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Nation-building and political abandonment:
A comparative historical sociology of rightist nationalism in
post-war Britain and Germany

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Abstract

Rightist nationalist politics have emerged globally in recent years. This dissertation traces the developing character of rightist nationalism in Britain and Germany since the early 1990s. The primary aim is to better understand its appeal at different political key moments. I draw on longitudinal individual- and macro-level data, and embed my analysis in a comparative historical sociology that is attentive to both countries' very different post-war periods and longer historical traditions. They form an instructive longitudinal contrast in which they illuminate each other (see Geertz 1971), and the shape of their nationalisms, within a wider European context. In addition to literature on the radical right (e.g. Betz 1994; Bonikowski 2017; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007), the thesis thus also speaks to more historically oriented work on the political right (Eatwell 2003; 1992a; Eley 2015b; Gamble 1995; Mann 2004). It further speaks to the literatures of nationalism (e.g. Gellner 1998b; 1990; Hall 1995; Malešević 2019; Mann 2005: Ch.3; 1995) and populism (Berlin et al. 1968; Canovan 1981; Mouffe 2018; Mudde 2004; Müller 2016). I explore inter-relationships between both concepts (e.g. Bonikowski et al. 2018), and contribute to the discussion with a more substantive focus on how their inherent struggle for political recognition and their shared drive towards socio-cultural homogenisation work within real-world rightist nationalism. By contextualising rightist nationalism within both countries' colonial and racialised traditions (e.g. Bhabra 2017b; Eley 2015a), I examine both its surface variation over time and the deeper historical alignment of its exclusionary mechanisms.

I undertake largely descriptive data analysis in two steps. First, I examine longitudinal macro-level data to identify socio-economic and political key moments in both countries' recent histories. Second, these key moments then provide occasions in which I explore social backgrounds and political perceptions of the same groups of respondents in panel surveys (BHPS-UKHLS, SOEP), as they lived through their countries' changing socio-economic and political landscapes. The dissertation's methodological contribution lies in its interpretive and historically embedded

approach to panel data that draws on as much of its longitudinal dimension as possible.

One substantial finding emerging from the longitudinal contrast between both countries is that I found no direct line from socio-economic positions to affinities for rightist nationalism. In a subtle adjustment to theories around the “left-behind” (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014b), I found that rightist nationalism was not simply located in the lowest socio-economic positions, although it was characterised by a risk of dropping and relative social stagnation over time. I offer an interpretive account of how both countries’ nationalists’ feelings of social abandonment became entangled with a broader sense of political grievance and a racialised retrieval of socio-political privileges. Second, the contrast between Britain and Germany allowed me to more clearly delineate their historical and post-war patterns of racialised exclusions. Rightist nationalism came to the surface especially during moments of strong migration. This was more distinctly contained within two key moments in Germany (early 1990s and mid-2010s), and expressed itself more gradually in the UK (since the late 1990s). This difference suggests varying degrees of urgency regarding feared cultural change. Migration prompted a more sudden rightward shift in Germany’s political landscape, while Britain foregrounded key moments of European (dis)integration. A third substantial finding highlights Europe’s increasing importance for both countries’ rightist nationalisms. Britain’s moved from a wider racial towards and narrower English ethnic nationalism and a political focus on sovereignty vis-à-vis Europe. German nationalism, by contrast, moved from an ethnic towards a wider racialised focus that locates Germany within the “fortress Europe” to preserve its culture.

The dissertation’s first argument is that both countries’ rightist nationalisms can be understood as different expressions of racialised nation-building in the face of growing cultural diversity, seen as threat to political rights and legitimate belonging. The second, related argument is that they are also indicative of the longer-term tension between class and nation that has recently tilted towards nation, culture, and “race”. This suggests that rightist nationalism is not simply “on the rise”, but also that

the decline of its counterweight, class, has facilitated its increasing pull on political mainstream and self-understandings. My main theoretical contribution is a four-feature framework that helps understand rightist nationalism in these two countries as it emerged from the longitudinal individual- and macro-level contrast. I suggest that rightist nationalism is characterised by racialisation; a populist impulse towards political recognition; a selective retrieval of historical narratives and legacies; and a conservative concern with (dis)order. This is relevant for studies of historical and present rightist politics, and those embedding longitudinal data analysis within historical contexts.

Lay summary

Over the past years, many countries in Europe and beyond have seen the emergence of anti-immigrant parties that reject cultural and social diversity, and often combine these claims with a criticism of the political mainstream and international cooperation. Events such as Brexit or the recent “refugee crisis” have demonstrated the real-world importance of questions surrounding immigration and the desire for stronger borders or national sovereignty. These issues, and the recent political successes of rightist nationalist movements, have prompted much interest by journalists, political commentators, and academics. Their analyses often concentrate on shorter-term explanations of why people might support anti-immigrant parties. In this doctoral thesis, I look at rightist nationalism’s appeal from a longer-term perspective. Focusing on the UK and Germany, I pay attention to their longer histories of, for instance, the colonial Empire and Nazism. But my main focus lies on the period following the Second World War, and particularly the decades from the early 1990s onwards.

I examine what both countries’ nationalisms looked like over the years, how they developed their concerns and claims, and how these interacted with the various economic, social, and political challenges that the last decades have seen. I seek to better understand rightist nationalism’s appeal at different political key moments. I analyse the problem from the perspective of British and German recent histories and nationalist parties; but I also look at individuals who lived in these countries throughout the last decades. To do so, I draw on large social surveys that have asked British and German respondents various social and political questions every year over a long period of time. This way I can see how the same groups of people changed (or did not change) certain social aspects of their lives since the early 1990s, such as education or employment, and how they perceived political issues, such as parties, governments, or the problem of migration. These kinds of social surveys, which ask the same individuals repeatedly over time, are not very commonly used to understand rightist nationalism. They are even more rarely used in a way that seeks

to analyse the same people's experiences over several decades, while viewing them in light of the historical context in which they expressed their political perceptions.

In this analysis over time I also pay attention to how the British and German contexts shed light on each other and the characteristics of their rightist nationalisms. I could see, for instance, that rightist nationalists were not just in the lowest socio-economic positions but that they nevertheless expressed a longer-term sense of vulnerability and stagnation when it came to their jobs and education. This was especially the case in Britain and eastern Germany. I outline what I understand as a process in which rightist nationalists' socio-economic concerns over time connected with a feeling of abandonment by politics and parties, and a growing perception of immigrants as further threatening their rights and sense of belonging. Another finding of this analysis over time is that rightist nationalism came most strongly to the fore at moments of soaring migration and rising cultural difference, rather than economic challenges. This was very visible in Germany during the early 1990s and mid-2010s, and in Britain more gradually since the late 1990s, accelerating in the recent years leading up to the EU referendum. I see the issue of the European Union as a crucial point for both countries' nationalisms, but from different angles: the UK has in the last decades significantly moved away from Europe to focus on British – or actually: English – national identity. German nationalism, by contrast, had to come to terms with Nazism's historical legacy, and has increasingly adopted a wider European outlook, which it sees as threatened by especially non-European and Muslim immigrants.

In this thesis I put forward two main arguments. The first one is that post-war rightist nationalism represents a response to growing migration and cultural diversity, in which it seeks to rebuild nation and society according to white "British-" or "German-ness", and to limit social and political rights to this more exclusive construction of the nation. The second, related argument is that rightist nationalism has recently not only been "on the rise", but that its growing appeal has also been enabled by the decreasing ability of economic issues to dominate political discussions and identifications. As such, the thesis makes the overall point that rightist

nationalism is not just a response to recent cultural and political challenges, but also needs to be understood in light of longer historical and social developments.

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1 Introduction

The last years have seen a historical emergence of rightist nationalist politics around the world. Recent examples include Brazil, India, and Turkey, but also the United States and Britain – two countries with an explicitly anti-fascist history and identity. Rightist nationalism is also a recurrent feature on the European mainland, including Germany where in 2017 it entered the parliament as third-strongest faction. These developments have generated much public and scholarly interest. Importantly, however, rightist nationalism entails very real consequences. For one thing, especially immigrants and diverse communities face increasing social and legal pressure, curtailed access to the state's benefits, or even deportation and family separation. Rightist nationalism also involves violence. Recent years have seen, for instance, soaring extremist attacks on refugees in Germany, and ongoing police violence against people of colour in the United States and elsewhere. The first half of the 20th century has once again shown the violent potential of nationalism's principle of cultural homogenisation, whose future re-emergence Ernest Gellner has not ruled out (1995: 7; see also: 1998b: 46; 54-62; 1990: 2; Mann 2005: Chs. 7-10; 2004). At the moment, Europe's more successful rightist nationalist movements usually disavow violence. But in the coming decades they will likely be confronted with migration movements – due to interrelated challenges of war, economic pressures, and climate change – that will let the recent “refugee crisis” pale in comparison. Rightist nationalism's imperative of preserving the physical and cultural “purity” of the nation will then face the reality that building walls, real or metaphorical, comes at a price. Migration will not cease because of obstacles or nationalism's promises. If those promises are to be taken seriously, then the logical consequence is that borders will have to be defended with violence. Whether rightist nationalists will be in power to enforce this remains to be seen.

Yet rightist nationalism's often indifferent regard for diverse others' hardship is already exerting an increasing pull on the post-war political mainstream. This is

another of its consequences. The last years were not only characterised by a notable tightening of immigration stances in European mainstream politics, but also a growing willingness to intercept and turn around boats in the Mediterranean Sea, thus at the very least condoning these migrants' deaths. European leaders also stroke deals with countries such as Libya to detain migrants under circumstances that hardly live up to Europe's post-war moral and legal standards (e.g. Beaumont 2019; Hayden 2019). Rightist nationalism has consequences, moreover, for international cooperation, as not only Donald Trump's or Viktor Orbán's governments have shown. In Europe it poses a challenge to both the EU's functioning and *raison d'être* (see Garton Ash 2019). But the EU and its predecessors were built for a reason; and it is not unthinkable to ask whether Europe might return to its long-standing tradition of war and conflict.

These brief points form some of the relevance of this research on rightist nationalism in the UK and Germany. I seek to understand its shape and appeal in the second half of the post-war period. I draw on individual- and macro-level longitudinal data, and embed my analysis in a comparative historical sociology that is attentive to Britain's and Germany's historical traditions but also views them in a wider European context. Indeed, the question of Europe emerges as a pivotal issue, also for viewing both cases in light of each other. In this introductory chapter, I first discuss my epistemological approach of contrast and interpretive understanding. I then outline my research questions, followed by a brief engagement with both countries' socio-economic and political trends of the last decades. In the last section, I delineate the dissertation's structure and arguments.

I Contrast and interpretive understanding

In this thesis, I aim to understand something of the shape of rightist nationalism in the UK and Germany through the contrast between them. Rather than seeking to establish a strict comparison of both cases in relation to a wider concept – e.g. rightist

nationalism – or hypothesis, a contrast approach follows a subtly different goal: I place both countries and their recent histories in a dialogue in which they shed light on each other. The aim is to better understand the particularities of Britain’s political landscape by viewing them against Germany’s, and vice versa. I seek to learn something about their rightist nationalisms inductively through the specific problems that emerge from the way in which both countries illuminate each other. This is a broadly Geertzian approach. In his seminal work *Islam Observed*, Geertz (1971) focuses on Morocco and Indonesia, and the different facets of Islam that they express. He famously outlines the ways in which his two cases are ‘[a]t once very alike and very different, ... [and thus] form a kind of commentary on one another’s character’ (Geertz 1971: 4; see also: 14, 15, 35; Skocpol and Somers 1980: 179; cited also in Kennedy 2013: 3). He comes to new understandings of the development of Islam in both places particularly through this contrast or reciprocal “commentary”.

In a more abstract sense, also Taylor’s (1981: 205) ‘language of perspicuous contrast’ enables a dialogue between two ways of being. By viewing both as inflections of wider human potentialities, ‘we may learn something more about ourselves as well in coming to understand another society’, that is, to ‘understand their practices in relation to ours’ (Taylor 1981: 205, 209; see also: 206, 210; Kennedy 2013: 4). Referring to both Geertz’s and Taylor’s approaches, Kennedy (2013: 4; see also: 3) employs a contrast in his study of liberal nationalisms in Scotland and Quebec to ‘draw out and highlight the peculiarities of each case’. He finds that, while both represented liberal nationalism, they emerged as different faces or types in their relative weight placed on liberal and nationalist objectives (Kennedy 2013: 8, 222, 226-7). Like Geertz, Kennedy would not have brought out the specific characterisations of his two cases without viewing them in light of each other.

The intellectual reason for choosing Britain and Germany as cases for this thesis lies in their instructive contrast. Over the last years, rightist nationalism has emerged as a global phenomenon in countries that are otherwise very different in character. The UK and Germany are European representatives of this trend, embedded in the wider history of post-war nationalism in Europe. Compared to other

countries such as France or Austria, both Britain and Germany were in most decades characterised by a comparatively inconspicuous post-war nationalism. In both places, it has only come more clearly to the fore in the last three decades, and particularly in very recent years. But in some sense, and not unlike Geertz's (1971: 4) cases, Britain's and Germany's nationalisms developed from 'opposite directions', as I point out below. I pay attention to both countries' disparate historic legacies; and in Chapter 10 I suggest that the contrast between rightist nationalism in Britain and Germany reveals their different faces over time, especially with respect to their developing racialised exclusions, and interplay between cultural and political concerns. They provide a unique commentary on each other and shed light on the intricacies of each other's nationalism. Yet through their two contrasting stories, both cases also speak to rightist nationalism as wider phenomenon. The goal is thus also, as Geertz (1971: 4) put it, to 'stumble upon general truths while sorting through special cases'.

Historically, the UK and Germany have frequently stood on opposite sides, both in wars and conflicts, and in terms of their socio-political traditions. Drawing particularly on Michael Mann's work (e.g. 2005: Ch. 3; 2004: Ch. 2), I discuss in Chapter 2 the two different ways in which nation-states often formed in Europe. Britain followed an early, liberal route, while Germany emerged in an organic way, seeking to suppress rather than bridge class conflict, and conceiving "the people" in ethnic and then "racial" terms. Britain's identity was defined by both its Empire and the transnational ideology of liberalism; Germany deliberated different geographic boundaries before its emergence as a modern nation-state, and was soon torn apart by the struggle between transnational socialism and aggressive nationalism (see e.g. Mann 2004: 81-3). Both countries' disparate histories intensified in the first half of the 20th century, reaching a climax when Germany descended into Nazism while Britain carved its anti-fascist identity from its liberal(-democratic) tradition. One could say, as Barrington Moore (1969: xii-xiii, 413; Chs. 1, 7, 8) does, that the UK and Germany have embarked on different paths to modernity – one through bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalism and democracy, and one through hampered revolutions of the ruling classes, ultimately resulting in capitalism and fascism.

Indeed, while Moore only makes England a distinct case study, he contrasts its development with that of Germany at different historical junctures, pointing out that ‘it is instructive to view England against the German background’ (Moore 1969: 38; see also: 34-6, 418, 444).

From the viewpoint of comparative historical sociology, the contrast between both cases is thus also informed by Germany’s historical significance for rightist nationalism, including its romanticist heritage, while the British case reaches back to a very different tradition of liberalism. These different pasts also shine a light on each other’s post-war nationalisms. So do the legacies of both countries’ racialised histories, which I outline further in Chapter 2. In the post-war years, Britain grappled with the tension between its theoretically open stance towards imperial subjects and its ongoing racialised exclusions. At least until recently, it largely ignored the devastating effects of its colonial past. British Conservatism marginalised rightist extremism while bringing some of its anti-diversity claims into the rightist mainstream. This way British nationalism was confined to the very fringes until it emerged in a more cautious manner that had to square its exclusivist positions with Britain’s (perhaps superficially constructed) anti-racist image. Germany arrived at a very similar position from the opposite side. After it made genocidal racism official program during the Nazi era, the post-war years saw both East and West Germany¹ claim to construct new anti-fascist states, one socialist and the other liberal-capitalist. As discussed in Part 2 of the thesis, both sides repressed fascism but perhaps did less well in engaging with the deeper problems underlying this past. At least in the West, and from 1990 in the unified country, a strong sense of guilt dominated both historic considerations and contemporary politics – much in contrast to the UK. German nationalism thus overall remained at the fringes not from a positive anti-fascist identity, but due to the country’s historical stigma.

Also more recently, the UK and Germany have shown disparate political trends, with the former leaving the European Union while the latter – particularly due

¹ I follow Fulbrook’s (2015: 284, fn.1) usage of upper-case “East” and “West” Germany to designate, respectively, the pre-unification German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The lower-case versions stand for these parts of the country after unification.

to its Nazi history – might be seen as a metonymy for the European project. Yet despite these different traditions and historical trajectories, both have only fairly recently seen a surge in rightist nationalism with a wider mainstream appeal. By placing both cases in a figurative dialogue or reciprocal “commentary”, their contrast offers a way of making sense of this process and of illuminating the character of their nationalisms beyond what might have been understood by regarding them both in a more separate way. Britain and Germany display particular inflections of the current global nationalist moment as much as they are situated within it; and they both shape and are shaped by its developing appeal. At the same time, today’s rightist nationalisms form only the current face of a longer tradition of similar movements – again internationally and within both countries – and of an even older colonial heritage. The contrast between Britain and Germany, in other words, draws on a continuous empirical reality. And it raises questions about, for instance, the possible role of their particular histories embedded within the wider global trend, and the potential impact of economic or demographic “crises”.

My research design seeks to capture some of this historical development in the data analysis, both at the national macro level and at the micro level of individuals’ social backgrounds and political views. This aim leads to a secondary, more pragmatic reason for selecting these two cases. For both countries it is possible to draw on large-scale longitudinal panel data surveys that include repeated responses of individuals over the course of nearly three decades (longer for West Germany). These are rich and unique data sources that are not very commonly used for the analysis of rightist nationalism in a longitudinal way (see Chapter 2). The availability of similar longitudinal data sources enables a contrast of rightist nationalism in these two countries over time also as constituted through the same groups of individuals, as they live through the recent decades and regard the social and political world around them. My case choice therefore rests, first, on the intellectual rationale of an instructive contrast between two countries with very different histories and which have both seen – each in its own way – a recent rise of rightist nationalism with increasing mainstream potential; and, second, on the fact

that these cases allow me to follow two groups of individuals through the recent decades with the aim of understanding something of their contextualised experiences and political commitments. I acknowledge, however, that in principle I could have chosen other cases whose contrast might have raised different or perhaps similar themes and questions.

My analysis of rightist nationalism draws on a longitudinal approach in which I examine individuals' social backgrounds and political preferences, as well as the positions of nationalist movements, as embedded in the wider socio-economic currents to which they respond. The aim to trace the shape of rightist nationalism, and make sense of its appeal, is thus based on a more interpretive approach to panel data. It is informed by an epistemological perspective of Weberian *Verstehen*, or interpretive understanding. While Weber did not generally dispense with attempts at causal explanations such as those employed by the natural sciences (see Weber 1978: e.g. 4, 6, 9, 11-12, 15, 18; see also: Heidelberger 2010: 241-4; Hughes et al. 1999: 137, 139; Ringer 2000: 3-6, 92, 94), his main focus of sociological analysis lay in 'the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning' (Weber 1978: 8). Understanding a social phenomenon in Weber's sense involves a hermeneutic process of interpreting the possible meanings or motives that individuals might attach to their actions (Weber 1978: 4-5, 9; Hughes et al. 1999: 138-9; Ringer 2000: 1, 93-5, 101-2).

One way to try and make sense of individuals' behaviour is to consider the context in which it takes place. This context might be understood in terms of the immediate circumstances surrounding individuals' actions, such as using knowledge about their backgrounds to form 'an understandable sequence of motivation' (Weber 1978: 9; see also: 8). Yet context for an observation and interpretation of social action might also be seen in a wider, structural or historical sense. This could be, for instance, specific socio-economic or political features of a society at a certain time (see Hughes et al. 1999: 139). As I outline in the next chapters, British and German respondents in the longitudinal samples lived through moments with very different political or socio-economic challenges. Their perceptions of representative politics or

Europe, for instance, varied over time, arguably also in relation to the changing issues with which these were associated under different circumstances. Rather than aiming to establish generalisable or abstracted explanations, or to ‘formulate an underlying uniformity behind superficially diverse phenomena’, it might thus be instructive to place diversity at the centre of analysis, and to think about the ‘different meanings the concept takes in different contexts’ (Geertz 1971: 24).

Trying to grasp something of individuals’ actions also requires an attempt to understand how they might perceive the world around them. Context is key. It follows from this discussion that it is not my aim to construct the best statistical model to assess which variables most accurately or generally explain why some of the respondents express a preference for rightist nationalist parties. I seek, instead, to follow certain groups of respondents on their social and political journeys through the recent decades, and to embed what I can observe of their experiences and perceptions in the developing socio-economic and political realities of their countries. This means that I do not assume that all people in similar social positions would generally perceive the world in the same way, or develop affinities for rightist nationalism. Rather, I focus on what the data can tell us about the lives of these specific nationalists. I aim to interpret their political attitudes and commitments by considering how they might have experienced the time and context in which they were acting or voicing their views. I seek to better grasp and tell the story of the right’s evolving character over the last decades, as observed through the experiences of these particular people.

II Aims and research questions

My principal research question that guides this analysis asks: *how can we understand the shape and appeal of rightist nationalism in the UK and Germany over the last decades?* This question is attentive to two points: first, Britain’s and Germany’s social and political landscapes have changed considerably over time, and the political right

is embedded in these broader national currents (and might itself shape them). One aim of the thesis is to trace the shape or character of rightist nationalism – both as embodied by sample individuals and political parties – through important national moments of the last decades. I thus also pay attention to how nationalism (and populism) might respond to, for instance, socio-economic or political crises (see e.g. Kriesi and Tappas eds. 2016; Pirro et al. 2018). Second, the question's longitudinal and contextualised outlook considers in how far rightist nationalism's present appeal might in both countries be rooted in deeper histories and structural movements. This speaks to calls for viewing today's nationalist moments against the background of longer-term social and political developments (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: xvii, xx-xxi); for conceiving nationalisms and their transformations as a broader and constant current underlying modern politics (Malešević 2019: 5-8; 2018); and for granting historical patterns and macro structures the weight that they often carry alongside human agency (see Zhao 2015: 4-5, 379-80). My main research question speaks, therefore, to a comparative historical sociology.


A second set of research questions aims at the micro level: *what are the social backgrounds and political perceptions of those individuals who embody rightist nationalism? In how far might they share certain dimensions of social experience, and do those change over the course of the last decades? What might have constituted rightist nationalism's varying appeal at particular moments?* These questions invite an interpretive exploration of individuals' social and political journeys and perceptions, embedded in the daily realities around them. Much of the analysis departs from these individuals' social backgrounds or social locations. For Michael Mann (2004: 23; see also: 20-2, 156), "social" should not be equated with "class". Accordingly, in his analysis of fascists' social backgrounds, he considers additional variables beyond class. I also seek to capture sample nationalists' social backgrounds more comprehensively. As outlined in Chapter 3, I examine variables that relate to socio-economic positions and employment status; but I also analyse individuals' education, sex, age, "race" or place of birth, and geographic region. These all form important aspects of their wider social locations, of their lives and experiences. As I

discuss in the following chapters, moreover, also certain regions have a history that is important to an understanding of today's rightist nationalism on a deeper, structural level.

III The macro-level background

I embed the sample respondents' experiences and perceptions within their countries' macro-level trends throughout the empirical chapters. Here I only sketch a brief overview of Britain's and Germany's socio-economic trajectories of the past decades. In the post-war period, both countries' economies fluctuated in line with broader trends. Similarly to the oil crisis in the early 1970s, also the early 1990s brought economic difficulties for Europe, the US, and other parts of the world. Britain's situation was exacerbated by dropping out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 (see Chapter 4), which sparked Eurosceptic rebellions in parliament, while Germany grappled with the economic consequences of reunification. Britain then saw one and a half decades of relatively stable GDP growth and sinking unemployment but was strongly impacted by the 2008 economic crisis and the subsequent years of austerity. Germany, on the other hand, faced faltering GDP growth and high unemployment for much of the 1990s and 2000s. The economic crisis mainly resulted in a deep but shorter recession that hardly halted the decline in unemployment – but also because it was still relatively high. As Figure 1.1 (see also: Appendix Figures A1b, A1c; for the following: A4a, A4b, A5c) shows, Britain's macro-economic trajectory since 1990 was thus broadly defined by two phases of rising unemployment in the early 1990s and late 2000s, and a fairly calm period in between. Germany, by contrast, struggled with some level of economic uncertainty throughout most of these years, and disproportionately so in the east. In both countries, the economic situation overall improved in recent years.

Figure 1.1: GDP and unemployment, UK and Germany, 1990-2017 (percent)




Source: OECD 2021; Eurostat 2019b.

This broad picture was reversed when it came to the question of migration and cultural diversity. After growing Commonwealth migration in the 1950s and 1960s, net migration in the UK was very low (and often negative) until the 1990s. From then on, and especially after Tony Blair’s much more open stance, net migration rose to unprecedented levels, remained high even during the economic crisis, and reached its highest point in 2015. As a consequence, the percentage of Britain’s foreign and foreign-born population displayed a steady rise over the last decades (see Appendix Figures A3a, A3b; for the following: A6h, A6i). In cultural matters it was Germany that showed more distinct fluctuations. After population movements following the Second World War and the guest worker programs of the first post-war decades, Germany saw two major phases of soaring migration, one in the years around 1990 and another in the mid-2010s. In comparison to these drastic spikes, the intervening years saw comparatively low net migration figures, albeit still higher than

Britain's until 2003 (see Figure 1.2). Also Germany's shares of foreign or foreign-born population were higher throughout this period, even though British percentages were catching up.

Figure 1.2: net migration and foreign-born pop., UK and Ger, 1983-2017




Notes: German numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. 2005 gap in German foreign-born numbers due to counting adjustment. Source: Eurostat 2019a; OECD 2020a; 2020b.

Since the early 1990s, the unemployment rate and net migration figures were negatively related in both countries (see Appendix Figure A8a): migration tended to be low when unemployment was high and vice versa. In addition to contextual factors, this negative relation expressed perhaps both a tendency of migrants to enter during periods of economic expansion, and their work's contribution to further economic growth and sinking unemployment. Both countries' macro-level indicators did not reflect frequent rightist nationalist claims around "welfare tourism" and

migration’s negative influence on the economy – if anything, they hinted at the opposite. The past decades also saw fluctuation along political indicators. Appendix Figure A3c shows that Britain experienced low turnout especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s, following New Labour’s victory under Blair, its more open migration stance, and the eastern EU expansion. Germany’s turnout (Appendix Figure A6a) in federal elections decreased more slowly over time. The population’s gradual disenchantment with the political or democratic process was echoed in both countries by a long-term decline in the shares of the two main parties left and right of the centre, while nationalists made electoral gains especially in recent years (Figure 1.3; see also Appendix Figures A3d, A3e, A6b, A6c).

Figure 1.3: vote results of “people’s parties” and nationalists, UK and Germany, 1970s-2019 (%)



Notes: numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. “People’s parties” include Conservatives and Labour (UK); Union and SPD (Germany). Nationalists include National Front, BNP, UKIP, Brexit Party (UK); NPD, DVU, Republicans, AfD (Germany). Source: Audickas et al. 2020; Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019; 2018b; House of Commons Library 2001-2020; The Guardian 2019.

The sample respondents' perceptions expressed a certain acknowledgment of these political and socio-economic events. They held some level of concern about, for instance, the economy, governments' actions, immigration, or the EU throughout these decades; but their political worries became more or less urgent in particular moments, which I interpret as responses to the specific context of the time. I outline this throughout the empirical chapters, in which I follow the shape of rightist nationalism in Britain and Germany, as seen through these individuals and the political movements.

IV Thesis structure and arguments

The thesis comprises ten chapters. Chapter 2 discusses key insights from the literatures around the radical right, wider historical rightist politics, populism, and nationalism. Building on these ideas and, crucially, observations from the empirical chapters, I present the dissertation's theoretical framework, which helps understand the workings of rightist nationalism in Britain and Germany, and potentially beyond. I conceive rightist nationalism as being characterised by four features: racialisation, a strong conservative sense of order and disorder, a populist impulse towards political recognition, and a selective retrieval of historical narratives and legacies. Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methodology. I use longitudinal macro-level data to identify socio-economic and political key moments in both countries' recent history. These key moments then provide occasions in which I analyse social backgrounds and political perceptions of the same groups of panel survey respondents over time to make sense of their responses within the changing socio-political contexts of their countries. Broadly informed by an epistemological approach of Weberian understanding, I thus employ panel data in a descriptive and

interpretive way that draws on as much of the data's longitudinal dimension as possible.

The next three chapters form Part 1 of the thesis, which addresses the British data. Chapter 4 discusses the social backgrounds of the British nationalism sympathisers in the early 1990s, during a time of economic recession and the Conservative Party's crisis over Europe. These British respondents were typically not found in the lowest social positions but had fears of falling further to the bottom, while feeling politically silenced and disregarded. I argue that during these years, the problem of Europe was mainly a sovereignty issue that involved both economic and political aspects, and which sparked the birth of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) as a new face of rightist nationalism outside the increasingly Eurosceptic Conservative mainstream. Chapter 5 examines the late 1990s, early 2000s, and late 2000s/early 2010s, and thus the years of soaring immigration under Blair, followed by the time of the economic crisis and austerity. Here I focus on the interplay between migration, Europe, and economic challenges largely under a centre-left government. Europe emerged here predominantly as a racialised issue. I further suggest that the dynamics between the softening extremist British National Party (BNP) and the increasingly anti-immigrant UKIP demonstrate rightist nationalism's surface variability while nevertheless staying concentrated on its deeper core issues. Chapter 6 is concerned with Britain's mid-2010s, with a focus on the EU referendum. I outline how British nationalists, who saw little development in their educational and occupational backgrounds over these decades, and who had long harboured a deep criticism of British politics and the EU, now voiced their overwhelming support for Leave. I argue that, building on the previous decades' developments, the problem of Europe now involved economic, political, and especially racialised issues in the name of sovereignty and a return to national greatness.

Part 2 consists of three chapters addressing the German data. Chapter 7 covers the early 1990s, which saw Germany's reunification and its economic challenges, accompanied by a sharp migration spike. I argue that these years constituted a moment of racialised nation-building in which high hopes soon gave

way to disappointments, especially among eastern rightist nationalists whose economically insecure positions connected with a sense of political abandonment by their new home's federal politics. I focus on regional differences more closely in Chapter 8. Here I discuss how economic disparities between east and west persisted throughout the 2000s, characterised by mounting unemployment and welfare retrenchment under Gerhard Schröder's centre-left governments. Rightist nationalists' socio-economic backgrounds showed some development, albeit mainly in the west. In the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), rightist nationalists experienced little social mobility. I further discuss how rightist nationalism became dominated by extremism during these years and increasingly found eastern strongholds. These developments proved crucial during the mid-2010s and the "refugee crisis", on which I focus in Chapter 9. I argue that these years constituted another moment of rebuilding or redefining the nation, with a strong eastern expression. Eastern sample nationalists, whose socio-economic positions had hardly improved, continued to struggle for their political inclusion in the face of racialised newcomers. Both rightist nationalism's violence and electoral appeal – now mainly embodied by the quickly radicalising Alternative for Germany (AfD) – were much stronger in eastern Germany. I also outline some of the dynamics between conservatism and rightist nationalism, in which the latter gained more weight and moved the mainstream rightward.

Chapter 10 presents the dissertation's key observations and arguments that emerge from the contrast between Britain and Germany. I offer an interpretive account of how rightist nationalists' risk of socio-economic decline might have transformed into political grievances and eventually into a desire for racialised solidarities. One main finding of the thesis is that in both countries, there was no direct line from socio-economic positions or problems to affinities for rightist nationalism. But socio-economic issues could still feed into political and cultural concerns, which are most instructive for an understanding of rightist nationalism. I further outline that rightist nationalists held concerns about Europe and migration for decades. Yet these feelings deepened in key moments of migration and European

challenges, and thus in line with their countries' developments over time. This occurred in a more gradual fashion in the UK and in more sudden ways in Germany. I argue, therefore, that rightist nationalism is not only a response to recent cultural and political challenges but also needs to be understood in light of its racialised longer-term roots.

Consequently, my main arguments are situated in comparative historical sociology. I argue, first, that post-war rightist nationalism can in both countries be understood as different expressions of racialised nation-building in the face of growing diversity and a perceived threat to political rights. Second, I suggest that both countries' nationalisms are also an expression of the macro-historical, Gellnerian tension between class and nation, which recently saw the former decline while a racialised understanding of the nation is gaining more weight. Derived from these main arguments, I further suggest that recent years saw not only the "rise" of rightist nationalism but perhaps also the decline of its main competitor – class – and thus nationalism's greater pull on the political mainstream. Both countries present different faces of these developments. When viewed in light of each other, I argue, Britain appears to have moved over the last decades from a wider "race"-based nationalism towards one based on a narrower English ethnicity vis-à-vis Europe. This is accompanied by characteristic concerns about the loss of sovereignty, border control, and British (or rather: English) culture. German nationalism, by contrast, has moved from a focus on German ethnicity towards a broader European identification, expressing strong concerns first and foremost about the threat to racialised notions of legitimate belonging and culture, particularly when confronted with Islam.

2 A conceptualisation of rightist nationalism

This chapter is concerned with the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of rightist nationalism. Mindful that nationalism can be civic or liberal, and populism leftist, I focus on examining phenomena specifically on the political *right*. It is worth remembering that ‘neither the right nor the left inhabit entirely distinct and exclusive worlds’, as Aughey (1992: 106) puts it. They are, for instance, contingent on the political tradition of a given country. But the left-right dichotomy – or continuum – has also more generally eluded an unambiguous definition ever since its introduction in the aftermath of the French Revolution (see Eatwell 1992b). This is still visible in recent attempts to categorise political parties. For example Inglehart and Norris (2016) view the left-right spectrum through an economic lens, that is, through issues such as preferences for a free market versus state intervention. They thus counter-intuitively classify the French Front National or Germany’s extremist National Democratic Party (NPD) as “populist-left” (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 44). Mudde (2007: 25-6) disagrees with a socio-economic approach and follows one based on egalitarian positioning, according to which the left perceives inequalities as artificial and the right as natural. These classifications based on stances towards economics and inequality are instructive to note, especially when considering the political right more widely. Historically, conservatism was often concerned with maintaining hierarchies and inequalities; and not only in Britain and Germany have conservative parties of recent decades favoured economic liberalism more strongly than parties on the left. The socio-economic dimension also demonstrates the relativity of being “rightist” – the post-Thatcherite British Conservatives arguably displayed a stronger affinity for neo-liberalism than the social market economy of Germany’s conservative Union.

But there is a third way of approaching the left-right question, which is relevant for the conservative but particularly the nationalist right. Rydgren (2007: 243-5), for instance, argues that the latter is most clearly rightist with respect to

socio-cultural issues. These include questions of ‘national identity, law and order, immigration policy, abortion’ (ibid.: 243), but also views on globalisation, Europe (particularly for Britain), or multiculturalism. From this perspective, rightist politics are, to some degree, geared towards social and cultural exclusion, and rejection of diversity. I generally follow this socio-cultural interpretation, but refer at times specifically to the more economically inflected understanding. These different lenses can help to locate and make sense of rightist nationalism empirically.

In this chapter, I engage with some of the key conceptual and empirical questions surrounding rightist nationalism. The first part discusses the literatures that are most relevant for this dissertation. I start by addressing the empirical work on the recent “radical right”. Yet because I seek to pay attention to both the changing surface variation of nationalist expressions and their deeper sociological alignments, I also engage with a longer-term, historical outlook on wider rightist politics, including conservatism. I then turn to the conceptual stakes involved in the literatures of nationalism and populism. While I briefly touch on the wider debates within these bodies of work, my focus lies on highlighting key problems and insights, and how these inform this thesis. The second part of the chapter then offers a conceptualisation of rightist nationalism’s core characteristics as they emerge from the empirical analysis of Britain’s and Germany’s contrasting rightist politics, as well as the discussion of above literatures.

I Homogenisation, political struggle, and the longer-term outlook

The political right, young and old alike

This thesis speaks to the empirical literature of what is often called the (populist) radical right, and related issues of Euroscepticism and right-wing extremism. I note the distinctions between “radical” and “extreme” rightist movements (Ignazi 1992; Taggart 1995; see also: Golder 2003: 443, 459), which capture something of parties’

relation to fascism and the extent of their rejection of (liberal-)democratic procedures (Mudde 2007: 24-5, 49; Rydgren 2007: 243). These differentiations can shed some light on the appeal and “acceptability” of, and the changing relationship or overlap between, for instance the British Conservatives, the initially Eurosceptic and then radicalising UKIP, and the extremist BNP. But as I outline in the next chapters, I suggest that the proposed positions of British and German parties further to the right have often been fairly close in content and varied mainly in terms of language. I thus often refer to rightist nationalism in general. An influential characterisation of rightist nationalism’s predominant form in recent years has been to identify an ideological core of anti-immigrant nationalism, complemented by authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007: 16-19, 22-3, 31; see also: Bonikowski 2017: 183-91; Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 910-11). This theorisation is useful for considering and framing the kinds of key concerns that might be underlying rightist nationalism’s appeal. I offer a conceptualisation of rightist nationalism with somewhat different emphases in the second part of this chapter.

The body of work addressing the nationalist right’s recent manifestations has grown immensely over the last years. I draw on its findings and insights throughout the following chapters, and emphasise in this section only a small number of points. Some of this literature discusses the origins and ideological positions of nationalist parties, sometimes with reference to the wider (inter)national socio-political climate. I rely in particular on the literature focusing on Britain and Germany to better embed my data analysis (e.g. Arzheimer 2015; Backer 2000; Bale 2018; Decker 2016; Eatwell 2003: Chs. 12, 14; 1998; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: Chs. 1, 2; Hartleb 2009; Lees 2018; Winkler and Schumann 1998). Some of these studies contribute, moreover, to the vast amounts of research that aims to explain the (lack of) electoral success of rightist nationalist parties. There is a wealth of approaches and foci. One common way of summarising these is to broadly distinguish between demand- and supply-side factors of rightist nationalism (for an overview, see Mudde 2007: Chs. 9-11; Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 911-17; Rydgren 2007: 247-57; 2006: Ch. 2). Demand-side explanations focus on why individuals might hold an affinity for rightist nationalism.

Amongst other things, they frequently point to social, psychological, or economic grievances. The supply side, on the other hand, concentrates on the organisation, conduct, and claims of the parties themselves, and, to use Rydgren's (2007: 247) succinct list, 'a number of so-called political opportunity structures, such as electoral systems, elite responses, and the media'.

A recurrent question that underlies many studies revolves around the relative weight of socio-economic, cultural, or political factors in explaining rightist nationalist success. Some studies emphasise the importance of economic issues, for instance pointing to problems of unemployment, regional exposure to imports and labour market changes, or (fears of) socio-economic deprivation or decline (e.g. Antonucci et al. 2017; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dippel et al. 2015; Rydgren and Ruth 2013). But scholars more commonly give precedence to socio-cultural issues, especially immigration, and cultural, demographic, or value change (e.g. Arzheimer 2008; Betz 1994: 65, 106, 177; Golder 2003: 454-5, 460; Goodwin 2016: 285; 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Ivarsflaten 2008; Kaufmann 2019: Ch. 4; Lengfeld and Dilger 2018; Rydgren 2008: 754). Others point, moreover, to the impact of political factors, such as disenchantment with existing parties or democratic procedures, or the idiosyncrasies of the wider political landscape and electoral system (e.g. Eatwell 2000; Mouffe 2018: 21-4; 2005; see also; Legge et al. 2009). Many of these contributions concur, however, with studies that highlight the interplay of (some of) these different dimensions in explaining rightist nationalist appeal and success (Arzheimer 2009; Bonikowski 2017: 202-3; Clarke et al. 2017: Ch. 6; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 211-12; Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Judis 2016: 98-108, 135-6; Mudde 2018: 59-60). The problem of globalisation, for instance, involves social, economic, cultural, and political dimensions; and also the idea of relative deprivation can capture these intersections when a (perceived) economic disadvantage or decline is attested for the own national group vis-à-vis diverse communities (see Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 212-20; Clarke et al. 2017: 115-16; Küpper et al. 2019: 268). This can thus lead to a diffuse but racialised sense of injustice and entitlement – a point to which I return below.

The findings of these various studies are illuminating for this thesis, albeit with one main caveat. As discussed in Chapter 1, I approach this research on rightist nationalism from an epistemological perspective of interpretive understanding (see e.g. Weber 1978: 4-15). My aim is not, therefore, to explain nationalist voting, for example by building the most fitting statistical model. Rather, I seek to understand something of rightist nationalism's appeal by tracing, contextualising, and contrasting its character in the British and German post-war period. Still, my data analysis is both informed by, and speaks to, this vast literature. I understand affinities for rightist nationalism most immediately in light of rapid cultural and demographic change, and discomfort with growing cultural diversity, accompanied by a sense of political abandonment and betrayal. But rightist nationalists' experiences have also frequently been characterised by longer-term socio-economic concerns and stagnation. I thus interpret rightist nationalists' survey responses in their historical context, and as expressions of a long-standing sense of abandonment that draws on all of the above dimensions. I also confirm some of the more specific findings that many of the studies on rightist nationalism have in common, and often across time and place. These point, for instance, to the strong overrepresentation of men among nationalism sympathisers, and their relative lack of degrees of higher education (e.g. Antonucci et al. 2017: 221-2; Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 428-30; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 175; 2010: 13-14, 19; Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013; Werts et al. 2013: 193).

A further point worth emphasising is this literature's increasingly diverse ways of measuring and analysing rightist nationalist affinities and successes. Some scholars approach the problem at the macro-level, for example through in-depth or comparative analyses of whole countries or regions (e.g. Backes 2006; Clarke et al. 2017; Eatwell 2000; Golder 2003; Goodwin 2016; 2014; Kriesi and Pappas eds. 2016), or through aggregate regression models of voting results and socio-economic indicators of constituencies, districts, or neighbourhoods (e.g. Becker et al. 2016; Coffé et al. 2007; Goodwin and Heath 2016b; Rydgren and Ruth 2013). Others focus on the level of individuals in surveys, typically through cross-sectional logistic regression to model the impact of social backgrounds and political views on the

likelihood of expressing preferences or voting intentions for rightist nationalist parties in a given year or place (e.g. Arzheimer 2008; Billiet and De Witte 1995; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: Chs. 4, 5; Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lengfeld 2017; Lengfeld and Dilger 2018; Rydgren 2011; 2008). Some studies focus more specifically on social and political attitudes as such, for instance by differentiating between anti-immigrant, nationalist, authoritarian, anti-democratic, or Eurosceptic views, or investigating who might typically hold these beliefs (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Decker et al. 2016; Küpper et al. 2019; 2015). Other contributions combine individual and aggregate units in multi-level analysis (e.g. Alabrese et al. 2019; Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Dülmer and Klein 2005; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Goodwin and Heath 2016a; Lee et al. 2018; Werts et al. 2013).

Furthermore, a comparatively small but growing number of studies utilises the time dimension of panel surveys to explain rightist nationalist affinities or anti-immigrant views (e.g. Burscher et al. 2015; Coffé and van den Berg 2017; de Blok and van der Meer 2018; Dippel et al. 2015; Marx and Naumann 2018; Sola 2018). These studies yield valuable insights. For instance, based on Dutch and German panel data, Berning and Schlueter (2016) argue that perceptions of immigrants as threat precede political preferences for rightist nationalism, rather than the other way around; Gidron and Mijs (2019) find that Dutch individuals' loss in income drove them towards the political left, not rightist nationalism; and, rather than focusing on panel data's time dimension as such, Coffé and Voorpostel (2010) investigate the transmission of rightist affinities in Swiss families, suggesting that especially mothers' rightist nationalist preferences tend to influence those of their children. Most often, however, these studies are "longitudinal" in a short-term sense spanning only a few years. The focus lies on a more technical use of time, often producing regression models similar to the cross-sectional analyses but with greater individual- and time-specific robustness.

It is important to note, therefore, that especially those approaches that rely on statistical models from individual-level survey data rarely embed their analyses in

their historical background or longer trajectories. Pointing to the general tendency of surveys to capture snapshots, Malešević (2018: 556) argues that ‘it is paramount to probe, contextualise and deconstruct such popular responses in order to identify their structural and other causes’. He thus calls attention to the significance of context and the past for the study of (rightist) nationalism. Malešević (2019: 275) agrees with Max Weber that ‘past events and processes deeply shape contemporary social realities’, arguing that ‘to understand the character of nationhood and nationalist ideologies today, it is crucial to engage in a *longue durée* analysis’ (for a similar point on understanding contemporary racism, see Solomos 1993: 51).

I aim to take at least some steps towards this goal, despite using survey data. While I also employ shorter-term macro-level regression models as above studies, my main focus lies on maximising the longitudinal dimension of panel surveys. I follow the same groups of British and German individuals through nearly three decades from the early 1990s, and examine their social characteristics and political beliefs as embedded in the historical context, and in light of the contemporary faces of rightist nationalism and conservatism. Analysing survey respondents’ social backgrounds and political perceptions over close to 30 years does, of course, not constitute a *longue durée* approach in Malešević’s sense above, which takes a measure of much longer historical periods and developments. Yet faced with data limitations, I draw on as many years of panel survey data as possible – and at least within the more present-focused, survey-based literature of the radical right, this does indeed represent a unique longer-term analysis.

This contextually embedded longitudinal micro analysis does, moreover, show that even developments over a – historically speaking – rather short time frame can be important for an understanding of rightist nationalism. In the following chapters, I outline the problem of socio-economic stagnation and sample nationalists’ sense of decade-long political exclusion. Especially their political perceptions showed at times considerable change over the years. This not only demonstrates their reactions to the unfolding socio-political shifts but also hints at the contextual contingency of survey responses more generally. While I would have

liked to draw on panel data over even longer periods of time, I thus focus on the latter half of the post-war period to show that a longitudinal focus can yield instructive insights for the question of rightist nationalism. But I also take into account some of rightist nationalism's truly longer-term historical undercurrents and traditions, and the ways in which the wider political right has transformed itself in different social and political contexts. I thus situate my analysis of the last three decades within a wider comparative historical sociology.

Accordingly, I also draw on a more historically oriented literature on rightist nationalism and conservatism. This is helpful, for instance, for a better understanding of the extent of Margaret Thatcher's break with the traditions of British Conservatism (see Gamble 1995) and its impact on subsequent politics; for considering potential lessons from Europe's socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions that gave rise to aggressive nationalism and anti-Semitism in the late 19th century (see Eatwell 2003: Ch. 2; Mann 2005: Ch. 3; 2004: Ch. 2), or those of Weimar Germany and in how far they compare to today's circumstances (see Möller 2018; Wirsching 2018; see also: Eatwell 2003: Ch. 6; Mann 2004: Ch. 5); or for retracing the racialised and colonial histories underlying rightist nationalist exclusions (see e.g. Bhabra 2017b; Bruns 2011; Eley 2015a; Gamble 2003: 62-8).

Taking a longer measure of the political right in the centuries following the French Revolution also shows how rightist nationalism emerged from conservatism (see Eatwell 2003: Ch. 2; 1992a; McClelland 1992), and the ways in which both have since interacted. For example Eley (2015b: 103, 105, 110-11) points to how a radicalising German conservatism in the early 20th century incubated many of the ideological pillars of Nazism, including ideas of "race", anti-Semitism, and a rejection of parliament and democracy. It is, he argues, thus productive to examine 'the complicated fields of equivalence, interarticulation, and convergence between this non-Nazi Right and the Nazis themselves' (Eley 2015b: 108; see also: 109-10, 112-13). Also Mann (2004: 44-8; 1995: 57-9) outlines the tensions and interactions between (proto-)fascist nationalism and the wider conservative right. Especially in Europe's centre and east, many of the conservative regimes of this period shared some degree

of authoritarianism with more radical movements. As indicated above, also works on today's radical right identify authoritarianism as an important part of its ideology, but locate authoritarianism within political conservatism as well (e.g. Mudde 2007: 22-3, 27).

This does of course not mean that conservatism should be equated with far-right politics. But I take from this discussion that their conceptual and longer-term empirical relations can inform an understanding of the unfolding story of rightist nationalism over the post-war period. The British Conservatives, for instance, responded harshly to rising migration following de-colonisation, perhaps also in the face of the growing challenge of the extremist National Front (e.g. Eatwell 2003: Ch. 14). Over the next chapters I also hint at how in Germany and especially Britain, rightist nationalism and conservatism have changed direction and responded to each other with respect to socio-cultural issues – the former mainly in terms of language and the latter with regard to actual policy change.

I also view the concept of conservatism in light of its longer-term roots. Based on their discussions of reactions to the enlightenment, to the French Revolution, and to social developments in the 19th and 20th century, scholars point to the limits of understanding conservatism simply as an aversion to change or aim to maintain the “status quo”. Aughey (1992: 101, 106, 107; see also: Eatwell 1992a: 66), for instance, argues that rather than opposing change *per se*, traditional conservatism is characterised by caution, and an emphasis on the restrictions to what (revolutionary) politics can achieve for social values and development. He does not view conservatism as stagnant or forever clinging to existing conditions, and points out that otherwise even successful revolutionary movements aiming to preserve new power relations would be considered conservative. Instead, he highlights instances in which the conservative tradition did – slowly and cautiously – adjust to historical change (Aughey 1992: 112, 113, 115-6, 117, 118). This understanding is echoed by Isaiah Berlin (2002: 63) who describes conservative thinkers as favouring slow and orderly development, so that under certain circumstances, ‘rational reforms and changes were allowed to be feasible and even desirable’. Also a response to emerging

liberalism, conservatism looked to social institutions as ‘a necessary safeguard against the chaos, injustice and cruelty caused by uncontrolled individualism’ (Berlin 2002: 59; see also: Eatwell 1992a: 67). Its present identification with neo-liberal economic policies thus represents a rather recent and actually untypical development following the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan (see Mudde 2007: 27-8; see also: Eatwell 1992b: 34, 35).

I understand conservatism in light of its more traditional focus on balance, moderation, order, evolutionary change, and reverence for constitutional and traditional (state) procedures (Aughey 1992: 100, 101, 104, 105, 113). Conservatism in this broadly Burkean sense (see Eatwell 1992a: 66; McClelland 1992: 80-1) is, therefore, pragmatic politics towards order and stability, but not simply the “conservation” of the status quo. Historical movements have not always fully followed this schema, of course. As Gamble (1995) outlines in detail, Thatcher broke with several customary pillars of political Conservatism, ushering in rather radical change. And very recently, the British Conservative Party under Boris Johnson has demonstrated a readiness to break with parliamentary conventions to a degree that made political commentators label the Tory leader a rightist populist (e.g. Boot 2019). Situating also conservatism in a longer historical frame thus illuminates both its ideological and political constants, and certain moments in which it might break with these.

With respect to a multifaceted and historically embedded understanding of the political right, especially Mann’s (2004) analysis of the inter-war period is very instructive. Amongst other things, he outlines the crucial role played by the interaction between fascists and other (authoritarian) rightists. But he also points to contextually specific problems such as the experience of the First World War and other economic, political, and ideological crises (Mann 2004: esp. Ch. 2), and embeds the appeal of fascists’ ideologies and offered solutions in this context. He is attentive to wider European socio-economic challenges and an exclusivist *Zeitgeist*, as well as specific countries’ historic legacies; and he considers the impact of short-term crises and national idiosyncrasies within longer-term and international developments.

Mann's account of fascism is relevant for an examination of today's rightist nationalism, furthermore, because he questions the traditional focus on a specific economic class segment – the *petite bourgeoisie*. Instead, he characterises fascism as an inter-class phenomenon, and points to wider social locations and “core fascist constituencies” (Mann 2004: 3, 17-23, 25-8, 107-8, 160, 190, 359, and *passim*; see also: Falter and Hänisch 2013).

As I point out throughout the thesis, this nuanced move away from locating rightist nationalism within specific, narrowly defined classes chimes with my own analysis. One key insight from the discussion of these literatures is, therefore, that rightist nationalism is not simply a reflection of material or economic issues. It is neither exclusively contained within specific class positions, nor immediately attributable to experiences of unemployment or wider economic insecurities. These can still matter for making sense of rightist nationalism; but I see them as especially longer-term grievances that can connect with more immediate concerns around growing cultural diversity and political recognition. I further take from these literatures that the historic roots and trajectories of the political right can inform an understanding of the present nationalist moment, and that it may be instructive to analyse panel survey data as embedded within its historical context. These points are also useful for this thesis because they encourage a consideration of deeper and longer-term social shifts, such as the decline of class politics, concerns around cultural and wider social diversity, and the tensions within democratisation and liberalism. I return to these problems in the second part of this chapter. But they are also crucial questions within the traditional literatures around nationalism and populism.

