhibited by Tanzania's increasingly close economic and ideological relationship to Maoist China in the 1960s. During this era, TANU leaders brokered aid and projects from China, exchanged visits, and adopted Chinese revolutionary symbolism and self-reliance developmental planning (Lal 2012 p. 2018).

Despite this anti-colonial lean, the language of self-help is a recollection of indirect rule ideology introduced by the colonial state (Jennings 2003). Indeed, Nyerere's invocations of self-help clearly recalls colonial compulsions, which continued in its policies toward refugees up to the present:

[Self-help] echoed a missionary ethic of voluntarism-as-uplift, but also served a practical purpose of legitimizing uncompensated labour and low state capital expenditure on local-level development—especially in the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. In the years following independence, 'self-help schemes'—increasingly dubbed 'nation-building schemes' to signal their reconfigured objectives—continued to form a staple of official rural improvement strategies (Lal 2012 p. 216).

The central dialectic tension of the concept of self-reliance was between the provision by the state of welfare such as schools, healthcare, and agricultural support on the one hand, and stigmatisation of individual 'laziness' or 'parasitism' and 'dependency' on the state and others. Dependency was anathema to Nyerere and TANU's eyes to what self-reliant individuals and nation should be. In this sense, '*ujamaa* could be taken either to mandate a kind of austere, pre-modern practise of self-sufficiency, or to represent the efforts of a benevolent state seeking to provide material goods and services to rural populations' (Lal 2012 p. 223).

The villagization programme, launched in 1973, forced the majority of the rural population to move to concentrated *ujamaa* villages rather than the more organic

widely dispersed homesteads that Tanzanians were used to. Additionally, the state replaced local cooperative societies with state actors in village leadership (Bryceson 1993 pp. 61-76). As Coulson (1942) recounts in Iringa, forced villagization was often violent and harsh:

Many people objected not so much to the move as to the way it was done. 'We were treated like animals' some said. Government representatives (militia, TANU Youth League members, government and party [...]) To assure that people remained in the new villages, former houses were usually made uninhabitable by ripping out doors and windows and knocking holes in the mud walls or by setting fire to the thatch roofs. In some cases grain stored in or near the house also caught fire and the family's food supply was destroyed (pp. 296-297).

This account is striking in its similarity to refugees' experience of violent repatriations by the Tanzanian state, which I recall below. These narratives include Rwandan mass returns in the 1990s and the severe shutdown of the Burundian camp, Mtabila, in 2012. All these harsh events can be traced and paralleled to the colonial containment and manipulation of mobility impulse that continued following independence. Lal (2012) makes this same case when she recalls the experience of many Tanzanians' experience of villagization: 'others who experienced villagization as a violent disruption of their lives identify a fundamental continuity between the colonial state and the post-colonial Tanzanian state in general, and dismiss the "politics" of *ujamaa* as another example of both state invasiveness and neglect (p. 225)' She goes on to quote one of her informants: 'After independence, yes, we had independence . . . but after about five, six, seven years passed, a new colonialism returned' (p. 225).

### **The 'open door' era**

During the time of *ujamaa*, the Tanzanian state also manipulated the movement of populations in less violent ways than villagization. Like the colonial state, the Tanzanian state feared and despised 'saboteurs' who they believed headed to urban centres to participate in crime and joblessness (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990).

This included African immigrants and Tanzanians alike:

the government stepped up its campaigns to 'repatriate' the urban unemployed, 'the exploiters,' to *ujamaa* villages to make them productive farmers. Africans from other states who could not prove their employment status were

apprehended along with people born in Tanzania. The [government] leadership viewed the urban unemployed as a 'problem,' and 'forcibly resettled' or 'repatriated' the 'jobless.' Police 'swept' urban areas, resettling the 'jobless' to rural areas where they could contribute to Tanzania's socialist revolution. In the case of some 'immigrants,' the police repatriated them to their home countries (Miller 2011 pp. 231-232).

On the other hand, Tanzania was also radical in its support to neighbouring countries' struggles against the vestiges of colonial rule. President Nyerere was revered as a pan-African statesman and was one of the most prominent supporters of anti-colonial struggles. The Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee was headquartered in Dar es Salaam and did more than all other African states to assist neighbouring countries against European and white rule. This was evident in his 'open door' policy toward refugees. Tanzania openly supported 'freedom fighter' refugees from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique. These guerrilla fighters were fondly referred to in Swahili as *wageni* or 'guests' and were allowed to freely move and work in the country. This is a far cry from the colonial branding of 'aliens' applied to migrants and refugees before (Miller 2011 pp. 25-27).

During President Nyerere's rule, there was also a different category of refugees that did not receive the same welcome as anti-colonial dissidents. The north-westerly neighbours, Rwanda and Burundi, experienced widespread violence from the late 1950s through the 1970s. While President Nyerere should rightly be lauded for giving these groups large tracts of land to cultivate and make livelihoods, they were also dealt with heavy-handedly and were exploited for the development of the Tanzanian periphery regions. Instead of *wageni*, they were called 'settlers' named after the large settlements of land they were given (Miller 2011). Moreover, the self-reliance which the state allowed and encouraged for these settler refugees paralleled both Tanzanian practises of *ujamaa* and villagization as well as colonial containment practises of self-help and indirect rule. Rwandan Tutsi refugees were displaced to Tanzania in 1959 during a fierce Hutu uprising. They were provided land to cultivate and offered Tanzanian citizenship and managed self-sufficiency beyond humanitarian aid. Many of these Rwandans initially resisted any integration such as planting crops or constructing permanent structures due to a desire to return to Rwanda as soon as

possible (Gasarasi 1990 p. 90). Some people even destroyed crops in defiance of locally integrating into Tanzania. The Tanzania government responded harshly by withdrawing rations, closing schools and dispensaries, prohibiting gatherings, and bulldozing obstructers' huts (Gasarasi 1990 pp. 90-91). Refugee resistance faded over time and eventually resulted in Tanzanian citizenship for 30,000 Rwandan refugees by the early 1970s (Gasarasi 1990 pp. 93-94).

President Nyerere has been mostly lauded for the provision of land and livelihoods to Rwandan and later Burundian refugees and has acted as an inspirational case for modern notions of refugee self-reliance (Betts et al. 2017 p. 24). However, there is considerable economic self-interest and labour exploitation manifest in these settlements. Examples of exploitation included back-breaking bush clearing and infrastructure construction such as roads and buildings. Remuneration was regarded by Tanzanian authorities and NGOs deceptively as 'self-help'. Difficult labour was often only paid by one Tanzanian shilling or provided in-kind as food rations, clothing, or as a ride from officials' vehicles (Gasarasi 1984 pp. 41-42). This was consistent with the Tanzanian state's self-reliance demands on Tanzanian citizens. Similar, though less-harsh, self-help work projects were part of self-reliance efforts for rural Tanzanians as well (Lal 2012 pp. 216-217). In other words, rather than self-help or self-reliance, the price for settlement was exploitable free and cheap labour. The state made clear in the Refugees (Control) Act of 1965 that the settlements were designed for containment. As Rutinwa (1996) notes, 'it is fair to conclude that the draconian Refugees (Control) Act was introduced not to provide refugees with rights but to control them and perhaps to discourage others from taking refuge in Tanzania. In retrospect, this was an important pointer to Tanzania's future response' (p. 292).

Since independence, Burundi has produced 'cycles of displacement, return and re-displacement' (Purdeková 2016 p. 5). These cycles began in the 1960s with conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis coming to the fore after Tutsi military leader Colonel Michel Micombero took power through coup d'état in 1966. In 1972, effectively shut out of power, insurgent Hutus made small attacks against Tutsi military units and civilians. This was followed by swift and extreme counterattacks by the army.

Following the failed Hutu uprising, explosive genocidal violence erupted throughout the country. The minority Tutsi government and military killed an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 Hutus. This violence was called by many a 'selective genocide' because many who were killed were targeted for being political leaders, educated, or economically successful (Russell 2015).

150,000 Burundian Hutu refugees fled to Tanzania and were settled in Mishamo, Katumba, and Ulyankulu in Tabora and Rukwa regions. These sites, known now as the 'old settlements', were under-cultivated and sparsely populated due to villagers being cleared out as part of President Nyerere's *ujamaa* policy of villagization. Moreover, this land was largely forested marshland that was difficult to farm and inhabited by disease-carrying tsetse flies (Chaulia 2003 p. 157). Like the Rwandan settlements before them, the Burundian settlements became food self-reliant shortly after their creations. The labour of these refugees was not just about easing the humanitarian burden to the Tanzanian hosts. Patricia Daley (1989) claims the settlements were 'vehicles for the exploitation of peripheral areas' (p. 79). Many of the crops prioritised were exportable crops such as coffee and tobacco and were sold by parastatals to benefit the state (Daley 1992). Burundians at the time were called by local Tanzanians 'tractors' for the cheap labour they performed (Malkki 1995a pp. 119-120) and still today (Felix da Costa 2017 p. 20). This long-term cultivation of land is how this population is claiming land rights today (Kuch 2018).

Despite the ability to engage in agriculture and other livelihoods, albeit in an exploitative manner, these settlements were still designed for containment away from towns and cities. They bore many semblances to the manipulation of people movements during villagization and colonialism (Chaulia 2003; Daley 1989). Although these refugee populations' movements were restricted, they deeply integrated into the host communities' economy and society. However, during the 1990s, which was rife with economic downturns and violent conflicts in the region, there was a seismic shift in refugee policy in Tanzania from refugee settlements to camps. The tragic irony is that the settlement model of agricultural self-reliance, which gave President Nyerere plaudits—though not entirely benevolent—has given way to one of the strictest asylum policies in Africa.

## Post-Nyerere: The encampment era

The 1990s was a volatile period for the state across Africa, which led to the strict encampment policies that largely remain today. Although strict mobility controls of *ujamaa* had disintegrated for Tanzanians and economic policies were rapidly liberalising in the country, for refugees, restrictions were forcefully tightened and coerced. The heavy-handed encampment period closely resembles the forceful movement and containment policies of villagization during the time of *ujamaa* and indirect rule during colonialism. These containment impulses represent the creation of the third, trifurcated space of the refugee camp which inhibits similar functions as indirect rule and socially engineered villages. I also demonstrate below how the trifurcated forms of the camp are inverted and largely differ from the configurations of the bifurcated state. Encampment resulted from the coalescence of the dismantling of the state and widespread war and conflict in Africa. The continent-wide and systematic 'rolling back' of the state under structural adjustment policies, as well as a 'third wave' of democratisation, meant that state authority shifted and left governance voids in many areas (Milner 2009). President Nyerere was succeeded by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985, who ushered in IMF liberalising and democratising reforms that President Nyerere long opposed. The next president, Benjamin Mkapa, ruling from 1995 to 2005, furthered these reforms and oversaw the refugee encampment policy that endures today.

In addition to the shifts in governance and authority, the 1990s also experienced widespread internal and multi-state wars, which produced displacements on a massive scale. Tanzania was a receiver of these displacements, with hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving from Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire (presently the Democratic Republic of Congo). Chaulia (2003) highlights the scale of these refugee movements: 'in the 32 years between 1961 and 1993, Tanzania hosted about 400,000 refugees spread over 20 settlements throughout the country, and in the seven years between 1993 and 2000, it received 1,500,000 refugees' (p. 148). The Rwandan genocide in 1994 prompted the largest exodus of refugees of the aforementioned

conflicts with an estimated 2,000,000 Rwandans fleeing the country. 600,000 of these refugees arrived in the Kagera region (Landau 2008 p. 66). Milner (2009) states, 'the scale of this movement was staggering: between 28 and 29 April 1994 alone, some 250,000 Rwandan refugees crossed the Rusumo bridge into Ngara, Northwestern Tanzania' (p. 117). In Ngara district, where many Rwandans settled into camps, refugees outnumbered Tanzanians nearly three to one (Whitaker 2002b p. 350). However, in December 1996, President Mkapa forced the return of half a million remaining Rwandan refugees (Chaulia 2003 p. 161). While the Rwandan refugee situation in Tanzania in the 1990s was a pivotal moment for refugee policy in Tanzania, this chapter will focus more on the Burundian and Congolese protracted refugee situations because they are the primary groups present today and the nucleus of my research.

### **Burundian displacements**

Nearly 300,000 Burundian refugees began arriving *en masse* to Tanzania once again in 1993. This was a reaction to the assassination by Tutsi officers of the first democratically elected and Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye three months after coming to office (Chaulia 2003 p. 161). Ndadaye's assassination set off the civil war that would embroil Burundi for varying degrees until 2008. In the immediate aftermath, violence erupted across the country. There were reprisal attacks against Tutsis and killings of Hutus by the putschist military and allied militant Tutsi groups. In 1993, around 50,000 Hutu and Tutsi people, roughly split, were estimated to have died (Reyntjens 2006 p. 117). There was a brief attempt at power-sharing between FRODEBU (*Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi*), Ndadaye's party, and UPRONA (*Union pour le Progres National*), the previous ruling party. The deal broke down quickly and in 1996 Pierre Buyoya, who first came to power in 1987 through a military takeover, successfully carried out his second coup.

Each group controlled their own territory and fought against the Tutsi-led Burundi army and each other. This chapter does not have the space to analyse the complex and shifting dynamics of the war, however, Patricia Daley (2006) describes the fractured nature of the conflict:

In the 2000s, the rebel forces splintered into further factions that were pro or anti-negotiated settlement; these differences escalated into Hutu-on-Hutu conflict as FDD ending up fighting FNL. Factionalism within the Hutu and Tutsi political groups was both an expression of ethnic extremism and individual rivalry among key members; the latter becoming more significant in the allocation of ministerial portfolios in the post-conflict government (p. 671).

It took two pan-African statecraft heavyweights in Julius Nyerere and, following his death in 1999, Nelson Mandela, to painstakingly broker a cease-fire, which included a 36-month transition. The peace treaty, known as the Arusha Accords, was signed in August 2000 and remained in place until the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of CNDD-FDD, the largest rebel group. He retains power still today. Despite an ethnic quota system split 60-40 between Hutu and Tutsi respectively, the 'peace' has been characterised by state oppression of dissent and rumblings of conflict culminating in a political crisis in 2015, leading to the most recent displacement of refugees.

Huge numbers of people were displaced both internally in the country, and externally to countries such as Tanzania. There were an estimated 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), with Tutsis mostly staying in Burundi near urban areas or protected military bases, or those with means moving on to Rwanda. Around 600,000 Hutu IDPs were forced into *regroupment* camps as a counter-insurgency strategy. However, they were not classified as IDPs and were blocked from international humanitarian aid (Ndikumana 2000). Many Hutu refugees went to Tanzania. The 1972 Burundian refugees came to be known by humanitarians as the 'old caseload', and refugees from the civil war are referred to as '1993' or 'new caseload'. Between these two displacement events, there is no clear data on the exact numbers of people displaced, when they were displaced, where they moved to, and when, where, or if, they ever returned to Burundi. In 1993, the first year of the war, an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 Burundians arrived following Ndadaye's assassination and the violence that ensued, although most returned in a year (Rutinwa 1996). The civil war ramped up in 1996 and by 2003 there were an estimated 500,000 living in camps (Schwartz 2019 p. 125).

### **Enforcing encampment**

The combination of reduced state capacity due to structural adjustment and the large influxes of refugees prompted the Tanzanian state to abdicate responsibility for managing the camps to UNHCR and its 'implementing partner' NGOs (Milner 2009). Unlike the large, widely dispersed agricultural settlements established for the 1972 caseload of Burundian refugees, large camps were created in Kigoma and Kagera regions to accommodate and contain these populations. As Branch (2009) powerfully argues, and I examine more closely in Chapter 4, humanitarian encampments are inherently accompanied by violent enforcement from the state. These entanglements in governance between the state, humanitarians, and refugees themselves represent the trifurcated form of encampment. The Tanzanian state wanted to remove refugees for multiple reasons. The main reason is the sheer magnitude of the population highlighted above. Additionally, with its recent transition to multi-party democracy in the 1990s, campaigning to rid the country of refugees was a way for Tanzanian politicians to gain domestic electoral support. Relatedly, as is the case in all parts of the world, the second reason anti-refugee rhetoric won domestic political capital was because refugees were perceived to bring crime and insecurity. The Burundian government constantly accused Tanzania of hosting rebel dissidents. Chaulia (2003) recounts that President Mkapa complained that that, "he was fed up of perennial accusations that his country was harbouring rebels from Burundi," and that if international assistance in separating refugees from militias were not forthcoming, he would *refouler* the entire immigrant community from Burundi (East African 2001 p. 1)' (p.162). Finally, the Tanzanians felt that they were not receiving enough support from the international community of sharing the burden for hosting refugees. I look more closely 'burden sharing' and how it relates to refugee self-reliance in Chapter 6.

The encampment era in Tanzania was marked by the heavy-handed measures of the state. In 1995, after many Burundian refugees had returned from Tanzania, the civil war in Burundi was starting to re-escalate. In response, the Tanzanian government closed the border with Burundi to contain additional refugee arrivals. Moreover, around that time, in a parliamentary debate, Minister for Foreign Affairs declared: 'We are saying enough is enough. Let us tell the refugees that the time has come for them to return home and no more should come' (Guardian 1995 p. 1 quoted

in Rutinwa 1996 p. 295). The state followed these words with clear actions. As already mentioned above, Rwandan refugees were given the ultimatum to return to Rwanda in 1996. Despite requesting additional time to stay and assess their options, the Tanzanian government did not budge, and the military conducted house to house 'round-ups' of those who had fled the camps into Tanzanian communities or were on their way to destinations further afield such as Uganda or Kenya. Whitaker (2002a) describes the ordeal in detail:

On the evening of December 6, refugees started fleeing camps in Karagwe district [Kagera region]. Nearly 10,000 refugees hiked toward Uganda and Kenya, where they hoped to get asylum. When questioned about their decision to flee, many said, 'death is death'; they would rather face the possibility of death in Tanzania than what they perceived to be certain death upon return to Rwanda. During the night of December 11, more than 35,000 refugees suddenly fled the Ngara camps and headed east, away from Rwanda. As the exodus continued the following day, heavily armed Tanzanian troops surrounded the area. On December 13, the army set up roadblocks 70 kilometres east of Ngara, forcing as many as 200,000 fleeing refugees to turn around and retrace their steps. Meanwhile, the camps were closed and their entrances were blocked. All Rwandan refugees were herded down the road toward the border. On December 14, the first group of refugees crossed into Rwanda. *Operesheni Rudisha Wakimbizi* (Operation Return Refugees) had officially begun (pp. 1-2).

I stress the details of this case because they are recurring motifs that have come up in my present research as well: the Tanzanian state issues an ultimatum to leave the country or be forced out, refugees resist or seek for other means of escape rather than repatriation, and the Tanzanian state follows through with its threats. Further harsh actions by the Tanzanian state during this time include similar house to house 'round-ups' of Burundian refugees by the Tanzanian army in 1997, 1999, and 2001 (Chaulia 2003 p. 161). These actions of containment were codified by President Mkapa by ushering in a new encampment policy through the passage of the Refugee Act in 1998, which made the freedom of movement and employment outside of the camps illegal (Kamanga 2005). During this era, the Tanzanian state resisted refugees integrating into cities such as Dar es Salaam and have heavily persecuted those who have self-settled there (Sommers 2001; O'Loghlen and Bwami 2018). This fierce protection of the city echoes President Nyerere's resistance to urbanisation during *ujamaa* and further back to the colonial anti-urbanisation instincts. I examine the idea

that refugees are deemed 'worthy' to only live in certain spaces in Chapter 3. Following the Burundian civil war, there were hopeful and progressive steps toward normalising refugee integration through the granting of citizenship to the old caseload of refugees. As for the new caseload, they faced pressure to return and even violent repatriations similar to what the Rwandans faced in 1996.

## **Two steps forward, one step back**

In his analysis of the politics of asylum in Tanzania, James Milner (2013) describes the oscillation between progressive and restrictive refugee policy as 'two steps forward, one step back'. This notion can be applied to the previously accounted era of Julius Nyerere where anti-colonial dissidents were treated as *wageni*, 'guests', yet Burundian and Rwandan 'settlers' were exploited and dealt with in harsh practises of containment. More recently, Milner (2013) uses the expression to describe the presidency of Jakaya Kikwete from 2005 to 2015, following Benjamin Mkapa. When vying for election, Kikwete ran on a platform to make Tanzania 'refugee-free' by 2010. This followed three tracks: naturalisation for Burundians in the old settlements, repatriation of the 1993 caseload of Burundians, and resettlement to third countries for Congolese refugees in Nyarugusu. Burundians in the old settlements of Mishamo, Katumba, and Ulyankulu had become entirely self-sufficient without humanitarian aid for decades and multiple generations had been raised in these settlements. 82 per cent of the residents were born and raised in Tanzania and had no desire to go to a Burundi that they never knew (Milner 2009 p. 9). The Tanzanian government's desire to repatriate all refugees, including the 1972 caseload, was countered by UNHCR who advocated instead for the naturalisation of those in the old settlements who wished to do so. The government agreed and beginning in 2007, the outcome was the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS), which actualised citizenship for around 150,000 Burundians. The process has not always gone smoothly and there were times where it looked like the process would collapse. However, the result has been the largest naturalisation in UNHCR's history (Markus 2014). The new caseload

of Burundians residing in camps further north in Kigoma and Kagera regions received far harsher treatment than those living in the old settlements of Tabora.

Despite the worst of the civil war ending in 2003, many Burundian refugees in Tanzania did not feel safe enough to repatriate to Burundi or did not have land or livelihoods to return to. This population of Burundian refugees was frequently pressured to leave, and the camps were eventually consolidated until only one remained called Mtabila. By 2008, both Tanzanian and Burundian governments agreed that Mtabila was to be closed. UNHCR protested the closure, and twice the deadlines were pushed back for the camp to be shut down. Similar to villagization procedures during Nyerere's *ujamaa*, when people did not move by state decree, they were moved by state violence and force. By 2012, with 36,000 refugees remaining, the Burundians' refugee status was revoked, and the camp was forcibly closed and those who remained were trucked back to Burundi by the Tanzanian military (IRRI 2012; Hovil and Mbazumutima 2012). This traumatic closure of the camp has clear echoes to Nyerere's forced villagizations during *ujamaa*. It is important to understand this event because it is feared to be repeated for the camps that remain today. Many of my informants in Nyarugusu experienced the violent shutdown of the camp and their memories are still fresh. Aline describes the events they went through:

Before [UNHCR and MHA] came to announce repatriation. Sometimes they even read bible verses to show what would happen if we did not leave. They even said they would beat us. They used music to emphasize for us to leave. The last days they gathered the *sungusungu* to cut all crops used in camp. On 30 October it was terrible. They came with soldiers and they were protecting themselves like they were ready for fighting. It was like a war started because you couldn't leave the house, or you couldn't collect property from the house. Families were separated, maybe only able to take some kids at a time. They went zone by zone. Once they closed each zone, they put soldiers there to protect it and prevent people from coming back to collect their things. If you returned to collect things you were beaten or raped. We know some people were killed. They used to shoot weapons in the air to move us to the departure centre to take lorries home. At the hospital, even if you were giving birth, they were given an operation in order to make you quickly return to Burundi.

The same drums for repatriation that were beaten before *refoulement* of the Burundians in 2012, and the Rwandans in 1996, are once again beating today.

## Congolese displacements

Following the closure of Mtabila, the only remaining refugee camp in Tanzania (excluding the old settlements) was Nyarugusu, the locus of my research, and the camp created to house Congolese. Nyarugusu, along with Lugufu I and II refugee camps were created in 1996 due to the First Congo War and grew in population throughout the Second Congo War. Congolese refugees are still arriving here today due to simmering hostilities. This population mainly came from South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which was then the state of Zaire. Due to the spillover of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the collapse of Zaire, hundreds of thousands of Hutus made their way to DRC fleeing reprisal attacks from the new Tutsi dominated government under President Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This influx of Hutus in DRC put a strain on Congolese communities, stoked local political conflicts, and made the Banyamulenge people (ethnic Tutsis who have lived in South Kivu for generations) scapegoats subject to persecution and violence (Lemarchand 2004). Mai-Mai militia groups, primarily formed along ethnic lines, proliferated in the region during this time. Ethnic tensions have been stoked and hardened due to Belgian divide and rule during colonialism, the upheaval in and around independence in the 1960s, and post-Mobutu democratisation and the political competition it entailed afterwards (Vlassenroot 2013). This occurred at the same time as Rwanda invaded Eastern Congo in search of Hutu *génocidaires*, and to aid Congolese rebels led by Laurent Kabila to overthrow President Mobutu. The conflict led to 32,000 Banyamulenge and refugees from other ethnic groups fleeing from South Kivu to Lugufu refugee camp in Kigoma region.

In 1998, the Second Congo War began after President Kabila turned on his Rwandan backers and unleashed a new wave of repression against Tutsi Banyamulenge across the country (Lemarchand 2004). Rwanda and Uganda both backed rebel groups to fight against Kabila. Kabila was backed by other regional states such as Angola and Zimbabwe and joined forces with Rwandan Hutu *génocidaires* and local militias. This led to a proliferation of arms groups with a myriad of motives and intents. Much of the worst fighting occurred in South Kivu, which caused 55,000 people of mixed ethnicity to arrive in Lugufu by 1999 (Talley, Spiegel,

and Girgis 2001, 413). By the end of the second war in 2003, nearly 150,000 Congolese refugees resided in Nyarugusu, Lugufu I, and Lugufu II camps. Despite the official ending of the war, South Kivu still experienced high levels of poverty and state fragility, as well as various armed actors, which made many refugees reluctant to return to the Congo (Autesserre 2006).

I did not include the Congolese displacement in the encampment section above because, since the ending of the war in 2003, Congolese refugees did not receive the same heavy-handed treatment that the Rwandans and Burundians received in the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, as mentioned above, the Tanzanian government forcefully repatriated Rwandans and Burundians by the hundreds of thousands. Why had they not done the same to the Congolese? Alexander Betts (2013) attempts to answer this complicated question. For Congolese refugees, while not being forced to return, the Tanzanian Government has also largely blocked new arrivals at the border. This poses an interesting question as to why the contradictory policies. The reason for these incongruities of policy can be explained by local, national, and international priorities. After the 1998 Refugee Act, Congolese were eligible for *prima facie* status or a blanket refugee status based on their nationality. This designation was subject to screening by committees at the local level under the regional commissioner using criteria brought down by the National Eligibility Commission in Dar es Salaam. In some districts, UNHCR is not given observer status to these ad hoc committees, however. This has in practise caused *prima facie* status to no longer exist for Congolese (Rutinwa 2005). What this means is that local authorities have restricted the space of asylum for Congolese and have either obstructed or denied refugee status at the border with little due process. Local and regional authorities in Kigoma have made it clear that Congolese refugees are not welcome. Congolese refugees are detained and arrested by police and border control officers, and immigrants already in local communities are hunted through informant networks. Many Congolese attempting to go through appropriate asylum channels are deported without going through due process, which amounts to *refoulement* (Betts 2013 p. 125).

Betts (2013) explains that UNHCR is in a better position to influence policy in Dar es Salaam through the central state, rather than in Kigoma, where the regional

commissioner and other local actors are far more hostile toward refugees. Some claim that the arrival of refugees and aid it brings have benefitted the local population in Western Tanzania (Milner 2009). Local politicians, however, paint refugees as economic burdens and criminals (Whitaker 2002b; Landau 2003). While refugee policy is crafted in Dar es Salaam, they are implemented and interpreted at the local level in the west of the country. UNHCR has built trust in Dar es Salaam with the MHA and other actors through the naturalisation process of the 1972 Burundian caseload, and have made significant donations to MHA. Elites in Dar es Salaam are insulated from electoral blowback of hosting Congolese in the west, unlike the Kigoma officials. The central government ultimately has the authority to enact cessation, which would push through repatriation of Congolese, but so far has not done so. It is unclear how much influence UNHCR has in this, although they have taken a principled stance against repatriation thus far (Betts 2013 p. 130).

My research offers an additional and more simple reason for why Congolese refugees have received better treatment than Burundians: Congolese refugees have more social and political capital with Tanzanians living around the camp than Burundians do. This is not a contradiction to Betts (2013) but rather gets to the core of hostility toward Burundians. I explore this further in Chapter 7, where I illuminate the many attitudes and stereotypes toward Burundians and Congolese. Furthermore, I explore how on the ground Burundians are materially affected by these prejudices with difficulty in accessing livelihoods and establishing relationships with Tanzanian host community members. Furthermore, Betts' (2013) findings need to be updated since the election President John Magufuli in 2015. His rise to power became another turning point and regression for asylum in Tanzania. Under Magufuli's ascendant nationalism, UNHCR has lost much of whatever influence it had over asylum in the country. This is most evident in the failure of the 'big push' of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, the CRRF, which I look at in more detail in Chapter 6.

## **Magufuli: The shutdown era**

Flash forward to today and little has changed regarding encampment policy in Tanzania. Moreover, as the entirety of this thesis demonstrates, Milner's (2013) analogy of 'two steps forward, one step back' no longer applies. Asylum prospects are marching in retrograde, which is affecting both Burundians and Congolese today. 2015 saw two events that further constricted Tanzania refugee policy: the third major displacement of Burundian refugees and the election of President John Magufuli, whose nationalist 'Tanzania first' policies have shrunk the space of democracy and asylum even further. Since April 2015, more than 400,000 Burundian refugees have fled to neighbouring countries. Around 200,000 of the 2015 caseload moved to Tanzania. Nyarugusu camp doubled from 62,000 mostly Congolese refugees to 132,000 in total. Burundian camps created in the 1990s, Nduta and Mtendeli, were resurrected to house such large numbers. At the height of the displacements from Burundi, hundreds of refugees were arriving in Tanzania each day.

This exodus, in an acute sense, was caused by President Pierre Nkurunziza overstaying his mandate set out in the two-term limit set out in the Arusha accords. The ruling CNDD-FDD created an environment of state-sanctioned repression and intimidation by the security sources and the youth wing of the ruling party known as the *imbonerakure*. The conflict intensified with huge protests in Bujumbura, a failed coup attempt while President Nkurunziza was visiting Tanzania, the formation of renewed armed rebellion, and renewed state oppression of perceived opposition, which remains in place today. Purdeková (2016) argues that rather than a present crisis, the 2015 displacement should be seen in a broader political sense where Burundians are entrenching displacement due to a profound distrust of the state founded over decades. Beyond distrust in the state, there are direct links from the 2015 displacements to the failure of reintegration into Burundi for the 1993 caseload of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. By WFP estimation, 60-80 per cent of the 2015 caseload of Burundian refugees in Tanzania had already been refugees in Tanzania in the 1990s or even the 1970s (Purdeková 2016 p. 7). These refugees failed to reintegrate into Burundi for multiple reasons. A fundamental issue is the paucity of livelihood opportunities, which is closely tied to the scarcity of land. The lack of available land has resulted in conflicts between Burundians who stayed and those

who left; between neighbours and even family. Stephanie Schwartz (2019) explains how these divisions were made:

First, there were the *Abahunguste* (Kirundi for “those who came back”), also known by the French term *les rapatriés* (the repatriates). Second were the *Abasangwa* (Kirundi for “those who were here and welcomed others”), or *les résidents* (the residents) in French. Within the *rapatrié* group, there were further subdivisions according to the era that returnees initially fled (1972 or in the 1990s), and in some cases by country of asylum (Tanzania, Congo, and Rwanda) (p. 126).

To deal with these complex issues, a federal land commission established the *Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens* (CNTB). The CNTB was eventually headed by an official loyal to the ruling party who privileged giving lands to 1972 returnees. This stance exacerbated conflicts and violence between *rapatriés* and *résidents*. CNTB’s actions led to protests and threatened violence toward the commission before it was suspended a mere month ahead of the 2015 protests against Nkurunziza, which rocked the country (Schwartz 2019 pp. 131-134). The story of Kezia I told at the beginning of the chapter was profoundly impacted by these land conflicts as her husband was killed and she was twice displaced.

International actors were also heavily involved in the reintegration process through setting up of ‘Peace Villages’, which largely failed due to a misunderstood development logic of villagization and added to further conflict instead of peace (Falisse and Niyonkuru 2015; Fransen and Kuschminder 2014). Many refugees who fled to Tanzania faced persecution and danger related to the political conflict. A large portion of the *rapatriés* who previously fled in the 1990s were actively waiting for a pretence to leave Burundi because they were never able to successfully reintegrate into the country (Schwartz 2019 p. 137). This is crucial to consider in the Chapter 5, where I explore the characteristics and socio-economic stratification of refugees in Tanzania and why Burundians on aggregate are far worse off economically than their Congolese neighbours in Nyarugusu.

The Burundian influx in 2015 coincided with the election and swearing-in of President Magufuli who came to fame in a rush of populist moves curtailing corruption and challenging international mining corporations. However, he has since been criticised for ‘authoritarian inclinations’ (Cheeseman 2016). These authoritarian

tendencies include clamping down on free press and opposition, culminating in jailing, disappearing, and even assassination attempts on journalists and opposition leaders (Kabendera 2018). Most recently, President Magufuli has blocked individuals and NGOs from filing cases against Tanzania in the African Court on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR). Japhet Biegona of Amnesty International warns: 'this is yet more evidence of the government of Tanzania's growing hostility towards human rights and human rights defenders' (Al Jazeera 2019). Under President Magufuli, beyond the shrinking space of human rights and democracy, there has been an assault on the space of asylum characterised by government shutdowns. These shutdowns include the restriction of access to shared camp markets as vital sources of livelihoods, the sudden termination of a popular and effective WFP cash transfer programme, and the unexpected pulling out of an international push led by UNHCR to reform the CRRF refugee encampment policy in Tanzania (Betts 2018). Moreover, Tanzanians and refugees alike have explained to me that the state police and military have cracked down more vigilantly now than at any other time on illicit economic activities outside of the camp such as farm labour and land rental, which are vital to the economic fabric of the region. Paired with these shutdowns, the government has repeatedly implored for Burundians to return despite numerous reports of human rights violations ongoing in Burundi (IRRI 2019). As Betts (2013) has demonstrated, Congolese refugees in Tanzania have not faced these same pressures to return, yet they have also had to endure the government's actions. These crackdowns, such as the cash transfer programme, which I call 'shutdown politics', are more closely scrutinised in the subsequent chapters to show the profound effects they have had on refugees in the camps.

The shutdowns, in conjunction with the steady shrinking of international food aid to the camps, is creating an untenable position for many refugees. This hostile environment, intentionally created by the Tanzanian state, is impelling many refugees to return before they are ready to do so, which makes their repatriations far less than 'voluntary' as an ideal solution to their protracted refugee situation (IRRI 2019). Everybody in the camps has heard the details of traumatic events around the violent closure of Mtabila and the forced repatriation of its residents in 2012. Furthermore,

thousands of the current camp occupants, like Aline, introduced above, have experienced these moments first-hand. Throughout my fieldwork in 2017 and still present today there is palpable anxiety that the shutdowns are precursory elements of Tanzanian refugee history repeating itself. The worries and fears are well-founded because on 24 August 2019, the Tanzanian government announced that they reached an agreement with the Burundian government. It was announced that Burundian refugees, 'are to return to their country of origin whether voluntarily or not' (Human Rights Watch 2019). I have spoken with all of the Burundian households in the financial diaries to hear of their plans. Those with the means are moving on to places with more progressive asylum policies such as Uganda or Malawi. Some households have already moved back to pre-empt being forced at the barrel of the gun. The majority of households, however, do not have the capital to move on and still have deep fears about returning to Burundi. They are bracing themselves for what they feel will be the inevitable *déjà vu* of Mtabila.

## **Conclusion**

The trifurcated state fully emerged in Tanzania and other parts of the post-colonial world in the 1990s due to large-scale displacements and structural adjustment policies. However, the impulse to contain and manipulate, which underpins the logic of encampment first emerged during colonialism. In Tanzania, this colonial genealogy has both endured and has been radically disrupted. This chapter tracks both the cyclical nature of containment by Tanzania as a host state, and the recurrent displacements from neighbouring states, particularly Burundi. In colonial Tanganyika, these manipulations included blocking flows of refugees and migrants fleeing from conscripted labour in neighbouring colonies as well as actively recruiting from these populations when there were needs in Tanganyika's domestic labour supply. The colonialists also attempted to keep the subject African populations from settling in cities such as Dar es Salaam. The prevailing colonial development logic was to foster self-help or self-reliance through indirect rule. Just before independence, attempts

were made for larger scale development, but like the groundnut scheme, these often failed or were ineffectual.

The post-colonial state also adopted containment and manipulation of migration strategies similar to the colonialists. However, post-colonial Tanzania has not been consistent in the application of containment but has instead oscillated between keeping an 'open door' for refugees, and strictly controlling the internal and external movements of populations. This is most evident through villagization and encampment policies. In *Citizen and Subject*, Mamdani (1996) shows that Tanzania was radical in abolishing indirect rule and traditional rulers through the state post-colonial national project. Tanzania under President Nyerere was radical in its support against the vestiges of white, colonial rule. He was at the forefront of the continent in hosting, funding, and celebrating anti-colonial dissidents. Yet simultaneously, Nyerere exploited and contained Rwandan and Burundian refugee populations in the 1960s and 1970s, manipulated and moved Tanzanian peasants across the country through villagization during *ujamaa*, and shared the colonial distaste for internal migration into cities. The older Rwandan and Burundian settlements, though not as strict as current encampment policies, were the emergent stages of trifurcated states in Tanzania.

Apart from the significant achievement of mass naturalisation of the 1972 caseload of Burundians, the 1990s bear the most striking resemblance to colonial containment, with the strict encampment policies designed to keep refugee populations on the country's peripheries and when their stay was no longer welcome to force them out. With the rapid increase of refugees in East Africa, also came the proliferation of international humanitarian actors, which filled a major role in governing and managing refugees in the absence of the state. The governance of camps, done in conjunction with cheap and free labour from refugees, bears striking resemblance to the functions of containment and theories of self-reliance central to bifurcated indirect rule. Yet unlike colonial rule through native authorities, these camps are constituted in trifurcated form shared between humanitarian and refugee actors under the watchful and suspicious eye of the hegemonic Tanzanian state.

Within the encampment era, we have also seen asylum history repeat itself with border closures preventing influxes of refugees, large scale 'round-ups', and

forced repatriations of Rwandans in 1996 and Burundians in 2012. By all accounts, this could be happening soon to many of the same Burundians who were forced back from Mtabila in 2012. The current Congolese refugee population has largely been spared from warnings to return. However, they have also endured the impacts of President Magufuli's crackdown on markets, livelihoods, and all-around possibility of self-reliance. The background and history of containment in Tanzania are crucial to recount because it is being played out cyclically. The repetitive history of re-displacements and harsh shutdowns by the Tanzanian state is informing the decisions and strategies of livelihoods and further migrations for the current refugee population in Tanzania. These histories are infused throughout each chapter of this thesis. The next chapter describes the cash transfer shutdown in Nyarugusu, though I view the shutdown as an event in a genealogy of refugee cash transfers around the world. Tanzania's shutdown of the cash programme made a clear signal that refugees are no longer 'worthy' to reside in the country.



# Chapter 3:

The 'worthy' refugee:

A genealogical history of refugee cash



*Figure 7: Taptap card refugees used to access cash. Credit: Boeyink 2017*

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in October 2016 made explicit UNHCR's commitment to instituting cash transfers instead of traditional humanitarian food aid: 'Our goal is to fully institutionalise cash by 2020, and to this end, we are building robust support systems. We are already using cash in over 60 countries, ranging from multipurpose grants to sector-based support' (UNHCR 2016). A year later he proudly announced, 'Our cash support—most in the form of multi-purpose grants—reached 2.5 million people in 2016, and for the first time exceeded in-kind assistance' (Grandi 2017). I arrived in Tanzania in 2017. I went because I was curious about the global rise of cash transfers for refugees that the High Commissioner was espousing. I arrived at the same time that a cash transfer programme was scaling up in Nyarugusu, much to the excitement of the households selected to receive cash. Yet as I mentioned in the Introduction, two weeks after arriving in the camp, the cash programme was suddenly shut down by the Tanzanian state. In the next two chapters I explore how these events affected refugees' lives and livelihoods as the implications of the role of the state in camps. However, in this chapter, I situate this specific cash shutdown within the brief, yet rapid history of the cash transfers for refugees around the world in order to find the reasoning behind the shutdown. I conclude that there is a 'xeno-racist' logic that follows where cash transfers are implemented (or not), and that where cash flows, refugees are deemed 'worthy' to reside. The case of the Tanzanian cash shutdown as a weapon to impel people to leave is a stark reminder that the colonial impulse to move unwanted populations remains strong in Tanzania and elsewhere.

UNHCR has been a pioneer in institutionalising humanitarian cash transfers, beginning with repatriation cash projects (Troger and Tennant 2008). These return operations include one-off or time-limited cash payments for refugees to purchase their needs upon return. In 2008, UNHCR experimented with its first 'care and

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter is based on a peer-reviewed article published in special issue entitled, 'Racialized Refuge' in *Refuge* journal. This chapter contains edits of that article, which includes removing background information already presented, in an attempt to not repeat information already presented in other chapters to best fit the flow of the thesis. For this reason, this chapter is shorter in length than most other chapters. The published version of the article can be found in the references (Boeyink 2019).

maintenance' cash operations for Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan. 'Care and maintenance' for refugee situations refer to ongoing and indefinite support for food, shelter, and other needs. Traditionally this has been addressed through in-kind donations, but now cash is increasingly prioritised by humanitarian policymakers because it is generally more cost-efficient than in-kind aid amidst limited humanitarian funding (ODI 2015). I argue refugee cash transfers are not a neutral technical humanitarian intervention, but rather an indicator of 'xeno-racism' following a colonial genealogy of mobility control where refugees are deemed worthy to reside (Sivanandan 2001; Fekete 2001). Sivanandan (2001) defines *xeno-racism* as, 'a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe's doors' (p. 2). I extend this analysis to incorporate South-South refugee discriminations. To state it simply, where cash is allowed to flow, so too are refugees. This is not a criticism of the efficacy of cash transfers as an intervention *per se*. On the contrary, I have heard great praise for cash from refugee recipients in Nyarugusu refugee camp in Tanzania and consider cash transfers as a more efficient and dignified way to deliver aid.

Coordinated primarily by UNHCR, the international refugee regime governs protracted refugee situations through many different modes, including food distribution, education, legal protection, and health care. Cash has been chosen as the locus of this chapter as a racialised indicator for two primary reasons. First, as the quote from High Commissioner Grandi shows, UNHCR has prioritised cash transfers as an institution. More broadly, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, which included the most influential humanitarian donors and organisations, committed to furthering the use of cash in humanitarian settings (ODI 2015). Second, research from the Cash Barometer project identifying humanitarian recipients' attitudes toward cash around the world reveals that the vast majority of recipients favour receiving cash rather than in-kind goods (van Praag 2018). Agreement from funders, implementers, and recipients denotes that any instances where cash is not used in protracted refugee situations will increasingly be considered an anomaly in need of explanation.

I submit that the fundamental racialised explanation for the refugee cash shutdowns and exclusions in Africa today are the continuities from colonialism of the racially and economically motivated control of African migrations and mobilities, as argued in the previous two chapters. This chapter interrogates the cash exclusion question empirically by first tracing the historical genealogy of the advent of refugee cash transfers for repatriation at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The inclusion of cash for return for Cambodian and Afghan refugees but not for Eritreans demonstrates that the earliest cash transfers clearly reflect donors' geo-strategic priorities of moving refugees for specific ideological benefits to Western powers. Next, I follow the rise of cash for care and maintenance operations beginning with Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan, to the present. Today we see African states blocking cash interventions as xeno-racist tools to keep African refugees out of cities and into the space of camps. In the case of Tanzania, cash has been blocked in cities *and* camps to signal to refugees that they are not worthy to reside *anywhere* in the country.

The selected cases since the end of the Cold War offer a brief history of refugee cash utilising a truncated and non-epochal version of Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of genealogy. He calls 'to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us (Foucault 1991 p. 81). I examine the 'accidents' such as the rise of cash in Jordan, but also the 'complete reversals' of cash shutdowns and exclusions in Africa in order to excavate 'the various systems of subjection' (Foucault 1991 p. 83). Before examining the empirical cases of refugees and cash, I will recount the colonial strategies of mobility control in Africa and introduce the concept and xeno-racism in the refugee regime today.

## **Xeno-racism**

There have been attempts to 'break the silence' on race in development practise and studies (Goudge 2003; White 2002). White (2002) argues, 'The silence on race is a determining silence that both masks and marks its centrality to the

development project (p. 407). The call to examine race in development was effectively taken up in a special issue of *Progress in Development Studies* edited by Uma Kothari (2006). Refugee studies have most notably grappled with racism in the journal, *Refuge*, in a special 2001 issue. This special issue also utilised xeno-racism as a lens to analyse international migration policy in cases around the world (Cheran 2001). The present chapter re-examines xeno-racism as situated by Mark Duffield to demonstrate the racialised nature of cash-based interventions for 'non-insured' refugee populations (Duffield 2005, 2006). Michel Foucault's theorisation of discourse and power forms the bedrock of 'post-development' critique (Brigg 2002). In addition, his writings have inspired many migration and forced migration scholars. Although his expansive work focuses little attention on these issues (Fassin 2001, 2011). Duffield argues that sustainable development is a bio-political technology with xeno-racist and colonial genealogy in order to root 'non-insured' populations in the South (Duffield 2005, 2006). Using Duffield's stance as a point of departure, while also keeping in mind how I engage with Foucault, which is set-out in Chapter 1, this chapter diverges from a bio-political analysis. This is in an effort to demonstrate through the genealogical method that refugee cash transfers are a symptom of how donors and host states judge where refugees are worthy to reside.

Foucault introduces bio-power and bio-politics in *The History of Sexuality*, describing epochal change from sovereign power to bio-power, which is 'the ancient right to take life or let live ... replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death' (Foucault 1979 p. 138). Bio-power can be understood as 'an anatomo-politics of the human body' where government disciplines individuals' bodies (p. 138). Bio-politics is a 'series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population' (p. 139). Duffield critiques sustainable development using a bio-political analysis in two important ways that will be borrowed for this chapter. First, he links the colonial genealogy or 'colonial present' of sustainable development today as a bio-political tool to foster self-reliance reminiscent of indirect rule during colonialism (Duffield 2005). I extend this analysis further by pointing to the colonial practises of controlling movements of colonial subjects. Second, Duffield argues that the use of sustainable development by the North is also a xeno-racist bio-political apparatus to

keep 'non-insured' populations contained in the South (Duffield 2006). I contend that African states are rehabilitating these colonial xeno-racist genealogies by disallowing cash for their own non-insured refugee neighbours.

As highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, near the end of the nineteenth century, colonial rule shifted from a violent and highly militarised direct form of rule to indirect rule where chiefs were backed as proxies to govern and exploit rural areas of the colonies. Duffield (2005) describes the bio-political nature of indirect rule, through Native Administration during the later stages of colonialism: 'Within the limits of self-reproduction, the biopolitics of Native Administration aimed to initiate a process of controlled social change through incremental self-management that maintained social cohesion (p. 150). He makes only brief mention of the colonial 'concerns over the negative effects of uncontrolled urbanization on social cohesion' (p. 149). I argue, however, that managing, controlling, and exploiting subjects' movements was a primary concern of the colonial project, the genealogies of which continue today.

Across Africa, onerous taxes in rural areas also impelled movements of people within and across countries in order to pressure them to enter labor markets and cash economies (Bryceson 2000). Within labour systems in colonial Africa, the city became a contested domain that the colonists wanted to control. This was most pronounced in apartheid South Africa through influx control policies culminating in infamous pass laws and passbooks. The ruling party attempted to balance recruiting enough black Africans to supply labour, while limiting these numbers to ensure racial segregation (Posel 1991). While not going to the same lengths as South Africa, the colonial regime in Tanganyika viewed Africans in Dar es Salaam 'suspiciously' and blamed them for urban criminality. They instituted identification documents and rural repatriations, and even spread propaganda about the difficulties of living in the city (Burton 2005 pp. 128-131). Under Nyerere, refugees in Tanzania were given land to settle in sparsely inhabited peripheries of the country and produced cash crops to benefit the Tanzanian state. Chaulia (2003) elucidates these colonial continuities: 'Arguably, development policies of a freely administered nationalistic government were quite different from crude extraction and transfer of wealth under the colonial yoke, but the utilitarian intentions of hosting immigrant labour were more or less consonant with those of the

pre-independence era' (p. 156). Asylum policies have constricted even further today as the result of xeno-racist policies under current Tanzanian President John Magufuli, which will be explored further below.

The other key point from Duffield is his critique of sustainable development as a xeno-racist form of bio-political population containment in the South. Xeno-racism is a nationalist project of exclusionary immigration practises. 'It is racism in substance but xeno in form—a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white' (Sivanandan 2001 p. 2). Xeno-racism is aimed at keeping the 'other' out of the Global North. Duffield takes this a step further by claiming that wealthy nations (the 'insured') demonstrate xeno-racism by engaging in bio-political aid projects to keep unwanted populations in the South (the 'non-insured') rooted where they are through sustainable development (Duffield 2005, 2006). Refugees are the quintessential example of the 'non-insured' as they have lost the protection of their citizenship and typically have limited rights under what Rutinwa (1999) calls 'pseudo-asylum'. Conceptualisations of insured and non-insured are relative. Xeno-racism is not merely the North containing populations in the South but can also be internal South-South containment, as we see for refugees in Africa.

The current global refugee system resonates with Duffield's critique of aid promoting 'self-reliance'. In 2006 UNHCR promoted a 'self-reliance' policy whereby refugees could be less dependent on international donors through their own livelihoods (UNHCR 2005; Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018). I go into a more detailed discussion on refugee self-reliance in Chapters 6. However, Duffield does not capture the entire picture of bio-political interventions for non-insured refugees by leaving out from his analysis the humanitarian care and maintenance aspect of international aid. Most refugee situations provide humanitarian interventions such as ongoing in-kind food aid or cash transfers alongside livelihoods or self-reliance programming. As protracted refugee situations get drawn out, donors reduce support (Aleinikoff 2015). With global displacement levels the highest they have been since the World War Two, the main humanitarian donors and organisations have made a major push for cash transfers to make more efficient uses of scarce humanitarian funding in place of in-kind aid (ODI 2015).

Duffield (2006) contends that the 'worthiness' or 'usefulness' of 'non-insured' populations is determinant of the types of interventions are applied from Northern 'insured' donors:

The worthiness of developmental-life can be gauged in terms of defending free society. It provides a means of assessing, for example, how useful the life in question is for achieving metropolitan social cohesion, overseas sustainable development, the resolution of internal wars, the reconstruction of fragile states (p. 76).

We see this 'worthiness' clearly in the following examination of refugee repatriation operations at the end of the Cold War. During this era, Western powers, primarily the United States and Europe, dominated the agenda of refugee management through border controls and dominance of UNHCR (Chimni 1998).

### **The role of cash: Cash to return vs. cash to remain**

UNHCR's first use of cash as an intervention was for repatriation operations during the twilight of the Cold War between 1990 and 1993 for Cambodian refugees from Thai camps and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Concurrently to these return operations in Asia, Eritreans were returning home from Sudan, but received only a fraction of the support and no option for cash interventions. A comparison of these three repatriation operations illustrates the vast discrepancies of donor funding levels and decisions to include or exclude cash programming. These policies by the Western powers to obtain ideological capital in the fight against communism demarcated where donors deemed refugees worthy to reside. These moves echoed colonial manipulations of migrations and people movements for the benefit of the metropolises.

First, the Cambodian refugee situation was the result of decades of conflict since decolonisation from the French. The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, was infamous for its 'killing fields' that killed an estimated 1.5 to 3 million people. This regime was toppled by Vietnamese communists supported by the Soviet Union in 1979. A communist coalition was installed known as Cambodian People's Party. The United States supported the counterweight, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The civil war and precipitating conflicts before it created a massive

refugee movement to Thailand. The war ended in 1991 and the West desired to repatriate 360,000 refugees before the scheduled 1993 elections in order for them to vote and to secure power to an amenable regime. The expediency of return trumped humanitarian concerns of safe reintegration (Eastmond and Öjendal 1999). UNHCR decided to offer \$50 for each adult and \$25 per child, which would allow for returnees to pay for rent or agricultural materials. This option was chosen by 87 per cent of returnees (Eastmond and Öjendal 1999 p. 43).

Second, the exodus of refugees from Afghanistan began in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of the country. Most fled to Pakistan or Iran, and each country had nearly three million refugees until the end of the conflict in 1989. Alarmed by the Soviet Union extending its sphere of influence, the United States and United Kingdom mobilised substantial resources to UNHCR and WFP for humanitarian operations supporting Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This support also included substantial military aid channelled through the government of Pakistan. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, international donor spending, particularly that of the United States, had pared down food aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Marsden 1992). Concurrently, and as a result of international donor fatigue, the generosity by the Pakistani state had largely dried up as a result of 'asylum fatigue' (Turton and Marsden 2002 p. 15). The repatriation operation in Pakistan, called encashment, provided 3,300 Pakistani rupees (USD 100) in exchange for refugees' ration cards to be turned in and deregistered. The money was to be used to pay for transportation costs of return. The cash component of the repatriation project was designed with the explicit goal to get international donors off the financial hook of indefinite funding care and maintenance (UNHCR 1994).