Nationalism and populism

The two concepts are related, both empirically and theoretically. Yet even if they display “elective affinities”, as Bonikowski (in Bonikowski et al. 2018: 6, 16; see also: Berlin 2013: 2-3; Bonikowski 2017; Caiani and Kröll 2017: esp. 338) puts it, it is worth

treating them as analytically distinct from each other. Over the past decades, nationalism scholars have discussed in depth whether nationalism is modern (most think so), and what socio-economic (e.g. Gellner 1990) or political (e.g. Hall 1995; Mann 2005: Ch. 3; 1995; Tilly 1994; see also: Kennedy 2013: 20) developments have helped engender it approximately from the late 18th century onwards. Kennedy (2013: Ch. 1) provides an excellent and concise overview of these discussions with an emphasis on political factors. In this thesis I am less concerned with the origins of nationalism than with the faces that it has shown in the post-war period. Yet I still draw on the ideas of these traditional debates. For one thing, if from the modernist perspective ‘nations can simply be “invented” or “imagined”’, as Kennedy (2013: 13) writes with reference to Anderson’s (2003: 6, 67, 141) prominent conception of “imagined communities”, then they can also be re-imagined. One of the wider arguments of this dissertation is indeed that the current nationalist moment constitutes a re-imagining or rebuilding of the nation at a time of growing cultural diversity. Another valuable lesson from nationalism scholarship lies in the attentiveness to deeper, longer-term social transformations. Historic developments such as industrialisation, militarisation and state power, colonialism and de-colonisation, or the interaction of class and nation were crucial for the way nationalism evolved. It is misleading, Malešević argues, to consider the recent rise of rightist nationalism as a “new” phenomenon; instead, he urges to pay attention to the ways in which nationalism has been gaining prominence for more than two centuries, and thus to ‘assess the long-term structural changes that make nationalist diffusion possible and likely’ (Malešević 2018: 555; see also: 2019: e.g. 3-10, 15, 27-39, 275-6, 278-9).

Also Mann’s work examines these historic trajectories, and not only with respect to rightist politics, as above. In particular his careful analysis of nationalism’s different phases and expressions is enlightening, as it underlines the long-standing relation between nationalism, the demand for political rights and citizenship, and the tension between nation and class. Mann outlines how late 18th-century nationalism in north-western Europe, epitomised by Britain, allowed for ethnic and class divisions

that had to be bridged by compromise, thus conceiving the nation as stratified and pluralistic; yet the later nationalisms in central and eastern Europe aimed to transcend and suppress class conflict, thus constructing the nation as homogenous and organic, and with a strong focus on ethnicity (Mann 2005: esp. 5, 55-7, 61-3, 67-9; 2004: 33-4; 1995: 48-50, 52-4, 56, 59-62; see also: Hall 1995: 13, 18, 22-3). Importantly, Mann draws attention to the growing pressure of political participation to which these nationalisms had to respond. In the earlier, north-western nationalisms, political rights were at first limited by class, and were only gradually extended to mediate between the interests of diverse social groups. This was – outside the colonies – a rather liberal democratisation process, in which class “trumped” ethnicity, to use Mann’s parlance. But when nations formed from the 19th century in Europe’s east and centre, including Germany, political culture had moved on. As Mann (2004: 33, original emphasis) argues, ‘aspirations for representative government became dominated by the notion that the *whole* people must rule’. As a consequence, emerging states did not restrict representative rights but the power of the parliament, thus creating “dual states” between parliament and strong executive (Mann 2005: 61-2). These nation-states often formed, moreover, out of multi-ethnic empires. Here, ethnicity became increasingly important in the construction of an organic nation, and the concomitant allocation of political rights and citizenship.

This account is broadly Gellnerian (see e.g. Gellner 1990: Ch. 7) in its emphasis on the significance of deeper social and political processes – including the intricate workings of class and nation – for the development of different nationalisms. Yet, importantly, it also illustrates the historical intertwinement of nationalism and the struggle for political representation and citizenship (e.g. Mann 2005: 56, 57, 62; 1995: esp. 48, 53-4, 58, 62; see also: Tilly 1994: 138). As I outline below, I see the demand for political recognition as critical also for an understanding of today’s rightist nationalism. Furthermore, Mann’s work embeds the concepts of liberal and organic nationalism in their historical context. These are closely related to another common dichotomy in nationalism studies: that of civic and ethnic nationalism. The former is often conceived as more open, focused on territorial residence and political

commitment, while ethnic nationalism is characterised by a concern with shared culture and ancestry, and is thus viewed as being more commonly exclusivist (see e.g. Smith 1991: 9-12, 82-3). In reality, as Smith (1991: 13) points out, historical nationalisms have often shared elements of both; and various scholars have qualified or questioned the depiction of civic nationalism as necessarily more benign (Brown 1999; Hall 2013: 67, 88-91; 1996; Yack 1996; cf. Brubaker 2004: 118, 120-2). These ideal-typical constructs are still useful ways of thinking about the various faces that nationalism could show historically and in recent years; and particularly ethnic nationalism is a recurrent feature in discussions of the contemporary radical right (e.g. Bonikowski et al. 2018: 3-4, 5, 15, 18; Rydgren 2017; 2006: 7).

Nationalism has proved to be malleable when faced with different contexts, and able to connect with other ideologies (see Kennedy 2013: 29; Smith 1991: 79). But, Malešević (2019: e.g. 1-4, 8, 9, 15, 20; 2018: 555) argues, this does not mean that nationalism is a “thin ideology” without own political substance and bound to disappear; instead, it has become more powerful, also because its adaptability has enabled it to infuse daily micro-interactions. He understands nationalism accordingly as ‘a very rich and diverse set of ideas, principles and practices that are integral to the organisation of everyday life in modernity’ Malešević 2019: 3). From this perspective, nationalism persists latently and habitually but can be energised at certain moments (see Billig 1995; Bonikowski 2017: esp. 188; Malešević 2019: 5, 12-14, 35, 278-9; 2018: 554-5). This is important because, as Bonikowski (2016a: 428) points out, nationalism scholarship has often focused on moments of nation-formation rather than the ways in which nationalism plays out in existing nation-states. I follow these and other scholars (e.g. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Mann 2004: 368, 370, 372-3; Skey 2013; see also: Hall 2019: 53; 1995: 10; Kennedy 2013: 15-16) who point to understandings, manifestations, and functions of nationalism beyond initial nation-formation. Yet the traditional nation-building focus still informs this thesis, especially if conceived more broadly. This is because, as indicated above, I view rightist nationalism’s politicisation of immigration as an ongoing endeavour to re-imagine and redefine the nation and who legitimately belongs to it.

In this regard, I draw on perhaps the most influential theorisation of nationalism. Ernest Gellner (1990: 5, 24, 50-1, 140-1, and *passim*; cf. Hall 1995: 10-12; Kennedy 2013: 17, 20; Mann 1995: 47) proposed that industrialisation required deepened and perpetual division of labour based on standardised communication and education – a centralised and shared culture. According to Gellner, this socio-economic transformation entailed the drive towards concordant ethnic and political boundaries in a given territory. It was, in other words, a drive towards a culturally homogenous nation-state. This demand for homogeneity through harmonious cultural and political boundaries constitutes, in a nutshell, his famous “nationalist principle” (Gellner 1998b: 3-4, 45, 72; 1990: 1, 2, 35, 39-40, 134; see also: Tilly 1994: 133, 140). When understood more broadly, for instance in less functionalist and economic terms (see Hall 2019: 46, 49; 1995: 12, 21, 22; O’Leary 1997), Gellner’s conceptualisation is of great use for this thesis. It captures something of how rightist nationalism works in the real world, not just historically but also in recent years. Rightist nationalist movements – or even today’s nationalism more generally (Malešević 2019: 15) – do indeed embark on a quest for homogeneity. They are fiercely opposed to immigration and multiculturalism; and, depending on degree of extremism, they either call for cultural assimilation, or, like the British National Front and BNP, for “repatriation” of groups that they perceive as “non-British”.

Gellner (1990: 1, 2) briefly mentions, moreover, the idea of ‘nationalists-in-the-abstract’ who propagate the need for national homogeneity in an ‘unbiased’ and ‘non-egoistic’ way to protect for example cultural diversity everywhere. This is a common pseudo-relativist argument employed by rightist nationalists since the French New Right (see Spektorowski 2003; Taguieff 1999). Yet ‘nationalism has often not been so sweetly reasonable, nor so rationally symmetrical’, Gellner (1990: 2) writes. He was keenly aware of the potentially violent consequences of homogenisation and nationalism’s necessity to address the problem of foreigners within the nation (Gellner 1998b: 46; 1990: 1, 2-3, 51). While at least more successful post-war rightist nationalist movements have rarely explicitly called for the use of

force², anti-immigration violence in Britain and especially Germany has soared at certain key moments, as I discuss in the following chapters. A certain idea of homogeneity is also an important aspect of populism.

One of the recurrent points of debate within the populism literature has centred on different ways of defining the concept. In particular, recent scholarship has discussed the question of whether populism should be understood as a (thin) ideology (Mudde 2007: 23; 2004: 543-5; see also: Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3; Kriesi and Pappas 2016: 4-5); a rhetorical style or discourse (Bonikowski 2017: 186; 2016b: 14-15; Hawkins 2009: 1042-3, 1046-7; Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 322-3); forms of political practice and strategy, such as mobilisation or interaction methods, charismatic leadership, and location in political space (Barr 2009: 38; Weyland 2001: 14-17); or combinations or extensions of these (Jansen 2011: 82-5; Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 386-90). I do not focus on populism's different conceptual lenses here (for a concise overview, cf. Gidron and Bonikowski 2013; Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 383-6; Rydgren 2017). But I briefly note two points in this regard.

First, defining and theorising populism is a long-standing effort with which scholars have already wrestled at a seminal 1967 conference in Oxford (see Berlin 2013; Berlin et al. 1968; Ionescu and Gellner eds. 1969). Their discussions highlighted the common complexities of relating an elusive concept to empirical case studies – a task that proved especially difficult for populism. As in the study of nationalism (see Hall 1995: esp. 8, 20; Smith 1991: 80-3), populism scholars considered different typologies, such as geographic (Berlin et al. 1968: 138-55) or agrarian-political (Canovan 1981: 8-16, 289, cf. 298-300), to accommodate some conceptual and empirical variety while still delineating the wider phenomenon. The different conceptual lenses – ideology, rhetorical style, political strategy – are another consequence of populism's ongoing resistance to clear definition, which is observable in both today's academic literature and public discourse.

² Although politicians of the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) have at the height of the “refugee crisis” caused some controversies by suggesting that the use of fire arms against refugees at the border might be justified (see *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2016b).

Second, these definitional debates, and different generations of populism research (see Jansen 2011), repeatedly emphasised a common theme: populism's anti-elitism, most often posited as a fundamental antagonism between various elites and "the (common) people", accompanied by the claim to channel the will of the latter (see e.g. Berlin et al. 1968: 156, 169, 172-3, 175; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 13-14; Canovan 1981: 294-7; Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 391; Pasquino 2008: 20; Rydgren 2017: 487-8). While this in itself might not be sufficient to define populism (see e.g. Müller 2016: 2-3, 101), the basic notion of a people-elite dualism is still important to note. It not only covers common ground between manifold academic approaches, but also helps describe populism's real-world expressions, as various political actors' appeals to "the people" have illustrated over the last years. Of course "the people" is, Canovan argues (1981: 295), 'one of the slipperiest concepts in the political vocabulary, capable of meaning many different things in different circumstances' (see also: Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 6; Bonikowski 2017: 184-5; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 10, 16; Panizza 2005: 4, 5, 17; Pasquino 2008: 15-16, 28). So, too, is the idea of the elite. I return to this below.

One reason for the vagueness of populism's basic dichotomy – its ability to construct different kinds of "people" and elites – lies in the fact that it can veer both left and right (e.g. Bonikowski 2016b: 18-19; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 1, 3, 5, 10-14; Canovan 1981: 294; Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 323; Judis 2016: 12-15). In recent years, populism has frequently been conflated with rightist politics, prompting renewed calls for analytical distinctions (e.g. Bonikowski 2017; Rydgren 2017). But parties like SYRIZA in Greece or Podemos in Spain (see Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015: 41-2; Pirro et al. 2018) often serve as recent European examples of leftist populism. Indeed, populism might even have its roots broadly on the socio-economic left; its early case studies, the Russian *Narodniki* and the American People's Party of the late 19th century, were concerned with farmers' exploitation in the face of industrialisation and modernisation, some criticism of capitalism, and, at least in the Russian case, the aim of socialist revolt. Populism has historically expressed itself across the left-right spectrum, often in response to contextually specific exclusions

and social dislocations. The same might be visible today. For instance Bonikowski (2016b: 21) points out that leftist populism, connected with socialism, is more pronounced in southern Europe, where economic pressures have led to disenchantment with neo-liberalism. But in Europe's wealthier centre, where the issue of migration outweighs that of economics, populism more often shifts rightward and becomes linked to nationalism. Bonikowski (2016b: 21) suggests that in both cases, populism 'has increasingly come to resonate with voters who are experiencing frustrations associated with rapid social change'.

It is important to keep in mind, therefore, that also populism can show various faces, but that certain issues or themes might nevertheless be typical of the concept *per se*. One is its people-elite antagonism. Another related – but often rather abstract – characteristic is its moralism. Scholars frequently emphasise populism's construction of "the people" as inherently "good", "pure", or "virtuous", whereas the elite is portrayed as "evil" or "corrupt" (see Berlin et al. 1968: 143, 158, 174-5, 179; Bonikowski 2016b: 11; Hawkins 2009: 1043-4; Mudde 2004: 543-4; Rydgren 2017: 489, 491-492). Populism thus considers the people-elite dichotomy as the focal point of a Manichean struggle. Müller (2016: 3; see also: 19-25) additionally points to populism's 'claim to exclusive representation' of those who allegedly constitute the only legitimate or "real people". This, he argues, is both a moral claim and part of populism's fundamental anti-pluralism. I return below to what I view as a more basic moral dimension in populism.

Two further characteristics of populism are worth highlighting in this discussion, also because they form certain points of connection with nationalism. The first relates to the problem of political representation and participation. Above I have outlined Mann's argument around nationalism's emergence in the context of democratisation. Populism, too, has a complex relationship with democracy (see Bonikowski 2016b: 11, 22-3; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 2, 5-10; Canovan 1981: Ch. 5; Mastropaolo 2008; Mudde 2015; Schmitter 2019). Some scholars argue that (leftist) populism has the potential for correcting or re-energising democratic politics (e.g. Mouffe 2018: 5, 35-8, 82, 85, Ch. 3; see also: 2005; Kaufmann in Bonikowski et al.

2018: 8), or point to populism's ability to act as a mirror for democracy and to call attention to its shortcomings (Panizza 2005: 30). Others, however, argue that populism has, at the very least, a tendency to undermine liberal-democratic principles such as representative politics, constitutional constraints, or minority rights (Halikiopoulou in Bonikowski et al. 2018: 7-8; Kriesi and Pappas 2016: 5; Mudde 2004: 561; Pasquino 2008: 16, 22, 28). Müller (2016: 3, 6, 50, 55, 56-7, 103), who conceives democracy as necessarily involving certain liberal elements, even contends that populism is hostile and poses a threat to democracy in general.

Yet underneath these conceptual questions are tangible concerns. In the influential 1967 conference, Berlin (in Berlin et al. 1968: 175) suggested that populism claimed to stand 'for the majority of men, the majority of men who have somehow been damaged' by the elite in its various interpretations. Accordingly, populism offers an omnibus sense of socio-economic, cultural, or political marginalisation. Here I focus on the latter dimension. As I outline below, I see the demand for political recognition as populism's core impetus, irrespective of whether it turns left or right. If nationalism was historically connected to the demand for, and allocation of, political rights, then populism carries this struggle forward indefinitely. It does so from a deep-seated feeling of being continuously at risk of political exclusion – of being disenfranchised, misrecognised, or abandoned by elites who seemingly undermine "true democracy". Populism's political quest is to reclaim those rights to which "the people" are allegedly entitled, even if this infringes on the rights of others. Here a challenge to (liberal) democracy can arise. 'Populism in at least some of its forms', writes Canovan (1981: 296), can 'be connected with distrust of competitive politics and unwillingness to bother with elaborate constitutional structures'. Earlier scholars had already remarked upon populism's valuation of social spontaneity rather than state institutions (Berlin et al. 1968: 172-3, 174); and also in following decades, students of populism highlighted its inclination to reject political opponents' legitimacy or election outcomes, to focus on emotive impact rather than balanced policy, to sacrifice individual or minority rights for the "common will", or to discard representative political procedures for unmediated links between leader and "the

people” (Bonikowski 2017: 185; 2016b: 22-3; Hawkins 2009: 1044; Mudde 2007: 23, 151, 153; Müller 2016: 3, 20, Ch. 2; Pasquino 2008: 22, 28). In its demand for political recognition, populism can, therefore, express a certain illiberal, charismatic, or authoritarian drive.

This leads to the second characteristic that I wish to emphasise. Authoritarianism, as Stenner (2009: esp. 142, 143, 152, 155; see also: Bonikowski 2017: 189-90) elaborates, seeks to suppress difference in order to attain social and normative uniformity. As discussed above, also (ethnic or organic) nationalism involves the pursuit of especially cultural and social homogeneity. Populism strives for uniformity too. It posits that its chosen “people” is fundamentally unified, homogenous, monolithic, indivisible, harmonious, etc. (e.g. Berlin et al. 1968: 143; Mudde 2004: 543, 546; Rydgren 2017: 487, 488). This “holism” is another reason why Müller conceives populism as inherently anti-pluralistic: the ‘notion that the polity should no longer be split and ... [that] it’s possible for the people to be one and – all of them – to have one true representative’ is intimately connected to the ‘claim that a *part* of the people *is* the people – and that only the populist authentically identifies and represents this real or true people’ (Müller 2016: 20, 22-3, original emphases). In other words, populism’s desire for a unified “people” entails the moral exclusion of difference in one or several of its socio-economic, political, cultural, ideational, or axiological forms. For Müller (2016: 20; see also: Rydgren 2006: 11) the ‘core claim of populism is thus a moralized form of antipluralism’. The longing for homogeneity is one way in which populism and nationalism (and authoritarianism) may express “elective affinities” (see Bonikowski et al. 2018: 6, 16; see also: Mudde 2007: 22-3); and indeed, historically and in recent years, rightist nationalism has often identified “the people” with the nation (see e.g. Caiani and Kröll 2017: 349; Eatwell 2003: 24; Mann 2004: 34; Rydgren 2017: 488). I further discuss this issue in the following conceptualisation of rightist nationalism, which I understand, moreover, as being primarily concerned with a *racialised* people or nation.

Also the literatures of nationalism and populism raise a number of useful points that inform this thesis. Amongst other things, these literatures, too, are

attentive to longer-term social transformations and historic roots of contemporary phenomena. They emphasise, moreover, the tensions within democratisation processes, and ongoing struggles for political rights and representation. As I point out below, these are also moral demands. It is important to note that nationalism and populism are both characterised by a drive for social and cultural homogenisation. One further point to highlight is that both concepts can turn left or right. While I focus on rightist nationalism, and conceptualise this below in relation to the notion of ethnic nationalism, I hope that my suggested framework is valid more broadly and able to capture something of political expressions across the left-right spectrum.

II Conceptualising post-war rightist nationalism

This thesis is informed by many of the aspects underscored in this literature review. Yet in conjunction with the insights gained inductively from the survey data analysis of the empirical chapters, and the developing claims and positions of rightist nationalist movements, the highlighted ideas also point to rightist nationalism's conceptual features. Developed both from above literatures and, importantly, the empirical research, I conceive rightist nationalism as being constituted by four main features: 1) racialisation; 2) a strong sense of order and disorder; 3) a populist impulse towards political recognition; 4) a selective retrieval of historical narratives and legacies. In the following discussion I focus again on outlining these core features as analytically distinct from each other, even though they often interconnect in reality.

1) *Rightist nationalism in the UK and Germany has often shown a racialised character.* I understand racialisation in the sense suggested by Riga et al. (2020: 717), namely 'as an embodied power relationship and subjugating process that attaches meaning, significance or negative value to physical or cultural difference'. This conception of racialisation is thus not limited to "race" in the narrow biological sense. Instead, its practices of signification and ascription are connected to those employed in the name of culture (see Appiah 1985: esp. 35, 36; Brubaker 2009; Michaels 1992:

684-5). Depending on definitional boundaries, racism itself has historically relied on modes of exclusion that involved cultural conceptions, both before and after the construction of “race” in the context of colonisation and enlightenment (see Hund 2007; 2006: Ch. 2; 2003; see also: Banton 2004; Goldberg 1999). I return to the importance of the colonial tradition for Britain’s and Germany’s nationalisms below; and in the following chapters I point out how rightist nationalist movements have not uncommonly excluded cultural “others” in ways captured by concepts such as “differentialist racism” (Taguieff 2001), “neo-racism” (Balibar 1991), or “ethno-pluralism” (Spektorowski 2003; see also: Rydgren 2007: 244; 2006: 10). These theorise racism’s current appearance which involves the construction of cultural difference as quasi-biological and fundamentally incompatible, so that the mixing of cultures would entail deleterious consequences for national identity. To clarify the positioning of rightist nationalism as racialised, I briefly view it against the classical conception of ethnic nationalism, on the one hand, and historical or current white nationalism, on the other. Rightist nationalism’s racialised character captures elements of both of these nationalisms.

I have previously referred to the broad dichotomy of civic and ethnic (and liberal and organic) nationalisms. In its historical context of nation-formation in eastern and central Europe, ethnic nationalism may be understood in Mann’s (2005: 55, 63, 64; 2004: 6, 34) wider sense as conceiving the national people as homogenous, without allowing for ethnic or class divisions. In some ways it might be seen as taking Gellner’s (e.g. 1998b: 4; 1990: 1, 2, 134) described nationalist principle of cultural and political homogeneity to the extreme. The notion of ethnic nationalism is further sharpened when its ‘emphasis on a community of birth and native culture’ means that, as Smith (1991: 11; see also: Yack 1996: 198) puts it, despite attempting to join another nation, ‘you remained ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of your birth and were for ever stamped by it’. National belonging became most strongly fixed and conflated with ideas of “race” in Nazism, which precipitated a very aggressive cleansing of the nation to restore its alleged purity (see Mann 2012: 318-19; 2004: 6, 13). This is one example of the complex

relationship between nation and “race”. At times both ideas could be equated, and at other times “race” could reach beyond nation by including, for instance, wider “Germanic peoples”. Yet within nationalism literature, ethnic nationalism is not usually connected to “race” but often revolves around a narrower focus on discrete (but perhaps imagined) ethnic groups that claim a nation and, potentially, state in their name only.

A focus on a wider notion of “race”, on the other hand, was and is very clearly visible in forms of white nationalism. It can be traced through the histories of colonialism, and the racisms and nation-building efforts of white settler societies in Australia, South Africa, and the United States, among others (see Affeldt 2010; Engelken 2010; Hund 2010: 74-9; Mann 2005: Ch. 4; Marx 1999; 1996). White nationalism also expressed itself in the historic struggles of various ethnic or immigrant groups in the United States to be recognised as “white” by distancing themselves from black Americans (Bashi Treitler 2013: Chs. 4, 5), or in the post-bellum period of Jim Crow and following practices of more diffuse racial segregation and discrimination (Riga 2019: 66-72). A century after the Civil War, James Baldwin (1964: 17; see also: 55, 62) wrote that ‘the black man has functioned in the white man’s world as a fixed star, as an immovable pillar’ upholding the latter’s white identity. Another half a century later, Ta-Nehisi Coates not only powerfully describes racism’s visceral violence and the ongoing legacy of slavery (Coates 2015: e.g. 10, 27-9, 37, 83, 85, 103), but also suggests that ‘the power of domination and exclusion is central to the belief in being white, and without it, “white people” would cease to exist for want of reasons’ (ibid.: 42). White nationalism has a long tradition in American politics (see Mudde 2018: Ch. 2), and, one might argue, soared to power very recently in the form of Trumpism (Bobo 2017: esp. 86, 99-100). As opposed to ethnic nationalism above, white nationalism creates a common racial appeal to several ethnic groups or national identities. It claims whiteness as the norm and excludes often substantial numbers of inhabitants or citizens, whom it considers “non-white” and to whom it traditionally attaches a variety of racist stereotypes.

Rightist nationalism, conceived as racialised, draws on the traditions of both ethnic and white nationalism, but simultaneously cuts across them. The post-war rightist nationalisms of Britain and Germany have often exhibited a strong concern with the nation's homogeneity, identity, and alleged purity. But they have neither been limited to an ethnic focus in the narrow sense, nor always made their claims in the name of a wider notion of "race" or whiteness. Reacting to contextual challenges, British and German nationalisms moved between emphases on nation or citizenship, broader intra-European differentiations, wider cultural exclusions, and thinly veiled or even explicit racism.

As I outline in the first empirical part of the thesis, British rightist nationalism showed a strong fascist and "race"-centred character in the face of decolonisation and Commonwealth immigration of the 1950s and early 1960s. In the following decades, it moved away from sympathising with Nazism but remained focused on whiteness and its supposedly essential role for Britishness, thus opposing "non-white" migration especially fiercely. This strand of extremist nationalism, then mainly embodied by the BNP, adopted cultural language from the early 2000s. Already a few years earlier, however, it was complemented by UKIP's much more Europe- and Britain-centred nationalism that included at first little reference to immigration and difference. But UKIP soon – and most strongly from around 2010 – became increasingly concerned with the preservation of British identity, focusing variously on immigration in general, (certain groups of) eastern Europeans in particular, or the alleged threat of Islam. British rightist nationalism thus assumed various faces in the post-war period. Yet with small exceptions it did not make its claims in the narrow sense of ethnic nationalism – what was effectively an England- (and Wales-)based nationalism usually argued in the name of a wider Britishness. This might have been a legacy of colonialism and Empire, as I discuss below.

Also German post-war nationalism drew on traditions of ethnic and white nationalism without becoming equivalent to either. While National Socialism also held ideas of whiteness, it more closely entangled "race" with nation. Faced with the Nazi heritage and the new Federal Republic's practice of banning anti-constitutional

movements, post-war rightist nationalist parties largely abandoned unveiled references to biological “race”, and framed their claims early through racialised notions of cultural and national identity. In the first decades after the war, rightist nationalism nevertheless stayed as close as possible to partially disguised (neo-)fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism. With the rise of the Republicans in the 1980s, it assumed a somewhat less extreme and more culture-focused character. Rightist nationalism at times showed a stronger emphasis on Germans as a distinct ethnic group and rejected all immigrants and foreigners; but around the time of unification it was ambivalent about the status of “ethnic Germans” from eastern Europe, and reserved most of its violence for non-European refugees who were more clearly identified as racialised others. In recent years, it focused most strongly on the exclusion of Muslims and immigrants from outside Europe, and invoked the image of a wider European culture locked in opposition to Islam. This is encapsulated in, for instance, Germany’s Pegida movement (“Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident”). Over time, German nationalism moved between a closer ethnic focus on specifically German identity and wider racialised cultural exclusions.

In both Britain and Germany, post-war rightist nationalism thus expressed its concerns about national identity and purity by operating across the registers of both narrow ethnic or national boundaries, and those of “race” or whiteness. On the whole, British nationalism tilted towards white nationalism, also due to its more pronounced colonial heritage, while German nationalism leaned more strongly towards an essentialised ethnic nationalism. In Germany, rightist nationalism also expressed the legacy of its fascist history more clearly, although this tradition was not entirely absent from inter- and post-war Britain either (see Eatwell 2003: Chs. 10, 14). Both countries’ rightist nationalisms showed much variation in their language and foci of exclusion over the course of the post-war decades and in reaction to contextual key challenges. But both continued to intertwine ideas of (national) culture and “race”, sometimes moving in one direction, and sometimes in the other. Underneath the shifting nuances of their claims and targets lay a core concern that

remained much more constant: the preservation of the alleged homogeneity and purity of a racialised vision of national identity.

I position post-war rightist nationalism as racialised to pay attention to both the surface variation over time and the deeper alignment of its mechanisms of exclusion. Whether it aims at ethnicity or nation, wider (non-European) culture, or formulations of “race” – in the heart of rightist nationalism, racialisation stands for a wider, multifaceted rejection of immigration and diversity. It is important to remember, however, that these post-war expressions follow a longer historical lineage. Racialisation underpinned the ways in which Britain and Germany – and, of course, other (European) countries – emerged as modern nation-states, as well as colonial powers. Although Britain nominally followed the liberal, inclusive path to nationhood, the toleration of class and ethnic distinctions stood in stark relief to, or was perhaps enabled by, its deadly colonial racism (see Mann 2005: 55, 61, Ch. 4; 2004: 37-8). German nationalism came later and took an ethnic or organic route; but soon after the birth of its nation-state, Germany, too, embarked on a shorter but genocidal program of colonisation during the “Scramble for Africa”.

Germany’s colonies held comparatively low practical political and economic importance, Fulbrook (2015: 19, 302-303) points out, but its brutal killing of native populations at the start of the 20th century may have laid some of the groundwork for further genocide in the years to come. Despite debates among political elites, Germany’s colonial atrocities emboldened militarism and demonstrated that large-scale ethnic cleansing was actually possible in a short period of time. German soldiers also already employed concentration camps in South West Africa, while some of the individuals carrying out the genocide later advised Turkey in the Armenian Genocide during World War I (Mann 2005: 105, 107; see also: 103). But Germany’s colonial project also shaped its wider national(ist) self-understanding in the early 20th century and, importantly, its racist ideologies (see Eley 2015a: 20-1, 26-7, 32-7). German individuals had participated in colonial projects long before the unified nation-state’s own establishment of African colonies; and their racist knowledge contributed to the German construction of Jews in racial terms already from the late 18th century (Bruns

2011: 103, 104). Colonial racism thus informed Germany's anti-Semitism and its own national understanding over a longer period of time (see Bruns 2011: 105, 113, and *passim*). This process was, of course, not isolated from wider colonial racism or genocidal practice. The Nazis were inspired by the American genocide, and by widespread notions of European superiority, which claimed, in a teleological fashion, that progress and the future of mankind inevitably entailed the demise of other "races" (Mann 2005: 98, 195; see also: 74, 75, 81-2, 85, 88, 93, 94, 101, 109; Bruns 2011: 115-16; Eley 2015a: 32; Hund 2007: 111-12). Perhaps with a measure of exaggeration one could argue that some of the callousness of this colonial history is still visible today, for example in the relative ease with which European public and political parties condone, and rightist nationalist actors implicitly support, non-European refugees' ongoing loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea.

A consideration of rightist nationalism in post-war Germany is inextricably linked to its Nazi heritage, whose racist and racialised underpinnings are themselves grounded in a longer history of colonial exploitation and genocide (for a convincing connection of Germany's extra-European colonial ambition and subsequent continental expansion, see Eley 2015a: esp. 28, 32, 34-5, 37-8). But perhaps the connection between nationalism and the racialised colonial tradition is even more clearly visible in the British case. The Empire not only formed a crucial pillar of British identity but also contributed to its racially tinged sense of superiority (Gamble 2003: 62-3, 67-8). Theoretically – and despite the deadliness of its colonial undertakings – the Empire carried within it an acknowledgment of diverse and multicultural citizenship (see Bhambra 2017b: 95-6; Gamble 2003: 65). Yet long before the post-war period and increasing decolonisation, the (rather rare) presence of racialised colonial "others" in Britain, especially seamen, was viewed with discomfort, and was met with legal and violent discrimination (Solomos 1993: 47-51). With growing post-war Commonwealth immigration, Britain made racialised distinctions regarding citizenship legal reality in 1962, even though the majority of immigrants were white (Bhambra 2017b: 96; see also: 97; Solomos 1993: 56-9, 63-4; Smith 1994: 96, 129-30). The colonial empire represents a central aspect of the UK's history and self-

understanding – in fact, as Bhabra (2017b: 92) argues, ‘what it is to be British cannot be understood separately from empire’. Perhaps also due to this history, British post-war nationalism rarely showed a narrow ethnic focus. Instead, it expressed a long-standing concern with “race” that was more clearly pronounced than in Germany, although it did not quite, and certainly not always, reach the extent of white nationalism as encountered in the United States.

The aim of this discussion was to locate post-war rightist nationalism’s racialised character conceptually and empirically. In both countries, rightist nationalism encompasses elements of both ethnic and white nationalism, overall leaning closer to the former in Germany and to the latter in Britain. But its racialised aspect was also defined by the longer history of colonialism and its consequences. This history has weight. It drove a conception of Britishness in racialised terms (see Bhabra 2017b: 97; Solomos 1993: 59), and it also informed Germany’s racialised national identity, albeit filtered through its Nazi legacy. These historical layers, or ideological sediments, demonstrate that the current shape of rightist nationalism did not simply emerge in the last decades. Even if they are not always directly visible, rightist nationalism’s racialised features have much longer historical roots that reach back to, or even predate, Britain’s and Germany’s moments of nation-formation. To paraphrase Bhabra above, post-war rightist nationalism, resistance to immigration, or the question of who belongs to the nation can only be properly understood before the background of these racialised colonial lineages.

2) *Rightist nationalism is characterised by a strong sense of order and disorder.* This is a deeply conservative concern. As previously discussed, I understand conservatism in a broadly Burkean sense as pragmatic politics towards moderation and balance, traditional rule, evolutionary change, and stability and public order (see Eatwell 1992a: 66; McClelland 1992: 80-1). Especially the conservative desire for order is an important feature of rightist nationalism. It is a longing for control and safety, and carries the wider conviction that ‘order and discipline are essential to any functioning community’ (Aughey 1992: 104). Its reverse is a deep aversion to social decay, disruption, or chaos. The longing for order entails, therefore, a keen sense of

threat that disorder or revolutionary change might pose. Also this has a historical tradition. As Mann (2004: 63-4, 76, 77, 358, 360) points out, inter-war old regimes' interests in preserving property – closely aligned with values of order and security – could, when threatened by socialism, turn into an affinity for fascist militarism that promised to restore order on the streets, paradoxically often through violence. But the conservative drive for order also implies a wider dislike for complexity and division. Or, put the other way around, it contains a certain authoritarian preference for sameness and conformity (see Stenner 2009: 142, 143, 155). This, too, constitutes a homogenising impetus; and in seeking to suppress dissent and diversity it expresses, moreover, a deep-seated rejection of liberalism. In this dissertation I focus on its rightist expressions, although authoritarian and illiberal undercurrents can also characterise the socio-economic left.

3) *Rightist nationalism's third feature is its populist impulse towards political recognition.* Above I have outlined that populism can veer left or right politically (e.g. Bonikowski et al. 2018: 3, 10-14). Here I concentrate on a particular feature that can be found across the political spectrum but which I also understand as constitutive of rightist nationalism: a populist impulse, grounded in a profound feeling of having been politically abandoned. This populist drive lies in the struggle for political rights, or, rather, the demand for recognition and relevance, to be heard and valued in the political space. It is a deeply moral claim. In fact, I understand this demand for political recognition and valuation as the core of populism's moral impetus (see broadly: Taylor 1994); but it goes even beyond the call for political visibility, and the feeling of deserving or being entitled to the political visibility which one seeks to reclaim. The populist moral drive also involves a sense of grievance and betrayal, of having not only been politically silenced but also disparaged or undervalued. I see this as part of populism's claim of having been "damaged", as Berlin (2013: 10) had argued. This does of course not preclude other aspects of populism's moral appeal, such as above-mentioned juxtaposition of a supposedly pure people and a corrupt elite, or the claim to exclusive moral representation (Mudde 2004: 543, 544; Müller 2016: 3, 19-20). I focus here on a specific political and moral dimension of the populist impulse towards

recognition. But in reality – and I speak to this in the empirical chapters – this is of course often related to wider ‘sense of collective status threat’, and a broader feeling of ‘unfair treatment of people “like them”’, as Bonikowski (in Bonikowski et al. 2018: 13, 14) puts it. He sees these concerns as being characteristic of populism in both leftist and rightist guises.

The moral claim to political recognition also provides the basis for potent social mobilisation, both on the left and the right. Gellner (1990: 121; see also: 1998b: 60-1; Hall 2019: 53) argues that class and nation became strong ‘political catalysts’ especially when their appeals aligned. Interpreted more broadly, political movements may become mobilised most fervently when they can speak to several sources of identity that are seen as being threatened, that is, when they can capture multiple senses of exploitation or abandonment. While this is not always or automatically the case, the populist impulse holds this intersectional potential for explosive popular mobilisation. Its moral thrust, aiming for political recognition in the face of felt disenfranchisement and disparagement, often aligns with the appeals of class and/or nation, depending on its leftist or rightist orientation. Rightist nationalism’s power also lies in its ability to channel political, cultural, and socio-economic dimensions of abandonment. The direction of the populist impulse determines, moreover, which elites it excludes. In addition to the political establishment, left-wing populism may denounce economic elites, whereas its rightist expressions tend to focus on cultural and intellectual elites (Bonikowski et al. 2018: e.g. 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16; Rydgren 2017: 490). This discussion has long roots. Already the participants of the pioneering 1967 populism conference pointed to its ability to make moral claims, to draw on multifaceted feelings of exploitation, and to exclude elites that could be variously identified in economic, political, cultural, or racial terms (Berlin et al. 1968: e.g. 142, 143, 169, 170, 174, 175, 179; see also: Berlin 2013: 10).

4) *The fourth feature of rightist nationalism is its desire to retrieve a discredited national legacy, or protect a certain historical narrative.* This is connected to rightist nationalism’s general tendency to look back to the past. Recent examples include Donald Trump’s appeal to what he perceived as the country’s past greatness

(Bonikowski 2016a: 428), or the common slogan used by British Brexit campaigners – “we want our country back” (Bhambra 2017b: 91) – which had already been the title of UKIP’s 2005 election manifesto. Also this draws on a historical lineage. In the decades and centuries after the French Revolution, the broader political right showed a strong concern with the past, albeit moderate conservatism less strongly so than the reactionary right (see Aughey 1992: 100-101). But even some reactionary rightists such as Charles Maurras, sometimes reckoned to be among the intellectual precursors of fascism, derived their aims to bring back monarchy from more modern ideas of strong political leadership and authority (McClelland 1992: 79, 82; see also: Eatwell 2003: 25; 1992a: 65). Fascism-proper displayed both nostalgia and a modern impetus. Its myth of “rebirth” syncretised romantic mysticism, essentialised values and traditions, and notions of original purity, on the one hand, and ideas of innovation, progress, and revolution, on the other (Eatwell 2003: xxiv, 13-14; Mann 2004: 12-15, 80-1).

Post-war rightist nationalism often appealed to the past, particularly focusing on longer-term national identities, cultural roots, or positive valuations of tradition. It also sought to recover past social or political conditions, which it associated with a lost glory. But the feature of rightist nationalism that I wish to emphasise here, and which I outline in the coming chapters, goes slightly beyond nationalist nostalgia and attempts to recapture a supposed national greatness. Rightist nationalism does not only aim to bring back elements of the past; it also wants to direct the way in which this history is perceived, retrieved, narrated, or (dis)credited. Edward Said (2000: 179, 176; see also: 177, 185) points out that memory-making and the writing of history are not uncommonly selective and politicising activities that are concerned with ‘a specifically desirable and recoverable past’, and may constitute a ‘nationalist effort premised on the need to construct a desirable loyalty to and insider’s understanding of one’s country, tradition, and faith’. In its effort to bring it back, post-war rightist nationalism reinvents the past, especially when it views the national legacy as having been vilified. It seeks to protect a very specific historical narrative or even, where

necessary, to purify its legacy from defamation. This can in some nationalist movements lead to outright historical revisionism.

In the UK, endeavours to retrieve a certain historical heritage have frequently revolved around the Empire with a focus on its positive effects for the world, a whitewashing of colonialism and slavery, or a defence of Britain's independence (see e.g. Gamble 2018: 1215-16; Judt 2007: 770; Said 2000: 181). In Germany, post-war rightist nationalism has predominantly grappled with the legacy of the Nazi era. It often downplayed National Socialism's disastrous effects, selectively pointed to redeemable features, questioned historiography, and at times (implicitly or explicitly) justified or even adhered to its very tenets (see e.g. Eatwell 2003; 281, 290). The process of coming to terms with the past underwent an additional layer in eastern Germany where rightist nationalism is particularly strong today. Here, reactions could vary from a sense that the GDR was unfairly stigmatised, along with a nostalgic view of its social structures (Fulbrook 2015: 293; Judt 2007: 769), to a harsh criticism of its socialist regime from a rightist perspective that might rather have glorified the previous Nazi rule. Also the retrieval of specific historical legacies has a longer rightist tradition. In Weimar Germany, for instance, the proto-fascist Conservative Revolution resented the criticism directed at the German empire while criticising the new democratic regime (Eley 2015b: 102, 105).

III Four conceptual pieces

I conceive post-war rightist nationalism as characterised by four principal features. The first of these is racialisation, which carries a deep unease with both physical and cultural difference, and which reaches back to Britain's and Germany's nation-building moments and colonisation projects. Rightist nationalism's second feature is its concern about order and disorder. This involves conservative fears about social disruption and chaos, and entails an authoritarian and illiberal rejection of diversity. The third feature is rightist nationalism's populist impulse, the demand for political

recognition following a sense of abandonment and political grievance. The fourth feature lies in rightist nationalism's efforts to retrieve a certain historical narrative or potentially defamed legacy, a selective process of memory-making.

I have inductively derived these four conceptual pieces and their specific emphases from the empirical work of the following chapters, as well as the literatures reviewed above. Amongst others, I have drawn upon Bonikowski's discussion of contemporary nationalism and populism, which is attuned to their specific expressions on the political left and right, and on particularly Berlin et al.'s, Gellner's, and Mann's more historic and conceptual analyses. Rightist nationalism's core features, as I understand them, have also been informed by literature on both countries' colonial and racialised traditions, such as Bhambra's and Eley's work; and the latter's, as well as Gamble's, Mann's, and Eatwell's research, for instance, has been instructive for considering rightist nationalism in a longer historic context, and as embedded in the wider (conservative) right.

Post-war rightist nationalism, as encountered in Britain and Germany, drives towards homogenisation through racialised exclusions, and connects this project with a struggle against disorder, a quest for political recognition of the "real people", and a retrieval of selective historical narratives and self-understandings. As this is an ideal-typical construction, not all of these features have to be constantly visible. They vary across both countries in the post-war period, as I outline in the empirical chapters with a focus on the last three decades. I show that the features also vary according to the political movements through which rightist nationalism is viewed. While racialisation was always at the core of the BNP's claims, for instance, UKIP's racialised aspect grew over time, and especially from about 2010. These four conceptual pieces thus help to examine rightist nationalism as a historically embedded phenomenon. In this dissertation I aim both to observe the changing surface variation of rightist nationalist expressions over the recent years, and to capture something of the deeper undercurrents of its exclusionary mechanisms, embedded within wider social and political shifts. Thus far I have considered rightist nationalism's core features as distinct from each other. The empirical chapters of

Parts 1 and 2 illustrate how these characteristics operate in both places, and I address this question more formally in Chapter 10. But first I turn to the research design and methodology.

3 Research design and methodology

The aim of this thesis is to trace the shape or character of rightist nationalism as it develops in the UK and Germany over the last decades. I seek to understand something of rightist nationalism's appeal since the early 1990s, but contextualise this timeframe in post-war history and pay attention to underlying, longer-term political, ideological, and socio-economic developments. The thesis thus adopts a longitudinal, two-step research design. I first draw on socio-economic and political macro-level trends to identify certain key moments in the recent histories of both countries. As a second step, I then take these key moments as lenses through which to view how Britain's and Germany's socio-economic and political landscapes developed over the years, and how the nationalist right responded to them. I follow the same groups of individuals in longitudinal panel surveys through more than two and a half decades, and analyse their social backgrounds and changing political perceptions as deeply embedded in the political realities of the time. By capturing something of the wider social climate at pivotal national moments, and then exploring the social character of rightist nationalism within them, I aim to also glimpse something of the deeper social structures that contribute to rightist nationalism's growing mainstream appeal. Embedding the data analysis in a wider comparative historical sociology, therefore, I seek to build a contextualised story of how today's rightist nationalism emerged from Germany's and the UK's longer-term social and political fabric.

The first part of this chapter addresses the research design and the chosen key moments in which I examine rightist nationalism in the UK and Germany. In the second part I outline the various data sources on which this thesis draws, the longitudinal samples of respondents, the core variables used in the panel data analysis, and the methodological approach which embeds largely descriptive data analysis in considerations of varying social contexts. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of the main limitations of data and research design.

I Two-step, longitudinal research design

The dissertation's research questions (see Chapter 1) suggest a longitudinal research design that is attentive to historical patterns and changing contexts. One of the general advantages of longitudinal data is that they provide opportunities to measure or grasp something about social change and, in case of panel studies, changes in the lives of individuals in a comprehensible order of events (Gayle and Lambert 2018: 1, 6-8, 11, 111; Longhi and Nandi 2015: 5, 57; see also: Laatz 1993: 535, 545). Some longitudinal data can be powerfully employed in panel regression models that make use of information from repeated contacts and control for unmeasured individual-specific effects (Gayle and Lambert 2018: 9, 61, 111-12, Ch. 5; Longhi and Nandi 2015: Chs. 9-10; Kohler and Kreuter 2009: 237-48; Treiman 2009: Ch. 15). Longitudinal data may also be amenable to more exploratory and descriptive analyses of life courses, such as sequence and cluster analysis (Pollock 2007: esp. 169; see also: Gauthier et al. 2010). In this thesis, I adopt a less technical and more interpretive approach to exploring the micro-level dynamics of individuals over time, keeping their responses firmly embedded in the historical context around them. To pay attention to historical and structural trends, I seek to make use of as many years of longitudinal data as possible. In practice, I explore the changing shape and character of British and German nationalism since the early 1990s. The choice of this time interval is largely determined by the availability of my panel data sources, but it enables me to follow the story of the right through the same individuals at least over the course of one generation. I recognise, however, that the developments in this period have longer roots, so that I also view these decades in light of both countries' wider post-war developments.

My research design follows two steps: as a first step, I use pointers from socio-economic macro-level data to select a number of critical national moments for the UK and Germany. Second, I then take these crucial moments as occasions in which I examine how British and German individuals experienced and responded to their countries' changing socio-economic and political landscapes. In this way, I not only

follow the same groups of individuals through several decades but also view the character of the right in certain years as being embedded within wider social developments as they unfold. Drawing on party manifestos, I also trace rightist nationalism's evolving character at the movement level through these key moments.

The empirical work starts at the outermost layer. I explore both countries' socio-economic and political macro-level development through indicators such as GDP growth, unemployment figures, net migration and percentage of foreigners among the overall population, election results, and measures of income inequality. Macro-analysis at the national level serves three purposes: first, it outlines the broad empirical story of the two countries and their rightist politics. By simultaneously tracking, for instance, economic recessions and recoveries, demographic changes, and the electoral vicissitudes of the nationalist and conservative right, I gain a better contextual understanding of what moved the two countries at certain times. Second, these macro-level trends also form the basis of selecting the critical national moments, that is, a certain range of years during which I then explore individual-level panel data. And third, the analysis of macro-level data allows me to view both countries in light of each other while also situating them within wider European political and economic post-war developments. This enables a contrast.

I choose the national key moments for their socio-political significance for each country, and thus for the weight that they might carry for shaping the broader political landscape and, by extension, rightist nationalism. I do not select them with a restrictive focus on key events that one might *a priori* presume to be crucial for the right in years to come. The selection of moments for a deeper exploration through panel data is instead guided inductively by the pointers emergent from the macro-level data that emphasise pivotal moments for the UK and Germany more generally. I pay particular attention to indicators that undergo significant change over time. As I discuss below, these years saw drastic developments, for instance, along economic variables such as GDP growth, inflation, or unemployment, but also with respect to cultural indicators such as net migration and numbers of asylum seekers. These point to important times of economic turmoil and recovery, or a sense of increasing

demographic challenges. Also turnout and electoral trends – particularly changes in government – can indicate political key moments. Some choices are additionally informed by specific political or historic junctures that are not immediately visible in the data. Devolution in Britain constitutes one example. When considering the precise years that constitute a moment with respect to data analysis, I have also taken into account how salient these socio-economic and political issues were at the time, that is, how individuals might have experienced them, and how strongly they were publicly discussed or even protested.

Chosen key moments

Based, primarily, on the pointers from the macro-level analysis and, secondly, historical and social considerations, I have chosen four British moments for a deeper exploration with panel data, and one additionally for a brief analysis of cultural and political variables. For the German data I have selected four moments. The first German moment comprises the years of 1990 to 1994. This interval includes a phase of economic troubles with plunging GDP and growing unemployment, unparalleled numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers, soaring hate crimes and rightist nationalist election successes, and the highly symbolic year of reunification. I might have preferred to start this moment from 1989, but then I would not have been able to include East-German respondents in the sample, who joined the survey only in 1990 (Goebel et al. 2019: 347). This was a moment strongly suggested both by significant macro-data developments and the watershed moment of the country's reunification. The second German moment encompasses the years of 2001 to 2005. This moment was again characterised by dropping GDP growth and the highest unemployment rate since reunification. The early 2000s also saw a spike in net migration numbers which was, however, moderate compared to the years of the early 1990s. This interval is furthermore important because conservatism was in opposition and undergoing a phase of modernisation (Clemens 2009: 127-30), while

the ruling Social Democrats enacted the highly contentious Agenda 2010 welfare reforms that led to significant welfare retrenchment. Conservatism under Angela Merkel came back into power in 2005 in a coalition with the Social Democrats.

The third German moment ranges from 2007 to 2010 to capture the years surrounding the economic crisis. Although Germany only experienced a relatively short recession, its decrease in GDP growth was deep – falling below minus 5 percent in 2009 – before recovering the following year. The decline in unemployment figures was only halted momentarily but continued from 2009. This fairly brief recession enables an exploration of the right’s social character before, during, and after the worst economic impact. It is a moment most strongly defined by economic uncertainty, the government’s countermeasures, and the global and European significance of the crisis. Yet while net migration was very low throughout these years, rightist political (and to a lesser degree: violent) crimes were at high levels; and so also from this perspective, this moment, which seems to contradict the usually close relation between immigration and a German nationalist backlash, promises to be instructive for an exploration of rightist nationalism at the micro-level.

Lastly, the fourth German moment consists of the years 2014 to 2017. Already before the “refugee crisis” of 2015/2016, Germany saw a steep increase in net migration figures and asylum applications, the former rising to more than half a million in 2014 (see BPB 2018b). This year also saw the formation of the anti-Islam PEGIDA movement in Saxony, and the best result of a rightist nationalist party in an European election (7.1 percent by the nascent AfD, equal to the Republicans’ result in 1989). Migration figures soared even further, particularly in 2015 and early 2016, and were subject to prolonged public discussions during which also voices within conservatism increasingly moved towards exclusivist positions (see e.g. Schuler 2015). The year 2017, the last year of the German survey, saw the AfD gain 12.6 percent in the federal election – the best result of a rightist nationalist party in post-war history. During these years, unemployment was the lowest since reunification, and also other economic indicators looked fairly inconspicuous. This last German

moment, therefore, was one at which questions of migration – not economy – and the rise of the nationalist right dominated public discussion.

The first moment of panel data analysis for the UK contains the years 1991, the first available wave, to 1993. These years saw an economic recession with shrinking GDP in 1991 after a decade of fluctuating but positive growth, and a steep rise in unemployment. As net migration was low and concerns over immigration were not as salient as they had been (Bale 2013: 31), this moment was characterised, in the first instance, by economic difficulties. Conservatism also met its own crisis, however. Shortly after the Thatcher years it faced deep internal rifts over the party's direction and legacy, and, crucially, the question of Europe (Gamble 1995). Resistance to the Maastricht Treaty shook the Conservatives and induced some of their Eurosceptic members to join the nascent UKIP (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 21-4; 2014b: 282). The second UK moment comprises the years 1997 to 2000. Economically, this moment showed fairly stable and positive GDP growth, and low and decreasing unemployment. But there were new demographic and symbolic challenges. After Conservatism lost power, Blair's New Labour opened the country to migration, which quickly led to a significant rise in the numbers of newcomers, despite Labour's subsequent move towards a more restrictive position (Kaufmann 2019: 150, 151; Shabi 2019). Political participation decreased, dropping to lowest turnout rates in post-war history (see Audickas et al. 2020: 25). At the same time devolution became reality, as national parliaments and assemblies became established in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. While macro-level data point to an important socio-political juncture, therefore, this moment was also a highly symbolic one for the UK and its regional politics.

Another socio-political moment of interest might lie in the years around 2004 that saw the eastern EU enlargement and a further surge in net migration figures due to the Labour government's decision to immediately admit the new European citizens (Clarke et al. 2017: 123; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 64). Economic indicators again were rather inconspicuous, displaying positive GDP growth and an unemployment rate even lower than in the late 1990s. For this reason, and also because net

migration figures had been – and would keep – rising for years, this moment might not have a clear enough justification for in-depth panel data analysis at this time interval. This is in spite of a first major success of UKIP at the 2004 European elections, winning 16.1 percent of the vote. As Ford and Goodwin 2014a (4-6, 61-5; see also: Goodwin 2016: 275-6) point out, this success was only very short-lived; the party's prolonged ascent would only really begin in the 2010s. I retain the years of 2003-2005 for the selection of the individuals in the panel to at least briefly explore their political commitments at this moment of European migration and ephemeral rightist success.

The third full British moment of in-depth panel data analysis roughly encompasses the years 2008 to 2012/2013, and thus covers the time of the economic crisis and austerity. Britain was strongly affected by the crisis (see Goodwin 2016: 276-8), particularly from 2009 when GDP per capita growth dropped to minus 5 percent, accompanied by soaring unemployment that Labour's initial Keynesian countermeasures were unable to stop. The year 2011 saw net disposable household income growth well under the level of inflation, and the worst unemployment figures (8 percent) which remained high in the following years. This chosen moment was therefore dominated by the economic troubles represented by these and other economic indicators, and the wider importance of the economic crisis for Europe and the world. But there are further reasons for considering this interval as a significant moment for the UK and its rightist movements. In 2010, the Conservatives came back into power in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats and ushered in a period of austerity and welfare retrenchment that further aggravated economic insecurities (see Clarke et al. 2017: 121). Anti-austerity protests sparked particularly in 2011 but continued also in the following years, as austerity turned into normality. At this moment, net migration figures had stalled slightly but remained at high levels with a surplus of overall more than 200,000 newcomers per year. These years were also characterised by the growing traction of UKIP's Eurosceptic and increasingly anti-immigrant message (Goodwin 2016: 283).

Net migration started rising again significantly from 2013, which constitutes the beginning of the fourth and final chosen moment for an analysis of the British

respondents' social and political backgrounds. This interval ranges from 2013/2014 to 2017/2018, and is one characterised by migration and Britain's relationship with the EU. Even though the UK had still not fully emerged from the shadow of the economic crisis, at least some economic indicators, such as unemployment, showed clear signs of improvement. The UK saw a particularly strong rise in net migration figures in 2015 when about 350,000 more people entered the country than left. In this year UKIP reached its best result at a general election (12.6 percent). Yet perhaps the EU referendum of 2016 made this a crucial and emblematic moment for the UK (and Europe). While economic consequences took time to materialise, social and political ramifications could be seen, for instance, in a sharp increase in hate crimes, a right-shifting conservatism, and prolonged political rifts and stagnation.

II Data and methods

Datasets and longitudinal samples

To realise the longitudinal two-step research design, I draw on a variety of data sources. At the national level, I use indicators from international organisations such as OECD, The World Bank, and Eurostat. I also draw on national ones such as the British Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the House of Commons Library, and the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB), the Federal Returning Officer, and the Federal Statistical Office. These macro-level data sources include diverse measures such as household disposable income, annual GDP growth, employment and unemployment rates, mean and median household income, inflation, measures of income inequality, rightist politically motivated and extremist (hate) crimes, general/federal and European election results, numbers of foreigners and those with "migratory backgrounds", and overall net migration. At times I have calculated own measures from these variables, such as household income growth minus inflation, vote shares, or relative percentages of population subgroups. Many of the macro-

level variables were available for both countries, particularly those indicators obtained from international organisations. Where no equivalent indicators were available, I have collected variables for both countries that speak to the same broader issues. I also analyse documents such as crime reports and party manifestos. Because important structural developments can occur at the local level (see e.g. Smångs 2016: 1368), I also pay attention to regional history and statistics. At the level of constituencies and districts, for instance, I draw on voting data from recent elections (2015 and 2017 in the UK; 2013 and 2017 in Germany), and numerous socio-economic characteristics of these sub-regional spatial units. These largely come from national sources, such as the British ONS and the House of Commons Library, and the German Federal Returning Officer and Federal Statistical Office. Given the wider interpretative approach, these only play a small role in this thesis; yet I briefly discuss insights from constituency-level regression models in Chapters 6 and 9.

The second set of main data sources, on which the core of my analysis rests, are large-scale longitudinal household panel surveys undertaken in both countries for several decades. These are the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which was recently integrated into the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS; see University of Essex 2019), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP; see SOEP 2019). They provide data relating a broad variety of questions and topics (see Alabrese et al. 2019: 133; Gayle and Lambert 2018: 14, 112; Goebel et al. 2019: 346, 357-8). Both the BHPS/UKHLS and SOEP began by interviewing all members of selected households and then followed up with the same individuals, as well as new members of their households, on an annual basis (Longhi and Nandi 2015: 9, 17-19, 115; see also: Gayle and Lambert 2018: 14, 18). The surveys therefore include information at the household and individual level. Over the course of the decades, they have added new households to the sample, and introduced additional booster samples of regional or demographic subgroups (see Gayle and Lambert 2018: 15, 16; Goebel et al. 2019: 347-8; Longhi and Nandi 2015: 17, 137, 138, 140; Kroh et al. 2018: 8-24). The survey samples thus became more diverse over time.

The British BHPS began in 1991 with respondents living in England, Wales, and Scotland, while Northern Irish respondents were only added in 2001 (Longhi and Nandi 2015: 18). In order to capture a longer period of time, and because I view developments of the 1990s as important for an understanding of today's right, I draw on the survey's information from the beginning. As a consequence, my longitudinal sample does not include respondents from Northern Ireland. This is not ideal; yet it can perhaps be justified by the longer-term emphasis of the project and the relative focus on what in many ways appears as a specifically English rightist nationalism. After the BHPS ended in 2008, its remaining respondents were included in the second wave of UKHLS in 2010/2011 (Gayle and Lambert 2018: 17), a survey with a much larger sample size. The German SOEP started in 1984 with West-German respondents. In order to also include responses from eastern German individuals – who seem critical to an understanding of today's rightist nationalism – I am using the survey's waves from 1990 onwards, which is when households in the GDR were added (Goebel et al. 2019: 347; Longhi and Nandi 2015: 17).

I have compiled and enabled the longitudinal datasets and carried out all analyses with Stata (version 15.1), which is a useful software for these tasks (Gayle and Lambert 2018: 121). From the assembled panel datasets I have constructed a British and a German longitudinal sample, comprising those individuals who were available at all chosen key moments above. In every year of the analysis, the two groups contain the same individuals throughout; they are, in principle, balanced panels (see Longhi and Nandi 2015: 6) minus usually small numbers of missing values on certain variables. I therefore analyse the changing political views voiced by the same individuals, rather than cross-sectional population averages for a given year. Intellectually, the choice of the key moments guides the analytical focus of contexts in which to view the character of the right; and pragmatically, they allow me to create longitudinal samples that are large enough for meaningful analysis. Had I only chosen those individuals present in every single year of the surveys, then the longitudinal samples would have been even more restricted in size and would hold even fewer individuals who expressed an affinity for rightist nationalism.

In both longitudinal samples, the numbers of respondents favouring rightist nationalism in a given year are low, only rising in the latest waves when more individuals were drawn to UKIP and the AfD. In fact, the British survey only provides information on preferences for UKIP and the BNP from Wave 5 (2013/2014) onward. In the German survey, information on political preferences for rightist nationalism is available in all years apart from 1992. But most years only include low case numbers of nationalism sympathisers. As my primary focus of analysis, I thus view rightist nationalism in both countries through larger groups of what I term “occasional nationalists”. Drawing on the longitudinal information in the surveys, these comprise all those individuals who *at some point* in the survey – i.e. in any year or wave – expressed a preference for rightist nationalism *on any of the variables capturing political preferences or past voting* (see details in Table 3.1 below). This way I can follow precisely the same groups of individuals in both countries since the early 1990s. I can also analyse their social backgrounds and political views in more detail due to their much larger numbers compared to the small groups of individuals expressing a preference for rightist nationalism in a given year. Yet where instructive, I also refer to the smaller groups who usually paint a very similar picture.

Table 3.1: criteria for selecting “occasional nationalists”

	<i>Britain (UKHLS)</i>	<i>Germany (SOEP)</i>
<i>Survey variables on which respondents indicated a preference for rightist nationalist parties at least once</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vote4 (“Which one?”), filtered through variables Vote1 (“Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?”) and Vote2 (“Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others?”) ▪ Vote3 (“If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?”) ▪ Vote8 (“Which political party did you vote for?”), filtered through variable Vote7 (“Did you vote in this [past] year’s general election?”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PI0012_h (“Which party do you lean toward?”), filtered through variable Plh011 (“Many people in Germany lean towards one party in the long term, even if they occasionally vote for another party. Do you lean towards a particular party?”) ▪ Plh0333 (“And how was it at the last federal election on September 22, 2013? Which party did you vote for?”)
<i>Nationalist parties listed in surveys</i>	Recorded as two separate answers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UKIP ▪ BNP 	Listed parties change over the years but include as separate categories: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Republicans and/or NPD and/or DVU and/or Die Rechte ▪ AfD (from 2014)

Notes: the British UKHLS survey lists nationalist parties in political “vote” variables only from Wave 5 (2013/2014), with the exception of Wave 8. The German SOEP survey does so from the beginning, with the exception of Wave/Year 1992. German variable names can change over the survey years. I have constructed the wider group of “occasional nationalists” based on any voiced preference for any of these listed parties at any time in the survey, while also at times pointing to potential differences according to what parties they supported. Information on the variables and wordings of questions can be found in the UKHLS and SOEP data documentation. Much of the information is also available under the following links:
<https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/documentation/mainstage/dataset-documentation>;
<http://companion.soep.de/Topics%20of%20SOEPcore/Attitudes,%20Values,%20and%20Personality.html?highlight=party> (accessed 22 February 2022).

The British longitudinal sample contains about 1,880 respondents whom I follow from 1991 to 2017/2018. The wider group of “occasional nationalists” includes approximately 290 individuals who have at some point in the UKHLS waves voiced a preference for rightist nationalism. The vast majority favoured UKIP. A small number expressed an affinity for BNP, but most of these have in other years also leaned

towards UKIP. The German sample includes about 2,210 individuals present at all key moments from 1990 to 2017. In most years, German rightist nationalism is viewed through political preferences for fairly radical parties, such as the Republicans, or even extremist ones such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the German People's Union (DVU), or smaller groups such as Die Rechte. Affinities for the AfD are recorded in the survey from 2014 onwards, and during this time the number of those leaning towards rightist nationalism increased significantly. The wider group of occasional nationalists is smaller – comprising about 160 individuals – than that in the British sample. This is because many of those German respondents expressing a preference for nationalism were only present in the beginning or end of the survey, but rarely throughout. About 110 occasional nationalists later voiced affinities for the AfD, and about 80 preferred at some point in the survey other, more radical nationalist parties.

Variable choices in panel surveys

Both panel surveys frequently offer more than a thousand variables at the household and individual level per year. That is a wealth of data to consider. Many variables are available in every survey wave, while others are asked less frequently, and some are only available in a single year. In this thesis, I focus on a relatively small number of core variables selected to address the problems and themes set out in the research questions. I seek to explore the social backgrounds and political understandings of rightist nationalists over time. While not all variables are directly comparable or available, I aim to capture the same wider concepts in both surveys.

One of these concepts is social location (see Chapter 1). I examine respondents' "race", place of birth, or "migratory background" to pay attention to rightist nationalism's deeply racialised dimensions. Also education is important, and not only because it emerges nearly ubiquitously as a crucial factor in examining rightist nationalism; it speaks, moreover, to rightist nationalism's (and populism's)

anti-intellectualism and anti-cosmopolitanism. I also view social backgrounds through additional variables that measure age, sex, and public or private sector employment, as well as occupation and employment status. Age is instructive as it provides a sense of the different cohorts within the groups of individuals and their possible life experiences. In some contexts, older age also emerges as an explanatory variable of rightist nationalism support (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 175; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 4; but cf. Betz 1994: 146; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 11-13). Rightist nationalism's male overrepresentation is well established (e.g. Betz 1994: 142-6; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 154-5; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 5; 2017: 446; Müller 2016: 14). This is also the case for the groups of individuals whom I am following, particularly visible in the German sample. The question of public sector employment seems relevant for historical reasons. Mann (2004: 14), for instance, found a strong identification with the state as a crucial characteristic of fascists. But in the post-war period, and particularly from the 1970s, when many rightist parties developed a neo-liberal orientation and might have despised those relying on the state, rightist nationalism became situated in private sector employment (Betz 1994: 148-50). Rightist nationalists in both longitudinal samples were indeed found most commonly in the private sector; and this remained virtually unchanged over the course of the survey.

The second theme or concept that I seek to explore with the panel data is that of political views and understandings, and perceptions of the world. Perhaps the most crucial variables are those that measure political preferences, as I use their information to differentiate between subgroups in the samples. I discuss the details of these variables below, but I note here one important caveat: I am interested in exploring rightist nationalism in a more general sense – yet at the level of individuals I view it largely as measured by more narrowly defined party preferences. I draw on additional indicators that go beyond immediate party politics. But for the most part I take individuals' party choices as an empirical lens to view the underlying phenomenon that might also be expressed in other ways. As the following chapters illustrate, specific rightist actors display ideological and electoral changes over time.

I thus aim to focus 'on countries, rather than parties', as Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 7) put it, and individuals as embedded in the histories and daily realities of these countries. Respondents might hold certain views and place their political commitments in response to what positions existing parties offer; or they might follow shifts in the political mainstream and develop their views over time. While I have to largely view rightist nationalism through individuals' party preferences, I thus ground these in changing national contexts in which a specific party preference might, over time, bear a different relation to a more broadly conceived nationalism.

Another political variable available for both countries over the vast majority of years is subjective political interest. I see this indicator as providing a background for respondents' political preferences, as it entails the question of whether they situated their party choice in a deeper sense of political engagement or conviction, or whether they voiced their preference without a wider interest in the political world around them. The use of these more narrowly political measures is complemented by a number of variables that capture political views and understandings in a wider sense. They vary more strongly across both countries, and are not always regularly available for all chosen key moments. Some are asked only very rarely, at times also because they refer to specific problems particularly topical in a given year. In both the UK and Germany I look at respondents' assessment of the way democracy works in their country, and how much respondents worried about crime trends (Germany) or becoming affected by crime (UK). Both surveys also offer variables capturing economic preferences, worries, and future expectations. In the German survey, I consider additional variables such as worries about immigration and terrorism, or an assessment of refugees' influence on economy and culture. For the British respondents, I explore variables such as the importance of their ethnic or racial background for the sense of who they are, their national identification as British or specifically English, their assessment of the most important political issues of the time, views on the responsiveness of governments or public officials, and their view on whether the UK should be a member of the European Union.

These variables speak, therefore, to different aspects of the individuals' socio-political perception of the world; and they also speak to crucial problems surrounding "race" and nation, and post-war social change. Viewed in changing contexts, these variables paint a picture of how the sample respondents act as political subjects at certain moments that bring their specific socio-economic challenges. The aim is, therefore, to contextually observe and embed what can be glimpsed of these individuals' political perceptions, and thus perhaps to modestly interpret some of the possible motivations behind their responses (see Ringer 2000: 94, 101; Weber 1978: 4). Together with information on social background and political preferences, these variables form a broader characterisation of rightist nationalism over time, and add to a fuller picture of how the respondents might see the world as political beings in varying contexts. This way I hope to understand something about how and why they chose rightist nationalism as their political home.

Main dependent variables

I introduce the chosen variables of the panel surveys in the in chapters in which they become relevant. The centrality of the variables capturing political party preferences, however, requires a more detailed discussion. Both datasets, and particularly the British one, offer several variables to measure political preferences. Some of these ask about general party preferences; some about the strength of support for the chosen party; some are filter variables prefacing the previous questions; and others ask about whether and for what party respondents have voted in the last election. As I further discuss below, I focus on the variables capturing general party preference, rather than vote choice in the last election.

It is important to note that the variables asking about political preference are not equivalent in both countries. The German variable is introduced by a filter question that asks whether a respondent leans towards a specific political party in the longer term. Those who answer "yes" are then asked toward which party they

lean. As previous research has pointed out (Brenke and Kritikos 2017: 597; Lengfeld and Dilger 2018: 188), this question is therefore aimed at more stable political commitments rather than short-term voting intentions. The British survey has two variables capturing party preference, Vote3 and Vote4 (see Table 3.1 above). Two filter questions initially lead to Vote4 if either one is answered with “yes”. These filter questions ask, first, whether respondents support a particular party, and second, if the previous question was answered in the negative, whether they feel somewhat closer to one party than to others. In some way, Vote4 might thus be seen as approximately comparable to the German variable in the sense of general, and perhaps longer-term, party preference; but already the two possible pathways to this answer are worded very differently.

If my aim was to establish a rather strict comparison between (longer-term) political commitments of British and German respondents, I could restrict Vote4 to only those who have provided an answer via the first filter question (party support). This would drastically reduce case numbers. As discussed above, however, a strict comparison is not my aim. Instead, I seek to draw on as much information as possible to understand something about rightist nationalism within each country, and through the contrast between both places. For the German variable there is no alternative question, and this means that in most years more than half of the respondents state that they do not lean towards any party. I still use this information by recoding the party preference variable so that it includes those who have “no” preference, and thus get a sense of their social backgrounds and perceptions of the world as well. Yet the group of those stating a political affinity, for instance for conservatism or rightist nationalism, is comparatively small by comprising just under half of the respondents. The British survey, on the other hand, already aims to capture as much information as possible on party preference by leading respondents to Vote4 through two filter variables. If they state two times that they do not support or feel closer to any party, they are asked yet another question, namely what political party they would probably support in case of an election the next day (Vote3). This is a different question, and gains – in relative terms – more responses for smaller parties, while Vote4 tends to

capture affinities for Labour and Conservatives much more strongly. That said, in most years both variables express an overall similar picture.

This is one of the reasons why, for my analysis of the British survey, I have combined the responses from Vote3 and Vote4 into an overall variable of political preference that also includes “none” and “don’t know” as meaningful categories. I am cognisant of the fact that these variables are not asking the same question, but believe that this methodological choice can be justified. First, this way I gain more responses on the combined variable, which is particularly useful for exploring the social and political characteristics of those who voice a preference for smaller political movements, such as rightist nationalism. Second, as discussed, Vote4 already conflates responses from two different filter questions. If I wanted to properly disentangle these different measures of political preference, I would also have to make distinctions between individuals’ responses on Vote4 based on how they provided their answer. This would result in three different measures, all with case numbers of much more limited use; and it would also result in much more fluctuation of respondents in these groups who might sometimes provide their party preference on Vote4 and at other times on Vote3.

Third, there is a precedent for combining both variables within the survey itself. The BHPS includes a variable simply called “Vote”, which merges responses for Vote3 and Vote4, except for Wave 2, which does not contain Vote3. The employed filter variables were aimed at making Vote3 and Vote4 mutually exclusive. While this is indeed the case for UKHLS, the BHPS survey has small numbers of respondents who gave an answer to both questions. In those cases, and if political preferences were conflicting, the combined “Vote” variable appears to give preference to the answer for Vote4. This makes sense, as it is capturing a stronger political affinity, and I have done the same in all of the rather few cases in which this was necessary. The fourth reason for combining both variables is that I am more interested in who, at certain moments, would generally state a preference for rightist nationalism – particularly when this might carry a certain stigma with it – rather than in the precise question underlying this stated preference.

These considerations also inform my approach to recoding the German variable of political affinity. While the vast majority of those respondents who voice a political preference do so for only one political strand, very few list several parties. I have included most of those cases into an “other and combinations” category, while retaining a more detailed variable version that differentiates between “rather rightist” and “rather leftist” combinations. Also using the SOEP survey, Lengfeld and Dilger (2018: 188, see their table) have merged “other” with “combination”, while Brenke and Kritikos (2017: 597, 602, see their tables) have created an own category for “several, rather leftist” parties and do not emphasise other combinations. For my main variable of political preference I include those who list rightist nationalism among their multiple responses in the “rightist nationalism” category. My main reason is, as above, that stating support for the radical or even extremist right in Germany might be seen in most years as a somewhat unpopular or even stigmatised choice (see Bergmann et al. 2016: 3); and the usually low case numbers of rightist nationalists reflect this. Hence I am most interested in all of those individuals who express a preference for rightist nationalism in a survey, even if a few of them additionally listed a second party. In practice, the number of cases to whom this applies is very low; in the full SOEP wave of 2017, for instance, fewer than 10 respondents voiced a preference for both a rightist nationalist party and another one³. A further reason for this choice lies in the low numbers of individuals expressing a preference for rightist nationalism. Given that this is my main interest, it is useful to maximise the case numbers, even if marginally.

Constructing the variables in this way follows my aim to make the most of these surveys rather than to ensure the strictest comparability. During the analysis I keep in mind that the variables are not measuring exactly the same; yet in a broader sense, both are lenses through which to view political commitments. Where useful or possible, however, I differentiate between variables and subgroups to confirm the overall picture. I find that usually differences in social backgrounds associated with

³ This can be viewed in SOEP’s online tool: https://paneldata.org/soep-core/data/bhp/bhp_184_01 (accessed 01/06/2020).

different political preferences, or those between regions, are more instructive than differences between the precise variables through which these political preferences have been measured. This gives me some confidence in my methodological choices.

The datasets of both countries also contain a variable each that asks for what party respondents have voted in the last election. In the German case, this only pertains to the 2013 federal election, captured in the survey year of 2014. In the British surveys, Vote8 (with Vote7 as filter) is available on several occasions but not on a continuous basis. Also because this is a retrospective question and may, depending on timing of the interview, only be available for certain respondents in a given wave, this is not my first variable of choice to capture political views. It is worth noting, however, that this variable often presents a picture that is fairly consistent with that displayed by Vote3 and Vote4 above. In Wave 7 of the UKHLS survey, for instance, 37 percent of respondents in the longitudinal sample expressed a preference for the Conservatives on my combined Vote3/Vote4 variable, compared to 35 percent of the smaller group who responded to the question on their vote in the last election. Other party choices are also overall similar, such as Labour (26 and 26 percent), Liberal Democrats (6 and 9 percent), Green Party (2 and 3 percent), or UKIP (7 and 8 percent). I also include information from the variables on past voting in the construction of the groups of wider, occasional nationalists that I have outlined above. This is again in line with the aim of viewing affinity for nationalism broadly while maximising the case numbers for meaningful analysis.

Methods and analytical approach

Located in comparative historical sociology, most of the narrative presented in the thesis relies on descriptive data analysis embedded in historical contextualisation. At the macro level, I follow the trajectories of a variety of socio-economic indicators over the available decades. As discussed above, these have guided the selection of certain key moments in both countries' histories for a more in-depth analysis of the panel

data. But the macro-data exploration is also useful for embedding the individual-level analysis by getting a sense of the social world around the respondents. And it has yielded findings in itself to which I return in Chapter 10 where I draw out the contrast between the UK and Germany. In addition, I employ constituency- or district-level data in (multiple) linear regression models to explore the potential relationship between socio-economic or demographic characteristics of certain localities and their vote share gained by rightist nationalist parties. The aim is to enrich the interpretive approach to panel data with a more controlled analysis of regional key variables in recent years that saw, in both the UK and Germany, rightist nationalism's greatest strength. They provide a useful background for the individual-level panel analysis that forms the core of this thesis.

In the panel data analysis I follow the British and German groups of individuals over the course of nearly three decades. My approach is broadly informed by Michael Mann's effort to, in a Weberian fashion (see e.g. Weber 1978: 302-7), not only conceive class as complex but also move beyond explanations of rightist nationalism predominantly based on class or narrow socio-economic background. Mann (2004: 3; see also: 19-23, 159-60, 171-2, 190-1) identifies wider social locations or "core fascist constituencies" of the inter-war period that were particularly sympathetic to fascist values centred on an adulation of the nation-state. 'We must reconstruct that nation-state-loving constituency', Mann (2004: 3) writes, 'in order to see what kinds of people might be tempted toward fascism'. He does so through an in-depth engagement with, and partial re-interpretation of, a vast array of data sources, and also attempts to understand fascists through what is known about their biographies. Mann does this also in related work (2005: especially Chs. 8, 9; see also: 2000) in which he seeks to assemble the biographies and "careers" of Nazi perpetrators as well as possible to understand their backgrounds and experiences, and the pathways through which they were socialised into committing organised mass murder. In using the wealth of data available about the individuals' socio-political experiences in the British and German survey, I also hope to grasp something of character and "core constituencies" of rightist nationalism. I explore the social locations and changing

political views of the same individuals over time, and hope to understand something of what moved the nationalist right at pivotal moments of both countries' histories.

Much of the analysis is based on descriptive cross-tabulations of the chosen variables of social location over subgroups defined by political preferences. I do this for the same individuals as they move through the decades, and embed the analysis within a consideration of the social world around them. This way I am able to explore in how far the character of rightist nationalism – as constituted by these individuals' social backgrounds and political views – changes over time, and at what moment the social face of the right differs from that displayed at other times. I also draw on the longitudinal dimension of these surveys in a more detailed sense, for instance by connecting variables of different years, and exploring individuals' transitions between variables' different categories over time. Where possible, Mann (2004: e.g. 118-9, 147, 149, and tables on pp. 381-5, 387, 388) also compares fascists' backgrounds to social characteristics of followers of other political movements. While my focus lies on rightist nationalism, I embed this analysis where instructive in the characteristics of conservatism, centre-left politics, those rejecting all parties, the overall samples, or wider society. This enables a further contextualisation, as I not only view rightist nationalism at changing socio-economic key moments but also consider what picture other movements or the full samples presented at the time.

Each of the dissertation's two parts engages with one country's history and the analysis of its longitudinal sample primarily on its own, with only few references to each other or future events. I thus focus on a historically embedded narrative attentive to the particularities of each case in its historical moments. Yet from this detailed analysis arises the contrast between both cases at which I occasionally hint in chapter conclusions but predominantly address in Chapter 10. I pay attention to both countries' unique characteristics and how they illuminate or provide a Geertzian "commentary" on each other, while also pointing to wider issues that might be relevant beyond the scope of Britain and Germany (see Geertz 1971: vii, 4, 21, 22).

Limitations and considerations

To conclude this chapter, I acknowledge a number of data limitations and considerations. Perhaps most importantly, the longitudinal samples cannot be seen as being representative of British or German society more widely. Respondents' selection into the samples is based on their presence at all chosen national key moments; and this, in turn, might have been influenced by both coincidence and specific features in their backgrounds. Individuals with diverse ethnic backgrounds who joined the German survey in the beginning, for instance, were less likely to remain available decades later, as many moved abroad or dropped out for other reasons (see the attrition of Sample B in Kroh et al. 2018: 39). I keep in mind, therefore, that I am not working with representative samples. Instead, I am following the same groups of people (minus occasional missing values) on their social and political journeys through nearly three decades. The aim is not to explain support of rightist nationalism in general, but to understand something about the changing shape of the right, as embodied by these specific individuals. That said, many of the variables in my analysis show social background distributions of these respondents that often appear fairly close to those of the full survey samples, at least in the early years. As time goes on, however, they grow further apart – particularly with respect to their older age and limited cultural diversity, as the ongoing surveys received new members on various occasions. Rightist nationalism sympathisers are often particularly underrepresented in surveys (Eatwell 2000: 175, 186). I have indicated above that voicing these political preferences may entail a certain stigma; and some who harbour rightist extremist views might not even participate in surveys or opinion polls (Küpper et al. 2019: 252). Especially the information available in the German survey data shows that many rightist nationalists were not commonly present throughout the wide range of survey years. Their number in my longitudinal sample, which relies on data from nearly three decades, is consequently relatively low.

The risk of identifying respondents in the surveys is minimal. To make certain that my analyses or outputs do not lead to inadvertent breaches in data

confidentiality, however, I have followed disclosure control guidance particularly intended for more detailed dataset versions that entail a higher, albeit still very low, risk of identification. This applies mainly when small cell counts display unusual background characteristics or are linked to other data sources such as low-level geographic information. Guides from the Government Statistical Service (GSS 2014) and UK Data Archive (2017) provide a good overview of potential issues arising from tables with low cell counts. Unsafe cells are often considered those with fewer than three cases (GSS 2014: 9; UK Data Archive 2017: 6), but I also treat cells with caution that hold a slightly larger number of underlying cases. Depending on data structure and analysis, I employ a number of strategies to avoid unsafe cells, such as generally aiming not to provide precise information on cells and rows with few cases; usually reporting rounded percentages while omitting underlying cell counts; generally presenting case numbers of samples and sub-groups rounded to the nearest 10, and often as ranges when referring to several years; merging, suppressing, or reducing to zero small cells when presenting tables; referring to pooled percentages of several years comprising a key moment, rather than to percentages of individual years; and carefully considering whether the combination of individually safe tables or descriptive analyses may inadvertently disclose information (e.g. differencing, see GSS 2014: 19). These measures go beyond what would strictly be required for the datasets that I use in this analysis; yet the slightly decreased precision – results should not rest on small fluctuations in cell counts in any case – are worth accepting for an additional effort to preserve data confidentiality.

As discussed above, I predominantly examine rightist nationalism's social character through the wider groups of "occasional nationalists". This way I draw on the surveys' longitudinal information and gain larger case numbers that allow a more detailed analysis. Yet I acknowledge that this comes with a drawback. To follow and delineate the changing shape of the right as contextually embedded also means to analyse the panel data in a way that stays close to how individuals might have perceived the social and political world around them at the time. Viewing rightist nationalism as constituted by the group of "occasional nationalists" breaks, to some

extent, with the aim of strictly embedded writing. While their social backgrounds and political views remain grounded in the realities of the time, I am observing them as nationalists at moments in which they may actually have favoured another political movement or none at all.

Introducing this anachronistic element into the analysis is, however, a pragmatic choice to glimpse something more of rightist nationalism in the face of data limitations. It is an attempt to make the most of the available data. As outlined above, at least for the British sample it is the only way of following a thus-constructed group of rightist nationalists through the decades before their political preferences are explicitly displayed in only the very recent survey waves. It is worth noting, though, that the data seem to justify this way of exploring the social character of rightist nationalism: in both countries, also the wider group of occasional nationalists exhibit certain characteristics that set them apart from those who have never voiced an affinity for nationalism. The same is true, to a slightly lesser degree, for those respondents of the British longitudinal sample who in 2016 espoused leaving the European Union. Already in the early 1990s, future Leave and Remain supporters show differences in their social locations and political understandings. This means that, while some respondents' perceptions changed and developed over time, others already held their specific political views for decades, even if they were not yet expressing a preference for rightist nationalism in the survey.

Finally, both surveys involve various minor challenges to a longitudinal use in the longer-term sense of the word. For example, the British survey does not provide the variable *Vote3* in 1992, and omits all *Vote* variables in 2016/2017, while east-German respondents were not asked about their political preferences in 1990 and 1991. Due to the transition from the BHPS to the UKHLS, Wave 2009/2010 constitutes a longitudinal gap in the British survey in which no answers for these respondents were recorded. Furthermore, especially in the larger UKHLS survey, each wave includes interviews carried out over the course of about two years. In the longitudinal sample, a small number (on average 6 percent) of individuals is thus interviewed in a later year than others. For simplicity, and given the small percentages, I generally

refer to the year in which the vast majority has been interviewed, unless there are analytical reasons to be more precise. These are some of the examples that show that these datasets are – as usual – not perfect. Yet given that they span several decades, they nevertheless constitute impressive and unique data sources that are being constantly improved. These and other limitations are important to note; but they do not present insurmountable challenges for data analysis, especially with the less technical and more interpretive approach that this thesis adopts.

PART I: UNITED KINGDOM

The chosen key moments for the panel data analysis start from the early 1990s. But these years are embedded within the socio-economic and political developments of the longer post-war period, which some of the survey respondents have experienced. I thus introduce this first empirical part with a brief outline of this historic background, the Conservative Party's longer-term standpoints on Europe and migration, and the British post-war fascist and rightist nationalist tradition. Britain's post-war years were characterised, amongst other things, by the gradual loss of the Empire's colonies while immigration from those territories into Britain increased (see Eatwell 2003: 331; Kaufmann 2019: 141). Perhaps also in the face of the 1958 racist attacks in Notting Hill, the following decades saw the introduction of anti-discrimination and "race relations" legislation. Yet at the same time, rising "non-white" immigration was met not only with growing public and Conservative worries about demographic changes to the British nation, but was also restricted by various acts concerning British nationality and Commonwealth migration that increasingly racialised citizenship and belonging (see Bale 2013: 30, 31; Bhambra 2017a, 2017b; Eatwell 2003: 331; Judt 2007: 336; Kaufmann 2019: 141-2; Smith 1994: 96-7, 101, 152, 180-1). It was particularly the British Conservative Party that, over the next decades, nurtured its image 'as the "tough" party on migration' (Eatwell 2003: 337; see also: 346; 2000: 181).

Conservatism showed a particularly exclusivist face with Enoch Powell's 1968 "Rivers of Blood" speech, which Kaufmann (2019: 143-4; see also: Gilroy 2000: 47-9; Smith 1994: 152-4) sees as a populist and nationalist manifestation very similar to today's rightist movements. This was one example of the socio-cultural proximity that the conservative and nationalist right could reach at times, and particularly during phases of symbolic or actually rising cultural diversity. But also the Tories' official immigration stance continued to tighten (Bale 2013: 31; Bale and Partos 2014: 608, 609). Examples include Conservative leaders' calls for voluntary repatriation (Bale

and Partos 2014: 607) and the Heath administration's next legal instalment to restrict "non-white" immigration in 1971 (see Judt 2007: 336; Smith 1994: 180-1). This is to highlight, therefore, Bale's (2013: 27) assessment that 'the British Conservative Party took a tough line on immigration, and sometimes couched it in pretty populist tones, before UKIP (or, indeed the British National Party or its forerunner, the National Front) came on the scene'.

The Conservative Party's aim to sufficiently cover disquiet about migration continued with the ascent of Margaret Thatcher, who led the Tories from 1975 and became prime minister in 1979. By then the National Front had participated in three general elections (1970, February 1974, October 1974) – albeit with only small numbers of candidates (see Eatwell 2000: 173) – and was preparing for a much more concentrated attempt in the upcoming 1979 election. Perhaps also in reaction to the (relative) rise of this extremist party, and polls indicating that nearly a third of the British electorate spoke in favour of the repatriation of immigrants, Thatcher expressed in 1978 her sympathy for people's fears of being "swamped" by culturally different newcomers (Eatwell 2003: 339; see also: 2000: 182; Bale 2013: 31, 33; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 23; Kaufmann 2019: 147; Lloyd 2002: 430). She also suggested the "prospect of a clear end to immigration" (Bale and Partos 2014: 610)⁴. Thatcher soon followed her words with action by vowing in the next year's election campaign to further constrain immigration, and by emphasising the necessity of law and order (Eatwell 2003: 340). In 1981, her government passed the British Nationality Act that curtailed citizenship rights for people from the (former) colonies (Smith 1994: 180), thus equating the designation "British" with the islands of the United Kingdom rather than the Empire (Bhambra 2017a: 220).

Amidst the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and shortly before the oil crisis, the UK joined the European Community in 1973. In a 1975 referendum on its continued membership a two-thirds majority voted to remain. Thatcher's governments from 1979 onwards were characterised by a strong neo-liberal turn with welfare cuts and

⁴ A transcript of the TV interview can be found here: <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103485> (accessed 08/07/2020).

privatisations (see Gamble 1995: 13, 17, 18; Judis 2016: 93; Judt 2007: 540, 542; Lloyd 2002: 453-4). She also oversaw the 1982 Falklands War, which Gilroy (2000: 51-2) views before the background of Conservatism's continuing nationalism and anti-immigrant stance. Thatcher's rule was defined, moreover, by growing Euroscepticism (see Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 192; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 21, 23; Judis 2016: 92-3; Kaufmann 2019: 147). Facing the inexorably declining Empire, the Conservatives had in the 1960s and 1970s undertaken strategic steps to direct British interests towards Europe (see Gamble 1995: 20). This changed with Thatcher. At first ambivalent in her acceptance or rejection of steps towards further European integration (Gamble 1995: 20-1), she soon turned increasingly opposed to a closer Union (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 192; Lloyd 2002: 458) and asked for Britain to be compensated for its financial contributions (Judt 2007: 526, 541). She warned against the loss of national identity and sovereignty in her 1988 "Bruges Speech"⁵, which sparked less than half a year later the formation of the Bruges Group, a rightist think tank arguing against European centralisation. One of its members was Alan Sked, a former Liberal politician who would a few years later form UKIP (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 21). Thatcher had thus legitimised hostility to the European project (Gamble 1995: 23), which would in short time lead to deep rifts among the Conservatives while creating an opening for an even harder variant of Euroscepticism.

Thatcher resigned in 1990. But her legacy continued to shape the following years and decades. I touch upon this briefly in the following chapters. Chapter 4, for instance, outlines how UKIP emerged among Conservatism's crisis over Thatcher's weakening of the Tories' traditional standpoints, economic problems and, notably, the question of Europe (see Gamble 1995). This constituted another example of the intricate interactions between the conservative and nationalist right. Furthermore, Thatcher's positions left their traces in New Labour's centrist economic positions, as I indicate in Chapter 5; and they materialised also in Conservatism's recurrent embrace of Euroscepticism in the early 2000s and mid-2010s (see Chapters 5 and 6).

⁵ A transcript of the speech can be found here: <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332> (accessed 09/07/2020).

Although this is not the focus of this thesis, these chapters, and the wider post-war outline, make an instructive point: it was not so much Boris Johnson's recent leadership that gave British Conservatism a stronger Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant character. Rather, from a longer-term perspective, it was David Cameron's leadership that was – at least initially (see Bale 2018: 267; Partos and Bale 2015: 172) – unusually mild on these issues. British Conservatism has traditionally captured many of rightist nationalism's claims, albeit mostly in a more socially acceptable language.

Embedded within this broader political outline was the history of British fascism and rightist nationalism. The Second World War had, Eatwell (2003: 327; see also: 21; 2000: 183; Vines 2014: 261) argues, 'helped to make antifascism a key aspect of British national identity and served to reinforce central aspects of Britishness', including 'a defiant story of democratic Britain standing alone'. But as he outlines in detail, also the post-war period saw several small fascist groups, such as Oswald Mosley's Union Movement, which had their roots in inter-war fascist creed and organisations (Eatwell 2003: 328-31, 333-5; 1998: 143-4; see also: Fielding 1981: 21-2). They often praised strong leadership and heroism, castigated liberal democracy, aimed to reconcile or transcend different ideologies and social classes, and continued – with varying intensity – to defend Nazism, while adhering to anti-Semitism and biological racism. In the face of increasing migration of the 1950s and early 1960s, Mosley had high hopes for electoral success. Yet despite their best efforts, his Union Movement remained hardly visible in national politics (see Eatwell 2003: 332). One aspect of his ideological thought is especially worth highlighting, as it foreshadowed later developments of the nationalist right. While Mosley remained hostile to representative democracy, he suggested to check and balance strong leaders' power by regular referenda over the continuation of the government (Eatwell 2003: 330). He favoured an elitist executive, in other words, but simultaneously envisioned the use of an instrument of participatory democracy that would soon become a key element of (rightist) populist political demands (see e.g. Canovan 1981: Ch. 5; Mudde 2007: 151-3).

In 1967, the National Front was established through a merger of various smaller extremist movements, and led by a chairman who had been a member of Mosley's inter-war fascist organisation, the British Union of Fascists (Eatwell 2003: 334, 335; Fielding 1981: 19-20). Five years later, the National Front's leadership was taken over by John Tyndall, who would in the 1980s also found the BNP. His aims included a move away from undisguised Nazism in favour of a more explicitly *British* white nationalism, and, similarly to Mosley, he also advocated the creation of a new state under a strong executive that would involve frequent referenda to sanction the leadership's decisions (Eatwell 335, 336; 1998: 146; Fielding 1981: 22, 66). The National Front therefore remained 'openly racist and less than keen on liberal democracy', as Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 23) put it. In line with its racialised parole of "Britain for the British" (Mudde 2007: 139), it demanded the deportation of the UK's non-white population – including (former) immigrants' "descendants and dependants" – so that Britain could truly "remain a White country" (Fielding 1981: 68). The party further opposed Britain's participation in the European Community and United Nations, endorsed economic nationalism and protectionism, and advocated harsh law-and-order measures, such as the restoration of capital punishment (see Eatwell 2003: 336; 1998: 146-7; Fielding 1981: 9, 66-9). Despite nominally rejecting the fascist label (Eatwell 2000: 172; 1998: 146), the National Front could never shake off its fascist or even Nazi reputation (see e.g. Eatwell 2000: 172, 182; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 23). It nevertheless managed to establish connections with the Conservative Monday Club (Eatwell 2003: 336) that was supported by Enoch Powell and that, as a somewhat lighter version of the National Front's demand, 'aired the idea of incentivizing non-whites to leave the country' (Kaufmann 2019: 148; see also: Eatwell 2000: 176; 1998: 144).

At times, the National Front showed some potential in local elections, but its overall electoral reach remained marginal and well below leaders' expectations, even in its strongest effort for the 1979 general election (see Eatwell 2003: 337-8, 340; 2000: 173; 1998: 144; Fielding 1981: 26-30; 228-30; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 23). Yet its claims seemed to resonate with a sizeable minority of British people (Eatwell

2000: 174-5). The party thus put some pressure on Thatcher's Conservatives who responded with sharpened anti-immigration rhetoric, if not 'closed ethno-nationalism' (Kaufmann 2019: 147; see also: Eatwell 1998: 151). From the mid-1970s, and particularly after the outcome of the 1979 the general election, the National Front increasingly struggled with internal strife, leading to party splits and its prolonged decline. With few candidates, minimal vote share, and low membership, the party had by the early 1990s 'virtually disappeared from the electoral scene' (Eatwell 2003: 342; see also: 340-1; 1998: 144-5; Fielding 1981: 25). The National Front had fostered connections with violent (youth) groups (Eatwell 2003: 343, 344), and its activists frequently collided during their street rallies with anti-fascists (Kaufmann 2019: 164; see also: Fielding 1981: 9; Gilroy 2000: 183). Similar to West Germany, where the electoral downturn of the NPD in the 1970s had been accompanied by the rise of militant non-partisan groups, also the UK saw a growth of racist violence as the National Front deteriorated (Eatwell 2003: 342).

After leaving the National Front, Tyndall's next attempt at a successful far-right party resulted in the formation of the British National Party (BNP) in 1982. It carried forward fundamentally the same ideologies (Eatwell 1998: 147; Goodwin 2016: 276), infusing, as Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 199) write, its 'campaigns with ethnic nationalism and white, racial supremacism', and 'preaching about the need to separate different racial groups, sterilise mentally ill citizens, refute the events of the Holocaust and forcibly remove migrants from the country'. Also the BNP thus visibly displayed rightist nationalism's racialised and revisionist characteristics. Tyndall initially aimed to keep a distance from violent groups and an overbearing street presence, instead seeking to appeal to Conservatives (Eatwell 2003: 343; 1998: 147). These objectives proved unsuccessful, however, and the party was soon forced to fall back on often violent extremists who had commonly been engaged in the National Front (Eatwell 2000: 183-4; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 199; Goodwin 2014: 896). As a consequence, the BNP showed 'a rather strange mix', as Eatwell (2003: 344) puts it, of 'leaders who tried to stress the party's relative respectability', while simultaneously having 'an increasing street presence that was characterized more by

young toughs'. Also the BNP was not able to avoid being labelled as neo-fascist or neo-Nazi (see Eatwell 2000: 172, 184, 185, 189), and has, like the National Front, been classified accordingly in the literature (e.g. Ignazi 1992: 10, 16; Mudde 2007: 49; see also: Goodwin 2014: 896; Kaufmann 2019: 163). While the BNP would become 'the most successful extreme right party ... in British electoral history' (Ford and Goodwin 2010: 1), its electoral performance was negligible until the early 1990s (see Eatwell 2000: 173; Ford and Goodwin 2010: 2). Due to low membership and support, it was at first also unable to hold large-scale demonstrations (Eatwell 2000: 183), and gained little public attention, except when it clashed with anti-fascists in the street or attacked diverse communities (Eatwell 1998: 145; Goodwin 2014: 896).

With this exposition of the post-war extremist right in Britain I aim to highlight two points: first, the British extremist scene displayed a traceable trajectory of – sometimes clashing – personalities and ideas from British inter-war fascism to the BNP. Or as Fielding (1981: 20) stated with regard to the formation of the National Front itself, '[b]oth members and ideology have been inherited'. Due to the respective histories and state instruments of the UK and Germany, British neo-fascists were able to propagate their racist ideologies in a much more open way, and also had more overt connections to violence. But due to this 'under-current of neo-Nazism and racial nationalism', Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 199; see also: 23; Kaufmann 2019: 174) argue, the BNP (and its predecessor) was still 'never accepted as a legitimate player in the political system'. German extremism, on the other hand, was forced to – not always successfully – tone down its language in the face of a state that was more inclined to ban movements that were too obviously outside the parameters of liberal democracy and the rule of law. This might be one of many reasons why Germany saw the rise of the slightly more moderate (but still fiercely anti-immigrant) Republicans out of the conservative mainstream in 1983 – nearly a decade before the foundation of the Anti-Federalist League, UKIP's predecessor, in response to the Maastricht Treaty (which was, in turn, two decades ahead of an initially mainly anti-Euro Alternative for Germany).

Second, similarly to the German case, the overall electoral impact of these rightist nationalist or extremist parties was marginal for the first five post-war decades, although they had some resonance in certain areas in eastern London, the Midlands, and the north of England (Eatwell 2000: 178; 1998: 145). Their “successes” were mostly understood in relative terms, and taken as a barometer of social issues or discontent. In both countries, rightist nationalism was confronted with a political conservatism that shared some of its ground and did not shy away from moving further to the socio-cultural right. In Germany, this was, for instance, reflected in increasing conservative confidence regarding historical guilt and Germany’s place in the world, and, from the early 1990s, in more restrictive nationality laws and migration policies. In the UK, Conservatism had on multiple occasions demonstrated its “tough” approach to curtailing migration, also perhaps in reference to a threat posed by the National Front. As in other times in places, therefore, these rightist movements’ impact lay, so far, mostly in their influence over the wider socio-political climate.

The following chapters build on this sketched post-war history of wider socio-political developments, and those of conservatism and rightist nationalism within them. But a shorter-term layering or sedimentation of political and ideological developments is visible also over the course of the analytical moments from the early 1990s. The problem of Europe, for instance, emerged in the 1990s as a challenge to sovereignty interpreted in wider economic and political terms. It then became a racialised issue amidst rising migration of the Blair years. The Leave campaign’s arguments leading up to Brexit built on all of these dimensions, and decades of political challenges and controversies. Over the years, the Conservative prime ministers Major, Cameron, and May faced repeated revolts in their own party over the problem of Europe. Especially the right-wing revolt leading to political stalemate in the early 1990s (see Chapter 4) – which moved the party rightward in the following years – foreshadowed the complicated political process that would play out after the EU referendum some two and a half decades later. The same was true for prime ministers’ accentuation of diplomatic victories over Europe that not only Major

(Gamble 1995: 21) but also all of his Conservative successors invoked to pacify the increasingly influential Eurosceptics within and without their own party. The early 1990s also provided much of the basis on which further arguments against were Europe built. Conservatism's language around "resistance", "damage", "defence", and "control", for instance, as well as the need to 'strengthen the external frontiers of the Community whilst maintaining the checks needed at our own borders against illegal immigration, drugs, terrorism and disease' (Conservative Party 1992: section 1), seem reminiscent of the recent debates before and after the 2016 EU referendum – and, more widely, of rightist nationalist leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

I outline in the following British chapters how the political right constructed the issue of Europe as a placeholder or metonymy for the contextual issues of the time. Europe's growing racialisation traced not only the nearly steadily rising net migration figures and associated shifts in public perception, but also the increasing radicalisation of UKIP, which, in turn, gradually expanded its appeal and became the dominant face of British nationalism. A consideration of longer-term developments also informs my understanding of the experiences and perceptions of the respondents in the British (and German) longitudinal sample. Many voiced a critical perception of Europe already in the 1990s and felt excluded from their governments' decisions. I interpret sample nationalists' political views within the changing contexts and their challenges – economic, political, or racialised. But I also understand them as longer-term, layered grievances that they harboured for decades. With respect to an understanding of contemporary rightist nationalism, it is thus useful to note that what might be considered new developments around the EU referendum were in many ways embedded and foreshadowed in recent political history, as well as the lives of these respondents. The developments outlined in this introduction illustrate some aspects of Malešević's (2019: 7; see also: 5-6, 15) historically oriented argument that recent nationalist outbursts are not "new" but rather constitute a 'particular variation of social processes that have been in place for the past 200 years'. British (and German) rightist nationalism in the shorter post-war period drew on older rightist ideas and traditions (see Chapter 2) and maintained, with small shifts in

emphasis, its focus on its four key features. Certain socio-political challenges of different moments – especially around Europe (UK) or migration (Germany, see Chapters 7 and 9) – entailed broadly analogous movements on the conservative and nationalist right. Some of these tensions have been visible in both countries' longitudinal samples for many years.

4 The early 1990s: recession, Conservative crisis, and the spectre of Europe

This first British chapter addresses the years of 1991-1993 before the wider post-war background. The early 1990s formed an important moment for the United Kingdom, both in economic and political terms. Britain faced a recession and mounting unemployment, and was forced to leave the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in the autumn of 1992, which further aggravated economic difficulties. In the aftermath, the governing Conservative Party not only lost public approval but also wrestled with a revolt within the party, precipitating its own political crisis. All of these challenges were intricately connected to the question of Europe and the Maastricht Treaty.

In the first part of this chapter, I outline this moment's economic and political stakes. The second part sheds a first light on sample nationalists' social backgrounds and political views at this critical moment for Britain's relation with Europe. Mindful of its fairly diverse socio-economic positions, British rightist nationalism was ideologically embodied by individuals who were white and UK-born, living in England, had middle educational qualifications, and worked in routine-oriented occupations with limited longer-term security and flexibility. Potentially threatened by downward mobility and with a sense that they were missing out on deserved opportunities, they were also strongly concerned about being excluded politically. Deeply disillusioned with the social, political, and moral landscape, I understand especially their fierce criticism of governmental politics, which they saw as unrepresentative of people's wishes, in light of the symbolic steps towards European integration that the Conservative government was undertaking at the time. I further suggest that rightist nationalism saw the problem of Europe at this moment as predominantly an economic and political threat to British sovereignty. Some of the significance of this moment lay in an expansion of traditional British Euroscepticism. This was visible within Conservatism but also, and most importantly, in the emergence of UKIP.

Although at this time electorally hardly visible, UKIP's emergence constituted a new face of the right that would slowly build influence over the direction in which the rightist mainstream was moving.

I Economic and political turmoil

After the recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s that Margaret Thatcher countered with neo-liberal policies (see Judis 2016: 91-3), the British economy had grown strongly from the mid-1980s (Lloyd 2002: 448). But there were warning signs that increased bank lending and new debts were not met by longer-term development, and that the increasingly financialised economy had been over-stimulated, as evidenced by a sudden drop in stock prices in 1987 (see Lloyd 2002: 448, 451; Morgan 2010b: 660-1). Like other countries at the time, the UK entered into a recession from 1990 but was affected particularly strongly (Lloyd 2002: 458; cf. Gamble 1995: 18). Economic troubles came to a head on "Black Wednesday" when the UK was compelled to exit the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in the autumn of 1992 to devalue the pound, much to the dismay of its European partners (Gamble 1995: 6-7; Lloyd 2002: 463; Morgan 2010b: 663). Britain's GDP only recovered in 1993 when its growth exceeded 2 percent; yet in that year unemployment reached its peak at 10.2 percent, thus nearly climbing back to the high levels of the previous decade (see Appendix Figure A1b). Real income per capita decreased while inequality rose (see Judis 2016: 93). Job loss and decline in incomes affected particularly those in more affluent areas who had weathered the storms of previous recessions comparatively well; and the late 1980s' rush to house ownership now resulted in the newly unemployed being unable to pay their mortgages while facing sinking house prices and negative equity (Gamble 1995: 19; Lloyd 2002: 452, 465; Morgan 2010b: 662).