Third, Eritrea formally gained independence in 1993 after a unanimous referendum following an armed struggle against Ethiopia that had been waged since 1961. By the end of the war there were a reported 600,000 refugees residing primarily in eastern Sudan (COR 1993 cited in Kibreab 1996b p. 58), and like Cambodian refugees in Thailand, many were eager to return (Kibreab 2002). Their enthusiasm was met by a tepid response from Western donors because they did not match the ideological and political importance of Cambodia or Afghanistan (Kibreab 1996b pp.

56-57). As a result, the lack of funding and absence of a cash-based return indicate Eritrean refugees lacked the usefulness to be assisted home. By 1992 those with the financial means—around 50,000—had spontaneously returned to Eritrea. Following military victory, the Eritrean government planned for the repatriation of 250,000 refugees between 1992 and 1993. The Eritreans appealed for \$200 million on the basis of similar repatriation programmes such as the Cambodian caseload. UNHCR balked and proposed a mere \$31 million. In June 1993 the international community managed to raise only USD 11.7 million for rehabilitation projects. No cash was offered to returnees, but rather in-kind items such as food and agricultural inputs were provided (Kibreab 1996b). Merely 25,000 of the 250,000 proposed returnees were resettled by 1995. Between 1991 and 1997, 157,345 Eritreans returned spontaneously from Sudan without UNHCR assistance Kibreab 2001 p. 1). Kibreab (1996b) judges the repatriation project in unequivocal terms: 'It is only possible to conclude with the depressing observation that the international community has failed the Eritrean people. It seems completely ludicrous that donors should choose to allocate funds in such a way as to keep thousands of refugees in settlements rather than help them rebuild their homeland. Yet this is what has happened' (p. 64).

Cash for repatriation projects continued into the mid-2000s and informed UNHCR's approach to cash for sustaining care and maintenance programmes around the world (Troger and Tennant 2008). UNHCR's first use of cash for care and maintenance programming was inaugurated in 2008 for the Iraqi refugee caseload in Jordan. This programme was more stumbled upon by the country staff on the ground than by UNHCR's organisational commitment to cash interventions, according to a UNHCR employee working on the project. The next section highlights the organisational history of how and why refugee cash interventions rose to prominence globally in ongoing care and maintenance operations, but the same is not afforded to non-Syrian, African urban refugees in Africa.

### **Cash in Amman**

The state of Iraq has had a tumultuous existence since the Saddam Hussein regime invaded Kuwait in 1990, which precipitated a counter-invasion from US-led

forces. The second US invasion in 2003 precipitated the fall of Saddam Hussein and descent into sectarian violence. By 2007, over two million Iraqis had been displaced to nearby Middle Eastern countries (UNHCR 2007). In Jordan, the government estimated 450,000–500,000 Iraqi refugees resided in the country, although this figure is most likely inflated (Crisp et al. 2009). In 2008, UNHCR’s first full-scale use of cash in care and maintenance operations was introduced in Jordan. This cash intervention developed as a result of the urban nature of displacement, and the high level of strategic importance of the refugee situation to US and European donors similar to cash for repatriation operations recounted above.

The cash programme in Jordan was equally novel in its design and inception. One of the main reasons for the creation of the cash programme in Jordan, and why it was so much larger than the other host countries such as Syria, was because Jordan is a middle-income country that did not want the presence of WFP. It did not want to be seen as a ‘poor country.’ WFP at the time was bound to using vouchers instead of unconditional cash. This gave flexibility to the UNHCR. One of the UNHCR officers overseeing the cash programme said, ‘We were making it up as we went along’. The Iraqi caseload was primarily urban. More than 80% originated from Baghdad and 75–90% were displaced to the region’s capitals (Harper 2008 p. 172). Moreover, this refugee population in Jordan has more middle-class, wealthy, and educated people than most refugee contexts (Crisp et al. 2009 p. 9). UNHCR officers ‘saw in-kind assistance made no sense. It didn’t make sense to have people come to UNHCR and get huge bags of grain’. Recipients could access funds throughout the city through ATMs using iris scans (Crisp et al. 2009 p. 43). These innovations were possible largely because UNHCR was new to the region and could rapidly improvise to fit the situation (Crisp et al. 2009 p. 9).

Finally, in order to institute a cash programme at the scale of operations in Jordan, funding had to be large and sustained. Amman has a higher cost of living compared to other cities in which UNHCR has operated. The programme in Jordan gave USD 120 per person, per month. While cost efficiency was driven down from 23% for in-kind donations to 2.3% for cash, this was still a costly operation. This funding was made possible because Iraq—like Cambodia during the end of the Cold

War—was of significant global strategic importance to the United States and other Western powers: ‘Needless to say, the states that have been directly involved in this crisis, by virtue of the troops which they have deployed in Iraq, have a very significant interest in addressing the refugee situation, not least by providing high levels of funding and resettlement places’ (Crisp et al. 2009 p. 9). Funding increased for the Iraqi situation from \$40 million in 2005 to \$271 million in 2008 (Crisp et al. 2009 p. 3).

### **Scaling up refugee cash transfers**

The cash programme in Jordan proved to be the launching point for cash as care and maintenance instead of in-kind goods for refugees in cities and camps around the world. This rapid proliferation of refugee cash, evidenced by Grandi’s quote above, did not occur in its own institutional vacuum, but was also influenced by social protection measures around the world. Some credit Roman Emperor Trajan as the first state to provide social protection through food aid and other subsidies for orphans and poor children in the first century. Targeted aid, which introduced the notion ‘deserving poor’ originates with the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 in England (Devereux 2016 p. 169). Many people consider the rise of welfare states after World War Two in Europe as the birth of modern social protection, with some variations in the U.S.’s ‘War on Poverty’ in the 1960s and 1970s under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Today social protection and cash transfers in the global south ‘are having something of a field day’ (Olivier de Sardan and Piccoli 2018 p. 1), while others are calling this growth a ‘quiet’ (Barrientos and Hulme 2008) or ‘cash revolution’ (Hanlon et al. 2010). Ferguson (2015) labels this emergence the ‘new politics of distribution’. To address the rapid and prolific rise of cash, this section traces the history from its introduction by states in Latin America to its shift to non-state cash transfers for development and humanitarian purposes in Africa and Asia, to the more recent calls for universal basic income.

Cash transfers in the global south were introduced in Brazil with the *Bolsa Familia* programme and in Mexico with *Progresa* (later changed to *Oportunidades* and *Prospera*). *Bolsa Familia* was a long, contested process from 1995 until its inception in 2003, with many failures along the way. Social insurance had been a social

protection mechanism since the 1930s, however, *Bolsa Familia* was innovative in its implementation for families rather than individuals, specific components for children, and the conditionalities or co-responsibility, which included health and education stipulations designed to boost human capital. Cash was generally given to women in the households (Soares 2011 p. 55). This programme is now the largest conditional cash transfer (CCT) in the world covering around 14 million households encapsulating around 50 million people (Galvani 2017 p. 6). *Progresa* began in Mexico in 1997 after an economic crisis in 1995. This programme was preceded by many attempts at food assistance and other social protection interventions. The programme had similar conditionalities to *Bolsa Familia* but were more strictly enforced. *Progresa* was initially criticized for its use of patronage by the party in power the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The programme eventually expanded and was renamed *Oportunidades* in 2002 and *Prospera* in 2014.

These programmes attracted numerous reports and quantitative studies that showed the programmes in favourable lights (Sugiyama 2011), which ‘narrativized’ CCTs positively at the international level through conferences organised by the World Bank and endorsed by prominent international actors such as Kofi Annan and Bill Clinton. This is what Olivier de Sardan (2018) refers to as the ‘production and circulation of traveling models’ (p. 69). Similar in design and structure, CCTs spread quickly across Latin America to reach 17 of the 20 Latin American countries by 2009 (Fiszbein et al. 2009). Despite diverse histories and politics, Latin American functional states and strong bureaucracies made state-led and financed cash transfers possible. However, in Africa and Asia, many of these countries do not have the same state reach or capabilities to implement social protection, which allowed the World Bank, UN, and NGOs to step in.<sup>2</sup>

Cash transfer conferences organised by the World Bank were catalysts in the spread of cash in Asia and Africa. International actors and organisations provided the funding and expertise for this proliferation of cash (Sugiyama 2011 pp. 263-264).

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<sup>2</sup> A notable exception to this is South Africa, which enacted significant social protection programmes such as pensions for white settlers as early as the 1920s, which was later extended to black Africans (albeit unequally) in the 1940s. More recently, nearly 30% of the South African population is covered by social protection grants (Ferguson 2015 pp. 73-77).

Typically, the World Bank would finance and nest cash 'projects' within a state's 'organisation chart' to enact a targeted 'safety net' using proxy means testing (Olivier de Sardan 2018 p. 46). The other option for cash delivery is through the UN and NGOs, often through unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) for humanitarian purposes. A turning point in humanitarian cash was in the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 when aid agencies piloted cash instead of in-kind goods such as food. One researcher and policymaker influential in the rise of cash recalled: 'The tsunami was a big boost [for cash transfer implementation]. There was a lot of money slushing around, and there weren't a lot of restrictions. If not then, when would you do it?' Since the tsunami, cash has been used during famine in Somalia and significant flooding in Pakistan (ODI 2015 p. 15).

Despite the recent rise in cash transfers, UNHCR as an institution has had longstanding internal resistance to implementing these changes due to worries that cash would be used fraudulently, abused through purchasing alcohol or other undesirable goods, or would create a 'dependency syndrome' among refugees (Easton-Calabria and Herson 2020). This paternalistic view toward dependency bears clear resemblance to development ideologies of self-reliance and 'trusteeship' of the colonial and post-colonial states examined in Chapters 1 and 2, where subjects and refugees are not trusted to make the best development decisions for themselves. Crisp (2017) attributes the steering of former prime minister of Portugal and current UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, who was UN high commissioner for refugees in 2005 until 2015, as one of the main catalysts of moving UNHCR away from in-kind aid toward cash. He is said to be visionary in seeing, 'that UNHCR should work more actively to find solutions to refugee situations—and to engage refugees themselves more fully in that process; and [...] that UNHCR's activities had to be more firmly based on fundamental human rights principles' (p.92). In line with Guterres' push for human rights principles, a major point of advocacy for transitioning to cash beyond just a cost-saving initiative centres around notions of dignity: 'cash transfers have been shown to support local businesses and markets, and people often prefer receiving it because it gives them greater choice and control over how best to meet their own needs, and a greater sense of dignity' (ODI 2015 p. 18). Since the cash

operations in Amman, UNHCR has expanded and specialised its use of cash to include cash for healthcare, gender, schooling, shelter, WASH programmes, and has even gotten as specific as cash for latrines.

Another reason for the wholesale shift to cash is due to competition for resources between international aid behemoths such as UNHCR and WFP. A prominent cash researcher and consultant with knowledge of the humanitarian systems explained, 'there was a fight between UNHCR and WFP for who would deliver cash.' UNHCR's use of cash in Jordan was used as a way 'to grab more of the pie' of donor aid. UNHCR essentially forced WFP's hand to also switch to cash aid instead of food:

The big and important shift was when WFP moved to cash because they are a dominate player. It gave a whole different scale to it. WFP has always been strategically and logistically savvy and they saw the existential threat of cash to their current business model of in-kind aid. They risked shrinking to irrelevance if they did not change so [their shift to cash] was a mix of protecting organisational and doing the right thing.

Today, with UNHCR and WFP throwing their institutional weight behind humanitarian cash transfers, they have effectively become major catalysts for mainstreaming and establishing cash transfers as 'common-sense' and pillars of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (Bailey and Harvey 2017). With cash becoming more mainstream, it is taking many new shapes and forms, with new humanitarian and development actors joining in the 'traveling model' of cash (Olivier de Sardan 2018 p. 46). For instance, some policymakers and researchers are advocating wherever possible to link state-led social protection in humanitarian situations or during times of acute crisis (Ulrichs and Sabates-Wheeler 2018; Harvey 2009). There are also some pushing for a basic income grant (BIG) also known as universal basic income for all citizens regardless of income or circumstances. Basic income has been debated and in the public consciousness in South Africa and has been piloted in Namibia (Ferguson 2015 p. 80). An influential NGO, GiveDirectly, is piloting a \$30 million study in Kenya giving cash to 20,000 individuals in 197 villages with 100 villages as control groups (GiveDirectly 2019). Beyond the Global South, US presidential candidate, Andrew Yang, was influential in launching the concept of basic income—'freedom dividends'

as he calls them—into the American consciousness before dropping out of the race. This section has demonstrated that we are currently amidst a rapid rise in the use of cash in many different forms for development and humanitarianism. With the clear evidence of global prolific growth of cash, it should alert us to take a closer look at the instances where cash is being blocked from implementation in refugee contexts such as African cities or anywhere in Tanzania at all.

### **Urban refugee cash in Africa**

UNHCR's handling of the urban caseload in the Middle East informed the organisation's broader urban refugee policy and inspired the expansion of cash (Crisp 2017). The Jordan case has not been expanded to urban refugee caseloads in Africa, however. In 2009, UNHCR released an update to its urban refugee policy created in 1997. In the document it states: 'In many cities where refugees are unable to establish livelihoods and meet their own needs, UNHCR has provided them with regular sums of money, usually by means of cash payments and sometimes through the distribution of ATM cards' (UNHCR 2009 p. 19). Why then, are there so few urban cash transfer programmes despite large populations of refugees in certain African cities? Moreover, for the urban cash programmes that exist in Sudan and Egypt, why do they include Syrian rather than African refugees? I conclude that African refugee caseloads, like the Eritrean case above, do not have the geopolitical importance in the current war on terror era. As such, host countries have greater power as xeno-racist gatekeepers to manage the non-insured refugee populations. Moreover, while many post-colonial states deracialized through independence, they are still structurally under 'decentralized despotism.' This entails a colonial genealogy of the 'bifurcated state' which rules the rural and urban separately (Mamdani 1996). The consequences of this bifurcation are xeno-racist protection of urban sites from the non-insured refugees.

It has long been known that large numbers of refugees live in major African cities. Today hundreds of thousands of refugees, both registered and unregistered, reside in cities such as Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, and others (Neldner 1979; Campbell 2006; Sommers 2001; Kibreab 1996a). Loren Landau argues against parallel aid systems such as cash transfers in cities because the majority of urban

displaced in Africa are 'more robust and resilient as the truly vulnerable are' (Landau 2014 p. 140). While this is largely true, others argue that those with significant vulnerabilities also reside in urban centres such as Nairobi (Boeyink 2017) or Kampala (Monteith and Lwasa 2017). It would be feasible to target vulnerable populations in African cities in similar ways to Jordan, especially with the proliferation of mobile money in Africa such as Safaricom's M-Pesa. African states have pushed back on allowing refugees from neighbouring states to live in cities. However, countries hosting Syrian refugees have deemed them a worthy urban population.

To illustrate, most major refugee-hosting states in Africa have instituted large-scale cash transfer programmes in refugee camps and settlements. No African countries, however, apart from Egypt, Sudan, and Niger have introduced cash for urban refugees. These are available mostly for Syrian refugees. Egypt hosts an estimated 500,000 Syrians, around 130,000 of whom are registered (3RP 2018). Egypt is the only African country that is part of Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP) to coordinate care for Syrian refugees. As part of 3RP, by 2016 UNHCR and WFP was providing nearly 42,000 Syrian refugees in Cairo with cash assistance (3RP 2017). There is a separate small programme by Caritas Egypt, which provides a small number of cash grants to 'extremely vulnerable' households, and only bimonthly for six months (Caritas 2018). One study found that only 13% of Sudanese households received this assistance (Jacobsen et al. 2014 p. 154). African refugees such as Sudanese, Ethiopians, Somalis, and Eritreans, among others, have been displaced to Egypt for decades. They constantly face xenophobic discrimination and have not been included in urban cash programmes (Jacobsen et al. 2014 p. 153). By following the cash, this shows that donors and host states deem Syrian refugees worthy only to live in cities with cash assistance.

A humanitarian cash researcher says that UNHCR in Africa has 'vanishingly tiny budgets'. As such, the researcher explained to me that urban aid programmes are some of the first items to be cut in a budget. In 2017, the appeal for 24.2 million people of concern in Africa was USD 2.925 billion, only achieved 53% of this amount (UNHCR 2018a). In comparison, the 3RP in 2017, which funds the cash transfers for Syrian refugees in Cairo, requested USD 5.58 billion for a refugee population of 5.3 million

refugees. 3RP had a smaller funding gap of 63% (3RP 2018). This demonstrates a funding ambivalence toward African refugees reminiscent of Eritrean repatriates in the 1990s. However, in situations with donor apathy toward African refugees such as Sudan and Egypt refugee operations, it opens the space for historic xeno-racist processes to be accentuated in refugee policies and interventions such as cash transfers.

Social exclusion for black Africans in Egypt and Sudan has a long history at the intersection of Arab expansion and slave trade in Africa (Moro 2004). Unfortunately for the sake of brevity, this chapter cannot expound upon that history. However, research from Troutt Powell (2003) trace the complex racial genealogies from colonialism, which recount how African states such as Egypt and Sudan became 'colonized colonizers'. Arabization has been a central cause of wars for decades, in Sudan in particular (Johnson 2003; Sharkey 2008). With low funding and involvement from the international community, xeno-racist exclusion for black Africans is revealed in refugee cash transfer programming. As a result, African refugees must struggle unassisted or even be persecuted in cities or live in camps—the only place they are deemed 'worthy' to live. Cash-based interventions have acquiesced to host states' desires to keep refugees confined to the peripheries of their countries. The final section returns to the contemporary Tanzanian refugee situation where cash has been shut down even in refugee camps, which signals that refugees are no longer welcome *anywhere* in the country.

## **Cash shutdown in Tanzania**

As described in Chapter 2, Tanzania has a history of heavy-handedness in dealing with refugees and migrants dating back to colonialism. Burundian refugees in particular have faced the brunt of these policies, most notably with the forced repatriation of Mtabila in 2012. The fears of forced return began again in earnest, following President John Mugufuli's abrupt shutdown of the WFP cash transfer programme in 2017. Tanzania began a pilot cash programme in December 2016 targeting 10,000 vulnerable refugees. Each household member received TZS 20,000

(USD 9.00) per month. The programme was set to reach 80,000 recipients, however, before being shut down the project only reached 30,000 individuals. The programme was designed by WFP through an extensive market assessment, which examined the capacity of all the feeder markets in the Kasulu district to supply maize, pulses and cooking oil to the cash recipients (WFP 2016). Many refugees and Tanzanians in the communities surrounding the camps who sold products in in the Common Market told me that they experienced greater demand for their goods as the cash pilot was scaling up.

The programme was funded by WFP, but transactions were brokered through Airtel, one of the largest mobile phone operators in the country which had the best connectivity in the area due to their investment in cellular towers. For monthly cash distributions, individual mobile money agents, known as *wakala*, were transported with a police escort from nearby Kasulu. The recipients were given *taptap* cards, which had SIM cards in them and could be read by machines operated by the *wakala*. When the cash was dispersed, recipients would receive a text message and they would take the *taptap* cards and individual PIN numbers in order to get cashed out with physical currency by the *wakala*. With the cash in hand refugees were free to purchase as they wished in markets within the camp or at the Common Market. Before the shutdown, there were plans to extend the cash programme to nearby Nduta and Mtendeli camps. Moreover, many of the international NGOs had plans to implement cash programmes for people with specific needs such as the elderly, people with disabilities, single parents, among as others. Other organisations planned to use cash in their vocational training programmes instead of giving in-kind products to start businesses, which was often not enough money for these businesses to succeed. In Chapter 6, I go into more detail why after the cash shutdown these livelihood programmes are often doomed to fail.

On 20 July 2017, Tanzanian President Magufuli met Burundi's President Nkurunziza at the border in Ngara. President Magufuli sided with President Nkurunziza and delivered a speech claiming Burundi was safe to return to, despite UN investigations reporting serious human rights abuses. President Magufuli made a thinly veiled reference to the WFP cash programme: 'I'm aware that there are people

who lured Burundians into refugee camps in Tanzania, telling them that they would be given [TZS] 10,000 each daily. If they have that kind of money, they should pay them once they are back home' (The Citizen 2017). Two weeks after this speech, on 4 August, WFP announced that the government had abruptly decided to shut down the cash programme, and the final distribution was cancelled. In the next chapter, I look in greater depth at the particular details of how important this cash programme was to its recipients and how this added tension to the strained environment of the camp at the time of the shocking announcement.

Sudden shutdowns have been increasing under President Magufuli. Prior to the cash shutdown, in January 2017, *prima facie* status was revoked for Burundians, and asylum seekers have been turned away at the borders (UNHCR 2018a). Additionally, on February 9, 2018, President Magufuli unexpectedly pulled out of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), citing lack of support from the international community. The CRRF, is a voluntary pilot project to re-evaluate national refugee policy in consultation with UNHCR and other stakeholders in exchange for increased international financial support. Like the cash shutdown examined in this chapter and the next, the CRRF should not be viewed in a vacuum, but is another example of cyclical and structural failure from UN 'big pushes', which is explored in Chapter 6. Finally, market days were limited to once a week, and draconian restrictions on businesses in camps were enacted whereby only small petty businesses could operate. Camp residents increasingly rely on livelihoods to survive, as a lack of international funding has decreased rations in the camp. This shrinking space of asylum and commerce puts into question if 'voluntary returns' to Burundi are actually voluntary (Van Laer 2018).

## **Conclusion**

The recent Burundian influx and subsequent cancellation of cash is further evidence that where cash is allowed, refugees are allowed. Tanzania is not alone in using cash shutdowns to signal if refugees are worthy to reside on their soil. Somalis in Kenya, like Burundians in Tanzania, have been vilified and collectively punished by

the state in Kenya since independence (Lochery 2012; Whittaker 2013; Anderson 2014). In 2015, immediately following the Al-Shabaab attack on Garissa University College, in which nearly 150 students were killed, the government of Kenya shut down all Somali remittance companies, popularly known as *hawalas*, for two and a half months. These actions, which amounted to collective punishment for all Somalis, temporarily devastated Somali refugee economies in Nairobi (Boeyink 2017). More recently, on November 2019, the government of Bangladesh began shutting down cash-based programming for Rohingya refugees in camps in an effort to tighten restrictions and like Burundians in Tanzania, impel them to leave the country (Ahmed 2019).

In the cases of refugee cash operations presented, one can see how donors and hosts calculate the worth of refugees. Worth is determined by the position of a refugee population in the global geopolitical hierarchy. Xeno-racism represents moves by states to prevent unworthy refugees from entering through immigration control or containing refugee populations. These determinations of refugee populations are a remnant of a racial colonial system or 'colonial present' manifest dictating the movements of non-insured peoples (Duffield 2005). Colonial lineages are not only imposed from the North, for xeno-racist 'colonized colonizers' also exist in South-South relations (Troutt Powell 2003). This chapter has offered a view 'from above' at an international relations level, and through a historical genealogy. Cambodians' worth to donors derived from a population to be mined for votes to install a new regime favourable to the West. Afghans' worth was initially tied to counteracting Soviet influence, but this transitioned to moving the Afghan caseload off ongoing aid obligations. Eritreans garnered very little worth in donors' eyes, and this was reflected in inadequate funding and no cash programme. The cash programmes for Iraqis in Amman and Syrians in Cairo demonstrate the high strategic importance to donors due to the war on terror and military involvement in these situations. This global process of refugee worth is also relevant Tanzanian trifurcated states. Conceptualisations of insured and non-insured can also be applied to Africa generally and Tanzania specifically. Host states in Africa contest the legitimacy of refugees outside of camps in cities. After hosting these populations for decades, Burundians have very little

usefulness to the Tanzanian state. They are worth more to the state when forced out of the country to gain domestic political points or as a favour to regional ally, President Nkurunziza. Allowing or blocking cash is a way to signal refugees' worth. In the next chapter, I zoom in to the view from below in Nyarugusu to describe the role of the state in camps and to observe the concrete effects of the cash transfer shutdown at an extremely tense time for refugees.

# Part II:

## Refugee constraints



*Figure 8: Houses on Burundian side of Nyarugusu camp. Credit: Boeyink 2017*



# Chapter 4:

## Shutdown politics: Anatomy of a camp protest and its demise



*Figure 9: Police presence on 26 April 2018 to deter would-be protesters. Source: Shaban 2018.*

## Introduction

'You will see how stones compare to guns!' the Nyarugusu camp commandant threatened at a camp-wide meeting. This meeting and announcement at the end of a discord-filled week, which included the cancellation of the cash programme described in the previous chapter and planned protests by camp residents in response, effectively shut down all camp dissent. This move, consistent with state's history of harsh crackdowns, which I conceptualise as 'shutdown politics', was one of many shutdowns reinforcing the violence that the state embodies in refugee camps. These shutdowns came at a time of despondency and fury felt by refugees. Amidst this tension, there was a mysterious armed robbery inside the camp, and all rumours accused Tanzanian police to be the perpetrators. This furthered enraged the people of Nyarugusu and threatened to ignite the camp. Thus far I have taken a broad historical view of encampment. I have argued that in post-colonial societies generally, and in Tanzania specifically, refugee camps share parallel functions and historic continuities of colonial containment strategies and self-reliance philosophies which underpin indirect rule. The previous chapter takes a narrower focus to examine the top-down state logic of the cash transfer shutdown, which is used as a weapon designed to force refugees out of the country. These shutdown politics are consistent with the coloniality of manipulating the movements of people such as refugees that are deemed to be not 'worthy' to reside in Tanzania. These mobility controls exhibiting varying degrees of harshness and violence is a continuous temporal thread weaved by the German and British colonisers, Nyerere's villagization and refugee settlements, through encampment of the 1990s, as well as today. This chapter zooms in even further to the ground-level of the camp during the tumultuous two weeks following the cash shutdown. I closely scrutinise the trifurcated forms of rule, which enforce containment and intensify the structurally violent conditions which impels refugees to leave the camp and country. I ask why did conspiracies in the camp quickly accuse the Tanzanian state to be the instigators of violence following the anonymous armed robberies? In spite of the rage felt in the camp, why was the Tanzanian state successful at instantly shutting down all protests? I discuss answers to these

questions, which give us insights into the violent role of the state, and the perceptions that refugees have of the state.

Through encampment, the Tanzanian state has abdicated service provision and other 'state-like functions' (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014b). Despite this aspect of the state missing, the violent conduct of the state is omnipresent in the minds of refugees. The state retains and reinforces its sovereignty through sudden closures and cancellations of programmes beneficial to refugees, through consistent use of 'shutdown politics'. These shutdowns act as forceful and acute projections of the 'idea of the state'. I begin the chapter with President Magufuli's announcements at Ngara, which was closely followed by the announcement of the cash transfer programme shutdown. These events triggered anxiety across the camp, particularly among Burundians. The concern was that these shutdown politics would be precursors to an eventual violent camp closure like many experienced in Mtabila camp in 2012. This fear remains to this day. These events were further exacerbated because food rations were being starkly reduced by WFP due to lack of funding at the time. Moreover, the cash transfer programme was very popular with those who received it. This background gives insights into the reasons for the bitterness of Nyarugusu residents, which led to the planned protests. To examine the anatomy of the protests, I include the circumstances in which the cash shutdown was announced, the organising and planning of the food boycott, and the violent interlude of an armed robbery in the build-up to the protests. In this discussion, I fuse clarifying information about state actors in the camp throughout. The remainder of the chapter is an autopsy of the swift demise of camp dissent through a camp-wide pronouncement by the camp commandant, accompanied by key actors in each tier of the trifurcated state. I make sense of this ethnographic moment by bringing into conversation the forced migration literature on protests and rumours. This vantage point and analysis 'from below' demonstrates how refugees perceive the state and humanitarian government in a spatialised combination of 'verticality' and 'encompassment' (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). For refugees, this means that though they are punished by the state, they attribute this violence to the whole nation of Tanzania. More broadly, this analysis reflects how refugees

experience the everyday structural violence of encampment and its amplification through the acute damage and societal breakdown of shutdown politics.

## **Anatomy of a protest and its demise**

The first interviews I conducted in the camp began on 19 July 2017. The following day, as mentioned in the previous chapter, President Magufuli met with Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza at Ngara and notably derided the WFP cash transfer programme:

We all know that there are people who benefit when Burundians flee their country in droves. There are organizations raking in money in the name of helping refugees. I'm aware that there are people who lured Burundians into refugee camps in Tanzania, telling them that they would be given Sh10,000 each daily. If they have that kind of money, they should pay them once they are back home (The Citizen 2017).

It is not a coincidence that two weeks later, the Tanzanian government shut the cash programme down. What the previous chapter left out, however, was the context on the ground of the frustration and anger at the time. Contempt was rising due to food ration cuts, how important the cash project was to its recipients, the symbolic and economic effects of the shutdown, as well as protests and violence in the camps that flared up following the shutdown announcement.

## **Food ration cuts**

I asked the majority of households participating in the financial diaries, most of whom had resided in Tanzanian camps since the 1990s, what the worst or most difficult year of living as a refugee in Tanzania has been. The reason for asking this was to get a relative historical sense of where the recent shutdowns and food reductions compared to times past. Most Burundians said 2012 or 2015 were the worst years. 2012 was the worst due to the forced and violent closure of Mtabila camp and 2015 because it was the most recent displacement from Burundi, which saw many refugees arrive at crowded conditions and led to a cholera outbreak. In both years, most had little money or resources to insulate from these hardships. On the other

hand, some Burundians and a majority of Congolese refugees overwhelmingly described 2017 as the worst year. During most of 2017, camp residents were given less than 70% of the required 2,100 kilocalories for recommended intake (WFP 2017). I go into detail the effects of ration cuts in the next chapter, however, many people explained that the monthly rations they received only lasted a week and a half to two weeks. Beyond that, they had to use their own capital, go into debt, or rely on the benevolence of others. There were greater effects that had repercussions throughout the camp, however. With fewer rations, there are fewer rations sold, which greatly diminishes the liquidity of cash in the camp and adversely affected all businesses. Chapter 8 explores how widespread this system of selling food rations is in Nyarugusu. As an elderly Congolese woman, Nyassa describes: 'in 2017 we were selected for the cash transfer programme and we were so happy to vary our diets and eat well. Then life became difficult for us. The food reductions were a problem.' Maisha, a middle-aged Congolese woman, echoes the sentiments of many others:

This year was most difficult because since we began living in the camp, we have not experienced this level of food reduction. Also getting permits to go out of the camp is more difficult this year than any other year. We don't know if the situation is caused by humanitarian organisations or by Tanzanians. We don't know.

An elected refugee leader, Tobias, explained, 'food reduction is the song and the drum played every day, but there is no change.' Rusi and Isabel, two Congolese women summed up the gravity of the events in 2017. Rusi expressed, 'Now we are dying. You see what we receive from WFP. Both the food we grow, and the food given to us by WFP is finished.' From Isabel: 'The biggest challenge of the camp is reduction of food. They are giving only three bowls [of maize flour] to last for one month. Refugees are treated like animals. Even animals are more valued.'

Anecdotally, I was told many times from Tanzanians living around the camps, refugees, and humanitarians that when food rations are reduced, there are spikes in crops being stolen from Tanzanian farms by refugees. In one focus group discussion among Tanzanians living in Kasanda village near Mtendeli camp, eight of the 19 participants claimed to have had crops stolen from refugees. One woman recounted a story of going to her farm and meeting a Burundian who had gathered a bag of her cassava without permission. The refugee asked the women who the owner was, and

fearing for her safety she said, 'not me'. The refugee then asked her to help lift the bag on his head and she recounted, 'I helped the Burundian steal my own cassava!' This was met with a large laugh from the group. Though told as a joke, ration reductions have stoked more serious tensions between refugees and host communities. Tobias recounted a violent event in Makere village near Nyarugusu in April 2017, just four months before the cash shutdown. This incident repeatedly came up in interviews with informants highlighting the state of relations with the host community:

At the time there was a big food reduction. Many people left [the camp] to work for money. The people who employed them would not pay the money, so the refugees tried to force payment from the Tanzanians. The Tanzanians responded by cutting 28 people and one person was even killed. It was reported to MHA and the [previous] camp commandant called a meeting between refugees and Tanzanians at the youth centre in the camp. It turned into a conflict. The Tanzanians were enraged trying to defend the country's policies. The meeting stopped immediately.

He went on to explain that a new camp commandant was installed shortly after these events and quickly met with the refugee leaders:

In the meetings, he said three things: 'You came from Congo you must respect laws of Tanzania or the government will never open its borders again. If you see big problems in the camp, you are free to register to return to Congo. We do not accept refugees causing problems in Tanzania.' [The camp commandant] has been having meetings to teach rules and policies of the camp, but we see the situation getting worse and worse.

Tobias' intuition about the situation getting worse would ultimately prove true. As rumblings of protest later grew, and a violent interlude of a robbery in the camp ensued only four months later, the new camp commandant remained consistent in his threat to 'not accept refugees causing problems in Tanzania'.

### **The hands and feet of the state**

Before continuing, I will discuss the role of the camp commandant and the police stationed in the camp. These actors operate at the interface of the trifurcated state between refugees, humanitarians, and the host community. Brankamp (2019) conceptualises Kakuma refugee camps as 'occupied enclaves' where state actors

fulfil militarised 'occupation assemblages'. He defines the 'occupied enclave' as, 'an assemblage of complementary domains of control which encompasses an architecture of material barriers and devices, inimical bureaucracies, policing practises that inflict physical harm on refugee bodies, and strategies of material extraction' (p. 70). This description of Kakuma also fits the role of state actors in Nyarugusu. Tanzania and Kenya share similar encampment histories since the 1990s, where the state has relinquished service provision and refugee protections and has securitised the camp space (Brankamp and Daley 2020; Milner 2009). Both countries have state security officers that function as the literal gatekeepers of the camp, as they are positioned at the main entrances of the camps. The camp commandant under MHA in Tanzania, the Officer Commanding the Police Station (OCS) in Kenya, and their colleagues, wield significant power in the camps. These actors' primary functions are as gatekeepers controlling access in and out of the camp, which usually comes at a price through bribes for refugees. As gatekeepers, they primarily manipulate refugee movements in and out of the camp. The police are the enforcers of encampment for those who do officially pass through the gates.

Refugees are required to appeal to the camp commandant and OCS for a pass to go out of the camp for medical trips, funerals, education and training opportunities, and to nearby towns to resupply stock for businesses. Brankamp (2019) traces this colonial genealogy of surveillance and movement control to the ID card system known as *kipande* system in Kenya under British rule (p. 73). Chaulia (2003) similarly argues that camp commandant occupies a similar role as British colonial 'labour officers' in Western Tanganyika during the 1930s. These colonial state agents set up 'refugee reception camps' at the borders to recruit migrants and refugees from neighbouring colonies for sisal and rubber plantations and factors (p. 152). The effects of these mobility controls 'place not only spatial restrictions on refugees in the camp but also curtails and suspend autonomous socialities and spacio-temporal freedoms in refugees' daily lives' (Brankamp 2019 p. 73). Also, the camp commanders as well as district commissioners of the three districts the camps are located in Tanzania all have a former military background. President Magufuli has prioritised a securitised chain of command surrounding the camps.

The way to circumvent movement controlled by state authorities is done primarily through 'digging bribes' (Brankamp 2019 pp. 74-75). By now it is well-known that bribery is endemic in the refugee regime with UNHCR officers, NGO workers, and police collude to solicit cash for resettlement places and other benefits. Investigations have uncovered these crimes in Kenya in 2001 (OIOS 2001) and 2017 (UNHCR 2017c), Uganda (Okiror 2020), and Sudan (Hayden 2019). Though it has not received the public attention of the aforementioned countries, countless informants have described to me and other researchers (Thomson 2016) about pervasive corruption in Nyarugusu. Most of the bribery in the camps occur on small scales with petty cash. This includes paying MHA officers to secure a permit to leave the camp to conduct business or paying the police if caught outside of the camp while farming or travelling. There are more elaborate bribery systems, highlighted in Chapter 8, where monthly payments to the police allow large quantities of WFP food rations to be sold out of the camp. In *Everyday Corruption and the State*, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) take a non-normative research posture toward bribery to analyse bribes not as morally wrong, but as practises embedded in social relations and a consequence of weakened states. With this framing, one could argue that the bribes in the camp milieu either open up possibilities of business and movement not legal under Tanzanian refugee law or insulate people from the harsh legal punishment of six months of prison and forced labour. Along these lines, informants have described certain police officers who, for a fee, will transport refugees to the Burundian border or to Kasulu to purchase supplies for their businesses. The benevolent (or opportunistic) police officer shields refugees from arrest or exorbitant bribes to immigration officers at the border or other police officers in town. These services can be fleeting, however, because police officers in the camp are on rotating assignments and these services are only available for a short time until the officer is transferred to another region.

This non-normative approach to bribery was not shared by the camp residents I spoke with. Whenever I asked refugees about these payments, they often became emotive in their disdain to have to pay bribes. Refugees are particularly easy targets for bribes because 'the legal frameworks and material architectures which spatially fixate refugees in camps have at least aggravated their susceptibility to exploitation'

(Brankamp 2019 p. 75). Another way of stating this is that refugees acutely understand that their fundamental right of movement is being violated through encampment. Nearly daily, I was told that they felt wronged by not being able to leave the camp. Moreover, it was one of the biggest barriers to achieving economic self-reliance. The necessity to pay bribes through the threat of physical violence and six-month imprisonment, which exploited their need to enact mobilities out of the camp, was a severe reminder of this injustice. While a small subset of the camp population may be able to budget for bribes, which unlocks mobility and enables them to accumulate wealth, these people are the minority. For the rest, an encounter with the police outside of the camp is met with physical violence and a loss of whatever earnings they have. This loss may lead to business failure and prolonged hunger or any number of financial harms, malnutrition, or illness. In the Weberian definition of the state introduced in Chapter 1, these individuals, particularly the police, are the hands and feet of the state who hold the 'monopoly over the use of force to exercise its authority' (Milner 2009 p. 9). Therefore, violence enshrouds nearly every interaction that refugees have with the state. The police officers are the embodiment of the structural violence of encampment, which they enforce with the threat to inflict acute violence to the body. This disciplinary power cannot be ignored or minimised. The violent *modus operandi* of daily life in the camp, in addition to the severe food ration reduction, sets the backdrop for when the camp reached a boiling point in 2017. The anger felt during this period threatened to spill over due to the convergence of state violence—both real and rumoured.

### **Cash shutdown**

The manner and day-to-day timeline of the shutdown provide further insights into the vertical layers of the state's involvement in the camp, from above and below. There is the central state, where power is heavily concentrated at the top with President Magufuli. This level of the state executes incisive shutdowns of the WFP cash programme, the CRRF examined in the next chapter, as well the violent repatriations in the 1990s, which Magufuli is now threatening to repeat. The previously described state actors from below, are the personification of state violence enacted

from above. For Burundians in the camps, the cash shutdown added further psychological toll because President Magufuli's visit to Ngara was the first of many pronouncements that Burundians should return to Burundi. At the meeting, Tanzanian Home Affairs minister, Mwigulu Nchmba, said, 'the most important thing is to let the world know that there is now peace in Burundi and that the situation is back to normal. This will help to facilitate the return of all refugees.' President Nkurunziza added: 'The time to head back home is now. The country is now peaceful and safe. We now need to work hard as one and rebuild our economy' (The Citizen 2017). A discussion with Burundian elected leaders revealed their analysis of the meeting:

It is like a game Tanzania and Burundi government are playing against Burundian refugees. I don't know why repatriation started in Tanzania when it didn't start in other countries. It looks like political games they are playing on us. Maybe the Tanzania government is tired of hosting Burundian refugees. We still ask the same question, why not go to Museveni [President of Uganda] or Kagame [President of Rwanda]? It seems Magufuli is pleased by acts of Nkurunziza.

Although Magufuli and Nkurunziza advocated for voluntary returns of Burundians, due to past experiences of displacement in Tanzania, the announcements brought fears of another forced repatriation, which many of them experienced when Mtabila was violently closed in 2012. Claude, a Burundian middle-aged man explains, 'I think there will be a forced repatriation. They always start voluntarily, but by the end they use force.' This fear has been compounded with each subsequent state shutdown and exhortation to return.

Following President Magufuli's announcement at Ngara on 20 July, business seemed to proceed as usual until the cash shutdown was announced two weeks later on Friday, 4 August. I spoke with two *taptap* leaders who were elected in each zone of the camp to facilitate the cash programme and bring forward complaints about the programme to Airtel and WFP representatives. They explained that on Wednesday and Thursday in the two days before the shutdown announcement, they had received a routine training seminar from WFP about how to resolve certain technical issues and improve the programme. They were shocked to find out that the programme was dismantled the following day. The suddenness of the shutdown, as well as how the

news travelled from Dar es Salaam to Nyarugusu, bypassing the camp commandant, gives weight to the vertical nature of state power exercised on the camp. The news of the cash shutdown was primarily retold to me from Tobias, introduced earlier, which was also separately corroborated by others who were present at the meetings. The following is his recounting of events, which I lightly edited for clarity:

[Tobias recalling the events to me]: When info came to us it came from the manager of the WFP Kasulu office, he came with four partners in the office and gave the following info, and I quote:

[WFP head of office, recalled by Tobias]: 'I have come with this info and tell this to your community. The day before yesterday [Thursday] I received news from my superior in Dar. My superior was told by MHA that from now, [the cash programme] has been stopped and this information will be given to refugees. I have no further explanation to supply this information as it is. This was decided from MHA in Dar.'

[Tobias]: 'Thank you for this information but your information is like a thorn. As a leader of the camp, we are not more intelligent than our community. Giving this information to the community and people will be either making fun of us, think we took a bribe, or others will think we are not doing a good job. You need to prepare to get this [information] to our community. Why didn't this come from the MHA camp commandant? In order to avoid bad things to happen here, you need to get the commandant. We are not receiving this information without the commandant.'

Tobias was surprised to receive such difficult news of the shutdown from WFP officers instead of the camp commandant and the state directly. A couple of hours later, the camp commandant came with four colleagues, as well as representatives from UNHCR, three WFP officers, and other NGO representatives. According to Tobias, when the camp commandant arrived, he seemed confused about what was going on. It soon became clear that he was not involved in the shutdown decision, but that it came from MHA in Dar es Salaam, and perhaps from President Magufuli himself:

[Camp commandant, recalled by Tobias]: 'I thank you [Tobias] for not accepting this information before I arrived. I just learned this now. As a government officer, I was supposed to receive the news first.'

[Tobias]: 'I'm sorry commandant, I am unable to pass this to my community. We respect your orders. You need to bring [the news] to the camp in order to receive blame from the community. I ask you to deliver it yourself.'

The commandant asked Tobias again to disseminate the information to the refugee camp.

[Tobias to the camp commandant]: 'The reason we don't get along with MHA is because of sudden news like this. I am telling you this because you are a newcomer in the camp. I accept to bring this news to the community, but I first have concerns: there are food reductions, the cash cut, and healthcare is not maintained, there is not enough water, and education is decreasing. What do you think of us? *Are you trying to kill us?*'

The information was later disbursed across the camp through the elected zone and village leaders. People received the news with anguish. One of the *taptap* leaders shared these sentiments to me:

We refugees have been dying because we can't vary our diet. We were happy with this cash transfer programme. Now again they end the programme. They bring back the situation, the death of our people in the camp. We are their business in the camp and internationally they benefit from us, but don't take care of us. It's like Tanzanians are taking us as a business. It's worse because Tanzanians don't like us. In Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, they give cash. Internationally, refugees' lives should be improved, here they are going against us. We had already improved [with cash transfers] and again we go back to the old style of life. We better go back to our country if Tanzania wants us to die. If Tanzania wants us to die, they better send us back to our country.

It is important to note that the informant here widens the scope of his anger. He is not only upset with the Tanzanian state, but with all Tanzanians that he feels exploited and oppressed by, which I will return to in the conclusion of this chapter. After giving the quote above, the same individual described to me the food boycott he was helping to organise in response to the ration reductions and cash shutdown.

### **Food strike**

In all the time I spent researching in the camp, a couple of weeks after the announcement of the cash shutdown were the tensest by far. I was accustomed to being stared at, harmlessly called *mzungu*, or hearing a reference to Donald Trump or American pop culture. While this got old to me, I never felt threatened or endangered. However, this period was the first time when I was yelled at by men in the camp. On a few occasions during this time, while walking with research assistants

to meet at informants' households, I would get derided angrily as to why I was not doing more to get food aid to the camps or to stop the government shutdowns. If the hecklers were near me, I would calmly explain my powerlessness to change anything and walk away. The cash shutdown, compounded by ration cuts, seemed to cross a line beyond which camp residents were willing to endure quietly. It triggered a deep, collective outrage, which became channelled into a planned protest. This section recalls these plans, which reveals camp residents' perceptions of the state as well as their pragmatic views of what form of dissent they deemed possible.

The day after the announcement of the cash shutdown, I met with leaders and organisers planning to put the anger into action through a food strike. They planned to convince as many households as possible boycott the next WFP food distribution. To disseminate this call to action, they planned to pass the word to elected zone and village leaders to spread the information to all the households therein. 'We want our voices to be heard by the international agencies,' proclaimed the zone leader. A different zone leader present at our meeting echoed the sentiment: 'Our goal is to be heard at the international level. Funding is coming from the international community but stopping at Tanzanians who are stopping [aid] for us. Money is being received in different camps, but Tanzanians are acting like they want to kill us.' I found it curious that although they felt most wronged by the state particularly, and Tanzanians generally—who they felt were stopping their aid—their primary audience was international actors somewhere 'above' and 'far away' from the realities of the camp. Clara Lecadet (2016), analysing a protest from Togolese refugees in Benin, notes similar behaviour: 'These demonstrations may seem paradoxical' she posits, 'however, as they are at one and the same time contesting the power of the UNHCR and calling for the strengthening of aid [...] In this sense, they are not revolutionary protests, but a call for a better dialogue between representatives of the refugees and the UNHCR authorities within camps.' (p. 192).

I think something else was going on here as well. The leaders did not describe a desire to negotiate or communicate with humanitarians. Rather, they were directing their ire to international actors because it was safer to do so. I asked some of the organisers of the protests if they planned to accompany the food strikes with public

demonstrations as well. One of the leaders replied, 'no, we will make passive protests by not showing up to receive the food. If we make big noises, then we know what the government will do. The Tanzanians will kill us.' This shows the totalising power of shutdown politics. I have gone to lengths in this chapter to highlight the violent nature of the state in the camps. Moreover, Chapter 2 gives a deeper history of shutdown politics in Tanzania. Refugees are keenly aware of this violent past as they have often recalled shutdowns of the past to me, such as what happened at Mtabila. They also live in the violent present and navigate around it daily. They wanted an outlet to voice their hunger plights yet knew any public action would be seen as a threat to the state. Alternatively, an appeal to the international community is not a confrontation with a violent state, but they calculated it to be their best chance to marginally improve their material conditions. This caution did not end up mattering in the end, as the Tanzanian state swiftly shut down the planned strike.

Nyarugusu residents have had a recent history of protests that have brought marginal gains at best, but more frequently have ended in losses. A similar food strike occurred in 2016 but ended when WFP negligibly increased some of the maize flour as part of the food baskets. In 2014, Congolese healthcare workers at the Red Cross, the main healthcare providers in Nyarugusu, tried to strike for better pay. In response, they were all fired and replaced by local Tanzanians. In 2015, teachers were not paid the amount they felt entitled to proctor national school exams. They claimed the international NGO which was contracted to oversee education in the camp and the Congolese state education employees responsible for paying for the exams had taken the money. The teachers appealed to UNHCR in the camp, wrote to the NGO's headquarters in New York, as well as their offices in Dar es Salaam and to the Congolese Ministry of Education in Kalemie. In the end, the leaders of the protest were fired and replaced. Protest in the camp has a history of being promptly shut down.

Over the same weekend that I interviewed the boycott organisers, the situation became more heated. Anonymous posters were being installed around the camp in prominent places such as notice boards and aid distribution points. These posters included a threat that if any refugee does not take part in the food strike and shows up to WFP food distributions they will be stoned to death. Lacadet (2016) also notes

that as protests continue and demands are not met, radical elements in the camp may rise to the fore. For Beninese camps, this culminated in the kidnapping of a UNHCR representative. This escalation led to an unintentional ricochet against the protest movement. The kidnapping was followed by the withdrawal of UNHCR from the camp and a collapse of their protest goals. In Nyarugusu, this too was a beginning of the end of the protests though they did not yet know it at the time. The Tanzanian police promptly removed the warnings of violence, but it already became the talk of the entire camp. The following weekend on Friday, 11 August, elected leaders, as well as church pastors, were summoned by MHA to the youth centre for a meeting that was said to take six hours. According to a leader at this meeting, 'the government gave a decision. If you decide to stone people receiving food, we as the government are prepared to respond against this decision. Tell people to prepare to receive food.' Up to this point, there had not yet been a food ration distribution and it was unclear how effective the hunger strike mobilisation would be, or how the state would respond. However, that Friday night there was violent robbery, which threatened further destabilisation in the camp.

### **A violent interlude**

In the middle of the night on Friday 11, August, in Zone 3 on the Congolese side of the camp, near the Tanzanian Red Cross Hospital, an unidentified car arrived with men carrying AK-47 assault rifles. They came to the house of a prominent businessman and robbed him of all the money in his house as well as his refugee ID and *taptap* card. Tobias recalls the events of that night:

We all heard gunshots coming from Zone 3. I called the second in command of the police and said, 'I heard bullets and don't know what's going on. The soldiers are not in the area, send soldiers!' I called the first commandant of the police, he said he is preparing soldiers. The incident continued for 31 minutes. I was hearing gunshots all the way from Zone 4 without any police arriving. Refugees started coming out of their houses to go to the incident. People started picking up bullets. The police came and called me. The bullets had the mark of the Government of Tanzania on them. When the police came, the first thing they did was to look for the bullets. That was the conflict. When this occurred, refugees asked, 'where have you been? You were waiting!'

The police then started shooting in the air and firing teargas, which dispersed the crowd, but not before a different elected leader collected three boxes of bullets. Tobias went on to explain:

The leader told me, 'I am being hunted by the police. The police are telling me that I must give back all the bullets my residents picked up.' The second in command of the police told me, 'dear leader, I am asking the leader to bring the boxes of bullets otherwise something bad will happen.' [The zone leader] is lacking peace and is not sleeping at home.

The leader was eventually apprehended by the police and was freed two days later. After that night, every person I spoke with, Congolese or Burundian, man or woman, was convinced that the police had carried out the attack. They explained that this was the reason that they did not arrive on the scene during the incident, despite the police station being mere minutes away. Some said that they heard the perpetrators speak that night and claimed they had Tanzanian, rather than Congolese Swahili dialects. Others said that the reason this certain individual was targeted was because the day he was robbed he went to Kasulu and withdrew cash, and at the incident, the attackers were demanding how much he withdrew from the bank in Kasulu. This suggested that, as gatekeepers, the police officers were aware he went to the bank that day. Similar claims were made about armed attacks that occurred in 2014 as well. I heard many of these similar accusations made toward the police and MHA. One included an occurrence in 2016 where a police officer asked a motorcycle taxi to take him to a location in the camp. The police then allegedly demanded to drive himself and struck and killed a woman on the road. This officer was then stationed at another location away from the camp, and the motorcycle owner was arrested and pinned with being responsible for the death. Another story was told of the camp commandant hitting a refugee child with his vehicle and seriously hospitalising him. The person telling me about this said: 'there will be no actions taken against him because to Tanzanians, killing a refugee child is like killing a goat or a chicken'.

Turner (2004) identifies that rumours and conspiracy theories are rife in the Tanzanian camp setting. He explains, 'I do not have intentions of quantifying the rumours but simply of interpreting them as interpretative schemes that were used in the camp and analysing them in relation to the camp context' (p. 240). Like Turner,

the point of retelling this interlude is not to participate in an investigation into the identity of the attackers, but rather to gain deeper anthropological insights into how refugees experience the violence of encampment. While I do not know, nor did I investigate the identity of the assailants, it should be no surprise that it is automatically concluded by camp residents that the police were to blame. An armed robbery is jarring and disorienting in any society, let alone in the liminality of impending repatriation, ration cuts, and cash shutdowns. The rumours and conspiracies attributing the Tanzanian state are acts of sense-making in a deeply uncertain and information starved camp context.

### **The state response: 'You will see how stones compare to guns'**

The sense of rage in the camp at this time was palpable. In response, the camp commandant called a meeting to address all camp residents, which I attended at the back of the crowd. The camp commandant arrived with truckloads of police officers as well as elected refugee representatives and UNHCR officers. The commandant began by saying, 'security is collective. It is the responsibility of everybody to maintain peace and security in the camp.' He quickly moved to place the blame for the environment on refugees and announced new security measures in the camp: 'Being hungry doesn't mean you can cause problems for others. Nobody is forcing you to live in Tanzania.' He followed this by announcing a nightly curfew at 7 pm. He asserted that records will be kept of anybody demonstrating or protesting and they will be denied resettlement to the United States, Canada, or Europe. Additionally, he warned anybody who was part of the food strike and did not collect their WFP rations would be taken off the WFP registry and never be allowed to receive rations again. Finally, he banned all meetings in the camp of national or ethnic leaders of any kind. He ended his speech more ominously in reference to the threats of stoning for those who go to collect their WFP rations: 'you will see how stones compare to guns'.