As Appendix Figures A3a and A3b show, net migration was low during these years. In 1991, about 27,000 more people arrived in the country than left. The following year net migration was negative but rose again to about 36,000 in 1993.

These numbers were higher than the often negative estimates of the mid-1960s and 1970s, but lower than those of the mid-1980s. At around 3.5 percent, the population share of those without British nationality was also low, especially when compared to Germany's proportion of foreign citizens at the time (Appendix Figure A6i); and similarly modest was the share of those born outside Britain (under 7 percent; see also Kaufmann 2019: 140). The early 1990s in Britain were, therefore, largely a moment defined by economic difficulties, not migration. But because the recession brought about significant challenges for the governing Conservatives and raised the issue of Europe, it was also a moment of political significance.

As adverse effects of Thatcher's neo-liberal policies came increasingly into view, the public support for the Conservatives waned. This trend was briefly halted when John Major became prime minister in 1990 and scored a surprise victory in the 1992 election (Gamble 1995: 5; see also: Lloyd 2002: 461; Morgan 2010b: 662). Yet Major's unexpected resilience came under stress in the aftermath of Black Wednesday. As Clarke et al. (2017: 184) argue, '[t]he currency crisis had a large negative effect on support for the Conservative Government and it seriously eroded confidence in the ability of Mr Major and his colleagues to manage the economy effectively'. While Labour continued to rise in popularity, both Major and his party dropped in the following years to record-low poll ratings (Gamble 1995: 5). The significant loss of approval from the electorate was not Conservatism's only challenge, however.

Gamble (1995) details Conservatism's deep-seated ideological crisis after Thatcher had hollowed out some of its traditional functions and pillars of its political identity. This was thrown into particularly stark relief when the issue of increasing European integration – embodied by the Maastricht Treaty – entangled the Conservatives in fierce disagreements, leading to drastic losses in local elections (Morgan 2010b: 664, 665). Rifts throughout the party went so far that Conservative Eurosceptics defied Major by voting against the Maastricht Treaty (see Gamble 1995: 21-2; Lloyd 2002: 466), thus delaying its eventual ratification in 1993. Outside parliament, meanwhile, the Anti-Federalist League formed in 1991 to resist the

Maastricht Treaty (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 21). At this time the party, which would become UKIP in 1993, did not score any electoral successes. But it did manage to draw away some Conservatives and slowly build up anti-EU pressure on the right. The political landscape at this moment therefore saw something of a bifurcated development: people in Britain increasingly turned towards Labour, while there was a simultaneous move towards a tougher Eurosceptic stance both within and outside the Conservative Party. Differently put, this moment saw a wider left-ward shift that was accompanied by nationalism and Euroscepticism acquiring a new political face outside the Conservative Party.

II Rightist nationalism reborn

Efforts to further European integration precipitated the formation of a new political challenger at this political key moment. Formed in 1991 as the Anti-Federalist League by the historian Alan Sked, a member of the conservative Bruges Group and past candidate for the Liberal Party, the small group was bitterly opposed to the Maastricht Treaty and aimed to ‘stop the UK “becoming a province of a united European superstate”’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 21). A few months before the 1992 election Sked stated that, following the Treaty, ‘British sovereignty faced “its greatest threat since Adolf Hitler”’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 22). After disappointing election results, the League was relaunched as UKIP in 1993. Still a small group consisting mostly of former Tories (Ford and Goodwin 2014b: 282; Kaufmann 2019: 175), they saw this as a more serious attempt at taking on the mainstream parties, and explicitly distanced themselves from the extremist BNP, which had its first local success in that year (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 22, 24). Importantly, in demanding that Britain leave the European Community altogether (Bale 2018: 268; Clarke et al. 2017: 87; Goodwin 2016: 275), UKIP advocated a harsher Eurosceptic stance than even the right-shifting Conservatives did.

Nationalists' backgrounds and the fear of falling

The group of British occasional nationalists, whom I take as my main lens to view rightist nationalism, was predominantly white and born the UK (95 percent, see Appendix Table A1a). They were in the early 1990s also much more commonly residing in England than in Wales or Scotland, both in absolute and relative terms. Sample respondents represented, in other words, mainly an *English* nationalism, and BNP followers even more so than UKIP sympathisers. This reflected a longer history of especially England-based rightist extremism (e.g. on the National Front, see Eatwell 2000: 177). In Scotland, rightist nationalism was particularly uncommon. Nationalists in England were widely distributed across the different regions, being most clearly (but still only slightly) overrepresented in the East Midlands, West Midlands, and South West. They were somewhat underrepresented in the East of England, London, and the South East. While rightist nationalists were slightly less commonly from those regions with higher equivalised household income, therefore, they were far from being simply concentrated in the most economically disadvantaged regions. Nor were these nationalist sympathisers confined to the traditional strongholds of the National Front or BNP (northern England, Midlands, London, see Eatwell 2000: 178; 1998: 145; Ford and Goodwin 2010: 5, 10; Goodwin 2014: 898), or UKIP (South West, see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 22).

British rightist nationalists were more commonly male. Keeping in mind that there were generally more women in the sample (see Appendix Table A1b), 51 percent of rightist nationalists were men, compared to 43 percent of those who kept to other political movements. This is in line with the common research finding that rightist nationalism is more strongly characterised by men both in the UK and elsewhere (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 154-5; Mudde 2007: 112-3). Being male was already an often-reported trait of National Front and BNP followers (see Eatwell 2000: 177; 1998: 148; Ford and Goodwin 2010: 2, 8, 9; Goodwin 2014: 898). But this male overrepresentation should not distract from the fact that nearly half of nationalists in the sample were women.

At this first moment in the early 1990s, rightist nationalists were on average 39 years old, less than half a year older than those respondents who did not veer towards nationalism. Far from being limited to older individuals (cf. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 156; 2014b: 278, 280), rightist nationalism in the sample was most commonly embodied by respondents in their thirties (27 percent) and forties (28 percent). Nearly one quarter were in their twenties or even teens, and slightly more than a fifth were in their fifties or older. Indicatively, there were age differences between nationalists who would express a preference for UKIP and the much smaller group of those who favoured the more radical BNP. The latter were about one decade younger than other survey respondents, and mostly in their twenties and thirties at the beginning of the survey. British rightist nationalism displayed different faces, depending on the movements through which it was viewed. These indicative differences between followers of UKIP and those the BNP are reflected in the literature (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 158; Kaufmann 2019: 176). But also here it is worth keeping in mind that not all UKIP followers are always “older”, and that also BNP sympathisers have been shown to straddle various age groups (see Ford and Goodwin 2010: 8, 9). Not even National Front followers were simply limited to “alienated youth” (see Eatwell 2000: 177; Fielding 1981: 57; Ford and Goodwin 2010: 8, 9). In the early 1990s, rightist nationalists in the sample were typically in their late thirties or early forties, with BNP sympathisers rather being in their late twenties.

Half of rightist nationalists in the British sample listed secondary school-leaving diplomas as their highest educational qualifications (29 percent O-Level, 21 percent A-Level). About 15 percent held other schooling or commercial qualifications without O-Level, and 21 percent had not gained any educational degrees. The share of rightist nationalists in these categories below secondary education was slightly larger than that of other respondents, but differences were stronger at the upper end of the educational spectrum. Seven percent of rightist nationalists named degrees beyond A-Level, such as nursing or teaching diplomas, as highest qualifications; but only 6 percent had achieved traditional university degrees (compared to 16 percent

of those who kept to other parties), and none of them had at this time completed a postgraduate degree. British rightist nationalism, as seen through these respondents, was thus most strongly characterised by a preponderance of school-leaving qualifications and a relative lack of higher educational degrees. Many of the British nationalists had finished their school education and then followed a more practical and job-oriented path instead of obtaining a traditional university degree. This was true for both UKIP and BNP sympathisers, but especially for the latter who mostly held A-Level and O-Level GCSE qualifications. Rightist nationalism, as viewed through these individuals, was not simply constituted by 'the least educated in society', as a more reductive view suggests (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 154; see also: 159, 175; 2014b: 282; 2010: 2, 10; Goodwin 2014: 898). But it did reflect what Eatwell (1998: 148) wrote about the National Front, namely that it was 'weak among the educated'.

Rightist nationalism's underrepresentation among those with university degrees was reflected in the socio-economic backgrounds of its followers who were working at this moment. Few rightist nationalists were higher managers or professionals (overall about 7 percent) who had the most immediate access to the benefits of the service relationship, such as salaries, career opportunities, and job security and autonomy (see, also for the following, ONS 2016: sections 2, 6; 2010: 3, 10-12; Rose and Pevalin 2002: 83, 91). About 19 percent worked in lower professional, managerial, or administrative jobs. Rightist nationalists were less commonly than followers of other political movements (e.g. Appendix Tables A2d-A3f) in occupations mostly defined by a service relationship; yet it should not be disregarded that about one quarter did have access to many of its benefits. Further 18 percent worked in intermediate jobs, especially clerical, administrative, sales, and service occupations that were defined by elements of both service relationship and labour contract; and 13 percent were non-professional freelancers and small employers. Yet a significant share of rightist nationalists worked in professions largely characterised by (modified) forms of labour contract that involved a more direct wage remuneration for actual hours worked and offered little longer-term prospects or securities. Approximately 16 percent were lower supervisors or in lower technical

craft occupations; 14 percent in semi-routine positions, particularly in sales and service operations; and 13 percent worked in routine occupations, especially in technical and operative jobs.

Following this picture, British rightist nationalism's socio-economic backgrounds could be portrayed in at least two ways: one could focus on the fact these British nationalists were less commonly in the most secure and flexible positions, and more often in occupations oriented towards routine work under labour contracts. This view echoes, for instance, Ford and Goodwin (e.g. 2014a: 152, 153, 159) who point to a more pronounced working-class aspect of UKIP followers. Yet one could equally highlight the broad variety and complexity in these respondents' backgrounds, and their representation among lower professionals, intermediate occupations, and freelancers. This perspective reflects something of UKIP's origins as a "middle-class party" (Kaufmann 2019: 174, 175, 227).

As indicated in Chapter 1, I am attentive to the complexity in rightist nationalism's socio-economic backgrounds (on inter-war fascism's multi-class character, see e.g. Mann 2004: 19-23), also because materialist foci on specific "classes" tend to grasp little of its specific, racialised appeal. Yet in attempting to interpret rightist nationalists' possible concerns, it might be instructive to depart from a focus on an exaggerated, ideal-typical image centred on its common representation among less secure socio-economic backgrounds. This is also because at least the vast majority of BNP sympathisers in the sample was indeed located in lower supervisory and technical, and semi-routine and routine occupations. Viewed from this perspective, rightist nationalism was at this moment characteristically embodied by workers in both non-manual and manual jobs that did not require many occupational skills, paid wages for time worked rather than salaries, and offered fairly little longer-term security.

Over the years of this key moment, the majority of rightist nationalists in the sample were working. About 10 percent were self-employed, and 64 percent were in paid employment. Of these last, nearly one quarter worked in civil service or local government; but two thirds were employed in the private sector. British rightist

nationalism did not, therefore, display the intimate proximity and vested interest in the state that was a key feature of fascists in the first half of the 20th century (see Mann 2004: 1-2, 14, and *passim*; see also: 1995: 55). There were also few signs of the soldiers, prison guards, and policemen who had been prominent within the National Front (Fielding 1981: 55).

The early 1990s saw a ‘general depression of living standards’ and many people in Britain ‘experiencing bankruptcy, unemployment, and negative equity on their homes’ (Gamble 1995: 7). But as the respondents in the sample seemed much less impacted by unemployment than the wider population, also overall only 5 percent of rightist nationalists were unemployed at this moment. Over the course of these economically troubling years, the share of rightist nationalists looking for work rose from 4 percent in 1991 to about 7 percent in 1993, when national unemployment reached its peak (see Appendix Figure A1c). Still, this increase involved only few individuals, while the vast majority held on to their jobs. Rightist nationalists in the British longitudinal sample were hardly characterised by the experience of unemployment – even at this moment of economic challenges. They did not immediately reflect common but not well-supported assumptions about unemployment-related insecurities resulting in affinities for rightist nationalism (see Rydgren 2007: 249; for the historical Nazi case, see Mann 2004: 159, 191). Yet, resembling other respondents in the sample, the majority still voiced in 1992 considerable disquiet about the high unemployment rate of the time. Even before unemployment would surge further in the next year, 69 percent stated to be worried “a great deal”, and 24 percent “a fair amount”. Although they themselves were rarely affected, the wider economic situation still appeared very threatening to them. In light of their less secure socio-backgrounds, they might have felt that they were constantly at risk of falling further to the bottom in case things took a turn for the worse.

Some of these worries came from their perception of their own financial situation. Overall one quarter of rightist nationalists stated in the early 1990s that they were “living comfortably”, and 30 percent said they were “doing alright”. But 29

percent were “just about getting by”, and 15 percent found their financial situation “quite” or “very difficult”. In their subjective financial assessment, rightist nationalists appeared somewhat less secure than other respondents – and this was also reflected in their personal and equivalised household income, which amounted to approximately nine tenths of what followers of other political movements had at their disposal. While rightist nationalism sympathisers were working practically as often as followers of other movements, therefore, their more prevalent occupations under labour contracts also meant that they had to be content with lower (household) incomes. Despite this, however, some rightist nationalists were generally optimistic when looking into the future. Overall 31 percent thought during these years that their financial circumstances would improve in the next year, while 18 percent expected to be worse off (51 percent thought it would stay about the same). Even though their financial situation was on average more difficult, the rightist nationalists in the sample appeared slightly more hopeful than followers of other movements. They did not generally express the heightened sense of (economic) pessimism that is sometimes found also among British nationalists (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 190, 192, 194; 2014b: 279-80, 282; 2010: 15-16).

Political abandonment and the spectre of Europe

For some decades, polls had indicated a growing openness to rightist nationalist or even extremist positions; but so far this did not, as Eatwell (2000: 187; see also: 188-90) points out, translate into serious electoral successes for British nationalist parties. Also in the 1992 general election, the BNP, National Front, and UKIP’s predecessor, the Anti-Federalist League, each put forward candidates in fewer than 20 constituencies, and gained even in these only very low vote shares (see Eatwell 2000: 173; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 22, 53 fn. 9; 2010: 2). Although a sceptical stance towards Europe was widespread, European integration did not yet appear as a very pressing political problem around the time of the election (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:

28), and thus a few months before Black Wednesday and the ensuing political ruptures that would shake Conservatism and bring the issue of Europe to the forefront. At the time of the election 'barely visible' (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 22), UKIP's foundation nevertheless marked an important moment at which the nationalist right re-formed itself once more, starting with a predominantly anti-Europe agenda but turning more and more anti-immigrant over the years. Also the BNP's vote share in 1992 was minimal. In the following year, however, it scored a first success by winning a local council seat in East London (Eatwell 2003: 344-5; 2000: 184-5).

For rightist nationalists, this moment arguably spoke to some of their core concerns. Particularly from the autumn of 1992, the emergence of key political issues – the potential connection between European integration and Britain's economic problems, questions of European curtailment of British sovereignty, and the disintegration of the Conservatives as the dominant right-wing actor who faced 'the most persistent and organized factional revolt in the Party this century' (Gamble 1995: 6) and became more Eurosceptic in the process – might have encouraged rightist nationalists to follow politics quite closely. During these years of economic troubles and growing Eurosceptic sentiment, however, many rightist nationalists in the sample did not appear particularly interested in the political world around them. About 22 percent stated at this moment to be "not at all" and 31 percent "not very" interested in politics. Overall 40 percent said that they were "fairly", and only 7 percent "very" interested. In 1992, the year of the general election, the Maastricht Treaty and Black Wednesday, rightist nationalists rated their political interest only marginally higher. The increasing prominence of Europe in public discourse did not seem to heighten nationalists' sense of political urgency. Even at critical moments for the nation and rightist nationalism, its followers appeared to be quite distant from politics. In that sense, they, too, hinted at the more general finding that nationalist or authoritarian positions resonate more commonly with those of lower education and lower interest in politics (Eatwell 2000: 186-7). Also within the group of nationalism sympathisers, those with lower educational qualifications and routine-

oriented professions tended to be somewhat less interested in politics – perhaps also because a feeling of being stuck socially went along with a decreasing belief that politics might change anything about their situation. This might have been an expression of having felt abandoned for some time, a long-term disenchantment with politics largely independent of contemporary developments. What rightist nationalists felt strongly about, however, was their critique of governmental politics.

The recession of the early 1990s and the experience of Black Wednesday resulted not only in a surge of Euroscepticism, but also ‘bred great disillusion with the Conservatives and with the Thatcher decade’, Gamble (1995: 6; see also: 7, 21) suggests. This was certainly reflected by the rightist nationalists in the sample. Asked in 1992 how they perceived the way British governments worked⁶, 67 percent stated that governments’ actions did not follow the will of the people (14 percent thought so), 75 percent believed that ordinary people had little influence over what governments did (16 percent disagreed), and 78 percent said that they did not trust governments to put national interests before those of the party (12 percent did). Going beyond other respondents’ political discontent, large majorities of rightist nationalists voiced an often fervent critique particularly of the representational basis of governments’ actions. In his discussion of the recession, Lloyd (2002: 466) suggests that the idea that anyone could be affected by financial ruin ‘was bound to weaken people’s faith in the government’. Also given ideal-typical nationalists’ socio-economic backgrounds, and slight indications that those who particularly worried about national unemployment tended to see governments even more negatively, they might have perceived Major’s economic response to the recession as inadequate or even counterproductive.

Yet together with their relatively low interest in politics, these respondents’ views hinted at a wider feeling of political abandonment – a sense of having been

⁶ These survey questions referred to governments in the plural. But – given the economic and political turmoil that was unfolding at the time of the interviews, and the fact that Conservatives ruled for more than a decade – it is reasonable to assume that respondents viewed these questions at least partly through the lens of recent Conservative governments, including Major’s. The sample individuals’ answers in the next key moments also indicate that many respondents related these questions to the respective governments in power.

silenced if not betrayed – in the face of their political leaders’ decisions with which they fundamentally disagreed. This was the year of the Maastricht Treaty, after all. For those already strongly concerned with the question of Europe, Major’s endorsement of further European integration might, despite his negotiated “opt-outs” (Gamble 1995: 21; Morgan 2010b: 662), have stood in stark contradiction to not only their vision of Britain but also to what they considered their political voice that they wished to be recognised. This interpretation is supported by the dynamic development of sample nationalists’ responses to the question of their political priorities over the course of these years. In 1991 and 1993, rightist nationalists’ most popular political objective was the maintenance of order in the nation, slightly ahead of the group thinking it most important to give people more say in government decisions. But in 1992, amidst the controversies surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, a higher share prioritised people’s influence over important government decisions (42 percent; 30 percent still wanted to maintain order). Many of these individuals had a sense that political decisions were being taken against their will and without legitimate popular or democratic consultation.

It is worth noting that detachment from politics was even more prevalent among BNP sympathisers. The vast majority stated to be either “not very” or “not at all” interested in politics, again presenting an exaggerated picture of UKIP followers. Being typically confined to less secure occupations with fewer opportunities, BNP sympathisers may have given up counting on the political process at all. They might have shared the BNP’s (1992: section 1; see also: sections 4, 17) view that Britain was dominated by an anti-patriotic media apparatus and corrupt ‘politicians and parties that have betrayed them [the British people] for so long’. Also most BNP sympathisers expressed a fierce criticism of the way British governments worked; but they potentially also rejected British governments on a more fundamental basis. If they were attuned to what the BNP proposed at the time, some of them might have supported the party’s ‘leadership principle’ and ‘need for a revolution to create a new political culture’ (Eatwell 1998: 146, 147). They perhaps rejected the established governmental system as such – ‘a system which’, as the BNP’s manifesto (1992:

section 1; see also: section 4) argued, 'frustrates reform and paralyses action at every juncture of national affairs', spawning 'one disastrous national leader after another', and which therefore needed to be overhauled in its entirety to cure the 'national sickness'.

The wider group of rightist nationalists in the sample expressed also considerable unease with Britain's moral landscape. Asked in 1992, about 52 percent stated they were "a great deal" concerned about deteriorating moral standards, and further 35 percent worried about this "a fair amount". At the time, the newly re-elected Conservative government was not only facing the loss of economic trust after Black Wednesday (Gamble 1995: 6-7) and growing discord over Europe; it also became entangled in a series of financial and sexual scandals (Lloyd 2002: 467-8; Morgan 2010b: 665-6). Termed "sleaze", these scandals met with 'immense moral disapproval by the media' (Lloyd 2002: 467) and 'added to a mood of disillusionment and cynicism' (Morgan 2010b: 665). What looked like 'a deep rot of corruption in Westminster' (Morgan 2010b: 666) may have added to rightist nationalists' already very negative perception of British political circles. They did not trust the government, felt excluded from its political decisions – especially regarding Europe and British sovereignty, as I have suggested – and condemned the moral development that they observed. This concern was especially strong for those rightist nationalists who viewed the maintenance of national order as the most important political goal. These individuals might have seen their country spin out of control economically, politically, and morally.

Rightist nationalism was at this moment further characterised by a keen awareness of social inequalities and injustices. Faced with a variety of survey questions aiming at classic economic problems of market liberalism versus state intervention, rightist nationalists appeared fairly divided but often leaned slightly towards favouring more government influence in economic matters. In 1991 and 1993, for instance, overall 39 percent disagreed with the statement that private enterprise was Britain's best solution for its economic problems (while 30 percent thought so). They did not regularly display the unyielding belief in liberalism and

meritocracy that Duina (2018) found among poor but patriotic Americans. Instead, they expressed substantial criticism of social relations and disparities, and especially when they were not limited to the economic dimension but also involved wider ideas of fairness. While 33 percent thought in 1992 that people in Britain had equal opportunities to be successful, 59 percent emphasised inequalities in life chances. More unequivocally, overall 69 percent of rightist nationalists stated in 1991 and 1993 that ordinary people did not have access to their fair share of Britain's wealth (15 percent thought so), and 76 percent thought that different laws applied to the rich and poor in society (13 percent disagreed).

To some degree, these respondents' perceptions reflected wider social processes that had been in the making for years. As Appendix Figure A1a shows, income inequality had been rising strongly throughout the Thatcher period (see also: Judis 2016: 93). Also in the years in which the individuals answered these questions income inequality continued to rise, although the Gini coefficient of disposable income after taxes seemed to stabilise at a high level. Thatcher's privatisation measures had led to a situation in which '[t]he enormous financial rewards garnered by a few privileged groups made a sharp contrast with the distress of many new property owners, suffering negative equity in the recession, often through bankruptcy or unemployment' (Gamble 1995: 19). But nationalists' views also seemed to hint at a more general disappointment in society. There was an underlying feeling, perhaps, that they were missing out on some of the safeties and chances that they felt they deserved, and that others seemed to take for granted. Instead of addressing these injustices, they may have reasoned, the government instead focused on its own political problems while driving forward European integration, which undermined British sovereignty and might make social disparities even worse.

Even though some of its core concerns became the focus of political debate and controversy, rightist nationalism was at this moment characterised by a withdrawal from the political world. Its followers may have had the feeling that politics was deaf to their concerns, and they fervently criticised British governments which they perceived as acting against the will of the people. I interpret their sense

of political abandonment also in light of Major's decision to sign the Maastricht Treaty. These individuals might have liked to submit the government to more popular control to prevent this symbolic step towards European integration and centralisation. Perhaps also before the background of government scandals and high inequality, rightist nationalism seemed also deeply concerned about the moral direction their country was taking more widely, about growing social disorder, and about the social injustices they perhaps observed in their daily lives. These individuals may have felt that their desire for social acknowledgment and assurances, and political inclusion, were blatantly disregarded by political leaders.

Even if this was not captured in the survey data, the themes of "race" and nation were a crucial characteristic of rightist nationalism at the movement level. This was most conspicuously the case for the BNP, which continued to be openly anti-immigrant and racist in its 1992 general election manifesto. Amongst other things, the manifesto emphasised the 'harmful consequences' or 'evils' of 'coloured immigration and multi-racialism' (BNP 1992: sections 8, 27, and *passim*); demanded a stop to non-white immigration and the 'resettlement overseas of those non-Whites already here' (section 8); propagated the urgency to protect what was left of the 'homogeneity' of the European 'racial stock' in Britain because 'crossings between vastly dissimilar races, such as is the case with Europeans and non-Europeans, have never produced good results' (section 27); advocated strong law-and-order positions such as 'the restoration of both capital and corporal punishment' (section 22), and the replacement of liberal democracy by a powerful executive and a corporatist approach to parliamentary representation (section 4); and stressed the need to 'preserve Britain's national identity by preserving the traditional character of her people' that was under attack both 'by the policy of multi-racialism' and other parties' attempts to 'destroy our freedom and sovereignty by surrendering that control to a supra-national authority in Europe' (section 2). The BNP rejected Britain's membership in the European Community both because it was 'permitting foreigners to make our laws' and because it had 'brought no advantage to us, only economic decline and political servitude' (BNP 1992: section 6). Viewed through the BNP,

therefore, rightist nationalism had a racist, authoritarian, and anti-globalist character, focusing on a racial understanding of the nation, social homogenisation to overcome divisions, the promotion of near-autocratic leadership, draconian law-and-order policies, and political isolationism.

Making public efforts to distance itself from many of the BNP's extreme positions, UKIP's agenda seemed much less controversial. Its core concerns revolved around Europe's threat to British national sovereignty, and it propagated an uncompromising "hard" Euroscepticism with the aim to leave the European Union altogether. UKIP thus held a "single-issue" focus on Europe and was, at first, not immediately concerned with immigration (see Bale 2018: 265; Kaufmann 2019: 174, 175; Wellings 2010: 501-2); but discussions around EU membership and control of migration are arguably closely related (e.g. Clarke et al. 2017: 70, 84, 85; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 146, 194). I trace UKIP's growing anti-immigration turn over the next two chapters.

III Europe's threat to economic and political sovereignty

To conclude this chapter, I briefly reflect on the key problems raised here. The first relates to the character of rightist nationalism in the early 1990s, especially as seen through the respondents in the longitudinal sample. Ideal-typical nationalists were white and UK-born, male, at this moment in their late thirties or early forties, and residing in England. They were of middle education and worked commonly – but not always – in positions under forms of labour contract, such as lower supervisory, semi-routine sales and service, and technical or operative routine occupations. But I argue that, even with this pointed emphasis, rightist nationalism in Britain was not simply embodied by those in the lowest social positions. It was also not characterised by the experience of unemployment, even at this time of recession. This is thus broadly in line with Mann's Weberian, non-materialist reading of fascists' social backgrounds beyond a narrow interpretation of class (see e.g. Mann 2004: 3, 159-60). Importantly,

however, rightist nationalism did display a characteristic absence of higher educational degrees; and its typical socio-economic backgrounds offered lower incomes and only little long-term security. This played into rightist nationalists' worries about the high unemployment rate. They had fewer safety nets, were never far away from the threat of falling socially, in which case the bottom would come dangerously close – both economically but also in wider sense of Weberian status, esteem, and privilege (see Weber 1978: 305-7). Not very interested in politics, they nevertheless fervently criticised British governments and their public accountability. Perhaps because they perceived their social status as potentially endangered, rightist nationalists were also very worried about political exclusion. From their perspective, their socio-economic concerns and political voice were being disregarded, for instance through the government's steps towards European integration that intertwined economic and political challenges. Rightist nationalists' entrenched disapproval of their country's politics was accompanied by a vocal condemnation of wider social, economic, and moral matters. They were especially worried about inequalities when these had a personal dimension or pointed to social injustices beyond broader economic considerations. Rightist nationalists felt that they missed out on the securities and opportunities – and the political recognition – to which they were entitled.

These individuals thus constituted an ideal-typical rightist nationalism that was characterised by potentially fragile status positions, a longing for social fairness, and a sense of moral indignation about those who considered themselves something better. It was also defined by deep sense of political abandonment. Embedded in widespread political disaffection, sample nationalists' perceptions illustrated the emergence of a particularly critical stance towards established politics precisely when the Maastricht controversies came to a head. Interpreted this way, rightist nationalism was crucially about opposition to Europe, connecting this issue with questions of democratic participation and control. Also this contributed to a sense that the direction the country was heading towards social and political disorder.

Second, these concerns drew on historical dynamics. The UK might be counted among the countries traditionally sceptical about the European project (Mudde 2007: 162; see also: Goodwin 2016: 274, 275). Due to its 'role in balancing European conflicts, its long history of democracy and its ties to the Anglosphere', Kaufmann (2019: 183) argues, Britain 'has never felt as warmly about the European project as its continental partners'. It joined the European Community in 1973 before the wider background of its deteriorating position in the world; and while many in the Labour party were against the membership, Conservatives saw it as a 'strategic necessity' (Gamble 1995: 20). For Germany, Europe represented new hopes and chances. From the British perspective, by contrast, the accession might have rather signalled a sense of loss and decline (see Wellings 2010; I discuss this further in Chapter 10). Shortly after joining and in the wake of the oil crisis, the UK fell into recession. In the 1975 referendum on continued membership in the European Community, two thirds voted to remain. But given the economic background, this outcome might have been driven by instrumental considerations (Kaufmann 2019: 138; 183). Already after the referendum doubts were raised about the depth of the British pro-European sentiment (Clarke et al. 2017: 1; Wellings 2010: 501). Over the next years and decades, 'a significant share of voters of Right and Left alike continued to doubt the benefits of being "in Europe"', Judt suggests (2007: 526; see also: Eatwell 2003: 336, 345). Polls indicated, moreover, that substantial segments of society were potentially supportive of anti-immigration, nationalist or authoritarian policies and messages (see Eatwell 2003: 337, 339; 2000: 174-5; Kaufmann 2019: 146-7). But at this moment in the early 1990s, especially anti-EU sentiments became aggravated.

For many European countries, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty might constitute an 'important turning point' that added strength to rightist nationalist and populist actors (Clarke et al. 2017: 66; see also: 216). British Conservatives did not see Europe as a 'real or mythical ideal', Eatwell (2003: 347) remarks, but as an 'economic club to which Britain necessarily has to belong in order to stay a member of the first division ... Yet these essentially economic appeals', he continues, 'pose major problems in the event of an economic downturn or a lengthy period of minimal growth'. This is one

of the crucial aspects of this moment. Britain crashing out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in the middle of the recession illustrated the potential economic problems of European integration and further undermined the utility of Europe in the public eye. After the 1975 referendum, the Maastricht Treaty constituted the second milestone for British Eurosceptics, many of whom would continue to pursue their goal from within or without mainstream politics and would later carry the Leave campaign (Clarke et al. 2017: 15, 16).

Third, I argue that the problem of Europe was at this moment perceived as a predominantly economic and political threat to British sovereignty. It was seen as locking the UK in potentially harmful economic regulations while undermining national parliament and historical independence. At this critical political juncture, the issue of Europe sparked the birth of UKIP as a response to Maastricht, which centred its campaign on a fiercer anti-Europe stance than the more ambivalent Euroscepticism displayed by the Conservative Party. UKIP propagated the need to completely leave the European Community to preserve British sovereignty and self-determination. This claim was shared by the BNP as part of its wider project of ending close international alliances. As in previous decades, and irrespective of actual migration levels, the BNP clung, moreover, to its demands to stop all immigration of people of colour and expel those who were already in the country, and to its aims to introduce a much tougher law-and-order regime and dismantle (representative) democracy. It thus continued to be characterised by the openly racist, anti-immigrant, and authoritarian positions that British rightist extremism had professed for decades. Yet at this moment, it was not migration but economic and political problems that most strongly infused Europe's portrayal as threat to British sovereignty, and that most immediately shaped the wider social climate.

Some of this moment's significance also lay in Europe's impact on Britain's wider political landscape. The Conservatives had over the years balanced both nationalism and a cautiously pro-European stance, but nevertheless regularly vocalised widespread doubts about further European integration. This was perhaps the flipside of Britain's war-era identity of "standing alone" against fascism (see

Eatwell 2003: 327). Rooted in and legitimated by Thatcher's later aversion to Europe (Gamble 1995: 23), and before the background of the recession, the early 1990s saw Euroscepticism emerge strongly within the Conservative Party, ushering in a deep political crisis. The drive towards Euroscepticism was at this moment largely carried by the Tories, while UKIP made hardly any electoral impact. But it did capture something of the wider atmosphere, aiming 'to help push its much older, much bigger rival on the right in the direction already being urged on it by Tory "anti-Europeans"' (Bale 2018: 265). In the next years, thousands of Tory followers and party members would make their way to UKIP (Clarke et al. 2017: 15; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 145), slowly turning up the pressure on the Conservatives. As in the case of Germany's non-extremist nationalist right, also UKIP's role was mainly to exert an influence over Conservatism, shifting the Overton Window (broadly understood, see Lehman 2010) to the right and thus dragging the mainstream towards its more radical positions. This moment was therefore also significant because – as unassuming as it first seemed – the nationalist right gave itself a new face by explicitly focusing on Europe as a political issue. This would, as I discuss in the next chapter, soon become more and more salient and polarising, and lead back to nationalism's core themes of migration and cultural diversity.

5 Between Maastricht and Brexit: immigration and economic crisis

This chapter follows the British respondents and examines broader political shifts between the late 1990s and early 2010s. In the first section, I discuss the key analytical moment from 1997 to 2000, which saw New Labour move into government during a time of economic stability. This was, in Morgan's (2010b: 670) words, 'one of the most remarkable electoral upheavals in British history'. As Blair at first followed a much more open approach to cultural diversity, net migration soon began to rise to unprecedented levels. The next section briefly addresses the years between 2003 and 2005 during which net migration rose further, also as a consequence of the 2004 eastern EU enlargement. The third section covers the years between 2008 and 2012, which saw the economic crisis and the Conservative-Liberal government's turn towards austerity, in addition to ongoing high net migration. Throughout these sections I outline how the nationalist right continued its slow ascent over the course of these years. Showing a bifurcated development between softening BNP and radicalising UKIP, rightist nationalism on the whole readjusted its language and surface claims but kept true to its core themes on a deeper level. Its anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic message amassed more weight within the political landscape and was initially shared by the Conservatives in opposition who reached their most rightward position in recent history. I further discuss that nationalists in the longitudinal sample displayed very similar social locations and signs of socio-economic stagnation. They regarded the experienced contextual challenges with an ongoing feeling of having been abandoned and disregarded by politics, and a growing willingness for Britain to leave the EU. Given these developments before the background of soaring migration, and rightist nationalism's claims at the movement level, I argue that rightist nationalism now conceived Europe's threat to British sovereignty predominantly in racialised terms.

I The late 1990s, immigration, and devolution under New Labour

Had the early 1990s been characterised by an economic recession and Conservatism's political crisis over Europe, the final years of the century saw a change in government amidst a period of relative economic growth and stability. As Appendix Figure A1c shows, annual GDP per capita had recovered and showed a steady growth of around 3 percent throughout this moment, and the unemployment rate was falling steadily to just over 5 percent in 2000. Net disposable household income growth lay above inflation, which was at its lowest point in decades, so that households were able to afford more. The stock market saw shares significantly rise in value (Morgan 2010b: 671). But also individuals and families benefitted from growing prosperity, gaining access to everyday comforts such as computers, mobile phones, and the internet, and increasingly booked holidays overseas (Morgan 2010b: 668). Even if Britain's economic stability proved somewhat fragile (Morgan 2010a: 678), at this moment in the late 1990s, the economic situation clearly looked much better than it had a few years previously.

Although the economy had already been improving during the last years of John Major's reign, he was not able to hold on to power in 1997 – an election that proved to be a 'watershed moment in British politics, ousting the Conservatives after eighteen years in government and ushering in New Labour for the next thirteen' (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 27-8). In stark contrast to Labour's previous approaches, Tony Blair reached for the centre and built on Thatcher's legacy from which there seemed no return (Judt 2007: 546-7; Morgan 2010b: 669-70, 671; 2010a: 678; Mouffe 2018: 4, 32-3; see also: Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 254, 255). New Labour's "Third Way" approach was characterised by its close proximity to business, and its low taxation policies and abandonment of nationalisation. Conceptualised as 'neither socialism nor capitalism', it appeared, in Lloyd's (2002: 476) words, 'rather more like capitalism shorn of some of its Thatcherite aggressiveness'. Thatcher's legacy was also visible in Blair's ambition to overcome social division and dissent (Judt 2007: 547; Mouffe 2018: 4). Viewed through an economic lens, therefore, and compared to earlier

political fault lines, '[t]he ideological gulf between Labour and the Conservatives was trivial' (Morgan 2010a: 679). They differed, of course, in many other respects, such as Labour's continued focus on redistributive policies to alleviate poverty (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 195; Lloyd 2002: 492-3).

A clear departure from previous Conservative governments was visible in Labour's adoption of a more open approach to Britishness, multiculturalism, and immigration (Kaufmann 2019: 139, 149, 354; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 64). Annual net migration figures soared from about 36,000 in 1993 to 97,000 in 1998, reaching 144,000 in 2000 (see Appendix Figure A3b). Many of the newcomers were from the Commonwealth, or asylum seekers from Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, or Iraq (Kaufmann 2019: 150-1). But despite this sharp increase in migration, the percentages of the foreign and foreign-born population in the UK rose only moderately during these years (the latter from 6.7 percent in 1993 to 7.6 percent in 2000) – and were far below the German estimates at the time (see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). From 1999, Labour began to tighten its stance on migration (Shabi 2019: para. 13; see also: Kaufmann 2019: 151), which did, however, not stop net migration from rising further. Macro-level data (Appendix Figure A3c) further underlined another socio-political process that became apparent at the national level and had already been indicated by the sample individuals' responses in the previous chapter. Turnout dropped to record-low levels in both the 1997 general election (sinking even lower in 2001) and the 1999 European election. Even at a moment of economic upswing and political change, these years revealed a widespread retreat from the political process.

This moment also constituted a highly symbolic juncture for Britain. Following 1997 referenda in Scotland and Wales, and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, national parliaments and assemblies were established, thus granting devolved powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (see Morgan 2010b: 671-2). Observers at the time anticipated a 'crisis in what it means to be British' (Ward 2006: 11; see also: 17) or an English nationalist backlash to devolution (see Condor 2010: 525, 526). At the same time, European integration and centralisation proceeded with

the Treaty of Amsterdam and the introduction of the Euro, soon followed by the preparation for the EU's eastern enlargement (see Judt 2007: 720-1). Britain and Britishness were therefore confronted by intertwined changes and challenges: devolution represented a political caesura on the inside, while British sovereignty was challenged further from the outside through the ever-closer EU – and all this before the background of strongly rising immigration (see Kim 2005; Morgan 2010b: 772; Skey 2012: 122). This was, therefore, a moment defined by social and political issues, not economics.

Rightist nationalism and the will to leave

While it exerted some influence on Conservatism's shift towards Eurosceptic and exclusivist positions, British rightist nationalism still struggled to establish a broad-based presence in the mid- and late 1990s. The BNP had not managed to field candidates for the 1994 European election (Eatwell 2003: 345), and also the general elections of the following years showed high fluctuation with respect to the constituencies in which it competed (Mudde 2007: 266). Also UKIP continued to be, in Ford and Goodwin's (2014a: 2) words, 'barely even noticeable' politically, although their higher results at European elections meant that they 'would stumble out of hibernation once every few years, briefly stir up popular discontent with Brussels and Westminster political elites, and then return to their slumbers' (ibid.; see also: 62). Low everyday presence and only marginal electoral successes have for many decades been one feature of rightist nationalism in both the UK and Germany. But this does not mean, of course, that there were no developments whatsoever. Despite a negligible overall vote share in 1997 (about 0.1 percent), the BNP had put up its largest number of candidates thus far (56), and received higher proportions of the vote in certain constituencies (see Eatwell 2000: 173; Judt 2007: 744). Also its share of about 1 percent in the 1999 European election was low – and yet, the BNP did receive more than 100,000 votes in this election (see Audickas et al. 2020: 52;

numbers pertain to Great Britain). These overall modest results nevertheless placed it far ahead of the fading National Front, clearly making it the dominant extremist party in Britain.

Although still very low in international comparison, also UKIP's electoral fortunes were slowly rising. Its nearly 200 candidates gained an overall vote share of 0.3 percent in 1997 (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 30), a result which was far below the leaders' hopes but constituted – at least in relative terms – a clear improvement from the Anti-Federalist League's 1992 effort. UKIP's anti-Europe message was eclipsed, moreover, by the evanescent Referendum Party that spent millions on its 1997 campaign, promising a referendum on whether the UK should be further integrated into a federal Europe or regain more autonomy (Clarke et al. 2017: 87; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 26-7, 28, 30; Lloyd 2002: 479). Shortly after the election and the death of its leader, the Referendum Party dissolved. UKIP thus became the main Eurosceptic party outside the mainstream, inherited some 160 Referendum Party candidates (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 33), and achieved a first small success in the 1999 European election. For the first time under a proportional system, UKIP received increased its vote share from 1 to 7 percent, and even sent three of its candidates to Brussels (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 34; see also: 24-5).

Despite overall low vote shares and continuing confinement to the political fringe, both the BNP and UKIP did, therefore, also see some small glimpses of hope. And while their electoral rise was very gradual, their core concerns were receiving much more exposure. Soaring migration numbers soon led to accompanying concerns and media coverage (Shabi 2019: paras. 12, 14), and also the issue of European integration continued to move into the political limelight and was regarded with increasing reservations by the British public (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 28, 33).

Seen through the respondents in the longitudinal sample, rightist nationalism's social characteristics had hardly changed. Occasional nationalists' social backgrounds in the late 1990s looked very similar to those displayed at the previous moment. This was due both to an emerging feature of social stagnation, which I discuss below and over the next chapters, and to the fact that they were the same

individuals for whom certain characteristics remained constant. For instance, as their gender distribution did not change, they expressed the same slight overrepresentation of men; and they now looked older simply as a result of the years passed since the last analytical moment. Occasional nationalists in the sample were now on average 46 years old, and most often in their thirties (26 percent), forties (27 percent), and fifties (25 percent). Although changes would have been possible with respect to other aspects of their social composition, nationalists showed only subtle development on other variables. About 8 percent had gained new educational qualifications between 1993 and 2000. But half still listed O- and A-Level schooling diplomas as their highest qualifications, and one fifth still held no educational certificates at all (see Appendix Table A2c). Perhaps the most characteristic educational feature of rightist nationalists continued to be their low share of those who had gained university degrees (8 percent, compared to 19 percent of non-nationalists). Like most sample respondents, also rightist nationalists were very rarely unemployed at this economically calm moment (around 2 percent). Although their share of individuals in retirement had risen (11 percent, risen from 5 percent in the early 1990s), the vast majority was still working.

Also rather little had changed with respect to nationalists' socio-economic backgrounds (see Appendix Table A2f). Still about one quarter worked in professional and managerial positions characterised by salaries and higher work autonomy. One fifth worked in intermediate clerical, administrative, sales, and service occupations. Twelve percent were small employers and non-professional freelancers. But about 44 percent of nationalists were distributed across various positions largely defined by (modified) forms of labour contract; they still typically worked, for instance, in lower supervisory and technical craft occupations, and (semi-)routine service jobs and technical operations. Rightist nationalists therefore remained employed less commonly in professional and managerial positions than respondents who kept to other political movements, and were more frequently found in occupational positions with lower job security and autonomy.

Rightist nationalism, as seen through these individuals at this time, was thus ideal-typically embodied by those in their mid-forties with school-leaving qualifications, who were rarely unemployed but still had lower incomes and often worked in routine-oriented positions without much long-term security. Apart from the growing age of these respondents, which was due to the sample being constituted by the same individuals, rightist nationalism was still characterised by the same social locations as it had been in the early 1990s. As outlined in the previous chapter, BNP sympathisers were considerably younger than most other respondents. At this moment they were frequently in their twenties and thirties, and even more commonly in paid employment than others. But they were still much more frequently wage workers in technical and (semi-)routine occupations that offered few opportunities and safeties. They were even more strongly characterised by the relative absence of higher educational degrees and the concentration of individuals with school diplomas. Importantly, hardly any of these individuals had gained a new educational qualification since the early 1990s. Although they were younger and thus more likely to still undergo training, they were stuck educationally, confined to the qualifications they had gained years ago.

Perhaps also because little had changed in their socio-economic positions, most rightist nationalists still lamented social inequalities. In 1997 and 2000, overall 73 percent still thought that different laws applied to the rich and poor in society (12 percent disagreed), and 70 percent stated that ordinary people did not receive their fair share of the nation's wealth (10 thought so). The wider economic situation had much improved since the early 1990s, and slightly higher shares of these individuals now stated that, financially, they were "living comfortably" (29 percent) or were "doing alright" (37 percent). But they still pointed to inequalities nearly as strongly as they had a few years before. Even if things had improved in relative terms, most of these individuals were still locked in the same socio-economic positions, and might have had the feeling that they were still not gaining access to the resources and opportunities that they deserved. But their perceptions might also reflect the fact that, despite the economic recovery, income inequality had remained at a high level

since the early 1990s (see Appendix Figure A1a). The same was true for wider ‘inequality in wealth, opportunity, and lifestyle [which] had scarcely diminished over the past thirty years’ (Morgan 2010b: 673).

Rightist nationalists’ strong recognition of social inequalities stood, however, in some tension with the rather neo-liberal economic outlook that UKIP’s 1997 manifesto presented. In many cases holding Europe responsible, the manifesto proposed, for instance, that laws and regulations restricting private sector business – including those aiming at workers’ rights and safety – be reduced (UKIP 1997: section 9), and that welfare provisions would foster ‘the growth of dependency and the decline of self help’ (section 11). UKIP did, in other words, offer little economic reassurance to individuals in potentially fragile status positions. What was perhaps slightly more in line with the sample respondents’ concerns was UKIP’s aim to exempt ‘the lowest paid workers from income tax by raising the earnings threshold above which tax becomes payable’ (UKIP 1997: section 9; see also: section 6). Still, there seemed to be a certain de-alignment of UKIP’s wider socio-economic claims and these individuals’ more personal perceptions. Instead of subscribing to what seemed to emerge as UKIP’s economically liberal and meritocratic character, rightist nationalists in the sample might have seen UKIP’s cultural and political issues as more compelling. At least with respect to the economic and cultural domains, I therefore understand them, in Weberian terms, as motivated more strongly by value than instrumental rationality (see Weber 1978: 24-6). This reading echoes something of Mann’s (2004: e.g. 22, 357) analysis of inter-war fascists for whom ideological, value-rational aims were much more important than economic considerations.

In 1997, and thus before the onset of strongly rising migration, respondents were asked whether they were concerned about becoming a victim of crime. About 15 percent of rightist nationalists voiced “big worries”, 37 percent saw it as a “bit of a worry”, 19 percent had “occasional doubts”, and 28 percent were not concerned at all. Shortly after the peak of recorded criminal incidents and violence (see figures in ONS 2020: 7, 12), rightist nationalism was therefore characterised by some worries about crime. Unlike the BNP, however, UKIP did at this moment not put very much

emphasis on the issue. Perceiving it as ‘understandably one of the greatest public concerns’, the party supported in its 1997 election manifesto the Conservatives’ call for ‘tough and consistent’ sentences (UKIP 1997: section 15). As I discuss below, UKIP also spoke about crime in the context of migration (ibid.: section 16). But the party’s overall approach was at this moment not characterised by a detailed outline of increasingly strict law-and-order measures, but rather by using crime to further bolster its arguments against centralisation, bureaucracy, and European control (UKIP 1997: section 15).

Rightist nationalism, as seen through the sample individuals, was still characterised by a strong sense of political abandonment. About 51 percent continued to think in 1998 that British governments did not reflect the will of the people (20 percent thought so), 70 percent stated that ordinary people had little influence over governments’ actions (16 percent disagreed), and 74 percent did not trust British governments to prioritise national over party interests (8 percent did). The shift to Blair’s administration had alleviated some nationalists’ concerns, hinting at the fact that rightist nationalism could at times also have affinities with leftist politics. But the majority still felt disregarded by established politics, irrespective of who led the government. And while also many other respondents expressed considerable dissatisfaction with British governments, rightist nationalists still did so more strongly. This might be viewed in light of the wider political disenchantment that seemed to intensify at the time and also expressed itself in low national turnout (see Appendix Figure A3c).

But at least for rightist nationalists, there were likely more specific reasons for their concerns about governmental conduct and democratic representation. Some of these were formulated by UKIP. In its 1997 manifesto, the party expressed various anti-establishment claims around dishonest mainstream parties and conniving bureaucrats, and pointed to perceived lack of democratic political procedure at European and national levels, promising to recover Britain’s lost democracy (e.g. UKIP 1997: sections 1, 2, 5, 13, 19, 20). Connecting also this issue with their core concern of Europe, UKIP claimed that ‘successive UK governments have condoned the

transfer of power into the hands of bureaucratic structures not only in the EU but also in almost every domestic policy area' (UKIP 1997: section 2). By aiming to wrest back control from self-serving and distant European institutions, it argued, '[t]he main thrust of the UKIP's policies is to bring government back within the reach and influence of those who are governed' (ibid.: section 5). One important characteristic of rightist nationalism, both at the level of sample respondents and movements, was thus also at this moment its pronounced distance to mainstream politics, and its strong concern about democracy, political recognition, and what it perceived as the establishment's sinister motives.

But UKIP's claims hinted at a specific connection between these concerns about political exclusion and the issue of Europe. In the previous chapter I have interpreted rightist nationalists' condemnation of British governments also as a response to the Maastricht Treaty. Now they had to contend with a Labour government in charge of European integration. Also New Labour was not without hesitation with respect to Europe. In 1996, for instance, the potential threat posed by the short-lived Referendum Party induced both Conservatives and Labour to promise a referendum before considering to adopt the Euro (Lloyd 2002: 479; see also: Conservative Party 1997: section 9). And after taking over office, Blair, too, prioritised other political and economic concerns, and kept a distance from certain social aspects of proposed EU legislation, and from a possible accession to the Euro area (for subtly different assessments of Blair's position on Europe, cf. Judt 2007: 794; Lloyd 2002: 489, 490; Morgan 2010a: 696; 2010b: 671). But this could do little to assuage rightist nationalism's concerns. Labour still showed a more Europe-friendly face than Major's (or Thatcher's) Conservatives had done. As European integration continued, for instance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, many rightist nationalists might also have seen the Labour government as violating what they perceived as the Eurosceptic will of the people. The same might be said for Labour's implementation of devolution with which rightist nationalism also disagreed, as I discuss below.

Again there is a more personalised way of making sense of these rightist nationalists' disaffection with governmental politics, however. Few of them had

experienced upward mobility over the course of the last years. Many thought perhaps that they were still missing out in socio-economic terms, even under a Labour government – and this feeling of not receiving what they deserved might also have translated into a sense of not being taken seriously politically, or even of being excluded from their rightful place as citizens determining the politics of their nation. Given the changed socio-demographic context of the late 1990s, this notion might have been compounded by Blair’s opening of migration policies soon after New Labour’s victory. Public opinion and news coverage became increasingly concerned about migration (Kaufmann 2019: 161-2; see also: Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 255), and polls had shown for some years that there was some measure of public sympathy for rightist nationalist claims (Eatwell 2003: 347; 2000: 175, 186; 1998: 153-4). At a time when Labour was still predominantly endorsing migration and cultural diversity, some rightist nationalists in the sample may have seen these issues as – narrowly interpreted – breaking with “the will of the people”. But more broadly, they may also have had the feeling that what they perceived as their rightful basis of “true” belonging was undermined, further weakening the sense of having any control over government politics. While their economic interests did not align with those of their chosen movements, therefore, these political concerns might constitute an element of Weberian instrumental rationality which formed a connection with their stronger cultural value-rational preferences.

When asked in 1999 what national identities best described them, 32 percent of rightist nationalists chose “English” (but not British), while 20 percent listed both “English” and “British”. But with 43 percent, the largest group stated that they felt “British” (but not English). Even though some nationalists felt specifically English, therefore, a sense of British identity predominated. Rightist nationalism, at the level of both movements and sample respondents, was again overwhelmingly located in England; yet the majority of rightist nationalists seemed to reflect UKIP’s (and the BNP’s) conflated party image as British, not simply English party (Wellings 2010: 502-3; see also: Copus 2009: 366-7). Asked about other political views, the majority of rightist nationalists also expressed their wish that the government do everything in

its power to keep the different parts of Britain united in a single state (58 percent; 17 percent disagreed). Like many other respondents, rightist nationalists acknowledged some aspects of Britain that might be improved or criticised – also with respect to the perceived inequalities or undemocratic government actions discussed above – but the vast majority still maintained that British citizenship was preferable to all others. They were reluctant to criticise their country as a whole, nor did they want to break it apart or focus exclusively on England. Despite certain lamentable features of Britain’s socio-political landscape, rightist nationalists were concerned with keeping Britain whole and united. In their eyes, it was still the most desirable country; perhaps all it needed was, as UKIP (1997: section 10) demanded, to regain ‘some self respect and a sense of purpose’.

UKIP shared the respondents’ worries about a further fragmentation of their country. In its 1997 manifesto, the party opposed devolution, seeing it as ‘the duty of every UK government to uphold the unity of the United Kingdom’ (UKIP 1997: section 19). It connected this position again with its ubiquitous criticism of centralisation, bureaucracy, and the EU’s influence. At this moment of devolution, both the sample individuals and UKIP did little to hint at a concentrated English backlash that had been expected by some observers at the time (Condor 2010: 525-6). Instead, and perhaps reflecting wider fears that the UK might break apart (see Lloyd 2002: 486; Morgan 2010b: 676), rightist nationalism was characterised by a desire to hold on to Britishness and the UK’s political integrity. But in its eyes, the country’s (former) greatness, or “self-respect”, needed to be restored, which it saw as closely linked to shaking off the perceived yoke of the European Union.

When asked about Britain’s international integration, the majority of rightist nationalists in the sample preferred maximal British independence over cooperation with other countries (54 percent prioritised autonomy, 18 percent international cooperation). But rightist nationalists stood out most strongly when asked specifically about the issue of the EU. Only just over one fifth thought in 1999 that Britain’s EU membership was “a good thing”, while nearly twice as many considered it “bad” (40 percent; 39 percent were undecided). Asked in a more practical way about the issue,

three quarters of rightist nationalists thought that Britain had on balance not benefitted from being a member of the EU. The vast majority (81 percent) also indicated that they would vote against Britain joining the Euro, should such a referendum materialise. It is instructive to note, furthermore, that already in 1999, about 28 percent of these individuals stated that it should be Britain's aim to leave the EU (compared to 9 percent of non-nationalists). Additional 45 percent wanted Britain to remain but reduce the EU's powers. In the late 1990s, Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 28) point out, 'British public opinion had shifted in a more Eurosceptic direction across the board'. But concerns about Britain's membership in the EU and the latter's influence were an especially strong characteristic of rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample. They wished their nation to be truly independent, perhaps hoping to retrieve Britain's greatness without political interference from abroad. But this was also a moment of migration, and while most immigrants still came from places outside of Europe, nationalists might also have seen Europe as standing in the way of taking control over own border policies.

Leaving the EU, and thus gaining full British independence, remained UKIP's eponymous core concern (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 20-1, 28-9). Ahead of the 1997 election, UKIP's manifesto warned of the various dangers that the EU allegedly posed – an organisation, it argued, that 'represents government by decree, and the bureaucratic waste over which it presides feeds immeasurable graft and corruption' (UKIP 1997: section 1). Amounting to 'institutionalised fraud' and broken policies, UKIP (ibid.) maintained, the EU forced the British people to 'pay billions of pounds each year to bureaucrats whose only job appears to be to think up new schemes to bankrupt them'.

Even if UKIP's wholesale rejection of the European Union went beyond most sample nationalists' positions, it might still have resonated with them. The majority was at least very critical of its benefits and influence over Britain; and their sense of political abandonment and betrayal was increasingly addressed by UKIP who connected its concerns about democracy at home with concerns about Europe's influence, and (inter)national bureaucracy and central control. In UKIP's eyes, only

the party itself could adequately represent what the British people wanted. UKIP might also have aligned with sample nationalists' preferences with respect to the problem of social order. They expressed worries about being affected by crime but did not make this their highest priority, while UKIP espoused a tough approach to crime, albeit without a law-and-order focus comparable to that of the Conservatives (see e.g. Conservative Party 1997: esp. section 7), let alone the BNP; and like UKIP, sample nationalists desired to maintain the traditional political order by holding on to Britain, rather than England, both in their subjective identifications and in the wish that their country stay united under one state. They did not, however, share UKIP's partly neo-liberal economic outlook. Instead, these individuals were still keenly aware of social inequalities. Importantly, rightist nationalism thus appealed to them mainly in socio-cultural and political but not economic terms. Rather than thinking about individual opportunities and meritocratic achievements, they might have still been concerned with maintaining their social status, and with gaining social and political acknowledgment and inclusion.

Although this was not recorded in the survey data, sample nationalists might have regarded the soaring migration numbers with concern. Also with respect to cultural diversity and British identity, UKIP presented itself as an increasingly suitable political option, if the BNP's positions and fascist reputation appeared too radical. In its 1997 election manifesto, UKIP (1997: section 16) treated immigration still fairly briefly. But it not only called for restrictions on the number of newcomers, portraying common EU rules as ineffective, but also linked migration and asylum to problems of illegality and crime. The manifesto thus conflated the questions of migration, social order, and Europe, illustrating some of the broader connections between these issues. Furthermore, UKIP's demand to maintain the UK's border controls mirrored those proposed by the Conservatives (1997: section 9) at the same time, again highlighting points of overlap within the broader political right. UKIP also increasingly focused on culture, nation, and British values. It argued, for instance, that 'school education has an important role to play in preserving the national cultural identity of

the UK', adding that '[i]f we ignore our culture and history, we belittle our society and ourselves' (UKIP 1997: section 10).

The BNP, meanwhile, saw at this moment some development in the way it framed its central claims. Elected a few months after the 1999 European election, its new leader moved the party away from overt biological racism and instead embraced the language of cultural racism and Islamophobia; yet while he established some distance to the BNP's traditional demand of "repatriating" those not considered white, his party maintained its fierce anti-immigration positions, claiming that Blair's open migration stance amounted to "genocide" against the "indigenous" British people' (Kaufmann 2019: 164; see also: Eatwell 2000: 188; Ford and Goodwin 2010: 4-5). Aiming for new voter groups, the BNP therefore attempted to leave behind its extremist or neo-fascist reputation and to follow the more modern recipe of culture-focused rightist nationalist parties that had become successful in other European countries (Goodwin 2014: 896, 898). This hardly constituted a new character, however, as its thinly veiled racism, its uncompromising anti-immigration claims, and its authoritarian law-and-order and anti-system claims remained intact.

Yet there were signs that these two strands of rightist nationalism were very slowly converging. The BNP was characterised, first and foremost, by its ongoing focus on racial and cultural purity, and on tough anti-immigration claims; and its anti-Europe and anti-globalisation stance flowed from these core concerns. But it started toning down its language in the quest for more political acceptance. UKIP's character was still chiefly anti-European, but it had begun to branch out and link this essential concern more clearly to issues of migration, crime and social order, democracy and political recognition, and national identity and history. Although still subtly and opaquely, the party displayed a growing concern with maintaining a glorified cultural identity against adverse influences. While UKIP emphasised its distance to the BNP and racism in general, both inflections of rightist nationalism thus started to slowly move towards each other. Together they formed a complex amalgamation of hard Euroscepticism set to leave the EU entirely, a critique of existing parliamentary and political procedures with the claim to restore "true" democracy, an emphasis of

British unrestricted sovereignty, a rejection of immigration and foreign influence, and a focus on maintaining a racialised notion of national identity. This development would continue also in the following years.

II The early 2000s, EU expansion, and politics' rightward journey

The years from 2003 to 2005 overall presented a picture of continuing economic stability, even though income inequality remained high (see Appendix Figures A1c, A1a; Morgan 2010a: 682-3). This moment was again more strongly characterised by socio-cultural developments. Migration kept rising also under Blair's second administration. Appendix Figure A3b shows that net migration continued its climb from about 144,000 in the year 2000 to 208,000 in 2003, now overtaking German figures at the time. By 2005, annual net migration in Britain reached 298,000. In addition to immigrants from the Commonwealth and beyond, and refugees of recent conflicts (see Kaufmann 2019: 150-1; Morgan 2010a: 686), this rise was now also driven by newcomers from nearby. In May 2004 the EU enlargement came into effect, bringing eight eastern European countries, as well as Cyprus and Malta, into the fold of the EU. A few years after taking office, and amidst increasing public and media concerns about immigration and asylum seekers, Blair's open migration stance became more and more restrictive, aiming especially to reduce the number of asylum seekers (Kaufmann 2019: 150, 151; Shabi 2019: paras. 12-16, 19-23). As Judt (2007: 744) suggests, also the BNP's strength in certain constituencies in 1997 and 2001 – standing in for the wider mood – may have contributed to Labour's tightening of migration. Nevertheless convinced about migration's economic benefits, Blair did not impose restrictions on eastern European citizens coming into the UK from 2004; and from then on the share of immigrants from the new member states rose far beyond government expectations (see Clarke et al. 2017: 123; Kaufmann 2019: 151, 161; Shabi 2019: paras. 23-4). These years saw, moreover, the most rightward stance of the Conservatives in recent history (see Bale 2018: 266; Bale and Partos 2014: 612;

Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 34). Growing worries about migration were perhaps compounded by highly symbolic events such as 9/11, and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, which entailed – not only in the UK – increasing securitisation measures and concerns about terrorism, as well as growing fears about cultural difference and Islam (e.g. Neal 2009: 338-40; Sides and Citrin 2007: 501; see also: Brubaker 2004: 123).

Rightist nationalism branching out yet hardly changing

As these events unfolded, the sample's rightist nationalists were characterised by an increasingly pessimistic perception of their home. Asked in 2005, about 46 percent thought that that the UK should at times take a leaf out of other countries' books (24 percent disagreed), and three quarters stated that there were certain shameful things about Britain (10 percent disagreed). These individuals perceived their country as changing for the worse; and this sentiment was adequately captured by the title of UKIP's 2005 election manifesto, "We want our country back". Compared to the early 1990s, the sample's nationalists expressed a stronger retreat from the political world, as only overall 7 percent stated to be "very" and 31 percent "fairly" interested in politics (see also Appendix Table A3d). Sample nationalists also viewed British governments in 2003 even more negatively than in the early 1990s amidst the Maastricht rebellion. Now 73 percent thought that British governments did not reflect the will of the people (6 percent said they did), 75 percent stated that ordinary citizens had little influence over governments' actions (10 percent disagreed), and 84 percent of nationalists suspected that British governments might put party interests before national matters (6 percent though the opposite). Blair's victory had at first mollified some of the sample nationalists' perceptions of governmental politics (see e.g. Appendix Table A3c). But after net migration had begun to soar, they again expressed an increasingly strong sense that they were shut out from political decisions. These concerns about political recognition and representation were

answered by UKIP's expanding repertoire of themes. The party portrayed itself as a non-elite movement close to the British people that would "restore" democracy, also through extended use of referenda, and attacked "professional" politicians while condemning political correctness (UKIP 2005: 3, 5, 6, 11, 15, 16; see also: Goodwin 2016: 275). UKIP linked these issues, and many others, again to its primary demand – its aims would only be achievable if Britain left the EU (UKIP 2015: 3, 5, and *passim*).

Rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample had by 2005 become even more convinced that their country's autonomy was preferable to international cooperation (63 percent; 12 percent thought otherwise). Also UKIP (2005: 13) repeated its earlier claims to halt European integration in defence matters while espousing a loose continuation of Britain's NATO membership. But this was embedded within its core concern with Britain's sovereignty and independence from the EU (UKIP 2005: 5, and *passim*). One year later, rightist nationalists in the sample (most of whom were present even though this question was only posed just outside this analytical key moment) felt even more negative about Europe. About 52 percent stated in 2006 that Britain's EU membership was "a bad thing" (13 percent though the opposite); 83 percent said that Britain had overall not benefitted from the EU (17 percent disagreed); and 39 percent espoused the longer-term goal of leaving the EU, in addition to 44 percent stating that it should stay but reduce Europe's influence (see also: Appendix Table A3e). A significant proportion of these individuals had made up their mind about how they viewed Britain and Europe's relationship. Also in this respect UKIP (or even the softening BNP) might have seemed an appropriate political option. At this moment, rightist nationalism was – both at the individual and movement level – characterised by a negative view of the country's development, a sense of having been politically disregarded and abandoned, a strong rejection of the EU, and a longing for Britain's sovereignty. But despite its emphasis on Europe, which was still much more strongly pronounced than in the German nationalist right, also British nationalism held on to its long-standing concerns around immigration and national identity.

At a time when the Conservatives' pursued their most rightward stance on Europe and migration (see Conservative Party 2005: 1, 19, 26; see also: Bale 2018: 266; Bale and Partos 2014: 612; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 38, 64, 65; Kaufmann 2019: 177; Partos and Bale 2015: 178), the BNP maintained its new leader's modernisation strategy. The extremist party continued to tone down its language on migration and "race" in the tradition of more successful rightist nationalist parties, at least partially moving from biological racism to an ethno-pluralist focus on cultural difference, and emphasising 'more voter-friendly themes such as "Democracy", "Identity", "Freedom" and "Security"' (Ford and Goodwin 2010: 5; see also: Kaufmann 2019: 164). While it maintained its criticism of the political establishment, the BNP abandoned its vision of overcoming the existing democratic system (Ford and Goodwin 2010: 5; see also: Goodwin 2016: 276). Instead, it gave more prominence to demands to leave the EU (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 69). Due to its organisational reliance on extremists, however, the BNP remained unable to escape its association with violence and illegitimate politics (Goodwin 2014: 896-8; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 199-200); and despite its softened language on "race", it still held a hard-line approach to migration, proposing in 2005 'an immediate halt to all immigration ... [and] the "voluntary" removal of settled migrants' (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 65).

UKIP, on the other hand, retained its focus on leaving the EU but was now also increasingly characterised by an expansion of its anti-immigrant claims (Bale 2018: 269; Kaufmann 2019: 176; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 46, 63-4, 69; Goodwin 2016: 275). In its 2005 manifesto, it devoted much space to the question of migration and asylum, suggesting to 'approach zero net immigration both by imposing far stricter limits on legal immigrants and by taking control, at last, of the vexed problem of illegal immigration' (UKIP 2005: 11). With the demand of subjecting newcomers to 'health checks for certain communicable diseases' (ibid.), the party appealed to harsher nationalist tropes and fears. UKIP (2005: 12) further proposed the 'reinterpretation of parts of the 1951 Convention of the Status of Refugees' – a

suggestion also put forward by the Conservatives in even more direct words (Conservative Party 2005: 19; see also: Bale and Partos 2014: 612).

In the previous section I have pointed to rightist nationalism's process of convergence, and this was still the case in the early and mid-2000s (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 69, also for the following). The BNP continued to move away slightly from the extremist fringe and paid more attention to some of UKIP's themes – and UKIP now embraced more strongly the issues of political recognition and immigration. Rightist nationalism was branching out, reshuffling the combinations of more exclusivist and more accessible themes. But on the whole it still continued to display the same gamut of key concerns: national identity and sovereignty, social order, immigration and cultural difference, Europe, and democracy and political voice. Importantly, this moment saw Conservatism as close to this nationalist recipe as it had ever been. The political right was a rather tight cluster far in the anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic corner, while Labour looked very welcoming by comparison even as it became tougher on migration. Perhaps this was not all too surprising – this was, after all, a moment of the 2004 EU expansion and strongly growing migration.

Europe and migration

Views on migration are not included in the British Household Panel Survey (nor in the subsequent UKHLS). But I understand this problem as contextually related to sample nationalists' strong criticism of Britain's EU membership and governmental decisions that they perceived as opposed to the will of the people. Wider polls during this period suggested that the EU was declining as a key concern on voters' minds (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 63; see also: 37). Yet at the same time, the problem of migration gained increasing prominence (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 63, 64; Kaufmann 2019: 161-2, 177; Shabi 2019: para. 23). Following the unseen levels of migration in the early and mid-2000s, the British public soon saw it as one of the most urgent

topics, and was pessimistic about its development (Clarke et al. 2017: 123). The Conservatives' and UKIP's increasing embrace of anti-immigration claims (e.g. Bale 2013: 31-2, Kaufmann 2019: 176, 177) thus harnessed (and perhaps contributed to) some of the wider social climate.

Not only amidst this political atmosphere might issues of migration and Europe become connected (see e.g. Clarke et al. 2017: 70, 84, 85). Many of the newcomers were now European citizens, and the political right perceived the EU as a threat to policing British borders and migration targets. UKIP, for instance, warned in 2004 of “uncontrollable EU immigration” (Goodwin 2016: 275), and argued in its manifesto the following year that its aims to reduce migration and asylum were closely linked to leaving the EU (UKIP 2005: 3, 11). Indeed, while some nationalists may oppose the EU in its own right, Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 146) write, Europe perhaps more ‘often functions as a symbol of other problems in society and perceived threats to the nation: unresponsive and out-of-touch elites in Brussels and Westminster; a breakdown in respect for authority and British traditions; and, most importantly, the onset of mass immigration’. The EU might, in other words, be a screen upon which various other issues, including migration, can be projected.

Turning this notion around slightly, I suggest that the issue of migration might to some degree underlie or be viewed through the problems I have discussed in this section. It is worth keeping in mind that during these years the economy presented an image of calm and growth, and that it was fairly clear that the UK would not join the Euro-zone anytime soon. In its election manifesto, Labour (Labour Party 2005: 84) still emphasised that several economic criteria would have to be met before considering to join the currency and promised a referendum for this hypothetical case, and another one on the EU's Constitutional Treaty. Net migration, on the other hand, was still rising steeply without any signs of slowing. Yet despite emphasising that it had reduced asylum claims and proposing a points-based immigration system, Labour (Labour Party 2005: 51; see also: 52) still maintained that ‘[i]mmigration has been good for Britain. We want to keep it that way’.

Before this background, I interpret sample nationalists' growing worries about political inclusion, government decisions, the direction in which Britain was moving, and the EU at least partially as also making a political statement about the critical issue of migration and cultural difference, and Labour's still comparatively open stance. The highly prominent issue of migration might have been one of several lenses through which they viewed other socio-cultural issues, including Europe. This way of making sense of the respondents' political views also aligns with the fact that rightist nationalism – both in the shape of UKIP and the BNP – reached its historically greatest strength precisely in a period of soaring migration and a stable economy. Also the Conservative Party reached its most rightist and exclusivist position at this moment, and was, in electoral terms, slowly catching up with Labour, whose vote share was steadily declining after its 1997 victory (see Appendix Figure A3d; Audickas et al. 2020: 12).

Although still low, UKIP's vote share in the general elections of the new millennium had – relatively speaking – seen a clear rise, gaining 1.5 percent in 2001 and 2.2 percent in 2005 (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 40, 65). But it was still far away from substantial advances or even the prospect of winning a seat in parliament. Its anti-EU message gained traction particularly in European elections. In 2004, UKIP received about 16 percent of the vote (see Audickas et al. 2020: 52; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 48), making it third-strongest party before the Liberal Democrats. This was a first significant breakthrough – but it was also a short-lived one. UKIP's success was partly due to this having been a European election, and to a boost in funds and popularity from being briefly joined by a famous TV presenter; yet already the next year showed that UKIP could not yet convert its European gains into a corresponding result in a general election (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 4-6, 44-8, 53, 61-5; Goodwin 2016: 275-6). Still, for both rightist nationalists and the mainstream parties, this was a sign of UKIP's potential at a time of unprecedented net migration and the eastern EU expansion. Also the BNP saw a period of increasing electoral support, albeit at an even more limited level than UKIP. Under their new leader, the extremist party achieved 0.2 percent in 2001, rising to 0.7 percent in 2005

– by far its highest result (see Mellows-Facer 2006: 45). Also its vote share of about 5 percent in the 2004 European election constituted a significant rise from its result of around 1 percent five years earlier (see Audickas et al. 2020: 52, numbers for Great Britain). While UKIP was now clearly the more successful nationalist and Eurosceptic party nation-wide, also the BNP garnered support and often outpolled UKIP locally (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 68-70, 73).

The early 2000s constituted a moment that was overall stable in economic terms, but saw the EU enlargement and an ongoing rise of immigration numbers. At this time, rightist nationalism achieved its most significant electoral successes at the national level, and the Conservatives – still weakened – reached their most rightward position. Also rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample displayed a growing discontent with issues that I understand as related to the context of soaring migration: the democratic basis of governmental politics, their feeling of political exclusion and abandonment, a pessimistic view of the country's wider development, and Britain's membership in the EU. I understand these issues as conflated in rightist nationalism's view. The key issue of Europe was still about sovereignty; but while its interpretation in economic terms was declining, its political attribution was now increasingly accompanied by one related to migration and cultural diversity. Europe had emerged, in other words, as racialised issue.

III The late 2000s, economic crisis, and austerity

The Great Recession and its aftermath constituted a crucial moment for the UK. Also because the country's recent economic stability had relied on its substantial banking sector and consumer spending (Kickert 2012a: 169; 2012b: 302; Morgan 2010a: 678), Britain was strongly impacted by the economic crisis and took a long time to recover (see Goodwin 2016: 276-8; Kickert 2012b: 300, 301). Annual GDP growth slumped notably in 2008 and reached its lowest point in 2009 when it shrank by about 4 percent (see Appendix Table A2g; Appendix Figure A1c, also for the following). Also

in the following years, GDP growth was low and fell in some quarters back to negative values (Goodwin 2016: 277). This longer-term weakness of the economy was also visible along other indicators. Reaching the highest level since the early 1990s, inflation rose to nearly 4 percent in 2011, while net disposable household income growth fell significantly under the level of inflation. Government debt soared during these years (Goodwin 2016: 277-8; Morgan 2010a: 705). Importantly, the unemployment rate leaped from 5.3 percent in 2007 to 8.1 percent in 2011, entailing a strong increase of welfare claims (Goodwin 2016: 278). Unemployment now lay clearly beyond German values.

Labour's response to these challenges centred initially on saving and nationalising UK banks in 2008 (Kickert 2012a: 169-71; Morgan 2010a: 704, 705). As a second step, the government adopted Keynesian measures to drive demand with extensive government stimuli, aiming to, amongst other things, boost the labour market, and reduce VAT and property tax (Kickert 2012a: 171, 172; Vis et al. 344-5, 347-8). Despite vast sums spent, however, these measures could not prevent the aggravating economic challenges of the following years. The period of increased borrowing and spending was soon answered by significant welfare and public sector cut-backs by the new Conservative-led coalition formed in 2010, ushering in a prolonged phase of austerity (Clarke et al. 2017: 121; Edmiston 2017: 262-3; Kickert 2012a: 174, 175; 2012b: 304). This sparked a series of anti-austerity protests especially in 2011 but also in the following years.

As the UK faced economic challenges not seen since the early 1990s, it was the economic dimension that defined this moment most strongly. But there were also socio-cultural and political developments. Although net migration's rise halted throughout the years of the economic crisis, it still remained high at a surplus of more than 200,000 newcomers in most years (see Appendix Figure A3b). The population percentage of those not born in the UK continued to climb, reaching 12 percent in 2011. Labour had seen its electoral lead shrink significantly already in the 2005 general election, and after further declining popularity in the face of the economic crisis, Britain now also saw a political change. The winner of the 2010 general election

was the Conservative Party, which under David Cameron initially showed a more socio-culturally moderate and modernising face (see Bale and Partos 2014: 613; cf. Partos and Bale 2015; cf. Conservative Party 2010: e.g. vii-ix, 21, 113-14). Its vote share did, however, not translate into enough parliamentary seats to govern alone (see Cracknell et al. 2011: 7). As a consequence, it entered a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. This moment thus saw a time of economic upheaval and insecurity, continuing migration, and the return of Conservative politics into government with a more centrist and economically liberal approach.

Socio-economic stagnation, migration, and nationalism's growing appeal

Rightist nationalism's electoral strength continued its steady ascent also during the time of the economic crisis. In 2010, both UKIP and BNP reached their highest results in a general election (3.1 and 1.9 percent, respectively, see Cracknell et al. 2011: 80). A year earlier, both parties had also slightly improved on their already comparatively high shares in the European election, leading to a political novelty as the extremist BNP captured two seats at a national-level election (see Audickas et al. 2020: 51-2; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 6-7, 76; 2010: 3). These years saw the height of the BNP's popularity, which continued its gradual softening but nevertheless remained limited in reach (Goodwin 2014: 898). Despite this, however, rightist nationalism continued to be most strongly embodied by UKIP. Since 2006 mainly led by Nigel Farage, the party further hardened its stance on migration (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 71-2). But as I outline below, it also used the Great Recession for its anti-Europe arguments.

During the years of the economic crisis, net migration remained high, so that British society became more and more diverse (see Appendix Figure A3b; Appendix Table A1a, also for the following). Predominantly white and UK-Born (5 percent), the longitudinal sample's occasional nationalists were by now much less diverse than wider society around them (11 percent born outside UK). This growing gap in diversity between sample respondents and wider society was partly due to these being the

same group of respondents since the early 1990s whose cultural backgrounds thus remained constant; but as I discuss in Chapter 10, low cultural diversity is also an important feature of rightist nationalism more generally. Like the wider longitudinal sample, the group of occasional nationalists again grew older as time progressed. On average 57 years old, they were now most typically in their fifties and sixties (each 27 percent). Their growing age simply reflected the years that had passed for the same individuals – it did not constitute a changing age profile of rightist nationalism. But on variables that could have indicated real change, rightist nationalism's social composition, as seen through these individuals, looked again very similar. Rather few respondents had gained new educational qualifications over the past decade, so that rightist nationalism remained characterised by school-leaving education. Still 24 percent of sample nationalists held A-level and 27 percent GCSE diplomas (see Appendix Table A2c). Still only 9 percent had achieved traditional university degrees, and another 9 percent more practically oriented or short-term educational degrees following high school.

Even as the economic crisis unfolded, only very few sample nationalists were unemployed (see Appendix Table A2g). Overall 2 percent were looking for work during these years. By now 34 percent were retired. But still more than half (55 percent) were working. Also their occupational backgrounds painted a socio-economic picture of rightist nationalism that looked very similar to recent years (see Appendix Table A2f). It still showed much socio-economic complexity but remained ideal-typically embodied by occupational positions largely defined by (modified) forms of labour contract, often characterised by routine work, and lower job security and career prospects. Even though they themselves were rarely unemployed, rightist nationalists might still have perceived the economic situation as posing a threat to their livelihoods and social status. The UK had not faced a recession for one and a half decades; this one impacted the British economy severely and still brought periods of negative GDP growth until early 2013 (Goodwin 2016: 276, 277). Unemployment remained high, also due to the Conservative-Liberal coalition's austerity measures,

which were followed by increasing economic pessimism in wider society (Clarke et al. 2017: 120-2).

Some of this was visible also in the sample nationalists' assessment of their future financial situation. During these years, overall 13 percent expected to be better off financially the next year, but a significantly grown share of 29 percent thought that they would be doing worse. This expressed some respondents' reaction to the context. Yet it was also in line with the wider sample's longer-term decrease in financial optimism (see Appendix Figure A2b). This development had started in the Blair years; it might thus indicate not just a sense of betrayal with respect to soaring migration but also Labour's centrist economic stance and, perhaps, its focus on education from which sample nationalists had hardly benefitted. Even in these years of economic pressures, however, over half of rightist nationalists still stated that they expected their financial situation to be about the same; and while they did so less commonly than others, also more than half of nationalists still stated to be "living comfortably" (overall 25 percent) or "doing alright" (37 percent). Some nationalists were thus feeling even less secure in the face of downturn and austerity. But the majority perceived the economic threat in theoretical and relative terms. Rather than being immediately impacted by the recession, the fear of social decline loomed over them as a constant possibility, compounded by their educational and occupational stagnation relative to others.

At the movement level, the BNP and UKIP spoke to the challenges posed by the economic crisis, charged banks and government, and promised to alleviate financial pressure on those with low income. But their focus lay on connecting economic questions with their central themes of immigration, globalisation, foreign influence, national strength and independence, political recognition and participation, and Europe (BNP 2010: 9-10, 68-83; UKIP 2010: 2, 3-5). For sample nationalists and parties, economic issues mattered. But even during 'the most serious economic downturn since the Second World War' (Morgan 2010a: 704), rightist nationalism maintained its concentration on its socio-cultural core issues (Goodwin 2016: 285-6). Rather than constituting a policy issue in its own right, the economic

crisis and subsequent bailouts bolstered especially UKIP's anti-EU arguments (Bale 2018: 269-70, 274; see also: Clarke et al. 2017: 72-3).

The economic crisis might have played into the risen turnout in the 2010 election (see Appendix Table A3d), which was also reflected in the sample nationalists' (and the wider sample's) somewhat increased interest in politics. Overall about 8 percent stated during these years to be "very" and 37 percent to be "fairly" interested in politics. But more than half remained "not very" (30 percent) or "not at all (25 percent) interested. Too deep was their longer-term disenchantment with the political process. Asked in 2011, after the return of Conservative politics to power, the majority of sample nationalists still thought that public officials did not listen to them (67 percent; 14 percent disagreed), and that people like them had no influence on the government's actions (64 percent; 18 percent disagreed). About 72 percent stated that it was rather unlikely that their vote mattered in the next election, while only 12 percent thought it might. Two thirds were "very" (34 percent) or "a little" (32 percent) dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in Britain. Many of these respondents had expressed a sense of being shut out from political participation for at least two decades (see also Appendix Table A3c).

While they voiced a long-standing feeling of political exclusion, also this moment provided renewed reasons for their political views. They may have felt abandoned, for instance, by the new government's unpopular austerity measures, or seen the recent parliamentary expenses scandal (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 75-6; Morgan 2010a: 706) as another sign that parliament and politicians were betraying the people. The widespread belief that members of parliament were corrupt (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 76), and the perception that the British people were being silenced and excluded, were also captured by rightist nationalist movements. The BNP (2010: e.g. 28; see also: 43, 70) attacked both 'the old-gang parties' and the media, while UKIP summarised the 'current political elite' as "'the LibLabConsensus'" (UKIP 2010: 2). It referred to the expenses scandal as proof that '[b]ureaucracy overrules democracy at every level', thus demanding both expanded

use of referenda and proportional representation (UKIP 2010: 13; see also: BNP 2010: 40).

Survey respondents were not asked specifically about Europe during these years. But still nearly two thirds (64 percent) of rightist nationalists preferred in 2008 Britain's independence over cooperation with other countries more generally (14 percent thought international cooperation more important). Their views thus expressed an ongoing alignment with rightist nationalist parties' positions on British sovereignty and autonomy, and opposition to the EU and globalisation (BNP 2010: 12, 27-9, 63-4, 69, 74-6; UKIP 2010: 2, 3, 9, 10, 14). As in previous years, both the BNP and UKIP connected the issue of Europe with that of migration (e.g. BNP 2010: 34; UKIP 2010: 5, 12). But while this had always been the main focus of the BNP, UKIP further deepened its concentration on issues of asylum, migration, and multiculturalism. It demanded, for instance, strict controls and more rigorous deportations, and argued that Labour's handling of migration 'has been a deliberate attempt to water down the British identity and buy votes' (UKIP 2010: 5; see also: 6, 13). As Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 85) put it, UKIP 'had become a fully-fledged radical right party'.

Differences between the two sides of British nationalism were still visible with respect to their consideration of "race". In 2010, about half of the sample nationalists stated that their ethnic or "racial" background was "very" (27 percent) or "fairly" (22 percent) important for their sense of who they were. The other half considered their ethnic background as "not very" or "not at all important" for their self-image (26 and 25 percent). "Race" was more central to the smaller group of BNP followers of whom more than 70 percent saw this as "very" or "fairly" important for who they were. While also UKIP sympathisers did attach a somewhat stronger significance to their "race" than other respondents, including conservatives, they overall provided a divided response to this survey question. Sample nationalists' reaction might have reflected, moreover, the different language around "race" employed by their preferred parties.

Despite its adoption of cultural themes and opposition to Islam, the BNP (2010: 17, 22, 23; see also: 16-22, 30-4, 44) still focused on the birth rates of the “white British” people, whom it portrayed as being threatened by extinction, and considered both British culture and political institutions as ‘an expression of blood’, held together by ‘a special chain of unique people who have the natural law right to remain a majority in their ancestral homeland’. It thus still made very thinly veiled references to biological “race”. UKIP (2010: 15), on the other hand, still distanced itself from the “blood and soil” ethnic nationalism of extremist parties’, instead claiming to adhere to a ‘civic nationalism, which is open and inclusive to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain’. Yet at the same time, it rejected multiculturalism and emphasised the ‘numerous threats to British identity and culture’ (UKIP 2010: 15; see also: 6, 16). The BNP’s and UKIP’s adopted language around “race” and identity illustrated one of the dimensions in which they differed from each other (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 7); and to some degree this was also visible in the sample nationalists’ responses. But both were united in their strong opposition to immigration, and their concern with the preservation of Britishness and cultural homogeneity. Even without the language of “race”, these were nevertheless racialised issues. Amidst the economic crisis, rightist nationalism channelled some of the financial worries and feelings of political marginalisation surrounding the Great Recession; but perhaps also because net migration remained high (Clarke et al. 2017: 123), nationalism remained focused on British identity and sovereignty, and the lacking political voice of its culturally homogenous people (see Goodwin 2016: 285-6).

While sample nationalists may have held general concerns about law and order during this time, they displayed the wider sample’s longer-term decline in worries about being affected by crime. As in previous years, this was still in line with national crime estimates that had been decreasing since the mid-1990s (see ONS 2020: 7). In 2011, less than one quarter of nationalists considered the possibility of becoming the victim of crime a “big worry” (5 percent) or a “bit of a worry” (17 percent). About 18 percent only voiced “occasional doubts” and 60 percent were not

concerned at all. At least this narrow survey question on crime concerns showed again a certain discrepancy between rightist nationalism at individual and movement levels. As opposed to the sample individuals, the BNP (2010: 16, 18-19, 21, 33, 38, 47-9, 70) and UKIP (2010: 5, 6) upheld their concerns about crime and demands for tough sentences, and connected these issues again with the question of migration. But they also invoked a wider sense of disorder and social decay, warning, for instance, about 'welfare dependency, educational failure, and other social pathologies', as well as security threats and 'large scale social unrest' allegedly caused by Muslim immigrants (BNP 2010: 18-19, 32; see also: 12, 17, 20, 22, 53, 67; UKIP 2010: 6, 14).

Also at this moment rightist nationalism showed, moreover, its characteristic concern with retrieving specific historical narratives. Amongst other things, UKIP (2010: 13) demanded that schools be required 'to teach Britain's contributions to the world, including British inventions and Britain's role in fighting slavery and Nazism'. Also the BNP called for schools to focus on British history and traditions, reversed the discussion of colonisation by identifying specifically Muslims as historic and current invaders, and promised to 'put the great back into Britain' (BNP 2010: 90; see also: 30-2, 44, 53).

IV Europe's emergence as racialised issue

The key moments covered in this chapter raise a number of issues worth highlighting. The first observation concerns a highly symbolic development in the late 1990s: devolution. This crucial event in British history sparked academic interest in a potential English backlash. But in the years following devolution, some scholars pointed rather to the absence of an organised English nationalism in the sense of, for instance, making concrete or widely supported steps towards an own English parliament (Aughey 2010; Condor 2010: esp. 526, 540, 541; see also: Bond et al. 2010: 464-6; Kumar 2010: 277; Vines 2014: 257-8). Nor did specifically English fringe parties seem to gain substantial electoral impetus in the following years (Copus 2009: 381-

2). What some scholars also highlighted, however, was a shift in popular sentiment and a higher propensity to emphasise Englishness at the expense of British identity (Aughey 2010: 520; Kumar 2010: 476; Skey 2012). Yet this does not have to be linked to devolution alone. Wellings (2010), for instance, argues that today's English nationalism, which still frames itself predominantly in wider *British* terminology, has always been mainly directed against European integration. Devolution, according to this argument, accentuated an English imagination but has not changed English nationalism's fundamental Eurosceptic orientation (Wellings 2010: 488, 489, 498; see also: Vines 2014: 261).

Based on survey data from 2006, Bechhofer and McCrone (2010: paras. 4.4, 5.2, 6.2) find that devolution had an impact on English people choosing to identify specifically as "English only", but that other social or cultural reasons appeared more important. Devolution seemed to be also – if not more strongly – connected to feeling both "English" and "British" (Bechhofer and McCrone 2010: paras. 4.11, 5.4, 6.4, 6.5). These considerations broadly chime with the way in which I have understood rightist nationalists' national identifications and preferences for British unity. They had a certain English aspect, but ultimately an identification with Britishness predominated. Also at the movement level, rightist nationalism emphasised British unity and juxtaposed it with European influence. Or, as Wellings (2010: 502) puts it, also because of Euroscepticism, 'political Englishness still remained obscured in the language of the defence of British sovereignty'. But it is important to note that despite this seeming British unity against Europe, British rightist nationalism has its strongholds in England and, to a lesser degree, Wales. Both at the level of the respondents in the longitudinal sample and the geographic concentration of parties' strength, it was and is fundamentally an English nationalism in British attire.

Second, the character of rightist nationalism was at these moments also defined by the tension between elements that changed at the surface and those deeper core issues that remained constant. The BNP adjusted its tone to move slightly away from overt extremism, while UKIP expanded its narrow Europe focus and started to adopt broader nationalist positions. Rightist nationalism's two

inflections thus moved towards each other – and yet, on a deeper level, it hardly moved. At a time of soaring migration and EU concerns under a centrist Labour government, rightist nationalism re-arranged the surface appearance of its core claims in a way that held the most gravity over the wider political right. With slightly changing emphases it was still characterised by racialised ideas of national and cultural identity, the aim to significantly reduce or completely stop immigration, the project of re-claiming political voice and recognition, and, of course, the desire to re-establish British sovereignty by leaving the EU. These aspirations were appealing to the rightist nationalists in the sample. Additional variables available at these moments provided new insights into their political preferences which largely aligned with those proposed at the movement level. But underneath these individuals' worries about the EU, political exclusion and betrayal, and an autonomous and united Britain were the same social locations. Ideal-typical rightist nationalists – white and UK-born – were still rarely of higher education, and often locked in relatively vulnerable status positions with little upward- but potentially all too easy downward movement.

Third, actual policy changes were more clearly visible within Conservatism. As briefly indicated, its move into opposition after Blair's victory had resulted in a drastic shift towards the socio-cultural right. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, growing cultural diversity was accompanied by an increasing appeal of exclusivist nation-building claims in the shape of UKIP and the BNP. Pulled by this shifting centre of gravity, Conservatism moved into the space of rightist nationalism. It was not as uncompromisingly anti-European as rightist nationalism, but at times displayed a stronger anti-immigrant face than UKIP and was certainly tougher on law-and-order issues. While a general concern with democracy and political recognition was more pronounced in rightist nationalism, the Conservatives' leaders nevertheless aspired to channel the will of "the people" and to defend it against politicians' alleged designs, using common rightist nationalist parlance (see e.g. Hague 2001; 1998). With Labour in a relatively centrist position, Conservatism and rightist nationalism formed a tight cluster far towards the socio-cultural right. Both cared deeply about Britain's

identity and tradition, and shared fundamental concerns about the defence of the nation against both internal fracture and external intrusion. Conservatism shifted back towards the socio-cultural centre when David Cameron became leader in late 2005 (e.g. Bale 2018: 267; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 70-1). According to Bale (2018: 264, 265, 267, 274; see also: Partos and Bale 2015: 172, 181-1), this gap on the political right helped UKIP to emerge more powerfully during the late 2000s, even as Cameron's party tried to reclaim tougher immigration positions in subsequent years. Rather than being directly related to the economic crisis as such, which was addressed relatively sparsely by nationalist movements beyond linking it to the issue of Europe and politics' failures, rightist nationalism's widening appeal might thus also be understood in light of this vacancy on exclusivist claims during times of ongoing high net migration and political discontent.

These key moments since the late 1990s thus delineated several developments. At the macro level, these years saw unprecedented migration under New Labour, at first together with a stable and then faltering economy. Conservatism in opposition moved far to the socio-cultural right and initially backtracked under Cameron; at the same time, rightist nationalism continued to gain traction, although its main impact still lay in the rightward move of the wider political landscape. While both the BNP and UKIP showed some developments in their claims – the former becoming more careful in its claims and the latter more radical – rightist nationalism at a whole remained focused on its core themes of the preservation of the nation, together with Europe and the political abandonment of its chosen people. Even during the economic crisis, the rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample were rarely in immediate economic danger. But these years indicated a certain stagnation and blocked mobility in their socio-economic locations. Importantly, they showed a growing sense of political abandonment and will to leave Europe especially during times of high migration and eastern EU enlargement. I thus argue that in the late 1990s and mid-2000s, the issue of Europe emerged predominantly as a racialised problem. It still represented a threat to British sovereignty, but less so in economic terms – despite the economic crisis – and in a much more direct political sense:

Europe now predominantly seemed to endanger British control of its borders, and consequently rightist nationalism's aim to preserve the racialised basis of Britishness.

6 The mid-2010s, migration, and the EU referendum

This final British chapter addresses the years from 2013 to 2017, which were defined by again more strongly rising migration, UKIP's best results in national elections, and the EU referendum. In the first part, I briefly outline the socio-cultural and political developments that sample respondents witnessed during these years. The second part then returns to their social locations, which hardly changed over course of more than two decades, and their perceptions of the political world around them. Rightist nationalists were still very strongly concerned about issues of political recognition and representation; and they voiced their overwhelming support for Leave based on preferences for British sovereignty that they had held for a long time. Seen through these individuals, affinities for Brexit were not a reaction to recent events but a longer-term preference that finally became political reality. I further outline how rightist nationalism at the movement level became fully dominated by UKIP, which at this moment reached the zenith of its racialised and exclusivist claims. In this chapter, I indicate how these years' developments built on those discussed in previous analytical moments. The rightist perception of Europe and its alleged threat to British sovereignty, I argue, now built on a mixture of economic, political, and particularly racialised problems, and became entangled with the promise to reclaim a lost national greatness.

I Migration and nationalism's growing appeal

In the mid-2010s, Britain's economy was improving visibly. As Appendix Figure A1c shows, GDP grew annually by approximately 2 percent, inflation fluctuated but was overall low, and the unemployment rate decreased steadily from 7.5 percent in 2013 to 4.3 percent in 2017. Compared to the previous moment, and despite the persisting effects of austerity, the mid-2010s were much more clearly dominated by socio-

cultural and political issues. After somewhat reduced increases during the economic crisis, net migration picked up strongly again from 2013, when about 242,000 more people entered the country than left. The peak was reached in 2015 with a record surplus of about 350,000, surpassing even the levels of the mid-2000s (see Appendix Figures A3a, A3b). Consequently, Britain continued to become more diverse. By 2017, about 9 percent of the population held foreign citizenship and 14 percent had been born abroad, now approaching German levels (see also Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). Rising migration – both from the EU and beyond – grew as a public concern and became the most urgent problem on voters’ minds by early 2016 (Clarke et al. 2017: 27-8; see also: 11-13, 123; Kaufmann 2019: 162-3; Partos and Bale 2015: 180).

It was especially the issue of migration, and growing pressure from the nationalist right, that paved the way for perhaps the most momentous political event in Britain’s recent history. Faced with UKIP’s increasing strength, and wider discontent over migration and Europe, Cameron promised a referendum on Britain’s EU membership in early 2013 (Bale 2018: 272; Kaufmann 2019: 192-3). Yet this did not prevent UKIP from gaining significantly in local elections of 2013 and 2014 (Bale 2018: 273). Following its previous strong results, UKIP emerged, moreover, as the winner of the 2014 European election (see Audickas et al. 2020: 52). The 2015 general election saw Cameron’s Conservatives defend their position in government with an own – albeit small – majority; but it was UKIP that achieved the strongest increase in its vote share, and with 12.6 percent by far its best result in a general election (see Hawkins et al. 2015: 11; see also: Kaufmann 2019: 192). As the BNP had all but vanished electorally, UKIP now fully embodied British rightist nationalism at the party level.

The question of EU membership was put to the vote in June 2016. Not only UKIP, but also some politicians associated with Vote Leave, the main strand of the Leave campaign within the Conservative camp, used the rising migration numbers and the symbolic threat of Europe’s “refugee crisis” to make their case for Britain to leave the EU (Clarke et al. 2017: 34-5; cf. Kaufmann 2019: 194-5). The referendum resulted in a victory for Leave, and entailed various short- and longer-term

consequences. Amongst other things, the outcome constituted a turning point for European (dis)integration, led to years of British-European negotiations that are not fully concluded at the time of writing, and created much uncertainty for citizens on both sides. The weeks following the referendum also saw soaring numbers of racist incidents and attacks (Agerholm 2016; Home Office 2018: 7, 14). For British politics, the result meant, moreover, new complexities regarding the Union's relationship with Scotland and Northern Ireland, the readjustment of both Labour and the Conservative Party (Gamble 2018: 1217-18, 1221, 1224-5), and a prolonged period of parliamentary stalemate over EU negotiations. In some ways, this time of dissent and political polarisation over Europe resembled the parliamentary revolts by Eurosceptic Conservatives with which John Major had to contend in the early 1990s following Maastricht and Black Wednesday (see Chapter 4).

Another potential consequence of the Leave victory was UKIP's electoral breakdown with only 1.8 percent in the 2017 election. Demonstrating the increasing fluidity of party allegiances in recent elections (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 253; Gamble 2018: 1226-7), both Labour and the Conservatives, who remained in government, increased their vote share (although Theresa May's Conservatives actually lost seats, see Apostolova et al. 2019: 8, 10; see also: Gamble 2018: 1222-3). Appendix Table A3g shows the results of previous elections and the referendum outcome, as well as political choices of the longitudinal sample's respondents. As in previous moments, these generally reflected the national results, although sample respondents expressed somewhat amplified affinities for the Conservatives compared to Labour.

II Longer-term disappointments and the chance to Leave

The years of this moment were most strongly characterised by growing migration, a significantly widening appeal of rightist nationalism (or perhaps a growing willingness to express these longer-term preferences more openly), and high political stakes in

the face of the EU referendum and its aftermath. Public support for UKIP had been growing significantly between 2010 and 2013 (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 9, 92-5), leading to the party's unseen successes at the 2014 European election and the 2015 general election. Ford and Goodwin (2014a: 163-5; see also: 93, 145-6) outline that, as its appeal rose, UKIP's social base somewhat broadened after the economic crisis, but became more focused again on what they identify as its core constituencies from 2012-2013. They highlight 'white older men with relatively little formal education' (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 165), although the authors also generally include working-class people among those "left-behind" groups to whom, they argue, UKIP was especially appealing (ibid.: e.g. 159, 175-6; 2014b: 278; I return to this in Chapter 10). In the years of this analytical moment, rightist nationalism, as seen through the longitudinal sample, showed no clear-cut trajectory with respect to these variables. Nor was a clear short-term development in socio-economic backgrounds visible when viewing it through the smaller groups of individuals who expressed a preference for UKIP or the BNP in specific years since 2013. Sample nationalists presented largely the same social backgrounds that they had displayed for more than two decades.

Predominantly white and born in the UK (which was a characteristic that remained constant within the longitudinal sample), rightist nationalism continued to be located primarily in England during these years (95 percent), both in absolute and relative terms. As I discuss below, this broadly reflected rightist nationalism's wider geographic concentration. Given that also the gender ratio of the sample's occasional nationalists was constant, they displayed again the same characteristic of being somewhat more commonly male. Yet Appendix Table A1b indicates that a slight overrepresentation of men was also a more general feature of rightist nationalism in Britain of the mid-2010s. This was, however, much less clearly pronounced than among German respondents (see Part 2). Although a few years had passed since the last analytical moment, the British sample nationalists were still most commonly in their fifties (27 percent) and sixties (28 percent). About 17 percent were in their forties or younger, 19 percent in their seventies, and 9 percent aged 80 or older. They were now on average 62 years old, hardly older than the sample average, and nearly

two years younger than respondents leaning towards Conservatism during these years. Also because they were the same respondents with constant characteristics, they (and the wider longitudinal sample) had by now grown far apart from wider society particularly in terms of age and cultural diversity (see e.g. Appendix Table A1a).

As in previous moments, the educational profile of British rightist nationalists remained largely the same, although change would theoretically have been possible. Rightist nationalism, as seen through these individuals, was still characterised by A-Level (24 percent) and GCSE (27 percent) school-leaving education. Still only 9 percent of sample nationalists held traditional university degrees (see Appendix Table A2c). Over the course of the last two decades, very few of these individuals had gained new degrees of tertiary education; in that regard, rightist nationalism's characteristic absence of higher education was compounded by a sense of stagnation. As for other respondents in the sample, retirement became more common also for rightist nationalists over the years (see Appendix Figure A2f). But while now overall 44 percent of occasional nationalist had retired, still very slightly more continued to work (9 percent as freelancers, and 36 percent in paid employment). Only around 2 percent were unemployed during these years. Even at this last analytical moment, and in contrast to respondents favouring Conservatism, rightist nationalism was still ideal-typically characterised not just by retirement but rather by ongoing employment.

Despite growing retirement, rightist nationalism's occupational composition remained again nearly unchanged. Still only 7 percent of working nationalists were higher managers and professionals, and 19 percent were lower managers and professionals with a somewhat reduced access to the benefits of service relationships. About 18 percent were in intermediate occupations, and 15 percent were own-account workers or small employers. Despite this complexity in nationalists' backgrounds, the largest group still worked under forms or labour contract, for example in lower supervisory or technical positions (12 percent), in semi-routine sales and service operations (14 percent), or routine sales, technical,

and operative positions (15 percent). The inclusion of occupational information from retired nationalists slightly deepened the ideal-typical focus on less secure socio-economic backgrounds under labour contracts (see Appendix Table A2f). Rightist nationalists also continued to be less well-off financially than followers of many other political movements. Yet still most stated that financially they were “living comfortably” (31 percent of occasional nationalists) or “doing alright” (40 percent). Also fewer nationalists now feared that their financial situation might become worse in the near future (overall 16 percent; 14 percent thought they would be better off), while the majority expected it to be the same (70 percent). Some of these individuals’ perceptions were more positive than during the economic crisis (see Appendix Figures A2a, A2b), even if they became less optimistic leading up to the EU referendum. But on the whole, during these years of economic calm most rightist nationalists did not feel under immediate economic threat. They were very rarely unemployed and not confined to the lowest positions. Over the past decades, relatively little had changed for them. But this also meant that few had experienced upward mobility during these years. Economic questions were not their most urgent concerns – and yet they were aware that they still had very few safety nets and securities if more difficult circumstances returned.

Ongoing political abandonment and Brexit

Especially at this moment it was political issues that seemed most pressing for sample nationalists. Following recent years of austerity and rising migration, they voiced yet again their long-term sense of having been abandoned by the political process. In 2014 and 2017, still overall 62 percent of rightist nationalists thought that public officials did not listen to their views (13 percent disagreed), and 58 percent said that they did not have any say in the government’s actions (18 percent disagreed). As Appendix Table A3c indicates, critical views of the government became somewhat assuaged after the EU referendum – the outcome and Conservatism’s affirmation of

Brexit (see Gamble 2018: 1218-22) seemed to have reassured some sample nationalists. But even after rightist nationalists had witnessed their symbolic aim become national policy, the majority continued to feel excluded from the government's actions. Some may have expressed their longer-term distance to mainstream politics, while others may have hoped for an immediate "hard Brexit".

This was a key concern in UKIP's 2017 manifesto. The party's emblematic goal had been nominally achieved; but UKIP (2017: 3, 6; see also: 7-9) now portrayed itself as 'the country's insurance policy, the guard dogs of Brexit', which would monitor the government's 'backsliding' and 'capitulating', and alleged betrayal of 'the Brexit the British people voted for'. As in previous years, UKIP criticised the state of British democracy more widely, invoked a sense of deception and betrayal by a corrupt government and political parties, portrayed itself as the only trustworthy party, and called for a more direct control of the British "people" over politics (UKIP 2017: 5, 7, 58-61; 2015: 56-9, 61). Much in agreement with sample nationalists' perceptions, UKIP (2015: 3; see also: 2017: 58) argued, for instance, that 'the establishment parties' had regularly failed to live up to their promises, thus giving rise to 'a feeling that successive governments were no longer representing the will of the British people'. Like UKIP, also sample nationalists, whose socio-economic positions had hardly improved over decades, remained very critical of both governments and the workings of British democracy in general. In 2014, nearly two thirds of rightist nationalists stated that it was rather unlikely that their vote had an effect in the next general election, and were "a little" or "very" dissatisfied with British democracy. Some changed their mind after the result of the EU referendum. But even in 2017, still 45 percent of occasional nationalists thought that their vote was unlikely to matter (38 percent thought it might), and just over half remained "a little" (33 percent) or "very" (20 percent) dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in Britain. Even if Brexit, and potentially UKIP's successes in recent elections, had restored a certain amount of confidence in the political process, rightist nationalism nevertheless remained characterised by a deep-seated feeling of not being heard or recognised politically.