The camp commandant's speech was followed by a white, European UNHCR officer who exhorted the audience that Tanzania has given them an 'open-door' that they should be grateful for. He pleaded with the audience to not 'wear out your welcome' by engaging in protests and civil disobedience. Tobias pointed out UNHCR's

tacit approval of the government's stance: 'people were surprised that the white guy with UNHCR sided with the government and not with refugees.' I later interviewed the same UNHCR officer at his Kasulu office. We talked about many things, but what I found most interesting was his musings on nation-states while we were discussing what occurred at Mtabila in 2012 and the prospects of it repeating. He said, '[The closure of Mtabila] wasn't how UNHCR wanted it to happen, but in the end, it's the decision of the government. They are still nation-states with agreements between two countries. The government wants to be seen as upholding its own laws. There is the nation-state logic: protect your citizens and territory. There is humanitarian logic: uphold universal human rights.' What he failed to see was that his own presence and comments at the aforementioned camp meeting were symbolic of the interconnected complicity of the humanitarian government's role in the violence of encampment, despite the different guiding logics.

Though the story of this chapter is of the role of the state and how it is perceived by refugees in Nyarugusu, humanitarian actors must be included in the narrative. Adam Branch (2009) calls this the 'humanitarianism-violence complex'. Branch's work focuses on northern Uganda, where the state forcibly encamped all rural, mostly Acholi people, during the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency. He argues that state violence through forced encampment is dependent on the administration of international humanitarian aid, which in turn legitimises state violence. Concurrently, international aid is dependent on the enforcement of encampment. There is a shared disciplinary nature to the state and humanitarians:

The collaboration between humanitarianism and state violence stems from the fact that both are fundamentally characterised by the same exigency: a need to contain people and strip them of their political relations and organisation, whether for the sake of efficient aid delivery or political repression. I argue that both humanitarianism and state violence reduce camp populations to the status of de-politicised, helpless victims, because each *needs* camp populations to be de-politicised, helpless victims if each is going to be able to carry out its own agenda (p. 478).

The mutual dependency and entanglements do not end there, however. In Tanzania, UNHCR provides funding and materials such as buildings and vehicles for police personnel in the camp (Rutinwa 2005 pp. 29-30), as well as the Refugee Services Department of MHA (Betts 2013 p. 134) Furthermore, UNHCR funds and cooperates with *sungusungu* or refugee community police and security agents that accompany and report to Tanzanian police within the camp. In all of these examples



Figure 10: Tweet showing entanglements of funding between Tanzanian police and UNHCR. Source: Khalif 2019.

of trifurcation, it is difficult to discern where the state begins and ends. This makes engaging with Foucault and others' work on governmentality helpful to understand the rhizomes of humanitarian governance in the trifurcated state discussed in Chapter 1.

Following the rally, no protests or boycotts materialised in Nyarugusu. Around the same time, there were demonstrations in nearby Nduta camp over food reductions but these were violently shut down by police with teargas and arrests. To this day, the cash programme has not been reinstated by WFP. This case is consistent with how the state under President Magufuli pre-empted protest and dissent; his shutdown politics applies to all of Tanzania, not just the camps. For example, US-based Tanzanian activist, Mange Kimambi, called for a country-wide protest on 26 April 2018, the anniversary of when mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar islands officially unified to form modern Tanzania. The Tanzanian state's response was to display and patrol heavily armed police in large towns and cities all over the country and to arrest CHADEMA opposition party members. The national police chief, Gilles Muroto warned the would-be protesters the day before by saying: 'Those who plan to demonstrate tomorrow will seriously suffer [...] they will be beaten like stray dogs' (Ng'wanakilala 2018).



*Figure 11: Camp-wide meeting organised by camp commandant, which shut down protests. Photo blurry because hiding behind a tree to avoid detection by the police. Credit: Boeyink 2017*

## **Refugees and protest**

Refugees around the world have utilised many different tactics for protest. These have included more benign acts such as public writing campaigns and online social media activity, to acts of civil disobedience such as disrupting headcounts and

registrations, sit-ins, barricading roads, or in the case of Nyarugusu, food boycotts. Dissent can also escalate to more violent acts such as food riots or even the kidnapping of UNHCR representatives. Refugee protests have also been analysed in refugee camps in Ghana (Holzer 2012, 2016), Guinea, Sierra Leone, Kenya, (Agier 2011), Uganda (Ilcan 2018), Namibia (Ilcan 2014), Sudan (Karadawi 1999), Mexico (Stepputat 1994), and undoubtedly other countries. Additionally, cities have been sites of refugee struggles to improve their conditions. These sites include Luanda, Angola (Agier 2011); Cairo, Egypt (Grabska 2006; Moulin and Nyers 2007); and Palestinian refugees resettled in Brasilia, Brazil (Moulin 2012). Most recently, hundreds of refugees in Pretoria, South Africa camped in front of UNHCR's offices for two months demanding to be resettled to new countries due to xenophobic violence. The protests were eventually dispersed by the police. 183 were charged and appeared in court, and 224 women, 169 children, and seven men were detained (Sunday Times 2019). Moreover, just two months later in January 2020, the South African government passed a law that allows asylum status to be stripped of political activity related to home countries, which critics fear is a violation of the freedom of speech and expression (Anna 2020).

In analysing the research on refugee protests, it is striking to me how repercussions for disobedience is a theme that is repeated in nearly all of the aforementioned situations. From the events cited above, apart from Guatemalan refugees, who were successful in agitating against the conditions of their repatriation from Mexico (Stepputat 1994), nearly all refugee protest movements ended in more deleterious repercussions from the host states than the conditions that they were initially protesting. This was made evident by the sit-ins in Pretoria and the crackdown and arrests that followed. Participants of refugee collective action are often detained, arrested, or deported. In the case of Liberians in Ghana who were requesting resettlement abroad and additional money for repatriation and reintegration, they overstepped their demands and their agitations prompted their own hostile repatriation (Holzer 2012).

Departing from the protests mentioned above, those who were planning the boycott in Nyarugusu heard the threats by the camp commandant and filtered this

through their intimate knowledge of the history of the Tanzanian state's heavy-handed responses to refugees. In the end, they decided against furthering their protests and potentially making their plights worse. This cost-benefit analysis and choice, though not glamorous, was in my view, an agential and prudent act to stand down, even if it maintains the status quo. Moulin (2012) summarises the bind that refugees are ensnared in. If refugees protest their lack of rights they will be seen by the state and humanitarian government as 'ungrateful subjects': 'either they may exercise liberty, or they may be included in the protective humanitarian scaffold. This means that, in order to be protected, refugees are expected to accept severe restrictions on their freedoms; if refugees want to be free, they can no longer be protected as refugees' (p. 55). Residents of Nyarugusu are stuck in the purgatory of the previous sentence. They neither accepted their severe restrictions and intended to protest for more freedoms, nor were they fully afforded protection when they backed down from their claims. As the restrictions and shutdowns are mounting, their supposed protection is eroding and life in the camp is becoming untenable.

## **Refugees and rumours**

In the increasing precariousness of the camp, which is pierced with violent interludes and where there no recourse for refugees to voice their injustices, Nyarugusu is a fertile incubator for speculation and hearsay to give meaning to suffering and uncertainty. Rumours, gossip, and conspiracy, like protests, have offered an intriguing point of departure for scholars of the camp because they unveil truths about how refugees experience encampment from below. Beyond encampment, rumours have also been a discursive political force throughout Burundi's emerging post-colonial history (Russel 2019) and in more recent politics in Burundi and its diaspora (Turner 2007). A recent book chapter from Victoria Jack (2018), reviews research on rumours in refugee situations in Mexico, Malawi, Nepal, India, Djibouti, and Kenya, as well as her research from camps in Thailand. In conversation with other scholars, she argues, 'refugees formulate and share rumours as a way of commandeering a platform for meaningful voice in environments where

such a platform is otherwise absent'. She argues that the top-down structure of humanitarian organisations is largely to blame for poorly disseminating communications throughout camps. In Nyarugusu, UNHCR operatives stood by MHA's side as they made threats of retaliation for protest. After the camp attack, UNHCR refused to engage with the rumours of the attacks so as to appease the state. The silence of the humanitarians and the shutdown impulse of the state continued to fuel rumours.

Turner (2004) one of the first scholars to engage with rumours as a mode of analysis in camps, explains: 'rumours provide an overwhelming source of knowledge about the ways in which people react to dramatic change and how they attempt to interpret the global through the local and vice versa' (p. 238). His examples are more colourfully elaborate and pertain to perceptions of far-off regional and international actors including global plots against Hutus, and conspiracies relating to Monica Lewinsky and Bill Clinton. These global actors, according to Turner, are perceived to be more accessible to refugees due to Tanzania's effective exclusion to the rest of the country (p. 246). He draws from anthropologist, Allen Feldman (2000), who makes the case that rumours flourish in times of war and violent transitions: 'rumour has a tendency to impute too much meaning into events, in the sense that causes are found (created) even in situations where there is no cause or meaning to be found, as is often the case with violent events' (p. 239). Feldman (2000) elaborates further:

By turning apparently once-stable social structure into provisional and contingent narrative, rumor becomes the production of a counter society. The social production of rumor is the social production of collective experience in the absence of wide-scale social credibility. Rumor emerges from, and accelerates, the collapse of official organs of institutional depiction, memory, and information dissemination. Rumor mills ironically counterconstruct society as a discrete and objectifiable entity through the process of documenting its fracturing (p. 23).

In other words, using Nyarugusu as an example, as the society in the camp is breaking down due to food ration cuts, government shutdowns, and violent robberies, rumours emerge in this void to make sense of the painful anomie. However, as rumours proliferate, they simultaneously contributing to the breakdown of truth and knowability, and further erode trust between refugees and the Tanzanian state. This may actually be an understatement. Beyond a lack of trust, there is a deep fear of state actors.

Recalling the attacks, my Burundian research assistant told me, 'people have fear now because of that attack. It shows that we are not protected. We are killed by those who should protect us.'

Turner's (2004) example points to far-off 'big nations' to make sense of the present. There are many similar rumours in Tanzanian camps of Burundian agents for the ruling party in Burundi who have infiltrated the camps as spies to surveil opponents and cause instability in the camps. These conspiracies have come up in the research of other encampment situations as well (Lecadet 2016 pp. 198-199). However, the case in Nyarugusu is closer to the ground of the camp's localised state actors rather than 'big nations' afar. The conspiracies of police as armed robbers are natural conclusions to be drawn from camp residents when there is a constant, low resonance of structural violence through hunger and poverty from cash and market shutdowns, food reductions, and violent containment methods. This becomes compounded by occasional acute moments of violence experienced from police beatings outside of the camp and armed robberies within. Similar violent interludes have spread rumours in different encampment contexts. Jack (2018) recalls a sudden, violent event in Ban Mae Surin, a Thai camp housing Burmese refugees. There was a large fire that killed 37 camp residents and left 65% of residents homeless. This, in conjunction with reduced humanitarian services, led to rampant rumours that the Thai authorities intentionally started the fire for refugees to return. These rumours and conspiracies are indicators of refugees' deep resentment not only to the 'vertical' Tanzanian state actors but of the 'horizontal' encompassment of all Tanzanians.

## **Conclusion**

Sadly, as I was finishing the edits to this chapter, I received a WhatsApp message from one of my research assistants that around 9 pm on 26 January 2020 that there was another attack. In Zone 8, on the Burundian side of the camp, there was an armed robbery under similar circumstances to what I described happened in 2017. The difference with this attack was that four refugees were shot. One of the four was killed, and the other three were severely wounded and hospitalised. A small boy

was similarly shot in November 2019. As before, neighbours said they recognised the police assailants as Tanzanian police. This time the rumours were that this was planned by the state from above to further impel Burundian refugees to leave Tanzania. With the increased insecurity in the camp, as Lecadet (2016) noted, this is evidence that radicalising elements in Nyarugusu are being pushed too far. My research assistant explains, 'refugees are very angry. When [the attackers] come back to steal, [refugees] will use sticks and stones to try to apprehend one to prove it is the police.' My fear is that like other heightened protests among refugees around the world, in addition to the Tanzanian state's propensity for crackdowns, that these escalations will see severe and lasting backlashes toward the whole refugee population and may spark a violent repeat of Mtabila's closure.

The turbulent last few years in the camps is not a recent aberration. Tanzania has a long history of shutting down refugees' rights through forced repatriations, roundups of non-camp residents, and a general clamping down of refugee mobilities. Since 2015, the Tanzanian state has enacted a series of refugee shutdowns with the goal of stemming new refugee arrivals or to encourage repatriations, which is consistent with migration and refugee policy lineages since colonialism. These include revoking *prima facie* status for Burundians, blocking asylum cases at the borders, and closing key refugee markets. All of these shutdowns portend to the ultimate shut down by the state of their right to exist in Tanzania, as was the case of Mtabila's violent closure in 2012. The cash transfer shutdown was yet another iteration of these sudden closures. Shutdown politics is not exclusive to Tanzania, however. Elsewhere I analyse the Kenyan state's 'collective violence' toward Somali refugees with the shutdown of remittance companies and other businesses that Somalis in Kenya depend on. The xenophobic nature of this shutdown is consistent with attitudes toward Somalis which have been incubated since colonial rule (Boeyink 2017).

Keeping in mind the post-structural and Foucauldian understanding of the trifurcated state from Chapter 1, I speak specifically with Ferguson and Gupta's (2002) 'spatialization of the state' using metaphors of 'verticality' and 'encompassment'. These conceptualisations help analyse these sudden, and at times violent, actions as coming from above at the national level of Dar es Salaam. 'Verticality' refers to the

central and pervasive idea of the state as an institution somehow 'above' civil society, community, and family. Thus, state planning is inherently "top down" and state actions are efforts to manipulate and plan "from above" (p. 982). This was made clear with how news of the cash shutdown reached the camp. The MHA camp commandant and police, the state agents at the interface of the camp, were bypassed with the delivery of the news of the shutdown. The commandant heard the news after refugee leaders did. In Chapter 6, I explore a similar rapid shutdown of the CRRF coming from President Magufuli, which left UNHCR officers and diplomats stunned. However, the cash shutdown was markedly different from other refugee shutdowns because it occurred during a time of hunger and resentment from food ration cuts that threatened widespread protests from camp residents. There is an additional space of verticality involved as well. The food strike was planned to bypass the verticality of the national space to reach the transnational level of the 'international community' to hear their pleas and restore full funding of aid. I contend that rather than confronting a violent host state, it was a strategic and safer choice to instead appeal to the humanitarian government, which projects a 'humanitarian logic: [to] uphold universal human rights.' The UNHCR representative's implicit support at the camp-wide meeting was therefore seen by refugees as a betrayal of the supposed benevolent tier of the trifurcated state; a deathblow for the protest movement. This particular event was symbolic of the entangled nature and mutually reinforcing positions of the state and humanitarian government in the trifurcated formulations of the state.

Once again, the Tanzanian state managed to shutdown camp dissent, which is the go-to action under President Magufuli. The shutdown of the would-be refugee protests did not come from above, but rather at the local space of the camp from below through MHA and police state intermediaries. We can filter refugees' interactions with the state through Hansen and Stepputat's (2001) 'idea of the state': 'that the study of the state and its practises must discern and explore these different languages [of stateness], their localized meanings, genealogies, and trajectories as they appear couched in mythologies of power, as practical, often nonpolitical routines or as violent impositions' (p. 5). Forced migration scholars remark on the absence of the state through 'abdication' of asylum responsibilities and services (Milner 2009), which

results in a new 'surrogate state' (Slaughter and Crisp 2009; Kagan 2011; Deardorff Miller 2017). I argue instead that the Tanzanian state is an ever-present force through the threat of shutdowns from above, to the 'nonpolitical routines' and 'violent impositions' when police and MHA collect rents through bribe. These actions impose encampment bureaucracies that limit mobility and social life and selectively assault and imprison individuals who violate these disciplining regulations. Even where the state actors are most absent—service provision provided by the humanitarian government—the idea of the state is at the front of everyone's minds. Chapter 6 makes this point as all refugee livelihood programming is prohibited from using cash-based interventions and must be approved by MHA. The idea of the state in the camp is always violent, whether from above or below. This is true not only in Tanzania, but in any encampment setting because force will always be necessary to execute containment (Branch 2009). Structural violence is also the consequence of shutdown politics because the camp environment flattens class and severely curtails possibilities for self-reliance, which is the subject of the next chapter.

In this chapter, I analyse the persistence of rumours in the camp to further diagnose refugees' ideas of the violent state. However, when refugees talk about the violence that they experience through encampment, they cast a wider net for the causes of their injustices. They speak in universalised tones of Tanzanian society as a whole as the sources of their suffering. At best, they see Tanzanians as indifferent to their rights and situation. At worst, they see Tanzanians as active enforcers or beneficiaries from their encampment. This appears in some of the frustrated quotes recalled from above: 'It's like Tanzanians are taking us as a business. It's worse because Tanzanians don't like us'; 'We don't know if the situation is caused by humanitarian organisations or by Tanzanians. We don't know'; 'Funding is coming from the international community but stopping at Tanzanians who are stopping [aid] for us. Money is being received in different camps, but Tanzanians are acting like they want to kill us.'

I constantly heard from refugees that they believed the international community wanted to help them, but Tanzanians were somehow subverting aid. This is why Tobias felt so hurt that the European UNHCR officer stood complicit next to the camp

commandant. When refugees talk about transnational organisations such as UNHCR on the ground or from below, they typically differentiate Tanzanian national and international staff (known in Swahili as *mzungu*, singular, or *wazungu*, plural). Often refugees see international staff as more likely to be ‘on their side’, which is similarly described by Thomson (2012) and Malkki’s (1995a) work in Tanzania. Ferguson and Gupta’s (2002) second metaphor of the state, ‘encompassment’, is a helpful tool to understand this phenomenon:

Here the state (conceptually fused with the nation) is located within an ever widening series of circles that begins with family and local community and ends with the system of nation-states. This is a profoundly consequential understanding of scale, one in which the locality is encompassed by the region, the region by the nation-state, and the nation-state by the international community (p. 982).

The majority of Nyarugusu residents, both Congolese and Burundians, have spent 10 to 20 years under the generalised violence of the camp. At times there have been acutely violent episodes with Tanzanians in surrounding villages as I describe above. Encompassment is the process where refugees perceive that Tanzanians in general, whether state officials, NGO workers, local host community members, or unknown people in Tanzanian regions afar, are culpable for their oppression felt in the camp. In this sense, for many camp residents, it is not merely the Tanzanian state making life increasingly difficult for them, but there is a foundational encompassment of the nation of Tanzania or *Tanzanianness* that is making them suffer. This has serious implications as to the viability of local integration for camps in Tanzania or anywhere. I argue in Chapters 7 and 8 that deep levels of de facto economic integration have long been occurring. However, the structural violence of the camp, enforced and compounded by the ‘humanitarianism-violence complex’ (Branch 2009) and ‘occupied assemblages’ (Brankamp 2019), instils a deep-seated resentment toward the host state and population as a whole, which can be diagnosed through the analysis of rumours. This calls into question the possibility of social integration, where such bitterness toward the host society exists.

# Chapter 5:

## Class in camps or the camped class?

The making and reshaping of socio-economic inequalities in Tanzanian refugee camps



Figure 12: Fashion business at the Common Market. Credit: Boeyink 2017.

## Introduction<sup>3</sup>

At the scales at the international, national, and camp level, Esperance was poor in her native Burundi and remained poor when I met her in Nyarugusu in 2017. Her neighbour, Augustin, fled to Tanzania with the equivalent of TZS 2.7 million (USD 1,173.73); he soon started a fish-selling business that was thriving until the camp economy collapsed in July 2018, when the government shut down the main market. A few blocks away, Christophe was running a successful business selling clothing and fabrics between Tanzania and Uganda; this was until he and his family had to go into hiding because of death threats due to family ties with a high-ranking Burundian security official. At the other end of the camp, meet Dalia, a Congolese woman who was found to be trustworthy by an acquaintance who provided her with capital and networks to buy and sell WFP rations. The business made her very wealthy, in camp terms, and she was recently resettled to Canada.

While there are economic outliers in the camp such as Dalia, the majority look more like Esperance, or Viola, who was featured in the Introduction. These, and countless other stories, illustrate how economic status in protracted refugee situations can be both fluid and stubbornly calcified over time. Socio-economic class, whether approached in Weber's sense of life chances (Savage 2002) or in Bourdieu's sense of being related to the conditions of existence (Bourdieu 1986), matters for livelihoods but also long-term displacement. Spatial and social mobility are often interconnected as pointed out by Faist (2013). Yet, the refugee studies literature has not engaged much with the idea that displaced people are marked by class (Van Hear 2004, 2014; Omata 2017; Turner 2015). The present chapter provides insights into the relevance

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<sup>3</sup> This chapter is based on a co-authored paper with Jean Benoît Falisse for a workshop organized by the Max Planck Institute entitled, 'Forced Migration, Exclusion, and Social Class', which took place 23 and 24 May 2019 in Halle (Saale), Germany. This workshop prompted us to think about whether class is an apt explanation for social stratification in Nyarugusu camp. Our most recent draft, which was submitted to the *Journal of Refugee Studies* on 9 March 2020 and we are currently awaiting a reply. This latest version located in the Appendix of the thesis. This chapter contains edits of that draft, such as removing background information already presented, in an attempt to best fit the flow of the thesis. In addition to the edits of the original draft to fit this thesis, Boeyink drafted the first version of this article (at the exception of the sections on class in Burundi and DR Congo, some elements of the methodology, and the quantitative analysis, which was done primarily by Falisse). The most recent draft was then reviewed jointly by the two authors. The original report for UNHCR that this is also partially based on can be found at Masabo et al. (2018).

of the concept of class for the study of encamped life over time. Moreover, I position this exploration of the shaping and reshaping of socio-economic positioning in refugee camps within the broader thrust of the thesis exploring the trifurcated coloniality of encampment and mobility manipulation in Tanzania.

The previous chapter introduced the shutdown politics in a time of severely reduced food rations in Tanzanian refugee camps. The inability for refugees to achieve economic self-reliance through humanitarian interventions (which I look at more closely in the next chapter) is being weaponised by the state to make economic conditions in the camp unbearable to the point that refugees will feel there is no better option than to leave the country. Building on the previous chapters, this chapter zooms in to explore the material effects on households that the recent shutdown era has had on camp residents and how they are withstanding these shocks. The evidence in this chapter demonstrates that the state's violent actions are having its desired effect and camp residents are planning to leave or are already doing so. Drawing this chapter into the broader colonial comparisons made throughout the thesis, I argue that the state is implementing manipulations of peoples' mobilities in a reverse fashion than past colonial administrators. The colonial state-imposed taxes in rural areas to impel African subjects to markets and labour reserves at plantations and factories near ports and cities. The current Tanzanian state is assaulting refugee markets and livelihoods in order to pressure and move camp residents in the opposite direction and out of the country.

Using qualitative and quantitative<sup>4</sup> methods, this chapter examines wealth, class, and mobilities of nearly three years in Nyarugusu, which was beset by food ration reductions, cash interventions and market shutdowns by the government. While people's position in society or socio-economic class proves useful to understand the journeys and destination of those who are forcibly displaced (Kleist 2010; Van Hear 2014), the notion of class trickier in refugee camps. The costs to flee, particularly for

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<sup>4</sup> Although the dataset from financial diaries is too small to be representative of the camp population, this is augmented with data coming from the comprehensive Community Household and Surveillance survey (CHS) organized by WFP and its partners in the camps in 2016, 2017, and 2018. It comes with its own limitations there is not access to the raw data and the survey was directly implemented by an aid agency (which heightens the likelihood of socially acceptable but inaccurate answers). These data constraints are supplemented by qualitative interviews and ethnographic observations in the camp.

those already poor in their countries of origin, initially causes a 'flattening' of classes. I argue that life in refugee camps often further prevents upward social mobility. There are different levels of wealth inside the refugee camps of Tanzania, which include 'ultra-poor', 'poor', and 'non-poor' households. These strata correlate with measures of social capital, however, such 'classes' appear fragile — they often do not calcify over time and there is little class consciousness, which is central to Marxist class theory. In the 'non-poor' category there are the beginnings of an elite class such as incentive workers and WFP resale traders who are accumulating social and cultural capital beyond material wealth and occupy positions of authority in camp politics.

The Tanzanian government's strict encampment policy and recent assaults on the space of asylum, in conjunction with ration cuts, have created shocks that repeatedly shake up the social order and force many to struggle in hunger and some to even repatriate prematurely and reluctantly. Only a few have weathered these events through mobilising their higher socioeconomic status. This has often meant leaving the camp for a new exile—when still having enough capital to do so. The core argument of the paper is developed over three sections: two relatively brief sections on class in the countries of origin of the refugees and class during flight, and a more comprehensive section on class in refugee camps. The latter section is divided into four subsections: (1) I discuss three possible socio-economic stratifications in Nyarugusu. Next, I analyse the way such stratifications are shaped by and interact with (2) livelihoods and economic activities, (3) government and humanitarian interventions, (4) and finally spatial mobility.

## **Refugees and class: Theoretical and empirical considerations**

Social theorist Zygmunt Bauman (1998) asserts that postmodern life is marked by mobility, and globalization makes wanderers of all. How one wanders to Bauman, is a markedly classed affair, dividing the world into 'tourists' and 'vagabonds': 'the tourists travel because *they want to*; the vagabonds because *they have no other bearable choice*' (p. 93). In the refugee camp milieu of Dadaab in Kenya, Hyndman (2000) notes a three-tiered mobility hierarchy:

Supracitizens, citizens, and sub-citizens have differential access to mobility and to the power relations that shape the geography of refugee camps. Refugee sub citizens have forcibly migrated across borders to safety and sustenance. International supracitizens have flown across borders to well-remunerated jobs carried out in often harsh conditions. Kenyan citizens find work where refugees and relief agencies have moved in (p.113).

The categorisations above are overly simplistic, but both key on class as a capability to move, or in the case of forced migration, to flee. Van Hear (2004) utilises Bourdieusian theory of class to demonstrate that in conflict contexts it requires economic, cultural, human, and social capital just to flee the country of origin and to navigate increasingly restrictive international migration regimes. Brun (2005) furthers this analysis to include, 'how—depending on intersecting categories of gender, ethnicity, and class—local actors act differently, and are differently situated, in the power relations of the local/global fields of war and displacement' (p. 58). In reflecting on his earlier work on class and migration, Van Hear (2014) notes that migration studies use class theory to consider, 'migration *outcomes* in host or destination countries – that is to say, in what happens after migration' (p. 101). While this point is true in migration studies, class conceptualisations of migration outcomes has long been mostly absent—or only mentioned in passing, without further problematisation—from forced migration or displacement studies literature, despite the large volume of literature on refugee livelihoods and economies (Jacobsen 2005; Werker 2007; Hammar 2014; Betts et al. 2017).

Recent research, however, has been bringing class and refugees to the fore. Lewis Turner (2015) argues that encampment (and non-encampment) policies based on socio-economic classes of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are tools of the state to satisfy the needs of their respective labour markets. This work does not engage with class theory, however, and only labels socio-economic classes as 'upper', 'middle', 'urban and educated', and 'lower and unskilled low-wage earners'. Omata's (2017) book, *The Myth of Self Reliance*, also creates socio-economic classes in his study of Buduburam camp in Ghana. Importantly, this work *historicises* class in Liberia and shows class is reproduced in the space of the camp and manifested during repatriation. While this chapter takes cues from Omata's research, there are clear

differences between Buduburam and the Tanzanian camps: the former is peri-urban while the latter are rural, the Tanzanian camps are also almost ten times larger, and, contrary to their Ghanaian counterpart, their population still receives international food rations. Similarly, both Buduburam and the Tanzanian camps are located in some of the poorest areas of their respective countries, which impairs the refugee economies and adds to the 'myth of self-reliance' in camps. Refugees of Buduburam (and Nyarugusu) have migrated or been resettled to the US and other Western countries, which has led to a remittance flow to family and friends still living in the camps. According to Omata (2017), remittances are the main drivers of the camp economy, and he uses them as the basis of his four-tiered wealth class breakdown. His high and middle groups directly receive remittances (constituting around 10% and 30% of the camp population) and differ in terms of the frequency and regularity of receiving funds. The low and very-low strata (40% and 20% of the camp respectively) do not have access to remittances. Remittances do not play such a central role in Tanzania, however. The distinction of class in terms of access to a specific source of income is something crucial that we will explore in this article.

Omata also finds significant internal differentiation in terms of social networks, which entrenches the various stratifications as evidenced by Americo-Liberians transnational ties. He recognises the overall vagueness of the concept and its different definitions by various scholars such as Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993). He settles most closely with Bourdieu's (1986) understanding of social capital which, 'aimed to highlight how different social classes form and reproduce themselves in relation to one another, with corresponding implications for different types of privilege, inequality, and oppression' (Omata 2017 p. 9). Secondly, he recognises the co-optation of social capital theory by key development players such as World Bank to justify the substitution of state intervention with social networks (Fine 2001, 2010; Elyachar 2005).

The socio-economic situation of the refugees in the Tanzanian camps must be understood in light of conflict and camp histories since the 1990s. Of course, the historical *longue durée* since colonialism—a root of the conflicts and inequalities in the countries of origin in DRC Congo and Burundi—always matters. However, this history

does relatively little to explain the temporalities and economic outcomes of the refugee populations, or what Novak (2007) calls the 'place-making projects' deployed in the camps. In particular, when considering class, Nyarugusu is best viewed as two camps within one: the Congolese camp and the Burundian camp, which is explored more in Chapter 7. To understand social stratification in the camps today, we must look at both Burundian and Congolese refugees' permutations of class in countries of origin, during flight, and in camps.

### **Class in countries of origin**

Ethnicity is often described as a key fault line in Burundian society and is associated with the concept of class (Daley 1991). Burundi's three ethnicities, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa share 'virtually the same culture, language, name, religion, and so forth' (Isabirye and Mahmoudi 2000). The extent to which these groups were distinct before the colonial encounter is debated. What is clear is that the German and Belgian colonists injected a racialised and ethnicised hierarchy, giving power in all aspects of society including politics, education, and the economy to the Tutsis (Daley 2006). Post-independence Tutsi rule maintained such privilege; ethnicity is a key, but not the only, fault line along which the 1993-2008 civil war was fought. Daley (2006) points to: 'five distinct cleavages around which [the 1993-2008] conflict occurred: intra-aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, between Hutu and Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and lately intra-Hutu' (p. 666).

The mass displacement in 2015 seems to have occurred along ethnic and class lines. Tutsis were mostly internally displaced or 'entrenched' or fled to Rwanda (Purdeková 2016). The wealthier among these were able to settle into cities, or further afield to places such as Europe or Canada. Many of the Hutu refugees went to Tanzania and it is estimated by WFP that 60 to 80% of this population is in fact 're-displaced' from the civil war in the 1990s and/or the 1972 genocide (Purdeková 2016 p. 7). Schwartz (2018) adds that many who fled in 2015 to Tanzania did so not entirely due to persecution or intimidation, but also because of the failure of many to

economically and socially reintegrate following their repatriation to Burundi in the early 2000s (Falisse and Niyonkuru 2014; Fransen 2017). The returnees primarily living along the bordering southern provinces failed to access land, livelihoods, or protection and were eager for a pretence to leave Burundi. This resonates with Jacqueline's experience. She said that before leaving for Tanzania: 'life was difficult. I tried to cultivate for others for money. I begged for a place to cultivate my own land. I saw the problems in my country. I saw it will be difficult to run later. I decided to leave before more difficulties came.' The combination of the qualitative research data of the 2015 displacement shown above, in combination with quantitative data from the financial diaries and Community Household and Surveillance (CHS) studies carried out by WFP and UNHCR, demonstrates that Burundians displaced to Tanzanian camps in 2015 relocated as an almost entirely homogeneous ethnic and low socio-economic class block from southern Burundi. I met some exceptions such as Augustin, who took with him a significant amount of money, as well as some urban and educated camp residents such as my research assistants, however, these were clearly outliers.

Eastern Congo has also faced a complicated class history centred around ethnicity and land rights and availability. Most Congolese refugees are from the neighbouring province of Sud Kivu, across Lake Tanganyika. Van Acker (2005) describes Kivu as a society structured around the customary, where access to land depended on paying tribute to customary kings or '*mwami*'. These dynamics changed after independence when neighbouring Rwandan and Burundian migrants and refugees began settling in Kivu. In 1973, President Mobutu passed a law placing all lands in the hands of the state. Through this transition between customary and modern land rights, chiefs became the arbiters of class (Van Acker 2005). Social mobility could be attained through social capital linked to state (such as civil servants or the military) or through customary actors set increasingly along ethnicity. The contestation of land continued past Mobutu's fall in the 1990s and contributed to setting the Kivu up for violence. Three decades of war and violence then curbed the authority of the State and chiefs; power now often resides between a wide constellation of (often armed) actors.

## Class and flight

As argued above, the majority of the 2015 caseload of Burundian refugees left the country as a poor, homogenous group. Moreover, many lost any capital they had on the short journey south to Tanzania. Van Hear (2004) describes the many forms of capital required to flee, and many of our interlocutors had to pay all or most of their savings in bribes to Burundian security forces or its allied militia, the *imbonerakure* just to reach Tanzania. Jean-Eliezel recounts the expenses involved in his journey:

When the election was planned there was not security in the country, so we decided to leave. We took a bus from Rumonge to Nyanza-Lac and from Nyanza-Lac to Tanzania we walked because there were many security checkpoints, so we had to hide ourselves. We used 400,000 Burundian Francs [USD \$218.33]. We had to pay for my whole family and had to pay bribes for people who showed us the way around barriers. We had to pay a bribe even at Kabunga [the main Tanzanian transit centre]. It was 11 days of travel.

Similarly, Onorine, who had to flee because her mother was a Tutsi and faced threats and harassment, fled with only TZS 20,000 (USD 8.69), which was quickly spent on treatment for cholera that infected many Burundians upon arrival in Tanzania. In order to start a business, she said the first three months she 'kept her children hungry' by only consuming a small portion of their food rations and selling the rest until raising enough money to sell onions in the Common Market. There are outliers, like Augustin, who could escape persecution, absorb the costs of travel and bribes and still have TZS 2.7 million (USD 1,173.73) to start a fish-selling business. Most Burundians recalled arduous stories of the transition to Nyarugusu in 2015. As Bernard recounts: 'It was difficult because we did not know where to go for firewood or jobs. If we left the camp, they would beat us and take our money. We also had many illnesses, and it was difficult to get medical care.' This put the majority of Burundians at an economic deficit, and it has taken time to establish livelihoods and integrate into markets around the camp.

Though there is not extensive research on the socio-economic strata of the first arriving Congolese refugees to Tanzania. Informants have suggested that more than two decades into exile, class fault lines around customary and state patronage are not central anymore in further defining class. Informants have suggested that the few

*mwamis* who live in the camp do not enjoy any special status or have the same material and political benefits as before. As Congolese refugee Kaskil explains they are only respected ‘the same way an old teacher would be’.

## **Class in the camp**

Congolese and Burundian refugees have all struggled to economically integrate into the camps upon first arriving (Thomson 2016). The stories recounted by the Congolese refugees who fled the First and Second Congo Wars of the 1990s are strikingly similar to the experiences of the 2015 caseload of Burundian refugees narrate. The benefit that Congolese have over Burundians is that protracted exile in Tanzania has allowed them to embed themselves in the local economy of Kigoma markets and agricultural systems within and surrounding the camp. In this sense, the Congolese refugee experience resembles the robust economy of ‘protracted refugee camps’ in Uganda analysed in *Refugee Economies* by Betts et al. (2017 p. 140). Similar to Omata’s (2017) analysis, Congolese refugees in Nyarugusu have also received an economic boost since 2012 as roughly 30,000 Congolese refugees have been resettled to Europe and North America and now send remittances to the camp (UNHCR 2019a p. 5).

In the newly re-established camps of Nduta and Mtendeli, the Burundian refugees have had to build markets from scratch. Still a consequence of their ‘newcomers’ status, Burundians have far fewer social networks in high-income countries to draw from for remittances (there is no resettlement programme for Burundian refugees) and face discrimination from Tanzanians in the agricultural land rental and labour systems surrounding the camp due to xenophobic attitudes toward Burundians by many Tanzanians, which I examine in Chapter 7. The disparities between Congolese and Burundians in Tanzanian camps is demonstrated by the CHS surveys of WFP and UNHCR. In 2016, only 19% of the Congolese refugees were ‘asset very poor’ and 4% ‘asset rich’ whereas there were 75% of Burundians in the ‘asset very poor’ and none in the ‘asset rich’ categories (CHS 2016 p. 13). Congolese also have more favourable scores in Coping Strategies Index, food consumption

score, Household Dietary Diversity, livelihoods metrics, and per capita expenditures (CHS 2017). The financial diary data shows similar outcomes, with the Congolese having in average assets of total value 25% higher than those of the Burundians.

### **Socio-economic stratification in Nyarugusu**

Bearing in mind the distinctions between Congolese and Burundians, and putting together the findings of UNHCR and WFP with the frameworks proposed by Omata (2017), I analysed the participants in the financial diaries in terms of the total value of their assets (cash, cattle, poultry, items, land). Defining economic categories in a refugee camp or elsewhere, will always be an arbitrary endeavour and the aim of this chapter is not to exactly pinpoint the impossible boundaries of such categories. It is nevertheless possible to identify three groups of refugees: (1) those who can be defined as ultra-poor, which means that their income does not allow them to cover 85% of their nutritional needs, and which they can be identified as owning assets worth less than one month living at the poverty line and not having three meals a day; (2) those who live below the Tanzanian poverty line (TZS 1,200 per day) but are not ultra-poor; and (3) the non-poor who live above the poverty line (who have assets worth three months of the poverty line). The findings below are adjusted per household size (counting 0.5 for children and elderly). The distribution (figure below) is surprisingly close to the 'typical' distribution of capital in a relatively unequal society, with the vast majority owning a lot less than a handful of wealthier households. The crucial distinction, though, is that in the case of Nyarugusu (and this result likely holds for Nduta and Mtendeli) the majority owns next to nothing.




Figure 13: Distribution of the total value of assets per household

Table 1 below confirms two crucial pieces of information from the ethnographic work. Firstly, there does not seem to be a major difference between groups when considering the cultural capital that is typically ‘acquired’ pre-displacement such as education or fluency in French or English. This suggests that pre-displacement classes may not matter much once in the camp. The next section will develop this point further. Secondly, social network indicators appear quite different across categories: the highest strata are more socially active than the other groups. This suggests the development of a class (the non-poor) that is not only defined in economic terms. In Chapter 8, I take a closer look at the refugee brokers or *madalali*, who use these social networks to buy and sell WFP food rations. These individuals are not only earning relatively large sums of money but are also seen as ‘famous’ and hold places of prestige and authority in the camp. Strong or multiple social ties are also useful to absorb shocks through informal loans from friends and family. They come with important social liabilities: in a camp setting where many are poor and reliant on the humanitarian system, the pressure to share food, lend money, and contribute to funerals and social events has been described as a constant pressure.

Table 1: Key characteristics across groups

		<b>Ultra-poor</b>		<b>Poor</b>		<b>Non-poor</b>	
		mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
household	number of adults	2.880	(2.934)	2.730	(1.820)	2.533	(1.302)
	number of elderly (>65)	0.080	(0.277)	0.216	(0.534)	0.267	(0.594)
	number of children (<16)	2.800	(1.732)	3.703	(2.856)	3.267	(2.604)
assets	total value of assets (household)	94 k	(93243)	322 k	(244513)	962 k	(546442)
cultural	speak French or English	0.240	(0.436)	0.324	(0.475)	0.267	(0.458)
capital	speak Swahili	0.840	(0.374)	0.865	(0.347)	0.867	(0.352)
	Congolese	0.440	(0.507)	0.676	(0.475)	0.600	(0.507)
	Burundian (Hutu)	0.440	(0.507)	0.189	(0.397)	0.400	(0.507)
	Burundian (Tutsi or mixed)	0.120	(0.332)	0.081	(0.277)	0.000	(0.000)
	Twa (Congolese or Burundian)	0.000	(0.000)	0.054	(0.229)	0.000	(0.000)
	none	0.280	(0.458)	0.270	(0.450)	0.333	(0.488)
	some primary	0.400	(0.500)	0.270	(0.450)	0.133	(0.352)
	some secondary	0.200	(0.408)	0.324	(0.475)	0.400	(0.507)
	finished secondary	0.120	(0.332)	0.135	(0.347)	0.133	(0.352)
	arrival pre 2015	0.160	(0.374)	0.568	(0.502)	0.467	(0.516)
	arrival in 2015	0.320	(0.476)	0.216	(0.417)	0.133	(0.352)
	arrival post 2015	0.520	(0.510)	0.216	(0.417)	0.400	(0.507)
	re-displaced	0.480	(0.510)	0.595	(0.498)	0.533	(0.516)
	average number of re-displacement	0.600	(0.707)	0.865	(0.822)	0.600	(0.632)
social	n of people who could lend them money	2.100	(0.866)	2.838	(1.448)	3.900	(1.583)
capital	n of friends	1.040	(1.136)	2.432	(2.523)	3.600	(6.104)
	groups hh is an ordinary member of	0.520	(0.918)	0.351	(0.538)	0.267	(0.458)
	groups hh is the leader of	0.280	(0.542)	0.514	(0.870)	1.400	(1.844)
	groups hh is very active in	0.400	(0.816)	0.514	(0.651)	0.800	(0.862)
	groups hh financially contributes to	0.480	(0.770)	0.676	(0.784)	1.533	(1.302)
	N		25		37		15

On the other side of lending is building up debts. Although limited on those aspects, the financial portfolios suggest that, expectedly, the ultra-poor tend to borrow or seek credit more than the poor and the non-poor, but they only get access to smaller

amounts. Strong or multiple social ties can allow access to informal loans from friends and family. They can pile up to be a large burden. This was true of Saidi, a Congolese man who was a leader in his church and ethnic group association. With recent reductions in food rations and inability to afford to rent land for agriculture like before, Saidi had around TZS 120,000 (USD 52.06) in debts. As he describes, 'since I've arrived in camp I haven't taken as big credit like this. We get enough food for two weeks and have to make it last for one month.' Access to such emergency cash is not only through credit and loans, both of which need to be reimbursed (sometimes with an interest rate), they are also through a more complex gift economy through which people support relatives and friends when they can afford it. Such transfers are visible as the 'gift' category in figure 16 below. Omata (2017) describes such gifts as 'shared destitution' (p. 17), a term he borrows from Leliveld (1991). This is important to understand because, as Omata notes, if social capital is glossed over, 'it could lead to the conclusion that because refugees have social networks they can make ends meet without the support from the international refugee regime' (p. 152).

## **Refugee work**

Beyond assets, professional activity and income derived from work are typical indicators of socio-economic classes. They should be considered carefully in the camp context: the 'work' refugees do is rarely stable and the salary they receive is not the main livelihood source for most. This section will provide a typology of income-generating activities in the camp and argues that such activities can help define the higher socio-economic groupings in the camp. This is partly because the revenues under consideration are too limited to be the main livelihood source for most. In 2016, 87% of all residents of Nyarugusu reported relying primarily on WFP food rations (CHS 2016 p. 10), and in 2017, this figure jumped to 95% (CHS 2017 p. 12). During the initial survey for the financial portfolios, a third of the households reported having no source of income at all, while only 6.5% (5 out of 77) reported an income –all sources put together– that is above the Tanzania poverty line of TZS 1,200 (USD 0.52) per

day per person.<sup>5</sup> Most refugees who engage in livelihood activities fall within a spectrum between the precipice of aid reliance and running very small profits.

Consistently with the self-reliance strategy of the global refugee regime led by UNHCR, which I analyse further in the next chapter, many of those who can muster the capital to attain incomes in the camps do so as 'micro-entrepreneurs'. As Easton-Calabria and Omata (2018) note this 'has coincided with a larger neoliberal shift in development from addressing structural factors of poverty and inequality to focusing on individuals' ability to navigate adversities alone' (p. 5). This livelihood category runs a wide gamut from children selling sugarcane for petty change on the road, to businesswomen like Dalia, who is featured in Chapter 8. She acts as a broker buying and selling the WFP food market nodes that find markets across Tanzania and the East Africa region. Dalia is wealthy enough to own cars (that she must conceal outside of the camp). These refugee brokers, beyond just receiving large sums of money, also wield prestige and authority in the camp due to the essential services they provide in liquidating food aid to cash.

The hub of these markets is the Common Markets constructed by UNHCR and partner organisations located near the entrances to the camps where Tanzanians and camp residents can set up retail as well as wholesale businesses. Products include fruits and vegetables, butchered meat, fish transported from Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, cooking oil, beauty and toiletry products, electronics, clothing and fabric (new and second-hand), and non-food items distributed by UNHCR and partner organisations. According to the Nyarugusu Common Market chairperson, there were more than 500 market shops registered at the beginning of 2018. Refugees also sell in informal markets established inside the camps, at WFP food distribution points, on the streets, and in their homes. For those who were not fortunate to bring capital upon initially joining the camp, people raise capital by borrowing from friends and family, informal savings and loans groups, receiving remittances, engaging in unskilled labour such as brickmaking or agriculture, or from selling a portion of their food rations.

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<sup>5</sup> When adjusting for household size.




Figure 14: Map of Nyarugusu Common Market. Credit: Boeyink 2017.

Among these micro-entrepreneurs are found a series of (semi)-skilled tradespeople and craftspeople. This includes but is not limited to tailoring and embroidery, hairstyling and barbering, cooking and baking, soap-making, mechanical and electronic repairing, skilled construction trades such as carpentry or masonry. People developed these skills both in the camps or in their countries of origin; through formal training programmes offered by NGOs or informally from acquaintances or family. On paper, these training programmes are free and often target ‘vulnerable’ households. However, social or economic capital is often required as many informants reported it takes personally knowing or paying a bribe to the recruiters. Once people attain marketable skills they can be employed by others, although often at a low rate, or start their own businesses—which requires raising difficult to obtain capital. This is the case for Burundian woman, Adelline. She learned to tailor in 2003 from an NGO

while living in Mtabila refugee camp in Tanzania. She repatriated in 2007 and struggled to reintegrate to Burundi like many others. After returning to Nyarugusu in 2015, her family was struck with cholera and it took a long time to start a business. She was not able to raise enough capital to buy her own sewing machine, which costs around TZS 300,000-350,000 (USD 130.43-152.16). She occasionally rents from a shop and works as a substitute when there are orders to fulfil. She took a loan for TZS 20,000 (USD 8.70) to sell beans in the common market with an eye to return to tailoring. Adelline explains: 'I am thinking to change from buying and selling to go to tailoring. I think it will take a long time. Sometimes if me or my family are hungry, I have to use capital from my business.' In the next chapter, I more closely examine why the humanitarian government is mostly failing in their 'pithy' attempts at fostering self-reliance in camps through vocational training programmes that Adelline went through.

A third category, which is explained in more detail in Chapter 7, consists of manual labourers who mainly work outside of the camp –which is illegal under the encampment policy. There is an extensive agricultural system surrounding the camps. For refugees who have capital, they pay Tanzanians to rent from a half-acre to up to four acres of land to grow crops for consumption and additional income. For those without capital, primarily Burundians, they venture outside the camp and are paid by both refugee land-renters and Tanzanian landowners. Some do this for a few days to acquire the capital they need, whereas others do work six days a week during labour periods. Burundian labour migrants also cross the border seasonally to sell their labour in this system. It is also known that some women leave the camp for sex work in nearby towns and villages. Within the camp, there is even lower paying work such as mud brick making, or bicycle transport services. There is also unpaid household labour that often befalls women. This includes gathering firewood outside the camp, collecting WFP food rations (which takes nearly the whole day of waiting in line), fetching water, and other caring responsibilities such as cooking and caring for the ill, young, and elderly within the household.

The three categories mentioned above may not be the most helpful to understand who becomes wealthy and powerful in the camp because those who

engage in these activities encompass a wide range of economic outcomes between ultra-poor and non-poor. The financial diaries show that, whenever possible, those strategies are pursued jointly rather than independently. If anything, of the three categories mentioned above, only one sets an economic category apart: few of the ultra-poor engage in micro-entrepreneurship/retailing activities, for the very simple reason that they do not have the start-up capital to start their own business (see table below). It is slightly less of an issue for some specific activities such as hairdressing or tailoring because they benefit from equipment provided by international aid or work for somebody who owns that equipment.




Figure 15: Income-generating activities per assets group (% of refugees who engage).

The final category of income earners is the ‘incentive workers’ who are hired by UNHCR and other aid organisations that work in the camps such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), UNHCR, or Oxfam. Since refugees are not allowed to be employed in Tanzania, such positions are considered ‘voluntary’ by the aid organisations and are paid lower than Tanzanian minimum wage (Morris and Voon 2014). Nevertheless, the pay remains well above the average income in the camp. Incentive work includes survey enumerators, language interpreters, cleaners, social workers, security officers, health workers, teachers, among others. The work, and this is further confirmed by our financial diaries, is rarely permanent but it usually includes a predictable monthly salary. The salary is precious as it can be channelled into other

businesses ran by household members. Rather than the incentive work *per se*, it is typically those businesses that constitute the main household incomes. Incentive positions are highly sought after as waged employment is rare and does not require start-up capital to attain. To obtain these positions, refugees must be able to read, write, and speak English or Swahili well enough to properly fill out an application and go through an interview.

As Turner (2006) points out, incentive workers often become 'big men' in the camp and gain influence in their communities, overtaking powerful elders and leaders from their pre-flight countries of origin. These incentive workers are conferred recognition by humanitarian agencies: 'Public authority is produced partly by the powers that UNHCR delegates to these actors, and partly by the power bases that the refugees manage to build up in the gaps in UNHCR's system' (p. 776). *Madalali* such as Dalia, featured in Chapter 8, through their business activities built on social capital and trust, become 'famous' and gain prestige at the expense of the gaps in the humanitarian paradigm of self-reliance. They gain this prestige by providing jobs and acting as bridges to bring cash to the capital starved camp environment, which international organisations are failing to do except for the few. Beyond brokering food to cash, in their systemic system of patronage set up with the police they also earn clandestine recognition by state actors on the ground, which reifies and enforces the state's power in the camp.

Of the different livelihood activities highlighted in this section, incentive work and brokerage through resold WFP rations, especially when repeated over time, is the closest that I am able to contribute to building a distinctive class in the camp. These two figures have built their positions through accumulated social, cultural, and human capital, which sets them apart from the majority of the camp population. Distinction over time is a crucial element to understand class production, particularly in Bourdieusian understandings of class. The idea to investigate notions of class in the camps only came to me after the prompt initiated by the Max Planck Institute workshop. This workshop took place after fieldwork was completed, rather than actively informing the questions I was asking amidst fieldwork. The conclusions that were reached came from looking back at the existing qualitative and quantitative data

that was available to me. In other words, there is still a ripe opportunity for exploring class in protracted refugee situations in the humanitarian environment where everybody lives in the same housing structures and attends the same schools. Possible fruitful avenues of inquiry could include religious leaders, leaders of refugee community-based organisations, like UPDF (introduced in the next chapter) which are outside of the purview of international humanitarian aid structures, or an even a deeper study building on my research of camp attitudes and perceptions toward figures like *madalali*.

## **Humanitarian and government interactions**

Despite refugee camps being circumscribed legal territories under Tanzanian law, they are not self-contained spaces but are subject to profound and somewhat erratic economic changes from humanitarian and governmental policies, which are analysed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The nascent socio-economic groupings in the camps, and especially the so-called non-poor, appear to be under constant threat of losing their status and assets—they are found to cope slightly better with shocks, but often not for long. One of the most devastating recent shock happened in July 2018, when the government shut down the common markets of the three camps, closed many wholesale businesses, and banned the use of bicycles and motorcycles in the camp (Van Laer 2018; IRRI 2019). If the humanitarian government of international aid gives, then the government of Tanzania has the power to take away, which has repeatedly been the case under President Magufuli. The financial portfolios count fewer observations from March 2018, but it is nevertheless possible to observe the devastating effect of the closure of the market on household income (see Figure 16 below).

Humanitarian aid innovations can also greatly raise households' economic prospects. Protracted refugee and other humanitarian situations are increasingly utilising cash transfer programming to replace in-kind goods such as food (ODI 2015). This has been a welcome development by refugees because many sell their WFP rations at a loss to purchase food that is more preferable or meets other needs (Oka

2014). In the last chapter, I described the sorrow and anger felt when the new WFP cash programme was shut down. In this chapter I take a closer look at the economic impacts that cash had on recipients. Households selected for the project received 20,000 TZS (USD 8.69) per person each month instead of staple food items. Such amount of money is typically more than the average income per person calculated for 2017-2018. Those who received cash had significant economic advantages that improved their positions. For example, the CHS reveals that those who received cash were able to on average purchase maize to last 24 days, whereas those without cash only were able to extend maize to 17 days (CHS 2017 p. 27). Moreover, cash recipients had 39.4% in the asset medium and asset-rich categories, whereas non-cash recipients had 21.7% in those categories (CHS 2017 p. 15). Beatrice, a Burundian woman in Nyarugusu, saved a bit of the cash she was distributed until she raised 86,000 TZS (USD 37.39), which was enough to start a business buying and selling food in the Common Market.