In this climate, leaving the European Union became all the more important. Both before and after the referendum, UKIP kept its founding purpose at the centre of its claims and connected Brexit to other issues, such as economics, immigration, crime, democracy, and wider notions of sovereignty and national strength (UKIP e.g. 2017: 6, 7; 2015: 5, 12, 13, 41, 53, 55, 70-1). The vast majority of sample nationalists supported this core aim. When asked in 2016 if they wished for Britain to remain or leave the EU, 90 percent of occasional nationalists, and 96 of those who had expressed a preference for UKIP or the BNP in the previous year, expressed their support for Brexit (see Appendix Table A3h). Although many other respondents also leaned towards leaving the EU, this question was where rightist nationalists stood out most.

It is instructive to remember, moreover, that Britain had regarded Europe with ambivalence for a long time (see Chapter 4). The longitudinal sample shed some light on this. Already in 1999, when the survey question was first asked, a significant share of sample individuals (and larger numbers of conservatives and especially rightist nationalists) were in favour of leaving the EU or at least cut back its power over Britain. Over time, these views grew among sample respondents (see Appendix Table A3h) but also persevered in the same individuals: 82 percent of those who wanted to leave the EU in 1999 still espoused Leave in 2016 (and 84 percent of conservatives, and nearly all of occasional nationalists). Especially rightist nationalists' political preferences were not simply a short-term reaction that occurred sometime in the 2010s; for many of them, the EU referendum represented the conclusion of a deeply critical stance towards Europe that had been decades in the making.

Racialised issues and the threat of disorder

After the EU referendum, and again after a series of Islamist attacks in 2017, the number of anti-immigrant and racist hate crimes spiked (Agerholm 2016; Home

Office 2018: 7, 14). Also Germany saw soaring hate crimes potentially in response to key events during the “refugee crisis” (see Chapter 9). But the British nationalist backlash after the EU referendum was different. These hate crimes rather resembled those reported after Donald Trump’s election, reaffirming a significant victory and perhaps emboldening rightist nationalists to more overtly express views that they held for a long time. These incidents constituted, moreover, the flipside of the common nationalist argument that migration would entail crime and threats to social order.

The BNP had focused on issues social cohesion, and (foreigners’) crime and punishment, for a long time. UKIP had developed its harsh law-and-order positions over time together with its growing anti-immigrant emphasis. In the years surrounding the EU referendum it had arrived at its most exclusivist and order-focused positions. It argued, for instance, that ‘[t]ruly horrific, tragic crimes have been committed in Britain by foreign criminals ... and petty criminality has risen as gangs of thieves, pickpockets and scammers have arrived from overseas to target the UK’ (UKIP 2015: 53; see also: 13, 55; 2017: 34, 40, 41). UKIP called for the deportation of “foreign criminals” and promised to overhaul human rights legislation. Yet beyond connecting these issues with immigration and Europe, the party was also more generally concerned about crime, terrorism, security, “anti-social behaviour” and social breakdown, and the strength of the police force (2017: 21-2, 36-7, 39-41, 43; 2015: 13, 53-5, 59, 61, 67). As discussed in Chapter 5, British nationalists may still have held wider concerns about disorder; at the time of devolution, for instance, they voiced their strong preferences to preserve Britain’s political and geographic integrity. Yet their narrower worries about crime continued their longer-term decline. In line with decreasing national crime estimates (see ONS 2020: 7), only 3 percent of occasional nationalists had in 2014 “big worries” about being the victim of crime, 19 percent had slight concerns, and 15 percent occasional doubts. Although they remained subtly more worried than other respondents, the majority (63 percent) voiced no concerns about being affected by crime.

During these years of soaring migration, nationalists attached a very slightly increased importance to “race” for their own self-image. Asked in 2013 and 2016, overall just over half of occasional nationalists perceived their “racial” or ethnic background as “very” (28 percent) or “fairly important” (24 percent). Rightist nationalism thus remained characterised by a somewhat heightened importance attributed to “race” (18 percent of followers of other political movements thought their ethnic background “very” and 27 percent “fairly important”). With slightly less than two thirds, BNP followers again more commonly perceived “race” as rather important. But nearly half of UKIP followers still stated in the survey that they attached little or no importance to their ethnic or “racial” background. Instead, the vast majority of sample nationalists considered Britishness as rather, and more than half even as very important. In some sense, therefore, these respondents mirrored UKIP’s comparatively careful stance focused on cultural language and “British values”, which the party also maintained at this moment. UKIP (2015: 11, 61; see also: 10, 13; 2017: 35) stated that the problem with ‘[i]mmigration is not about race; it is about space’, and claimed to ‘promote a unifying British culture, open to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain and British values, regardless of their ethnic or religious background’.

In line with ethno-pluralist and differentialist arguments (see Spektorowski 2003; Taguieff 2001), UKIP (2015: 61; see also: 11; 2017: 34, 35) thus deepened its opposition to multiculturalism, in which it saw a challenge to British values and traditions that had ‘led to an alarming fragmentation of British society’. It warned of Islam, both explicitly in terms of extremism and implicitly with reference to cultural practices seen as undermining, and incompatible with, British law and custom (2017: 36-8, 41, 43; 2015: 55, 61, 67). Reminiscent of anti-Jewish arguments in the 19th and 20th centuries, UKIP leader Nigel Farage questioned the loyalties of British Muslims, and portrayed the EU’s migration policies in the face of the “refugee crisis” as “the free movement of Kalashnikov rifles, the free movement of terrorists and the free movement of jihadists’ (Mason and Perraudin 2015: para. 9). UKIP further promised to drastically curtail migration numbers. It argued that contemporary migration not

only entailed detrimental consequences for economy and public safety, but also worried about migrants' birth rates, and their alleged exploitation of the health service (UKIP 2017: 5, 20, 32-4; 2015: 11-13, 16).

At this moment of growing concerns over migration (Clarke et al 2017: 11-13, 27-8) and the EU referendum, UKIP reached the height of racialised exclusions. Yet despite occasional more openly racist statements by individual politicians, its arguments remained more culture-focused than those of the BNP. Although the individuals in the sample were not asked about these issues directly, concerns about migration and multiculturalism were arguably important factors in their professed affinities for a party that had been amplifying its anti-immigrant claims (see Bale 2018: 269, 270, 272; Kaufmann 2019: 194-5; Partos and Bale 2015: 180) and was taking over much of the BNP's appeal. In their survey responses they embraced "Britishness" rather than "race"; but they may have shared their party's view that this British identity needed to be preserved and defended, kept pure from foreign influence. Amongst other things, UKIP (2015: 61; see also: 2017: 34, 35-6) warned about 'parallel or conflicting systems' of religion – i.e. Islam – that were threatening essential British values, such as democracy, tolerance and (women's) equality, and freedom of speech.

As I discuss more closely in Chapter 10, the British (and German) respondents' experiences suggest that rightist nationalist affinities are not immediately about economic status positions or fears, but that these might play into political and racialised concerns, which are most important for an understanding of rightist nationalism. Similar indications could be found in British constituency-level data of recent years. Appendix Figure A8b shows that British constituency-level unemployment figures seemed by themselves unrelated to the strength of UKIP in the 2015 election. When included in linear regression models with other contextual variables (see Appendix Table A7a), unemployment was estimated to be negatively related to the strength of rightist nationalism in England. Differently put, when holding other variables constant, rightist nationalism was stronger where

unemployment was lower – an observation contrary to the assumption that nationalism generally flourishes in economically struggling areas.

Socio-cultural measures at the constituency level hinted at rightist nationalism's racialised dimension found in the social locations of the longitudinal samples: rightist nationalism tended to be stronger in places with low cultural diversity (see Appendix Figure A8c; Appendix Table A7a). Higher shares of UK-born population in especially English (and to a lesser degree: Welsh) constituencies were associated with higher voting results for UKIP. This regional data points to a potential disconnect between the local strength of rightist nationalism and the actual presence of racialised others. As with other socio-economic and political issues, rightist nationalism's fear of cultural difference might thus be informed by certain perceptions or interpretations of events at the national level, arguably also related to their treatment in the media. Moreover, opinion on immigration can appear detached from demographic or economic facts (see Sides and Citrin 2007), pointing to these fears' subjective dimension (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 141). This is not without historic precedents. Comparatively small communities of immigrants could cause public concerns in Britain if they were, for instance, Jewish or black (see Solomos 1993: 44, 48).

III Europe's multifaceted threat to British greatness

To conclude this final British chapter, I reflect again on a number of key points. The first concerns the character of rightist nationalism in Britain over the past decades. At the individual level, it was defined by nearly unchanging social locations. Sample nationalists were mainly white and born in the UK, somewhat more commonly male, and hardly above the average age of the sample. Largely with lower and middle school-leaving qualifications, British nationalists only rarely held degrees of higher education, and few received any over the course of the years. They were rarely unemployed during these decades and worked in various occupational positions,

albeit with an ideal-typical focus on (semi-)routine professions defined by lower job security and longer-term prospects. Not confined to the lowest socio-economic positions, rightist nationalism, as seen through these individuals, was nevertheless characterised by a feeling of being potentially exposed to social decline during economically challenging moments, accompanied by a sense of longer-term stagnation. I discuss in Chapter 10 how their experience of relative socio-economic uncertainty might have become intertwined with their characteristic feeling of having been politically abandoned. Rightist nationalists were particularly vocal about their criticism of political leaders, governments, and the workings of British democracy.

Rightist nationalism at the movement level had long been characterised by extremist, “race”-focused parties at the very political fringe. UKIP added a more moderate anti-Europe lens to nationalism’s concern with British sovereignty, and, as I have discussed over the last chapters, soon became more and more focused on immigration and cultural difference. Rightist nationalism’s language changed, but its deeper core problems remained fundamentally the same. At the time of the EU referendum, UKIP had fully taken over as the dominant face of rightist nationalism, and reached the height of its racialised and law-and-order concerns while retaining its foundational concern with leaving the EU to restore British sovereignty and greatness. In its calls for pride in British tradition and history, moreover, UKIP presented a very selective interpretation thereof. Amongst other things, the party argued that ‘[w]e led the way in the abolition of the slave trade’, that a ‘plethora of great Britons stream through international history’, and that ‘[w]e have helped shape the modern world’ (UKIP 2015: 61; see also: 2017: 42). It did not address, for instance, the harmful consequences of Britain’s colonialism but criticised the ‘liberal metropolitan elite[‘s]’ view that ‘we should be ashamed of our past’ and ‘that wanting to celebrate “Britishness” is an act that touches on extremism’ (UKIP 2015: 61; see also: 51).

Second, the longitudinal dimension shows that not only but particularly the sample’s rightist nationalists had harboured a deep criticism of the EU for many years before finally having their will at this analytical key moment. Clarke et al. (2017: 65)

show with cross-sectional data from 2004 onwards that public attitudes were characterised by notable reservations about the EU for more than a decade before the EU referendum. The longitudinal sample demonstrates this within the same individuals, and for a slightly longer period of time. For many rightist nationalists, their rejection of Europe was not simply a short-term reaction to recent events. The previous chapters have shown that at least since the early 1990s these individuals had characteristic socio-political experiences and concerns, which often expressed themselves subtly or clearly differently from other respondents. This opens an interpretive route of their experiences, leading up to the moment at which they finally witnessed their country vote for Brexit.

British views of the EU were, as Clarke et al. (2017: Ch. 4; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 146, 194) show, bound up with perceptions of the national government, economic considerations, and worries about immigration. I have argued that Europe's perceived threat to British sovereignty – and its accompanying symbolism of British decline and loss of control (see e.g. Gamble 2003: 29) – was mainly viewed through an economic and broader political lens in the early 1990s (Chapter 4), and then acquired a predominantly racialised interpretation from the late 1990s, as migration began to soar (Chapter 5). This last moment around Brexit built on these developments. To some degree it involved economic arguments about, for instance, specific costs of EU membership and how this put British citizens at a disadvantage (e.g. UKIP 2015: 15). It also combined wider political claims around self-determination with more precise ones about Europe's encroachment on British democracy. But Europe still stood most immediately for racialised claims about immigration and cultural diversity (e.g. UKIP 2015: 11-13, 41, 53; see also: Bhambra 2017b: 91; Clarke et al. 2017: 22, 27-8, 34-5). This was also evidenced by the surge of hate crimes after the referendum. Furthermore, leaving Europe was at this moment especially associated with a chance to regain national greatness, based on a selective interpretation of the country's history.

Third, like some of the previous moments, also the years around the EU referendum showed a Eurosceptic and exclusivist repositioning of Conservatism (see

Conservative Party 2017: 36, 54-5; 2015: 29-31; Gamble 2018: 1121-2; Kaufmann 2019: 192-3). This was partly due to the pressure arising from UKIP (see Bale 2018; Partos and Bale 2015: 180-1) and its growing ability to capture concerns of the right-shifting political centre. Conservatism's recurrent movement into rightist nationalist territory was further illustrated in recent years under Boris Johnson. This is not the focus of this dissertation but is important because it shows rightist nationalism to be embedded in, and in interaction with, the wider political right, as it historically was (see Chapter 2). I also hint at the problem of mainstreaming of rightist nationalist claims in the German part of the thesis, and discuss it briefly in Chapter 10.

Fourth, the mid-2010s national elections and the EU referendum emphasised once more that British rightist nationalism is particularly deeply rooted in certain regional strongholds. As discussed in the previous chapter, Wellings (2010) argues that opposition to Europe gave rise to a specifically *English* nationalism, even if it still retained its rhetorical focus on a wider Britain. This simple yet instructive insight also emerges clearly from both macro- and individual-level data: the respondents in the longitudinal sample were disproportionately English, even if they held on to Britishness and Britain's political Union. At the regional level, electoral support for rightist nationalism is strongest in England and Wales (see e.g. Apostolova et al. 2019: 20; Hawkins et al. 2015: 36). It is practically absent in Scotland and Northern Ireland, although in the latter case the Democratic Unionist Party arguably channels some of its social-conservative claims. British rightist nationalism really is an English (and to a lesser degree: Welsh) nationalism. For many years, the strength of rightist nationalism varied strongly across English regions. British extremism tended to have its strongholds in the Midlands, certain London areas, and northern England (e.g. Eatwell 2000: 178; Goodwin 2014: 898), while UKIP was initially represented most strongly in the south (Kaufmann 2019: 176). Over time, the BNP and especially UKIP expanded geographically. In recent years rightist nationalism's differences between English regions were less clear-cut; but at least cosmopolitan London was characterised by much lower support for rightist nationalism. As the next chapters show, regional strongholds also play an important role within German nationalism.

PART II: GERMANY

Also the developments outlined in the German part of the dissertation begin in the early 1990s. The country's reunification constituted a historical watershed moment. But also in the German case it is important to view the following analytical key moments against the background of the longer post-war period, not least because of the lasting legacy of the present state's regional and structural separation between east and west. As before, I introduce the German chapters with a brief outline of its post-war political background and that of its rightist movements.

In the immediate years after the Second World War, Germany was characterised by its aftermath and that of the Nazi regime, de-Nazification processes, and institutional arrangements with the Allied occupation (see Judt 2007: 53-7, 122-6). Soon socio-economic trajectories bifurcated in eastern and western parts. West Germany experienced the "economic miracle" of the 1950s, joined NATO, and housed nearly three million "guest workers" by the early 1970s (Judt 2007: 335; see also: 265, 334, 355; Fulbrook 2015: 152, 166-7). By contrast, East Germany experienced a much more forceful extraction of reparations and dismantling of its industry, accompanied by wider socio-economic restructuring and collectivisation of the economy (Fulbrook 2015: 131-3). As the most industrialised state, Saxony was hit hardest by the Soviet disassembling of its industry (Kroll 2014: 118). In light of food shortages and protests, East Germans fled to the West, which prompted the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed economic recessions, the rise of liberal social movements and student protests, and the simultaneous institutional repression of radical leftist movements in the West (Nachtwey 2018: 216). The late 1970s also saw increasing engagement with the Nazi past – a process that continued throughout the following decades. Embedded in the wider disintegration of the Eastern bloc, East-German "Monday demonstrations" arose in Saxon cities in 1989, and invoked the slogan of "We are the people" to demand a democratic reconstruction of the GDR (Judt 2007: 613, 615; Patton 2012:

757). After growing protests and flights across the border, the GDR regime collapsed in 1989. Helmut Kohl, West Germany's conservative chancellor who sought a more confident German identity and position in the world (Eatwell 2003: 288-9), swiftly pushed for unification amidst soaring immigration numbers and unprecedented rightist nationalist successes.

Over the course of the following years, the east-German slogan of "We are the people" was invoked in very different contexts. Always directed against what demonstrators perceived as unresponsive and oppressive political authorities, the Monday protests were at first a claim to political recognition and democratic rights in the GDR, some 15 years later a protest against Social-Democratic welfare restructuring that impacted the east particularly strongly (see Chapter 8), and finally a racialised defence of German and European identity and political control against refugees and the alleged threat of Islamisation (see Chapter 9). Like the British case, therefore, also German rightist nationalism of recent years built on sediments of political and structural developments that had been three decades in the making. But also these drew on the even longer roots of the regional post-war disparities between east and west. As the next chapters show, these continued to influence the unified country's wider socio-economic and political landscape; and they persist today, although slow progress is being made (see e.g. BMWi 2019). The deep regional divides were also visible in the social backgrounds and political perceptions of the respondents in the German longitudinal sample since at least 1990. The changing face of rightist nationalism at the movement level, too, is characterised by the ongoing regional dynamic. Over time, western-based nationalism moved eastward in a strongly extremist guise and finally emerged with the (somewhat) more moderate AfD as a mainstream phenomenon while maintaining its eastern strongholds.

The moment of unification is important, moreover, because it foreshadowed many of the developments during the recent "refugee crisis". This is not only because unification coincided with hitherto unprecedented levels of migration, as I discuss in Chapter 7. But the surrounding years also saw a prolonged violent nationalist backlash against immigrants and asylum seekers, and a record appeal of rightist

nationalism in the shape of the Republicans, who benefitted from – or perhaps also drove – a shift in public perception. Responding to nationalist pressure (e.g. Fulbrook 2015: 235; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 21), Kohl’s conservative Union sought to capture some of rightist nationalism’s exclusivist positions. The Union emphasised, for instance, the alleged abuse of the German asylum law (CDU-CSU 1990: 19), and delivered its promise to introduce significant restrictions in 1993 with support from other mainstream parties (see BPB 2013; Ramet 1999: 74). In addition to unification, and a greater emphasis on national pride and strength, conservatism thus delivered some of rightist nationalism’s key demands and catered to its language and concerns (see e.g. Eatwell 2003: 297, 299; Willier 1992; cf. Betz 1994: 133-4; CDU-CSU 1994: 42-3, 47). These sketched developments would again resurface during the recent “refugee crisis” under very similar conditions. Also in the mid-2010s, soaring migration was met by (often eastern) anti-refugee violence, a significant widening of nationalist appeal, and a rightward shift of the political centre visible also in the conservative Union’s hardening positions on asylum and its supposed “abuse” (briefly discussed in Chapter 9). The intervening 2000s were still defined by the socio-economic and political consequences of unification and older regional disparities. But as I discuss in Chapter 8, they witnessed a different context of low net migration and the prominence of economic issues. Under these circumstances, and broadly analogously to the British Tories under Cameron, German conservatism modernised in opposition, while an electorally inconspicuous rightist extremism slowly expanded its grassroots particularly in eastern regions.

The individuals in the German sample shed light on these national and regional developments. Living through the recent decades, they witnessed many of the same (international) key events as the British sample respondents, albeit from a very different angle. While I stay embedded within the German context for most of the following chapters, I point in the chapter conclusions (and Chapter 10) to some of the ways in which German individuals’ social backgrounds and perceptions speak to or contrast with those of the British ones, and how both countries and their nationalisms illuminate each other’s character. Like British sample respondents’ long-

standing criticism of governmental politics and the EU, German individuals held substantial concerns about migration, the economy, political participation, and crime for decades. But the urgency of their perceptions changed with the context. In line with their British counterparts, they point to a rightist nationalism that involves longer-term disappointments and worries. But they also more clearly evince shorter-term reactions to specific contemporary challenges.

I conclude this introduction to the German chapters with a brief historical outline of German rightist nationalism, which was embedded in the two German states' wider post-war histories and regional divides. After the end of the Second World War, both East and West Germany began perhaps perfunctory and regionally disparate "de-Nazification" processes, guided by the Soviets and western Allies (see Eatwell 2003: 273-4; Fulbrook 2015: 122-9, 228-9, 313). While rightist extremist parties were prohibited in the GDR – but former Nazis were sometimes easily incorporated into the bloc parties (Fulbrook 2000: 58, 63-4; see also: 2015: 119) – the western FRG soon faced the formation of a number of nationalist and extremist groups, often led by former Nazis (see Backer 2000: 89-93; Eatwell 2003: 277-8; Lewis 1991: 38-46; Niedermayer 1990: 566; Ramet 1999: 68-9; Winkler and Schumann 1998: 95-6). As some were banned by the state, others were founded and soon adjusted their language to not be too easily classified as hostile to the constitution, or in an attempt to be electorally viable, leading to some short-lived successes (see Backer 2000: 89-90; Eatwell 2003: 278-80; Hennig 1993: 67-8).

In the 1960s, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) rose in the West as the predominant far-right contender that achieved entry into several regional state parliaments (Backer 2000: 91-2; Fulbrook 2015: 228-9; McGowan 2006: 257-8). It combined extremist and conservative ideas (Eatwell 2003: 281; see also: von Beyme 1988: 4), and showed some measure of caution about its rhetoric to maintain 'a facade of legality' (Lewis 1991: 8; cf. also: 50; Ramet 1999: 69; von Beyme 1988: 3-4). But scholars still frequently classified the NPD as a neo-Nazi or neo-fascist party due to its *völkisch*, at least implicitly anti-democratic, statist, and revisionist ideological claims, and its support of militant extremist groups (Lewis 1991: 8, 47, 50-

1; Winkler and Schumann 1998: 96, 101-3; see also: Ignazi 1992: 10, 16, 24-5; Mudde 2007: 49). It scored electoral successes with calls 'for an end to the feeling of collective guilt, ... the reestablishment of a self-confident German identity based on reunification ... [and] the expulsion of the growing number of foreign workers' (Eatwell 2003: 281; see also: 282-3). The first two claims were in the coming decades taken on board by the conservative Union under Kohl. The 1970s saw the electoral decline of the NPD, which nevertheless remained active and continued to contend in elections while radicalising further (Eatwell 2003: 283). During this time a range of other nationalist political and extra-parliamentary (militant) groups and activities emerged (Backer 2000: 93-4; Eatwell 2003: 284-6; Lewis 1991: 91-4; McGowan 2014: 199-200; 2006: 257-8). Many neo-Nazis seemed to turn away from party politics and towards more extreme underground groups.

Broader electoral success of the nationalist right only returned in the late 1980s in the shape of the Republicans (see Backer 2000: 93, 96-9; Betz 1994: 17-19; Eatwell 2003: 291-2; Lewis 1991: 75; Ramet 1999: 69-70; Winkler and Schumann 1998: 97). Founded by discontented members of the Bavarian conservative CSU in 1983, the Republicans were somewhat more restrained than the NPD. But they, too, were fiercely anti-immigrant and, as I discuss in Chapter 7, displayed many of rightist nationalism's key features. With contacts to both the conservative Union and neo-Nazis, the Republicans might be considered 'a bridge between the moderate and the extreme right' (Backer 2000: 111; see also: 109-10; Lewis 1991: 76-7) that enabled transitions between both camps. Like many rightist movements in Britain, Germany, and elsewhere, however, they struggled with growing radicalisation and – due to the specific German context – with the constant prospect of being monitored or even banned. Still, their birth out of Bavarian conservatism constituted a move away from obvious extremism. To some degree the Republicans prefaced the establishment of UKIP as an initially Eurosceptic movement largely out of British Conservatism, which again provided a template for the German AfD two decades later.

At the eve of reunification, German rightist nationalism was embodied by the extremist NPD, which was well past its political heyday, the Republicans, who were

the most prominent face of nationalism in the early 1990s, and smaller rightist groups, such as the German People's Union (DVU). These were slightly different strands of German nationalism. But I suggest that they represented the same fundamental rightist nationalist concerns: they sought to preserve the basis of belonging to the racialised nation by demanding an end to – or even “repatriation” of – cultural diversity; they also understood their political project as struggling for the social and political recognition of their chosen “German people”; they aimed to maintain and restore social order and cohesion, often interpreted in racialised terms; and they sought to selectively retrieve and positively inflect certain elements of their country's recent history, while questioning – to varying degrees – its culpability in the war and the victors' historiography. As Winkler and Schumann (1998: 102; see also: 103) point out, ‘while the NPD relied on nationalist-racist arguments and conspiracy theories, the REP [Republicans] and the DVU emphasize the role of foreigners as the cause of increasing social problems, crime, and delinquency’. Voiced in slightly different ways, they established a political appeal at the very edges of the legal and social limits – even as the socio-political Overton Window shifted towards the right in the face of soaring migration.

7 The early 1990s: unification, immigration, and the racialised nation

The early 1990s were perhaps the most important years in Germany's recent history. This was when the present nation-state was rebuilt – and with it some of the problems and regional inequalities that would haunt the country for decades to come. In the first section of this chapter, I outline some of the socio-economic and political challenges involved in the country's reunification, especially for its “new” eastern citizens. The second section examines the character of rightist nationalism as embedded in this moment, which comprises the years 1990 – the year of unification – to 1994, a year by which many of its socio-economic consequences had become apparent, but in which at least parts of the overall economy recovered and immigration numbers decreased. With some subtle nuances compared to the British sample, I find that also German nationalists were of low cultural diversity, and were at this moment commonly found in lower and middle educational and occupational positions. But they were younger, relative to other German respondents, and much more typically male than their British counterparts, indicating perhaps their more frequent affinities to rather radical rightist politics. I further point to differences in rightist nationalists' social locations and political perceptions between eastern and western respondents. At the movement level, rightist nationalism was most strongly embodied by the Republicans, a recent party somewhat more moderate than previous German extremism but still much more exclusivist and radical in its claims than UKIP. In the third section, I suggest that the years around unification constituted a moment of racialised nation-building. While the state was expanded according to the west-German image, the nation was reassembled and consolidated on the basis of “true German-ness” – and at the expense of the millions of past and recent immigrants and asylum seekers who instead faced legal restrictions, and were exposed to a wave of rightist nationalist violence.

I Unification and its discontents

The reunification of Germany in 1990 was a unique and momentous political watershed. It was a moment of consolidating eastern and western parts of the country, and addressing the challenges of establishing a unified political, cultural, and economic realm. Hopes and expectations were high, not least because West-German chancellor Helmut Kohl had famously promised “blossoming landscapes” in the East (e.g. Eatwell 2003: 298; Fulbrook 2015: 285; Wagner and Borstel 2009: 287). Yet, as Fulbrook (2015: 284) pithily puts it, ‘[f]or the vast majority of both east and west Germans, the initial euphoria at the fall of the Wall wore off rather quickly’. Unification came at a high price, both economically and socio-politically. Already a few months before reunification, East Germany had adopted the West-German Mark, which meant not just an extended selection of products but also being exposed to western prices and the removal of subsidies. This precipitated wider fears around equal purchasing power and housing opportunities (Fulbrook 2015: 276). The already struggling eastern economy had difficulties adjusting to the common market and competing with western (and European) companies, resulting, among other things, in business closures and worker redundancies (Fulbrook 2015: 277-8). Between 1990 and early 1993, east-German industrial production shrunk by approximately 40 percent before starting to recover the following year (Ramet 1999: 80; see also: 79).

Economic costs of reunification were also paid in the west. The influx of East Germans coming into the West before reunification had put pressure on welfare systems and housing, and taxes rose steeply as immense sums were invested into both countries’ economic and structural consolidation (see Fulbrook 2015: 271, 285; Green 2013: 51; Judt 2007: 643, 686, 756). Macro-level data (see Appendix Figure A6h) show that inflation in the unified Germany rose to 5 percent in 1992. GDP growth fell from over 5 percent in 1991 to negative values in 1993. Also the overall unemployment rate started to climb higher and higher, reaching more than 8 percent in 1994. But while these economic challenges were also felt in the west,

unemployment soared particularly in the east, where it was at times nearly twice as high (see Appendix Figure A5c; see also: Green 2013: 52-3; Heitmeyer 2009: 25-6; Ramet 1999: 79-80). In the face of disproportionate eastern unemployment and economic restructuring, large parts of the eastern population were soon reported to believe that they lost out in the unification process and were treated as second-class citizens (Ahbe 2011: 238). At this moment in the early 1990s, in other words, initial hopes of country-wide prosperity soon gave way to bitter disappointment – perhaps more so in the east, but ultimately in both parts of the country (see Fulbrook 2015: 284-5). Regional cleavages were not only of an economic nature, however, but also expressed themselves socio-politically.

As people in eastern Germany had to adapt to new economic realities, so, too, did they have to face drastic changes to their everyday lives, witness western business and culture “colonise” their home towns and social worlds (see, for instance, Bartmanski 2011: 214, 223; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 240), find their place and status in the new and unknown nation, and confront western claims to a “sovereignty of interpretation” of both states’ recent historical legacies. Many of these “transformation experiences” (see Küpper et al. 2019: 273-6) mentioned here have been, and are, of course subject to public and scholarly debate, including in what ways to make sense of the GDR regime, also vis-à-vis the FRG (e.g. Ahbe 2011; Jaraus 2004; Fulbrook 2015: Ch. 10, 294-5; Pearce 2011). The moment around reunification brought at least ‘two phases of frustration’ (Förster et al. 1993: 21; see also 22-3; Backer 2000: 105) for many east Germans: the growing discontent with, protests against, and collapse of the GDR’s regime, followed by the search for new – ultimately disappointed – hopes and perspectives.

Importantly, this already complex process of reunification coincided with the onset of unprecedented levels of immigration. Refugee numbers started to rise already in the late 1980s, in addition to thousands of East Germans who tried to reach the West via Hungary (Judt 2007: 612-3; Patton 2012: 755). Yet migration soared particularly in the early 1990s when each year more than one million people arrived in Germany, and more than 1.5 million in 1992. Some of these were “ethnic Germans”

largely from areas of the “Eastern Bloc” (*Aussiedler*), some were guest workers, and more than one million between 1990 and 1994 were refugees and asylum seekers from, for instance, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Turkey (see Backer 2000: 107-8; Ramet 1999: 71-2; see also: BPB 2018b; Green 2013: 50). Although many left the country again, net migration was unparalleled in post-war history. Appendix Figures A6h and A6i also show that in 1992, the percentage of people without German citizenship climbed above eight percent. At the time, Germany had a very “open” asylum system – ‘a means of atonement for Nazism’, as Eatwell and Goodwin (2018: 139; see also Eatwell 2003: 291) put it. Germany had in these years taken in far more refugees than other countries, and particularly the UK where number of asylum seekers actually decreased (Judt 2007: 683). But as a response to this rise in newcomers, also Germany swiftly amended its asylum law, driven by the conservative Union (see e.g. CDU-CSU 1990: 19) but with broad parliamentary support also from other mainstream parties (see BPB 2013; Eatwell 2003: 296; Ramet 1999: 74).

This moment also saw some successes of the Republicans, a recently formed rightist nationalist party that – partly unsuccessfully – tried to stay away from extremism while nevertheless propagating strong anti-immigrant and -diversity claims. Given Germany’s Nazi history, the stigma that it attached to post-war nationalism, and the state’s strategy of banning anti-constitutional movements, rightist nationalism had achieved for many decades only marginal electoral results. Gaining 7.1 percent in the 1989 European elections and 2.1 percent in the 1990 federal elections (Backer 2000: 96-7), the Republicans scored unprecedented successes, although these results were still rather low in international comparison. They were at this moment the dominant face of German nationalism. Shortly after reunification, and in the face of soaring migration, violent hate crimes against refugees surged in both parts of the country, but particularly so in the east. This moment was characterised, therefore, by several challenges. Individuals living through the early 1990s in Germany witnessed a political watershed moment, its economic repercussions, blatant regional imbalances, and record-level migration,

accompanied by a growing presence of rightist nationalism in elections and on the street.

II Faces of the nationalist right

Nationalists' social locations and regional disparities

German rightist nationalism of the early 1990s was present at a low level across the country. Yet while its post-unification violence was particularly unbridled in the former GDR, its electoral strength was higher in the west (see Träger 2015: 71, 80). The occasional nationalists in the longitudinal sample lived in both parts of the country, albeit – in relative terms – very subtly more commonly in the east (38 percent, compared to 35 percent of followers of other political movements). Rightist nationalism's drive for cultural and physical homogeneity was also embodied by its followers in the sample. About 95 percent of occasional nationalists were born in Germany, and even more possessed German citizenship. Also 95 percent reported no "migration background", that is, neither they themselves nor their parents (sometimes grandparents) had migrated into Germany (see SOEP Group 2019b: 23). As discussed in Chapters 3 and 10, also other respondents in the longitudinal sample were rarely of diverse backgrounds, so that rightist nationalism's racialised aspect becomes more clearly visible in the full waves of the survey (see Appendix Table A4a). This did not change the fact, however, that rightist nationalism, as embodied by the individuals in the longitudinal sample, was characterised by low cultural diversity. Broadly in line with wider regional disparities visible in the sample (74 percent of western respondents were German-born, and 98 percent in the east), the few rightist nationalists with diverse – mostly eastern European – backgrounds lived exclusively in the west.

In contrast to the more subtle picture of the British sample, German nationalists were clearly typically male (65 percent, see Appendix Tables A1b, A4b).

Their gender distribution was in line with near-universal findings (e.g. Eatwell 2003: 278, 292; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2017: 446; 2016: 5), even if the potential reasons for nationalism's gender gap are still being discussed (see Betz 1994: 142-6; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 154-5, 212, fn.46; Mudde 2007: Ch. 4; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 236). German sample nationalists' greater male overrepresentation might reflect something of the stigma attached to nationalist parties, and of women's – potentially – greater reluctance to voice affinities for parties seen as extreme (Mudde 2007: 118). Few nationalists in the sample were teenagers at this moment, but most were in their twenties and thirties (26 and 33 percent). Roughly one fifth were in their forties, and another fifth in their fifties or older. With an average of 37 years (median: 35), they were about four years younger than followers of other political movements, with an even larger age difference to respondents favouring the conservative Union. Rather different from being constituted by older men (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 175), German nationalism perhaps captured something of rightist extremist youth cultures and machoism. Especially the smaller group of respondents who expressed a preference for the Republicans or NPD during the early 1990s were overwhelmingly young, male, and German-born.

Most of the longitudinal sample's occasional nationalists reported school-leaving education as their highest educational qualification. In the early 1990s, about 38 percent held elementary and 40 percent secondary schooling diplomas, and 10 percent high-school degrees. Most of them had gained additional vocational qualifications. But only few had attained tertiary education after school. About 4 percent held a degree of practically oriented or polytechnic courses, and 7 percent of academically-oriented universities (on lower and higher tertiary education, see Brauns et al. 2003: 223). Viewed through these individuals, rightist nationalism was not characterised by the lowest educational backgrounds; in fact, sample nationalists were less commonly limited to elementary school qualifications than respondents favouring the conservative Union or the Social Democrats (see Appendix Tables A5a-A5c). But they had very rarely achieved diplomas of higher education. Ideal-typical

nationalists left school after 10 years – thus with intermediate schooling certificates (see SOEP Group 2019a: 45) – and then pursued a profession rather than following the high-school pathway towards a potential university education. In that sense, rightist nationalism looked rather down-to-earth.

The past decades had led to structural disparities in education between eastern and western parts of the country. Due to a more egalitarian access to higher education in the GDR, numbers of graduates had been rising strongly (Fulbrook 2015: 191-4, 254). The wider longitudinal sample and its nationalists expressed these historical trajectories. Nearly one fifth of eastern nationalists had gained tertiary education – three times as commonly as their western counterparts. In eastern areas, most nationalists held, moreover, secondary schooling diplomas (60 percent), while this was only the case for 27 percent of nationalism sympathisers in the west. Here, more than half had only completed elementary school education. Many had left school at the earliest possible stage, and then entered basic vocational training. The deep-seated differences between east and west thus also painted two somewhat different pictures of German rightist nationalists. That said, in both parts of the country, nationalists were less likely to have achieved higher educational degrees than those individuals living in their respective regions who preferred other political strands. Whether in east or west, therefore, rightist nationalism was characterised by a certain relative absence of higher educational qualifications.

Over the years of this moment, the share of unemployed sample respondents rose slightly. This was also the case for rightist nationalists, of whom in 1994 about 8 percent were looking for jobs (compared to 6 percent of followers of other political movements). These respondents thus broadly traced the rising national unemployment rate of these years (see Appendix Figure A4b; Ramet 1999: 79-80). As eastern nationalists lost their jobs somewhat more frequently, the sample also reflected something of the existing regional disparities in this respect. Following reunification, unemployment soared particularly strongly in the areas of the former GDR (see Appendix Figure A5c; Green 2013: 52-3). Over the course of the years comprising this analytical moment, however, rightist nationalists were not more

commonly unemployed than other respondents (overall 5 percent). The vast majority of nationalists (80 percent) was working. Even at this moment of post-unification recession and growing unemployment, rightist nationalism was hardly characterised by joblessness.

Similarly to other respondents, about two thirds of the sample's nationalists worked in the private sector during the early 1990s. Rather than expressing fascists' historical connections to the state (e.g. Mann 2004: 14), they shed some light on the western-focused restructuring of the eastern public sector (see Patton 2012: 768), as well as more general trends within rightist nationalism towards economically liberal and welfare-chauvinistic preferences (Betz 1994: 148-50). Of those employed, more than half of rightist nationalists worked in routine service and sales occupations (10 percent), or skilled (33 percent) or semi-/unskilled (15 percent) manual positions. These employment positions under labour contracts were characterised by wages rather than salaries, potentially short-term contracts, and rather low job opportunities and self-determination (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004: 5, 9-10; see also ONS 2016: sections 2, 6; Rose and Pevalin 2002: 83). Around one tenth of nationalists worked in routine clerical occupations, such as secretaries or accountants, or were non-professional freelancers; and over a quarter were in lower (19 percent) or higher (9 percent) management and professional positions. These enjoyed the most immediate access to the benefits of the service relationship, such as salaries and longer-term job security.

To some degree, these German nationalists expressed something of Nazis' diverse class backgrounds in the 1930s (see Mann 2004: 160, 171, 201). Yet even if they were far from being limited to these economic positions, they displayed a certain ideal-typical preponderance of especially skilled manual occupations that was at this moment more clearly visible than in the British sample, and which was particularly pronounced among the smaller group of respondents who favoured the Republicans or the extremist NPD in these very years. Despite this narrowed focus on manual and routine professions, however, it is important to emphasise that also German nationalists, with their intermediate school education and rare joblessness,

were not generally located in the lowest social positions. This captures something of the Republicans' wider electorate during these years, who were not the most socio-economically deprived (Betz 1994: 177; Eatwell 2003: 292). In addition to targeting asylum seekers and immigrants, the party still portrayed itself as the guardian of 'the "small people" threatened by the economic and social consequences of unification' (Betz 1994: 134). This might have resonated with the longitudinal sample's nationalists. Even if they were themselves not often affected by unemployment, typical nationalists faced a risk of dropping further to the social bottom, especially during economic troubled times. Before the background of their limited job security and opportunities to find new jobs (see Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004: 9-10), the recession and reunification's potential longer-term effects entailed high uncertainty as businesses closed and unemployment rose.

This might have been felt particularly strongly by individuals in the former GDR. Even though eastern nationalists were better educated than western ones, they were rarely in more secure socio-economic positions. Despite their theoretical educational advantage over western individuals, they may have made the experience that their higher qualifications and socio-economic positions were not worth much in the reunified Germany. Instead, they faced soaring unemployment in the east, and a drastic restructuring of their social and economic environment (e.g. Judt 2007: 642-3). They may have had a growing sense that the promised "blossoming landscapes" of unification would not materialise any time soon. Unable to take advantage of new opportunities, they might have felt not only socio-economically vulnerable but also treated as "second-class citizens" (see Fulbrook 2015: 279, 284; see also: Ahbe 2011: 238).

Unification's disappointments, political abandonment, violence

In light of these regional disparities, eastern respondents in the longitudinal sample, including rightist nationalists, voiced stronger worries particularly about the own

economic situation. About 34 percent of eastern nationalists stated during these years to have “strong worries” about their own finances, while only 14 percent stated to be “not worried at all”. These numbers were broadly reversed for western nationalists (13 percent “strong worries” and 43 “no worries”). Also concerns about the own job security were more widespread among individuals in the former GDR. Over the course of the early 1990s, and in line with rising national unemployment and dropping GDP growth (see Appendix Figure A4b), personal economic worries rose slightly for both eastern and western nationalists; yet this was more clearly visible when asked about the broader national picture. Similar to other respondents, the share of rightist nationalists expressing “strong concerns” about the general economic development rose from 26 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in 1993 (see Appendix Figure A5a). Even if they hardly surpassed other respondents, the majority of nationalists stated to be “strongly” (overall 34 percent) or “somewhat worried” (53 percent) about the national economy during the years of this moment.

A short-term development in these respondents’ perceptions was also visible in their subjective interest in politics. On the whole, sample nationalists were broadly divided during these years, with just under half reporting “very strong” (14 percent) or “strong” (32 percent) interest in the political world, while 45 percent felt “not so strongly” and 9 percent “not at all” interested. But as the social and economic challenges of this moment unfolded, particularly eastern nationalists voiced a declining political interest. While 61 percent stated to be (very) strongly interested in 1990 – a share clearly above that of western nationalists (43 percent) – only 40 percent felt this way in 1993. Already the 1980s had seen across western Europe ‘a marked public disaffection and disenchantment with the established political parties, the political class, and the political system in general’ (Betz 1994: 169; see also: 170). Yet I understand these German nationalists’ political perceptions mainly before the background of unification’s challenges. For some of them, the soaring numbers of immigrants and refugees might actually have contributed to a strong interest in the political world, not least because the issue of cultural diversity and its supposed threats to culture and society were utilised by rightist nationalist actors such as the

Republicans (Betz 1994: 133-4; Winkler and Schumann 1998: 102-3). According to Betz (1994: 61), Republicans followers in 1989, when immigration numbers already rose significantly, appeared much more interested in politics than the wider public and also felt confident in their political perception.

Other nationalists in the longitudinal sample, however, lost their interest in politics within a few years following unification. Particularly for eastern nationalists, initial hopes and a sense of meaningful political choices in their first free elections (see Fulbrook 2015: 275) soon turned into disappointments surrounding the political, social, and economic process of unification (see Fulbrook 2015: 271, 277-8, 315). Like other nationalism sympathisers of the time, they may have 'believed that the main parties appeared incompetent and were unable to address day-to-day problems of the person in the street' (Backer 2000: 94). While unprecedented numbers of cultural newcomers entered the country, they themselves did not seem to gain access to the rights they felt they deserved as "true Germans". I interpret this as one way in which socio-economic uncertainties became intertwined with a sense of political abandonment. Considering themselves relegated to "second-class citizens" (see Backer 2000: 105; see also: Wagner and Borstel 2009: 287-9), they retreated from a political world in which their needs were overlooked and their livelihoods endangered. These individuals' sense of wider social and political abandonment might have resonated with the Republicans' attack on the mainstream parties whom they portrayed as corrupt and self-serving, and pointed to their alleged failure to address economic challenges, housing problems, immigration, and rising crime rates (Betz 1994: 135).

Regarding the problem of crime, rightist nationalism, as embodied by the sample individuals, was at this moment characterised by substantial concerns. Asked in 1994, two thirds of nationalists stated to have "strong worries" about Germany's crime trends, and hardly any said that they had "no concerns" at all. Also here regional differences were visible. In the west, rightist nationalists expressed greater unease about crime than followers of other political movements (63 and 47 percent "strongly worried). In eastern areas, rightist nationalists were even more commonly

“strongly worried” (72 percent); but as concerns over crime were much more widespread in the east, they hardly differed from other eastern respondents in this respect. Sample nationalists’ disquiet about crime developments might have been reflective of the rise in recorded crime since unification (see BKA 1994: 14). But they also hinted at the wider picture of nationalist concerns around this time. According to Betz (1994: 65), Republicans supporters stood out especially with respect to worries about purported exploitation of asylum and crimes relating to drugs, which was among the categories with a high percentage of foreign suspects (BKA 1994: 97-9).

Also the Republicans themselves attacked immigration not only because it would undermine German culture and identity, but also because it would bring crime and disorder (Betz 1994: 134; Winkler and Schumann 1998: 103). The party thus presented a racialised conception of crime. Connected to its general rejection of multiculturalism, the Republicans portrayed Germany in 1992 as a ““multi-criminal”” society, in which citizens lived together with ““Polish car thieves, Italian mafia, Turkish drug dealers, and Arabic terror commandos”” (Willier 1992: Section 2; also referred to in Wilpert 1993: 80). Also for that reason, the party espoused a strict curtailing of foreigners’ rights in Germany, including a withdrawal of options to gain citizenship and even the right to political asylum (Betz 1994: 134). It is instructive to note that the Republicans’ claims were partly echoed by the conservative Union, albeit in more moderate and legalistic language (e.g. CDU-CSU 1994: 46-7, 49). This was similarly the case for the Union’s discussion of legitimate grounds for seeking refuge (CDU-CSU 1994: 42-3; 1990: 22), which led to an amendment of the basic law’s asylum clause in 1993 carried by most mainstream parties. This was one moment, in other words, in which the wider political right, when faced with soaring migration, brought forward similar arguments and policies that differed not so much in content but mainly in terms of language and degree. With respect to crime and asylum – and by extension: German citizenship – this moment therefore saw a certain mainstreaming of rightist nationalist positions.

Despite being overall less extreme in their language than the NPD, which only thinly concealed its references to biology and anti-constitutional claims, the Republicans were still concerned with the same core problems. In the tradition of the New Right, the party adopted an ethno-pluralist and culture-centred racism revolving around the preservation of German and European identity, which it portrayed as being threatened and undermined by foreign influences. Accordingly the Republicans demanded that Germany must “remain the land of the Germans. Foreigners are guests” (Betz 1994: 133-4). Rejecting globalisation both because it would put national workers at a disadvantage and because it would lead to an amalgamation or dilution of cultures, the party warned against multiculturalism, and especially against “the advances of the aggressive and intolerant Islam” (Betz 1994: 135).

Also because it broke away from the Bavarian mainstream conservatives, scholars have sometimes considered the Republicans Germany’s rightist populist example, rather than one of outright neo-fascism (Backer 2000: 100; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 8; Mudde 2007: 42; for more ambiguous categorisation and terminology, cf. Taggart 1995: 40, 45; Winkler and Schumann 1998: 97, 102). But as it is often the case with rightist nationalism’s somewhat more moderate iterations, also the Republicans, struggled with increasing radicalisation and neo-Nazi affiliations, and were locally declared anti-constitutional (see Eatwell 2003: 292-3, 296-7; Ramet 1999: 73, 77). The Republicans overall avoided to vindicate Nazism. But their most prominent leader spoke rather fondly of his time in the *Waffen-SS* and downplayed Nazi crimes (Pfaffenzeller 2018: sections 1-2; see also: Betz 1994: 18). The party criticised, moreover, what it saw as the government’s tendency “to equate the German past with twelve years of National Socialist rule”, arguing that the “war propaganda of the victor powers has gone into our history books and their exaggerations and falsifications must be largely believed by the young people” (Lewis 1991: 79; see also: Betz 1994: 133; Eatwell 2003: 291). Like the NPD and DVU, the Republicans thus called for guilt-free ways of dealing with Germany’s history, renewed national pride, and reunification – including eastern territories that belonged to Germany before the Second World War (Mudde 2007: 140). They

constituted one example, in other words, of German rightist nationalism's concern with specific, selective, and at times revisionist readings of history and heritage.

One further element that characterised rightist nationalism at this moment was the wave of anti-immigrant and -refugee violence across the country. Precise data vary according to sources, but it is clear that within a few years, hate crimes increased by an order of magnitude. For instance, Ramet (1999: 72; similar numbers in Backer 2000: 102) points to some 270 violent anti-immigrant attacks in 1990 that nearly rose tenfold to about 2,500 in 1992. Merten and Otto (1993: 15-16) report overall about 6,330 xenophobic crimes in 1992, which, according to their calculation, amounts to approximately a twenty-five-fold increase from 1990. And data on rightist extremist crimes more generally display an increase from 1,380 rightist crimes (nearly 130 acts of violence) in 1990 to about 7,120 (more than 2,580 violent) in 1992 (see Staud 2018). Infamous examples of anti-immigrant violence include the lethal arson attacks on Turkish families in Mölln (Schleswig-Holstein, 1992) and Solingen (North Rhine-Westphalia, 1993) in the west, and the riots in Hoyerswerda (Saxony, 1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, 1992) in the east.

Particularly the attacks in the east startled the (western) German public: these instances of anti-immigrant and -refugee mob violence went on for days, left countless injured, were met by notably slow responses of the authorities, and seemed to receive broad public tolerance if not support by – at times applauding – onlookers (see Eatwell 2003: 293; Fulbrook 2015: 285; Hennig 1993: 73; Jüttner 2007; Kinzer 1991; Merten and Otto 1993: 14; McGowan 2006: 262; Panayi 1994). Eastern public attacks stood in some contrast to the largely secretive assaults in the west, as Merten and Otto (1993: 20) point out; and they testified to a widespread potential for violence among the youth, as perpetrators rarely seemed to be members of extremist organisations (Kühnel 1993: 239; see also: Backer 2000: 112). Moreover, while anti-immigrant violence significantly rose in both parts of the country, it seemed to do so particularly strongly in eastern states, even though these took in much lower shares of asylum seekers (Backer 2000: 102; see also: Eatwell 2003: 293; Kühnel 1993: 239; but cf. Wilpert 1993: 67-9 who questions full reliability of

disproportionately eastern numbers). Rightist violence appeared, therefore, as another emergent regional discrepancy.

While these attacks were by no means limited to the east, the relative frequency, severity, and apparent public acquiescence drew considerable attention in the west and quickly developed into a much-studied phenomenon (e.g. Förster et al. 1993; Otto and Merten eds. 1993; Süß 2000; see also: Wilpert 1993: 67-9). Scholars pondered social experiences and “authoritarian mentalities” in the “second German dictatorship”, debated insufficient “de-Nazification” practices in the GDR and its disavowal of existent eastern xenophobia, and discovered recently developed extremist youth cultures who, at times, profited from the flourishing exchange with western “professional” neo-Nazis (Räthzel 1995: sub-heading 12; on other points: Förster et al. 1993: Ch. 1, esp. 27-33; Süß 2000: 11-19; see also: Backer 2000: 102-4, 112; Gieseke 2010; Ramet 1999: 70-1). Surveys at the time found a high and rising willingness to tolerate or even participate in violence in eastern regions (e.g. Förster et al. 1993: esp. Ch. 5; Ramet 1999: 75), where youth protesters also shouted Nazi rallying cries and freely displayed Hitler salutes (Lewis 1991: 167). Some western commentators were tempted to point to regional imbalances and portray rightist extremism as an eastern problem that had now been imported into the unified country (see Wilpert 1993: 67-9). Yet perhaps the rise of anti-immigrant violence and politics in both parts of the country in the context of reunification also increasingly held up a mirror to the way racism had (not) been addressed in the western FRG. It raised questions, for instance, about various forms of western institutional racism, or about the different treatment and naturalisation chances of “ethnic German” *Aussiedler* and “guest workers” (and their German-born children and grandchildren) from other backgrounds (Räthzel 1995; Wilpert 1993; see also: Fulbrook 2015: 285; Taylor 1998: 145).

German rightist nationalism at the end of the 20th century called for national unity, and a homogenous and untarnished German identity. Instead, it had to face hundreds of thousands of immigrants and asylum seekers each year who came from a variety of backgrounds. Some were – depending on point of view – “ethnic

Germans” from eastern European areas; yet the Republicans’ welcoming stance towards them was met with disagreement by many of the party’s sympathisers (Betz 1994: 18, 105). Even among nationalists, who sought to rebuild a “pure” German nation, the question of who was to be recognised as “truly” German proved to be not entirely straight-forward. This invites a brief reflection on this extraordinary moment of rebuilding German state and nation.