The cash transfer shutdown came as a major financial shock to the many household recipients. As Viola, who featured in the Introduction, describes: 'since the [cash] shutdown, this has caused malnutrition for my family. Before I could vary my food, but now I can't. I took out loans that I would pay back with the cash we received from cash from WFP [a TZS 55,000 (USD 23.92) loan]. Now I have to use capital from my business to pay'. The cash shutdown also greatly affected higher income earners such as Augustine: 'It affects my profit because instead of using it for the future, I have to use it for household needs. People have bought less fish from my business than before. We must now reduce the price of fish because we will not have enough customers otherwise.' Furaha, a Congolese woman who rents farmland from Tanzanians explains: 'it has affected my business so much. *Sana, sana, sana*.<sup>6</sup> The money I was receiving I was able to buy land to cultivate. When it stopped, I couldn't buy as much land as before. I was farming two and a half acres but went down to one.' Our quantitative data displayed in the figure below shows the sharp decrease in incomes after the shutdown in August 2017.

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<sup>6</sup> Sana is a Swahili word for meaning 'so much' or 'too much'.




Figure 16: Monthly income.

The shutdown came in a context marked by large food ration cuts due to the 'chronic underfunding' of the Tanzanian refugee situation (UNHCR 2019a), which I highlighted in the previous chapter. In September through November 2017, WFP was only able to provide 62% of 2,100 kcal per person. These ration cuts make the poor go hungry, and households with livelihoods must use capital from their business to buy additional food. Ration cuts also cause people to borrow food and money and go into debt. According to the CHS, those who reported borrowing money increased from 17.9% in 2016 to 26.8% in 2017. Those borrowing money to buy food rose from 79.3% to 91.5% between 2016 and 2017 due to the deep ration cuts (CHS 2017 p. 13). Tracking the income of the strata labelled as ultra-poor, poor, and non-poor over one year, the classes seem to converge in terms of income per household member around January 2018. This shows that the toll of the food ration cuts and the government's

assault on livelihoods caused a flattening of socio-economic status that even the non-poor struggled to cope with. Overall, these acute shocks, in addition to the government's encampment policy since the 1990s, which disallow freedom of movement and employment, makes it difficult for any to prosper beyond the poverty level. The government's goal of creating a hostile economic environment to impel refugees out of Tanzania is succeeding as thousands of Burundians have been repatriating before they want to do so. Many have said that Tanzania has become unbearable, which calls into question the 'voluntary' nature of repatriation (IRRI 2019). Though movement out of the camp is prohibited, it does not stop people from leaving or are staying put in distinctly classed ways.

### **Class, mobility, and migration**

Tanzania's encampment policy was designed to control and constrict refugee mobility. The reality is that these spaces consist of dynamic movements of people and goods in and out of the camp. Looking at the financial diaries data, 13.6% of the ultra-poor, 8.21% of the poor, and 12.3% of the non-poor reported leaving the camp, which demonstrates that people within all classes are on the move. These movements include daily mobilities in and out of the camp to nearby farms, villages, and towns, and also longer-term or further distanced movements to cities or other countries in the region.

As I feature in Chapter 7, many camp residents illegally leave the camp to engage in agriculture. Though legally circumscribed, the camp has no fencing or barriers but has many footpaths leading out of the camp to the farms and neighbouring villages. The lowest class of mostly Burundians, with little recourse to acquire capital, leave the camp to sell their labour on farms owned by Tanzanians or rented by fellow refugees. Not only is this physically demanding labour, but it comes at great risk because if they are caught by a police patrol, they must pay a bribe, which would take all of their earnings if they are carrying it or face a six-month prison sentence of hard labour. For those in the poor and non-poor classes, depending on their levels of capital, these refugees have enough money to first rent the land, pay labourers to

cultivate the land, and absorb the bribe they must pay if caught by the police to evade six months in prison.

Other short-term mobilities are only available for those with the social and economic capital to do so. For instance, some will leave the camp to go to nearby towns such as Kasulu town, the largest population centre and market in Nyarugusu's district. To get there, refugees have to leave the main gate with policemen stationed to control in and out movements of the camp. To pass, refugees must either attain a temporary pass from the camp commandant office (usually through a bribe) or by bribing the attending police officer. People with means temporarily go to town to pay for medical care that is not available in the camp. Others will go to Kasulu to buy goods to sell in the camp at cheaper prices available from wholesalers at the Common Market. Being in a higher class even affords people like Kabange to travel four hours to Kigoma town, the largest city in the region, to attend a wedding and visit family members knowing that they can afford any illicit payments that are necessary. On the other hand, there are people like the elder Congolese woman, Koserini, the head of the household for the poorest Congolese family in our financial diaries, who said she has never afforded the money to leave the camp since arriving in 1996.

Jansen (2016) notes that in East Africa, households utilize strategies of splitting up members of the family between city and camp, or between camps in different countries in the region in efforts of 'digging aid'. This is only a possibility for people with significant social and economic capital to do so. There are households that have sent members of the family to nurse school in Bujumbura, and they return to Nyarugusu on holidays to visit their family. Before shutdown politics became too severe, Christophe purchased clothing and decorative clothes in Uganda for his business in the camp and regularly traveled between the two countries. In Nyarugusu, the economic squeeze of ration cuts and government shutdowns is flattening even the highest income earners. Moreover, many Burundians fear the Tanzanian government will forcibly repatriate the camp residents as they did with Mtabila camp in 2012 (Hovil and Mbazumutima 2012). In response, Burundians with enough money to make the journey or those with contacts that can assist them are opting to leave Tanzania for countries like Uganda, which have more open refugee policies. As Van Hear (2004)

argues, similar to fleeing their country of origin, there are significant costs to reaching new countries of asylum. The costs include paying for bus fares, paying Tanzanians to help them use Tanzanian IDs, returning to Burundi to get passports, paying bribes to police and immigration officials at the border and on the journey, and even paying bribes to Ugandan police and UNHCR officials who register refugee status in countries like Uganda. The informants estimated that costs to resettle in Uganda range from TZS 200,000-700,000 (USD 86.96-304.36). Further journeys to Kenya or Mozambique cost around TZS 1,200,000 (USD 521.76). As far afield as South Africa could cost around TZS 5,000,000 (USD 2,173.98).

Some in the non-poor category of refugees like Thierry are even able to make investments in Burundi for a 'safer landing' when it is time to repatriate, even though he would prefer not to return to the country he has twice been displaced from. Thierry has made his wealth from being employed by NGO implementing partners as a skilled builder, and for privately repairing homes for other refugees. As he describes, 'there is work in Nyarugusu and I can get money. That is why I chose to stay here. It isn't why I originally came, but now I am doing well for my family. I have plans to go back to Burundi when there is peace in my country and the problems there are finished.' To prepare for the eventual return he has invested in land in Burundi by purchasing two acres in September 2017 for BIF 2,600,000 (USD 1,384.46). He further describes his rationale:

I cultivate cassava, beans and rice. I keep the money in Burundi. I have children and I may pass away. I want them to have something. I go back to Burundi many times; there are many things I need to check on: to see my land, to see my family. I have other things I sell there. I don't have permission to leave I just pay the police. I go by car and pay them. I chose to buy land in Burundi before a shop in Tanzania because it is my country. Tanzania is a bad country and I will not be able to keep the shop for many years.

However, conditions in the camp as well as in Burundi have deteriorated since 2017 when Thierry told of me his plans. Now he has plans to join a friend and look for work in Cape Town, South Africa and then send money to his family in Tanzania to move on to Uganda.

The vast majority of refugees have far fewer options than Thierry. After the Tanzanian government announced in August 2019 that refugees must return or face

forced repatriation, I asked all 30 Burundian households of their plans. Nobody had intentions to go to Burundi unless coerced, and nearly everybody had a third country like Uganda or Kenya identified where they were planning to relocate with specific bus routes, people who would assist them, and exact prices it would cost in mind. However, when probed further, most of the respondents said they did not have enough money or would have to sell everything they owned whenever forced repatriation was eminent. A couple of households were so poor that they have no plans to return to Burundi or move to a different country in the region. Since fieldwork began in 2017, Burundians have expressed increasing anxiety of what they felt would be an inevitable forced repatriation. The conditions to establish livelihoods beyond subsistence and survival has been so dire that only a select few have managed to go beyond poverty income to have the agency to migrate beyond Burundi and Tanzania. Onorine expresses this harsh immobility: 'Even if they force us to return to Burundi I can't return back. In my country, there is no peace. Every day they kill people. I can just die here, but I can't return back to my country.' This speaks to the totalising power of the host state on refugee livelihoods, which significantly flattens the notions of class in the camps. This deflation of class hierarchy, in turn, forces the majority in the middle and lower socio-economic strata to face 'involuntary immobility' (Lubkemann 2008). Without any other options, Eliezer simply stated, 'we are waiting for UNHCR to save us.' Despite Eliezer's hopes resting with UNHCR, the next chapter argues that UNHCR's history in Tanzania has been often marked by a failure to protect and enhance refugee self-reliance, which may not portend well for him and others like him.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter is an attempt to move toward a conceptualisation of class in camps, using the case of Tanzania—one of the most rigid asylum policies in the world. In Burundi and DR Congo, it is possible to see class formations from colonialism to the present centred around access to land, social, economic, and political capital controlled by complex and shifting interweaving of the state, ethnicity, and regional power. However, classic structural Marxist and Bourdieusian theories of class are

difficult to fully apply in the ephemeral and volatile economic and political space of Tanzanian refugee camps for at least two reasons.

Firstly, the socio-economic stratification that was observed in the camp does not have the long-lasting nature of a social class. Burundian refugees arriving in 2015 primarily came as a block grouping of poor Hutus from the south and the journey often depleted them of most economic capital. New socio-economic stratifications have emerged in the camp, which were manifested by different levels of assets ownership and social connections. Social capital was, however, not the 'class stratifier' in the same way Omata (2017) described in Buduburam refugee camp as remittances only play a minor role in Nyarugusu. From the data collected, only two economic activities seem associated with a specific socio-economic 'elite' group, which is consistent with Turner's (2006) research among 'big men' or 'liminal experts': incentive work for international organisations and WFP food resale brokers or *madalali*. Despite these findings, more concentrated research may uncover additional categorisations of class distinction in camps. It is not enough to provide a stable ground for building a social class as the availability of such source of incomes fluctuates significantly, as many of the income-generating activities that were studied show. Humanitarian and government actions further contribute to blur the lines between socio-economic strata: cash transfers can aid 'class' mobility as they help constitute start-up capital for establishing small business ventures, whereas food ration cuts and host government assaults on markets have a profound flattening effect on embryonic 'classes' as households' economic buffers are being depleted. This research shows many poor—but not extreme poor households—the potential 'aspiring middle class', are ruthlessly pushed into precariat positions without much of a safety net.

Secondly, apart from incentive workers and WFP brokers mentioned above, socio-economic stratification in the camp does not appear to come along with mechanisms of social distinction or a form of 'class consciousness'. Refugees that fare better than others in the camp still live amongst each other, receive the same rations, attend the same schools, associations, and churches, and speak the same languages. The gift economy and mechanisms of 'shared destitution', coupled with a shared pre-displacement class culture (the 'block (repeat) displacement' mentioned

earlier), may explain this apparent lack of social distinction. From the quantitative data, interviews, and observations available, there were no clear markers of 'class consciousness' or active processes of social distinction over time, which are crucial factors in Marxist and Bourdieusian theories of class. There were no temporal solidifications of class consciousness or social and cultural factors in class distinction, although these would be fruitful avenues to further interrogate class in protracted refugee camps and beyond. However, it is crucial to note that the refugees, from all socio-economic strata, are perceived by humanitarians and host Tanzanians to embody homogenising 'refugeeness' (Malkki 1996). When zooming out of the camp to include the rest of Tanzania, then social classes more clearly come to view. In line with Hyndman's (2000) provocation on 'humanitarian supracitizens' in Tanzania it is possible to distinguish a class of people constituted as refugee sub-citizens, who have significantly limited rights and opportunities (and know it well). Refugees as a sub-citizen class in Tanzania becomes a more salient categorisation when returning to the comparative analysis of refugee camps as a third, trifurcated space which is governed differently than urban and rural bifurcated states. This is a similar 'othering' logic of colonialism, which justified a cost-saving self-reliance ideology through indirect rule. When refugees are grouped as a sub-class of Tanzania, the justification becomes clearer as to why strict containment through camps is the *modus operandi* for refugees. This conceptualisation also helps to explain that when national politics dictate refugees as unworthy to reside in the country, as argued in Chapter 3, the state is justified in discarding these sub-citizens through cyclical assaults on self-reliance or through outright violent repatriations like Mtabila.

This does not mean that the concept of class is never useful to understand refugee camps. It has proven useful to analyse other refugee situations (e.g. Omata 2017). It may also be useful, and this is the direction future research in Nyarugusu should explore, to better understand the different possibilities and options camp residents have for mobility and migration. This chapter suggests that the poorest strata are forced to risk leaving the camp to engage in illegal livelihoods, whereas the non-poor have more agency to be mobile for life events nearby, or to escape the worsening conditions in Tanzania to places like Uganda nearby or South Africa further afield. In

a context where the cards are constantly reshuffled, regional or even international mobility—in the sense of connections outside the camps—may well be the main way for households to consolidate and preserve their social and economic status.



# Chapter 6:

## Historicising (refugee) self-reliance: The failures of 'big push' humanitarianism and 'pithy development'



Figure 17: UPDH savings group meeting. Credit: Boeyink 2017.

## Introduction

‘When donors came, they promised the money would be given. I’m disappointed because they didn’t fulfil their promises. I’m planning to leave my group and sell my own onions. I feel it’s better to go on with my own life and my own business.’ This quote from Viola, which I return to below, is indicative of the frustration I often heard from camp residents about the ineffectiveness of NGO livelihood programmes. Although these comments were recent, the failures of refugee self-reliance must be understood in its genealogical history since colonialism and indirect rule. This thesis is principally about the restrictive and cyclical means the colonial and post-colonial states have dealt with various phases of displacement in Tanzania to the present, how this has impacted refugees, and the ways that they respond to encampment. To this point, I have mostly omitted the role of the humanitarian government—UNHCR and implementing partners. This is a purposeful omission because, in the case of Tanzania, the host state and refugees themselves are the primary drivers of refugee policy in Tanzania. The previous chapter looked at socio-economic stratification on an individual household level to demonstrate that the majority of Nyarugusu residents are unable to attain self-reliance and are being systematically and purposefully pushed out of the country by President Magufuli’s shutdown politics. This chapter examines why humanitarian projects are not helping the ultra-poor and poor residents achieve self-reliance. On a more macro frame, apart from a few instances such as the nationalisation of the old caseload of Burundian refugees, which is largely deemed a progressive success (Milner 2013)—though not without significant complications (Kuch 2018)—UNHCR has a history in Tanzania of failing to ensure enduring protection and integration in the country at times when they have needed it the most. The Tanzanian state has maintained its will on asylum policy, and refugees have endured, subverted and co-opted encampment in various ways. This has left UNHCR and partners important in maintaining camps and the limited protections that they afford, yet ineffectual in preserving the rights of refugees when they are most under assault.

This chapter joins a recently growing chorus of scholars critiquing the current refugee self-reliance paradigm. I examine self-reliance through a range of historical

angles: from the developmentalist ideologies and practises of self-reliance since indirect rule to top-down 'big pushes' by humanitarians to ease the 'burdens' host states in order loosen states restrictions on refugee self-reliance and livelihoods. I take a further deconstructive step than most of these self-reliance critics by analysing the genealogies of self-reliance as a concept through its various iterations since indirect rule.

This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, I examine the convergences and variances with which self-reliance is conceived and applied by the colonial British, President Nyerere and TANU throughout Tanzania's post-colonial transition, and the current usage in the global refugee regime. In the second section, I recall the repeated failure of international donors and organisations' 'big pushes' to meet the expectations of 'burden sharing' for host states in protracted refugee situations in Africa. The most recent iteration of failure in Tanzania is evidenced by President Magufuli's abrupt cancellation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in early 2018. In part three, I zoom in to the ground level to explore the perceptions and expectations of burden sharing by Tanzanians living around the camp and argue that refugee self-reliance should more fully incorporate these communities. I evoke these attitudes by recalling the Kibondo Chamber of Conference meeting that I opened this chapter with. In the fourth part of this chapter, I recall a meeting at the Common Market with Viola, who was featured in the Introduction chapter. She was in a heated argument with a business and savings group that was cheating her out of money. Julia was angry at the group members as well as the NGO which assigned her to it. I use this ethnographic moment to demonstrate that the self-reliance projects UNHCR and their partners are implementing are critically restricted by the Tanzanian state. These projects are constrained to the point that they only amount to expensive 'cosmetic' projects, which merely fosters 'pithy development'.

## **Historicising (refugee) self-reliance**

There has been a recent flurry of research on refugee livelihoods and self-reliance, which has been headlined by the Refugee Economies Programme at the

Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. This policy-focused research uses qualitative and quantitative tools to get a clearer picture of camp and urban refugee economies in Kenya and Ethiopia, and their flagship publication focusing on Uganda (Betts et al. 2017). While this research offers key insights in the scales of refugee economies, I argue that it tends to ignore or understate the politics of self-reliance, which is the focus of this thesis. There has also been a concurrent rise of non-normative explorations of 'displacement economies' (Hammar 2014) and problematisation of refugee self-reliance policies (Omata 2017; Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018; Carpi 2019; Ilcan 2018). This critique is not new, however, and has been argued by many scholars before (Chambers 1986; Black 1994; Kaiser 2006). As part of the recent critical turn toward refugee self-reliance, scholars such as Evan Easton-Calabria (2015) have historicised refugee livelihoods since the interwar period to critique the recent ahistorical policy pushes toward refugee 'innovation'. However, I argue these historiographies do not penetrate deep enough as they largely ignore the colonial ideologies of self-reliance and development in Tanzania and the broader post-colonial world. This 'colonial aphasia' (Stoler 2011) ignores how self-reliance genealogies since indirect rule interact with the current refugee self-reliance paradigm.

### **A brief history of refugee self-reliance**

The creation of the League of Nations in 1919, shortly followed by the High Commission for Refugees in 1921, marks the first coordinated international institution to address large displacement situations. Evans-Calabria (2015) marks this time period as the refugee 'pre-history' before the Geneva Refugee Convention in 1951. The pre-historic period mostly concerned refugees from Russia, Greece, Armenia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Germany and was marked by 'bottom-up' livelihood strategies toward self-reliance:

Due to social and political trends, internal funding constraints, and a lack of prior experience in refugee assistance, League assistance strategies emphasized bottom-up methods and refugees' capacity to contribute to independent national commissions and rehabilitation through their own expertise as well as financial means. The promotion of refugee self-sufficiency and professional skills meant that refugees became employed in settlement commissions, served as

delegates of the High Commission and even funded other refugees' settlements through microfinance (Evans-Calabria 2015 p. 5).

Moreover, during this time, the Nansen International Office for Refugees, which transitioned from the High Commission, 'had a strict "no-charity" philosophy and conceptualized refugees as an economic and "technical" problem with economic solutions' (p. 6). Many projects after World War One were designed with the purpose to benefit the hosting countries through large agricultural or infrastructural projects. Indeed, most of the humanitarian funding during this time came from refugees themselves through repaid loans (Skran 1995 pp. 181-182). This echoes the use of Burundian and Rwandan refugees in Tanzania after independence. The 1930s were marked by the global economic depression and humanitarian aid transitioned to focusing on 'vulnerable populations' through increasingly technocratic and professionalised aid (Evans-Calabria 2015 p. 9).

World War Two caused massive levels of displacement and led to the Refugee Convention in 1951 and the creation of UNHCR. Despite the post-war advent of the modern welfare systems, 'the goal for refugee settlements to contribute to national development through self-sufficient refugee livelihoods remained' (Evans-Calabria 2015 p. 11). Unlike the previous 'bottom-up' approaches, this period was marked by 'top-down' development run by the UN and other large institutions where refugees had little input in how development was being enacted or imposed from above:

The 'development project' was integral to this and also significantly accounted for the construction of refugees as beneficiaries rather than active participants in their resettlement. As refugee assistance moved into Africa and other newly independent countries, organizations such as UNHCR entered (post-)colonial landscapes of humanitarianism and domination that greatly influenced the implementation of livelihoods schemes and settlements (Evans-Calabria 2015 p. 12).

It is important to note that to this point in the Evans-Calabria (2015) article, the quote above is the first mention of colonialism, albeit only cursorily, despite the colonial project operating in full swing in parallel to these mostly European refugee movements. To the author's credit, the quote above is followed by a prescient footnote noting the absence of colonial analysis:

It is beyond the scope of this article to identify direct corollaries between colonial and post-colonial livelihoods assistance and development structures, yet strong critical analyses discussing the effects of colonialism on humanitarianism exist (see Barnett and Weiss 2008; Chimni 2009) and further research specifically focused on refugee livelihoods assistance is a worthwhile and needed endeavour (p. 21).

I will briefly pause this history of refugee self-reliance to take up the 'worthwhile and needed endeavour' of linking the coloniality of refugee self-reliance. In doing so, I will further deconstruct the 'colonial aphasia' of refugee self-reliance in particular, and refugee encampment in general present in policy and academic literature on refugees (Chimni 2009; Marfleet 2007).

### **Colonial aphasia and self-reliance**

Though she is focused on French society and academia, Ann Laura Stoler's (2011) conceptualisation of 'colonial aphasia' is apt in the inability of policymakers and scholars to successfully link refugee development to the present moment. She describes aphasia as different than amnesia or forgetting:

In aphasia, an occlusion of knowledge is the issue. It is not a matter of ignorance or absence. Aphasia is a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things. Aphasia in its many forms describes a difficulty retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a difficulty comprehending what is spoken (p. 124).

However, in the practises and ideologies of 'self-reliance' and development, we uniquely have the vocabulary to make these linkages. For example, concurrent to the refugee 'pre-history' of the interwar years following World War One, the British and French colonialists transitioned to indirect rule predicated around 'self-help' and 'self-reliance', which I highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2. This bifurcated form of rule, both in the colonies and the refugee situations of Europe and Asia-Minor following the war and global economic depression, were motivated by lack of ability or willingness to offer significant funding by the colonial powers to these supposed self-reliant spaces.

The seismic global changes from World War Two also shaped colonial and refugee policies. Following the war, there was growing unrest in the colonies, which

led to 'developmentalist' colonial aid and investments in social services and 'development projects' in an effort to appease the brewing nationalism (Cooper 2002 p. 31). The top-down logic of the colonial development projects, evidenced by the spectacular failure of projects like the groundnut scheme in Tanganyika, followed the same development ideologies present in the top-down refugee governance. The post-war refugee governance and its colonial influence can be more clearly linked beyond just parallel similarities. For instance, Lucy Mayblin (2014), using archival sources of meeting minutes of Cabinet and Parliament during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention, reveals the lengths that the colonial British government opposed asylum and human rights accountability for its colonised empire. Indeed, it was not until 1967 with the introduction of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, that the 1951 convention would be expanded to include refugees beyond Europe. This change was largely due to the rise in refugee numbers relating to anti-colonial struggles and Cold War proxy wars. Mayblin (2014) forcefully argues:

Silences around the colonial rationales that informed early exclusions from refugee rights, as well as around histories of displacement outside of Europe, are therefore problematic in the limitations they place on critical engagement with contemporary asylum policy [...] Factoring colonialism and decolonisation into the analysis [...] shows that exclusions are not recent deviations from earlier moral standards, they were there from the start. This may mean that there is less that is new in the present than many accounts suggest (p. 428).

I continue this genealogy of self-reliance since colonialism to show the coloniality inherent in self-reliance development philosophy.

### **Refugee self-reliance to the present**

During the 1960s and 1970s, after non-European refugees were added to the Geneva definition of refugees, the United States took a leading role in development policies after many post-colonial countries such as Tanzania had gained independence. Ad-hoc and localised agricultural projects supported by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and other NGOs were the norm during this era. These projects, which had the goal toward gaining 'self-sufficiency', were

designed and managed from the top down with the economic desires of the host state in mind rather than refugee involvement in the planning to fit their own needs. The interventions were known at the time as 'zonal development' (Easton-Calabria 2015 pp. 12-17). Tanzania's use of labour from Mozambican, Rwandan, and Burundian refugees were emblematic of this time and the refugee settlements were largely successful at attaining economic self-sufficiency. The Tanzanian refugee settlements were seen as a model to aspire to: 'Tanzania's prior experience of incorporating refugees in national development projects as a means of achieving self-sufficiency and local integration was championed as the pioneering example of success' (Betts et al. 2017 p. 24). Some scholars noted the similarities of refugee settlements to Nyerere's *ujamaa* villagization policies (Van Hoyweghen 2002 p. 300). As I argue in Chapter 2, Nyerere and TANU's usage of self-reliance was full of tensions and contradictions between anti-colonial independence and local austerity. Moreover, the ideology of self-help espoused by Nyerere had clear linkages to very similar ideas of self-help under indirect rule (Jennings 2002; Lal 2012 p. 216).

The 1980s and especially the 1990s made way to the refugee encampment policies that are largely around to this day. This era was also marked by funding appeals or what I call, 'big push' humanitarianism, which I analyse and historicise in the section below. This period was saw the rise of neoliberalism, which permeates global society today. Notions of self-help and self-reliance were largely applied to whole communities, countries, refugee settlements in the discussion above. Neoliberalism is marked by the rolling back the state's involvement in society inspired by the idealisation of market capitalism. This economic and political outlook has resulted in large-scale privatisation of state services. Moreover, the notions of self-reliance espoused by colonial and post-colonial regimes, which puts the onus of self-help on communities and nations, has narrowed under neoliberalism with the responsibility of self-reliance primarily being placed on the individual (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018 pp. 4-6). This has hugely affected international development, humanitarian, and refugee discourse and policy by moving collective agricultural refugee settlements of yore to encouraging resilience of individuals and households in finding market-based, often entrepreneurial solutions to their protection (Ilcan and

Rygiel 2015). Despite this new development orientation, restrictive encampment policies—which I have explored throughout this thesis—remain deeply entrenched. This makes the possibility of refugee self-reliance a ‘myth’ for most (Omata 2017). Easton-Calabria and Omata (2018) summarise the current problems of refugee self-reliance in the neoliberal era:

[T]he international refugee regime has increasingly incorporated neoliberal principles into its policymaking, and the active promotion of self-reliance has become a ‘mantra’ among refugee-supporting agencies and policy-makers. This trend can be practically observed through a reduction in free food rations and other forms of gratuitous material assistance for refugees, as well as through the implementation of numerous vocational training or entrepreneurship programmes that aim to enable refugees to participate in labour markets through acquired skills (p. 5).

The neoliberal development worldview posits that long-term aid and care and maintenance for refugees causes ‘dependency’ or the ‘dependency syndrome’ among refugees. In this neoliberal humanitarian configuration, which Ilcan and Rygiel (2015) call ‘resiliency humanitarianism’, ‘refugees are reconstituted along the lines of the neoliberal subject, from passive recipients of aid to camp “residents” and resilient subjects. Refugees are now expected not only to withstand adversity but also to thrive by becoming empowered and involved in the management of camp life’ (p. 334). This quote above evokes the discussion in Chapter 1 about the inherent flaws to the camp-as-community approach to conceptualising the camp space. There is no essentialised ‘community’ in camps, but instead multitudes of countervailing intersectionalities pervade the camp space (Hyndman 2000 p. 143; Bulley 2014). Moreover, attempts by humanitarians and host states to incorporate refugees to self-government often end up amount to exploitative cheap sub-contracting or cosmetic performances, rather than empowering self-reliance. These expectations of resiliency and camp managements by refugees can be also be said of Tanzanians relocated to *ujamaa* villages or arbitrarily instrumentalised through the ‘tribe’ in the philosophy of indirect rule.

Since colonialism, the central tension for states operating under the bifurcated structure of minimalist rule—discursively mobilised through notions of self-reliance—is knowing where to draw the line at the minimum amount of aid possible to maintain

an equilibrium of order and control. The colonial rulers realised this tension when they transitioned from the brutal and totalising control of direct rule to indirect rule. They also attempted to reconfigure this balance in their belated and ultimately unsuccessful attempts after World War Two to quell calls for independence by providing social services such as health and education and economic development projects. This dialectic pressure was prevalent among Nyerere's development philosophy: '*ujamaa* could be taken either to mandate a kind of austere, pre-modern practise of self-sufficiency, or to represent the efforts of a benevolent state seeking to provide material goods and services to rural populations' (Lal 2015 p. 223). This uncomfortable balance between aid and austerity through self-reliance has been central to refugee governance in trifurcated states as well. The remainder of this chapter examines how these tensions have been negotiated between host states such as Tanzania and international donors through 'big pushes', the expectations of aid that Tanzanians near the camps have, and the failure of humanitarians to provide effective enough aid to foster true self-reliance in camps.

### **'Big push' humanitarianism**

In the Spring of 2017, a secretariat comprised of UNHCR and refugee NGO officers as well as bureaucrats from MHA and Presidents Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) had just been established to implement CRRF. This was a pilot programme Tanzania signed up for as part of the New York Declaration hosted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2016. I began fieldwork at the same time that this secretariat was formed and spoke with UNHCR staff who were part of the process. There was early excitement at the possibility of reforming the strict refugee policy in place since the 1990s. In December 2017, the secretariat visited the Kigoma region and the humanitarians and the government bureaucrats reported seeing promise in the process. They had also visited Uganda's settlements, which afford greater freedom of movement for refugees and was a model that UNHCR wanted to see implemented in Tanzania. Moreover, the director of Refugee Service Department at MHA verbally announced to UNHCR that

a new draft refugee law would be tabled before the end of February moving away from encampment policy (Felleson 2019 p. 7). However, in January 2018, President Magufuli suddenly pulled out of the CRRF. I spoke with the same UNHCR staff shortly after the announcement and they were left shocked and dumbfounded. In this section, I will join others to argue that the CRRF shutdown should not be such a surprise, as it shows history repeating itself in the cyclical failures of previous UN big pushes (Betts 2018; Rudolf 2019).

The New York Declaration billed itself as a novel solution to protracted refugee situations. UNHCR (2018c) describes this novelty:

Among the key new elements are commitments by States to: Strengthen and facilitate emergency responses to refugee movements and a smooth transition to sustainable approaches that invest in the resilience of both refugees and the communities that host them[.] Provide additional and predictable humanitarian funding and development support to host countries' (p. 2).

Betts et al. (2017) note, however, that these big pushes have been around for a long time:

Attempts to bridge the humanitarian-development gap in order to promote refugee self-reliance are not new. Appearing as early as the interwar years to address refugee crises in Europe, they were used again to respond to displacement during the partition of India and became the norm for refugee settlement in postcolonial Africa (p. 14).

The central tension to big push humanitarianism is the negotiation around 'burden sharing' by host-states. The language of 'burden' appears directly in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention: 'the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation' (Gottwald 2014 p. 525).

Since the creation of the Refugee Convention in 1951, which was the single biggest push for refugee reform, there have been the rise and fall of big pushes and conferences, particularly in Africa. The reasons for these failures bear striking resemblance to the rationale that President Magufuli used to pull out of the CRRF recently. Big pushes began in Africa the late 1970s and 1980s as it became clear that

the protracted refugee situations in Africa were not being resolved. In 1979, the OAU's Arusha Conference on the Situation of Refugees African states called for more assistance from the international community. The result of the conference was a demand for international development projects to target both refugees and host communities as self-sufficient settlements like the Old Settlements in Tanzania. What followed the OAU conference in Arusha was a UNHCR-led initiative in Geneva known as the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I) in 1981 and ICARA II in 1984. ICARA I had three main goals to (1) bringing attention to the large numbers of refugees in Africa; (2) raising donor resources to support refugees and returnees; (3) aid countries hosting large numbers of refugees. The African states were to submit proposals for development projects to be funded by the international community. Gorman (1993) gives an appraisal of the conference:

ICARA I succeeded in its public relations goals and in terms of generating revenue to meet Africa's emergency refugee assistance development needs of African countries, as opposed to the emergency needs of refugees themselves, [which were] almost totally ignored by the donor community, even though a third of the assistance requests placed before ICARA I dealt with these needs (p. 63).

Though largely seen as a failure, this conference ushered in the idea of 'refugee aid and development' known as RAD. In the wake of the first failed conference, ICARA II in 1984, which was themed as 'Time for Solutions' was better planned to put RAD and durable solutions at the forefront. The OAU and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) became co-sponsors of the event. In the end, the conference only managed to raise pledges of USD 81,000,000 out of the requested USD 392,000,000 for 128 schemes in 14 African countries (Betts et al. 2017 p. 25). The conference also coincided with massive drought and famines across Africa, which diverted funding away from refugee issues. According to Betts et al. (2017), the causes of failure were once again primarily a North-South polarisation in expectations and interests and a lack of commitment on the part of both donors and recipient states (p. 25). Gorman (1993) expands on the poor results shortly after the conference:

The term ICARA II is rapidly becoming one that cannot be used even in UN or government assistance agency circles without a history lesson and substantial explanation. This is not a good sign [...] Neither the OAU nor the individual African governments affected by refugee flows have been zealous in pursuit of

refugee-related development assistance from a lagging donor community (p. 68).

In short, the Northern donors were interested in durable solutions and results for their aid, whereas African states wanted additional burden sharing via donor aid commitments. This left both sides disappointed. Former Tanzanian Minister for Home Affairs, Omar Mapuri, looks back on the frustrating process:

We have had a bitter experience in this...[We] provided income-generating activities and open markets to [refugees]. But immediately once we introduced that, then the international community washed its hands. So they left the whole burden with us. We fully provided education, health services, water, and all other social services to these settlements. And when we invite the international community to come in, they say 'we are preoccupied with the asylum-seekers' (Betts et al. 2017 p. 34).

Betts et al. (2017) analyse other UN big pushes such as the International Conference on Refugees in Central America (CIREFCA) (1987-1995), UNHCR's Convention Plus Initiative (2003-2005), and The Solutions Alliance between UNHCR and UNDP (2014-2017). For the sake of brevity, I will not go into detail for each of these, however, apart from the CIREFCA, each initiative has largely repeated the failures of ICARA I and II by failing to meet three key conditions:

First, donor states needed to provide 'additionality' in development assistance. Second, host states needed to be willing to recognize that with additional development assistance they would consider opening opportunities for refugee self-reliance. Third, UNHCR and development agencies needed to work together effectively to implement projects that could credibly benefit hosts, donors, and the displaced (Betts et al. 2017 p. 39).

The most recent iteration of the big push, the CRRF, has once again failed to live up to all three conditions.

### **The failure of CRRF in Tanzania**

19 September 2016, at the UNGA, member states agreed on the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, calling for increased awareness, funding, and reforms for refugees and migrants. There are two important contextual notes to make about this conference. The first is that President Barack Obama was presiding at the summit in 2016 and had pledged large commitments to resettle refugees to the US at

the time. President Donald Trump, who was elected in 2016 and has subsequently dismantled the United States' refugee resettlement programme, has not given the same backing to the process of the New York Declaration as his predecessor. Secondly, at the time of the meeting, Europe was amidst the so-called 'refugee crisis' where large numbers of many asylum seekers from Syria and elsewhere were crossing into Europe via Turkey and other destinations. This captured much of the attention of the meeting, rather than countries of lower priority to donors such as Tanzania. The result of the summit was the formation of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration in 2018. The Declaration also initiated the CRRF whereby 13 states, including Tanzania, voluntarily committed to evaluating national refugee policy in consultation with UNHCR and other stakeholders in exchange for increased financial support. The key pillars to the CRRF include easing pressures on countries hosting large numbers of refugees, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third-country solutions, and support for safe returns to countries of origin. Each CRRF pilot country has different goals to fit their different contexts. Tanzania pledged to (1) continue receiving refugees; (2) review refugee policy and law to be in line with international instruments; (3) continue implementing durable solutions for the remaining Burundian refugees who have lived in Tanzania since the Burundian genocide in 1972 and were offered Tanzanian citizenship; (4) enhance local opportunities for refugees through access to education and domestic labour market; (5) support global compact on responsibility-sharing. No Tanzanian living near the camps that I spoke to except for one man at the Chamber of Commerce meeting in Kibondo (who was contracted by an NGO to supply refugees with cookstoves) had ever heard of the CRRF or knew of its goals. Other than refugees themselves, host communities potentially had the most to gain from aid designed to benefit them. Moreover, as they identified during the discussion, which I recount below, easing the restrictions on mobilities for refugees would lead to increased commerce for neighbouring communities as well. On the other hand, I also did not meet any refugees who were aware of the CRRF process as well.

Despite the potential gains to come to the region through the CRRF, in early February 2018, in a room full of international diplomats in Dar es Salaam, President

Magufuli announced the immediate withdrawal from the CRRF. He cited the lack of burden-sharing and a refusal to take a loan from the World Bank IDA 18 lending window. Scholars and policymakers have been searching for explanations for the shutdown (Rudolf 2019; Felleson 2019; Betts 2018). Felleson (2019), a senior UNHCR officer in East Africa, recalls the CRRF experience:

[L]ooking back, the initial work of institutionalizing the CRRF was, in part, an unbalanced exercise as regards the level of engagement and involvement of the stakeholders concerned. Right from the start, the UNHCR was much in the front line, pushing for a quick preparation of predefined central components in the CRRF application [...] the UNHCR acted very much as the principal penholder, with the MHA and the PO-RALG as reacting and approving counterparts [...] this division of labour, which shared some characteristics of a classical, paternalistic donor-recipient relationship, was quite a dominant feature during the implementation, which potentially might have had a negative effect on strengthening the ownership of the CRRF within the government (p. 5).

Moreover, within the government's role in the secretariat, MHA took a leading role above the PO-RALG, which meant the PO-RALG never fully came on board (Felleson 2019 pp. 6-7). Despite these challenges, UNHCR's goals of the CRRF were nearly met. According to Felleson (2019), the head of the Refugee Service Department had told UNHCR in January 2018 that the first draft of a new refugee policy ending strict encampment would come by the end of February. Instead, the President took the 'drastic decision' to shut down the CRRF process. Similar to the shutdown of the cash transfer programme, explored in more detail in the previous two chapters, it seems that both MHA and PO-RALG were just as surprised by this action as UNHCR (pp. 7-8). Felleson (2019) sees this as evidence of the distance between the President and the ministries involved in the secretariat. Moreover, the lag in the immediate procurement of funds and the perceived lack of recognition for Tanzania's long history of hosting refugees led to the sudden closure. In this regard, the government conflated a World Bank loan relating to the support of hosting refugees with the CRRF. Though the CRRF and proposed World Bank loan were both related to refugee governance, they were two separate initiatives (Felleson 2016 p. 12). Betts (2018) also follows the government's line in an article he penned in *Foreign Policy* condemning the international community for tying the CRRF to a World Bank loan. He makes no mention, however, of Tanzania's hard-line stance on border closures,

forced repatriations, and structurally violent encampment policy already analysed in Chapter 4. Rudolf (2019) is more explicit that this shutdown should be understood through domestic and regional politics and a failure of funding support from international donors. President Magufuli's consistently nationalistic 'Tanzania first' policies are independent of Northern donors' values:

He takes pride in the fact that he has not travelled outside the region yet. The mutual agreement with Burundi on the return of refugees is foremost a move to strengthen bilateral relations and the regional position of Tanzania – but it also resonates with Magufuli's promotion of traditional values and national unity policy [...] The CRRF was seen as an opportunity by Tanzania to point at the uneven burden-sharing for the local integration of Burundian strangers yet again. It was very sceptical that CRRF would live up to its promise on robust and sustained support to host countries. Officials felt on the contrary that they were lured into the same trap again (p. 213).

In hindsight, the failure of the CRRF in Tanzania is a repeat of the ICARA conferences in the 1980s. It did not match the three key criteria of 'additionality of development assistance, host state's willingness to open policy for refugee self-reliance, and effective cooperation between hosts, donors, and refugees (Betts et al. 2017 p. 39). 'Additionality' in this sense, is considered to be the additional push of funding for assistance to the host country or additional resettlement allotments beyond the care and maintenance programming that is expected as a baseline contribution. The erosion of asylum in the US under President Trump as well as in Europe does nothing to inspire confidence in host states such as Tanzania to extend greater generosity to refugees. The expectations between Northern donors and Southern states often fail to be reconciled in these UN big pushes, yet it is refugees who bear the brunt of these failures. Even though none of the refugee informants I asked were even aware of the possibility of the CRRF, it could have had a huge impact on their lives to not experience the violence of encampment. Despite enduring and sustained critique, individuals I have spoken to within UNHCR and the official organisational policy point to a desire by the organisation to end encampment (UNHCR 2009; Crisp 2017), which is counter to the containment impulse that I have argued throughout this thesis. Yet the organisation's inability to influence the Tanzanian state's entrenchment of encampment, in addition to maintaining humanitarian support, make them unwitting

partners in maintaining the violence of containment that they are trying to ameliorate (Branch 2009). This also supports Deardorf Miller's (2017) argument that the greater degree to which states such as Tanzania rely on the humanitarian government for providing services and management of refugees in the absence of the state, the less ability actors such as UNHCR have to positively influence the host state for more rights for refugees.

### **'Burden sharing' from below**

You should give us all cows and tractors!' This tongue-in-cheek comment was met with a room full of laughter at a Kibondo District Chamber of Commerce meeting in February 2018. Though said in jest, the sentiment is indicative of a central tension that exists in countries hosting large numbers of refugees: the expectation of aid as 'burden sharing' from the international community. Although the big bushes for refugee governance funding and reform largely occurs at the elite level between national bureaucrats, heads of state, international organisations, and donors, on the ground level, there are also expectations of burden sharing, which affects local host communities' perceptions of refugees, humanitarian governments, and their own government. I gained valuable insights into these perceptions in villages surrounding the camp as well as the Chamber of Commerce meeting, which consisted of 25 businesspeople based in Kibondo, the closest town and trading hub near Nduta and Mtendeli camps. The discussion group was assembled for the socio-economic assessment of the three refugee camps and host communities for UNHCR that I was a part of. At this discussion group, we first asked the group what they felt were the benefits of hosting refugees. The chairman of the group responded:

On the face of it is a profit to hosting refugees but attached to the profit is a loss. The profit can be economical, sometimes it can have an impact of profit for relationships or with health. Before, when there were refugees [in the 1990s], we saw profit because there were good relationships between us and the refugees and organisations that were around. In the current phase, we expected to have the same benefits. Some of the businessmen and their leaders took their proposals to the District Commissioner to allow refugees to stay in the previous camps because they could see profits in those previous years. The proposal was

taken and implemented, and the refugees are there as before. The profit is not as we had expected. Currently, the economic benefit is not high except for those with the opportunities for those working for the NGOs and there are not many opportunities. We expected each person to benefit from the refugees.

Another man went on to describe the downsides and disappointments of hosting refugees, which took up most of the time of the meeting:

The losses include environmental pollutions like trees being cut, poor infrastructures like roads and education are affected. We had expected there to be improvements in education and the water sector but have not seen that. Even the Burundians themselves don't see a benefit because they no longer have the common markets that they used to have. The previous markets were within four kilometres from the camp. The UN did not construct market structures.<sup>7</sup> UNHCR has capacity but has no will do to it.

A different businessman joined in with the complaints:

Most tenders are not given to local construction companies. They are giving the tenders to people from Dar es Salaam. The economy can only grow if it stays in the region. Most tenders go to people even outside Kigoma. The new employees from other parts of the country cause rents to be higher. Most of the projects that come just focus on the refugees so whatever projects the partner organisations do they come to refugees only.

By the end of the meeting people were taking turns going around the table listing all of the problems to hosting camps that they could think of:

'We have diseases like *'kuhara damu'* [coccidia, an intestinal parasite] that we didn't have in Kigoma before the refugees came.'

'Refugees get referred to the Kibondo hospital, but the UN doesn't give money to the local hospital'.

'There is an increase of insecurity and crime.'

'Refugees are stealing crops because UNHCR and WFP are reducing rations.'

'There was loss of land without compensation in all of the villages where there are now camps.'

This discussion in Kibondo illuminated two simultaneous, yet contradictory truths: communities surrounding the camp are both burdened and benefit from the

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<sup>7</sup> The common markets he is referring to are the markets of Nduta and Mtendeli camps. These markets are located a long distance away from the camps. The Common Market at Nyarugusu is located right at the entrance of the camp and does not have this same issue.

presence of refugees. While host communities experience more insecurity and environmental damage, their primary disadvantage is neglect from the state, which is enabled by the presence of humanitarian actors in the region for decades. This is what Lauren Landau (2002) calls the 'humanitarian hangover' that he found in this same Kigoma region nearly two decades prior: 'In the humanitarian hangover we see how the humanitarian influx, interacting with the "discursive state", has resulted in a sub-population even less firmly linked with the state's formal institutions, but tied to a reified complex of national (i.e. Tanzanian) virtues' (p. 286). Additionally, Landau correctly predicts that the large refugee influxes of the 1990s in North-western Tanzania, which has historically been neglected and marginalised, serves as a reference point from which host communities are once again making claims to the humanitarian government rather than the Tanzanian state: 'The initiative of this new [humanitarian] regime may act as a kind of historical node that will serve to structure future responses from both official and popular actors within Kasulu. Without a strong centralized state, such regional variations are likely to persist and are further institutionalized' (p. 288).

The members of the Chamber of Commerce also recognised that they have benefited from the presence of refugees. Quantitative research shows that the regions in Tanzania which host refugees largely benefit economically from their presence (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014; Maystadt and Duranton 2014; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2015). These advantages are not felt equally across all classes in the host populations, however, as often poorer Tanzanians often lose out on jobs and struggle affording price increases due to greater consumption demands (Whitaker 2002b; Landau 2002). Indeed, the 'displacement economies' (Hammar 2014) of the refugee camps and the surrounding host communities, which I focus on in the next two chapters, are deeply intertwined and symbiotic. In large part, if the camp economy is thriving then the host communities will benefit and vice versa. It naturally follows that any notion of self-reliance should incorporate the surrounding communities alongside the camps. The basic design of a macro big push from international donors through burden sharing aid to host communities, combined with an opening of encampment restrictions from the state will make winners of all in theory. This would include development for a neglected Kigoma region, self-reliance for refugees, and a reduced

humanitarian funding tab as a result of increased refugee earnings and less need for aid. Alas, this has yet to come to fruition in Tanzania or most protracted refugee situations. In the wake of macro big push failures, which ensures strict encampment policies remain, the humanitarian government's micro-efforts through projects targeting individual households amount to meagre and 'pithy development' at best.

### **'Pithy development'**

Reflecting on ethnographic moments I witnessed, as well as speaking with financial diary participants and humanitarian workers, I contend that self-reliance strategies by the humanitarian government are underfunded and ineffective. Yet the thesis to this point shows that Tanzania has made self-reliance even less attainable in its heavy-handed shutdown politics. Many post-colonial countries such as Tanzania have been left frustrated by the lack of financial support for hosting refugees, which has resulted in repeated failed big pushes. Leaders like President Magufuli see little incentives in expanding rights for refugees. Beyond enforcing containment through encampment, Magufuli is trying to ease the so-called burden of hosting refugees by assaulting markets and humanitarian programmes through shutdown politics in order to impel refugees to leave the country. This section analyses the combination of mostly 'cosmetic' livelihood programming by humanitarians in conjunction with the shutdown politics of the Tanzanian state. I argue that development efforts are mostly 'pithy' and self-reliance is becoming increasingly impossible for all but a small minority of the 'non-poor' examined in the previous chapter. This view of 'pithy development' in Tanzania can be situated within the broader critique of refugee self-reliance where refugees and humanitarians face many of the same constraints and dilemmas as other protracted displacement situations such as Lebanon.

Estella Carpi (2019) argues that refugee self-reliance projects such as chocolate-making for Syrian refugees in Lebanon are 'neo-cosmetic' in that they function merely as a 'cosmetic accessory' meant to not disrupt the already constrained labour markets and maintain refugee and host relations:

Local economic vulnerability and poor infrastructures in Akkar were in fact internationally recognized only when the Syrian-refugee crisis became

protracted and INGOs activated belated compensatory aid and service provision to both locals and refugees as a biopolitical strategy of containing local discontent and forced migrants (Duffield 2008: 149–151) within the Middle East region [...] Even Syrian returnees who went back to Akkar after the beginning of the conflict had no resources and social capital to rely on, even though some of them already previously worked or were even born in the region [...] On the whole, refugees considered self-sufficiency as neither achievable nor conceivable in the Lebanese context. Most of the refugees affirmed their dependence on NGO support and the remittances of relatives who resettled in other host countries to better sustain themselves; on the other hand, some incur debt, accept exploitation or advance promises of payment in order to survive (pp. 9-10).

Though Carpi's research takes place in urban Lebanon, an entirely different context than Nyarugusu camp, if you substitute the words, 'Akkar', 'Syrian', 'Middle East', and 'Lebanon' with 'Kigoma', 'Burundian', 'East Africa', and 'Tanzania', you will still be telling a very similar story. As I describe further below, all livelihoods interventions allowed by the Tanzanian state in camps must respect encampment policies, and not disrupt the existing labour structure. For example, in the next chapter, I analyse the illicit farming networks surrounding the camps where thousands of refugees engage illegally outside the camp in the agricultural system. Despite the prevalence of these workers and renters, no livelihood programming such as agricultural inputs or equipment can be provided by humanitarian actors. Alternatively, the humanitarian government repeatedly implements vocational training programmes such as soap-making projects, which are doomed to fail due to containment policies. Ilcan (2018) argues that more is at play in this programming than just enhancing livelihoods. She analyses 'citizenship training' programmes which are producing new political subjectivities:

Citizenship training includes governing efforts designed to instruct particular individuals about the optimal relationships between citizens and the market, civil society, or the state. These efforts may involve neoliberal governing initiatives, such as self-reliance strategies, that emphasize the need for individuals to take greater economic and social responsibility for themselves, and to learn to become good or active citizens (p. 100).

This is a similar conceptualisation of 'resiliency humanitarianism' which, 'focuses on ideas of assistance deemed necessary for vulnerable groups [...] in order for them to adapt to crisis. Here, individuals are not viewed as passive recipients of aid but rather

as having the potential to be transformed into responsible, resilient subjects who survive through crisis' (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015 p. 337). Despite being trained by humanitarian agencies to be 'good' or 'resilient' citizens, as non-citizens, refugees are subject to xenophobic discrimination and a lack of rights such as mobility to purchase soap-making supplies outside the camp. In Tanzania, the state has deliberately neutered the refugee regime's ability to enhance self-reliance, which is compounded by a lack of international funding for food aid, livelihood projects, and livelihood personnel to implement livelihood programming.

### **Refugee self-reliance in Tanzania**

When I arrived in Tanzania, I was surprised to learn that for the three Kigoma refugee camps, which housed over 350,000 refugees at the time, there was only one solitary livelihoods officer employed by UNHCR. This officer's responsibilities were to coordinate more than 14 national and international NGOs that were implementing livelihoods projects in the camps and host communities. Earlier in Chapter 1, I argued against the conceptualisation of UNHCR as a 'surrogate state' partly because governance was shared and contested among more actors than just UNHCR. Getting to know the livelihoods officer reinforces this argument. UNHCR in Tanzania and most settings do not directly implement projects but instead holds a managerial and coordinating role through subcontracts with 'implementing partner' organisations. The livelihoods officer described to me the difficulty of coordinating the livelihood projects of the implementing. As a funding body, UNHCR only finances some of the projects being implemented by the various NGOs. These partners also acquire direct funding through other donors such as DfID, USAID, the World Bank, and numerous others, which do not make them accountable to UNHCR. Thus, the UNHCR livelihoods officer only received partial reporting on project indicators and quantifiable figures. Moreover, he struggled to get the partner organisations to cooperate and join in the livelihoods working group meetings at all. His job was made even more difficult after the cash transfer programme was terminated by President Magufuli because, after the shutdown, the state ordered that no refugee livelihood programming could include cash transfers or cash-based microfinance of any kind. Due to the shutdown, as well

as facing significant funding constraints due to lack of donors, the humanitarian government was mostly limited to implementing projects to create savings groups or vocational training programmes.

### **Savings groups**

Savings groups are often called village savings and loan associations (VSLAs), village community banks (VICOBAs), rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), merry-go-rounds, and many other names. These groups have long been popular around the world where formal finance institutions do not have branches or are too expensive to access by many. The biggest barrier to starting and maintaining a business is acquiring capital. The same is true for savings groups. To join a savings group, there is almost always a fee ranging in value, as well as minimum deposits required each week, every other week, or monthly depending on when the groups meet. In other words, it takes capital to make capital, and it takes capital to save capital. The barriers to joining groups are significant because as Chapter 5 shows, most people fall into ultra-poor or poor categories in Nyarugusu and often the only waged employment available is illicit and precarious agricultural labour outside the camp. The alternative is to go hungry and sell food rations to raise money. The consequence of these barriers is that it is prohibitive for poorer households to join savings groups. Furthermore, the mandatory minimum fees are so low that the quantities loaned in the groups are too insignificant to make a difference, which I heard many savings group members complain about. These groups are beneficial to smooth finances to pay for things such as funeral dues, they can act to supplement an already running business, or can be tapped into during economic shocks. While savings groups are a valuable service to many, the financial services they provide are only a small aspect to attaining economic self-reliance. However, they rarely propel people out of their current situations of poverty.

While these savings projects offer minimum benefits, due to the restrictions by the Tanzanian state, these groups have been the go-to option for humanitarians, despite high costs relative to their benefits. According to an internal database obtained with permission from UNHCR, in Nyarugusu camp alone, there were four different

organisations which had targets in 2017 to create savings and vocational groups that would include 2,544 individual members (UNHCR 2017d).<sup>8</sup> An organisation operating in the camps, the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and partner organisations, which were not included in the aforementioned UNHCR document reporting livelihood groups in the camp (UNHCR 2017d), claims to have formed over 100 savings groups in the three camps in 2017. They have set targets for new savings group members in 2018 at 1,500, which is set to rise each year to reach 9,000 members by 2021. This will come at an estimated cost of USD 2.5 million (UNCDF 2018). In meeting with the people responsible for implementing these savings groups, it became even more clear how unnecessarily costly these projects were.

In November 2017, I was in Dar es Salaam and met with the programme manager of an international organisation which was supporting the expansion of savings groups in the camps. We had a conversation where I explained the camp's economic context, and they explained the aims of the programme they were going to implement. The end of the conversation is what sticks most vividly in my mind. When I asked about where they had gotten their funding, the manager explained to me: 'Refugees fell into my lap, it's not what I'm familiar with. Refugee camps are wonderful places to see what works and don't work. They are like sandboxes to try things out. Because they are contained, you can reach people easily'. The programme manager was explicit that they entered the refugee camp development industry not because of the missing needs of financial inclusion that they saw, but because they had acquired earmarked funds to start more groups. The manager explained the significant costs of running the project. Beyond just setting up savings groups, the programming also included digital training and literacy to the project through mobile phones and tablets. The international organisation sub-contracted three separate NGOs to implement these technological aspects as well as an additional international NGO to recruit and train the savings groups in the camp. Moreover, these operations required funds to pay for an office and staff in Dar es Salaam as well as the field office coordinating the project at the camp level.

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<sup>8</sup> I am unable to verify if they reached the target numbers for membership because the document does not include this data.

These experimental and technological ideals merge remarkably close to what Tom Scott-Smith (2016) calls 'humanitarian neophilia', which is an obsession with innovation rooted in a 'Californian ideology' found in the technology industry in Silicon Valley. The manager's use of the term 'sandboxes' is itself a term from the tech industry referring to computer programming but also experimenting and trial and error often found in start-up tech companies. Other examples of humanitarian neophilia include experimenting or refining the uses of blockchain and other technologies on refugees (Cheesman 2017; Korkmaz 2018). Scott-Smith (2016) problematises the innovation turn, not because innovation is inherently wrong, but because these initiatives prioritise new technologies over incremental improvements. 'They risk reducing complex humanitarian problems, which need political engagement and have a significant social angle, to the provision of material goods' (p. 10). He argues that these innovations benefit the humanitarian community rather than the recipients of the interventions.

A project like this becomes starkly expensive when juxtaposed against savings groups that are initiated and sustained by refugees themselves. Many of the informants in the financial diaries households that have some degree of access to incomes are involved with savings groups. However, they have been set up by refugees themselves separate from costly humanitarian interventions through friends, families, ethnic, religious and networks. For example, I met multiple members and leaders of one of the largest refugee-led organisation called *Union Pour le Progrès et la Délivrance Humanitaire* (UPDH),<sup>9</sup> which was originally formed in Fizi territory of South Kivu but transplanted to Nyarugusu in 2002. At the time of research in August 2017, they had formed 52 self-selected savings groups accounting for 580 members. Their numbers were growing, and they were also helping form Burundian savings groups on the other side of the camp. UPDH and many similar refugee community-based organisations (RCOs) operate on shoestring budgets coming from membership dues while being neglected by UNHCR and other funders. In other words, they do more for far less.

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<sup>9</sup> In English this means Union for Progress and Humanitarian Deliverance.

## Vocational groups

The other popular option for international NGOs funding self-reliance in camps are vocational groups, which provide training for a skill or business such as tailoring, hairstyling, or breadmaking, which are popular business in the camp. After the training is complete, the NGOs often provide cash or in-kind materials to start the business. To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of these types of projects, I revisit Viola, the Burundian woman whose story I highlighted in the Introduction, as well as Julienne, a Burundian woman who was also part of the financial diaries. In the intentionally restrictive space of the camp, these interventions are often doomed to fail.

In November 2017, my research assistant, Fred and I decided to visit Viola in the Nyarugusu Common Market to observe relations and networks at the market. When we arrived, Viola was in an animated exchange with five other women who were shouting at one another. After the commotion was over, we spoke with her about what was going on. She explained that she was chosen by an NGO to be part of a vocational training group with the other five women. The group was to be trained in entrepreneurial and saving skills and then given fish as capital to start a business. Before the group was formed, the women were strangers. Viola explained that four of the women had colluded to sell their portion of the product in the market before the others arrived. They reported back to the group that they sold the products for lower than the actual price in order to pocket the extra cash. Viola was very angry that she was left out and lost money. 'It is better to give [capital] individually to avoid conflicts', she explained. According to her, they were initially promised a significant cash transfer to start a business before the government cut this option off. Viola continued:

According to [the NGO] you must remain in a group even if you lose money or get profit. When donors came, they promised the money would be given. I'm disappointed because they didn't fulfil their promises. I'm planning to leave my group and sell my own onions. I feel it's better to go on with my own life and my own business.

After this conversation, Fred commented that this similarly happened to his wife in a basket-making group that she was assigned to: 'This always happens when groups are formed by NGOs. They fall apart. I always say, "money smells funny"'.

Every person who was part of an NGO-led vocational programme complained that the materials or capital they were given was not sufficient to sustain a business. Moreover, I also learned that bribes or personal connections to the recruiters and NGO employees are often the only way to be selected for vocational training groups set up by NGOs that give training and start-up in-kind capital. This only further entrenches the inequalities that have formed within the camp. I met another business group that had similar issues as Viola and more. They were also put together with strangers; also promised cash that was not delivered. A Burundian woman in the group further described the issues:

The capital they gave us was too small. They gave us fish too late and it became spoiled. We had to sell them so cheap just to get rid of the products. Our group was given worthless fish, but other groups were taught tailoring skills and were given sewing machines, which are worth way more than the fish we were given. None of it was fair and it has been a waste of time.

Even if business groups have a viable product, the nature of encampment often also leads to failure for the business. Julienne, a Burundian woman who is part of the financial diaries was in a soap-making group that was similar to the chocolate-making groups that Carpi (2019) describes in Lebanon. On paper, soap-making livelihoods make sense. There is a demand for soap in the camp because the soap provided by donors is of poor quality and often runs out before the next distribution. However, in practise, these businesses are not viable. Julienne described to me how an NGO brought her and others with physical disabilities to Kigoma town four hours away to learn how to make soap as a group. They were given TZS 100,000 (USD 43.56). This was not enough money, so they all pooled money together to purchase more materials. The group was successful in selling what they made. However, they could not purchase most of the materials they needed to make new stock because these products were not available locally. They had to go all the way back to Kigoma to purchase acid, large buckets, colouring, a special instrument to balance oil and acid ratios, and wood tools to cut the soap into pieces. The encampment policy means that they legally cannot leave without permission, which is difficult to be granted, and the number of bribes they would have to pay to get to Kigoma would make their business unprofitable. As such, this business failed. Meeting Viola at the Common Market, as

well as many anecdotes from others, showed that the random assembling of strangers into business groups are often doomed to fail because of the difficulty to build trust in the group. Even if there is positive social cohesion in the groups, as was the case with Julienne, many times people involved in these groups explained to me that the start-up capital provided in-kind was insufficient or unsuitable to start sustainable businesses. I do not mean to say that training programmes do not have value to some. I have met people that were trained for trades such as tailoring that have found jobs or started successful businesses. Unfortunately, these people are not the majority.

I use all of these examples of failed savings and vocational groups to join with the critique of refugee self-reliance as a fair and viable way to govern camps. I am critical because the stakes are high. With dwindling funding for refugee situations such as Tanzania, UNHCR self-reliance strategies are used as a pretext to justify further reductions to humanitarian food aid. Instead of spending large amounts of limited international funds on costly tech-laden, yet ultimately pithy interventions, better value for money would be to support organisations such as UPDH, who offer similar, if not better services (due to familiarity and trustworthiness within the refugee community). Otherwise, money should be diverted to interventions that refugees prioritise as valuable to them. There seems to be a large converging view from other disciplinary approaches such as economics that microfinance and savings groups are not a 'panacea' to poverty and have a mixed picture of success (Banerjee et al. 2015; Karlan et al. 2017). Microfinance and financial inclusion have important effects, my informants describe some financial and social benefits to joining groups that should not be ignored. I share the view with David Roodman (2012) in his book, *Due Diligence*, that there is some benefit to 'industry building' or enhancing access to financial services to the poor, or in this case, camped refugees. Indeed, it is certainly better to have more options for savings groups and vocational training than not to have those available at all. The question is, however, are the high costs of implementing these programmes amidst dwindling humanitarian budgets worth it? This question of costs is the crucial tension in all iterations of self-reliance from colonial indirect rule to refugee management today.

## Conclusion

This chapter has covered a lot of ground by deconstructing self-reliance from multiple historical registers and scales of analysis from above and below. Policymakers and many forced migration scholars often mistakenly view refugee self-reliance initiatives as ‘innovative’ or ‘novel’ (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018; Scott-Smith 2016). Easton-Calabria (2015) deconstructs the novelty of the current refugee self-reliance paradigm by showing the continuities of livelihood projects under various derivative monikers such as self-help or self-sufficiency since the interwar ‘pre-history’ of refugee management to the current neoliberal development philosophy. I take her historiography deeper by fusing with it the concurrent and parallel self-reliance ideologies occurring at the same time amidst colonial indirect rule and *ujamaa* in Tanzania under President Nyerere. I trace these continuities from colonialism as Nyerere’s self-reliance ideals prevalent in villagization and agricultural refugee settlements had strong overlaps with colonial self-help philosophies of indirect rule. Nyerere’s agricultural refugee settlements, despite their exploitative and containing nature, are seen as an inspiration for the global refugee regime’s commitment to self-reliance today. The ideologies underpinning the application of self-reliance has shifted throughout time: from the primordial racist beliefs of indirect rule, attempts to decolonise as a Third World country from the global capitalist system through *ujamaa*, and a neoliberal belief in the free market and renunciation of the state more recently. However, all of these eras can be distilled to the basic desire to drastically reduce the costs of governance. The colonial and later post-colonial states needed to reduce costs of governing the bifurcated state; since the 1990s, refugee hosting countries drastically reduced costs by abdicating responsibility for managing the camps to humanitarian actors. Finally, humanitarians are now attempting to reduce costs of ongoing care and maintenance by pushing the current neoliberal self-reliance strategies to individual households. This plays into the hands of the Tanzanian state because it can leverage and weaponise the failures of self-reliance to the breaking point, which force refugees to leave the country before it is safe for them to do so.

Broadly speaking, indirect rule benefited few ‘decentralised despots’ and was imposed on the rest of colonial subjects (Mamdani 1996). After independence, in the

1960s and 1970s the hegemonic colonial state was replaced by the Tanzanian state, which imposed self-reliance and self-help through villagization and refugee settlements. Beginning during the late 1970s and 1980s and up to the present, the costs of refugee governance was negotiated through big push humanitarianism. International donors have had soaring bills to pay for care and maintenance of protracted refugee situations. Big pushes have attempted to keep these costs down by enticing refugee hosting countries such as Tanzania with aid and development projects or burden sharing in exchange for reducing encampment barriers to refugee livelihoods. In this view, it follows that self-reliant refugees leads to less need for care and maintenance aid for donor countries to pay for. Under the same logic, self-reliant colonial subjects were less costly than direct rule in earlier eras of colonialism. However, As the failures of ICARA I and II and the CRRF shutdown demonstrate, the balance of shared costs and burdens is rarely able to satisfy all parties. This leaves the possibility of refugee self-reliance stillborn.

When zoomed in to the level of the camp and surrounding communities, the meeting of demands for burden-sharing seem far away. Localised expectations for burden sharing include improved healthcare, education, and infrastructure, access to humanitarian jobs, reduced violence, and environmental degradation. Landau (2002) describes this effect of the trifurcated state as the 'humanitarian hangover' where welfare claims are placed on the humanitarian government rather than their own state. Even though many surrounding communities benefit from the presence of refugees and stood to benefit even further from development to arrive as a result of the CRRF, their perceived burden causes hostility toward humanitarians and refugees, rather than the central Tanzanian state. With power in Tanzania held so closely to President Magufuli, he is more ideologically concerned with his 'Tanzania first' project of forfeiting international aid and maintaining a regional alliance to Burundi's power-broker President Nkurunziza, than cooperating with the international refugee regime or concerns over the well-being of refugees and surrounding communities in the Kigoma region. The shutdown of the CRRF not only blocked aid to the host community but proved also to be a deathblow to the possibility of self-reliance for refugees in Tanzania.

As others have argued (Omata 2017; Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018; Carpi 2019; Ilcan 2018), in contexts where encampment limitations on the rights to work persist, and where food and cash aid is continually decreasing, refugee self-reliance is an impossibility; a neoliberal pipedream. Despite the lack of economic progress toward self-reliance of the savings and business groups described in this chapter, these 'citizenship training' projects are still producing neoliberal resilient subjects (Ilcan 2018; Ilcan and Rygiel 2015). The difficulties of doing development are compounded in Tanzania, where cash and other micro-lending projects for refugees have been forbidden by the state. These state-imposed constraints mean that the only options for development in the toolkits of NGOs that remain are savings and vocational training groups, which are ineffectual. This is evidenced by placing Viola in a livelihoods group with strangers or equipping Julienne with the skills to make an in-demand soap commodity without access to supplies. Accessing sufficient capital and mobility are requirements to make the businesses viable, which are not currently being provided to most refugees. Despite little evidence of success, UNHCR and implementing partners persist at funding and implementing these projects with technological frills, despite RCOs such as UPDH being more effective at mobilising groups organically. If money is earmarked to specific organisations for development, then I supposed the money must be spent, even if the results are pithy. The results of this restrictive system is that the projects are used more as means of performance, or 'little more than a cosmetic accessory' (Carpi 2019 p. 9).

Any possibility of reaching true levels of self-reliance for both refugees and host communities must be met with a thorough decolonisation of all tiers of the trifurcated state, which I address in the concluding chapter. A beginning point would be for international donors to be reparative of colonial legacies by first addressing the costs they are asking for to share the burden. Although the big pushes have repeatedly failed, and pithy development projects means self-reliance continues to be an unreachable myth in camps, refugees and migrants have long resisted the constraints of the camp to struggle for creating their own livelihoods beyond the humanitarian structure. In the final two empirical chapters I focus on these everyday acts of

resistance—what I call decolonising mobilities—which are enacted through establishing networks and businesses linking to markets outside of the camp.

# Part III:

## Refugee agency



Figure 18: Colourful house in Nyarugusu. Credit: Boeyink 2017.



# Chapter 7:

## Sufficiently visible/invisibly self-sufficient: Recognition in displacement agriculture



*Figure 19: Burundian labour migrants outside the camp. Credit: Boeyink 2017.*

## Introduction<sup>10</sup>

In *Politics of Innocence*, Simon Turner (2010) analogises the top-down humanitarian logic to a description of a bird's-eye of Tanzanian refugee camp, Lukole: 'defying the surrounding countryside with its straight rows of blue and white huts, its equally straight roads, and its evenly distributed water stands' (p. 16). If you flew over Nyarugusu camp, you would see that half of the camp has thatched roofs, and the other half have metal roofing. The thatched side are the Congolese who have resided in Nyarugusu since its inception in 1996, and the tin-roofed half of the camp was constructed in 2015 with newly available funds for the influx of Burundian refugees. This is symbolic of the 'place-making projects' (Novak 2007) which explains economic inequalities between the Congolese and Burundians. Extending Turner's visual analogy, widening your gaze from the camp you would see acres of surrounding farmland. Unseen to the observer, however, are the refugees and migrant mobilities that make up this agrarian system. See Figure 20 below for a satellite image of the camp. The thesis to this point has primarily centred on the severe economic constraints and violence refugees face through the containment logic of the trifurcated state. The next two chapters, beginning with this chapter on 'displacement agriculture' systems, shifts the focus to look at the ways refugees and migrants are enacting mobilities to defy the containing restrictions and scrape their own self-reliance through circumventing and subverting humanitarian encampment.

These agricultural spaces are illegal because it is forbidden under Tanzanian refugee law to leave the camp without official permission. The humanitarian actors respect the sovereignty of Tanzanian law, so farming is also outside of the 'visibility field' of the humanitarian government (Feldman 2008). From the top-down view of Tanzanian national law and humanitarian programming, agriculture outside of the camp is unrecognized and thus invisible. This means the actors are 'invisibly self-

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<sup>10</sup> This chapter is based on a chapter in an anthology called, *Invisibility in African Displacements: From Structural Marginalization to Strategies of Avoidance* edited by Jesper Bjarneson and Simon Turner, which is in the editing process. This chapter contains edits of that chapter, which includes removing background information already presented, in an attempt to not repeat information already presented in other chapters to best fit the flow of the thesis. For this reason, this chapter is shorter in length than most other chapters. The most recent version of the chapter to be published is located in the Appendix of the thesis.

sufficient' beyond the support of international aid. When the field of vision shifts to the actors on the ground, however, there is a refraction of visibility. Recognition occurs between the interactions and relations involved in buying and selling of land and labour. Refugees and migrants, therefore, must also ensure they are 'sufficiently visible' to market themselves to participate in the agricultural system, yet 'invisible enough' to the authorities of an increasingly hostile state.

Immediately surrounding these camps are extensive 'displacement economies' (Hammar 2014) of agricultural systems that amalgamate land rental and labour between Tanzanian host communities, Burundian and Congolese refugees, and



Figure 20: Satellite image from Google Earth of Nyarugusu camp. Congolese houses darker (top of camp) Burundian houses brighter (bottom of camp).

Burundian labour migrants. The three camps and agricultural spaces include many displacement experiences and temporalities, or 'place-making projects' (Novak 2007), which inform stereotypes and prejudices that are central to the process of renting land. This chapter analyses the juxtaposition of visibility and invisibility among refugees and migrants in Tanzania since colonialism with a focus on the current conjuncture under President John Magufuli. The question guiding this research is how has visibility and invisibility been imposed upon or produced amongst the actors in the agricultural systems surrounding the camps, and how does this differ for Congolese refugees and Burundian migrants and refugees over time?

One day in October 2017, I was interviewing a Congolese woman, Furaha, who is a member of the financial diaries project. During the interview, a Burundian labour migrant she employs stopped by to visit. By this time, I had heard from other informants about the agricultural systems they were involved with, however, this was the first time I met a non-camp resident to learn about their role in the system. With his consent, I visited the *shamba*<sup>11</sup> he was currently working on. On the visit, I interviewed 28 Burundian labour migrant men and boys. Shortly after leaving Tanzania, my research assistants conducted interviews with refugee land renters, refugee paid labourers, Burundian labour migrants, and multiple Tanzanian landowners participating in this system. As I discuss in the Introduction, the voices and perspectives of state actors such as the police and MHA in Nyarugusu on the agriculture system are absent because, like the informants in this chapter, I was also trying to be invisible to them. I decided to avoid them to not bring attention to myself or being surveilled and putting the informants at risk or being barred from conducting further research in the camp as they have been known to do.

## **Invisibility and recognition**

At first glance, there is a clear cause and effect link between a host state imposing invisibility on displaced populations through encampment policies designed for containment. This results in migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, registered or

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<sup>11</sup> *Shamba* is Swahili for farm.

otherwise, enacting invisibility, or 'invisibilisation' in order to seek opportunities outside of the camp. In addition to discussing ethical dilemmas and raising awareness of blind spots in academic and policy involving these populations, this was a main point in the special issues on invisible displacements in the *Journal of Refugee Studies* (Polzer and Hammond 2007). What is missing from this conceptualization of invisibility is the aspects of visibility within the lived experience of these populations. A refugee or migrant must be seen to be able to make a livelihood, which is the primary motivation for those to leave the legally protected space of the camp or their home country. Borrowing from the philosophy of recognition, this chapter proposes a different framing of imposed invisibility to include actors such as agricultural labourers and renters who are seen but not recognized (Honneth 2001a). This section briefly reviews how invisibility has been used in forced migration studies, and how the philosophy of recognition can more completely capture the precarious realities of displacement in Tanzania.

In Liisa Malkki's (1995a) groundbreaking work, she introduces the nascent field of forced migration studies to 'town refugees' referring to self-settled Burundian Hutus who employ 'strategies of invisibility' to live in Kigoma town of Western Tanzania instead of mandated refugee settlements. She argues town refugees in Kigoma shed their national Burundian and Hutu identities for 'creolized, rhizomatic' or 'cosmopolitan' identities (Malkki 1995a p. 36). Malkki's contemporary, Gaim Kibreab, was also elucidating the steady rise of urban refugees in Africa such as Ethiopians and Eritreans in Khartoum (Kibreab 1996a). He disputes Malkki's theory of deterritorialisation by asserting 'town refugees' in Kigoma were being tactically deceptive: 'the strategy of invisibility was an act of defiance and resistance rather than being a manifestation of submissive behaviour or a lost identity' (p. 394). He describes Eritrean refugees in Khartoum strategically toggling between religious identities to their benefit (pp. 397-398). Burundians in Tanzania are still making themselves invisible today by obscuring ethnicities, changing names, and intermarriage despite many being given Tanzanian citizenship (Daley et al. 2018). It is not my intent to re-open the identity and belonging debate between Malkki, Kibreab, and others. What is largely missing from this discourse on invisibility, however, are the instances where

town refugees are necessarily seen; whether they are recognised or not. Kibreab (1996a) alludes to this notion but is making this point to humanitarian policy actors who are more biased toward rural refugees: 'If rural refugees were, in the 1970s, "what the eye did not see," today refugees in many of the African urban centres are what the eye "refuses to see"' (p. 131). This ocular analogy between what the eye sees or refuses to see follows the logic of recognition of philosopher Axel Honneth.<sup>12</sup>

Honneth uses the Hegelian notion that one's self-awareness and value are relationally or 'intersubjectively' constituted. He distils Hegel's theory to assert, 'our idea of justice is essentially connected with a conception as to how, and in what way, individuals recognize one another reciprocally' (Honneth 2001b p. 45). The challenge of theorising recognition, and the biggest cause of disagreement, is how to widen recognition to the level of society. The opposite of recognition is disrespect or humiliation, which can occur at the individual or group level by intentionally causing harm or through a social exclusion of legal rights (pp. 46-52). Drawing from Ralph Ellison's novel, *The Invisible Man*, Honneth (2001a) relates the narrator's humiliating experience of being black in America and feeling invisible because people see through him. Honneth interprets this to mean that the narrator is not physically invisible, he is 'cognized' as having a 'spatio-temporal framework as an object with situationally relevant properties' (p. 113). He is figuratively and socially invisible because he is not recognized or validated. In other words, relating to Kibreab's (1996a) description of urban refugees, invisibility is what the eye *refuses* to see. Invisibility is fundamentally about recognition. Yet there are two definitions of recognition that Honneth often uses interchangeably. One way is to distinctly notice somebody interpersonally, the second is to acknowledge somebody's validity or rights. This distinction can become blurred. For example, urban refugees may desire recognition from host and humanitarian governments, but unlike Ellison's narrator, they seek to be unrecognized and anonymous by their neighbours and authorities in the city. It is therefore important to clarify to whom and at what level displaced people are seeking visibility and recognition, or invisibility for safety and protection. This makes Kelly Oliver's (2015) critique of Honneth especially prescient for refugees and migrants in Tanzania. She

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<sup>12</sup> Thanks to Lotte Pelckmans for this suggested source.

asserts, 'recognition is experienced as conferred by the very groups and institutions responsible for withholding it in the first place. In other words, recognition is distributed according to an axis of power that is part and parcel of systems of dominance and oppression' (p. 474). Tanzania's asylum and migration history demonstrate the inconsistency of the states' recognition for refugee and migrant populations.

City-dwelling refugees described by Malkki, Kibreab, and others live a daily *modus operandi* or 'habitus' of invisibility. With the impossibility of legal recognition, they strategically enact invisibility to camouflage into diverse, dense, and transient urban populations to survive. They are cognized in the city by being a part of its fabric, but intentionally avoid recognition as refugees. The forms of invisibilities that take place in agricultural settings around the camps in rural Kigoma do not fit these characterisations. For example, Burundians share many physical, cultural, and linguistic features with the Ha ethnic group and impersonate them in places like Dar es Salaam. However, to attempt to do the same in the largely homogenous Ha villages surrounding the camps and Burundians would instantly be outed and exposed (Daley et al. 2018 pp. 30-31). When Honneth's analysis of invisibility is applied to refugees and migrants in and around Nyarugusu, we see refractions of recognition depending on the level of analysis. On the ground level of the village and *shamba*, refugees cannot blend in because they will always be identified as 'the other' to the host community, yet they achieve a level of recognition by entering in business agreements over land and labour. However, at the level of the state and in humanitarian programming, they will remain unrecognized and invisible until asylum law in Tanzania changes, which I am not hopeful for. See the Conclusion chapter of this thesis for an explanation why. Refugees and migrants leaving legally bounded areas such as the four-kilometre camp buffer zone, or the Tanzania-Burundi border must balance invisibility and visibility; they must find what I coin as '(in)visibility sufficiency'. In other words, invisibility in this case is about hiding *enough* from the state and police, while being visible *enough* to network and negotiate for land and wages. Also different from urban refugees, migrant and refugee land-renters and labourers are forced into limited moments of invisibility as they transit the imaginary legal veils of the national borders and the camp boundaries.

Recognition is not evenly conferred upon all refugees and migrants in Tanzania. This is the case when comparing Congolese and Burundian refugees, first-time and repeat refugees, or between legal Burundian migrants and refugees. These groups, with overlapping geographies and temporalities of displacement and mobility, resemble the various 'place-making projects' among Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Novak 2007). Place-making projects encapsulate multiple power relations influenced by refugees' multiple displacement registers, temporalities, ethnicities, religious identities, and governance structures: 'It is only by unravelling the different projects simultaneously attributing significance to the same people and territory, and their interactions, that the process of place-making can be captured' (Novak p. 255). The various place-making projects and the stereotypes that reify them determine degrees of recognition in these agricultural spaces.

## **Displacement agriculture**

In *Displacements Economies in Africa*, Amanda Hammar (2014) and contributors widen the normative conceptual frame of forced displacement to 'observe the emergence of, and articulation between, a range of new physical, social, economic and political spaces, relations, systems and practises that displacement itself was producing' (p. 3). Despite being the poorest region of Tanzania, Kigoma has produced agricultural surpluses in recent years, even during times of droughts throughout most of East Africa (WFP 2016). Moreover, unlike in neighbouring Burundi, population density is low, and land is abundant in this area and not difficult to obtain for Tanzanians. From this excess, many Tanzanian landowners decide to rent land to refugees to produce 'displacement agriculture'. The full scale of land rental practises around the camps is unclear as there is limited data on these systems. According to the Community Household and Surveillance (CHS) study, 46% of the households from all three camps had access to land. Of this number, 3.8% reported leaving the camp to lease land (CHS 2017 p. 3). The population of the three camps at the time was nearly 320,000, which suggests 5,500 people have somebody in their household

involved in these agricultural rental networks. This number is almost certainly low, however, as many would be reluctant to report illegal activities outside of the camp.

There are two main entrances to the camp guarded by Tanzanian police at the southeast and western edges of the camp. The camp has no fencing or walls with countless footpaths leading out of the camp. Those leaving the camp simply walk from the nearest border of the camp to their destination. Prospective labourers or renters must make themselves visible to attain livelihoods. They wait along main roads in the mornings, go to village centres, or directly to peoples' farms to inquire about land or wage availability. When I took these same paths to interview labourers, I did not expect to see the large numbers of people walking in and out of the camp with no cover of darkness or bush. Apart from a few households of Burundian migrants described below, most participants in displacement agriculture barely invisibilise themselves at all, yet the consequences for being caught by the police are dire. These movements are literally and figuratively out in the open. All actors that I asked about this agricultural system near the camp: refugees, host community members, and aid workers were aware that these practises existed. The only form of evasion is to simply run and hide at the moment a police officer is heard or sighted. With the ubiquity of these farming networks, I was surprised to learn that the majority of those I spoke with had at one time or more been apprehended by the police, which carries harsh consequences. If a refugee or migrant is caught by the police without a work permit, they are often beaten. If they are unable to pay a large enough bribe, they are sent to the local prison for six months where they face further physical punishment and conscripted farm labour. Migrant labourers at times have lost all of their earnings for the year. Moreover, I heard many reports that Tanzanians often extort refugees and migrants they rent land to or hire as labourers by giving incorrect measurements of land, stealing crops, or refusing to pay wages with the threat of reporting them to the police.

There are small pockets of Burundian migrants who invisibilise themselves through tactics of seclusion. For instance, five households of Burundian migrants found Tanzanian landowners willing to let them live and work on their land permanently. Knowing they will be detected and not allowed to live and integrate into

nearby villages by Tanzanians, these households are sequestered far away from roads villages or roads to avoid detection. Like other Burundian migrants and refugees, they were displaced from Burundi through lack of access to land or employment and conflict. What is unique about this group is that they brought their wives and families to live with them, rather than returning circularly like other migrants. One of these informants, Moise, explained this choice, 'I decided to live in Tanzania because Tanzania made me freer than Burundi.' This group is only visible and recognised by their employer who pays the chairman of the nearest village to maintain their invisibility, although recent events show how precarious this secluded invisibility is.

On 1 August 2019, Tanzanian military forces conducted an operation in villages where clashes have taken place between local Ha landowners and Sukuma cattle herders arriving from northern Tanzania. According to one of my research assistants, the military had shoot-to-kill orders and machine-gun fire was heard by everyone in nearby Nyarugusu camp. The Sukuma herders lived close to the settled Burundian migrants introduced above. While not the target of the operations, the Burundians fled and stayed in villages hidden by their Tanzanian employers or in Nyarugusu camp. This operation had an intense chilling effect on all participants in the displacement agriculture *shambas* and the camp economy. Refugee land renters and labourers were too afraid to leave the camp immediately afterwards. As a result, the price of firewood and charcoal gathered outside the camp more than doubled. This event illustrates how precarious displacement agriculture is. It also shows the speed in which the Tanzanian state can shut down these practises, but before this event has chosen not to. It occurred to me that if the local police wanted to crack down and stop this system, it would not be difficult to do so. Instead, it seems the police strike a balance between doing random searches as a source of revenue, but do not crackdown to the point of ending the practises altogether. This makes sense in Brankamp's (2019) framing of camps as 'occupied enclaves' where security forces are 'digging bribes' or extracting significant rents from the agricultural system. Those involved in this system understand the risks to participate but endure because they have so few alternative options for livelihoods. People with the least amount of recognition from the state and

host communities—Burundians in general, and Burundian migrant labourers in particular—must endure greater amounts of exposure and risk visibility by the police.

### **Host community landowners**

There are high variances in class, motivations, attitudes, costs, and profits among all the participants in displacement agriculture in Kigoma, which I briefly discuss in Chapter 5. Without the demand and complicity of the Tanzanian host community, however, displacement agriculture would not exist. In Kasulu District where Nyarugusu is located, 85% of income is estimated to be generated from agriculture, however, nearly 80% live below the poverty line. The need for cash is a large motivating factor for many to rent land to refugees. Others have decided to rent their surplus land to refugees due to friendships formed through interactions at the Common Market shared by Tanzanians and refugees. Nehemiah, who rents to Congolese describes this relationship: ‘We knew each other for a year. Then he asked me if I have a piece of land to rent. Because we were already friends, I decided to give the land. We met when I was selling bananas at the Common Market in camp, then he invited me to visit his family. They hosted me and treated me well. As a gift, I rented them two acres and gave another for free.’ Others, like Yakub, rented or gave away land for free out of a humanitarian impulse: ‘I saw that some people suffer a lot. Then I decided to rent but usually, I give for free.’ For most who rent land to refugees, it is more of a neutral business-like transaction where refugee land seekers show up to Tanzanian’s farms or villages and a price is negotiated.

### **Refugee Land Renters**

Like Tanzanian landowners, refugee land renters encompass a wide spectrum of motivations and outcomes for their farming practises. It is generally understood that more Congolese rent land than Burundians, although this is changing as Burundians’ economies are growing. For Burundians to acquire land, they must pay more or travel greater distances outside of the camp. One reason for this, analysed in Chapter 5, is that Congolese refugees are more established economically in Nyarugusu than

Burundians who arrived in 2015. The other reason, which will be explored further below, is due to the negative stereotypes associated with Burundians in the region. Ranging from a half-acre to four, renters pay anywhere from as low as TZS 20,000 (USD 8.65) to as much as TZS 170,000 (USD 73.54) to rent various acreages of land per year. Land has been more expensive recently due to the increased demand after the arrival in 2015 of the Burundians and the decrease in food rations. Many borrow money or take loans to acquire this land. Some only consume what they grow, whereas others eat and sell their produce. One household reported earning more than 1,200,000 TZS (USD 520), which is nearly double the GDP per capita for Kigoma (NBS 2012). This was the only source of income for about half of the households renting land. Motivations for renting land include hunger from reduced food rations, or a desire to diversify their food rations to be more culturally appropriate. Many used the Swahili phrase *maisha magumu*—the ‘difficult life’—to describe what drove them to rent land. For these refugees, other livelihoods or self-reliance strategies such as paid employment or petty trade in the market were difficult to obtain. For Kiza, ‘I did farming because it is the only thing that I am used to. Others like selling, but this is tough for me. I needed a place where I could cultivate things and generate some money.’ This deeply ingrained desire to cultivate was not only borne out of desperation, however. For others like, Congolese refugees Isaelo and Laurent, it seems to be a form of habitus: ‘I am accustomed to cultivating. I do not like staying anywhere without cultivating.’ Laurent added, ‘I decided to do this because I had always thought that agriculture is the main thing in the life of a human being.’

### **Refugee Labourers**

Camp refugees who sell their labour for wages to both refugees and Tanzanian landowners have bleaker livelihood prospects than land renters. Eighteen-year-old Christoph recounts, ‘I had no education and failed to continue with my studies due to the difficult life. I lost my parents, so I decided to make a little money.’ Another Burundian refugee in Nduta described his predicament: ‘I normally go there during the hardest moments—especially following ration cuts. I take the risk of going to work in the village even though I know we are not allowed. But what can I do if my family has

nothing to eat? How can they survive without food?’ In the best of cases, they enter farm wage labour for a few days or a week to raise capital to supplement their existing business or temporarily addressing an economic shock. In more desperate situations, they work five to six days a week throughout planting and harvesting seasons. The more these labourers have to work outside of the camp, the greater their chances of visibility to Tanzanian police. Refugee labourers can find jobs from within the safety of the camp by leveraging their relationship with fellow refugees, through referrals from previous employers, inquiring in public places such as the market, or asking door-to-door. Others who are less connected must wait along the footpaths leading to the *shambas* or along the main roads to ask potential employers. In the illegal and unregulated space outside the camp, there are high divergences in wage ranges and how wages are determined. For example, people are paid daily rates by the task such as digging, planting, and harvesting, or by the crop that they are cultivating. Informants even said that each village has different ranges of pay. While this category of participants is structurally disadvantaged, Burundian migrant labourers face the most precarious and vulnerable position.

### **Migrant Labourers**

Burundian labour migrants have travelled to Tanzania as farm labourers for generations. Celestine explains, ‘It is our nature. We take from our parents and our grandparents growing and cultivating in Tanzania.’ Arriving primarily from the border regions of Burundi, but also as far north as Kirundo and Ngozi provinces, migrants cross over the porous border by foot or bicycle. Some transit only for a couple of months at a time, but others like Moise mentioned above have attempted to live permanently in Tanzania. A few migrants return to the same farms each year where they have positive relationships with Tanzanians and refugee land renters, whereas others, like André, ‘do not make a choice, I only go where I heard there is a job. I am like a flag blowing in the wind.’ This takes people as far as Rukwa region south of Kigoma or Kagera region to the north. They typically do not venture further as they would be more at risk of arrest.



Figure 21: House of migrant labourers in the field. Source: Boeyink 2017.

The key difference between many of the migrants and refugees is that unlike many of the re-displaced Burundian refugees who do not have access to land back in Burundi, the migrants I spoke with still own land, which they can effectively access (Schwartz 2019; Purdeková 2016). They cross into Tanzania because they have little or no means for gaining cash or wages in Burundi. Also, unlike the camp-based renters and labourers, where women participate as renters and labourers, usually, only men engage in the circular labour migrations while the women stay behind. While camp refugees and migrant labourers receive the same ranges of pay, these wages have been markedly depressed since the labour supply skyrocketed with the arrival of Burundian refugees in 2015. Residents of the camp have many overhead expenses such as food, shelter, and other services provided by the humanitarian apparatus, thus affording them to take lower wages. This has in turn further lowered prices labourers receive for work. Migrants are also exposed outside of the legal and physical protection of the camp and must create makeshift huts on the *shambas* or live in the forest in an attempt to remain invisible to a growingly hostile state (see figure 21 above). Moreover, some say migrants are arrested more often than refugees because

they often seek jobs in villages where there are more likely to be police patrols rather than utilising networks in the camp.

## **History of migration and asylum in Tanzania**

As I recalled in Chapter 2, Tanzania has shown the oscillating nature of state recognition over time. To borrow from James Scott (1998), 'legibility is a condition of manipulation' (p. 183). At the heart of the colonial project was the exploitation of African labour, but to benefit from labour, populations had to be made legible or visible to the colonial state. Once visibilised, the colonialists could manipulate migrant and refugee labour and control their movements. President Nyerere continued this exploitation under a more benevolent guise of self-reliance for refugee populations from Rwanda, Burundi, and Mozambique, while simultaneously glorifying anti-colonial freedom fighter refugees from the region for foreign policy gains. The wholesale change to invisibilisation came in the 1990s through strict encampment policies making it illegal to leave the camps without permission. Under President Magufuli today, there has been an increase in police vigilance patrolling the sources of livelihood *outside* of the camp, as well as a crackdown on livelihood opportunities *within* the camp. As a result, refugees and migrants are forced to be invisibly self-sufficient in the face of dwindling aid.

## **Place-Making in Kigoma**

Nyarugusu is essentially two camps within one. There is the Congolese side or a 'protracted refugee camp' where Congolese have resided since 1996, and the Burundian side, or 'emergency refugee camp', considered a 'blank slate' economy (Betts et al. 2017 p. 140). To recall Chapter 5, by many wellbeing metrics, Congolese refugees are faring better than Burundians refugees in Tanzania. For example, in Nyarugusu in 2016, Congolese refugees only had 19% in 'asset very poor' category and 4% in 'asset rich' compared to 75% of Burundians in 'asset very poor' and none in the 'asset rich' category (CHS 2016 p. 13). Congolese have better measurements than Burundians in Coping Strategies Index, food consumption score, Household

Dietary Diversity, livelihoods metrics, and per capita expenditures (CHS 2017). The simplest explanation for Congolese prosperity over Burundians is that many have lived in Nyarugusu since 1996 and have had longer to establish networks. Since 2012, nearly 30,000 Congolese have been resettled from Nyarugusu to the US, Canada, and other countries (UNHCR 2019b p. 5). This leads to remittances being sent to friends and family remaining in Nyarugusu, strengthening the camp economy.

According to WFP estimations, 60-80 per cent of the most recent 2015 arrivals have been 're-displaced' from the civil war in the 1990s or as far back as the genocide in 1972 (Purdeková 2016 p. 7). Many of these refugees who returned to Burundi faced extreme economic hardship primarily because they lost access to their land while in exile. Some informants explained that they used the political crisis as a pretext to flee the poverty of Burundi to Tanzania even before they faced intimidation and persecution. People left with the few resources they possessed, and most said they had to spend what they had to pay for transportation or payments to police or *imbonerakure* on the journey to Tanzania. Upon arrival, there was inadequate housing, a cholera outbreak, and the capital people had was spent on buying food or paying for medical supplies. Most Burundians did not have the capital to start businesses—the main reason Burundians sell their labour on farms outside the camp. Conversely, Congolese rent land from Tanzanians at higher rates, and it is rare for Congolese to work as paid labourers on the farms. Economic stratification is not the only explanation for these outcomes, however, as a Burundian man explained to me: 'There are Burundians who rent land, but not very many. Congolese have been in the region for longer and have relationships with Tanzanians. It is more about relationships to get lands than just having money.' In seeking to better understand how these relationships are formed, I found that stereotypes play a critical role in this.

A Burundian man in Mtendeli camp gives a telling illustration of these stereotypes:

If a Congolese and a Burundian are on a bus and the police stop them, then a Burundian will be taken off and the Congolese can continue on. Burundi has a bad image in Tanzania. The bad image is attached for a long time. Burundians are highly attached to the war from before. All are labelled as bad or dangerous people.

Two labels of Burundians persist: One label is that Burundians are untrustworthy thieves prone to violence. The other is that they are hardworking and capable farmers. The former stigmatisation is forcing Burundian land renters further away from the camp to find landowners willing to rent land to them. For the latter categorisation of strong labourers, this is both seen positively and pejoratively from their history of labour in the country. Malkki's (1995a) analyses 'mythico-histories' of Mishamo that residents use to make sense of protracted exile. Prominent in these cosmologies were the sentiments of having their cultivation exploited. Malkki recounts the sentiments of these Burundians: 'We are the granaries of the Tanzanians [...] We feed all the poor regions of Tanzania [...] We have become their slaves. We have been given a pet name here, "the tractors." They benefit by us' (pp. 119-120). In more recent research, Felix da Costa (2017) noted Burundians are still being called 'our tractors' by Tanzanians (p. 20). This also helps them to find employment as labourers because they are said to finish the work faster than Tanzanians.

In relation to Burundians, Congolese are seen as their opposite as trustworthy and honest, but lazy. A Tanzanian describes, 'Congolese do not do labour for others. They are not strong like Burundians. Congolese like soft jobs and music. They like to dress smart even if they do not have any money.' This, in turn, has been internalised by Congolese because even those who live in extreme poverty in the camp, it is rare to find Congolese paid farm labourers. In Chapter 4, I explain that the long difficult history of encampment for refugees means that camp residents also have projections toward Tanzanians as being corrupt and the cause of the violence they endure under encampment. While stereotypes are highly problematic on many levels, they are borne from a history of place-making in the region and must not be dismissed as they form the basis of relationships and livelihood outcomes among the actors in the and around the camp.

## **Conclusion**

Invisibility has been conceptualised in forced migration studies with a singular lens that does not capture the entire experience of displaced populations. Scholars

have focused on instances where displaced people are invisible to policymakers and academics, or due to restrictive policies, must enact strategies of invisibility to avoid detection. If people are not recognised or validated by the state above, they must avoid being recognised or detected from below. What is missing from these accounts is the mirrored edge of visibility. During colonialism and immediately after, visibility was the goal of migration and refugee policy to benefit the state. Strict encampment during the 1990s and increasingly today under President Magufuli created the need for refugees to invisibilise or blend into spaces like towns and cities because refugee life is only recognised in camps.

The same top-down policies that impel invisibilisation in urban settings do not produce uniform invisibility in rural Kigoma, however. Local integration for refugees and migrants is more difficult when everybody knows their neighbours and outsiders are recognised and unwanted. The only possibility to invisibilise is to live in seclusion like the Burundian migrants who rely on their Tanzanian employers to keep them hidden. To rent land or sell labour in the *shambas* surrounding the camps, people must have connections or make themselves sufficiently visible out in the open along heavily trafficked roads and footpaths, in villages, or at the farms. People who have no other access to incomes in the camps or Burundi must spend more time at the farms and are at greater risk of encountering police. This is experienced more by Burundians in general, and Burundian migrants in particular, compared to Congolese refugees due to the costs of re-displacement, chronic poverty, and regional prejudices and stereotypes. For those involved in displacement agriculture who are forced to be invisibly self-sufficient beyond humanitarian aid, visibility is less enacted than it is *endured*. As less-than-voluntary repatriations are increasing in this restrictive political and economic environment, it appears that endurance is wearing thin. The movement of people in displacement agriculture systems described in this chapter, are not the only forms of mobilities that are produced by displacement agriculture. Whereas the mobilities of this agricultural system are spontaneous and only coordinated at the household level, in the next chapter, I analyse the carefully organised networks of brokers who enable the mobilisation of WFP food rations, which are sold and shipped across the country and East Africa.

# Chapter 8:

*Walanguzi* or *madalali*; ‘saboteurs’ or ‘brokers’?  
Demystifying the food aid resale markets



Figure 22: WFP food sacks stored at Dalia's house. Credit: Boeyink 2017.

## Introduction

During the socio-economic assessment my colleagues and I conducted on behalf of UNHCR in 2018, we asked many of the 30 focus group discussions in Nyarugusu, Nduta, and Mtendeli camps if they had ever sold the food rations distributed by WFP. Nearly all participants, men and women, young and old, Burundian and Congolese, raised their hand that they sell food. This was not surprising to me because it had come up in my prior fieldwork in Nyarugusu throughout 2017 and has featured in academic and humanitarian grey literature. Most of this literature examines the front end of food aid distribution and the rationales of refugee 'agentive consumption' (Oka 2014) and why people decide to sell what they are given (Pottier 1996). What is absent in this research, however, is a holistic accounting for the networks of the back end of distribution after the original food recipients choose to sell what they are given. What was surprising to me was the scale and levels of organisation required to find markets by these enterprises. This chapter offers new understandings of self-reliance that subverts humanitarian aid beyond its intended purpose of short-term consumption. Additionally, by exploring the personal histories, motivations, and networks of individuals at each link in the post-distribution food ration value chain present in north-western Tanzania, I show the deep embeddedness of this displacement economy and provide a new perspective on refugee de facto integration.

The actors in this system, deemed to be the 'black market' by the humanitarian government and Tanzanian state, must make financial arrangements with the police to ensure the continuity of their businesses. I situate these people and networks within the wider history of Tanzanian agricultural policy. This history has moved from significant state control and intervention during colonialism and the post-colonial transition through to market liberalization pressured by the IMF. These state transitions have brought differing opinions of private traders: from criminalized 'black marketeers', 'brokers' in 'unofficial markets', to simply being neighbours who are part and parcel of the Tanzanian agrarian rural fabric today. The various monikers for traders are currently being evoked and reimagined in illicit food aid markets in the camps. Next, I introduce individuals within each link of the chain after households

decide to sell their food rations. These individuals who serve as linkages, are called *madalali*—the Swahili word for ‘brokers’—include food-gatherers and more prominent collectors. I also present the traders from outside of the camp who have historically been the movers of goods of this displacement economy. These people are the lynchpins to finding the final markets of this lucrative system. Traders include non-refugee Burundians who cross borders into the camp from nearby provinces in Burundi, as well as Tanzanian traders known by the refugees as ‘bosses’. Finally, this chapter speaks with the wide literature of political brokerage in colonial, development, and refugee environments to argue that the brokers who emerge in this system—although somewhat ambivalent in their moral outlook toward encampment—nevertheless fill a humanitarian purpose that the humanitarian government is unable to fill. This gives them a position of authority and prestige among their refugee neighbours as well implicit legitimacy to state actors on the ground through brokering a significant system of bribery.

### **The ‘black market’ of food aid**

It has long been common knowledge that food aid in refugee and humanitarian settings gets sold back into local and regional economies for various reasons. More than twenty years ago in Tanzania, Johan Pottier (1996) noted many reasons for Rwandan refugees to sell their rations including the lack of cultural appropriateness of the food, the high costs of food preparation, and adverse health effects. In these camps, maize was the primary food staple distributed by humanitarian actors. Rural Rwandans preferred root crops such as cassava more than the high costs of maize, which many claimed caused diarrhoea and other health issues (pp. 327-330). More recent studies tell a similar story for Burmese refugees in Thailand (Brees 2008), Kakuma camp in Kenya (Oka 2014), and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Malhotra 2018). Oka (2014) dissects food preferences further to explore what he terms ‘agentive consumption’. He argues that ‘the purchase and consumption of foods that are desired and familiar, unlike the passively received, largely unpalatable, and culturally and logistically unsuitable relief food, generate a counter-narrative of the

refugee as an agent as opposed to a perpetual recipient of global largesse' (p. 24). Agentive consumption is why refugees, even poor households, will sell food rations at a loss in the market in order to purchase more expensive, yet desirable, foods from nearby markets. A Congolese woman in Nyarugusu, Charlotte,<sup>13</sup> explains this logic: 'people sell [maize] flour because of a lack of food variety. It doesn't mean that they are getting enough food.' The knowledge that such a high prevalence of food aid ends up being sold was catalytic to the rapid rise and acceptance of refugee and humanitarian cash transfers around the world and a reason why cash transfers are far more popular than in-kind food aid (Boeyink 2019; ODI 2015).

In Oka's (2014) study of refugee camp consumption, he only briefly lingers on what happens after camp residents sell the food aid: 'According to the research participants (refugees, traders, and relief workers), around 80 to 90 per cent of the refugees sell part or most of their food package on the black market' (p. 29). The author offers a useful illustration displayed below in Figure 23. In the figure, and throughout the article, he refers to an opaque and mystified 'black market' where food aid is sold without expanding further on the characteristics of these markets. Loren Landau (2002), researching in the same Kasulu district where Nyarugusu is located nearly 20 years ago briefly describes this system:




Figure 23: Food aid black market chart. Source: Oka 2014 p. 30.

<sup>13</sup> Some of the names in this chapter have been changed due to their prominent positions in the camp and because they shared information about illicit dealings with police.

The trading networks spawned by the World Food Program's food-aid distributions [...] have drawn otherwise remote villages (e.g., Mugombe) into a national and potentially international trading regime. On distribution days, refugees stream from the camps on their bicycles carrying 100-200 kg sacks of maize destined for local buyers. Some of this food is then sold through local marketing mechanisms, but even larger quantities are immediately loaded onto lorries and carried to Mwanza or other regions where there are markets for wholesale foodstuff (pp. 277-278).

This chapter aims to demystify the black market by introducing the actors and their lived experiences comprising the networks which make up these so-called 'black markets'. Moreover, I historicise these systems by providing a brief agrarian history of Tanzania and an overview of agriculture markets in the Kigoma region, predicated on brokers, that resold food aid is embedded in. First, I will review conceptualisations of brokerage in colonial, post-colonial, and refugee studies literature.

### **On (refugee) brokerage**

On the one hand, nearly all commerce involves brokerage between links in all value chains; connecting producer and consumer, advertisers and finance, and so on. However, in colonial and post-colonial contexts, which have extreme disparities of power; where taxes, labour, and resources were extracted from indigenous populations, there are inevitably links, or brokers, at the local level. These middlemen—indeed they are most often men—enable and benefit from these unequal exchanges. There is a robust academic literature analysing political brokers and their role in colonialism, the post-structural adjustment era, and in protracted refugee situations. I will bring these understandings of brokerage in conversation with *madalali* who are catalysts in the systems of resold food rations in refugee camps. The common attribute for all types of brokers from chiefs during colonialism, traders during the post-colonial *ujamaa* era, to more recent *madalali* in refugee camps are the ambivalent (Gluckman et al. 1949; Bierschenk et al. 2002) or 'morally ambiguous' (James 2011) attitudes and relationships that brokers have between their own communities and various humanitarian and stataal nodes of power.

According to Bierschenk et al. (2002), the first political anthropology account of brokerage was by Gluckman et al. (1949), which examined the village chief mediating between kinship and the colonial state. In the 1950s, Eric R. Wolf's (1956) inquiry into colonial Mexico applies equally to the present research:

The study of these 'brokers' will prove increasingly rewarding, as anthropologists shift their attention from the internal organization of communities to the manner of their integration into larger systems. For they stand guard over the crucial junctures or synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole (p. 1075).

Foundational texts on African politics and history from Bayart (1993) to Mamdani (1996) examine the roles of intermediaries such as customary rulers and chieftains; the key brokers in the local arenas during and after colonialism. More recently, Deborah James (2011) has announced 'the return of the broker' and argues that societies such as South Africa, which is undergoing rapid political and societal change following apartheid, have spawned new types of brokers. These individuals creatively channel resources to poor and disenfranchised people through historically and bureaucratically complex land reform and redistribution programmes. They could also be considered 'hustlers' who exploit these same people to enrich themselves (p. 319). This moral ambiguity makes them both products and producers of state and market relations to local populations.

Brokers not only mediate between state and society but also international aid and NGOs. Anthropologists of development have investigated the role these mediators play. Bierschenk et al. (2002) note that following independence, strong central states were retreating due to poor economic performance in the 1970s and Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s. This reduced the prominence of the state and its ability to extend power and administration. Moreover, development aid has been increasingly distributed to intermediary NGOs and other decentralised circuits. This has opened space for 'development brokers' to seek rents that previously went to the state. 'In Africa, they can be found wherever decentralised aid is present' (Bierschenk et al. 2002 p. 8). The collection by Mosse and Lewis (2006) borrow from Bruno Latour's use of 'translation' to argue, 'brokers deal in people and information not only for profit in the narrow sense of immediate reward, but also more

broadly in the maintenance of coherent representations of social realities and in the shaping of their own social identities' (p. 16).