III Unification and nation-building

Not for the first time did the establishment of a German nation-state revolve around unification; and it appeared that, much like in the previous century, all that was needed was ‘to confer a worthy political roof on a nation which already existed’ (Gellner 1998b: 53). For Kohl, this worthy state was socio-economically and politically embodied by the western FRG which simply had to be transplanted onto the “new” eastern *Länder* without paying too much heed to their views or recent history. ‘Rather than engage the GDR’s troubled history’, Judt (2007: 642-3) points out, ‘its former subjects were encouraged to forget it – an ironic replay of West Germany’s own age of forgetting in the Fifties’. The overhaul of the eastern symbolic and social landscapes was accompanied by enormous investment and promises of prosperity. And so, again, ‘Germany would buy its way out of history’ (Judt 2007: 643). Reunification was a huge economic challenge, but at least in broader Gellnerian terms there was little doubt that both parts of the unified state would fundamentally host the same nation. The previous decades of separated lives had perhaps led to different experiences and “mentalities”, but had neither altered language nor descent-based ideas of “German-ness”. And further confirmation of a holistic unification of state and nation might have been provided by the fact that many east Germans changed their famous slogan of “We are the people” to “We are one people” (Fulbrook 2015: 272; Patton 2012: 753, 761).

Yet the reunification of two German countries, and the concomitant rebuilding of a wider (albeit western-coined) identity, coincided with the inflow of large numbers of “ethnic Germans” from the territories of the Soviet Union, and millions of other immigrants and asylum seekers from diverse backgrounds. They posed an economic challenge to a smooth unification process by putting an additional strain on the welfare state, and also represented an unparalleled increase of cultural diversity. How to handle those newcomers? One answer was to redefine and adjust their legal and citizenship status – and thus to solidify the narrow definition of who was to be recognised as “truly German”. I suggest that this crucial moment of reunification, accompanied by soaring numbers of diverse others and nationalist eruptions, constituted an expression of racialised nation-building, which was more clearly concentrated within a few years compared to the slower British developments.

From a socio-cultural perspective, the presence of these new immigrants might be seen, as Rätzl (1995: sub-heading 12) proposes, ‘not as an obstacle for the stability of the nation, but a means by which it is constructed’. The growing racism and anti-immigrant violence might not only be a consequence of ‘social dislocation in the new circumstances of the 1990s, accompanied by a general rise in violent crime in the east’, as Fulbrook (2015: 285) suggests. In some sense, attacks against foreigners could also be considered micro-level expressions of Gellner’s (1990: 1-2, 35, 39; 1998b: 3-4, 46) “nationalist principle” of culturally homogenous nation-states – historically sometimes achieved through ethnic cleansing – or of historical uses of violence to build and reconfirm racial identities, exemplified by lynching in the United States (Smångs 2016: esp. 1336-7). In its struggle for political rights and belonging, this nationalist backlash also sheds light on the wider discussion around the requirement of homogeneity for the formation or functioning of democratic society (see Marx 2003: 31-2; see also: Hall 2013: 91; Taylor 1998: 143-4). Increasing racism was part of the price of unification under these circumstances.

Although after the Nazi atrocities the word has largely disappeared from public discourse in Germany, conceptions of “race” and, more precisely, racialised

national belonging, are arguably inseparable from Germany's modern history. It may be 'impossible to purge such manifestations of racism in the space of half a century' (Panayi 1994: 286; see also: Winkler and Schumann 1998: 101)⁷; but Germany has also expressed a long-standing struggle with "race", nation, and state that dated back at least to 19th-century competing visions of uniting the Germans then resident in various kingdoms and statelets. Mann (2004: 140; see also: 156, 188) points out that about 20 million Germans lived outside the Weimar Republic in the early 20th century, which might have given 'the German "nation" a less state-centered and more ethnic and potentially more racist identity', as well as a strong irredentist impulse.

Like Rächtzel (1995) and Wilpert (1993), I am interested in how "race" in a wider sense persisted at a time when the conservative and nationalist right urged to move beyond the shadow of the past. The strong and violent backlash against particularly visibly "non-German" immigrants and asylum seekers in the face of nation-building reflects not only a general (European) rise of racism and attacks against immigrants (see Panayi 1994: 286-7). It was also the consolidation of German national identity at a time of diverse challenges, which involved, moreover, partly unaddressed ambiguities around national belonging grounded in German history. While (West) Germany generally accorded rights and membership largely on the basis of German culture and descent rather than territorial birth (Wilpert 1993: 70-1), the process of unification as nation-building particularly 'refuelled the belief in an ethnic nation state, the legitimacy of a Germany for Germans' (Wilpert 1993: 81). To quote Wilpert (*ibid.*) again at length:

One of the most remarkable factors in this context, is the fact that a country which opened its arms to hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans during the disintegration of the east and which was willing to unify and take on responsibility for another seventeen million persons [from the former GDR] at a record pace did not consider that the unification of Germany might be the opportunity to offer full, unambiguous membership to the 4.5 million foreigners (less than half are Turks and Yugoslavs) who had been over a

⁷ Fulbrook (2015: 234) and Eatwell (2003: 295) also note the persistence of anti-Semitic attitudes in, respectively, the western FRG and the united Germany.

decade or two working, paying taxes, increasingly born and schooled in the country.

Although Germany introduced disincentives for “ethnic Germans” from eastern Europe (Räthzel 1995: sub-section 11), the conservative Union’s 1994 election manifesto mentioned them only briefly yet positively (CDU-CSU 1994: 50). The main force of immigration legislation adopted amidst soaring migration and a socio-political shift to the right was, arguably, aimed at immigrants and asylum seekers without German descent largely defined by blood – and they certainly bore the brunt of xenophobic violence on the ground.

Germans from the former GDR, whose citizenship status in the united Germany remained entirely unquestioned, contributed in their own way to consolidating the new (and old) nation. At a time when their own social realities and memories were dismantled, at least initially a condensed and streamlined western German identity became, according to Wilpert (1993: 78-9), ‘the overwhelming source of identification, and with it perhaps the adoption of beliefs about what was thought to be distorting German identity – unwanted foreigners, especially “lowly” Turks and asylum seekers’. As discussed above, anti-immigrant sentiments were rampant in the east although numbers of, for instance, Turks were extremely low (Räthzel 1995: sub-section 12; see also: Judt 2007: 742-3). East and west Germans built and reaffirmed a nation, and bridged potential sources of regional conflict by, at times violently, excluding those clearly outside the racialised parameters of “German-ness”.

IV Regional divides and the struggle for national belonging

The purpose of this chapter was to paint a picture of this crucial moment of unification, and to characterise the nationalist right as embedded within it. Like their British counterparts, also rightist nationalists in the German sample were of low cultural diversity. But they were much more typically male. They were also a few

years younger than followers of other political movements, and particularly clearly so compared to conservative Union followers. Nationalists in the British sample were on average as old as other respondents, and also slightly younger than conservatives. In both countries, therefore, rightist nationalism was not simply a phenomenon of older individuals (see Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 12-13). In both Britain and Germany, moreover, followers of the extremist BNP and NPD (and Republicans) were significantly younger than those who would favour UKIP and AfD (see Chapter 9). This hints at rightist extremism's (implicit) connection to youth culture and activist networks (see Chapter 8), and highlights the various faces of the political right. The German sample contained a higher proportion of respondents voicing a preference for more aggressive parties; their male and younger image thus also expressed something of the certain machoism and violent potential underlying German nationalism that stood in a subtle contrast to the more conservative character presented by the British sample respondents.

German nationalists were predominantly of school-leaving education, followed by vocational training, and rarely held tertiary university or college degrees. In this regard they resembled British rightist nationalists around this time. Higher education was much more common among nationalists in Germany's east; but in both parts of the country, German nationalists were characterised by a relative absence of higher education compared to followers of other political movements. This was similar with respect to their occupations. I have outlined an ideal-typical focus on nationalism's socio-economic positions under labour contracts, especially skilled manual occupations, which were characterised by comparatively little job security and opportunities. But I have indicated that, despite this ideal-typical focus on less secure occupational positions, which was at this moment somewhat more clearly visible than in the British sample, German rightist nationalism still showed socio-economic complexity. It was also not characterised by unemployment, even as unification's challenges became palpable. Rightist nationalism was not exclusively a phenomenon limited to the lowest social positions. As in the British sample, there was no direct route from social location to nationalist affinities. There might have

been, however, concerns about social decline rooted in their often less secure occupational backgrounds; and many rightist nationalists voiced strong concerns about the aggravating economic situation that they perceived as increasingly threatening. Particularly eastern nationalists worried about their personal financial situation. They were also characterised by a growing retreat from the political world, which I interpret as an expression of disappointment in their new government, and politics more widely, after many social and economic promises of unification remained unfulfilled and unemployment continued to climb.

Sample nationalists were at this moment also strongly worried about crime developments – an issue that especially the political right viewed, as in the UK, through a racialised lens, frequently linking crime to immigrants and asylum seekers. Rightist nationalism at the movement level was fiercely opposed to immigration and multiculturalism, aiming to preserve the racialised basis of “German-ness”. The Republicans, the most dominant party at this moment, represented a somewhat less extreme strand of rightist nationalism. They focused mainly on cultural arguments, portraying German (and European) identity as under threat by multiculturalism and diversity, disruption of social order, and the alleged threat of Islam. Rightist nationalist movements were concerned, moreover, with a selective retrieval of Germany history and national pride, and – to varying degrees – downplayed or historically revised aspects of the Nazi era.

Much of the socio-political reality in the early 1990s, as well as the analysis of the respondents’ backgrounds, was characterised by strong regional differences between east and west. Many of these differences, such as the higher share of eastern respondents with tertiary education, were themselves produced by decades of life in separate systems. This regional dynamic is an important characteristic of German nationalism to which I return in the following chapters. Also for historical reasons, rightist nationalism was at this moment much more strongly represented electorally in the west (see Träger 2015: 71, 80), while its eastern character was rather defined by anti-refugee riots, bottom-up mobilisation, and strongly increasing membership in neo-Nazi groups (see Backer 2000: 99).

At this crucial moment, questions of racism and “German-ness” came to a head when large-scale immigration coincided with the already challenging efforts of reunification. I have argued that overcoming historically shaped social, political, cultural, and economic differences between east and west before the background of an influx of “non-German” newcomers required a moment of nation-building in which German national belonging reaffirmed its racialised character. While the *political* unit, to use Gellner’s (1990: 1-2; 1998b: 45, 72) language, had expanded in a comparatively straight-forward fashion, these years marked perhaps only the beginning of the struggle for redefining the *cultural* one. Extremist perpetrators defended what they perceived as boundaries of legitimate belonging and political rights with large-scale violence; yet unease about growing numbers of refugees was visible not just within the nationalist or conservative right, but also in the wider social and political landscape. And something else was already visible: as Ramet (1999: 79) points out, anti-immigrant violence was often the most rampant where there were actually relatively few immigrants – notably, but by no means exclusively, in the territories of the former GDR. I have hinted at the frequent phenomenon of nationalism’s strength in areas with little cultural diversity in Chapter 6 in the British context. I also return to this problem in Chapter 9. First, however, I address a time in recent German history when migration pressures receded and economic issues determined much of public discussion.

8 From Schröder to Merkel: the 2000s and the primacy of economics

This chapter covers two of Germany's analytical key moments. The first section addresses the years of 2001 to 2005, which saw prolonged economic difficulties and symbolic welfare restructuring by Gerhard Schröder's government led by the Social Democrats (SPD). Similarly to the UK's New Labour, also Germany was ruled during this time by a centre-left administration, while the conservative Union found itself in opposition after Kohl's 16-year chancellorship. This sparked a phase of renewal and modernisation, ultimately leading to the conservative Union's move towards the centre on socio-cultural issues (see Clemens 2009: esp. 127, 128, 132-3; Debus and Müller 2013: 154, 162; Green 2013: 46, 52; cf. e.g. CDU-CSU 2009: 9, 30, 48-51, 81; 2005: 34, 35; 2002: 60-3). The conservative right returned to power in late 2005 under Angela Merkel, initially in a Grand Coalition with the SPD, and from 2009 in a conservative-liberal coalition at the height of the economic crisis. I discuss this momentous economic event in the second part of this chapter, which examines the years between 2007 and 2010.

The 2000s capture a time that was characterised primarily by economic and political challenges, whereas net migration was low compared to the early 1990s. I outline how sample nationalists' typical social locations remained fairly stable throughout these years. While western individuals showed some signs of educational and occupational mobility, eastern individuals improved their positions much less commonly and were particularly worried about economic issues. I further discuss how sample respondents' socio-economic locations and perceptions signalled broader regional differences between east and west. Rightist nationalism at the movement level increasingly found its strongholds in eastern regions. With the revival of the NPD it also acquired a more pronounced extremist character. Despite this, however, I suggest that rightist nationalisms' deeper racialised key concerns remained fundamentally the same.

I The early 2000s and economic downturn

At the beginning of the new millennium, Germany's economy found itself again in a recession. Annual GDP growth fell and reached negative values in 2002 and 2003 (see Appendix Figures A4b, A5c, also for the following). The unemployment rate was at the highest level seen by the reunified state, rising from under 8 percent in 2001 to more than 11 percent in 2005. In the east, unemployment reached 18 percent. Net disposable household income growth lay below inflation, also due to continuing costs of unification and the rise of low-wage jobs following substantial economic reforms (Green 2013: 54). These were implemented by the coalition of Gerhard Schröder's Social Democrats and the Greens. Like Tony Blair in the UK, also Schröder followed the recent trend of leftist parties leaning towards the economic centre (Debus and Müller 2013: 153; Judis 2016: 95; see also: Clemens 2010: 8).

Germany's economy had struggled for some years (Green 2013: 53), so that *The Economist* (1999: sections 4, 2) dubbed the country 'the sick man of Europe', plagued by, among other things, 'a bloated welfare system and excessive labour costs'. From 2003, as the recession deepened, the Red-Green government addressed the economic challenges through a comprehensive restructuring programme termed Agenda 2010, often metonymically referred to as the Hartz laws. Measures included a significant shortening of unemployment benefits while emphasising individual responsibility, a reduction of labour security and extension of business flexibility, and the implementation of a wide array of low-paid jobs (see Grässler 2014; Nachtwey 2018: 65, 83, 87; Pretz 2013). Schröder's steps meant, in other words, a significant welfare retrenchment and liberalisation of the labour market, and thus a clear departure from previous, more leftist social-democratic positions. These reforms were highly contentious and unpopular. They were subject to political disputes and legal challenges; resulted in a drop of the Social Democrats' popularity and the breakaway of a leftist splinter group that soon consolidated the political left in east and west; and also caused widespread protests, especially in eastern parts of the

country that suffered from high unemployment and were thus particularly strongly affected (Fulbrook 2015: 287; see also: Berg et al. 2004a; Grässler 2014: sections 1, 5; Green 2013: 56). While parts of the economy seemed to recover soon after the implementation of the reforms, individuals still faced soaring unemployment, as well as increasing income inequality and a heightened danger of downward mobility (Nachtwey 2018: 83, 114-6; see also: Green 2013: 49, 55).

The first years of the millennium also saw briefly rising net migration, reaching its peak in 2001 when about 275,000 more people arrived than left (see Appendix Figure A6i). Although these figures were still higher than Britain's at the time, they were low compared to Germany's early 1990s. Another notable feature of this moment could be found in the realm of politics. Shortly after Schröder's victory in 1998, turnout in the federal and European elections of this moment decreased (see Appendix Figure A6a; Träger 2015: 62). This signalled, perhaps, a renewed phase of disappointment in the political options, given the socio-economic challenges and the government's response. Not only was the turnout comparatively low during this moment, but also both "people's parties" seemed to politically capture a shrinking share of the German electorate (see Appendix Figures A6b, A6c; Träger 2015: 65). Also due to its welfare reforms, the SPD gradually lost votes since 1998, while smaller parties were gaining electoral ground. The conservative Union, relegated to opposition, was forced to adjust its positions. After a very brief shift towards neo-liberalism, it ultimately remained in the economic centre but modernised under Angela Merkel and opened up especially its socio-cultural policies regarding family, gender equality, and – eventually – migration (see Clemens 2009).

This key moment was strongly defined by economic problems of slumping GDP growth and skyrocketing unemployment, and the Red-Green government's welfare restructuring. This sparked a time of fervent protests and political discontent, especially in the east. When the Union under Merkel took over government in a coalition with the Social Democrats in 2005, neither of these two main political forces seemed very popular. Much less popular remained rightist nationalism – and yet, this

moment still saw its subtle resuscitation with an increasingly extremist and eastern face.

Nationalism, extremism, and the eastern move

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the electoral appeal of the Republicans, who had dominated rightist nationalist politics in the previous moment, was in decline both at the federal and regional level⁸. The party's downturn was matched by a continuous drop in membership (see BMI 2006: 105; Edinger and Hallermann 2001: 591; McGowan 2006: 256; Pfaffenzeller 2018: section 5). In some ways, as Backer (2000: 101) points out, the Republicans 'electoral comeback and decline paralleled exactly the rise and fall in importance of the asylum-seeker issue'. For a few years, especially in the late 1990s, the extremist DVU became the torchbearer of the nationalist right. The party achieved a – relatively speaking – good result of 1.2 percent in the 1998 federal election, and gained access to local parliaments in a few eastern states in the following years (see Backer 2000: 106; Backes 2006: 132). As the DVU's momentum remained limited, it entered an electoral alliance with the NPD, Germany's oldest and most extreme rightist nationalist party, which also showed signs of revival in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Backes 2006: 131-3, 137, 139; BMI 2006: 89, 99, 100; see also: Staud 2004: paras. 2, 13).

This moment thus saw steps towards a consolidation of the otherwise fragmented extremist right, which had strong neo-Nazi undertones, to maximise its electoral chances. In 2004, the NPD gained 9.2 percent in Saxony's regional election and entered its local parliament (for details, see Backes 2006: 131-7) – a success not seen by this party since the late 1960s, and reaching nearly the Social Democrats' vote share in Saxony. In the next year, the NPD achieved its best federal result for

⁸ Here and in the following: for federal election results of rightist nationalist parties, see <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/1998.html> and related pages (accessed 29/12/2020). For regional state election results, see <https://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/index.htm> (accessed 29/12/2020).

decades in the 2005 federal election (1.6 percent). Its share of the vote was consistently higher in the eastern states, with 4.8 percent in Saxony constituting its best state result in this election (see Namislo et al. 2006: 222). This illustrated a more general regional development visible in rightist nationalism. As opposed to the early 1990s, the nationalist right drew since 1998 increasingly on electoral support in the areas of the former GDR where its results lay clearly above those in the west (see Träger 2015: 71, 80).

Rightist nationalism was at this moment electorally most successful with young voters, both nationally and in eastern key states (see Berg et al. 2004b: 44; Namislo et al. 2006: 232). As the rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample had grown older, they only reflected this partially. Rarely anymore in their twenties, they were now most often in their thirties (22 percent) and forties (35 percent). Just under one fifth were in their fifties, and about 22 percent in their sixties or older. Their average age was now 48 (median: 46). As in the British case, this growing age of these nationalists was a function of their selection into the sample and did not constitute an actual change nationalism's age composition. But as opposed to their British counterparts, German nationalists did at this moment show more visible change on another variable. Since the early 1990s, not only the wider German sample but also some of its occasional nationalists had gained additional educational qualifications. Now overall about 9 percent had achieved traditional university degrees. Particularly the share of those gaining degrees of shorter or technically oriented studies had increased (now 9 percent, see Appendix Table A5c). To some extent, rightist nationalism seemed in the process of catching up educationally. Yet these individuals still held higher educational degrees less commonly than respondents who kept to other political movements. On the whole, rightist nationalism was still predominantly represented by those with diplomas of elementary (38 percent) or secondary, intermediate school education (36 percent), most often with additional vocational qualifications. As I discuss in Chapter 9, nationalism's increase in tertiary education was largely due to respondents who would favour the AfD, while those expressing a preference for more radical parties such as the Republicans, NPD, or DVU were

especially confined to school-leaving diplomas. Viewed through these individuals, also German nationalism displayed slightly different faces, depending on the degree of radicalism that appealed to its followers.

As they grew older, also the share of these wider nationalists in retirement had increased (now 8 percent), albeit at a slower rate than that of other respondents (12 percent). At this time of economic pressure and high unemployment (Green 2013: 53, 56; Pretz 2013: section 2), rightist nationalists were again rarely looking for work. Overall about 6 percent were unemployed in the early 2000s, thus hardly above the average of those keeping to non-nationalist movements (5 percent), and clearly below the national unemployment rate (growing from just under 8 percent in 2001 to over 11 percent in 2005). Few rightist nationalists lost their jobs during this time. Even at a moment that saw the highest unemployment in recent history, therefore, rightist nationalism was again not characterised by the experience of joblessness; instead, the majority of rightist nationalists (about 71 percent) were still working. Reflecting some of the lasting regional disparities, eastern nationalists were less often retired and more often unemployed (overall 10 percent). But also they were most often in paid employment.

Had rightist nationalists been ideal-typically quite clearly characterised by relatively insecure work relations in the early 1990s, their socio-economic backgrounds now presented a subtle shift. To some degree, this reflected their newly gained educational qualifications. Still about 22 percent of these wider nationalists were skilled manual workers under modified labour contract, 9 percent were routine service and sales workers, and 14 percent were semi- or unskilled manual workers; but an increased number now worked in somewhat more secure occupational positions. About 21 percent were now in lower managerial and professional occupations, and 11 percent were even in higher managerial or professional positions with the highest degrees of security and career opportunities (see Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004: 5; Rose and Pevalin 2002: 83). Drawing at least on some of the benefits of service relationships, the percentage of nationalists in intermediate, routine clerical work had nearly doubled (13 percent). Including the last known

information of recent retirees slightly re-emphasised the previous focus on less secure backgrounds but did not change the picture of the 2000s fundamentally (see Appendix Table A5f). As the longitudinal sample – and the full survey samples of these years – gradually moved away from positions largely defined by labour contracts, also rightist nationalism’s socio-economic backgrounds displayed some of this development. Despite this, however, compared to other respondents, the nationalists in the sample were still underrepresented with respect to secure positions, and more commonly found in blue-collar and short-term work. Also in that sense, albeit with less clarity, rightist nationalism was still ideal-typically characterised by these less secure backgrounds.

Although they themselves were not very often affected by the growing unemployment, the sample nationalists proved even more worried about economic matters than they had been in the early 1990s. During these years, overall 54 percent had “strong” and further 43 percent “some” concerns about the wider economic development. Rightist nationalists had moved away slightly from the least secure occupational backgrounds mainly defined by labour contracts – but this did not prevent the majority from worrying about their own financial situation (overall 25 percent voiced “strong” and 52 percent “some” concerns, see Appendix Figure A5b), or even fear losing their jobs (16 “strong” and 45 percent “some” worries). Echoing the mood in the wider sample, also rightist nationalists’ fears in all these respects had increased, and particularly strongly from 2003 when unemployment soared to new heights (see Appendix Figures A4b, A5a). They now viewed the wider and personal economic situation as even more threatening.

One way to make sense of this is to view it in light of Schröder’s welfare and labour reforms. These made it easier for businesses to lay off workers, or to hire them under subcontracting or temporary work schemes that were subject to lower standards of security and protection (Nachtwey 2018: 86-8; Pretz 2013: section 4). Although some rightist nationalists gained access to more secure occupational positions, overall labour standards were simultaneously weakened. This, and the much reduced welfare benefits, increased the threat of downward mobility

(Nachtwey 2018: 83). Adding to their wider fears of sinking to the social bottom, also these nationalists may have felt that now, in Nachtwey's (2018: 83) words, 'the ladder was steeper: descent was much quicker and it was that much harder to rise again'. All the while, unemployment kept growing around them, demonstrating the very real threat of falling off the ladder.

Importantly, sample nationalists' economic worries were still more pronounced in the east, and especially their anxieties about joblessness. This reflected a certain reality. Not only did the east face a persistently worse economic situation with higher risk of poverty and unemployment (BMWi 2016: 27, 41, 75; Green 2013: 53, 56), which did impact eastern sample nationalists more frequently; but also rightist nationalism's new educational qualifications had been achieved less often by individuals in the east, who, moreover, had also gained access to new occupational opportunities and positions far less commonly than their western counterparts. Eastern nationalists were still more often found in manual occupations strongly defined by labour contracts and lower job security. For these individuals, whose social positions had hardly improved over the last years, Schröder's reforms and his demand for individual responsibility (Nachtwey 2018: 84) might have been both economic threat and political slight. After unification's unfulfilled promises, also the Red-Green restructuring efforts might have transformed socio-economic grievances into a sense of political abandonment. The SPD's welfare cuts were widely unpopular, and especially in eastern parts of the country (Der Spiegel 2004).

In 2004, "Monday demonstrations" arose against the reforms in several east-German cities (Berg et al. 2004a: 25; Nachtwey 2018: 172), invoking the symbolic protests in the GDR that had accelerated the fall of the Berlin Wall one and half decades earlier. Again, it might have seemed to eastern protesters, decisions were unilaterally taken by unresponsive (western) authorities who had not kept their promises since unification (cf. Nachtwey 2018: 172; Staud 2010: section 3). Channelling this widespread eastern discontent, the extremist NPD swiftly co-opted the protests led by the political left, and tailored its 2004 state election campaign in Saxony around the welfare reforms which did indeed worry its voters (Backes 2006:

134-5). Already in the late 1990s the party had started to specifically target globalisation and capitalism while adopting a focus on social issues (Hartleb 2009: 101-4); and this rediscovery of a remodelled “national socialism” – a departure from its formerly anti-communist stance – appeared to be especially appealing in the east (Staud 2004: section 3). In the states of the former GDR, the NPD presented itself as a force of help and support that addressed local issues, and successfully recruited youth into their community-based associations or “comradeships” (Berg et al. 2004b; Staud 2010: section 4; 2004: section 3; see also: McGowan 2006: 264-5).

The NPD concentrated its efforts on the eastern states to capture their rightist extremist youth cultures and underground networks, and chose specifically Saxony as a ‘model region’, moving some of its organisational structures to the eastern state (Backes 2006: 136; see also: 135, 137; Hartleb 2009: 99; Staud 2004: section 3). Here, the Monday demonstrations of 1989 and 1990 had originated, and were also now prevalent in the state’s cities. As in other eastern states, Saxon unemployment was high (Backes 2006: 133)⁹; and respondents in the longitudinal sample living in Saxony seemed especially strongly worried about the wider economic development and about falling into unemployment. The NPD embodied nationalism’s particularly strong appeal in Saxony (see Backes 2006; Musharbash 2004); but it also channelled and guided some of the wider growing eastern nationalism that had come to public attention in the widespread post-unification violence (see Chapter 7).

Also at this moment, rightist nationalists in the longitudinal were characterised by moderate interest in the political world (see Appendix Table A6c). But they expressed in 2005 their deep feelings of abandonment by German politics and the political system. Overall 57 percent of these individuals were rather discontented with democracy, as it existed in Germany (31 percent were rather satisfied). In western parts of the country, nationalists felt less strongly excluded from political participation (48 percent rather dissatisfied with democracy; 40 percent

⁹ Regional unemployment figures can be found in Eurostat data browser: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/LFST_R_LFU3RT_custom_401315/default/table?lang=en (accessed 30/12/2020).

rather satisfied), but more so than they had when answering a similar question in 1989, a year before reunification. Perhaps the following years of large-scale migration, repeated economic downturns, and contemporary social and economic pressures had given some of them a growing feeling of having been neglected and shut out from the political process that had repeatedly ignored their concerns.

This view was much more widespread among individuals in the east, however. Here, the vast majority of rightist nationalists was rather unhappy with German democracy (73 percent; 17 percent were rather satisfied). Despite their still better education, these individuals were more often stuck in potentially fragile socio-economic positions, more commonly worried about the wider and personal economic situation, and deeply critical of democracy in Germany. These eastern nationalists displayed perhaps an aggravated picture of wider sentiments in the areas of the former GDR (see Heitmeyer 2009: 32). Given their socio-economic stagnation in the face of economic pressures, they may have grown increasingly pessimistic about their future, as well as the German political and democratic process, because they felt that they had seen few of its benefits and were being treated unfairly (see Backes 2006: 133; Heitmeyer 2009: 30). In their minds, they were still “second-class citizens” (Heitmeyer 2009: 33), or mere ‘spectators’ when it came to politics, public life, or media (Staud 2010: section 3). They now had the right to protest freely; but they might have felt that they held very little actual influence over political procedures, while their fate was decided by elusive political actors (Fulbrook 2015: 292-3). Before the background of their experience in the GDR, and their disappointed hopes and expectations after unification, some of eastern sample nationalists’ persisting economic concerns might thus have heightened the feeling of having been politically silenced and betrayed.

Some of the sample nationalists might also have renounced representative democracy as such. They might have belonged to a sizeable minority in wider society who longed for strong leader to rule Germany with an iron fist or for a single party that embodied a homogenised and racialised idea of “the people”, or thought the common depiction of Nazi crimes were exaggerated (Cziesche et al. 2005: 27). The

NPD's claims might themselves have contributed to these perceptions, particularly in its local strongholds – increasingly in eastern Germany – where it slowly expanded its influence and undermined liberal rights (Staud 2010: sections 1, 2). Perhaps also due to lower satisfaction with democracy in the east, in some areas, rightist extremist parties were increasingly considered “normal” political actors (Heitmeyer 2009: 45; Staud 2010: section 4). The fierce criticism of German democracy, which especially eastern nationalists in the longitudinal sample displayed, might therefore be understood before the background of their socio-economic positions and fears, their feelings of political abandonment, their experiences in the GDR and post-unification disappointments, and very recent regional and political developments. Another concern – crucial for the racialised character of rightist nationalism – was of course related to immigration and cultural difference.

In the first years of the new millennium, many respondents in the longitudinal sample expressed at least some concerns about immigration. Those in the east tended to be slightly more strongly worried – reflecting a more general societal picture (see Backes 2006: 134) – and especially those individuals living in Saxony. Concerns about migration were particularly common among the sample's rightist nationalists of whom in the early 2000s overall 56 percent expressed “strong” and 33 percent “some” worries. Although this moment did not see a sudden surge in cultural diversity compared to the previous decade (see Appendix Figure A6h), for sample nationalists the existing levels might have been sufficiently threatening to sustain their fears about their country's changing demographic character. Hinting at wider regional differences, also eastern nationalists voiced even greater concerns about this issue (64 percent “strongly” worried, compared to 51 percent in the west). In addition to the economic and political problems discussed above, also these deepened fears about cultural diversity are important for an understanding of rightist nationalism, and its higher prevalence in the states of the former GDR at this moment (see Träger 2015: 70, 71, 80). It is instructive to note that also at this moment the eastern share of immigrants among the population was much lower than that of the

west, but that – in relative terms – this low eastern percentage was increasing strongly since unification (Backes 2006: 134).

Faced with the eastward EU expansion, and recent terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, rightist nationalists' (and the wider sample's) worries about migration grew even more urgent (see Appendix Figure A7a). In 2005, two thirds of nationalists stated to be "strongly" concerned about cultural newcomers entering the country. Echoing these worries, also overall 56 percent of nationalists voiced in 2004 and 2005 "strong" and 35 percent "some" concerns about the EU expansion. The relationship between both variables was particularly strong for the sample's nationalists; and also the development of these respondents' perceptions over time indicates, perhaps, that not only in Britain but also Germany, issues of immigration and eastern EU integration could become entangled in people's minds. Sample individuals' perceptions reflected a wider, long-standing unease about both the financial and migratory impact of the new eastern member states (see BPB 2019b: section 2; Judt 2007: 718, 721-2). These led Germany – among many other countries but, notably, not the UK – to implement restrictions on the new EU citizens' freedom of movement until 2011.

The nationalists in the longitudinal sample were characterised by pronounced worries about immigration and cultural difference; and this also constituted the core concern of nationalism at the movement level. The Republicans promulgated fears about the alleged financial burden of migrants and their privileged treatment, of social unrest following large-scale migration, and of the alteration, if not dissolution, of the German people (BMI 2006: 102-3). Also the DVU stereotyped foreigners as causing crime, and taking jobs and welfare away from the native population. The party also explicitly warned about the planned EU accession of Bulgarian and Romania in 2007 (BMI 2006: 94-5). And, deeply concerned about Germany's racial and national purity, the NPD advanced claims that were reminiscent of traditional demands of British extremists. In 2005, for instance, the NPD propagated demands to eventually "repatriate" foreigners, as well as children from "mixed" relationships between Germans and non-Europeans (BMI 2006: 79-81). It also suggested to

exclude foreigners from national insurance and to expel those who were unemployed (Rösmann 2005: para. 4).

With differences in presentation, these rightist movements shared concerns about Germany's racialised basis of belonging, and its social cohesion and order. But also to avoid legal problems and to appear "respectable", they largely focused on cultural, ethno-pluralist language (see Chapter 2). This was the case even for the NPD, the most extreme of these parties. It resorted, for instance, to arguments around cultural supremacy tied to its anti-American and anti-globalisation rhetoric which, in turn, had anti-Semitic undertones (Hartleb 2009: 105, 107; see also: BMI 2006: 79, 83; Mudde 2007: 187, 189; Rösmann 2005: para. 4). But the party was still not free from classical biological racism. The NPD's leader, for instance, expounded the belief in people's "natural inequality" that was genetically determined, so that they could not be treated equally (Staud 2004: section 4). Like rightist nationalist movements, also rightist nationalists in the sample related concerns about immigration to their disquiet about the still relatively high levels of crime (see BKA 2006: 27-8). Hinting at rightist nationalism's wider worries about disorder, and with slightly growing intensity during these years (see Appendix Figure A7e), overall 57 percent of sample nationalists voiced at this moment "strong" and 39 percent "some concerns" about contemporary crime trends.

Rightist nationalism at the movement level continued, moreover, to be characterised by its desire to retrieve selective interpretations of history. Still holding on to a much more radical version of Helmut Kohl's aim to rebuild a proud German identity (Eatwell 2003: 288-9, 297) around the time of unification, the NPD propagated the need to free Germans from historical guilt, and offered a euphemistic and often revisionist reading of the Nazi past (BMI 2006: 75-6, 83-6; Staud 2004: sections 1, 4). In early 2005, for instance, prominent NPD politicians in Saxony's state parliament rejected a minute of silence for the Nazis' victims and instead equated the Holocaust with the Allies' bombing of Dresden, announcing the NPD's "struggle against the guilt bondage of the German people, and for historical veracity" (Der Spiegel 2005: para. 1; see also BMI 2006: 84; Cziesche et al. 2005).

With its attempts to also capture socio-economic themes especially in eastern regions, the NPD cultivated its image of a “respectable” political actor (Backes 2006: 135, 137). But at the same time, the party welcomed more radical followers. Already in the late 1990s the NPD had sought to attract extremists from smaller organisations and stylised itself as a haven for neo-Nazis. This led to a rise in members. In Saxony, its membership numbers almost increased threefold, thus reaching the level of the Greens (Backer 2000: 92). The NPD’s welcoming stance towards neo-Nazis continued also in the early 2000s (see e.g. Backes 2006: 131, 137, 139; Berg et al. 2004b: 49; Hartleb 2009: 99, 101; Rösmann 2005: para. 2; Staud 2004: section 3). If there had been any doubts before, the party’s ‘openness towards militant skinheads, neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften* [i.e. comradeships] and espousers of “national resistance”’ (Backes 2006: 139; see also: 137, 141) made it clearly the most extreme of the larger rightist nationalist movements in Germany. Its ideological radicalism was so strong that it not only limited its political flexibility (Backes 2006: 138, 139), but also led to a serious (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempt by the German state to ban the party between 2001 and 2003 (Hartleb 2009: 100-1; see also Backes 2006: 139-41). The NPD’s growing influence thus gave rightist nationalism at this moment an extremist character. In general terms, however, its principal concerns around migration, a pure German nation, social order, the “true” people’s political inclusion, and overcoming the country’s historical stigma remained largely constant. Rightist nationalism’s core features, and its extremist and increasingly eastern face, would also remain visible throughout the years of the Great Recession.

II The late 2000s and the Great Recession

The economic crisis of the late 2000s impacted Germany less severely than many other countries, and certainly less than the UK (Kickert 2012b: 300, 301). But it nevertheless constituted an important economic and political moment in Germany’s recent history, as it does for Europe and beyond. Macro-level data shows that

Germany's economy fell into a relatively short but deep recession (see Appendix Figure A4b). Its GDP growth contracted visibly in 2008 and then slumped to below minus 5 percent in 2009 (see also Lees 2018: 299). Angela Merkel's conservative-led coalition governments initially responded by bolstering the banking sector with substantial capital injections from late 2008 (Tagesschau 2008; Vis et al. 2011: 344). They then employed Keynesian measures to boost demand, including tax relief, and substantial government investment into labour market and infrastructure (Vis et al. 2011: 346, 347; see also: 340; Clemens 2010: 13-14). The economic response further included a lowering of the interest rate to stimulate business investment and prevent unemployment. These comprehensive measures seemed to work fairly well, as GDP swiftly recovered in 2010. The unemployment rate only increased very slightly between 2008 and 2009 but then continued to fall. As Vis et al. (2011: 343-4) point out, however, German unemployment had already been at high levels (between 7 and 9 percent over the years of this moment). Inflation, which had sunk during the crisis, rose with the government's measures but remained low at just over 1 percent in 2010. Especially from this year, Merkel's new centre-right government announced plans to significantly tighten the budget, however, which included cut-backs on social services in the following years (Kickert 2012b: 307; Vis et al. 2011: 348-9; Zeit Online 2010). This move was strongly criticised by the opposition; yet it did arguably not result in the level of austerity that characterised Britain's post-crisis years.

The moment around the economic crisis saw the lowest net migration figures in the post-unification period (see Appendix Figure A6i). In 2010, Germany's net migration numbers started to rise again, also because the country's economy was fairing comparatively well in the Great Recession (see Green 2013: 49, fn. 24). In the middle of the economic crisis, turnout in the 2009 federal election reached a new low point at 70.8 percent, accompanied by a still very low 43.3 percent in the European election the same year (see Träger 2015: 62). Both major parties continued to lose votes (see Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018b: 16, 18; Lees 2010: 89), indicating widespread disenchantment with the "people's parties" that had governed in a coalition. Following the election, the conservative Union and liberal FDP were able to form a

centre-right coalition again under Merkel's leadership (see Fulbrook 2015: 288), ending the previous Grand Coalition and sending the Social Democrats into opposition.

Nationalism still growing underground

Electoral support for the nationalist right was still low during these years (see Träger 2015: 71, 80). The Republicans continued their decline in the national elections of 2009, and achieved only very low vote shares even in its southern strongholds¹⁰. The party was far from its golden times around reunification. Also the more radical DVU gained only marginal results and could not connect to previous regional successes. The party was still in an electoral alliance with the NPD until 2009, and decided in late 2010 to merge with the most extreme nationalist party. This meant a more concentrated power potential for the NPD. With 1.5 percent of the vote, the party achieved again a comparatively strong result in the 2009 federal election; and in Germany's east it succeeded also during these years in regional state elections, entering the parliaments of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in 2006 and Saxony in 2009.

The two main developments within the nationalist right that characterised the early 2000s were still visible during the economic crisis: first, rightist nationalism remained more strongly embedded in eastern parts of the country, exemplified both through national and regional elections (see Träger 2015: 71, 80). Second, with the NPD cementing its position as its dominant face, rightist nationalism still maintained its strong extremist hue. In line with the NPD's strategy of combining parliamentary representation and street presence (Decker and Brähler 2016a: 18; see also: BMI 2013: 78), the party still nurtured its connections to potentially violent extremist

¹⁰ See <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2009.html> for results of the 2009 federal election, <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/europawahlen/2009.html> for the 2009 European election, and <https://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/sachsen.htm> and related pages for regional results (accessed 08/01/2021).

groups and neo-Nazi “comradeships” which had grown to levels similarly high as those of the mid-1990s (Hartleb 2009: 97-8; see also: 101; Schölermann 2009: 254, 255). Underneath low electoral results at the federal level, and state-level successes largely in specific (eastern) regions, therefore, rightist nationalism continued to gradually build a broader extremist basis on the ground.

This is also illustrated by the general upward trend of rightist and extremist crimes during this time (see Appendix Figure A6d; Staud 2018: sections 2, 6; see also: BMI 2020: 2). Although the number of violent and hate crimes was decreasing slightly, other rightist offences reached a peak in 2008. Many of these were related to distributing forbidden extremist propaganda or displaying banned symbols such as the swastika (see BMI 2013: 36; 2006: 34; Staud 2018: section 2). This was perhaps a more structural indication of a reinvigorating nationalist right and its ideological mobilisation at the grassroots level. The NPD’s connections with militant extremist groups was particularly strong in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, but not limited to the eastern state (see Borstel 2012: 255; Hartleb 2009: 99; Schölermann 2009: 254, 255). In Saxony, where the NPD re-entered the regional parliament, it continued its strategy of – despite public provocations – aiming for social acceptance (Borstel 2012: 255). Rightist nationalism’s ideological positions remained largely similar to those of the early 2000s (and previous years); and so, too, did the social backgrounds of its sympathisers in the longitudinal sample.

Rightist nationalism, as viewed through the sample respondents, displayed also at this moment its constant overrepresentation of men, and those who were born in Germany, were German citizens, and whose parents had also not migrated to Germany. Again rightist nationalism appeared older, which was, however, an artefact of being embodied by the same respondents since the early 1990s. Occasional nationalists were during the time of the economic crisis on average 54 (median: 51) years old. As they grew older, these individuals moved further and further away from those age groups in their late teens and early twenties that, in wider society, showed also around this time the strongest affinity for especially extremist movements such as the NPD (see Hartleb 2009: 100).

While the previous analytical moment had shown clear developments with respect to sample nationalists' educational backgrounds, their achieved qualifications hardly changed after the early 2000s (see Appendix Table A5c). Rightist nationalists remained at this moment most commonly of elementary (overall 38 percent) and intermediate (35 percent) school-leaving education, again typically accompanied by additional vocational training. Still 9 percent held traditional university degrees, thus somewhat less commonly than respondents who kept to other political movements. Also the socio-economic positions of the employed rightist nationalists resembled those that they had displayed a few years previously (see Appendix Table A5f). While they showed a very subtly increasing employment in professions with higher safety and opportunities (see Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004: 5; Rose and Pevalin 2002: 83), rightist nationalism remained overall ideal-typically characterised by work largely under labour contracts. But as in the early 2000s, this picture was less clearly defined in the west where rightist nationalism's share of managers and professionals had risen over time. In the east, on the other hand, ideal-typical nationalists were still much more commonly remunerated through wages and not salaries, and had access to low career prospects and little job security. Despite their better education, they had remained especially stagnant while facing a larger regional impact of the economic challenges of unification, welfare restructuring, and global economic crisis.

The economic crisis in Germany saw a deep but short recession with a sharp drop in GDP growth (see Lees 2018: 299-300). The unemployment rate, however, only rose very slightly between 2008 and 2009, but then continued its downward trend in both east and west (Appendix Figure A5c; BMWi 2016: 27). With overall 4 percent of sample nationalists looking for work around this time, they were as often unemployed as other sample respondents but much less commonly than average German residents at the time (e.g. the unemployment rate in 2009 was 7.6 percent). Only few rightist nationalists in the sample lost their positions over the course of the economic crisis, while some even managed to find new ones. The majority of rightist nationalists who were looking for work resided in the east, where unemployment

was still more widespread (see Appendix Figure A5c; Green 2013: 53). On the whole, though, rightist nationalism, as seen through these respondents, was also at this moment not characterised by the experience of unemployment. Nor did unemployment play much of a role in the NPD's 2010 party programme (see NPD 2010: 11). But as the longitudinal sample aged, also nationalists moved more frequently into retirement (now 19 percent; again below the overall sample's 25 percent). Nevertheless, and more commonly than many other respondents, just under two thirds of rightist nationalists were still working as the economic crisis unfolded.

During the years in which 'Germany saw its greatest recession of the post-war years' (Nachtwey 2018: 53), rightist nationalists were still nearly as worried about their own economic circumstances as they were in the early 2000s (see Appendix Figure A5b). Overall 24 percent expressed "strong" and 51 percent "some" concerns about how they were fairing financially, and 58 percent of those working were still worried about losing their jobs. Reflecting their more precarious situation, these economic fears were still more prevalent among nationalists in the east. But they were common among western nationalists, too. The slow move towards more secure occupational positions in the west had, it seemed, still done little to alleviate most of these individuals' worries about facing social decline. Over the years, the consequences of Schröder's welfare reforms – continued by the Grand Coalition under Merkel – had become palpable. Unemployment had declined notably, but at the cost of reduced job securities and dismissal protections, and an increase of short-term and sub-contracted labour (Pretz 2013: section 5). These changes had been least beneficial to those with lower qualifications (ibid.: section 6) – such as the rightist nationalists in the sample – while previous safety nets and unemployment benefits had been eroded. Even though the German economy recovered fairly quickly, decreasing net real wages and growing risk of poverty meant that, as Green (2013: 54) wrote a few years later, 'in the bottom half of the income spectrum, the population has endured more than a decade of rather lean years'.

But also the economic crisis itself posed a threat, as companies coming under pressure could mean for less secure individuals in the sample to be laid off any time. The vast majority of rightist nationalists thus still felt anxious about the broader economic development; and like the wider sample they became especially concerned around 2009, when Germany's GDP growth dropped to negative values (see Appendix Figures A4b, A5a). After witnessing the extent of the economic challenges, 55 percent of rightist nationalists had "strong" worries in 2010, and further 40 percent "some" concerns about the direction the economy was going.

Speaking to these concerns, the NPD continued to present itself as local "helper" with a focus on social issues, and to show its presence at leftist demonstrations against globalisation (Hartleb 2009: 99, 102). Also in its 2010 party programme, the NPD employed economically leftist arguments to further its cause. While the party's main emphasis lay on defending its vision of a pure nation (BMI 2013: 67-8), it extended this racialised core concern with ideas of class. Connecting both, it argued for instance that '[t]he "social gap" between rich and poor must not become so wide that class conflicts increase and the national community breaks apart. Nor must the solidary community's social stability be undermined by foreign infiltration' (NDP 2010: 10-11). Playing with inter-war fascism's drive towards transcendence (Mann 2004: 14-15, 26-7), the issue of class itself played only a minor role in the NPD's claims. But it may have offered an opportunity to exclude also certain economic, political or intellectual elites from the organic "*Volksgemeinschaft*", and to appeal to multiple senses of exploitation and dislocation (see Chapter 2). Its references to class and social issues may have helped the NPD to locally attract individuals with mainly economic concerns and to induct them more deeply into its racist worldview. The NPD aimed to mainstream or normalise its radical claims, which seemed to have become at least in some (eastern) areas a relatively successful endeavour (see Borstel 2012: 254, 256; Heitmeyer 2009: 45; Staud 2010: section 4; cf. Hartleb 2009: 100).

Asked in 2009 about changes in their life satisfaction since unification, sample nationalists in both parts of the country seemed overall rather disenchanting, and

clearly more often so than other respondents. In the west, about 16 percent of nationalists stated that they felt better about their lives, while 45 percent said that their life satisfaction had decreased since unification. Eastern nationalists were more divided, with 33 percent saying that their lives since unification had improved, 38 percent stating that they had become worse, and 28 percent thinking that they had stayed the same. But also they perceived their life satisfaction more negatively than other eastern respondents, and particularly in contrast to eastern conservatives who saw unification's impact on their lives in a much better light. On the whole, rightist nationalism was two decades after unification characterised by a rather critical view of its consequences. In both parts of the country, a pessimistic view was especially prevalent among the majority of nationalists whose highest educational qualifications were elementary or intermediate school diplomas. They may have had the feeling that they were stuck in their social positions, missing out on the social and economic opportunities they deserved; instead they may have felt exposed to unification's pressures and uncertainties, while others around them seemed to reap its benefits.

Many rightist nationalists still stated in 2010 that they were unhappy with the way German democracy worked (46 percent; 36 percent were rather satisfied). Also at this moment, therefore, rightist nationalism was characterised by a sense of political abandonment by the political and democratic process, even if this was less pronounced as it had been five years earlier (see Appendix Tables A6a, A6b). This was mostly because rightist nationalists in the east had become more accepting of German democracy (now 47 percent dissatisfied; 30 percent satisfied), which seemed to reflect a wider subtle shift in the areas of the former GDR around this time (cf. Decker et al. 2016: 53; Heitmeyer 2009: 32). Perhaps some eastern nationalists in the sample agreed generally more with Merkel's centre-right government than with Schröder's Red-Green administration of the early 2000s. But they were still less content with German democracy than their western counterparts (46 percent dissatisfied; 40 percent satisfied).

Over the course of these economically dominated years, the wider sample's and also rightist nationalists' concerns about migration trends had somewhat decreased. But still overall 49 percent stated to be "very" and 35 percent "somewhat" worried about newcomers entering the country. Despite very low net migration (see Appendix Figure A6i), these individuals maintained substantial concerns, expressing an exacerbated view of nevertheless present worries about migration in wider society (see Weaver 2010). Like the wider sample, most rightist nationalists felt also at this moment uneasy about the problems of global terrorism and crime. These were again strongly related to their concerns about migration. Also the NPD (2010: 18-19) associated the problem of crime first and foremost with foreigners' actions, illegal immigration, and Germany's "imposed" multiculturalism. At least partly underlying these other concerns, the most characteristic issue for rightist nationalism thus remained migration. Perceptions of this issue was what set sample nationalists clearly apart from other respondents; and at the movement level, the problems of crime and disorder offered more variation in framing its anti-immigrant claims, and its deeper concern with cultural difference vis-à-vis a racialised, "pure", homogenous, and organic nation.

Also at this moment, the NPD declared 'national identity, national sovereignty, and national solidarity as basis of life of our people'; rejected 'all "multicultural" models of society as inhumane' because they alienated and "deracinated" both Germans and foreigners; charged the 'system parties' with a scheme for retaining power through 'population exchange' and the 'foreign infiltration of culture'; and stated that 'integration is tantamount to genocide' (NPD 2010: 5, 13; see also: BMI 2013: 68, 71; Hartleb 2009: 104, 107). Having nearly been banned in the early 2000s, the NPD still overall focused on putting forward its claims in cultural and ethno-pluralist language, increasingly warning of the "Islamisation" of Germany's identity and culture (NPD: 2010: 13; see also: BMI 2013: 80-1). It seemingly shed hierarchical value judgments, instead praising the 'diversity of the peoples as carriers of cultures', and emphasising that '[e]ach people has a right to self-determination and protection of cultural and national identity' (NPD 2010: 6, 13).

But at the same time, the NPD still offered hidden or overt references to biological racism. It stressed, for instance, the need to respect ‘the *natural* difference between humans’, demanded that German citizenship be limited to the principle of *jus sanguinis*, the “right of blood”, and combined its fundamental rejection of integration and naturalisation with a variety of racist stereotypes (NPD 2010: 5, emphasis added; see also: 6, 12; BMI 2013: 68, 71-3). The NPD continued, therefore, to offer its racialised exclusions in both relatively oblique cultural and egalitarian, and in more overtly biological and hierarchical terms.

This was again accompanied by rightist nationalism’s characteristic desire to salvage selective and revisionist understandings of history. The NPD rejected, for instance, the German borders set out after the Second World War and the ‘one-sided’ interpretation of the Nazi past while criticising the ‘guilt cult decreed by the state’, as well as the ‘glorification of Allied war criminals’ (NPD 2010: 14; see also: 15, 17, 18; BMI 2013: 76-8). Rightist nationalism in this extremist guise revolved, therefore, still primarily around migration and the preservation of a racialised national identity. It was also concerned with related issues of globalisation, international restrictions of German sovereignty, social order, and the political recognition and organic rule of the German people. But before the background of the specific German history, it was also very explicit in its backward-looking defense of the Nazi past, longing for a new, guilt-free and glorious Germany that could – in accordance with nationalism’s principal objective (see Gellner 1990: 1; 1998b: 45) – eventually regain control over its ‘partitioned territories’, as the NPD (2010: 14) argued, which were still inhabited by Germans with ‘German culture and national identity’.

III Eastern disappointments, stagnation, and growing extremism

Both key moments discussed in this chapter showed certain similarities. Despite a moderate spike around 2001, they were not moments defined by net migration. Instead, the 2000s were strongly characterised by economic problems. A legacy of

the costly process of unification, the early 2000s saw slumping GDP and peak unemployment, leading to significant welfare restructuring under Schröder's Red-Green government; and a few years later, the economic crisis resulted in another recession that required increased government spending and subsequent saving measures. In addition to the widespread protests against Schröder's welfare reforms in the early 2000s, both key moments also saw relatively low political participation in elections, and the loss of votes for the two "people's parties" (see Lees 2010: 89; Träger 2015: 63-5). Embedded within this broad picture, however, these moments saw various smaller developments. I briefly return to some of them.