While there is a rich literature on development and political brokerage, as highlighted above, less work has focused on refugee brokers. Simon Turner (2006) has written of refugee brokers among Burundian Hutu refugees in Lukole camp in Tanzania. He describes three types of 'liminal experts' or 'big men' who negotiate authority in the exceptional space of the camp, while simultaneously reifying and subverting the authority of the camp. These brokers include elected street or village leaders who are the mediators recognised by UNHCR to govern the camp. These men are influential in Burundian politics that are exported to the camp, despite UNHCR's attempt to create an apolitical space of exception. Other brokers are NGO employees who are typically more educated and speak foreign languages such as English or French. This makes them powerful brokers between UNHCR, the Tanzanian state, and 'the people' of the refugee camp (Turner 2006). Both of these brokers are legitimised by the refugee humanitarian apparatus. Finally, prominent businessmen gain authority through means different than elected leaders or NGO workers. They engage far less in camp or Burundian politics and have little contact with camp authorities or NGOs. In different ways, they all subvert the authority of the camp by engaging in prohibited politics and illegal business enterprises (Turner 2006). The first two categories gain legitimacy and recognition from UNHCR. The third category, the businessmen, offer a different kind of authority:

At first sight, they do not seem to be involved in public authority, as they stay away from politics and make no pretence of representing the refugee population, just as they would rather avoid too much contact with camp authorities. However, due to their success in following livelihood strategies that strengthen their independence from the relief agencies, they have become 'big men' who are respected in the camp (Turner 2006 p. 774).

Below, I describe the businesspeople, or 'liminal experts' in Nyarugusu who collect and sell WFP food rations, whose successes range from making modest earnings just to get by to some of the wealthiest individuals I met in the camp. As most of the literature on African brokers argues, *madalali* on the highest ends of the WFP resale value chain capitalise off of deeply entrenched systems of inequality and also

share a degree of ambivalence between refugees and Tanzanian and regional markets. Turner (2006) says businessmen like Patrick ‘gain respect and authority by proving their independence from—and defiance of—official camp authorities’ (p. 775). He is ‘a “man of the people” by minding his own business’ (p. 776). However, refugee food aid *madalali* differ in this regard because unlike small-scale Tanzanian *madalali* in Kigoma villages, which I introduce below, these brokers are well-trusted and respected for their roles in the camp economy. They hold these positions of legitimate authority and prestige outside of the camp by establishing relationships with camp authorities by brokering a lucrative a system of bribes. These connections to the police and MHA, albeit at times tenuous, allow the illicit system of WFP ration resale to persist and enable the valuable liquidation of food to cash. Moreover, while a few *madalali* have immensely profited on their brokerage status, they still share in the economic shocks and pain of the Tanzanian state’s shutdown politics.

## **History of agrarian trade in Tanzania**

Agrarian trade in Tanzania is a history of state control from colonialism until the 1980s when the nearly two-decade reign of founding father, Julius Nyerere, made way to second President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. President Mwinyi ushered in the liberalization of trade under pressure from the IMF that President Nyerere had fervently resisted. Within this history is the story of private traders who have been branded ‘racketeers’ in the ‘black market’, to more benignly branded ‘brokers’ in ‘parallel’, ‘unofficial’, ‘informal’, or markets or the ‘second economy’ (Maliyamkono and Bachachwa 1990). Bryceson (1993) notes the negative history of traders in Tanzania: ‘For decades, traders have been pariahs in Tanzania, accused at best of being unproductive and at worst being super-exploitative’ (p. 1). What follows is a short history of these changing relations between the state, markets, and traders, which has set the conditions present today. We see variations of these interactions in the trifurcated state of Nyarugusu. How traders—who function as brokers—are perceived by the state depends on the state’s constantly changing orientation toward the market.

In the *longue durée* of Tanzania, the burden of food security fell to chiefs, and failure in the nutrition of a community was a serious threat to that leadership. In rural Tanganyika society, where the majority are subsistence farmers, there is a sense of 'natural rights to food' and a 'just price' which means, 'the consumer is inherently right and the trader is suspect' (p. 4). Both British and German colonialists used 'brutal force and taxation to compel subsistence peasants to switch to commercial agriculture' to maximise extraction (Maliyamkono and Bachachwa 1990 p. 64). Under British colonialism, there was a paternalistic view toward peasants and their dealings with traders, so cash-cropping was discouraged (Bryceson 1993 p. 5). For decades, private trade was dominated by Asian traders and their familial networks primarily coming from India who remained in East Africa for generations. The colonial state distrusted Asian traders and attempted a series of restrictions on their business activities to various degrees of success (Bryceson 1993 pp. 32-38). This changed with the outbreak of the Second World War, which brought an increased demand for food, however. The country had limited food producers due to migrations of male wage labourers to cities. In 1942, the colonial state enacted price guarantees for farmers and edged out most Asian traders and subsumed wealthy traders as marketing agents. Many of the disenfranchised traders sold higher prices on the black market, which the state later cracked down on. After the war and following strong harvests, the colonial state relinquished control of marketing crops in 1957. This saw once again the rise of Asian traders to dominate the markets until nationalist African leaders and cooperatives began encroaching on Asian gains. Independence brought 'the death blow' to Asian marketers, which reintroduced state marketing that would remain in various forms for more than 20 years (Bryceson 1993 pp. 40-53).

Following independence, marketing of crops was dominated by the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) and eventually made way to the National Milling Corporation (NMC) in 1967. President Nyerere's Arusha Declaration in 1967, which I introduced in Chapter 2, committed the country to 'African socialism' and led to widescale villagization forcing the majority of the rural population to move to concentrated *ujamaa* villages (Bryceson 1993 pp. 61-76). Private traders during *ujamaa* were criminalised with penalties including a fine, up to one year of

imprisonment, and seizure of their stocks. Despite these restrictions, black markets emerged in many places. Kigoma region's black market, in particular, was thriving due to its proximity to Lake Tanganyika allowing for easy transport to neighbouring countries (Bryceson 1993 p. 97). By the 1970s, as the national economy was entering crisis, international economists, and increasingly Tanzanian economists, who were more doubtful of the state's role in grain marketing, stopped referring to 'black market' labels but began sympathetically describing these traders as 'informal' or 'parallel' markets. According to Bryceson (1993), 'politicians, on the other hand, grew continually more ill at ease with the "black market" eventually declaring war on it' (p. 99) This war against 'black marketeers', or *walanguzi*, took the form of the Anti-Economic Sabotage campaign in 1983 and was the last gasp before complete market liberalisation. The presence of *walanguzi* and their self-enrichment tactics were a fundamental threat to the classless society that President Nyerere set out in the Arusha Declaration (Maliyamkono and Bachachwa 1990 p. 31). The initiative ultimately failed because the practise was decentralised and widespread: 'evidence suggests that so much of the unofficial trade in maize and rice was done ubiquitously on a part-time basis in relatively small amounts, such an amorphous, moving target was not readily incorporated in the campaign' (Bryceson 1993 p. 100).

In 1985, President Nyerere stepped down and was replaced by President Mwinyi. Before Mwinyi arrived, President Nyerere had already begun the process of liberalisation that he had long resisted with the removal of the popular *sembe* or maize flour subsidy in 1984. In 1986, President Mwinyi capitulated to IMF structural adjustment policies and growing domestic pressures by removing price controls and allowed the purchase and transport of grains by private traders (Bryceson 1993 p. 183). State control of export crops remained officially until 1993 but was fully removed by 1996 (Ponte 1998). Agricultural policy today remains mostly liberalised. Gone are the days of the dominance of Asian marketers, or the vilification of *walanguzi*. There remains, however, notions of 'just price' and a lack of trust toward local brokers and traders. I focus on this system in the Kigoma region surrounding the camps.

## Kigoma agrarian economy<sup>14</sup>

Kigoma has long been the poorest region in Tanzania due to few industrial investments, road infrastructures, and state funding. Kigoma is one of two regions in the country to have an increased rate of poverty from 2001 to 2012 (UN 2017 p. 8). The result is a lack of incomes outside of agriculture where an estimated 70-90% engage in subsistence farming. The three most planted crops for smallholder farmers in the region are cassava, beans, and maize. Beans and maize are staple foods in the region and smallholders grow these for household consumption as well as cash income. Cassava is not popularly consumed in Kigoma by Tanzanians and is instead a cash crop for distribution to Burundi, Rwanda, and the refugee camps where they are in higher demand. Smallholder farmers are caught in a cycle of low crop productivity due to lack of access to capital, credit, and inputs. With low harvest yields and poor storage equipment and facilities, farmers are forced to sell when supplies are high and demands are low, which results in low prices and incomes. Finally, because most farmers have low incomes, they cannot afford to transport the crops to more lucrative markets in towns and cities in the region. The culmination of these mutually reinforcing constraints, in conjunction with the sweeping market liberalisation described above, is that smallholder farmers are reliant on brokers within their villages who have connections to buyers with capital from larger towns and cities in Tanzania, as well as in Burundi and Rwanda.

These brokers are known in Swahili as *dalali* in the singular or *madalali* in the plural.<sup>15</sup> The literal Swahili translation for *dalali* is 'auctioneer'. *Madalali* at the village level purchase crops either with their own capital or with advances provided from purchasers and aggregators they sell to. Because *madalali* are the only link to markets, farmers are forced to sell at lower prices than what would be fetched in larger markets. *Madalali*, like other brokers throughout African history highlighted above,

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<sup>14</sup> Much of the background for this section I learned while doing a research consultancy evaluating smallholder farmer value chains in Kigoma in 2018.

<sup>15</sup> For a robust overview of *madalali* in Tanzania see Molony (2008) and van Donge (1992), although the nature of agricultural brokerage between their research near Dar es Salaam is somewhat different than in Kigoma because Dar es Salaam is a vastly larger market than Kigoma and have different types of products and actors involved.

hold a 'morally ambiguous' (James 2011 p. 319) positions in their community. They often face resentment and distrust because farmers often do not think they offer fair prices. A large survey of Kigoma farmers found that among cassava growers, only 33% feel they get a fair price, 30.1% felt that they had a mutually beneficial relationship to them, and only 26.3% of farming group members and 30.1% of non-group members view *madalali* as reliable and trustworthy (SAKiRP 2018 pp. 55-56). Moreover, many farmers I interviewed said that *madalali* use purposefully inaccurate crop scales and that they do not always pay on time.

Large traders, also known as aggregators, are the people for whom the *madalali* are collecting crops. I spoke with five traders from each of the refugee camp hosting districts of Kasulu, Kibondo, and Kakonko. Traders, like local level *madalali*, have varying levels of capacity and capital, and the lines can blur between an aggregator and a local *dalali*. For example, one trader in Kakonko began as a farmer, became a *dalali*, and eventually saved enough money to purchase a warehouse, allowing his business to expand. He uses his own capital and pays *madalali* in five surrounding villages to collect for him, but at times continues to get cash advances from larger traders. I interviewed another trader, who moved from Mwanza. He who handles far greater quantities of crops and recently took a TZS 90,000,000 (USD 39,087.95) loan from a bank to create one of the few processing plants in the region. Due to the poor quality of maize in the region, most of the maize processed comes from Sumbawanga in Rukwa region or is imported from Zambia. This trader sells cassava flour to buyers in Burundi, Rwanda, and DR Congo, and plans to expand this to the Dar es Salaam market as well. He plans to get certified through the Tanzania Bureau of Standards to sell his product as food rations to the refugee camps in the region. Burundian and Rwandan traders, some of whom I will highlight below, also clandestinely cross the porous borders. The same system of agricultural brokerage is not only mirrored in the food resale markets, but many of the traders described above are crossing over their business into the camps as well.

## Food aid resale markets and networks

The wealthiest of all households among the financial diary participants I got to know by far is Dalia, a Congolese *dalali* whom I briefly introduced in Chapter 5. Dalia has become so successful that she affords to own a car that she keeps in a village outside of Nyarugusu. Her and others' wealth demonstrate the scale of business that WFP food resales create. She is, however, an outlier among my informants and in the rest of Nyarugusu. The highest earning *madalali* such as Dalia, beyond merely enriching themselves, wield significant social capital and influence in ways similar to Turner's (2006) work among 'big men'. Most *madalali* operate on a small scale, only sell occasionally, or are employed by people like Dalia. My research assistants and I spoke with as many actors at all levels of the system as possible, however, I am certain there is more diversity in wealth and motivations for participation we did not meet due to time and financial constraints.

Selling food rations is not only a means to agentive consumption described by Oka (2014) but acts also as a fundraising activity to raise capital for starting businesses. Some households with larger families will divide portions of their food for consumption, saving the rest for their businesses. One Congolese woman explained that for her household of seven, the rations of five members is adequate to feed the household. The remaining rations of the other two members are fed back into the businesses. Alternatively, a Burundian woman, Adelline explained, 'I kept my children and myself hungry for three months so we could eat more later after I started a business.' A Congolese woman named Kristina and five other women in her

neighbourhood slowly saved TZS 5,000 (USD 2.17) until they each raised TZS 100,000 (43.43). As a group, they sold baked goods together.

A Congolese woman, Charlotte, purchases peoples' maize flour near the WFP food distribution centre and sells at the market inside the camp closest to her home for convenience. She will buy a bowl of flour for TZS 500 or 600 (USD 0.22 or 0.26) and sell for TZS 800 (USD 0.35). A Burundian woman, Lenatha, conducts all of her business buying and selling WFP oil at the Common Market, 'because it is the easiest business to do. You buy here and sell here. You don't have to move around.' Additionally, since the 1990s, Msoshi, a Congolese man, has been selling goods such as pots and pans and the (in)famously UNHCR-branded tarps at the Common Market. It is no surprise that in neighbouring villages or towns such as Kasulu you will see UNHCR tarps and buckets in houses and businesses. All of the items described above are sold as retail in and near the camp. However, the bulk of the products are sold in wholesale quantities far away from the camp.



Figure 24: Lenatha selling oil at the Common Market. Credit: Boeyink 2017.

## ***Madalali* gatherers**

I first learned of the post-distribution food enterprises in my first week of financial diary interviews when I spoke with a Burundian man named Andre. After his arrival in 2015, like many others, Andre had no access to material capital to start a business, nor the human capital or skills to be employed as an incentive worker or construction labourer. At 56, he felt he was too old and in too poor of health to work as an agricultural labourer as many others do. His solution was simply to ask a Congolese *dalali*, whom he always saw collecting food rations at his WFP distribution centre for a job: 'I found I did not have enough money for business, so without even knowing her, I asked for help.' She would give him TZS 50,000 (USD 21.72) each food distribution to buy as many food rations from his neighbours as he could. After gathering the food, he would sell the food back to the woman. Whatever he earns above the original TZS 50,000 (USD 21.72), he keeps as profit. His monthly profits ranged from TZS 3,000 (USD 1.30) to 80,000 (USD 34.74). Andre describes his relationship with the *dalali* financier: 'I depend on this woman for my business, but each time I sell to her she is easy to negotiate with. I only trust her a little bit because she is Congolese and I am Burundian'. This notion of trust among *madalali* employment networks is an important and recurring theme among these interlocutors.

For example, a Congolese woman, Sifa, is trusted by those looking to sell to such a degree that customers go directly to her with their products. She is in a less precarious position than Andre because she has multiple businesses, so she is not dependent on others' capital. With her own money, she began gathering WFP peas in 2015 when the Burundians arrived. She saw many were not eating the maize flour WFP distributed so she would trade flour, which was popular among Burundians, in exchange for WFP peas, which sold for high prices outside of the camp. She has grown her business to the point where people in her village will come to her to sell their peas, which she then sells to four Congolese *madalali* collectors. Sifa's earnings dwarf Andre's. She claims each month she makes TZS 500,000 to 1,000,000 (USD 217.16 to 434.31).

## ***Madalali* collectors**

*Madalali* collectors are the vital link from refugees to buyers from outside the camp. Their roles are crucial beyond just bringing needed cash liquidity in the camp. They also function as employers for people like Andre who have very few options to access capital. Moreover, they forge one of the few semi-productive—rather than violent—relationships with the Tanzanian state actors by coordinating a system of rents or bribes to the police, which allows the crucial food resale system to persist. Like the aforementioned gatherers, *madalali* collectors' businesses are of various size and scale, which blur together the different chains in the system. Dalia, the most



Figure 25: *Madalali* gatherers collecting food rations in Nyarugusu. Credit: Boeyink 2017.

successful of all the financial diary households, first began a rung lower as a gatherer like Andre and Sifa. Dalia used to sell *mandazi* (small fried doughnuts) in exchange for food rations. One of her customers was one of the largest food collectors in the camp. According to Dalia, 'he got used to me and he saw that I was trustworthy, so he started giving me some money to buy food for him'. This brought her to the rank of collector. She became more and more successful, so he entrusted her with larger cash advances. She saved her profits along the way until in 2016 when her boss was resettled to Canada and left the camp. Before he left, however, 'we sat down and figured out how much profit I made, and it came to TZS 6,000,000 (USD 2,605.86). When he was leaving, he connected me with Tanzanian and Burundian bosses.' Now she employs six gatherers: 'I pay other people to help buy food. In case there is a big need of food, I see I can't do it on my own.' She usually spends her capital to purchase food, although occasionally she takes advances for specific orders. 'It is better to use

your own capital than take an order because once you have someone else's money, anytime the boss can show up for the food you have collected, even if you're not ready.' She also has the option to sell to larger collectors such as Baraka.

Baraka, a Congolese *dalali*, started his brokerage business upon arrival in Nyarugusu in 1996: 'when we arrived, Tanzanians came to the camp looking for businesses, so we made acquaintances with them'. Now he works at all three WFP distribution centres in Nyarugusu and employs many Congolese and Burundian gatherers. He is proud of the prominent position that he has risen to in the camp: 'Because we are famous, people can come to give us their products. I am known to most people.' Baraka has become so successful that he purchased Tanzanian land in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, the two largest cities in the country. This shows that his esteemed position as *dalali* has allowed him to be one of the very few camp refugees to transcend the flattened class structure—analysed in Chapter 5—which characterises encampment. Furthermore, he is in the process of furthering and solidifying this status differentiation through resettlement to the United States. He plans to build and invest in the land to return to later: 'I plan to get to the US to search for life and more wealth and then return to Africa where it is my home.' Paul, however, is even more prominent than Baraka. Paul fled violence in Burundi and came to Nyarugusu because 'many Burundians were trying to hunt me because I am Tutsi, so I wanted to infiltrate among the Congolese'. He registered as Congolese and married a Congolese woman. He started in 2000 as an incentive worker earning TZS 35,000 (USD 15.20) each month and selling small bowls to now being a WFP food resale magnate in the camp. Paul advances money to Baraka and around ten other *madalali* collectors. Before introducing the outside traders and 'bosses' who link with camp *madalali* and provide the financial fuel for this system, I will further elucidate the scale and structure of the networks within the camp.

### **Scale and logistics**

The scale of the food redistribution system is staggering, just as the size of Nyarugusu camp is staggering in relation to the Kigoma countryside where it is located. Dalia estimates that camp-wide 1,000-1,500 tonnes of food rations are sold

and leave Nyarugusu monthly. Baraka claims there are around ten Congolese and 15 Burundian *madalali* collectors in Nyarugusu, who in turn pay countless gatherers to accumulate food from the camp population in bulk. Before the large resettlement programme moved many Congolese Nyarugusu residents to the US, Baraka estimated that there were upwards of 30 Congolese collectors. Each month, Paul sells around 350 sacks (weighing 150-250kg each). Each sack brings a profit of TZS 2,000-2,500 (USD 0.87-1.09) which amounts to TZS 700,000 to 875,000 (USD 304.02 to 380.02) in monthly profit. At each monthly distribution in the camp, Paul gives out advances to around ten other *madalali* collectors such as Baraka and Dalia: 'I give them little by little, TZS 2,000,000 (USD 868.62) sometimes TZS 3,000,000 (USD 1,302.93), other times more. This money can be finished in one or two days. When they are finished, I give more. Each distribution I can give TZS 8,000,000 (USD 3,474.48).' Paul says there is another Burundian collector in the camp who is even more successful than him.

The process of procuring these items is heavily layered with profits being gleaned at each level. For example, someone may buy one bucket of peas for TZS 500 (USD 0.22) and sell it for TZS 800-1,000 (USD 0.35-0.43). A *dalali* collector sells to traders by the sack, which is made up of around six buckets. A sack of green peas is typically sold to Tanzanian or Burundian bosses in nearby villages for TZS 10,000 (USD 4.34). When a sack is accumulated by the collectors, they will pay a cyclist a fee of TZS 2,400-3,000 (USD 1.04-1.30), as well as the costs of a police bribe and a warehouse fee in Makere. See below in Figure 26 for a diagram visualising this process. Each of these steps has additional layers as well. For example, the cyclist (a job done exclusively by men) will most likely be part of a transportation collective where he will be required to pay a transport manager a fee for organising the trip TZS 800 (USD 0.35). Ferdinand is a Burundian man who began his cycling career in 2016 because, 'I missed what to do at that time that could give me money. The only thing that was needed to do the job was to own a bicycle and have strength.' He eventually became transport manager because he is better educated than most of the other cyclists. Each WFP food item—maize meal, Super Cereal (a fortified food blend), pulses (beans, lentils, or green peas), vegetable oil, and salt—have specialised

markets throughout Tanzania, as well as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and even further afield. Before reaching these destinations, however, they pass through the wealthy hands of Tanzanian bosses or traders from Burundi.




Figure 26: Diagram of WFP food resale system.

### Burundian traders

Traders from Burundi cross the border from southern provinces to carry out similar functions as refugee *madalali* collectors. Didier and Pascal are from Makamba province in Burundi. Beginning in 2014, Didier was familiar with Tanzania from living as a refugee in Nduta and Mtabila before repatriating in 2008. Unlike so many others, he did not return to Tanzania in 2015 because he still had access to land. He simply

explained, 'I didn't like to be a refugee in Tanzania.' Didier began his enterprise by selling a pig for start-up capital and going to Tanzanian villages near Nyarugusu to purchase maize and cassava flour because prices in Burundi were expensive from a poor harvest at the time. He explained how he expanded his business into Tanzania:

Firstly, I bought flour from Tanzanians. Slowly they became friends and told me to come to Nyarugusu camp because they got most of their products from Nyarugusu. Flour from [Tanzanian] villages is more expensive than the flour from Nyarugusu. Also, in Nyarugusu we get the fresh flour, but from the villages, it is needed to pass to the machine from stalk to flour.

Pascal began more recently in 2018 raising money by renting land from Tanzanians and selling cassava. He was introduced by friends who have done this profession in Nyarugusu for many years.

Unlike larger Burundian and Tanzanian traders, Didier and Pascal do not purchase huge quantities in nearby Tanzania villages. Instead, they enter the camp and go from zone to zone and village to village collecting as other refugee *madalali* do. Didier sells what he collects to Tanzanian bosses and transports the rest back to Burundi at the market right at the border where he lives. Didier makes this trip twice a week and stays in the camp collecting for two days at a time. Pascal brings his goods Kayagoro Commune in Makamba Province where he has found success at an eager market. He boasts, 'since I began this job, I have already bought a plot to build. Now I am famous! If I arrive with [maize] flour it takes me hours to sell it and finish it.' Although I did not visit Makamba, and would need further research to corroborate the statement, this quote demonstrates that like refugee *madalali*, traders such as Didier and Pascal enjoy some level of esteem for re-routing humanitarian food aid to markets.

It is difficult to get a sense for how many Burundian traders are operating in and around the camp because our snowball sampling was unable to get in contact with additional traders. Pascal says he knows 21 others and Didier claims that there are too many of them in similar positions to count. When asked, Pascal describes an aggressive market for *madalali*: 'It is a competition because we buy in secret and also, I sell in secret.' This gives food sellers some edge when deciding prices: 'We negotiate because it is like a competition, but there is a limit to prices that we cannot overtop.'

For example, when the general price is TZS 250 (USD 0.11) a kilo, I can buy for TZS 280 (USD 0.12) to attract clients.’ Didier does not feel he competes with Tanzanian bosses, however, because they use refugees to collect food and they spend larger amounts of money to collect peas and maize flour.

### **Tanzanian ‘bosses’**

Baraka aptly states the centrality of Tanzanian bosses: ‘if bosses don't give money, the camp is in a bad mood. All the money given to us spreads through the camp.’ Tanzanian bosses are the primary financiers of the food ration trade in the camps. These traders sit atop the WFP resale pyramid and embody the most morally ambivalent position of all the brokers in this system. They benefit most from the system because they do not live in the camp and therefore do not share the same costs and risks of refugees’ precarious position in the camp. They do not hold social loyalties to certain collectors but follow a market-based logic to the best price they can get. Moreover, as Kigoma region has the highest rates of poverty in the country, they are far wealthier than the vast majority of their Tanzanian neighbours. Despite their ambiguous moral positions, Tanzanian bosses are still appreciated by refugees for the service of bringing markets to the camp even though camp *madalali* know they are receiving poor terms of trade.

Julia capitalised early in the trade since the inception of Nyarugusu in 1996. Already established as a farmer, she explains, ‘I started exchanging my agricultural products to refugees who would give me their products that I had to sell in the Tanzanian villages and make money.’ She accrued capital until becoming a ‘*dalali* boss’ by 2000. Today, she has expanded operations to all three Kigoma refugee camps. In Nyarugusu alone, she finances ten *madalali* collectors with TZS 2,000,000 to 5,000,000 (USD 868.62 to 2,171.55) each distribution. Other *madalali* whom Julia finances use the Swahili expression ‘*ana hela ndefu*’, which translates to ‘she has long money’ to describe the financial clout she wields. Earnest, who I briefly introduced in Chapter 1, does not possess the same amount of capital as Julia but is still a significant player in Nyarugusu’s resale economy. He did not begin as a boss until 2015 with the influx of Burundians but had many prior connections leading to the role. His most important link was with his aunt, herself a ‘boss’ in the system. She began

mentoring him in 2009 as a farmer and trader. In 2012, he was employed with the NGO subcontracted by WFP to unload and distribute food shipments in Nyarugusu where he was able to network with *madalali* in the camp. With these contacts and his aunt's support, he used the money he had saved from farming and his job in the camp to become a boss when Burundian refugees began arriving in 2015.

Earnest offers *madalali* financing but also buys directly from people like Baraka: 'I have five *madalali* to whom I give money so they can buy for me. By so doing I save



Figure 27: Tanzanian traders loading WFP food rations into lorry in nearby village. Credit: Kaskil Ibrahim 2019.

some money as they buy products directly, but I don't usually give them a lot of money because they usually don't get the products in the needed time. It takes a little time to get your complete products from them quickly.' Speed is important for bosses in competition with one other. Julia says there are around ten other Tanzanian bosses: 'We compete with others because you need to get food and your competitors do as well. Sometimes I ask my *madalali* to raise money to get my business quickly so I would have the products first.' Julia and Earnest both work with Congolese and Burundian *madalali*, 'because in case if on the side of Congolese I am unable to collect more food, I can have it from the side of the Burundians,' Julia explains. Purchasing products quickly allows bosses to buy stock from refugee *madalali* at lower prices and to capitalise on selling at higher market rates, which Earnest describes: 'When there is a high soaring price, my *dalali* can change his mind and say that he has no product for you. You can wait until next time. Meanwhile, he will have sold it to another boss who rose the price higher than the money advance you gave him.'

As the primary link to the market for wholesale food, Tanzanian bosses ultimately hold significant leverage and power over refugee *madalali*. Earnest illustrates how he handles *madalali* seeking better prices from his competition:

there are two remedies: either to be patient until the *dalali* gets your other products or ask for your money back and think about what to do about it. Usually I am patient. In 2018, it happened to me and I asked for my money back. That is the reason why a seemingly good strategy to do this business is to use the money *dalali* owns on his own. So, if the price will rise or lower it will all depend on whom to give the products. Instead of giving him your money and work in favour of another competitor of yours, this is not okay.

Bosses set the prices they buy at based on the market prices of the next destination in Tanzanian cities such as Kahama, Mwanza, and Dar es Salaam and further across the region. Julia has been connected to these markets for decades from selling the crops she grows. She explains this leverage she holds: 'We set the price of buying a sack after considering the profit I will make in the market. There are no negotiations. I buy the product on the price I set because it all depends on me and the place where I will bring my products like in Uganda or where the market is available.' Interestingly, the refugee *madalali* I spoke with all recognise that they do not get a fair rate for selling

their rations, however, they do not feel exploited by Tanzanian bosses as Tanzanian farmers do from brokers in their villages. Baraka describes this sentiment:

I know we are getting a small, small rate for our products, and we have no room to negotiate, but I am grateful to the bosses. What would I do without them? The food we collect would rot. I would have to struggle with a different business. These bosses let me and my fellow refugees eat. I say, 'thank you!'

Tanzanians also have the freedom of movements that Burundian traders and refugees do not enjoy due to encampment policies. Julia uses her own vehicles to transport the food to markets or shares lorries with other bosses as pictured below. They are also insulated from arrest and exorbitant bribes because they have licenses to operate their business and shipping through the Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA). Refugees and undocumented migrants must operate clandestinely. Julia was once robbed at gunpoint by unknown assailants while doing business where she lost TZS 700,000 (USD 304.02) but is otherwise insulated from state authorities in ways that refugees and Burundian traders are not. She acknowledges this imbalance: 'We don't usually meet the police. Our *madalali* meet them and defend their causes relative to their hard life and starvation in the camp when they are collecting the food for us.'

## **Police**

One morning, while at the food distribution centre, a WFP branded vehicle pulled into the gate to the centre. The vehicle suddenly stopped before entering and a WFP I knew as a field manager stepped out of the passenger door and stood over three refugee women buying and selling food. He was shouting and shaking his finger at each of them before slamming his door and driving off. My research assistant and I asked the women what was said to them. They were told, 'it is illegal to buy and sell aid' and that if they continued 'they would take the food away and put them in jail.' A different lower-ranking WFP officer later confirmed it was illegal, but that it was MHA, and the police's responsibility to stop the resale markets. He conceded, however that 'it is hard to stop people'.

As analysed in Chapter 4, Police and MHA officers are the personification of the country's violent encampment policy and are responsible for enforcing the

containment of people and goods in the trifurcated state. In the previous chapter, I argued displacement agriculture is 'sufficiently visible' and out in the open and if the police desired to shut down the illegal practises it would not be difficult for them to do so. The same is true of this secondary food market. When the police turn a blind eye to these markets, they serve as the unlocking node which allows the mobility of camp residents and WFP food to enter markets. By largely allowing these practises to continue, the police is able collect sizeable bribes through 'digging rents' from the *madalali* as enforcers of the 'occupied enclave' (Brankamp 2019).

Paul said that in the past, police used to crack down harder on resale: 'they used to forbid us, but refugees went to the police and said, "they give us peas and many of us don't eat peas." Normally police would stop us, but they are human beings so then they would allow us.' Although he insinuates it is a sense of shared humanity that caused the police to cast a blind eye, there are significant sums of money that pays for their acquiescence, and the benevolence of the police officers is not always maintained. Whereas the police's bribes taken from people renting and working on farms outside of the camps are raided through scattered and randomised patrols, the system of rent-collection for ration resale markets is more systematic and coordinated. Dalia explained the system to me:

Each *dalali* pays. I paid yesterday. There's a supervisor who keeps names of all *madalali* in the camp. Each pay TZS 65,000 (USD 28.22) to the supervisor, who pays the police. The police then give us the freedom to send sacks to [the nearby village] Makere. Each sack that goes to Makere pays [TZS] 1,000 to police. Every six months we pay another TZS 65,000 (USD 282.30).

Paul is one of five spokespeople or supervisors of the *madalali* in the camp who meet with the police to sort out problems if they arise. Although this bribery system is done clandestinely and not out in the open, the coordinating role carried out by refugee brokers implicitly legitimises these *madalali* to the state actors on the ground even if they are still vilified by the state above through its encampment policy.

Despite this agreement in place, the participants are not always insulated from the police who often flout these arrangements by leveraging their positions of power for individual bribes. Dalia recalled a time in April 2016 when police followed her home from collecting food:

The police came to my home and found the children at home and asked, 'where is your mother? What is your family size? Where does she keep the food?' The children showed the police where they keep the products. My boss gave TZS 50,000 (USD 21.72) to the police and I haven't had problems since. Any time new police arrive, we have to explain our problems to them to be able to continue.

Others have not been as fortunate as Dalia to simply pay a bribe and move on. Ferdinand, the bicycle transport manager explains, 'sometimes we transport food during the night to get out of the camp without permission, however, my fifteen friends were caught by the police and jailed in Kasulu prison for five months.' More recently, in February 2019, a Congolese woman in a supervisory and prominent *dalali* position similar to Paul was arrested and sent to jail on her way for a resettlement interview with UNHCR. This had a chilling effect for the *madalali* for a few days. All WFP resale business in the camp ceased until there was a negotiation between MHA, the police, and *madalali* spokespeople. People with knowledge of this discrete meeting said that a large fee was paid, and the *madalali* were directed to do their business less out in the open and to transport materials more in secret before business began in earnest again.

For traders who come from Burundi to the camp, however, there are even more Tanzanian state obstacles that they have to navigate. Didier's journey to Nyarugusu is short but fraught with chokepoints where he needs to pay Tanzanian state actors:

I use my bicycle because I live at the border. I sometimes pay something to Tanzanian soldiers at the border and then we traverse our way to Nyarugusu. We pass to [a Tanzanian village near Nyarugusu] police station and pay something. We continue and arrive at the main gate of Nyarugusu camp; we pay and then begin our business.

This trek is not always successful, however:

Sometimes the police accept that we pay something, sometimes no. If they do not accept then we return back, but we can find paths to escape the police. When the immigration authorities are in the areas we cannot dare to come. If you are caught it is a very dangerous issue because you cannot get the time to discuss about bribes, they are so furious and send you to jail.

Didier estimates that he spends around 40% of his profit on bribes to the police. When asked how he could improve the business he responded, 'improve this business? I

don't think that it can because it is illegal.' Pascal, who has been arrested by the police and had to pay all of his earnings is more dramatic in describing the risks of encountering the police: 'To work on Tanzanian land is very dangerous, it is a suicide job because we use so much effort just to make a living.' refugee brokers enjoy wealth and prestige vis-à-vis camp residents and state agents. Even though they are offering crucial services of bringing markets to the camp and liquidating food to cash, as usurpers of the humanitarian aid system, they are also reifying the strength of the Tanzanian state, which enforces these 'occupied enclaves' (Brankamp 2019).

## Conclusion

In an environment such as Tanzania, where the state has mostly retreated from crop marketing, smallholder farmers who live in sparsely populated areas far from large markets are reliant on selling products at low prices to brokers. They must do this because they do not have the capital required to get their products to the market. In Tanzanian refugee camps, where the only option for the majority of impoverished residents to get access to cash is to liquidate distributed food aid, refugee *madalali* also serve as this connection to markets. More than just the offer of cash, this system of brokerage enables refugees the choice 'agentive consumption' described by Oka (2014), which brings a small sense of dignity and normalcy. This food resale system is pyramid in shape with three, somewhat amorphous layers underneath. The bottom layer of the pyramid is comprised of refugee gatherers, such as Andre and Sifa. The second layer are comprised of collectors like Dalia, Baraka, and Paul as well as Burundian migrant collectors, Didier and Pascal. Collectors are only successful if they can sell to the third layer of well-resourced Tanzanian bosses such as Earnest or Julia or large Burundian traders. To understand the role these brokers have as figures of prominence in the camp, we need to situate these actors within the wider histories of agricultural trading in Tanzania and the academic literature on brokerage in Africa since colonialism.

In Tanzania, traders have been vilified as *walanguzi*—black marketeers—throughout colonial and post-colonial histories because they were seen to be

undercutting the state and taking advantage of the citizenry. This is particular true of Asian traders who often dominated trade yet were mistrusted by Africans and colonialists alike. As economic crises gripped the country in the 1970s and agricultural markets began liberalising in the 1980s, the market has beaten the state back in agricultural marketing across Tanzania. With the retreat of the state, negative views toward traders dissipated and they were perceived more benignly as 'parallel', 'unofficial', or 'informal' markets. Concurrently, after independence, Asian traders who once dominated private markets made way for African traders.

Today we see trading occur 'amorphously' and 'ubiquitously on a part-time basis in relatively small amounts' as described by Bryceson (1993 p. 100) by neighbours in even the most remote locales of Kigoma. While the vitriol of the Anti-Economic Sabotage campaign has waned and mostly disappeared, there is still a sense by farmers that traders are selling at unjust prices. This fits with the academic literature on brokers as 'morally ambiguous' (James 2011) or 'ambivalent' (Bierschenk et al. 2002) figures. Their goals are more about using their bridging positions to profit from a needed service, rather than operating for the good of the community. They are tolerated, yet mildly resented by their neighbours for violating the faded, yet still present notion of 'just price'. *Madalali* in Tanzanian villages, like their counterpart brokers in the camp, benefit from highly unequal terms of trade where households without access to markets sell their rations far below market value. However, the difference between refugee *madalali* and Tanzanian *madalali* is that refugee brokers are considered 'famous' and hold positions of prestige in the camp. I argue that the reason for this is due to the highly restrictive encampment structure, which makes the roles of *madalali* even more vital than impoverished and remote Kigoma villages. Even the Tanzanian bosses who sit at the top of the pyramid and have all of the leverage are not despised by their refugee suppliers.

*Madalali* inside the camp see themselves first and foremost as businesspeople rather than humanitarians in ways similar to how Turner (2006) describe the 'big men' in Lukole camp (2006). Although they profit from an oppressive camp system and can better withstand economic shocks than most, there is some sense of solidarity they felt as neighbours who are also subject to Tanzania's shutdown politics. For instance,

I asked most high-level *madalali* what they thought about the cash transfer system that threatened to upend their business model. While they recognised it hurt their businesses, they all responded similarly to Paul: 'It was bad for business, but I was happy the cash programme came to Nyarugusu because it was good for everybody.'

*Madalali* also hold prominent positions in the camp because these transactions and employment relationship are deeply imbedded within social networks. *Madalali* bring liquidity to the camp, which enables agentive consumption and a sense of normalcy (Oka 2014). For most of these transactions, rather than impersonal market forces based on supply and demand, refugees do not represent the *homo economicus*, but rather this system within the camp is based on well-worn networks and systems of employment along the value chains based on trust, loyalty, and social capital. Sifa's neighbours go directly to her house when they are ready to sell rations. Andre speaks in reverent tones of the Congolese woman who gave him a lifeline by entrusting him with capital when he had so few other job prospects. Dalia made it clear that her trustworthiness was rewarded by being elevating from a low-level gatherer to collector, which has made her a wealthy woman today. The highest earning *madalali* boasted of being 'famous' throughout the camp, which marked his prestiged position in the camp. These socially informed transactions in the camp are contrasted by the Tanzanian bosses living outside of the trifurcated state and who toggle through suppliers based on price and the market rather than by loyalty and trust.

Refugee aid brokers are not only legitimised by their neighbours in the camp, however, but by the state-actors on the ground as well. Despite the unquestionably vast differences between Tanzanian refugee camps and the situation in post-apartheid South Africa, Deborah James' (2011) concluding thoughts of the influence of brokers gives valuable insights into the trifurcated forms of power and their interactions in Nyarugusu, albeit in an inverted way:

I argue that brokers are both product and producers of a new kind of society. They re-emerge in a setting where the state intervenes, partly to create conditions where the market will have primacy (Ferguson & Gupta 2002), but also to ameliorate the resulting inequities through redistributive practice (Seekings & Natrass 2005). The return of the broker is partly, but not only, a response to these conditions. The broker creates and perpetuates such conditions, and indeed embodies the contradictions which ensue (p. 336).

The trifurcated state resonates with a new kind of society James (2011) describes, where neoliberal market primacy dialectically merges with welfarist (humanitarian) state through care and maintenance food aid. In Chapters 5 and 6, I argued that refugee self-reliance in camps—parallel in function to indirect rule and villagization—is difficult to achieve for most camp residents due to the lack of access to capital, dwindling humanitarian aid, and perpetual ‘pithy’ development projects. However, self-reliance is made impossible for all but a few because, unlike in the quote above, the Tanzanian state has an oppositional relationship to the market in camps through shutdown politics. These shutdowns are designed to hinder and erase market relations and livelihoods to force refugees out of Tanzania. The space of the camp is seeing an inverse interaction between the state and the market compared to the Tanzanian society encircling it, or the post-apartheid society analysed by James (2011). While the state is *less* involved in Tanzanian agricultural markets since the 1980s, it has gotten *more* involved in the camp economy. It should be no surprise then that history is repeating itself: greater state control of the camp markets, in conjunction with the prohibition of food aid resale means that refugee traders are pejoratively seen by the state from above once again as black marketeers, *walanguzi*.

This arrangement complicates the trifurcated governance structures of the camp. Within the central Tanzanian state concentrated at the top, there is an incongruence from above and below. Despite, being vilified by the state above, from below, *madalali* are tacitly accepted and legitimised by the state actors enforcing encampment. While *madalali* are able to gain some legitimacy and protection from the shutdown politics of the state through bribes, they are also entrenching the encampment system further by supplying an additional cash subsidy for police and MHA salaries. Yet at the same time, the state actors are increasingly receiving orders from above to shut down physical markets, which enable the resale system. This is essentially kneecapping their own illicit salaries in the process.

*Madalali* go beyond evading the humanitarian actors like the businessmen Turner (2006) analyses in Lukole. Instead, their authority is parasitic of the humanitarian government. By converting WFP food to cash, they offer a valuable

service in the camp by co-opting and subverting the humanitarian aid system to a more favourable (albeit far less efficient) cash-based system that humanitarian government has been prevented to implement by the Tanzanian government. In this process, *Madalali* strengthen their status and legitimacy in the camp at the expense of the humanitarian government. This chapter aligns with my argument throughout this thesis that the authority of the humanitarian government as a tier in the trifurcated state should be decentred as they have repeatedly been side-lined or ineffectual in their goals of refugee protection and development. While actors such as refugee brokers fill some of this power void that humanitarians are unable to fill, the majority of this space is violently controlled by the Tanzanian state.



# Conclusion: Exit, voice, loyalty, or mobility?



*Figure 28: Last day of fieldwork with financial diaries at farewell celebrations in Nyarugusu. Top: Congolese. Bottom: Burundians. Credit: Boeyink 2017.*

Toward the end of December 2019, while writing this concluding chapter, I received a Facebook message from one of my Congolese research assistants, Dieudonné. He told me he was leaving Nyarugusu to return to Congo:

I'm going to Kalemie, [Tanganyika province]. My life is passing me by in this camp. No scholarship, no business, no bank access, and most importantly, no security. I can't endure without these anymore. I have decided to go die trying to straighten out my country rather than perish in this camp like many of us already have. I think I might start a small business and get busy growing it. I don't know much how to properly grow business, but I have no better choice. Never again will I be a refugee. I'd rather die standing home.

Dieudonné came to Tanzania in 2013 to take English classes in Kigoma town but overstayed his visa and moved to Dar es Salaam. He stayed there until June 2017, but as it is well-chronicled, life for refugees in Dar es Salaam is precarious because the state actively seeks to keep them out (Sommers 2001; O'Loghlen and Bwami 2018). He was tired of having to live secretly to avoid detection: 'I could breathe well when I arrived in the camp. Before, I had to endure hiding my accent in Dar es Salaam for five years. I had no access to almost all social services and goods.' The relief of the camp did not last long as the economic conditions became unbearable in Nyarugusu. He concluded, 'I have suffered as an illegal immigrant and as a refugee as well. It is time to go home.' Dieudonné is educated and fluent in English and French, which puts him in a better position than the majority of Nyarugusu residents. The Tanzanian state's efforts to impel refugees to return is taking its toll on all camp refugees, even those with desirable human capital like Dieudonné. He had exhausted all efforts to make a life for himself in both the camp and city in Tanzania, so his final choice was to exit.

Albert O. Hirschman created a simple framing device using exit, voice, or loyalty that scholars have used to analyse undesirable living conditions from disparate locales such as Sulawesi, Indonesia (Li 2014) to the Jim Crow South in the US (Tolnay et al. 2018). Tania Murry Li (2014) paraphrases the three choices to mean people 'can tolerate their conditions, protest, or find a way out' (p. 150). I will not deeply engage with Hirschman's work (1970, 1993), but will use this triad in summation of decisions that refugees are making, or being forced to make, in the camp. In short, exit is becoming the only option for many. The question is, where are they exiting to? Those

with means are travelling onward to places like Uganda or have options to reintegrate to Congo or Burundi. The option to give voice has been made virtually impossible for refugees as we see from the shutdown politics enacted by the Tanzanian state, which does not tolerate dissident voices, especially from refugees. As the assault on livelihoods and self-reliance in camps by the state continues, it is becoming harder for camp residents to remain loyal or endure life in Tanzania. Moreover, I argued in Chapter 6 that UNHCR and the humanitarian government have been ineffectual at advocating and intervening to make development and self-reliance for refugees attainable through 'big pushes'. Humanitarian actors are relegated to practising 'pithy development'. In this final chapter, I analyse a fourth way, mobility, that is being enacted from below by refugees and in small ways constitute micro acts of decolonising the trifurcated state. Though I admire these daily acts of mobility, I do not consider them to offer a long-term durable solution. I argue that the global refugee regime requires decolonisation on a massive scale in all tiers of the trifurcated state. However, based on the historic and cyclical trajectories for refugees and migrants since colonialism I am not hopeful of any positive solutions to the current refugee caseloads in Tanzania.

## **Exit**

In many ways, each chapter in this thesis has fed into the imperative for refugees to leave the camp. When mass displacement happens on the scale that it has in Tanzania and many other post-colonial contexts, encampment, which results in a process of trifurcation, is often the state's preferred solution. The manipulation of the movements of people is borne out of a colonial impulse of containment. The first part of this thesis began by exploring how other policymakers and scholars conceptualise the camp as a community, city, or a surrogate state. I do not find these analogies to be theoretically productive, however, as the parallels of the city and the camp do not consistently hold. The surrogate state does not fully capture the history or the fluid complexity of actors negotiating and contesting authority and governance in the camp. Framing the camp as a community does not capture the heterogeneous

nature of camps, and any attempts by the humanitarian actors to support 'community-led' projects generally fall short. Instead, I explored encampment through the theoretical frame of trifurcation, building on Mamdani's (1996) work in *Citizen and Subject*, which recognises the historical lineages of colonial containment, while giving space to analyse the assemblages of tiers between the state, refugees, and humanitarian government. In Chapter 2, I brought trifurcation theory to the context of Tanzania's history of controlling the movements of migrants and refugees both at the border and internally since colonialism. In the history of Tanzania and most protracted refugee situations, there comes a time when large refugee populations are no longer welcomed or tolerated and are first impelled then forced to exit by force.

Expulsion of refugees and migrants has taken many forms in Tanzania over the last two centuries. It can be traced in subtle ways such as labels of populations on the move. For example, the colonial state branded people fleeing neighbouring labour conscription as 'aliens' and of indigenous Tanganyikans moving to towns and cities as 'alien natives'. The British and German colonialists oscillated between blocking and expelling incoming migration at the border, and actively recruiting from neighbours for their own labour demands in the 1930s. When President Julius Nyerere came to power in independent Tanzania, he ushered in a pan-African and anti-colonial revolution. He labelled neighbouring dissidents or 'freedom fighters' from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique who were fighting against colonial and white settler rule as *wageni*, or guests. They were given the freedom to settle where they wanted and were allowed to find employment. Yet at the same time, President Nyerere maintained colonial-like containments of Rwandans, Burundians, and to some extent Mozambicans to rural settlements, where they were known as 'settlers'. They were not allowed to leave and were also exploited for their labour. Under Nyerere, movements of Tanzanian citizens were also contained through villagization during *ujamaa*, and internal migration to cities such as Dar es Salaam was meant to be kept at a minimum.

Everything changed in the 1990s when Tanzania's economy was in shambles and the state was being dismantled through Structural Adjustment. This economic precarity was met with displacements on an unprecedented scale in the country with

hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to Tanzania from Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo. This resulted in strict encampment where camps were maintained through the care and maintenance of UNHCR, WFP, and implementing partners. Refugees were not allowed to leave the camps without permission. This period saw frequent border closures to prevent increases in refugee numbers as well as the most violent forced exits of thousands of refugees. In 1995, around half a million Rwandan refugees were forced to leave Western Tanzania. Many instead fled to third countries such as Uganda or Kenya (Whitaker 2002a). In 2012, apart from Nyarugusu camp and the 'old settlements', Mtabila, which housed Burundian refugees from the 1993 caseload, was one of the last remaining refugee camps. In that year, nearly 40,000 Burundians were expelled at gunpoint by the Tanzanian military and forced to return to Burundi.

Many of the Burundian refugees that I met living in Tanzania today, who were 're-displaced' in the political crisis of 2015, had experienced the violent closure and exit from Mtabila. Most who returned to Burundi in the 2000s were unable to economically, socially, or legally reintegrate due to contested land shortages, intimate feuds and violence between and among neighbours and families, and a complete lack of trust with the oppressive state under Pierre Nkurunziza (Purdeková 2016; Schwartz 2019). It is from this backdrop, this shared trauma, that Burundians frequently refer to and fear will be repeated. Chapters 4 and 5 under Part II closely examined how the Tanzanian government under the increasingly nationalist and undemocratic personality of President John Magufuli is purposefully making life in the camp difficult and untenable. The state created a 'hostile environment'<sup>16</sup> by assaulting livelihoods through shutdowns of markets and international humanitarian interventions, while constantly antagonising Burundians to make it clear that they are no longer welcome. On top of this, the international refugee response in Tanzania is 'chronically underfunded' and ration-cuts have been a constant contributing factor to making life in the camp unbearable. I gave close scrutiny of the shutdown of the popular WFP cash transfer programme to explore the motivations by the Tanzanian state for the shutdown and how this has been experienced in the camp from below. Chapter 3 used

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<sup>16</sup> 'Hostile environment' is in reference to then Home Secretary of the UK, Theresa May said in 2012 her aim, 'was to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration' (Grierson 2018).

a macro-historical view of the rise of cash transfers to argue that where refugee cash transfers are not allowed, as in Tanzania, refugees are also deemed not 'worthy' to reside. The cash shutdown was a major blow because it was substantially improving livelihood prospects for recipient families. Chapter 4 notes the outrage and dejection that refugees felt during the shutdown politics of the camp, and how their livelihoods were affected. Even in Part III, which explores the agency and mobility of refugees through 'invisible agricultural systems' and the extensive systems of brokers in the resale market of WFP food aid, I note how these practises have been made more precarious under President Magufuli.

In the current encampment environment, self-reliance is becoming impossible for many, and there is palpable anxiety of a repeat forced closure like that which many Burundians experienced at Mtabila in 2012. This combination is forcing exits for refugees in large numbers. What destinations individuals and households are choosing to move to, illuminates the socio-economic stratification that has occurred in Nyarugusu and the other camps, which is the focus on Chapter 5. Burundian refugees largely came in 2015 as a mostly homogenous block of mostly rural Hutu of low socio-economic class after failing to reintegrate following their return to Burundi. Congolese refugees, on the other hand, had been arriving since 1996 and had established themselves economically and built connections with nearby markets. Class is flattened in the camp and is no longer as salient as it previously was in Congo and Burundi, however, there is still socio-economic stratification with groups that we identify as 'ultra-poor', 'poor', and 'non-poor'. This stratification creates different possibilities and constraints. Those in the non-poor category, like Thierry, can afford to invest in Burundi for a 'safer landing' in the future, move their family to Uganda, and pay for their way as far as South Africa to earn higher wages. Others have also moved to Uganda or Kenya, just as some Rwandans did during involuntary repatriation in the 1990s. The majority in the poor and ultra-poor groups, while they have the same aspirations to move to third countries, are either immobilised and waiting to be forced out, or are returning to Burundi before they want to because they can no longer stand conditions in Tanzania. Despite my informants' fears of repatriation since I began fieldwork in the middle of 2017, the poor economic climate which gives few prospects

for livelihoods has meant that they have not been able to save or plan toward an exit to a better situation. Whether camp residents decide to stay in Tanzania or go, it is clear that the second option of voice, or protest, is the option that the Tanzanian state has made impossible.

## **Voice**

Voice, or protest to make conditions in the camp better has been closed off for refugees in Tanzania. This is true not only for the populations of refugees living there now but was also the case in the 1960s during the supposed 'golden era' for asylum under President Nyerere, which I recount in Chapter 2. When Rwandan Tutsis fled a violent Hutu uprising in the 1960s, unlike the current Burundian and Congolese camp residents, they wanted to return home as soon as possible and heavily resisted any integration into Tanzania. They were given land to cultivate and were offered citizenship. Their protest was to refuse to plant crops or build permanent structures, and some even destroyed crops in defiance. The government responded to this resistance by withholding food rations, closing schools and dispensaries, banning large gatherings, and detaining leaders. After a failed attempt for this population to exit to Burundi, they eventually stopped resisting and accepted integration into the country (Gasarasi 1990). I observed these same 'shutdown politics' by the state more recently in Nyarugusu in Chapter 4.

More recently, there have been additional failed actions by refugees to improve the conditions of the camp. Education and healthcare sectors in the camp attempted to strike for better pay, but striking employees were quickly replaced in both instances. In 2016, there was a food strike that had marginal success in that WFP slightly increased the flour in their rations. Finally, in 2017, I witnessed the most recent attempt at protest. Amidst the throes of food ration cuts, President Magufuli abruptly shut down the aforementioned WFP cash transfer programme. The shutdown had gone too far for the camp residents. The combination of aid cuts and cash shutdown led to a planned protest for households to refuse WFP food *en masse* in order to appeal their case to the international community. In the lead-up to the protest, there was also an

armed robbery that all the refugees I spoke to believed was carried out by Tanzanian police officers. This stoked tensions even further until the Nyarugusu camp commandant called a meeting in the camp and announced anybody who refused rations would be taken off the WFP recipient list, and anybody who protested would be made ineligible for resettlement. In Nduta camp further north, demonstrations were violently put down with teargas and arrests were made by the police. Instantly, any possibility for refugees to give voice in dissent was shut down and remains so to this day.

I concluded that the decision by camp residents to pull back from their planned strike was a prudent one because other refugee protests around the world often lead to harsher retaliations and worse conditions than they were originally voicing their protest against. Additionally, Chapter 4 gave many insights into the violent role of the Tanzanian state and the complicit entanglements of the humanitarian government within the trifurcated arena of the camp. Despite their frustration lying mostly with the Tanzanian government, refugees directed their voice beyond the state toward the 'international community' above. This is symbolic of the 'humanitarian violence' (Branch 2009) that humanitarian actors legitimise even if their conduct is itself not violent. Moreover, building off the theoretical grounding of Michel Foucault's work presented in Chapter 1, a 'governmentality' analysis is helpful in understanding the decentred and rhizomic trifurcation of power in the camp space. The persistence of rumours within Nyarugusu are indicative of the violent 'idea of the state' (Hansen and Stepputat 2001), which has a projected 'verticality' to the Tanzanian state and 'encompasses' all Tanzanians as the causes of their oppression.

## **Loyalty**

This chapter has summed up the compounding ways in which it is becoming harder for refugees to be loyal to enduring encampment in Tanzania. People who are capable are moving back to their countries of origin or third countries in the region due to decreased food rations, government shutdowns of livelihood opportunities, and the looming spectre of forced repatriation. As analysed in Chapters 2 and 7, throughout

Tanzania's asylum history, however, certain displacement groups, or 'place-making projects' (Novak 2007), have been spared harsher treatment by the Tanzanian state compared to others. This makes loyalty or local integration more smooth or difficult depending on the group. Under Nyerere, *wageni* 'freedom fighters' from neighbouring countries under white rule were afforded greater rights and freedoms than 'settler' Burundian and Rwandan refugees who were contained and exploited for labour. The 1972, or 'old caseload' of Burundians living in the refugee settlements of Tabora region were granted Tanzanian citizenship, whereas the 1993 caseload of Burundians were forced to leave. More recently, Congolese refugees in Nyarugusu were spared the repatriations of the 1993 caseload of Burundians, have a better reputation locally, and have more livelihood prospects than their Burundian neighbours. Despite Burundians particularly being implored by the state to leave, the camp shutdowns have equally affected Congolese refugees who share the space of Nyarugusu.

What then is humanitarian government's role in creating a space where it is safe and prosperous to remain in Tanzania? The central purposes for the humanitarian government in protracted refugee situations are to first advocate for and ensure a protected space for refugees to be granted asylum and shelter from *refoulement*. While UNHCR may succeed at times of delaying repatriations and border closure, when the state chooses, as we have seen with the Rwandans in the 1990s and the Burundians in the 2000s, UNHCR has repeatedly failed to prevent mass involuntary returns of refugees. Secondly, in camps, humanitarians at least initially provide care and maintenance needs such as food and shelter. This too has recently eroded as international funding has slowed to a trickle and has caused multiple food ration cuts. Finally, as international aid has dwindled for refugees in Tanzania and around the world, the refugee regime has been attempting to facilitate refugee self-reliance, or in other words, a transition from humanitarianism to development. Unfortunately, in Tanzania's refugee history, apart from the Burundian naturalisation project, there have been too few successes in these regards, especially recently, and I am not hopeful for the near-term future.

Beyond the day-to-day duties such as reviewing legal cases of asylum, and dispensing food aid for in-country offices like UNHCR and WFP in Tanzania, the UN

has made 'big pushes' to raise more funds for protracted refugee situations, but also to advocate for less-restrictive refugee policies in places like Tanzania and across Africa with the potential to open spaces for refugee self-reliance. In Chapter 6, I recounted how initiatives like ICARA I and II largely failed in these objectives. The most recent incarnation of these big pushes in Tanzania was the CRRF, which was an outcome of the New York Declaration in 2016. The early excitement and promise of this initiative, which was felt among both humanitarian actors and government bureaucrats working together to guide the process, points to the CRRF as being the only real conjuncture capable of reforming refugee policy in Tanzania in place since the 1990s. On the table was the opening up of more rights for mobility and employment and integration in exchange for more aid. However, President Magufuli squashed the CRRF as abruptly as the state shut down the cash programmes and markets in the camp. Like the ICARA conferences in the 1980s, this push failed due to the lack of 'additionality' of international funds and poor communication between parties. When zoomed out even further to trace the genealogy of self-reliance as a developmental ideology since colonialism, however, we see that minimalist and austere government intervention—whether under the racist aegis of colonialism, the revolutionary spirit of *ujamaa*, or the neoliberal *zeitgeist* of today—inevitably produces deep inequalities and extractive outcomes, which benefit the brokers of power and resources rather than attaining self-sufficiency.

In the wake of the failure of big pushes has UNHCR and the humanitarian government in Tanzania been able to do to assist refugee self-reliance through development assistance? I made the case that humanitarians have been limited to implementing a 'cosmetic' (Carpi 2019) or what I term, 'pithy' development in the camps. In the Introduction chapter, I introduced Viola, who is a Burundian prototypical of so many refugees in Tanzania. I returned to her Chapter 6, recalling a moment when I met her at the Common Market. She was in an angry dispute with women whom she had been randomly assigned to run an entrepreneurial group with. This group is emblematic of the pithy development that the humanitarian government is forced to implement due to the Tanzanian government limiting more innovative programmes such as cash transfer projects. Toward the end of my fieldwork, before

returning home, I checked in a final time with Viola. Not only did she leave the group that had attempted to take advantage of her, but she formed a new one with her friends she trusted to start a successful business selling onions. The groups that Viola and Julienne were corralled into are more than just ineffectual, they are also costly to run. In contrast, refugee-led groups such as UPDH, which mobilise the same sorts of savings groups often to greater effect, are rarely ever given funding or support from international donors.

## **Mobility**

The fourth option available for refugees is mobility, which I consider to be temporary movements outside of the camp ranging from a day to any period of time that falls short of being considered long-term or permanent. I argue that there are two forms of mobility: there is daily mobility of people and products briefly leaving the camp described in Chapters 7 and 8. The second type of mobility—migration—is what Katy Long (2010, 2013a, 2014) advocates for. While not part of Hirschman’s original triadic framework, I argue that mobility is an option that incorporates all three aspects of exit, voice, and loyalty. Finally, in my concluding remarks, I discuss mobility as a ‘fourth’ durable solution or as an act of decolonisation. Unfortunately, in the case of refugees in Tanzania, I am not hopeful that mobility will be a viable ‘fourth’ durable solution.

Mobility most closely resembles the idea of exit, albeit temporarily. Though camps are designed for containment, countless refugees will go back and forth undetected between their country of origin to visit family, check on livelihoods such as farms, or even go to school (Monsutti 2008). Some members of households will oscillate between camp and cities as livelihood strategies as well (Jansen 2016). Chapters 7 and 8 in Part III focus on mobilities refugees initiate in defiance of encampment policy and law, while deeply embedding themselves into the Kigoma economy through de facto local integration (Hovil 2014). Chapter 7 brings to light the extensive agriculture systems surrounding the camps, which include refugees renting land from Tanzanians and Burundian refugees and circular migrants working as labourers on these farms. The actors in these displacement agricultural spaces must

be in balance of what I call '(in)visibility sufficiency'. This means they must be 'sufficiently visible' in order to remain 'invisibly self-sufficient' away from the Tanzanian state. Chapter 8 notes that not only people are mobile, but food and goods as well. I demystify the 'black market' of resold WFP food rations to show the brokers and individuals that make up these networks, and how they intersect with Tanzania's shifting history of agricultural policy. Through their mobile businesses, which co-opt and subvert the humanitarian food aid system, refugee *madalali* gain authority and prestige among camp residents for enabling 'agentive consumption' (Oka 2014) in the camp. Through the highly organised system of bribes to the police, which allows the illicit food aid resale networks to continue, these refugee brokers are also implicitly legitimised by the state actors on the ground level of the camp.

Refugee mobilities have a more complicated relationship with the concept of loyalty. On one hand, mobilities are defiant of obeying encampment law requiring them to remain in the camp. On the other hand, because these mobilities are enacted temporarily to improve livelihoods, they are providing means to stay loyal to living in the camp. Not all camp residents can participate in camp mobilities, or conversely, are forced to be mobile (Omata 2018). Refugees who rent land from Tanzanians, or who are receiving large profits as *madalali* or brokers in the food aid resale markets must first have the financial or social capital to be able to make these movements. The opposite is true for refugee farm labourers—mostly Burundians. These individuals risk arrest from the police or exploitation from their employers. They sell their labour, not because they want to, but primarily because it is their only means to get start-up income or merely get by. Since President Magufuli has been in power in 2015, there has been a pincer movement where these mobilities have been cracked down on by the police making them more dangerous. Simultaneously, mobility has been made more necessary due to food ration cuts and the closures of markets. This is leading to all possible actions—exit, voice, loyalty, and mobility—undesirable except for the few who have built enough wealth to attain a positive outcome such as a successful *dalali* such as Dalia. Though President Magufuli's nationalist proclivities most likely mean any international advocacy will be cast aside just as the CRRF was, I will offer final thoughts how UNHCR and the global refugee regime should advocate for mobility

as a remedial (rather than durable) solution in the short-term but any holistic long-term solution to refugee situations will require monumental will and resource to decolonise the coloniality of the trifurcated state.

### **A Fourth Solution?**

Katy Long (2014) argues that the three durable solutions for refugees—repatriation, local integration, and resettlement—are mostly failing refugees in protracted displacement. We see this in the case of Tanzania. Burundian repatriations in 2012 resulted in re-displacements in 2015. Local integration, similar to the citizenship given to the 1972 caseload (Kuch 2016; Milner 2013), is nowhere in sight for the current caseloads in Kigoma. Resettlement, which was once a promising option for Congolese refugees in Nyarugusu, is currently being gutted by President Trump. Long (2010) critiques hosting countries and donors who have obsessed over permanent physical returns. She calls for an approach that takes seriously the understanding that refugees rarely remain sedentary but are actively mobile. Migration and asylum were once closely tied through Nansen passports before the modern refugee regime was created in the 1950s (Long 2013b). Instead, she proposes a mobility-centred approach:

Arguably the crucial difference with a mobility-centred approach is that instead of equating a solution to a displacement crisis with the end of movement (as is the case with traditional approaches to repatriation, local integration, and resettlement), advocates of a mobility-centred approach explicitly couple the undertaking to end forced movement with a different parallel commitment: that individuals should be *free* to move (Long 2014 p. 480).

Long (2013b) does not consider mobilities in same way that I do, which are short and daily movements out of the camp. Which are more of a response to encampment rather than a long-term durable solution. Though she does not define mobility, she advocates toward a more flexible migration regime, in ways similar to the refugee regime before the Geneva Convention. She points to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an example of regional citizenship that offers freer mobility for citizens in the regional block as migrants rather than exclusively refugees.

This was helpful for Liberian and Sierra Leoneans who fled to neighbouring states but did not wish to repatriate right away.

I also advocate for the flexible solutions proposed by Long, which allows for refugees' own agency in making solutions and better captures the realities of displaced situations. However, due to the realities on the ground, it is far away from being a solution anytime soon. The geopolitical realities of East Africa prevent an ECOWAS-type arrangement where the impulse to contain non-citizen refugee and migration populations remains strong. Tanzania is a member of the East Africa Community (EAC) regional bloc, which is comprised of Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, and recently South Sudan. The EAC has some provisions for freedom of movement, but due to regional rivalries and xenophobic sentiments, the countries have not seen the freedom of goods and people fully implemented. President Magufuli, in particular, has been resistant to supranational integration for both refugees and migrants (Landau et al. 2018). Perhaps in the future, the EAC and other regional blocks will progress for the flexibility between migration and asylum similar to ECOWAS, however, this does not seem to be promising in the short-term. Furthermore, while a mobility-centred approach advocated by Long would be favourable for refugees to extend their stay in a place like Tanzania, it would not address the entrenched problems of governance and conflict in places such as Congo and Burundi. These solutions seem to be a long way out of sight because it would require a large-scale repositioning of power in all tiers of the trifurcated state. The deeply entrenched coloniality of encampment would take a monumental decolonisation effort, which in small ways has already under way by refugees themselves.

## **Mobility as decolonisation**

The individuals I spoke with who are involved in the illicit mobilities above do not consider themselves to be subversive or engaging in protest, but rather enact daily routines of 'habitus' to marginally make their lives under encampment better. Yet from my analytical vantage point, I consider mobilities to not only be an agentive voice

through micro-actions against encampment but more broadly as decolonising acts. These mobilities are insurgent against the colonial containment impulse, which is the foundation of the trifurcated state. The accumulation of subversive mobilities around the world has decolonised humanitarian aid to a degree that gives more freedom and decision making to refugees. For example, there is no rise in humanitarian cash transfers if the selling of food rations is not as widespread as it is in Nyarugusu and so many other refugee situations. There is no shift in UNHCR's urban refugee policy to advocate against encampment if refugees did not defy the long-standing encampment-first policies that existed prior. The very acts of local integration through refugee mobilities in agriculture and food aid networks, as well as the movements into cities, strike against the heart of colonial impulses to protect borders, 'tribal homelands', and cities from disorder and illegibility. This is a similar viewpoint to the 'autonomy of migration' approach, which offers a different framing: 'the focus has shifted from the apparatuses of control to the multiple and diverse ways in which migration responds to, operates independently from, and in turn shapes those apparatuses and their corresponding institutions and practices' (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015 p. 895).

While these micro-decolonial acts should not go unnoticed, a more comprehensive disentanglement from top to bottom of the trifurcated system would be required to bring a more just system of refugee management. Brankamp and Daley (2020) reach similar conclusions in their post-colonial analysis of labour, migration, and refugee regimes in Kenya and Tanzania:

Contemporary refugee regimes in Tanzania and Kenya have emerged from overlapping legacies of colonial laws and regulatory frameworks, international and regional legislations introduced after independence, and the more recent national politics of mobility, each of which displayed a noticeable concern for closely managing the belonging, bodies, and (im)mobilities of Africans on the move (p. 119)

Their solution brings in Francis Nyamnjoh's (2013, 2017) calls to disrupt the contemporary notions of belonging in Africa, which were shaped by the colonial powers:

Lived experiences on the continent are interwoven with notions of flux at the territorial and symbolic 'frontiers' that empirically question the compartmentalization of Africans into contained units of belonging and reimagine them as what Nyamnjoh (2017: 258) terms 'frontier beings.' He notes that 'frontier Africans . . . straddle myriad identity margins and constantly seek to bridge various divides in the interest of the imperatives of living interconnections, nuances and complexities made possible or exacerbated by the evidence of mobilities and encounters.' As opposed to reinforcing colonial binaries at the border, this position involves 'experimenting with multiple layered and shifting identities' (ibid.: 264). (Brankamp and Daley 2020 p. 124).

This reimagining of 'frontier beings' requires a 'conviviality' which emphasises coexistence rather than difference, which was entrenched by the tribalisation of indirect rule and the selective enforcement of arbitrary borders since colonialism. For Tanzania, this would invoke Julius Nyerere's radical decolonisation opposition white rule, which openly accepted anti-colonial dissidents into the familyhood of *ujamaa* philosophy. However, Nyerere's revolutionary global decolonial politics were only partial, due to Tanzania's reception of its Burundian and Rwandan refugee neighbours through exploitative containment practises, which have endured until today. As such, a holistic decolonial movement would need to transcend Nyerere's legacy of post-colonial contradictions, which upheld the colonial impulse to contain and forcibly move populations through villagization and refugee constrictions.

Finally, a comprehensive decolonisation must necessarily involve reparative contributions from the former colonial and imperial powers, which shaped the unequal global system as it is today. For post-colonial states to shed the ardent nationalism, which 'others' and vilifies refugees culminating in encampment and violent repatriations, they would need to be compensated beyond the minimums that have been contributed since the modern refugee regime was constructed. Chapter 6 made clear that a large reason 'big pushes' by donors failed because they did not meet the demands of host states to 'share the burden' of allowing refugees to reside. It seemed that the CRRF, which would have opened possibilities of self-reliance for refugees in Tanzania, was actually close to being realised if the cash commitments were upheld and if the Tanzanian state was partnered with at all stages of the initiative.

True decolonisation would also require a commitment to 'localisation' that would transfer money and other resources Tanzanian and refugee organisations such as UPDH, rather than the bulk of it going to large international organisations as they do now. Beyond just cash-flows, this would confer decision-making responsibilities to these groups as well, beyond the top-down structures that characterise the global humanitarian system. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2019) point to the dangers localising humanitarian aid:

On the one hand, we must remain concerned about the instrumentalisation of Southern actors and the extent to which the localisation agenda may be a way for Northern states to shift resources and responsibilities to Southern actors, or simply to withdraw from international responsibilities without sharing promised funding and resources. On the other hand, it affords an opportunity to acknowledge the extent to which Northern approaches are limited while Southern-led initiatives can have major advantages (p. S51).

In other words, localisation should not be a new form of cheap sub-contracting as is often the case. In an interview with Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Juliano Fiori takes this critique even further:

While localization might be morally intuitive, Western humanitarians betray their hubris in supposing that their own concessions can reorder the aid industry and the geostrategic matrix from which it takes form. Their proposed solutions, then, including donor budgetary reallocations, are inevitably technocratic. Without structural changes to the political economy of aid, localization becomes a pretext for Western governments and humanitarian agencies to outsource risk [...] In the place of real discussion about power and inequalities, then, we get a set of policy prescriptions aimed at the production of self-sufficient neoliberal subjects, empowered to save themselves through access to markets (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Fiori 2020 pp. 184-185).

Finally, in order for former-colonial powers to advocate for mobility in places like Tanzania, they would also need to ease their own hypocritical stances toward migration on their own soils. Achiume (2019) argues that this would also require a recognition of the rights for former colonial subjects to be mobile:

European colonialism entailed the emigration of tens of millions of Europeans and the flow of natural and human resources across the globe, for the benefit of Europe and Europeans [...] global interconnection and political subordination, initiated over the course of this history, generate a theory of sovereignty that

obligates former colonial powers to open their borders to former colonial subjects (p. 1510).

This would entail a substantial restructuring of refugee resettlement to allow for greater numbers to be resettled, as well as an opening up of migration for Tanzanians and other host communities in post-colonial countries to be mobile if they so choose. It pains me to admit, however, that the resources and political will necessary to usher decolonisation on this massive scale, not just in Tanzania, but across the world seems far out of reach. With this in mind, I am not able to muster hope for their prospects, though I am not without inspiration by the persistence of residents of Nyarugusu and the daily mobilities and decolonising acts they undertake just to keep going.

### **What comes next?**

Dieudonné, who is introduced at the beginning of this chapter, is my friend. It infuriates me that he is forced to return to an unstable Congo before he wants to. While I did not have the same level of personal relationship with the participants of the financial diaries and informants that I did with Dieudonné and my other research assistants, they were so generous with their time and gave me such an intimate look at their finances and lives. We certainly grew fond of each other and I feel so dejected when I think about people such as Viola, who has worked so hard with so many different livelihood ventures only to tread water in the poverty of the camp. As another forced repatriation is looming, she does not know what she will do or where she will go. Her life would be in jeopardy from her ex-husband and his family if she would return home, but the last time I spoke with her she did not have the capital to move to a third country. I am struggling to find hope for what comes next for refugees in Tanzania.

Ta-Nehisi Coates, a public intellectual who writes incisively about racism and white supremacy in America, had an interview in 2017 with Stephen Colbert, television host of *The Late Show*. At the time, Coates was on a book tour promoting *We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy*. In the interview, they had an exchange

about hope that I think about often, which could be applied to the refugee situation in Tanzania and the state of asylum around the world:

Colbert: You've had a hard time in some interviews expressing a sense of hope in this country. Do you have any hope tonight for the people out there, about how we could be a better country, we could have better race relations, we could have better politics?

Coates: No, but I'm not the person you should go to for that. You should go to your pastor. Your pastor provides you hope. Your friends provide you hope.

Colbert: I'm not asking you to make shit up. I'm asking if you personally see any evidence for change in America.

Coates: But I would have to make shit up to actually answer that question in a satisfying way.

Sadly, I also do not have hope to offer for the residents of Nyarugusu, Nduta, and Mtendeli. It seems that the critical juncture has passed for dynamic changes to be made to encampment in Tanzania. The CRRF and the rise of cash transfers in the camps were the last feasible chances to implement innovations that substantially benefited refugees' lives beyond cosmetic or pithy interventions. Additionally, I do not foresee UNHCR and partners making commitments to enhance refugee self-reliance. 'Liminality' has become a buzzword to describe the situations of refugees in all displacement situations (Mortland 1986). A simple Google search of 'liminality' and 'refugees' yields more results than I could even begin to cite. This word has endured because it is perhaps the most apt for capturing 'the refugee experience'—as problematic as that phrase may be (Malkki 1995b). If liminality is a general way of being for many refugees, after the cash shutdown and recent direct calls for Burundians to return, refugees in Tanzania have experienced something of a 'hyperliminality'. Most camp residents cannot raise or save money for an exit, and there is a general feeling that they are bracing for their forced return.

American journalist and author, Krista Tippett, followed up with Coates about his interview with Colbert and his remarks on hope.

Tippett: You have this quote from James Baldwin that really stuck out at me: 'White people in this country will have quite enough to do in learning how to accept and love themselves and each other. And when they have achieved this,

which will not be tomorrow and may very well be never, the Negro problem will no longer exist or will no longer be needed.'

Coates: No one will need it. No one will need it. When I read that, that was like getting hit by a truck. It was so profound, because what he was saying was that there actually — there is no 'Negro problem.' And that's how it's always historically been talked about— even that: 'the problem of the color line.' No, there's no problem of the color line. The problem is over here. It's not us. We actually are quite human.

There is no 'refugee problem'. There is a nationalism problem personified in Presidents Donald Trump, John Magufuli, and too many others. This is closely related to the coloniality problem that still has not shed the impulse to contain and 'other' populations rather than integrate and protect them when it is necessary.

While I cannot find hope in the situation improving for my interlocutors, I was and am still constantly given inspiration. This inspiration comes not in the sense of what Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2017) describes of the 'super-refugee' who must earn and be worthy of our inspiration like, 'the Olympian swimmer who has overcome herculean feats, the hyper-successful entrepreneur, the genius who changed the world'. In Colbert's words, I do not want to 'make shit up' because the reality of the super-refugee is an outlier. I am inspired not because they succeed, but because they survive; they grind and keep going. They are not mere 'vulnerable victims' which humanitarianism projects onto them, nor are they 'cunning crooks' as Tanzanian state's rhetoric points to (Horst 2006). I am inspired by the decolonising mobilities that they enact daily in defiance of the trifurcated state. Whether to make some cash through working on a *shamba* outside the camp or by returning briefly for weddings or funerals in the country that caused their displacement, refugees continue with life beyond *homo sacer*, 'bare life'. Despite the poverty of the camp, which creates the conditions Omata (2016) describes as 'shared destitution' (p. 17), it is still an inspiration to observe their shared mutuality. In short, I am inspired by the Violas of Nyarugusu who are doing all that they can to get by. This is an active and agentive, rather than passive response. I do not say this as an idealisation of the camp. There is still the ugliness of suspicion, violence, and suffering, yet people endure and continue to make plans to persist in their liminality. So, what comes next for refugees in Tanzania? Probably nothing good, and it breaks my heart. At the end of the

interview on *The Daily Show*, Colbert dejectedly responded to Coates' pessimistic analysis of race in America by saying, 'I hope you're wrong.' Although I am deeply inspired by the defiant, daily life-making in and around the camps, I am not hopeful. I hope I am wrong too.



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# Appendix:

## **[In review] Class in camps or the camped class? The making and reshaping of socio-economic inequalities in the refugee camps of north-western Tanzania**

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This article interrogates the connections between physical and social mobility in and out of refugee camps through the lens of socioeconomic stratification. The research draws from a longitudinal ‘financial diary’ survey of 77 Congolese and Burundian refugee households in Nyarugusu refugee camp, as well as from more than 200 qualitative interviews in 2017-2019. We show that those displaced to camps are from the poorest classes –especially in the case of re-displacements. Shifting from country-wide to camp-level analysis, we find clear socio-economic inequalities. By tracking households for more than two years, it emerges that the restrictive and exclusionary encampment policy of Tanzania, as well as economic shocks imposed by ration cuts and shutdowns by the Tanzanian state, cause a further flattening of class and mobility. Against this background, there is, unsurprisingly, little evidence of class consciousness or active social distinction processes.

keywords: mobility; class; livelihoods; Burundian refugees; Congolese refugees; Tanzania

Gloire lives in Nyarugusu refugee camp in Tanzania. In international, national, and community terms, she was poor in her native Burundi and remained poor when we met her in the camp in 2017. Her neighbour, Jacques, fled to Tanzania from Burundi with the equivalent of TZS 2.7 million (USD 1,173.73); he soon started a fish-selling business that was thriving until the camp economy collapsed in July 2018, when the government shut down the main market. At the other end of the camp, meet Dalia, a Congolese woman who was found to be trustworthy by an acquaintance who provided her with capital and networks to buy and sell World Food Programme (WFP) rations. The business made her very wealthy, in camp terms until she was recently resettled to Canada.

These and countless other stories illustrate how economic position in protracted refugee situations can be both fluid and stubbornly calcified over time. Socio-economic class, whether approached in Weber’s sense of life chances (Savage 2002) or in Bourdieu’s sense of being related to the conditions of existence (Bourdieu 1986), matters for livelihoods but also long-term displacement and mobility (spatial and social mobility are often interconnected as pointed out by Faist 2013). Yet, the refugee studies literature has not engaged much with the idea that displaced people are marked by class (Van Hear 2004, 2014; Omata 2017; Turner 2015). The

present article provides insights into the relevance of the concept of class for the study of encamped life over time and explores the shaping and reshaping of socio-economic positioning in refugee camps.

Using qualitative and quantitative methods, we examine wealth, class, and mobilities in the refugee camps of north-western Tanzania through interviews and correspondences with camp residents spanning nearly three years (2016-2019). This time was beset by food ration reductions, cash interventions and market shutdowns by the government. While people's position in society or socio-economic class proves useful to understand the journeys and destination of those who are forcibly displaced (Kleist 2010; Van Hear 2014), we find the notion of class trickier in refugee camps. The costs to flee, particularly for those already poor in their countries of origin, initially causes a 'flattening' of classes. We argue that life in refugee camps often further prevents upward social mobility. We observe different levels of wealth inside the refugee camps of Tanzania, which correlate with measures of social capital, however, such 'classes' appear fragile — they often do not calcify over time and there is little class consciousness, which is central to Marxist class theory. The Tanzanian government's strict encampment policy and recent assaults on the space of asylum, in conjunction with ration cuts, have created shocks that repeatedly shake up the social order and force many to struggle in hunger and some to even repatriate prematurely and reluctantly. Only a few have weathered these events through mobilising their higher socioeconomic status. This has often meant leaving the camp for a new exile —when still having enough capital to do so.

After introducing the refugee situation in north-western Tanzania, our methodology, and our theoretical positioning, the core argument of the paper is developed over three sections: two relatively brief sections on class in the countries of origin of the refugees and class during flight, and a more comprehensive section on class in refugee camps. The latter section is divided into four subsections: (1) we discuss possible socio-economic stratifications in Nyarugusu. Next, we analyse the way such stratifications are shaped by and interact with (2) livelihoods and economic activities, (3) government and humanitarian interventions, (4) and finally spatial mobility.

### **The Refugee Camps of north-western Tanzania**

Situated in north-western Tanzania bordering Lake Tanganyika, Kigoma Region hosts the country's three remaining refugee camps. The largest camp, Nyarugusu, was established in 1996 to accommodate Congolese fleeing primarily from the First Congo War and grew over the years, receiving Congolese fleeing from ongoing insecurity. By 2015, there were roughly 60,000 Congolese living in Nyarugusu. That same year saw Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza stay in power into a contested third mandate, which led to massive protests in Bujumbura, government violent crackdowns and intimidation, and a failed military coup. This resulted in the displacement of more than 400,000 people to neighbouring countries, primarily to Tanzania. Consequently, the population of Nyarugusu doubled and Nduta and Mtendeli— camps established in the 1990s— were resurrected to accommodate the newly arrived Burundians. As of 1 March 2020 (UNHCR Data Portal), there were around 61,000 Congolese refugees and 162,000 Burundians in the three camps. In the last couple of years, de facto border closure and forced returns of asylum seekers has reduced the flow of arrivals from Burundi (UNHCR 2019a). Moreover, the governments of Tanzania and Burundi have put intense pressure on the Burundian refugees to 'return' to Burundi, even agreeing that the refugees 'are to return to their country of origin whether voluntarily or not' (Human Rights Watch 2019).

Tanzania's strict encampment policy echoes other countries' such as Kenya. It started in the 1990s as the country received hundreds of thousands of the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan refugees. The Tanzanian state had been dismantled by structural adjustment policies and was unable to cope with such a huge influx. The state abdicated governance and management of the camp to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) but reserved the right to securitise and contain the population therein (Milner 2009). This policy, codified by the Refugee Act of 1998 and still in force today, disallows free movement and employment outside of the camps (Kamanga 2005). The space of asylum has constricted even further under current President John Magufuli (Boeyink 2019).

### **Methodology**

The first author carried out the initial research this paper is based on between May and November 2017. It was supplemented by additional research carried out as part of a UNHCR-funded socio-economic assessment of the three Tanzanian camps and surrounding host communities in February 2018, which is the time when the second author and other researchers joined the first author. Periodic research through paid research assistants has occurred up to the date of writing.

Following the methodology of Collins et al. (2009) in *Portfolios of the Poor*, the first author met with 77 households split between Congolese and Burundians every two weeks recording their economic transactions, or 'financial diaries' for a year. This methodology allows an understanding of livelihoods and economic situations over time as it affected by shocks and seasonal variation. There are, however, clear limitations: not every household reported fortnightly and the random sample is not sufficiently large to appropriately represent the population of the camp.

The financial diary methodology, in combination with ethnographic work, enables quantitative data to be truly useful for exploring class and livelihoods in camps. Indeed, the portfolios allowed the researchers to build relationships and close rapport with the households to explore through interviews their economic histories, strategies, and perceptions of events in the camp and beyond. In total, we conducted more than 200 interviews and focus groups mostly with camp residents but also UNHCR, WFP, NGO partners, and Tanzanian government officials. All the research participants provided voluntary consent to the interviews and most of them saw no issue with us using their real names. Nevertheless, decided to anonymise the quotes (using pseudonyms), since the security situation of the refugees significantly deteriorated during the research (and kept deteriorating at the time of submitting our article).

### **Refugees and Class: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations**

In the refugee camp milieu of Dadaab in Kenya, Hyndman (2000) notes a three-tiered mobility hierarchy:

'Supracitizens, citizens, and sub-citizens have differential access to mobility and to the power relations that shape the geography of refugee camps. Refugee sub citizens have forcibly migrated across borders to safety and sustenance. International supracitizens have flown across borders to well-remunerated jobs carried out in often harsh conditions. Kenyan citizens find work where refugees and relief agencies have moved in' (p.113).

The categorisations above are overly simplistic, but both key on class as a capability to move, or in the case of forced migration, to flee. Van Hear (2004) utilizes Bourdieusian theory of class to demonstrate that in conflict contexts it requires economic, cultural, human and social capital just to flee the country of origin and to navigate increasingly restrictive international migration regimes. Brun (2005) furthers this analysis to include, ‘how—depending on intersecting categories of gender, ethnicity, and class—local actors act differently and are differently situated, in the power relations of the local/global fields of war and displacement’ (p. 58). In reflecting on his earlier work on class and migration, Van Hear (2014) notes that migration studies use class theory to consider, ‘migration *outcomes* in host or destination countries – that is to say, in what happens after migration’ (p. 101). While this point is true in migration studies, class conceptualisations of migration outcomes has long been mostly absent—or only mentioned in passing, without further problematisation—from forced migration studies literature, despite the large volume of research on refugee livelihoods and economies (Jacobsen 2005; Werker 2007; Hammar 2014; Betts et al. 2017).

Recent research, however, has been bringing class and refugees to the fore. Turner (2015) argues that encampment (and non-encampment) policies based on socio-economic classes of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are tools of the state to satisfy the needs of their respective labour markets. This work does not engage with class theory, however, and only labels socio-economic class as ‘upper’, ‘middle’, ‘urban and educated’, and ‘lower and unskilled low-wage earners’. Omata’s (2017) book, *The Myth of Self Reliance*, also creates socio-economic classes in his study of Buduburam camp in Ghana. Importantly, it *historicizes* class in Liberia and shows class is reproduced in the space of the camp and manifested during repatriation. While this article takes cues from Omata’s research, there are clear differences between Buduburam and the Tanzanian camps. The former is peri-urban while the latter are rural; the Tanzanian camps are also almost ten times larger and—contrary to their Ghanaian counterpart—their population still receives international food rations. Similarly, both Buduburam and the Tanzanian camps are located in some of the poorest areas of their respective countries, which impairs the refugee economies and adds to the ‘myth of self-reliance’ in camps. Refugees of Buduburam (and Nyarugusu) have migrated or been resettled to the US and other Western countries, which has led to a remittance flow to family and friends still living in the camps. According to Omata (2017), remittances are the main drivers of the camp economy, and he uses them as the basis of his four-tiered wealth class breakdown. His high and middle groups directly receive remittances (constituting around 10% and 30% of the camp population) and differ in terms of the frequency and regularity of receiving funds. The low and very-low strata (40% and 20% of the camp respectively) do not have access to remittances. Remittances do not play as central of a role in Tanzania, however. The distinction of class in terms of access to a specific source of income is something crucial that we will explore in this article. Omata also finds significant internal differentiation in terms of social networks, which entrenches the various stratifications as evidenced by Americo-Liberians transnational ties. He recognizes the overall vagueness of the concept and its different definitions by various scholars such as Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993). He settles most closely with Bourdieu’s (1986) understanding of social capital which, ‘aimed to highlight how different social classes form and reproduce themselves in relation to one another, with corresponding implications for different types of privilege, inequality, and oppression’ (Omata, 2017 p. 9). Secondly, he recognises the co-optation of social capital theory by key

development players such as the World Bank to justify the substitution of state intervention with social networks (Fine 2001, 2010; Elyachar 2005).

The socio-economic situation of the refugees in the Tanzanian camps must be understood in light of conflict and camp histories since the 1990s. Of course, the historical *longue durée* since colonialism—a root of the conflicts and inequalities in the countries of origin in DRC Congo and Burundi—always matters. However, this history does relatively little to explain the temporalities and economic outcomes of the refugee populations, or what Novak (2007) calls the ‘place-making projects’ deployed in the camps. In particular, when considering class, Nyarugusu is best viewed as two camps within one: the Congolese camp and the Burundian camp (Boeyink 2020 forthcoming). To understand social stratification in the camps today, we must look at both Burundian and Congolese refugees’ permutations of class in countries of origin, during flight, and in camps.

### **Class in countries of origin**

Ethnicity is often described as a key fault line in Burundian society and is associated with the concept of class (Daley 1991). Burundi’s three ethnicities, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa share ‘virtually the same culture, language, name, religion, and so forth’ (Isabiryé and Mahmoudi 2000). The extent to which these groups were distinct before the colonial encounter is debated. What is clear is that the German and Belgian colonists injected a racialised and ethnicised hierarchy, giving power in all aspects of society including politics, education, and the economy to the Tutsis (Daley 2006). Post-independence Tutsi rule maintained such privilege; ethnicity is a key, but not the only, fault line along which the 1993-2008 civil war was fought. Daley (2006) points to:

‘five distinct cleavages around which [the 1993-2008] conflict occurred: intra-aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, between Hutu and Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and lately intra-Hutu’ (p. 666).

The mass displacement in 2015 seems to have occurred along ethnic and class lines. Tutsis were mostly internally displaced or ‘entrenched’ or fled to Rwanda (Purdeková 2016). The wealthier among these were able to settle into cities, or further afield to places such as Europe or Canada. Many of the Hutu refugees went to Tanzania and it is estimated by WFP that 60 to 80% of this population is in fact ‘re-displaced’ from the civil war in the 1990s and/or the 1972 genocide (Purdeková 2016 p. 7). Schwartz (2018) adds that many who fled in 2015 to Tanzania did so not entirely due to persecution or intimidation, but also because of the failure of many to economically and socially reintegrate following their repatriation to Burundi in the early 2000s (Falisse and Niyonkuru 2014; Fransen 2017). The returnees primarily living along the bordering southern provinces failed to access land, livelihoods, or protection and were eager for a pretence to leave Burundi. They relocated as an almost entirely homogeneous ethnic and low socio-economic class block to Tanzania. This resonates with Jacqueline’s experience. She said that before leaving for Tanzania:

‘life was difficult. I tried to cultivate for others for money. I begged for a place to cultivate my own land. I saw the problems in my country. I saw it will be difficult to run later. I decided to leave before more difficulties came.’

Eastern Congo has also faced a complicated class history centred around ethnicity and land rights and availability. Most Congolese refugees are from the neighbouring province of Sud Kivu, across Lake Tanganyika. Van Acker (2005) describes Kivu as a society structured around the customary, where access to land depended on paying tribute to customary kings or '*mwami*'. These dynamics changed after independence when neighbouring Rwandan and Burundian migrants and refugees began settling in Kivu. In 1973, President Mobutu passed a law placing all lands in the hands of the state. Through this transition between customary and modern land rights, chiefs became the arbiters of class (Van Acker 2005). Social mobility could be attained through social capital linked to state (such as civil servants or the military) or through customary actors set increasingly along ethnicity. The contestation of land continued past Mobutu's fall in the 1990s and contributed to setting the Kivu up for violence. Three decades of war and violence then curbed the authority of the State and chiefs; power now often resides between a wide constellation of (often armed) actors.

### **Class and flight**

The majority of the 2015 caseload of Burundian refugees left the country poor. Moreover, many lost any capital they had on the short journey south to Tanzania. Van Hear (2004) describes the many forms of capital required to flee, and many of our interlocutors had to pay all or most of their savings in bribes to Burundian security forces or its allied militia, the *imbonerakure*, just to reach Tanzania. Jean-Balthazar recounts the expenses involved in his journey:

When the election was planned there was not security in the country, so we decided to leave. We took a bus from Rumonge to Nyanza-Lac and from Nyanza-Lac to Tanzania we walked because there were many security checkpoints, so we had to hide ourselves. We used 400,000 Burundian Francs [USD \$218.33]. We had to pay for my whole family and had to pay bribes for people who showed us the way around barriers. We had to pay a bribe even at Kabunga [the main Tanzanian transit centre]. It was 11 days of travel.


Similarly, Honorée, who had to flee because her mother was a Tutsi and faced threats and harassment, fled with only 20,000 TZS (USD 8.69), which was quickly spent on treatment for cholera that infected many Burundians upon arrival in Tanzania. In order to start a business, she said the first three months she 'kept her children hungry' by only consuming a small portion of their food rations and selling the rest until raising enough money to sell onions in the common market. There are always outliers, like Jacques, who could escape persecution, absorb the costs of travel and bribes, and still have 2.7 million TZS (USD 1,173.73) to start a fish-selling business, but most Burundians recounted stories of arduous travels and transitions. There is no extensive research on the socio-economic strata of the first arriving Congolese refugees to Tanzania—many arriving more than two decades ago. Informants have suggested that chiefs and state official do not play a key role. Olivier explained to us that the few *mwamis* who live in the camp are only respected 'the same way an old teacher would be,' but without the material and political benefits as before.

### **Class in the camp**

Congolese and Burundian refugees have all struggled to economically integrate into the camps upon first arriving (Thomson 2016). The stories recounted by the Congolese refugees who fled the First and Second Congo Wars of the 1990s are strikingly similar to the experiences of the 2015 caseload of Burundian refugees narrate. The benefit that Congolese have over Burundians is that protracted exile in Tanzania has allowed them to embed themselves in the local economy of Kigoma markets and agricultural systems within and surrounding the camp. In this sense, the Congolese refugee experience resembles the robust economy of ‘protracted refugee camps’ in Uganda analysed in *Refugee Economies* by Betts et al. (2017). Similar to Omata’s (2017) analysis, Congolese refugees in Nyarugusu have also received an economic boost since 2012 as roughly 30,000 Congolese refugees have been resettled to Europe and North America and now send remittances to the camp (UNHCR 2019b). The Burundian side of Nyarugusu camp, as well as Nduta and Mtendeli camps created in 2015, seems more akin to ‘emergency refugee camps’ (Betts et al., 2017 p. 140). In the newly re-established camps of Nduta and Mtendeli, the Burundian refugees have had to build markets from scratch. Still a consequence of their ‘newcomers’ status, Burundians have far fewer social networks in high-income countries to draw from for remittances (there is no resettlement programme for Burundian refugees) and face discrimination from Tanzanians in the agricultural renting and labour systems surrounding the camp due to xenophobic attitudes toward Burundians by many Tanzanians (Boeyink 2020 forthcoming). The disparities between Congolese and Burundians in Tanzanian camps are even visible in the Community Household and Surveillance studies carried out by WFP and UNHCR: in 2016, 19% of the Congolese refugees were ‘asset very poor’ versus 75% of the Burundians (Community Household and Surveillance (CHS) 2017).

### **Socio-economic Stratification in Nyarugusu**

Bearing in mind the distinctions between Congolese and Burundians, and putting together the findings of UNHCR and WFP with the frameworks proposed by Omata (2017), we analysed the participants in the financial diaries in terms of the total value of their assets (cash, cattle, poultry, items, land). Defining economic categories, in a refugee camp or elsewhere, will always be an arbitrary endeavour and the aim of this article is not to exactly pinpoint the impossible boundaries of such categories. It is nevertheless possible to identify three groups of refugees: (1) those who can be defined as ultra-poor, which means that their income does not allow them to cover 85% of their nutritional needs, and which we identify as owning assets worth less than one month living at the poverty line and not having three meals a day; (2) those who live below the Tanzanian poverty line (TZS 1,200 per day) but are not ultra-poor; and (3) those who live above the poverty line (who have assets worth three months of the poverty line). Figure 1 shows the extent of inequalities, with a vast majority of people owning next to nothing.



**Figure 29** *Distribution of the total value of assets per household*

Note: adjusted for household size (counting 0.5 per child/elderly)

Table 1 confirms two crucial pieces of information from the ethnographic work. Firstly, there does not seem to be a major difference between groups when considering the cultural capital that is typically ‘acquired’ pre-displacement such as education or fluency in French or English. This suggests, and the next section will develop this point, that pre-displacement classes may not matter much once in the camp. Secondly, social network indicators appear quite different across categories: the highest strata are more socially active than the other groups. This suggests the development of a class (the ‘non-poor’) that is not only defined in economic terms. Strong or multiple social ties are also useful to absorb shocks through informal loans from friends and family. They also come with important social liabilities: in a camp setting where many are poor and reliant on the humanitarian system, the pressure to share food, lend money, and contribute to funerals and social events has been described as a constant pressure. Being better-connected means, as our informants explained, playing a bigger role in the complex ‘gift economy’ (see figure 3 below) through which people support relatives and friends —and which Omata aptly describes as ‘shared destitution’ (Omata 2017; a term borrowed from Leliveld 1991).

**Table 2** *Key characteristics across groups*

	<b>Ultra-poor</b>		<b>Poor</b>		<b>Non-poor</b>	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
household number of adults	2.880	(2.934)	2.730	(1.820)	2.533	(1.302)

	number of elderly (>65)	0.080 (0.277)	0.216 (0.534)	0.267 (0.594)
	number of children (<16)	2.800 (1.732)	3.703 (2.856)	3.267 (2.604)
assets	total value of assets (household)	94 k (93243)	322 k (244513)	962 k (546442)
<i>cultural capital</i>				
language	speak French or English	0.240 (0.436)	0.324 (0.475)	0.267 (0.458)
	speak Swahili	0.840 (0.374)	0.865 (0.347)	0.867 (0.352)
ethnicity	Congolese	0.440 (0.507)	0.676 (0.475)	0.600 (0.507)
	Burundian (Hutu)	0.440 (0.507)	0.189 (0.397)	0.400 (0.507)
	Burundian (Tutsi or mixed)	0.120 (0.332)	0.081 (0.277)	0.000 (0.000)
	Twa (Congolese or Burundian)	0.000 (0.000)	0.054 (0.229)	0.000 (0.000)
schooling	none	0.280 (0.458)	0.270 (0.450)	0.333 (0.488)
	some primary	0.400 (0.500)	0.270 (0.450)	0.133 (0.352)
	some secondary	0.200 (0.408)	0.324 (0.475)	0.400 (0.507)
	finished secondary	0.120 (0.332)	0.135 (0.347)	0.133 (0.352)
arrival	pre 2015	0.160 (0.374)	0.568 (0.502)	0.467 (0.516)
	in 2015	0.320 (0.476)	0.216 (0.417)	0.133 (0.352)
	post 2015	0.520 (0.510)	0.216 (0.417)	0.400 (0.507)
	re-displaced	0.480 (0.510)	0.595 (0.498)	0.533 (0.516)
	average number of re-displacement	0.600 (0.707)	0.865 (0.822)	0.600 (0.632)
<i>social capital</i>				
	n of people who could lend them money	2.100 (0.866)	2.838 (1.448)	3.900 (1.583)
	n of friends	1.040 (1.136)	2.432 (2.523)	3.600 (6.104)
	groups hh is an ordinary member of	0.520 (0.918)	0.351 (0.538)	0.267 (0.458)
	groups hh is the leader of	0.280 (0.542)	0.514 (0.870)	1.400 (1.844)
	groups hh is very active in	0.400 (0.816)	0.514 (0.651)	0.800 (0.862)
	groups hh financially contributes to	0.480 (0.770)	0.676 (0.784)	1.533 (1.302)
	N (number of households)	25	37	15

### Refugee work

Beyond assets, professional activity and income derived from work are typical indicators of socio-economic classes. They should be considered carefully in the camp context: the ‘work’ refugees do is rarely stable and the salary they receive is not the main livelihood source for most. In 2017, 95% of all residents of Nyarugusu reported relying primarily on WFP food (Community Household and Surveillance (CHS) 2017). A third of the households of our portfolio reported having no source of income at all, while only 6.5% (5 out of 77) reported an income –all sources put together– that is above the Tanzania poverty line of TZS 1,200 per day per person.

Consistent with the self-reliance strategy of the global refugee regime led by UNHCR, many of those who can muster the capital to attain incomes in the camps do so as ‘micro-

entrepreneurs' (as the neoliberal discourse on poverty would call them, see Easton-Calabria and Omata, 2018). This livelihood category runs a wide gamut from children selling sugarcane for petty-change on the road, to businesswomen like Dalia, who acts as a broker buying and selling the WFP food market nodes that find markets across Tanzania and the East Africa region. Dalia is wealthy enough to own cars (that she must conceal outside of the camp). The hub of these markets is the common markets constructed by UNHCR and partner organisations near the entrances to the camps, where Tanzanians and camp residents can set up retail and wholesale businesses. According to the Nyarugusu common market chairperson, there were more than 500 market shops registered at the beginning of 2018. A key issue faced by the 'micro-entrepreneurs' is start-up capital, which we found is typically raised from selling a portion of their food rations, borrowing from friends and family, engaging in labour such as brick-making or agriculture for a moment or, more rarely, receiving remittances.

Among the micro-entrepreneurs, and sometimes employed by other micro-entrepreneurs, are found a series of tradespeople and craftspeople: tailors, hairstylists and barbers, cooks and bakers, soap-makers, mechanics and electronic repair people, and construction traders. People developed these skills both in the camps or in their countries of origin; through formal training programmes offered by NGOs, or informally from acquaintances or family. On paper, these training programmes are free and often target 'vulnerable' households, however social or economic capital is often required as many informants reported it takes personally knowing or paying a bribe to the recruiters. Once people attain marketable skills they can be employed by others, although often at a low rate, or start their own businesses—which requires raising difficult to obtain capital. This is the case for Burundian woman, Adèle. She learned to tailor in 2003 from an NGO while living in Mtabila refugee camp in Tanzania. She repatriated in 2007 and struggled to reintegrate to Burundi like many others. After returning to Nyarugusu in 2015, her family was struck with cholera and it took a long time to start a business. She was unable to raise enough capital to buy her own sewing machine, but occasionally rents from a shop and works as a substitute. Adèle took a loan for TZS 20,000 (USD 8.70) to sell beans in the common market with an eye to return to tailoring explaining:

'I am thinking to change from buying and selling to go to tailoring. I think it will take a long time. Sometimes if I or my family are hungry, I have to use capital from my business.'

A third category consists of manual labourers who mainly work outside of the camp—which is illegal under the encampment policy. There is an extensive agricultural system surrounding the camps. For refugees who have capital, they pay Tanzanians to rent from a half-acre to up to four acres of land to grow crops for consumption and additional income. For those without capital, primarily Burundians, they venture outside the camp and are paid by both refugee land-renters and Tanzanian landowners. These agricultural labourers suggest a form of lower-class status: even the poorest Congolese refugees said (and were said) to refuse to be labourers despite their significant need of income. Some do this for a few days to acquire the capital they need, whereas others do this six days a week during labour periods (Boeyink 2020 forthcoming). It is also known that some women leave the camp for sex work in nearby towns and villages. Within the camp, there is low-paying work such as mud brick making, or bicycle transport services. There is also significant amounts of unpaid household labour that often

befalls women, which includes gathering firewood outside the camp, collecting WFP food rations, fetching water, and care work inside the home.

As Figure 2 shows, the ultra-poor, poor, and non-poor all engage in these activities, in relatively comparable proportions, except for micro-entrepreneurship that is not accessible to the ultra-poor without start-up capital. Our survey shows that, whenever possible, these strategies are pursued jointly rather than independently.




Figure 30 Income-generating activities per assets group (% of the refugees who engage in)

The final category of income earners is the ‘incentive workers’ who are hired by UNHCR and other aid organisations operating in the camps. Refugees are not allowed to be employed in Tanzania and such positions are considered ‘voluntary’ and are paid lower than Tanzanian minimum wage (Morris and Voon 2014). Nevertheless, the pay remains well above the average income in the camp. Incentive work includes survey enumerators, language interpreters, cleaners, social workers, security officers, health workers, teachers, among others. The work is rarely permanent but usually includes a predictable monthly salary, which is precious as it can be channelled into other businesses ran by household members. Rather than the incentive work *per se*, it is typically those businesses that constitute the main household incomes. Incentive positions are highly sought after as waged employment is rare and does not require start-up capital to attain. To obtain these positions refugees must be able to read, write, and speak English or Swahili well enough to properly fill out an application and go through an interview. As Turner (1999) points out, incentive workers often become ‘big men’ in the camp and gain influence in their communities, overtaking powerful elders and leaders in pre-flight countries of origin. Of the different livelihood activities, incentive work is the closest to contribute to building a distinctive class in the camp.

### Humanitarian and government interactions

Despite refugee camps being circumscribed legal territories under Tanzanian law, they are not self-contained spaces but are subject to profound and somewhat erratic economic changes from humanitarian and governmental policies. The nascent socio-economic groupings in the camps, and especially the so-called ‘non-poor’ appear to be under constant threat of

losing their status and assets. They seem to cope slightly better with shocks, but often not for long.

The most devastating recent shock happened in July 2018, when the government shut down the common markets of the three camps, closed many wholesale businesses, and banned the use of bicycles and motorcycles in the camp (International Refugee Rights Initiative 2019). If international humanitarian aid gives, then the government of Tanzania has the power to take away, which has repeatedly been the case under President Magufuli. Our financial portfolios count fewer observations from March 2018, but it is nevertheless possible to observe the devastating effect of the closure of the market on household income (see Figure 3 below).

Humanitarian aid innovations can also greatly raise households' economic prospects. Protracted refugee and other humanitarian situations are increasingly utilising cash transfer programming to replace in-kind goods such as food (Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 2015). This has been a welcome development by refugees because many sell their WFP rations at a loss in order to purchase food that is more preferable or meets other needs (Oka 2014). In December 2017, WFP introduced in Nyarugusu a cash transfer programme pilot. Selected households received 20,000 TZS (USD 8.69) per person each month instead of staple food items. Such amount of money is typically more than the average income per person we calculated for 2017-2018. Those who received cash had significant economic advantages that improved their positions. For example, the CHS reveals that those who received cash were able to on average purchase maize to last 24 days, whereas those without cash only were able to extend maize to 17 days (CHS 2017 p. 27). Moreover, cash recipients had 39.4% in the asset medium and asset-rich categories, whereas non-cash recipients had 21.7% in those categories (CHS 2017 p. 15). Bénédicte, a Burundian woman in Nyarugusu, saved a bit of the cash she was distributed until she raised 86,000 TZS (USD 37.39), which was enough to start a business buying and selling food in the common market. However, as the cash transfer programme was ramping up the pilot to reach 80,000 people in Nyarugusu, it was suddenly shut down in August 2017 (Boeyink 2019). This came as a major financial shock to the many household recipients. As a Burundian woman, Victoria, describes:

‘since the shutdown, this has caused malnutrition for my family. Before I could vary my food, but now I can’t. I took out loans that I would pay back with the cash we received from cash from WFP [a TZS 55,000 (USD 23.92) loan]. Now I have to use capital from my business to pay.’

The cash shutdown affected most people in the camp including higher income earners such as Annabelle:

‘It affects my profit because instead of using [profit] for the future, I have to use it for household needs. People have bought less fish from my business than before. We must now reduce the price of fish because we will not have enough customers otherwise.’

Geneviève, a Congolese woman who rents farmland from Tanzanians explains:

‘[the shutdown] has affected my business so much. The money I was receiving I was able to buy land to cultivate. When it stopped, I couldn’t buy as much land as before. I was farming two and a half acres but went down to one.’

Figure 3 shows the sharp decrease in incomes after the shutdown in August 2017.




Figure 31 Monthly income

The shutdown came in a context marked by large food ration cuts due to the ‘chronic underfunding’ of the Tanzanian refugee situation (UNHCR 2019a). In September through November 2017, WFP was only able to provide 62% of 2100 kcal per person. These ration cuts make the poor go hungry and households with livelihoods must use capital from their business to buy additional food. Ration cuts also cause people to borrow and go into debt. According to the CHS, those reporting borrowing money increased from 17.9% in 2016 to 26.8% in 2017. Those borrowing money to buy food rose from 79.3% to 91.5% between 2016 and 2017 due to the deep ration cuts in 2017 (CHS 2017 p. 13). Tracking the income of the strata we label as ‘ultra-poor’, ‘poor’, and ‘non-poor’ over one year, we find that the classes seem to converge in terms of income per household member around January 2018. This shows that the toll of the food ration cuts and the government’s assault on livelihoods caused a flattening of socio-economic status that even the ‘non-poor’ struggled to cope with. Overall, these acute shocks, in addition to the government’s encampment policy since the 1990s, makes it difficult for anybody to prosper beyond the poverty level. The government’s goal of creating a hostile environment to impel refugees to return is succeeding as thousands of Burundians have been repatriating before they want to do so. Research participants often explained that

Tanzania was becoming unbearable, thereby questioning the ‘voluntary’ nature of repatriation. Though movement out of the camp is prohibited, it does not stop people from leaving or are staying put in distinctly classed ways.

### **Class, mobility, and migration**

Tanzania’s encampment policy was designed to control and constrict refugee mobility. The reality is that these spaces consist of dynamic movements of people and goods in and out of the camp. Looking at the financial diaries data, 13.6% of the ultra-poor, 8.21% of the poor, and 12.3% of the non-poor reported leaving the camp, which demonstrates that people within all classes are on the move. These movements include daily mobilities in and out of the camp to nearby farms, villages, and towns, and also longer-term or further distanced movements to cities or other countries in the region.

As mentioned above, many camp residents illegally leave the camp to engage in agriculture. Though legally circumscribed, the camp has no fencing or barriers but has many footpaths leading out of the camp to the farms and neighbouring villages. The lowest strata of mostly Burundians, with little recourse to acquire capital, leave the camp to sell their labour on farms owned by Tanzanians or rented by fellow refugees. Not only is this physically demanding labour, but it comes at great risk. If they are caught by a police patrol, they must pay a bribe, which would take all of their earnings or face a six-month prison sentence of hard labour and a fine. For those in the poor and non-poor classes, depending on their levels of capital, these refugees have enough money to first rent the land, pay labourers to cultivate the land, and absorb the bribe they must pay if caught by the police to evade six months in prison. Other short-term mobilities are only available for those with the social and economic capital to do so. For instance, some will leave the camp to nearby towns such as Kasulu town, the largest nearby population centre and market in the district to buy wholesale goods at a cheaper rate than in the camp. To get to Kasulu or Kigoma town, refugees must attain a temporary pass from the camp commandant office (usually through a bribe) or by paying the attending police officer at the camp gates. Being in a higher socio-economic bracket even affords people like Kagambe to travel four hours to Kigoma town, the largest city in the region to attend a wedding and visit family members knowing that they can afford any bribe necessary. On the other hand, there are people like Congolese woman, Furaha, the head of the household for the poorest Congolese family in our financial diaries who said she has never left the camp since arriving in 1996. Jansen (2016) notes that in East Africa, households utilize strategies of splitting up members of the family between city and camp, or between camps in different countries in the region in efforts of ‘digging aid’. This is only a possibility for a small number of people with significant social and economic capital to do so.

In addition to short-term mobilities, longer-term (forced) migrations are also occurring along classed lines. Faced with the fear of being forcibly repatriated to Burundi, and with the memory of the violent closure of Mtabila camp in 2012, Burundians with enough money or connections are planning their escape to countries with more open refugee policies such as Uganda or Malawi. The costs of realising such plans are significant and reportedly include bus fares, (forged) identification documents, a trip to Burundi to get passports, bribes to police and immigration officials at the border and on the journey, and even sometimes bribes to officials who register refugee status. The informants estimated that costs to resettle in Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, or as far afield as South Africa range from TZS 200,000 to 5,000,000 (USD 86.96-2,173.98) depending on the distance. Some in the ‘non-poor’ category also make

investments in Burundi for a 'safer landing'. Charles, who has been twice displaced, made his wealth from being employed by NGO implementing partners as a skilled builder, and for privately repairing homes for other refugees. As he described in 2017:

'there is work in Nyarugusu and I can get money. That is why I chose to stay here. It isn't why I originally came, but now I am doing well for my family. I have plans to go back to Burundi when there is peace in my country and the problems there are finished.'

To prepare for the eventual return he has purchased two acres of land in Burundi in September 2017 for BIF 2,600,000 (USD 1,384.46). He further describes his rationale:

'I cultivate cassava, beans and rice. I keep the money in Burundi. I have children and I may pass away. I want them to have something. I go back to Burundi many times; there are many things I need to check on: to see my land, to see my family. I have other things I sell there. I don't have permission to leave, I just pay the police. I go by car and pay them. I chose to buy land in Burundi before a shop in Tanzania because it is my country. Tanzania is a bad country and I will not be able to keep the shop for many years.'

However, conditions in the camp and in Burundi have deteriorated since 2017 when Charles told of us his plans. Now he wants to join a friend and look for work in Cape Town, South Africa. From there he will send money to his family in Tanzania to move on to Uganda. The vast majority of refugees have far fewer options than Charles. After the Tanzanian government announced in August 2019 that refugees must return or face forced repatriation, we asked the Burundian households of our sample their plans. Nobody had plans to go to Burundi unless coerced, and nearly everybody had a third country like Uganda or Kenya identified. However, when probed further, most of the respondents said they did not have enough money or would have to sell everything they owned whenever forced repatriation was imminent.

Since the fieldwork for this research began in 2017, Burundians have expressed increasing anxiety of what they felt would be an inevitable forced return. The conditions to establish livelihoods beyond subsistence and survival has been so dire, however, that only a select few have been able to go spend beyond their poverty income levels to migrate beyond Burundi and Tanzania. Honorée expresses this harsh immobility:

'Even if they force us to return to Burundi, I can't return back. In my country, there is no peace. Every day they kill people. I can just die here, but I can't return back to my country.'

Elie, a Burundian man simply stated, 'we are waiting for UNHCR to save us.' This speaks to the totalising power of the host state on refugee livelihoods, which significantly flattens the notions of class in the camps. The deflation of class hierarchy, in turn, forces the majority in the middle and lower socio-economic strata to face 'involuntary immobility' (Lubkemann, 2008).

## **Conclusion**

This article is an attempt to move toward a conceptualization of class in camps using the case of Tanzania, one of the most rigid asylum policies in the world. In Burundi and DR

Congo, it is possible to see a type of class formation from colonialism to the present, centred around access to land, social, economic, and political capital controlled by the complex and shifting interweaving of the state, ethnicity, and regional power. However, the classic structural Marxism, Weberian, or Bourdieusian theories of class are more difficult to apply in the ephemeral and volatile economic and political space of the Tanzanian refugee camps, for at least two reasons.

Firstly, the socio-economic stratification that we observed in the camp does not have the long-lasting nature of a social class. Burundian refugees arriving in 2015 primarily came as a block grouping of poor Hutus from the south and the journey often depleted them of most economic capital. We find that new socio-economic stratifications emerged in the camp, as manifested by different levels of assets ownership and social connections. Social capital was, however, not the ‘class stratifier’ that Omata (2017) described in Buduburam refugee camp as remittances only play a minor role in Nyarugusu. Only one economic activity seems associated with a specific socio-economic ‘elite’ group: incentive work for international organisations. It is not enough to provide a stable ground for building a social class as the availability of such source of incomes fluctuates significantly, as many of the income-generating activities that we studied. Humanitarian and government actions further contribute to blur the lines between socio-economic strata: cash transfers can aid ‘class’ mobility as they help constitute start-up capital for establishing small business ventures, whereas food ration cuts and host government assaults on markets have a profound flattening effect on embryonic ‘classes’ as households’ economic buffers are being depleted. Our research shows many poor—but not extreme poor households—the potential ‘aspiring middle class’, ruthlessly pushed into precariat positions without much of a safety net.

Secondly, socio-economic stratification in the camp does not appear to come along with mechanisms of social distinction or a form of ‘class consciousness’. Refugees that fare better than others in the camp still live amongst each other, receive the same rations, attend the same schools, associations, and churches, and speak the same way and the same languages. The gift economy and mechanisms of ‘shared destitution’, coupled with a shared pre-displacement class culture (the ‘block (repeat) displacement’ mentioned earlier), may explain this apparent lack of social distinction. From our quantitative data, interviews, and observations, there were no clear markers of ‘class consciousness’ or active processes of social distinction over time, which are crucial factors in Marxist and Bourdieusian theories of class. We were not able to deeply engage with temporal solidifications of class consciousness or social and cultural factors in class distinction, although these would be fruitful avenues to further interrogate class in refugee camps and beyond. However, it is crucial to note that the refugees, from all socio-economic strata, are perceived by humanitarians and host Tanzanians to embody homogenizing ‘refugeeness’ (Malkki 1996). However, if we zoom out of the camp and include the rest of Tanzania, then social classes more clearly come to view. In line with Hyndman’s (2000) provocation on ‘humanitarian supracitizens’ we find in Tanzania a specific class of people constituted by the refugee sub-citizens, who have significantly limited rights and opportunities (and know it well).

This does not mean that the concept of class is never useful to understand refugee camps. It has proven useful to analyse other refugee situations (e.g. Omata, 2017). It may also be useful, and this is the direction future research in Nyarugusu should explore, to better understand the different possibilities and options camp residents have for mobility and migration. Our research suggests that the poorest strata are forced to risk leaving the camp to

engage in illegal livelihoods, whereas the ‘non-poor’ have more agency to be mobile for life events nearby, or to escape the worsening conditions in Tanzania to places like Uganda nearby or South Africa further afield. In a context where the cards are constantly reshuffled, regional or even international mobility—in the sense of connections outside the camps—may well be the main way for households to consolidate and preserve their social and economic status.

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# [In-review] Sufficiently Visible/Invisibly Self-Sufficient: Recognition and Displacement Agriculture in Western Tanzania

## [A] (subheading) Introduction

In *Politics of Innocence*, Simon Turner (2010) analogises the top-down humanitarian logic to a description of a bird's-eye of Tanzanian refugee camp, Lukole: 'defying the surrounding countryside with its straight rows of blue and white huts, its equally straight roads, and its evenly distributed water stands' (p. 16). If you flew over Nyarugusu camp, also in Tanzania, you would see that half of the camp has thatched roofs, and the other half have metal roofing. The thatched side are the Congolese who have resided in Nyarugusu since its inception in 1996, and the tin-roofed half of the camp was constructed in 2015 with newly available funds for the influx of Burundian refugees. This is symbolic of the 'place-making projects' (Novak 2007) which explains economic inequalities between the Congolese and Burundians. Extending Turner's visual analogy, widening your gaze from the camp you would see acres of surrounding farmland. Unseen to the observer, however, are the refugees and migrant mobilities that make up this agrarian system. These agricultural spaces are illegal because it is forbidden under Tanzanian refugee law to leave the camp without official permission. The humanitarian actors respect the sovereignty of Tanzanian law, so farming is also outside of the 'visibility field' of the humanitarian government (Feldman 2008). From the top-down view of Tanzanian national law and humanitarian programming, agriculture outside of the camp is unrecognized and thus invisible. This means the actors are 'invisibly self-sufficient' beyond the support of international aid. When the field of vision shifts to the actors on the ground, however, there is a refraction of visibility. Recognition occurs between the interactions and relations involved in buying and selling of land and labour. Refugees and migrants, therefore, must also ensure they are 'sufficiently visible' to market themselves to participate in the agricultural system, yet 'invisible enough' to the authorities of an increasingly hostile state.

The Kigoma Region of Western Tanzania has hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees since colonial rule, and today hosts around 280,000 Burundian and Congolese refugees in three remaining camps: Nyarugusu, Nduta, and Mtendeli. Nyarugusu, the primary site of my research, is roughly split by Congolese and Burundians, whereas Nduta and Mtendeli camps were reopened for the 2015 caseload of Burundian refugees. Immediately surrounding these camps are extensive 'displacement economies' (Hammar 2014) of agricultural systems that amalgamate land rental and labour between Tanzanian host communities, Burundian and Congolese refugees, and Burundian labour migrants. The three camps and agricultural spaces include many displacement experiences and temporalities, or 'place-making projects' (Novak 2007), which inform stereotypes and prejudices that are central to the process of renting land. This chapter analyses the juxtaposition of visibility and invisibility among refugees and migrants in Tanzania since colonialism with a focus on the current conjuncture under President John Magufuli. The question guiding this research is how has visibility and invisibility been imposed upon or produced amongst the actors in the agricultural systems surrounding the camps, and how does this differ for Congolese refugees and Burundian migrants and refugees over time?

## [A] (subheading) Methodology

The original point of departure for my doctoral research was to explore the shift by the World Food Programme (WFP) from food aid to cash in Nyarugusu refugee camp. My research in Nyarugusu lasted from May to November 2017. In early August the Tanzanian government abruptly shut down the WFP cash programme, forcing me to change my focus of research (Boeyink 2019). The primary methodology employed is called 'financial diaries' popularised by the book *Portfolios of the Poor*

(Collins et al. 2009). My research assistants<sup>17</sup> are residents of the camp, and we met with 70 households in Nyarugusu split between Congolese and Burundian families bi-weekly to record their financial transactions for a year. I conducted more than 200 interviews primarily with camp residents, and also UN, implementing partner NGOs, and Tanzanian government officials. Before fieldwork, I was unaware of the extensive agricultural system surrounding the camps as they were not present or glossed over in the current academic and policy literature (WFP 2016; CHS 2016, 2017).

The financial diaries helped me learn about the agricultural system because it was prevalent among many households we interviewed. One day while interviewing a Congolese woman, a Burundian labour migrant she employs stopped by to visit. With his consent, I visited the *shamba*<sup>18</sup> he was currently working on. On the visit, I interviewed twenty-eight Burundian labour migrant men and boys. Shortly after leaving Tanzania, my research assistants conducted interviews with refugee land renters, refugee paid labourers, Burundian labour migrants, and multiple Tanzanian landowners participating in this system. I returned in February and May in 2018 for consultancy research on refugee and host community livelihoods with UNHCR and another UN body researching smallholder Tanzanian farmers near the camps. These consultancies added forty focus group discussions and nearly 200 interviews that deepened my understanding of agriculture in the region. The voices and perspectives of state actors such as the police and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in Nyarugusu are absent because, like the informants in this chapter, I was also trying to be invisible to them. I decided to avoid them to not bring attention to myself or being surveilled and putting the informants at risk or being barred from conducting further research in the camp as they have been known to do.

#### **[A] (subheading) Invisibility and Recognition**

At first glance, there is a clear cause and effect link between a host state imposing invisibility on displaced populations through encampment policies designed for containment, which results in migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, registered or otherwise, enacting invisibility, or ‘invisibilisation’ in order to seek opportunities outside of the camp. In addition to discussing ethical dilemmas and raising awareness of blind spots in academic and policy involving these populations, this was a main point in the special issues on invisible displacements in the *Journal of Refugee Studies* (Polzer and Hammond 2007). What is missing from this conceptualization of invisibility is the visibility within the lived experience of these populations. A refugee or migrant must be seen to be able to make a livelihood, which is the primary motivation for those to leave the legally protected space of the camp or their home country. Borrowing from the philosophy of recognition, this chapter proposes a different framing of imposed invisibility to include actors such as agricultural labourers and renters who are seen but not recognized (Honneth 2001a). This section briefly reviews how invisibility has been used in forced migration studies, and how the philosophy of recognition can more completely capture the precarious realities of displacement in Tanzania.

In Liisa Malkki’s (1995) groundbreaking work, she introduces the nascent field of forced migration studies to ‘town refugees’ referring to self-settled Burundian Hutus who employ ‘strategies of invisibility’ in order to live Kigoma town of Western Tanzania instead of mandated refugee settlements. She argues town refugees in Kigoma shed their national Burundian and Hutu identities for ‘creolized, rhizomatic’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ identities (Malkki 1995 p. 36). Malkki’s contemporary, Gaim Kibreab, was also elucidating the steady rise of urban refugees in Africa such as Ethiopians and Eritreans in Khartoum (Kibreab 1996). He disputes Malkki’s theory of deterritorialisation by asserting ‘town refugees’ in Kigoma were being tactically deceptive: ‘the strategy of invisibility was an act of defiance and resistance rather than being a manifestation of submissive behaviour or a lost identity’ (p. 394). He describes Eritrean refugees in Khartoum strategically toggling between religious identities to

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<sup>18</sup> *Shamba* is Swahili for farm.

their benefit (pp. 397-398). Burundians in Tanzania are still invisibilising today by obscuring ethnicities, changing names, and intermarriage despite many being given Tanzanian citizenship (Daley et al. 2018). It is not my intent to relitigate the identity and belonging debate between Malkki, Kibreab, and others. What is largely missing from this discourse on invisibility, however, are the instances where town refugees are necessarily seen; whether they are recognised or not. Kibreab (1996) alludes to this notion, but is making this point to humanitarian policy actors who are more biased toward rural refugees: 'If rural refugees were, in the 1970s, "what the eye did not see," today refugees in many of the African urban centres are what the eye "refuses to see"' (p. 131). This ocular analogy between what the eye sees or refuses to see follows the logic of recognition of philosopher Axel Honneth.<sup>19</sup>

Honneth uses the Hegelian notion that one's self-awareness and value are relationally or 'intersubjectively' constituted. He distils his theory to assert, 'our idea of justice is essentially connected with a conception as to how, and in what way, individuals recognize one another reciprocally' (Honneth 2001b p. 45). The challenge of theorising recognition and the biggest cause of disagreement is how to widen recognition to the level of society. The opposite of recognition is disrespect or humiliation, which can occur at the individual or group level by intentionally causing harm or through a social exclusion of legal rights (pp. 46-52). Drawing from Ralph Ellison's novel, *The Invisible Man*, Honneth (2001a) relates the narrator's humiliating experience of being black in America and feeling invisible because people see through him. Honneth interprets this to mean that the narrator is not physically invisible, he is 'cognized' as a having a 'spatio-temporal framework as an object with situationally relevant properties' (p. 113). He is figuratively and socially invisible because he is not recognized or validated. In other words, relating to Kibreab's description of urban refugees, invisibility is what the eye *refuses* to see. Invisibility is fundamentally about recognition. Yet there are two definitions of recognition that Honneth often uses interchangeably. One way is to distinctly notice somebody interpersonally, the second is to acknowledge somebody's validity or rights. This distinction can become blurred. For example, urban refugees may desire recognition from host and humanitarian governments, but unlike Ellison's narrator, they seek to be unrecognized and anonymous by their neighbours and authorities in the city. It is therefore important to clarify to whom and at what level displaced people are seeking visibility and recognition, or invisibility for safety and protection. This makes Kelly Oliver's (2015) critique of Honneth especially prescient for refugees and migrants in Tanzania. She asserts, 'recognition is experienced as conferred by the very groups and institutions responsible for withholding it in the first place. In other words, recognition is distributed according to an axis of power that is part and parcel of systems of dominance and oppression' (p. 474). Tanzania's asylum and migration history demonstrate the inconsistency of the states' recognition for refugee and migrant populations.

City-dwelling refugees described by Malkki, Kibreab, and others live a daily *modus operandi* or *habitus* of invisibility. With the impossibility of legal recognition, they strategically enact invisibility in order to camouflage into diverse, dense, and transient urban populations to survive. They are cognized in the city by being a part of its fabric, but intentionally avoid recognition as refugees. The forms of invisibilities that take place in agricultural settings around the camps in rural Kigoma do not fit these characterisations. For example, Burundians share many physical, cultural, and linguistic features with the Ha ethnic group and impersonate them in places like Dar es Salaam. However, to attempt to do the same in the largely homogenous Ha villages surrounding the camps and Burundians would instantly be outed and exposed (Daley et al. 2018 pp. 30-31). When Honneth's analysis of invisibility is applied to refugees and migrants in and around Nyarugusu we see refractions of recognition depending on the level of analysis. On the ground level of the village and *shamba*, refugees cannot blend in because they will always be identified as 'the other' to the host community, yet they achieve a level of recognition by entering in business agreements over land and labour. However, at the level of the state and in humanitarian programming they will remain unrecognized and invisible until asylum law in Tanzania changes. Invisibility, in this case, is about hiding enough from the state and police while being visible enough to network and negotiate for land and wages. Also different from

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<sup>19</sup> Thanks to Lotte Pelckmans for this suggested source.

urban refugees, migrant and refugee land-renters and labourers are forced into limited moments of invisibility as transit the imaginary legal veils of the Burundi-Tanzania border and the camp boundaries.

Recognition is not evenly conferred upon all refugees and migrants in Tanzania. This is the case when comparing Congolese and Burundian refugees, first-time and repeat refugees, or between legal Burundian migrants and refugees. These groups with overlapping geographies and temporalities of displacement and mobility resemble the various ‘place-making projects’ among Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Novak 2007). Place-making projects encapsulate multiple power relations influenced by refugees’ multiple displacement registers, temporalities, ethnicities, religious identities, and governance structures. ‘It is only by unravelling the different projects simultaneously attributing significance to the same people and territory, and their interactions, that the process of place-making can be captured’ (Novak 2007 p. 255). The various place-making projects and the stereotypes that reify them determine degrees of recognition in these agricultural spaces.

#### **[A] (subheading) Displacement Agriculture:**

In *Displacements Economies in Africa*, Amanda Hammar (2014) and contributors widen the normative conceptual frame of forced displacement to ‘observe the emergence of, and articulation between, a range of new physical, social, economic and political spaces, relations, systems and practices that displacement itself was producing’ (p. 3). Despite being the poorest region of Tanzania, Kigoma has produced agricultural surpluses in recent years, even during times of droughts throughout East Africa (WFP 2016). Moreover, unlike in neighbouring Burundi, population density is low, and land is abundant in this area and not difficult to obtain for Tanzanians. From this excess, many Tanzanian landowners decide to rent land to refugees to produce ‘displacement agriculture’. The full scale of land rental practices around the camps is unclear as there is limited data on this practice. According to the Community Household and Surveillance (CHS) study, 46% of the households from all three camps had access to land. Of this number, 3.8% reported leaving the camp to lease land (CHS 2017 p. 3). The population of the three camps at the time was 318,444, which suggests 5,500 people have somebody in their household involved in these agricultural rental networks. This number is almost certainly low as many would be reluctant to report illegal activities outside of the camp.

There are two main entrances to the camp guarded by Tanzanian police at the southeast and western edges of the camp. The camp has no fencing or walls with countless footpaths leading out of the camp. Those leaving the camp simply walk from the nearest border of the camp to their destination. Prospective labourers or renters must make themselves visible to attain livelihoods. They wait along main roads in the mornings, go to village centres, or directly to peoples’ farms to inquire about land or wage availability. When I took these same paths to interview labourers, I did not expect to see the large numbers of people walking in and out of the camp with no cover of darkness or bush. Apart from a few households of Burundian migrants described below, most participants in displacement agriculture barely invisibilise themselves at all, yet the consequences for being caught by the police are dire. These movements are literally and figuratively out in the open. All actors interviewed near the camp: refugees, host community members, and aid workers—Tanzanian and international—were aware that these practices existed. The only form of evasion is to simply run and hide at the moment a police officer is heard or sighted. With the ubiquity of these farming practices, I was surprised to learn that the majority of those I spoke with had at one time or more been apprehended by the police, which carries harsh consequences. If a refugee or migrant is caught by the police without a work permit, they are often beaten and if unable to pay a large enough bribe they are sent to the local prison for six months where they face further physical punishment and conscripted farm labour. Migrant labourers at times have lost all of their earnings for the year. Moreover, heard many reports that Tanzanians often extort refugees and migrants they rent land to or hire as labourers by giving incorrect measurements of land, stealing crops, or refusing to pay wages with the threat of reporting them to the police.

There are small pockets of Burundian migrants who invisibilise themselves through tactics of seclusion. For instance, five households of Burundian migrants found Tanzanian landowners willing to let them live and work on their land permanently. Knowing they will be detected and not allowed to

live and integrate into nearby villages by Tanzanians, these households are sequestered far away from roads villages or roads to avoid detection. Like other Burundian migrants and refugees, they were displaced from Burundi through lack of access to land or employment and conflict. What is unique about this group is that they brought their wives and families to live with them, rather than returning circularly like other migrants. One of these informants, Moise, explained this choice, ‘I decided to live in Tanzania because Tanzania made me freer than Burundi.’ This group is only visible and recognised by their employer who pays the chairman of the nearest village to maintain their invisibility, although recent events show how precarious this secluded invisibility is.

At the time of writing on 1 August, Tanzanian military forces conducted an operation in villages where clashes have taken place between Sukuma cattle herders arriving from northern Tanzania and local Ha landowners. The military reportedly had shoot-to-kill orders and machine-gun fire was heard by everyone in nearby Nyarugusu camp. The Sukuma herders lived close to the settled Burundian migrants introduced above. While not the target of the operations, they fled and stayed in villages hidden by their Tanzanian employers or in Nyarugusu camp. This operation has had an intense chilling effect on all participants in the displacement agriculture *shambas* and the camp economy. Refugee land renters and labourers were too afraid to leave the camp immediately afterwards. The price of firewood and charcoal gathered outside the camp has more than doubled. This event illustrates how precarious displacement agriculture is. It also shows the speed in which the Tanzanian state can shut down these practices, but prior to this event has chosen not to. It occurred to me that if the local police wanted to crack down and stop these practices, it would not be difficult to do so. Instead, it seems the police strike a balance between doing random searches as a source of revenue, but do not crackdown to the point of ending the practices altogether. Those involved in this system understand the risks to participate but endure because they have so few alternative options for livelihoods. People with the least amount of recognition from the state and host communities—Burundians in general, and Burundian migrant labourers in particular—must endure greater amounts of exposure and risk visibility by the police.

#### **[B] (Sub-subheading) Host Community Land Owners**

There are high variances in class, motivations, attitudes, costs, and profits among all the participants in displacement agriculture in Kigoma. Without the demand and complicity of the Tanzanian host community, displacement agriculture would not exist. In Kasulu District where Nyarugusu is located, 85% of income is estimated to be generated from agriculture, however, nearly 80% live below the poverty line. The need for cash is a large motivating factor for many to rent land to refugees. Others have decided to rent their surplus land to refugees due to friendships formed through interactions at the common market shared by Tanzanians and refugees. Nehemiah, who rents to Congolese describes this relationship: ‘We knew each other for a year. Then he asked me if I have a piece of land to rent. Because we were already friends, I decided to give the land. We met when I was selling bananas at the common market in camp, then he invited me to visit his family. They hosted me and treated me well. As a gift, I rented them two acres and gave another for free.’ Others, like Yakub, rented or gave away land for free out of a humanitarian impulse: ‘I saw that some people suffer a lot. Then I decided to rent but usually, I give for free.’ For most who rent land to refugees, it is more of a neutral business-like transaction where refugee land seekers show up to Tanzanian’s farms or villages and a price is negotiated.

#### **[B] (Sub-subheading) Refugee Land Renters**

Like Tanzanian landowners, refugee land renters encompass a wide spectrum of motivations and outcomes for their farming practices. It is generally understood that more Congolese rent land than Burundians, although this is changing as Burundians’ economies are growing. For Burundians to acquire land, they must pay more or travel greater distances outside of the camp. One reason for this Congolese are more established economically in Nyarugusu than Burundians who arrived in 2015. The other reason, which will be explored further below, is due to the negative stereotypes associated with

Burundians in the region. Ranging from a half-acre to four, renters pay anywhere from as low as TZS 20,000 (USD 8.65) to as much as TZS 170,000 (USD 73.54) to rent various acreages of land per year. Land has been more expensive recently due to the increased demand after arrival in 2015 of the Burundians and the decrease in food rations. Many borrow money or take loans to acquire this land. Some only consume what they grow whereas others eat and sell their produce. One household reported earning more than 1,200,000 TZS (USD 520), which is nearly double the GDP per capita for Kigoma (NBS 2012). This was the only source of income for about half of the households renting land. Motivations for renting land include hunger from reduced food rations, or a desire to diversify their food rations to be more culturally appropriate. The majority use Swahili phrases *maisha magumu*—the ‘difficult life’—to describe what drove them to rent land. For these refugees, other livelihoods or self-reliance strategies such as paid employment or petty trade in the market were difficult to obtain. For Kiza, ‘I did farming because it is the only thing that I am used to. Others like selling, but this is tough for me. I needed a place where I could cultivate things and generate some money.’ This deeply ingrained desire to cultivate was not only borne out of desperation, however. For others like Isaelo and Laurent, it seems to be a form of habitus: ‘I am accustomed to cultivating. I do not like staying anywhere without cultivating.’ Laurent added, ‘I decided to do this because I had always thought that agriculture is the main thing in the life of a human being.’

### **[B] (Sub-subheading) Refugee Labourers**

Camp refugees who sell their labour for wages to both refugees and Tanzanian landowners have bleaker livelihood prospects than land renters. Eighteen-year-old Christoph recounts, ‘I had no education and failed to continue with my studies due to *maisha magumu*. I lost my parents, so I decided to make a little money.’ Another Burundian refugee in Nduta described his predicament: ‘I normally go there during the hardest moments—especially following ration cuts. I take the risk of going to work in the village even though I know we are not allowed. But what can I do if my family has nothing to eat? How can they survive without food?’ In the best of cases, they enter farm wage labour for a few days or a week to raise capital to supplement their existing business or temporarily addressing an economic shock. In more desperate situations they work five to six days a week throughout planting and harvesting seasons. The more these labourers have to work outside of the camp, the greater their chances of visibility to Tanzanian police. Refugee labourers can find jobs from within the safety of the camp by leveraging their relationship with fellow refugees, through referrals from previous employers, inquiring in public places such as the market, or asking door to door. Others who are less connected must wait along the footpaths leading to the *shambas* or along the main roads to ask potential employers. In the illegal and unregulated space outside the camp, there are high divergences in wage ranges and how wages are determined. For example, people are paid daily rates by the task such as digging, planting, and harvesting, or by the crop that they are cultivating. Informants even said that each village has different ranges of pay. While this category of participants is structurally disadvantaged, Burundian migrant labourers face the most precarious and vulnerable position.

### **[B] (Sub-subheading) Migrant Labourers**

Burundian labour migrants have travelled to Tanzania as farm labourers for generations. Celestine explains, ‘it is our nature. We take from our parents and our grandparents growing and cultivating in Tanzania.’ Arriving primarily from the border regions, but also as far north as Kirundo and Ngozi provinces, migrants cross over the porous border by foot or bicycle. Some transit only for a couple of months at a time, but others like Moise mentioned above have attempted to live permanently in Tanzania. A few migrants return to the same farms each year where they have positive relationships with Tanzanians and refugee land renters, whereas others, like André, ‘do not make a choice, I only go where I heard there is a job. I am like a flag blowing in the wind.’ This takes people as far as Rukwa Region south of Kigoma or Kagera region to the north. They typically do not venture further as they would be more at risk of arrest.

The key difference between many of the migrants and refugees is that unlike many of the re-displaced Burundian refugees who do not have access to land back in Burundi, the migrants I spoke with still own land (Purdeková 2016). They cross into Tanzania because they have little or no means for gaining cash or wages in Burundi. Also, unlike the camp-based renters and labourers where women participate as renters and labourers, usually only men engage in the circular labour migrations while the women stay behind. While camp refugees and migrant labourers receive the same ranges of pay, these wages have been markedly depressed since the labour supply skyrocketed with the arrival of Burundians in 2015. Refugees in the camp have food, shelter, and other services provided by the humanitarian apparatus, thus affording them to take lower wages, which has further lowered prices labourers receive for work. Migrants are also exposed outside of the legal and physical protection of the camp and must create makeshift huts on the *shambas* or live in the forest in an attempt to remain invisible to a growingly hostile state. Moreover, some say migrants are arrested more often than refugees because they often seek jobs in villages where there are more likely to be police patrols rather than utilizing networks in the camp.

### **[A] (subheading) History of Migration and Asylum in Tanzania**

Tanzania shows the oscillating nature of state recognition over time. During colonialism, the goal of the state was to visibilise or make legible mobile populations in order to manipulate their labour and control their movements. President Nyerere continued this under a more benevolent guise of self-reliance, while simultaneously glorifying anti-colonial freedom fighter refugees for foreign policy gain. The wholesale change to invisibilisation came in the 1990s through strict encampment policies. Under President Magufuli today there has been an increase in police vigilance patrolling the sources of livelihood *outside* of the camp, as well as a crackdown on livelihood opportunities *within* the camp. As a result, refugees and migrants are forced to be invisibly self-sufficient in the face of dwindling aid.

### **[B] (Sub-subheading) Colonialism: Visibility as Manipulation**

To borrow from James Scott (1998), ‘legibility is a condition of manipulation’ (p. 183). At the heart of the colonial project was the exploitation of African labour, but to benefit from labour, populations had to be made legible or visible to the colonial state and then controlled. To make the populations visible for manipulation, colonial officials created ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnographic maps’ (Miller 2011 p. 18). The colonial state felt high degrees of anxiety with uncontrolled movements of African subjects across and within borders. The colonists wanted to limit neighbouring Africans or ‘alien natives’, from ‘detrribalising’ their simplistic, yet effective indirect rule (Miller 2011 pp. 18-19).

During German and British rule, refugees arrived in Tanganyika<sup>20</sup> from neighbouring colonies to flee excesses of labour conscription. Tanganyika was ruled as German East Africa from the 1880s until becoming a British Mandate in 1919. In 1899 the Portuguese colonists enacted forced labour decrees in Mozambique and thousands fled to southeastern Tanganyika. These movements from Mozambique to Tanganyika continued under British control into the 1920s and 1930s. Both colonial regimes in Tanganyika tried to block these flows. The Germans and British discouraged mobility *into* Tanganyika because they feared similar movement *away* from Tanganyika. The colonists were anxious their subjects would flee their own coercive labour tactics, which would lead to decreased cash crop production as well as their pool of taxation. ‘In other words, controlling migration had bearings upon the profitability of the colonial project itself’ (Chaulia 2003 p. 149).

From the 1930s onward, Western Tanganyika became a ‘labour reserve’ for large scale plantations, especially sisal. Many Burundians were fleeing Belgian colonial conscription while being recruited by British Labour Officers. This was a contradictory policy period for the British. On the one hand, there was a need for workers and migrant recruitment. On the other hand, colonial authorities were worried about detribalisation in border regions as well as the spread of disease. In response, the

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<sup>20</sup> Tanganyika was the name of the mainland of modern Tanzania before Zanzibar and Pemba islands unified in 1964.

British passed the Defence War Evacuees Regulations Act (1946) and the Refugee Control Ordinance (1949), which granted powers to the state remove refugees and to control movements and provides the spine of refugee policy in Tanzania today (Daley 1989 p. 111). Host communities quickly welcomed those from neighbouring countries to ease their conditions. Acting as brokers, chiefs would recruit migrants and refugees for cheap, sometimes free labour, or as a buffer for native subjects from harsh colonial labour conditions (Chaulia 2003 p. 153). Recognition of migrants and refugees was granted insofar as these populations benefited colonial interests and remained confined to designated areas of the country. President Nyerere, while known for his generosity and openness, also exhibited these tendencies.

### **[B] (Sub-subheading) Nyerere: Visibility as Foreign Policy and Exploitation**

Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere was a revered Pan-African statesman, which was the central platform of his foreign policy. Ruling from Independence in 1962 until 1985, part of this reputation stems from his posture toward refugees and asylum seekers. Tanzania's refugee policies under President Nyerere went beyond bringing visibility to the refugees for the sake of legibility as it was under colonialism. These policies projected a bright enough light on refugees to reflect positively on the Tanzanian state to the region and the world. President Nyerere was praised for supporting anti-colonial 'freedom fighters' from the region and the 'Open Door' policy that granted access to land and self-sufficiency for refugees. While bordering policies fit President Nyerere's Pan-African ideals initially, this is contrasted by the Tanzanian state's at times used heavy-handed tactics of control and capitalization from refugee labour from Rwandan and Burundian refugees.

Nyerere's Tanzania was at the forefront of anti-colonial resistance aiding many dissidents from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique. Nyerere was influential in drafting the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the 1969 Convention expanding the rights of refugees beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention to include those fleeing anti-colonial conflicts. Guerrilla movements housed in Tanzania at the time were given extensive freedom of movement and employment (Chaulia 2003 pp. 155-156). This golden age of asylum in Tanzania brought more than a legal recognition for right of asylum and residence but evoked positive visibility that exalted fleeing anti-colonial dissidents. They were seen as '*wageni*' or 'guests' instead of the colonial moniker of 'aliens' (Miller 2011 pp. 25-27).

The narrative of anti-colonial refugees as *wageni* eventually made way to referring refugees who fled internal war such as Rwandans and Burundians as 'settlers'. The term refers to refugees' 'settlement' or de facto 'integration' into the country (Miller 2011). Settlers were seen more ambivalently than the aforementioned freedom fighter refugees, and their reception followed a less altruistic anti-imperialist logic. Refugee recognition in the country, though not as harsh as the colonists, was dependent on the contribution to the economic development of the peripheries and acquiescence to state control. Settler refugees faced restrictions to freely move within the country.

Rwandan Tutsi refugees began arriving in 1959 due to a violent Hutu uprising and were given land to cultivate for self-reliance without humanitarian aid. The Rwandans rejected this recognition and visibility and resisted any integration such as planting crops or constructing permanent structures due to a desire to return to Rwanda as soon as possible (Gasarasi 1990 p. 90). Some even destroyed crops in defiance. Refugees who took steps toward integration were socially ostracised and seen as traitors. The Tanzania government took a heavy-handed response by withdrawing rations, closing schools and dispensaries, prohibiting gatherings, and bulldozing obstructers' huts (Gasarasi 1990 pp. 90-91). Refugee resistance faded over time and eventually resulted in Tanzanian citizenship for 30,000 Rwandan refugees by the early 1970s. President Nyerere has been largely lauded for the provision of land and livelihoods to Rwandan and later Burundian refugees, however, there is considerable economic self-interest and labour exploitation of these settlements. This included bush clearing and infrastructure construction such as roads and buildings. Remuneration was regarded by Tanzanian authorities and NGOs as 'self-help' and was as low as one Tanzanian shilling or provided in-kind as food rations, clothing, or as a ride from officials' vehicles (Gasarasi 1984 pp. 41-42).

The 1972 caseload of Burundian Hutu bears many echoes of the Rwandan refugee situation, but on a larger scale. Approximately 150,000 Burundian refugees were placed into three locations now known as the ‘old settlements’: Mishamo, Katumba, and Ulyankulu. The land set aside for the settlements was under-cultivated and sparsely populated due to villagers cleared out as part of President Nyerere’s *ujamaa* policy of villagization. Moreover, this land was largely forested marshland that was difficult to farm and inhabited by disease-carrying tsetse flies (Chaulia 2003 p. 157). As Daley (1989) describes, Burundian refugees were ‘vehicles for the exploitation of peripheral areas’ (p.79). Many of the crops prioritized were exportable crops such as coffee and tobacco and were sold by parastatals to benefit the state (Daley 1992). Both the Rwandan and Burundian settlements were successful in becoming food self-reliant within a few years, which no longer necessitated humanitarian aid and eventually offered citizenship. Under Nyerere, refugees were visible because they were useful and capitalizable for the state. The tragic irony is that the settlement model of agricultural self-reliance—though not perfect—that gave Tanzania and President Nyerere plaudits internationally, has given way to one of the strictest asylum policies in Africa since the 1990s.

### **[B] (Sub-subheading) 1990s Encampment Policy: Codifying Invisibility**

Overwhelmed and under-resourced, asylum policy in the 1990s departed from the settlement model to a strict encampment policy. Immense refugee numbers gave refugees and camps in Tanzania visibility to the international community that led to greater funding and governing in the hands of UNHCR. This marked the end of local integration and self-reliance practised since Nyerere. This era, however, pushed labour outside the camp where refugees and migrants had to invisibilise or face violent-round-ups. By the 1990s, Tanzania was reeling economically and in a debt crisis, which led to the dismantling of the Tanzanian state’s control of the economy, public sector, and social spending through structural adjustment policies pushed by the IMF and World Bank. Tanzania was unable to mobilise the resources to care for refugees, paving the way for Tanzania, UNHCR, and NGOs to construct refugee camps near the western peripheries of the country (Daley 1992 p. 144). These camps were tightly controlled and did not allow for mobility or livelihood activities.

The massive movement of people in the 1990s far surpassed the displacements of the 1960s and 1970s. First, 300,000 Burundians arrived in 1993 with the assassination of the President Ndadaye, although most returned in a year. Additional conflict came in the mid-1990s and by 1999 there were again between 200,000-300,000 Burundian refugees and an estimated additional 400,000-500,000 living unregistered in the country. The Rwandan genocide in 1994, however, prompted an estimated 2,000,000 Rwandans to flee the country. 600,000 of these refugees arrived in the Kagera region of Tanzania (Landau 2008 p. 66). Under President Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005), control and force were used more frequently with refugee populations. Some key events during his presidency include 483,000 Rwandans forcibly repatriated in 1996 (Whitaker 2002); operations in 1997 by security forces to round-up Burundians living outside of camps; and the passing of the 1998 Refugees Act, which stipulated that refugees could not travel more than four kilometres outside camps or seek wage-earning activity outside the camps. In 2005, President Jakaya Kikwete ran on a platform to make Tanzania ‘refugee-free’ by 2010. This led to two vastly different outcomes for Burundians of the 1972 and 1993 caseloads. For the 1972 caseload around 200,000 Burundian refugees were given Tanzanian citizenship beginning in 2007, which brought international price reminiscent of President Nyerere’s legacy (Kuch 2016). For the remaining Burundians of the 1993 caseload, their fates were less secure. At the end of 2012, the remaining refugees living in Mtabila refugee camp—nearly 40,000 in total—were violently forced to repatriate to Burundi against their will (Hovil and Mbazumutima 2012).

Not yet mentioned is the of this locus of research, Nyarugusu camp, and the emergence of Congolese refugees in Tanzania. Created in 1996 due to the First Congo War, growing throughout the Second Congo War, with new Congolese still arriving today, Nyarugusu was the last remaining camp in the country until the Burundian crisis in 2015. Alexander Betts (2013) attempts to disentangle the ‘paradoxical response’ why in the 1990s and 2000s Rwandans and Burundians faced a series of forced repatriations, but Congolese have not had the same fate. In short, he concludes that Congolese face

hostility from local and regional political actors such as the Regional Commissioner of Kigoma, but the decision for repatriation is decided in Dar es Salaam by the central state. UNHCR has been relatively successful in forging a relationship with the MHA in Dar es Salaam and advocating against repatriation for Congolese.

### **[B] (Sub-subheading) 2015 – Present: Entrenching Invisibility**

2015 saw two events that further constricted Tanzania refugee policy: the third wave of displacement of Burundian refugees, and the election of President John Magufuli, whose nationalist ‘Tanzania first’ policies have shrunk the space of democracy and asylum even further. Since April 2015, more than 400,000 Burundian refugees have fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Tanzania. This exodus, in an acute sense, was caused by President Pierre Nkurunziza overstaying his mandate and instilling an environment of state-sanctioned repression and intimidation by the youth wing of the ruling party known as the *imbonerakure*. Purdeková (2016) argues that rather than a present crisis, the 2015 displacement should be seen in a broader political sense where Burundians are entrenching displacement due to a profound distrust of the state founded over decades. Nyarugusu doubled from 62,000 mostly Congolese to 132,000 and resurrected two former camps Nduta and Mtendeli.

The Burundian influx in 2015 coincided with the election and swearing-in of President Magufuli who came to fame in a rush of populist moves curtailing corruption and challenging international mining corporations but has since been criticised for ‘authoritarian inclinations’ (Cheeseman 2016). These authoritarian tendencies include clamping down on free press and opposition, culminating in jailing, disappearing, and even assassination attempts on journalists and opposition leaders (Kabendera 2018). What has largely stayed out of the press has been the regime’s assault on asylum in the camps. Some of these actions have included: suddenly shutting down a popular WFP cash transfer programme in Nyarugusu in August 2017 (Boeyink 2019); pulling out of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), a pilot designed to enact more progressive refugee legislation in exchange for greater international aid; and in July 2018 and again in February 2019 the government shut down common markets at all three camps shared by refugees and host communities (Van Laer 2018).

These government actions have exacerbated a protracted refugee situation experiencing ‘chronic underfunding’ resulting in food and non-food item reductions and shortages, and lack of health and education services (UNHCR 2019 p. 8). With severe livelihood and aid constraints, the situation in the camps has impelled many to repatriate to Burundi calling into question how ‘voluntary’ these voluntary returns are (IRRI 2019). Moreover, many of the re-displaced refugees that were violently expelled from Mtabila in 2012 and UNHCR staff are fearing these actions are precipitating another forced repatriation similar to Mtabila. One Burundian man sums up these fears of *déjà vu*: ‘I do not feel like returning to Burundi. I do not have land; I do not have a job. The same causes are still going on. How could you expect me to leave? In 2012, we were forced to go back to Burundi. We lived there for three years and were forced to come back. The same will probably happen.’

The restricted refugee environment today bears many similarities to the regressive asylum policies during the 1990s and 2000s, replete with round-ups and forced returns. Refugees, Burundian labour migrants, and Tanzanian hosts who have lived through both eras agree the key difference between then and now, is that participating in agriculture outside the camps has been more policed and dangerous under President Magufuli now than before. President Magufuli has increasingly criminalised these agricultural spaces, yet livelihood opportunities are continually being squeezed in the camps and Burundi. This is causing a pincer movement forcing people into displacement agriculture to be invisibly self-sufficient when self-reliance in the camp is impossible.

### **[A] (subheading) Place-Making in Kigoma**

Nyarugusu is essentially two camps within one. There is the Congolese side or a ‘protracted refugee camp’ where Congolese have resided since 1996, and the Burundian side, or ‘emergency refugee camp’, considered a ‘blank slate’ economy (Betts et al. 2017 p. 140). By many wellbeing metrics, Congolese refugees are faring better than Burundians refugees in Tanzania. For example, in

Nyarugusu in 2016, Congolese refugees only had 19% in ‘asset very poor’ category and 4% in ‘asset rich’ compared to 75% of Burundians in ‘asset very poor’ and none in the ‘asset rich’ category (CHS 2016 p. 13). Congolese have better measurements than Burundians in Coping Strategies Index, food consumption score, Household Dietary Diversity, livelihoods metrics, and per capita expenditures (CHS 2017). The simplest explanation for Congolese prosperity over Burundians is that many have lived in Nyarugusu since 1996 and have had longer to establish networks. Since 2012, nearly 30,000 Congolese have been resettled from Nyarugusu to the US, Canada, and other countries (UNHCR 2019 p. 5). This leads to remittances being sent to friends and family remaining in Nyarugusu, strengthening the camp economy.

According to WFP estimations, 60-80 per cent of the most recent 2015 arrivals have been ‘re-displaced’ from the civil war in the 1990s or as far back as the genocide in 1972 (Purdeková 2016 p. 7). Many of these refugees who returned to Burundi faced extreme economic hardship primarily because they lost access to their land while in exile. Some informants explained that they used the political crisis as a pretext to flee the poverty of Burundi to Tanzania even before they faced intimidation and persecution. People left with the few resources they possessed, and most said they had to spend what they had to pay for transportation or payments to police or *imbonerakure* on the journey to Tanzania. Upon arrival, there was inadequate housing, a cholera outbreak, and the capital people had was spent on buying food or paying for medical supplies. Most Burundians did not have the capital to start businesses—the main reason Burundians sell their labour on farms outside the camp. Conversely, Congolese rent land from Tanzanians at higher rates, and it is rare for Congolese to work as paid labourers on the farms. Economic stratification is not the only explanation for these outcomes, however, as a Burundian man explained to me: ‘There are Burundians who rent land, but not very many. Congolese have been in the region for longer and have relationships with Tanzanians. It is more about relationships to get lands than just having money.’ In seeking to better understand how these relationships are formed, I found that stereotypes play a critical role in this.

A Burundian man in Mtendeli camp gives a telling illustration of these stereotypes: ‘If a Congolese and a Burundian are on a bus and the police stop them, then a Burundian will be taken off and the Congolese can continue on. Burundi has a bad image in Tanzania. The bad image is attached for a long time. Burundians are highly attached to the war from before. All are labelled as bad or dangerous people.’ Two labels of Burundians persist, that Burundians are untrustworthy thieves prone to violence, or that they are hardworking and capable farmers. The former stigmatisation is forcing Burundian land renters further away from the camp to find landowners willing to rent land to them. For the latter categorisation of strong labourers, this is both seen positively and pejoratively from their history of labour in the country. Malkki’s (1995) analyses ‘mythico-histories’ of Mishamo that residents use to make sense of protracted exile. Prominent in these cosmologies were the sentiments of having their cultivation exploited. Malkki recounts the sentiments of these Burundians: ‘We are the granaries of the Tanzanians [...] We feed all the poor regions of Tanzania [...] We have become their slaves. We have been given a pet name here, “the tractors.” They benefit by us’ (pp. 119-120). Felix da Costa (2017) noted Burundians are still being called ‘our tractors’ by Tanzanians (p. 20). This also helps them to find employment as labourers because they are said to finish the work faster than Tanzanians.

In relation to Burundians, Congolese are seen as their opposite as trustworthy and honest, but lazy. A Tanzanian describes, ‘Congolese do not do labour for others. They are not strong like Burundians. Congolese like soft jobs and music. They like to dress smart even if they do not have any money.’ This, in turn, has been internalised by Congolese because even those who live in extreme poverty in the camp, it is rare to find Congolese paid farm labourers. While stereotypes are highly problematic on many levels, they are borne from a history of place-making in the region and must not be dismissed as they form the basis of relationships and livelihood outcomes among the actors in the and around the camp.

## [A] (subheading) Conclusion

Invisibility has been conceptualised in forced migration studies with a singular lens that does not capture the entire experience of displaced populations. Scholars have focused on instances where displaced people are invisible to policy-makers and academics, or due to restrictive policies, must enact strategies of invisibility to avoid detection. If people are not recognised or validated by the state at the top, they avoid being recognised or detected from below. What is missing from these accounts is the mirrored edge of visibility. During colonialism and immediately after, visibility was the goal of migration and refugee policy to benefit the state. Strict encampment during the 1990s and increasingly today under President Magufuli created the need for refugees to invisibilise or blend into spaces like towns and cities because refugee life is only recognised in camps.

The same top-down policies that impel invisibilisation in urban settings do not produce uniform invisibility in rural Kigoma, however. Local integration for refugees and migrants is more difficult when everybody knows their neighbours and outsiders are recognised and unwanted. The only possibility to invisibilise is to live in seclusion like the Burundian migrants who rely on their Tanzanian employers to keep them hidden. To rent land or sell labour in the *shambas* surrounding the camps, people must have connections or make themselves sufficiently visible out in the open along heavily trafficked roads and footpaths, in villages, or at the farms. People who have no other access to incomes in the camps or Burundi must spend more time at the farms and are at greater risk of encountering police. This is experienced more by Burundians in general, and Burundian migrants in particular, compared to Congolese refugees due to the costs of re-displacement, chronic poverty, and regional prejudices and stereotypes. For those involved in displacement agriculture who are forced to be invisibly self-sufficient beyond humanitarian aid, visibility is less enacted than it is *endured*. As less-than-voluntary repatriations are increasing in this restrictive political and economic environment, it appears that endurance is wearing thin.

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