First, as they experienced these economic tensions, the rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample showed overall few changes in their social locations. Ideal-typically male and of low cultural diversity, they had grown older as the years passed. By the late 2000s they were typically in their early fifties. They were still most often of school education and held university degrees less commonly; and while they were rarely unemployed, they still worked frequently in positions with relatively low security and career prospects. Sample nationalists in the west saw a subtle move away from an ideal-typical confinement to socio-economic backgrounds that were especially at risk during these years' economic pressures. But eastern nationalists displayed little upward mobility, were more often – but still rarely – unemployed, and were more commonly found in work under labour contracts. Two decades in the unified Germany had passed, and they had faced ongoing economic pressures while little in their social positions seemed to have changed for the better.

Reflecting their less comfortable socio-economic positions, and the economic challenges of these moments, sample nationalists voiced even stronger worries about both wider and personal economy than they had in the early 1990s. Eastern nationalists, who witnessed disproportionately high unemployment around them, felt particularly threatened by economic issues; and they also voiced an even stronger sense of having been abandoned by the political system than western nationalists. Although net migration was at a post-unification record low, rightist nationalists remained characterised by somewhat alleviated but still prevalent concerns about

cultural newcomers. Again, these concerns were even more widespread among eastern nationalists. As they had not received the opportunities and recognition that they felt they deserved, and promises about post-unification “blossoming landscapes” had not materialised, worries about personal circumstances could connect to with a wider criticism of the authorities. For eastern individuals, this could be accompanied by a disappointed view on western capitalism and individualistic society, prompting a nostalgic re-evaluation of their life in the GDR (see Fulbrook 2015: 292-3); or it could go the other way, culminating in the feeling that an autocratic regime was yet again imposing wide-ranging social and economic changes while silencing the will of “the people”. But the feeling of being stuck and overlooked by existing governments was common among western nationalists, too. Like British nationalists at the time, German respondents thus expressed an amalgamation of concerns relating to socio-economic location and contextual challenges, and pronounced feelings of having been politically silenced. During this time they also felt that even low numbers of immigrants represented a worrying development, perhaps perceiving them as threat to already endangered political rights, national belonging, or public order and safety.

Second, as already indicated by the sample respondents, regional differences between east and west still played a crucial role for the nationalist right, but also for wider social climate and political structures. Turnout, for instance, was lower and support for the main parties still much weaker in the east, while the far left remained disproportionately stronger (see Träger 2015: 62-5, 69). Economic discrepancies persisted, and the wide regional gap in unemployment only narrowed slowly. Accordingly, the east saw more widespread protests against Schröder’s welfare reforms. In some ways, specifically Saxony stood out. The Monday demonstrations that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall had erupted here; and in the early 2000s, the same slogan, “We are the people”, returned powerfully also to Saxony. Yet despite these protests that were often organised by the political left, this was one of the eastern states in which conservatism tended to be comparatively successful (see Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018b: 16-17). Saxony became, furthermore, a rightist nationalist

and extremist stronghold. Chosen as a “model region”, the NPD at times concentrated its efforts on the state, successfully fostered connections with its neo-Nazi subcultures, and twice gained access to its regional parliament. Often slightly more so than its neighbours, Saxony seemed to have a certain affinity for rightist politics (see Nachtwey 2018: 196). But the nationalist right had generally become stronger across the areas of the former GDR.

Third, over the years, German rightist nationalism became defined by two intertwined developments: its growing eastern appeal – both in electoral terms (see Traeger 2015: 71, 80) and on the ground (e.g. Staud 2010) – and its strong extremist character, which was increasingly embodied by the NPD and its renewed take on “national socialism”. But despite regional successes, its overall electoral reach remained very low. McGowan (2014: 197) thus sees the NPD’s actual significance ‘in firstly, socialising new recruits to its far right agenda and secondly, radicalising some of its adherents to deepen their involvement within the extreme right scene and form groups that engage in politically motivated acts of confrontation and violence’. Not only was nationalism’s electoral appeal now stronger in the east, but also violent crimes continued to be much more prevalent in eastern states in the late 1990s, and throughout the 2000s (see BMI 2006: 40; BMI 2013: 41; Edinger and Hallermann 2001: 588-9; McGowan 2006: 266). This impression is in line with what Edinger and Hallermann (2001: 591) identify as a more general characteristic of rightist extremism in eastern states: ‘its strong orientation towards action, its violence, and a weak, rather decentralised organisational structure’. This is illustrated by the neo-Nazi terrorists of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) who committed 10 murders mainly of people with Turkish roots between 2000 and 2007, in addition to various other armed crimes. Raised in the GDR, they made their way through the eastern skinhead scene and extremist youth clubs into the NPD where, importantly, they received their ideological and political socialisation (McGowan 2014: 201-3). They were ardent activists and soon engaged in politically motivated criminal actions (ibid.: 202), before having to go underground. Their following killing spree was perhaps the most prominent example of rightist extremist violence during this time. Despite low

vote shares, the NPD thus played its role in cultivating activists' radical world views which, not uncommonly, would lead to violence.

Fourth, with small developments and reactions to the context, rightist nationalism's deeper core concerns at the movement level remained fundamentally the same. The NPD voiced them to a more extreme degree than the Republicans had done, while simultaneously embracing especially local social concerns. But also this slight expansion of its programme led back to its core issues of political recognition of "true Germans" (even if this required overcoming the current political system), social order and control, national pride in revisionist historical interpretations, and, above all, migration as threat to a racialised vision of the nation. The NPD's offered claims might have been appealing to the sample nationalists who were concerned about economic pressures and blocked social mobility, political abandonment, and crime and migration – even if few were comfortable with expressing preferences for a highly stigmatised extremist party during these years. The developments discussed in this chapter would prove crucial for the socio-political events of the mid-2010s, which I address in the following. While rightist extremist crimes would soon skyrocket during the "refugee crisis", the NPD's extremism would be superseded by a more moderate rightist nationalism's grasp for the socio-political mainstream.

9 The mid-2010s, the “refugee crisis”, and the nationalist moment

For large parts of Europe but Germany in particular, the “refugee crisis” of 2015/2016 brought about a social and political turning point. In these two years, Germany received more than one million refugees, together with a wider spike in net migration figures. The country’s response was at first characterised by a “welcoming culture” and widespread public engagement (Küpper et al. 2015: 21; Nachtwey 2018: 225-6). But this soon gave way to a broad shift in public opinion with significant reservations about refugees, accompanied by rising nationalist agitation and violence. During these years, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) filled the gap between a modernising conservatism and rightist extremism. The new Euro-sceptic party swiftly became the increasingly radicalising mouthpiece of rightist nationalism, boosted also by growing anti-diversity demonstrations in the streets. After witnessing significant welfare restructuring and the economic crisis, the years around the “refugee crisis” thus saw ‘an increasingly loud articulation of a new right as hinge between rightist extremism and an anti-liberal, anti-modern neo-conservatism’ (Decker and Brähler 2016b: 95). This final German chapter examines the political right from 2014 to 2017. I find that sample nationalists’ social locations hardly changed since the 2000s, but that their socio-cultural and political views changed with the context of soaring migration. Taking a longer measure of sample respondents’ backgrounds, I reflect once more on nationalists’ limited social mobility since the early 1990s, which was particularly pronounced among east-German and British individuals. I also outline the surface variation in rightist nationalism’s character at the movement level, and return to regional differences between east and west, which now expressed themselves predominantly in political and socio-cultural terms. I briefly point, moreover, to the dynamics between rightist nationalism and conservatism. The former gained increasing hold on the political mainstream also because conservatism had abandoned its relatively exclusivist positions of the 1990s. I overall suggest that the

socio-cultural and political developments discussed in this chapter constitute another moment of racialised nation-building – this time in the name of wider European culture and identity rather than a narrower redefinition of “German-ness”.

I “Refugee crisis” and the public shift to the right

As opposed to the key moments discussed in the last chapter, these years around the “refugee crisis” were not characterised by economic problems. In both parts of the country, GDP grew by annual values of around 2 percent, and unemployment reached its lowest points since unification (under 5 percent) with a still existent but narrowing gap between east and west (see Appendix Figures A4b, A5c; BMWi 2019: 37, 98, 99). Even though measures of income inequality remained at a relatively high level (see e.g. Grabka and Goebel 2020: 319, 321), these years painted a picture of relative economic comfort and stability. This sharply contrasted, however, with developments in the socio-cultural realm.

Net migration had already started rising strongly since the beginning of the decade (see Appendix Figure A6i). The surplus of arrivals rose from about 130,000 in 2010 to 584,000 in 2014, now again by far surpassing British numbers at this time. But Germany saw its strongest increase of newcomers in 2015 when some 1.2 million more people arrived than left. In the following years, after efforts to tighten restrictions (e.g. Der Spiegel 2016a: section 1; 2016b; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016a), net migration remained at overall high levels above 400,000. Many of these new arrivals were refugees, especially from war-torn areas in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (BPB 2018a: paras. 1, 3; see also BPB 2018b: section 1). Even after the large-scale migration around Germany’s reunification, the “refugee crisis” represented an unprecedented increase of cultural newcomers in a short period of time, and led, after years of relative stagnation, to a significant rise in the percentage of foreigners among the population, and those with a personal or familial “migratory background” (the latter surpassing 23 percent by 2017).

German society was quickly becoming more diverse, prompting a contentious public and political debate also about the Muslim backgrounds of the majority of new arrivals. Fears about social cohesion and safety were exacerbated by symbolic key events. During the years of this moment, several European countries experienced major (suspected) Islamist terror attacks, such as those in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Manchester, London, and Barcelona. Also Germany saw a small number of potentially terrorist incidents, most notably a lethal attack on a Berlin Christmas market in late 2016 (BBC 2016b; Oltermann 2016). A year earlier, Cologne and other German cities had seen more than a thousand instances of sexual assault on women, which were in the vast majority reported to have been carried out by recent immigrants (see BBC 2016c; Connolly 2016; Kampf 2016). This changed nearly overnight the hitherto largely welcoming stance towards refugees.

These years also saw a strong rise of rightist nationalism as a street-based or extra-parliamentary phenomenon. In the wake of increasing migration, a series of anti-immigration and anti-government rallies emerged in Saxony in late 2014 under the name of Pegida (“Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident”). Claiming the tradition of the Monday demonstrations that helped topple the GDR regime, these protests gained large followings especially in eastern Germany. During the years of this migration moment, also the number of (violent) hate crimes skyrocketed. In 2017, moreover, rightist nationalism in the shape of the AfD entered the German parliament after an absence of more than half a century, and became its third-strongest faction. Putting ‘into question the traditional immunity of Germany to populist radical right actors’ (Pirro et al. 2018: 382; see also: 383), this symbolic caesura coincided with a loss of votes for the both the conservative Union and the Social Democrats (see Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018b: 16, 18). These had already been governing in another Grand Coalition since 2013 and were, after prolonged political uncertainty about the formation of a working government, forced to enter another one. This key moment was one, therefore, defined not by economic issues, but by soaring migration, increasing cultural diversity, the public’s shift to the right, growing nationalist appeal, and the ensuing political consequences.

II Political abandonment and the challenge of cultural diversity

Rightist nationalism, changed and unchanged

This moment of unprecedented migration saw rightist nationalism come to the surface at its greatest strength in post-war history. Wearing the more presentable guise of the AfD, nationalism emerged as a significant force in federal and regional politics, while anti-immigrant and anti-government protests on the streets turned into mass phenomena, and hate crimes and rightist violence soared once again. Electorally, rightist extremism, which had defined nationalism over the course of the last key moments, remained a fringe movement. Although it incorporated the DVU in 2011 (McGowan 2014: 199), the NPD achieved only low results in national and regional elections (see e.g. Träger 2015: 71, 80). From 2013, and especially in the following years, it became overshadowed by the nascent AfD. Initially with a much tamer and more economy-focused programme than that of the Republicans in the 1980s, the party constituted at first a new face of nationalism in Germany. Established between 2012 and 2013 by former Union members, the AfD's beginnings lay in opposition to Merkel's moderate socio-political course, and to the European bailouts following the economic crisis (see Arzheimer 2015: 540-1; Decker 2015: 110-11; Lees 2018: 299, 300-1). Aiming to abolish the Euro as currency, but without suggesting to leave the EU completely, the party displayed a softer Euroscepticism than UKIP – although the claim was still fairly radical in the German context. In its first year, the AfD already voiced a populist drive for political inclusion and recognition by demanding, for instance, greater use of instruments of direct democracy and an open discussion of 'unconventional opinions' (AfD 2013: 2). Touching only briefly on migration, the party agreed to 'qualified and integration-ready' migrants while warning that 'uncontrolled migration into our social systems must absolutely be stopped' (AfD 2013: 3). These wordings would very soon be used by the conservative Union as part of its wider socio-cultural rightward move particularly in the wake of

the “refugee crisis” (see CDU-CSU 2017: 11; see also: 56, 60-3, 70-1, 74; Meiritz 2014; Werkhäuser 2017; Wittrock 2014).

On the whole, the AfD had thus far a rather intellectual, well-connected, and Europe-focused character (see Lees 2018: 300); and while it did not succeed in entering the parliament in 2013, its result of 4.7 percent was the best post-war result ever achieved by a rightist nationalist or Eurosceptic party in a federal election. It lay clearly above the NPD’s result of 1.3 percent and the Republicans’ 0.2 percent¹¹. In the following few years, and especially as the “refugee crisis” unfolded, the classic nationalist themes of immigration, cultural difference, national identity, and Islam increasingly became the centre of the AfD’s claims. Its positions, but also its political following, thus swiftly radicalised (see Brähler et al. 2016: 93; Brubaker 2017: 1193; Decker 2016: 6; 2015: 115, 116, 199; Gensing 2015; Kroh and Fetz 2016: 712-13; Lees 2018: 301, 306, 307; Marx and Naumann 2018: 112; Nachtwey 2018: 227). With this shift its appeal continued to increase. The party seemed to capture something of the wider rightward-moving social climate, as well as anti-pluralist claims traditionally covered by both conservatism and extremism.

Still comparatively restrained with respect to migration (see AfD 2014: 10), the AfD gained 7.1 percent in the 2014 European election, thus matching the Republicans’ hitherto best rightist nationalist result a quarter of a century earlier. From 2014 onwards, and as it focused more strongly on issues of migration and national identity, it entered all regional parliaments, often with much higher percentages than previously achieved by nationalist contenders¹². While its vote shares set new records also in the west, they grew particularly in eastern states where the AfD’s regional branches had early opened themselves to more radical members (Decker 2016: 12; 2015: 120). In 2017, the AfD finally entered the national parliament with a nationalist record vote share of 12.6 percent, becoming third-strongest force

¹¹ For results of the 2013 federal election, see:

<https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2013/ergebnisse/bund-99.html> (accessed 27/01/2021).

¹² For regional state results, see <https://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/sachsen-anhalt.htm> (accessed 28/01/2021) and related pages.

and largest opposition party. Also here its results were especially high in the east; and in Saxony it even became the most popular party with 27 percent, just ahead of Merkel's CDU (see Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018b: 17, 20-1, 23). Rightist nationalism continued to be particularly strong in Germany's east; but rather than outright extremism, it now adopted the shape of a more moderate movement. This way, it captured the growing unease about migration from across the rightist spectrum.

Also the respondents in the longitudinal sample now more readily expressed affinities for rightist nationalism, especially in the shape of the AfD. Relatively few individuals moved towards the AfD from other parties – not uncommonly the conservative Union (overall 28 percent of those expressing a new preference for the AfD during these years) – but the largest share (54 percent) of new nationalism followers had not felt connected to any political party in the year before arriving at their new political home. The shift in public opinion following the “refugee crisis” and the AfD's comparatively low stigma seemed to induce some of them to attach a political name to their often already existing doubts and concerns. As I discuss briefly below, in line with the AfD's move towards more exclusivist positions on immigration and national identity, also the social backgrounds of its followers seem to have undergone rapid changes (Kroh and Fetz 2016). The longitudinal sample reflects this only to a limited degree, as the groups of those who leaned towards the AfD in a given year were still quite small, and especially in 2014 and 2015. When viewed through the larger group of occasional nationalists, which I take as my main lens, rightist nationalism's social backgrounds over the course of this moment largely showed a similar image to previous moments.

Rightist nationalism remained also at this moment characterised by low cultural diversity (a constant property for the occasional nationalists), as the vast majority of sample nationalists was born in Germany and without “migratory background”. As indicated above, this moment of large-scale migration entailed demographic changes, so that by 2017 some 12 percent of the population were not German citizens and nearly a quarter had an own or parental “migratory background”. Even more so than the overall longitudinal sample, nationalism's low

diversity grew increasingly out of sync with the changing image of wider society. Similarly to the British nationalists, this was in part due to the sample selection of the same occasional nationalists; but Appendix Table A4a also shows low cultural diversity to be an important trait of the nationalists in the full survey waves. Rightist nationalism was again characteristically male. Two thirds of the occasional nationalists were men – also a constant characteristic of this group – and this gender gap was even larger for those respondents who expressed a preference for the AfD or more extreme movements in these very years (see Appendix Table A4b). This confirmed again nationalism’s traditional male overrepresentation that was also found again in studies on AfD supporters at the time (e.g. Kroh and Fetz 2016: 715, 716, 718; Lees 2018: 302-3; Lengfeld 2017: 219, 220-1).

Again reflecting the process of aging in the longitudinal sample rather than actual change, the majority of occasional nationalists was now in their fifties (39 percent) and sixties (22 percent). About 14 percent were still in their forties, 20 percent in their seventies, and 6 percent in their eighties or older. With an average age of 61 (median: 58), rightist nationalists were, as before, a few years younger than other respondents, and several years younger than those favouring conservatism at this moment. Taking into account the problem of the aging sample, these respondents thus hinted at wider findings not only on younger extremists but also on AfD followers who were often found in middle age brackets and whose average age was somewhat lower than that of many other party sympathisers (Brähler et al. 2016: 70, 71; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 12-13; Lees 2018: 303; Lengfeld 2017: 219).

Also those aspects of these individuals’ social location that were not constant showed little development. Only few nationalists in the sample had acquired new educational qualifications since the economic crisis or even the early 2000s (see Appendix Table A5c). Rightist nationalism thus remained characterised by school-leaving diplomas (38 percent of elementary and 35 percent intermediate), most often followed by vocational training. About 10 percent of occasional nationalists held degrees from colleges or polytechnic courses. Still somewhat less commonly than others, 9 percent had acquired traditional university degrees. It is instructive to note

that those respondents who voiced an affinity for the AfD held tertiary degrees much more often than followers of rightist extremism. To some degree this signified the different origins of these strands of rightist nationalism; like the party's leadership, at least some AfD followers were – more so than UKIP sympathisers – from more highly educated backgrounds. Sample individuals favouring the AfD constituted a certain exception within typical rightist nationalist backgrounds more commonly limited to lower and intermediate education. Yet they, too, still held degrees of higher education slightly less frequently than respondents keeping to other political movements. On the whole, rightist nationalism, as seen through these individuals, remained characterised by school-leaving education, and by a somewhat (for AfD followers) or much (for sympathisers of more extreme movements) lower proportion of individuals with university degrees. The full survey waves of the 2010s overall confirmed again nationalism's typical underrepresentation among the highly educated also with respect to AfD followers (see Brähler et al. 2016: 69, 70; Brenke and Kritikos 2017: 596, 598).

At this moment of relative economic stability (see BMWi 2019: 37, 98), rightist nationalists were very rarely unemployed. By now about 28 percent had moved into retirement. But the majority (58 percent) was still working. Rightist nationalism was during these years constituted by a range of socio-economic positions overall similar to the previous analytical key moment (see Appendix Table A5f). Just under four tenths of employed nationalists were higher (10 percent) or lower (28 percent) managers or professionals, who had the most immediate access to the benefits of service relationships. Slightly more (40 percent) still worked in positions largely defined by forms of labour contract, such as non-manual service and sales occupations or manual professions. Rightist nationalism, as seen through these individuals, had since the early 1990s slowly moved away from the least secure occupational positions. This stood in some contrast to the rightist nationalists in the British sample who had hardly moved over time (see Appendix Table A2f). But also in Germany, this certain degree of upward mobility was limited to individuals living in

the west, while some eastern nationalists even lost their higher-paid jobs or moved to the west.

Although I focus on a specific subgroup of rightist nationalists, these respondents in the longitudinal sample still shed some light on the wider, short-term ambivalence in AfD followers' educational and occupational backgrounds, which also relates to the party's rapid change (see Lengfeld 2017: 216-17). As the AfD itself went through 'several "processes of shedding skin"' in a short amount of time, this transformation process also affected its support base (Brenke and Kritikos 2017: 595). Coming, like UKIP, from middle-class, economically liberal origins (Kaufmann 2019: 174, 227), the AfD initially also attracted individuals with higher education and more comfortable social status (e.g. Bergmann et al. 2016: 2). But as it became more popular, it increasingly mobilised those without political preference and sympathisers of rightist extremist parties; and while the party retained a certain share of adherents in more secure status positions, these new followers were now mostly of middle and lower education, and less secure socio-economic locations (see Kroh and Fetz 2016: 715, 716, 719; see also: Brähler et al. 2016: 69, 70, 73, 92-3; Brenke and Kritikos 2017: 597, 598, 601).

Already in previous moments, sample nationalists' socio-economic backgrounds had shown much complexity. A characterisation of nationalism as being ideal-typically concentrated among less secure backgrounds might still be justified, however. First, the inclusion of the last occupational information of retirees again shifted the picture slightly towards nationalists' experience of work under labour contracts. Second, although nationalism's socio-economic backgrounds had become more varied, a comparison with other political movements (see e.g. Appendix Tables A5d, A5e) still showed rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample to be somewhat less commonly in those positions with the highest degrees of security and opportunity, and more commonly in semi- or unskilled manual professions. Third, the full survey waves located followers of the AfD (and extremists even more so) more commonly in manual professions – and this reflected, as discussed above, the wider trend in the AfD's support base.

Perhaps in light of the less threatening economic situation, the urgency of occasional nationalists' concerns about economic and financial issues had markedly decreased (see Appendix Figures A4b, A5a). And yet, only slightly more commonly than other respondents, the vast majority of nationalists still proved "strongly" (23 percent) or "somewhat" (57 percent) worried about the wider economic development. Nearly two thirds still felt somewhat uneasy about their own financial situation, and 36 percent of those working expressed some fears about losing their jobs. Reflecting their differently accentuated social locations, western nationalists worried slightly more strongly about the general economic situation. For rightist nationalists in the former GDR, on the other hand, the more personal economic insecurities were still more pronounced. Although eastern nationalists continued to be of better education than their western counterparts, they remained more often in manual labour positions, and less commonly held rather sheltered professional and managerial jobs. Their relatively stronger stagnation and ideal-typical concentration in less secure socio-economic positions seemed to make economic fears more immediate. But these also remained grounded in reality, as the unemployment gap between east and west – despite gradual narrowing – still persisted (see Appendix Figure A5c; BMWi 2019: 37). Even after all these years, many of these nationalists were stuck, facing lasting economic disadvantages while not gaining access to the social opportunities that had been promised. Irrespective of the improving economic situation, they and other individuals in the east may have felt a longer-term disappointment in their low social mobility and life chances (see Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 216). This might have been one reason why eastern nationalists were in 2015 especially dissatisfied with social justice in Germany (56 percent; 21 percent were rather content). But also a relative majority of nationalists in the west, many of whom were also in underprivileged socio-economic positions, perceived German society as rather unfair.

Contrary to the extremist NPD's social emphasis of the last years, however, the AfD hardly portrayed itself as a party that would lend a very sympathetic ear to these existing economic concerns. In its 2017 manifesto, it only made a very small

offer in this direction by demanding a reduction of temporary work and supporting minimum wages – but chiefly because the state would otherwise have to pay more for social services (AfD 2017: 50). In other, rather brief sections addressing socio-economic questions, the AfD promoted a soberly formulated market-liberal approach. Rather than discussing, for instance, better consolidation between east and west, the party highlighted amongst other things ‘the personal responsibility of the economic subjects’ (AfD 2017: 51). Also its briefly mentioned aims to create new jobs and “citizen work” followed largely a liberal and meritocratic agenda that, moreover, juxtaposed different claims to pensions for long-term employees and long-term unemployed (AfD 2017: 50, 51, 56). The AfD hardly responded, therefore, to its sample followers’ personal or structural concerns and disappointments, or their perception of insufficient social justice. Respondents for whom the own socio-economic position and related worries were the predominant political driver might have found much more suitable options on the political left. Yet both for the AfD, and rightist nationalists in the sample, the real issues of concern were once again found in the political and especially socio-cultural domain. Like their British counterparts, therefore, German respondents held economic concerns; but I understand both groups’ political affinities as much more informed by value-rational than instrumentally rational considerations (see Weber 1978: 24-6).

Soaring migration and the nationalist response

At this time of strongly rising numbers of cultural newcomers, the rightist nationalists in the sample displayed a somewhat raised interest in politics (see Appendix Table A6c). More than half now stated to be “very strongly” (14 percent) or “strongly” (41 percent) interested, and these shares were even higher for those who expressed a preference for the AfD in these very years. For some, the increased salience of rightist nationalism’s key concerns – and the responses of public and parties to the “refugee crisis” – had entailed a growing interest in the political world. But this did not mean

that they had come to value the political system. While the overall sample expressed in 2016 a slightly grown appreciation of the way democracy worked in Germany, rightist nationalists remained characterised by a feeling of not being politically represented or heard (see Appendix Table A6a). With overall 48 percent of occasional nationalists being dissatisfied (and 35 percent rather content) with German democracy, they continued to see this question more negatively than other respondents, as well as wider society (see Brähler et al. 2016: 80-1; Decker et al. 2016: 53). Asked the same year what they perceived as the most important political objective, rightist nationalists also attributed more commonly than other respondents the highest political priority to increasing the influence of citizens over decisions of the government. Importantly, the regional dimension between east and west emerged again more clearly. After having shown signs of mollification in the late 2000s (see Appendix Table A6b), the majority of eastern nationalists now expressed a grown disenchantment with German democracy (57 percent; 26 percent were rather satisfied). They seemed to think even more strongly that their voices were not being heard by political authorities. But this time, it was not only economic issues that might have translated into the feeling of political abandonment, but also the “refugee crisis” and Merkel’s initially welcoming stance (Benček and Strasheim 2016: 2; Lees 2018: 301).

This sense of being disregarded, silenced, even disparaged by unresponsive political leaders manifested regularly and on a large scale under Pegida’s (“Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident”) street protests in late 2014. After a brief decline, this movement became reinvigorated as the numbers of incoming refugees soared in the last third of 2015. Again it was Saxony where the Pegida protests emerged; and again they invoked the old theme of the “Monday strolls”, demanding political voice and recognition through the claim of “We are the people” (Küpper et al. 2015: 21; Nachtwey 2018: 195). From Dresden, protests spread to other German cities in east and west, and even abroad. But they were especially frequent and well-attended in eastern Germany. In the Saxon capital, usually several thousand protesters assembled every week, at times even around 20,000 (Sarovic

2015: section 1). Well-situated individuals and ordinary “concerned citizens” marched next to neo-Nazis showing the banned Hitler salute (see Connolly 2015; Küpper et al. 2015: 21-2; Nachtwey 2018: 198; Sundermeyer 2015: 170-3, 176, 177). They voiced a potpourri of demands. But often radical and – at best – tolerant of violence, their claims were directed against immigrants, Muslims (and at times Jews), politicians and authorities, the media, or the EU and globalisation (Connolly 2015; Küpper et al. 2015: 22, 23, 27; Sarovic 2015; Sundermeyer 2015: 168, 170, 171).

After two previous sediments of anti-authority protests – a revolutionary one against the regime in the GDR and a politico-economic one against Schröder’s welfare reforms – the eastern “Monday demonstrations” had now acquired a racialised expression (see broadly: Sundermeyer 2015: 171). This new face of grassroots politics rejected liberal democracy and claimed “the people” in the name of the “true” German nation, or perhaps, for those who closely identified with the name of the movement, constructed a broader European people in “civilisational” European terms against Islam (see Brubaker 2017). As the “refugee crisis” unfolded, the AfD staged its own anti-immigration and anti-government protests. Yet despite initial distancing efforts, also its links with Pegida were numerous (see Küpper et al. 2015: 22; Nachtwey 2018: 202; Scally 2017: section 1; Sundermeyer 2015: 167, 168, 174, 177). The party and its supporters shared, moreover, the same notions and terms which – with strong Nazi connotations – spoke of the “lying press”, and portrayed politicians as “traitors of the people” who allegedly instigated Germany’s infiltration by migrants and terrorists (see BBC 2017; see also: Nachtwey 2018: 200; Sundermeyer 2015: 170). I understand sample nationalists’ critique of German democracy as contextually embedded within these intertwined concerns around political voice and recognition, on the one hand, and immigration and cultural difference, on the other. These were also expressed by the AfD.

Democracy and political inclusion had been one of the party’s recurrent themes from the beginning, but its close connection with issues of cultural diversity only emerged over time. In 2013, the party demanded a general ‘strengthening of democracy and democratic citizen rights’ through more frequent use of direct

democracy (AfD 2013: 2). It combined these claims with criticism of political parties, political correctness, and EU bureaucracy and influence. The following year, its criticism of democracy in conjunction with the EU deepened, with the outlines of a self-portrayal of being the sole guardian of democracy and freedom also at the national level (AfD 2014: 4, 5, 7). In 2015, when the AfD shifted much more strongly towards the issue of migration and asylum, the party connected its new principal concern about national identity with its critique of both national and European politics. It characterised the government's management of the "refugee crisis" as 'misconduct' liable to 'far-reaching political consequences', as it was blind to the 'psychological stress of the affected German population' and neglected its 'constitutional mission to safeguard the interests and the safety of the population' (AfD 2015: 4, 6). At this point, and like Pegida and many nationalists in the longitudinal sample, the AfD saw the government's still welcoming stance as both violating the will of the people and disparaging concerns about cultural change. This became even more evident in the AfD's 2017 manifesto. Here, the party consolidated its role as true defender people's political interests against international politics and the secret influence of a 'small, powerful political oligarchy' whose decisions regarding immigration breached constitution, parliament, and the people's sovereignty (AfD 2017: 7; see also: 6, 8, 9, 30). Like many other rightist nationalist parties, it also employed the themes of democracy and liberal rights to reject Islam (AfD 2017: 33, 34, 43; see also: Betz 2002: 255-6; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 13, 15; Brubaker 2017; Taguieff 2012: 26-7).

On the street, in parliaments, and in the longitudinal sample, rightist nationalism was therefore characterised by a sense that people's political rights were being disregarded and betrayed by political authorities and the political process; and it tied this claim not only to long-standing socio-economic disappointments as in previous years, but increasingly to issues of the EU's (migration) policies and growing cultural diversity. For the sample nationalists, who were both strongly worried about migration and political representation, the AfD might have appeared as the only

political actor that would actually listen to their – the people’s – key concerns (see Decker 2016: 4-5; Nachtwey 2018: 227).

Questions of migration continued to set rightist nationalists apart from other respondents even at a time when worries about recent demographic changes increased throughout the board (see Appendix Figures A6i, A7a; see also: Marx and Naumann 2018). As net migration soared during this moment, overall 68 percent of sample nationalists voiced “strong” concerns about migration to Germany (compared to 40 percent of followers of other movements), and further 22 percent had at least “some” concerns. Also their perceptions showed a reaction to the rise of migration numbers and the New Year’s Eve assaults. After record numbers of newcomers had entered the country (BPB 2018b: para. 4), about 81 percent of rightist nationalists had “strong” concerns in 2016. Accordingly, rightist nationalism was in the same year also strongly characterised by negative views on refugees. Clearly more frequently than other respondents, 65 percent of the sample nationalists expected refugees to have a negative impact on the economy (20 percent considered it to be rather positive); 74 percent thought that refugees undermined cultural life in Germany (15 percent disagreed); 77 percent said that refugees made Germany a worse place to live (less than one tenth saw it become better); and, rather than mentioning potential opportunities, 77 percent perceived a strong influx of refugees as a long-term and 90 percent as a short-term risk. Even more commonly, the overwhelming majority of the smaller group of respondents favouring rightist nationalism in this year expressed “strong” worries about migration at this moment, and viewed the presence of refugees pessimistically.

Respondents’ concerns mirrored those of rightist nationalism at the movement level. In a short period of time the AfD had surged towards much harsher exclusivist positions (e.g. Sundermeyer 2015: 174), and embraced the twin issues of migration and national identity as its core concerns. It warned of the allegedly devastating effects of “mass migration”, and demanded that – in light of demographic projections in Africa and the Middle East – the post-war asylum and protection policies should be abandoned and fundamentally renegotiated (AfD 2017: 27; see

also: 29). The AfD thus demanded the closure and better control of borders to 'immediately end the uncontrolled mass migration of predominantly unskilled asylum seekers into our country and its social systems' (AfD 2017: 28; see also: 29). Amongst other things, the party further proposed a swift deportation of rejected asylum seekers at an annual minimum quota, and insisted that border guards return refugee boats in the Mediterranean Sea to their starting points or facilities outside of Europe (AfD 2017: 28, 29; see also: 30). The party promised, moreover, to demand an investigation committee in parliament to 'bring those responsible for the countenanced mass migration from September 2015 to justice' (AfD 2017: 30). With these and other claims, the AfD had much to offer to the rightist nationalists in the longitudinal sample who felt shut out from political decisions and voiced significant concerns about migration and refugees.

Like the NPD before, also the AfD connected its ubiquitous key themes of migration and asylum to most other topics in its manifesto, including democracy, international development, law and order, finances, education, social welfare, pensions, and healthcare (AfD 2017: e.g. 8, 20, 22, 24, 27-8, 30, 31, 42, 43, 54, 55, 58). It had come to adopt, moreover, rightist nationalism's core concern about the racialised nation. Stating that '[t]he preservation of the own constitutive people is the primary task of politics and every government', the AfD emphasised the threat of German 'self-abolition' and the 'shrinking of our ancestral population' (AfD 2017: 36). To raise the birth rate of the 'indigenous population', it aimed to strengthen marriage and 'traditional family', and called for 'stimulating family policies' and a 'child-friendly society' (AfD 2017: 36; see also: 37-9). While some parts of this discussion were couched in seemingly neutral language around social security systems, it was evident that the AfD saw immigrants and cultural minorities as threat, not part of its solution to halting Germany's population decline.

Generally sceptical about foreigners' integration (AfD 2017: 28, 31) – especially with respect to Muslims (ibid.: 33, 34, 43) – the AfD allowed naturalisation only for those 'whose permanently successful assimilation and loyalty to their new home is beyond any doubt' (AfD 2017: 31; see also: 22). The party stated

unequivocally that 'Islam does not belong to Germany', adding that '[i]n the expansion of Islam and the presence of more than five million Muslims, whose numbers are constantly growing, the AfD sees a great danger to our state, our society, and our order of values' (AfD 2017: 33; see also: 43, 45). Praising German culture and traditions, the AfD rejected multiculturalism. As there could only be one holistic culture for a society, the party argued, multiculturalism was an 'expression of parallel societies that always lead to domestic conflicts and the inoperability of states' (AfD 2017: 45). The party thus employed the established neo-racist themes of an alleged incompatibility of cultures and the deleterious effects of "mixing" (see e.g. Balibar 1991: 21, 24; Betz 2002: 253-4, 256; Taguieff 2001: 5, Ch. 8; 1999: 211, 212). Pledging to protect Germany's 'cultural face' (AfD: 2017: 45), also the AfD's core concern was the preservation of a homogenous racialised nation – even if it largely shied away from thinly veiled biological references in the tradition of the NPD. But with its proposal to revoke the territorial principle of citizenship, and instead return to *jus sanguinis*, the principle of blood (AfD 2017: 31), the party made a small offer to more radical nationalism followers. This way it left no doubt as to what it meant by its aim of 'self-preservation, not self-destruction of our state and people' – or by its objective to 'bequeath our descendants a country that is still recognisable as our Germany' (AfD 2017: 27).

As migration grew over the course of the years of this moment, so did the overall sample's already widespread concerns about crime trends (see Appendix Figure A7e). Actual crime estimates hardly rose during this time, and actually decreased after subtracting offences related to refugees' right to stay (cf. BKA 2018: 14, 15, 17). The most notable increase in sample respondents' worries about crime occurred between 2015 and 2016, and thus at the height of the "refugee crisis". Also the perceptions of sample nationalists reflected this. Over the course of this moment, overall 60 percent voiced "strong" and 34 percent "some" worries about crime. In 2016, around 68 percent were "strongly" concerned. The same year, a larger share granted the political goal of maintaining law and order high importance; and between 2015 and 2017, the vast majority of these wider nationalists expressed "strong" (41

percent) or “some” (50 percent) concerns about social cohesion. They – but also other sample respondents – viewed the influx of refugees at this time as a threat to social order and security, and may have perceived the New Year’s Eve attacks on women (e.g. BBC 2016c) as an epitome of their concerns. The overall sample’s widespread worries were thus indicative of the general mood swing in society and politics around this time, which also led to increasing pressure on Merkel (see Adler 2015; Gathmann 2015; Huggler 2015; Nachtwey 2018: 226-7; Schuler 2015), and to a sudden tightening of Germany’s rape laws (Connolly 2016). What characterised rightist nationalists especially was not just their heightened disquiet about these problems, but their more pronounced relationship between worries about crime and those about migration. As most of those nationalists holding strong worries on one variable also did so on the other, this connection was especially strong at this moment.

The conflation of issues surrounding migration and public order was also visible in rightist nationalism at the movement level. Only few days after the 2015 Paris attacks, the AfD found the culprit in the “the European Union’s and Berlin’s irresponsible, chaotic asylum policies” (Amann 2015: para. 2), and similarly accused Merkel in late 2016 of being responsible for the Berlin Christmas market attack by opening the country to a large number of refugees (BBC 2016b: section 6). Like the NPD in previous decades, the AfD’s 2017 election manifesto focused much of its treatment of law-and-order questions on terrorism and the fight against “foreigners’ crime”, and demanded, amongst other things, deportation already for committing minor crimes (AfD 2017: 22, 24, 30). This pattern continued also in the following year (see Hestermann and Hoven 2019).

The AfD did, moreover, display typical characteristics of German nationalism in a further way. Not only did some – especially eastern – regional AfD politicians frequently resort to more obviously racist comments (e.g. Deutsche Welle 2015); but the party’s leaders also sought to rehabilitate Germany’s historic legacy by arguing, for instance, that Germany had the “right to be proud of the achievements of the German soldiers [sic] in two World Wars” (Scally 2017: section 2). The desire to

retrieve selective historic understandings was echoed in the AfD's election manifesto. Here the party criticised Germany's 'ideological manipulation by the state' in cultural politics, and demanded that the 'current restriction of German commemorative culture to the time of National Socialism must be broken up in favour of an expanded view of history that also includes the aspects of German history that positively serve identity development' (AfD 2017: 45, 46).

As in recent decades, German nationalism's centrepiece was its vision of a pristine nation that was under constant threat – by cultural change, the dilution of political rights, its alleged historical defamation, and social disruption and chaos. Now it was time again to strike back and rebuild it. Over the years, the nationalist right had demonstrated that its actions were not limited to rhetoric and political demands. But rightist crimes and violence skyrocketed during these years of unprecedented migration. In 2015, attacks on asylum accommodations quadrupled to more than 1,000, including 180 violent and arson attacks, while general anti-refugee crimes – including incitement and hate postings online – increased a hundredfold between 2012 and 2015 (Staud 2018: section 5; see also: Der Spiegel 2015; cf. Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 235). Wider rightist hate crimes in 2015 and 2016 were estimated to be just under 10,000 per year, more than one tenth involving violence (see BMI 2020: 2). And overall rightist (extremist) crimes went far beyond 20,000 during these years, with a particularly strong increase in more confrontational crimes such as vandalism, incitement of the people, and especially: bodily harm (Staud 2018: sections 1-3). In 2016, nearly 1,300 persons were injured by rightist violence, and one died (Staud 2018: section 3).

I suggest below that also this drastic increase in especially violent rightist crimes in the face of large-scale migration and political challenge constituted an expression of racialised nation-building. But there is also a shorter-term dimension in which key events played a role. In Britain, for instance, hate crimes rose strongly after the EU referendum, which perhaps served as symbolic validation of rightist nationalist concerns about migration and cultural difference. Ushering in a turning point for German public opinion and political mainstream positions on refugees, the

sexual assaults on women on New Year's Eve 2015/2016 arguably constituted such a symbolic moment for Germany. A possible rightist response might be seen through macro-level data on anti-refugee incidents and attacks between 2015 and early 2017, created by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation in partnership with Pro Asyl and the journalistic magazine Stern (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2018; see also: Benček and Strasheim 2016: 1, 3; Müller and Schwarz 2018: 7). The data is separated into broad categories: rallies and demonstrations, arson, assault and bodily harm, and other attacks on refugee shelters. Taken together, they show total anti-refugee incidents build up over the autumn of 2015 (see Appendix Figure A8h). But the largest spike occurred directly after the turn of the year. Rightist violence reached a new peak in January 2016 and was also carried out by Germans without previous rightist (extremist) backgrounds (Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 240-1). It thus seemed to develop roughly in line with the increasing arrival of refugees over the autumn, but then erupted in acts of retaliation following a symbolic public outcry. Also this could be seen as a violent reassertion of racialised solidarities against cultural outsiders (see Smångs 2016: esp. 1336-7) – who, in addition, were charged with defiling a suddenly glorified German womanhood.

During this time period, and although the attacks on women happened largely in western cities, rightist anti-refugee actions were disproportionately more common in the east (see Appendix Figure A8i; for a similar graph, see Benček and Strasheim 2016: 7). Here, the perpetrators were also more willing to assault and physically harm refugees (see also: Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 236). As discussed above, also anti-refugee demonstrations were more widespread in the east. This was part of a wider pattern. Relative to population, eastern states still showed at this moment a much higher prevalence of overall rightist extremist crimes (see BMI 2017: 29; 2016: 30; BMWi 2016: 10-11; Zick et al. 2015: 61), which were growing especially strongly in 2015. Saxony saw the strongest increase that year. As in the early 1990s, not only but frequently eastern (and not uncommonly Saxon) towns made it into the news due to hundreds of citizens blocking access to refugee shelters, shouting the slogans of “We are the people” or “Traitors of the people” (e.g. Der Spiegel 2016c; Zeit Online 2015),

while rightist extremists hunted immigrants in the streets (Zeit Online 2016; see also: Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 237, 239). But rightist violence was not only limited to cultural newcomers or minorities – nor to the east – as, for instance, the public stabbing of a refugee-friendly politician in Cologne demonstrated in the autumn of 2015 (see Benček and Strasheim 2016: 2; Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 239-40).

This surge in rightist violence did not come out of nowhere. Increasing migration might have played a part in itself, but rightist nationalist parties and grassroots movements both channelled and boosted public concerns. Especially ‘Pegida caused a radicalisation of the anti-refugee discourse’, Sundermeyer (2015: 177) suggests – and this trajectory coincides with the AfD’s own radicalisation. Also the party’s followers were reported to evince a heightened tolerance or even readiness for violence (Brähler et al. 2016: 91, 93). These movements, and particularly Pegida’s even less constrained exclusivist claims, may have led to a certain emboldening and growing self-confidence among rightist activists who sought to fight for their racialised political recognition by any means necessary; and Pegida’s calls to social unrest and resistance to the arrival of refugees were not entirely unrelated to the concomitant wave of violence (Küpper et al. 2015: 23; Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 238; Sundermeyer 2015: 175, 176). But underneath all this also lay years of underground mobilisation by rightist extremism, as I have outlined in the previous chapter. While the AfD immediately overshadowed the NPD in electoral terms, the latter still had a strong presence in extremist networks, organised demonstrations or joined others, and was not uncommonly connected to violence (see Decker and Brähler 2016a: 17; Reinfrank and Brausam 2016: 236, 237, 238; Zeit Online 2015: paras. 3, 6). Rightist nationalism was arguably strongly bolstered by the “refugee crisis” and the wider shift to the right. But it also drew on historical and regional structures, as well as long-standing extremist subcultures, which had prepared the ground for the growing violence of these years and the swift retaliation after key events.

III Reclaiming “the people’s” racialised voice

This moment of large-scale migration saw public opinion in Germany shift from an initially very welcoming stance to one of caution, doubt, and resistance. In a short period of time, many individuals in the longitudinal sample voiced heightened worries about issues such as crime and migration, while also especially the political right adopted harsher anti-immigrant positions. To conclude this last German chapter, I again reflect on key issues addressed here, at times viewing them in light of Britain and the longer-term background. First, while the wider context changed significantly and acquired a pronounced socio-cultural inflection, the social backgrounds of rightist nationalists in the sample were again very similar to previous moments. They were disproportionately male and rarely born outside Germany or with an own or parental “migratory background”. Although they had grown older over time – now characteristically in their late fifties or early sixties – they were on average a few years younger than other respondents. German nationalists were still ideal-typically of elementary or intermediate school education, and, rarely unemployed, most commonly continued to work. Rightist nationalism’s ideal-typical socio-economic backgrounds were still characterised by less secure work under forms of labour contract. But this focus had become increasingly diluted, also due to AfD followers’ more complex social positions.

Despite the narrowed focus on middle and lower socio-economic locations, both German and British sample respondents showed nationalism to be represented by a broad range of socio-economic and educational backgrounds. Nationalists were somewhat more typically found in routine or manual jobs in Britain and east Germany. But in neither country were rightist nationalist defined by joblessness. They were, therefore, not simply in the bottom socio-economic positions. Yet many had relatively little protection from moving downward if things took a turn for the worse. They knew that they were not as economically comfortable as others, faced relatively low degrees of flexibility and opportunity, and had fairly little control over what circumstances they might be facing in the future. Since at least the early 1990s, the

individuals in both samples had witnessed economically difficult years several times. These moments could feel very threatening for rightist nationalists, and especially for those in the (east) German sample, even if they were in most cases not directly affected. They might lose their job any time without the means to find another one swiftly; and these potential challenges might already be sufficient to precipitate a fall further down the social ladder, which would bring them dangerously close to the bottom. With contextual fluctuations, particularly German nationalists had harboured worries about personal and more general economic matters at least since unification nearly three decades earlier.

Again more commonly in Britain and eastern Germany, nationalists also saw little social mobility over the course of these years. Rightist nationalism was perhaps most strongly defined by its relative absence in positions that offered highest degrees of privilege and security. Coupled with the reduced possibilities for self-determination and autonomy in their jobs, their limited opportunities to move upward may have added to a feeling of being “stuck” socio-economically, while society moved on around them. A sense of stagnation was also visible in nationalists’ educational attainments. Although eastern nationalists, like other respondents from the former GDR, were better educated than those in the west, they – similarly to British nationalists – very rarely acquired tertiary education degrees after the early 1990s. Western nationalists showed fewer signs of stagnation. But they, too, did not commonly advance into the highest educational positions. While all sample nationalists were characterised by somewhat more precarious and stagnant socio-economic positions, there were subtly different experiences of west-German nationalists, compared to east-German and British ones. These might point to more abstract and ideologically rooted world views in the former, who were more commonly followers of more radical nationalist movements; and they might also hint at more tangible socio-economic and political disappointments of east-German and British nationalists, who felt especially neglected and disregarded following the key events outlined over the course of the last chapters.

Although German nationalists' social locations remained largely the same as in recent years, their views and concerns showed visible reactions to the changed socio-cultural context of the mid-2010s. Had they been characterised by substantial worries about migration and crime also in previous years, they now deepened these concerns and voiced highly negative views about refugees in Germany. They also continued to view German democracy very critically, which I interpret as one expression of their sense of having been abandoned politically. Some of this was captured by longer-term disappointments that were grounded in their ongoing economic disadvantages and unfulfilled promises of unification. But at this moment, they might also have perceived political leaders as "traitors of the people" by not sufficiently restricting migration and perhaps even abiding a German "population exchange".

The AfD offered some of those individuals in the longitudinal sample and wider society, who had long been concerned about cultural diversity, a non-extremist political option that adopted these worries as its key issue. Its somewhat more cautious anti-diversity claims could appeal to both more extreme and conservative constituencies. Through the AfD, rightist nationalism had emerged in a less socially oriented, and more economically neo-liberal and – initially – Euro-centred form. But as migration mounted, also the AfD moved its main focus very swiftly back on to traditional nationalist concerns about immigration as an attack on a racialised vision of the nation. While the party had undergone an increasingly radicalising evolution in record time, rightist nationalism on the whole had again hardly changed. Albeit with slightly more constrained language around culture and Islam, it still displayed the same racialised core concerns, calls for political recognition of nationalism's chosen people, predilection for social order, and desire to re-interpret German history that had characterised German rightist nationalism in previous years and decades.

The second point relates to rightist nationalism's still salient regional dimension. In previous chapters I have pointed to persisting disparities between east and west that expressed themselves in social, political, and economic respects (see Borstel 2012; Heitmeyer 2009; Noack 2016; Zick et al. 2015). At this moment, the

regional dynamic emerged predominantly in relation to political and anti-diversity claims. Perhaps also due to their ongoing self-perception as “second-class citizens”, a strong sense of political abandonment was especially common among sample nationalists in the east. Here, the “Monday demonstrations” – this time against politicians and racialised outsiders – were particularly popular. East-German nationalism continued to hold a different relation to political participation. Some of this was perhaps also visible at the level of constituencies and districts (see Appendix Tables A7a-A7c). In British and west-German areas turnout in, respectively, 2015 and 2017, was negatively associated with the vote share of rightist nationalism. But it was positively related to AfD results in areas of the former GDR. Eastern nationalism tended to be stronger, in other words, not in areas where many people felt removed from politics but where they participated more commonly. After decades of feeling abandoned by politics, especially people in the east were mobilised by a swiftly radicalising anti-immigrant party that promised political recognition for its racialised “people”.

Echoing the still existing regional dimension of political preferences (see *Der Bundeswahlleiter* 2018b: 22-3), moreover, both the conservative Union and Social Democrats remained less popular among eastern sample respondents. They rather continued to more commonly favour the far left – and now also more clearly rightist nationalism. Rightist nationalists in the German sample were widely distributed across the country. But in relative terms at least AfD followers lived slightly more commonly in the east (42 percent in the years from 2014, compared to 34 percent of followers of other political movements). This hinted at recent decades’ developments at the national level. German rightist nationalism – embodied by political parties, grassroots movements, and anti-immigrant violence – emerged strongly in both parts of the country. But in all of these dimensions it had acquired over time a much more pronounced eastern face. In areas of the former GDR, rightist crimes and violence soared disproportionately, Pegida (and similar movements) gained more widespread support (Sundermeyer 2015: 175), and the AfD became a real challenger to the traditional “people’s parties” (see *Der Bundeswahlleiter* 2018b: 16-20, 23). The AfD’s

eastern branches showed a much more radical face, which seemed to be mirrored by more prevalent nationalist affinities and views among the eastern population (Küpper et al. 2015: 40; Zick et al. 2015: 62, 64, 65).

It is again instructive to note that even within the east, Saxony stood out with particularly prevalent rightist violence and electoral support (see e.g. Appendix Figures A8i, A8j; Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018b: 20-1). Possible ways of understanding these regional affinities for rightist nationalism, coupled with a strong opposition to federal government, might be found in the state's longer history. In the late 19th century, Saxony was a highly urbanised state with strong connections to the political left, and soon became an industrial and logistical centre with a proud history and identity (Kroll 2014: 94-121). Yet in the following decades its relative independence was repeatedly overthrown – first by the German empire's demands in the First World War, then by the Weimar constitution, then by Hitler's forced co-optation, then by the Soviet Union which specifically dismantled Saxony's industrial capabilities as reparations, and finally by the GDR regime which broke up both Saxony's geographical unity and traditions (ibid.). This brief outline gives the slogan of "We are the people", which recurrently emerged in this state, not just an eastern but also a specifically Saxon flavour. But also more recent developments might play a role, such as the efforts of rightist nationalist movements themselves. In Chapter 8, I have pointed to extremist NPD's expansion of its influence in east-German key regions – especially Saxony – during the 2000s. The persistence of rightist extremism in Saxony is visible not only in its strong underground networks and violent potential, but also in the strong constituency-level correlation of the electoral strength of the extremist NPD and the radicalising AfD, today's main political face of German nationalism (see Appendix Figure A8k).

Third, also at this moment I argue that rightist nationalism's increasing presence – in street and parliament – can be understood as an expression of racialised nation-building in the face of unprecedented numbers of cultural newcomers over a short period of time. Compared to the early 1990s, this rightist redefinition of the nation was perhaps less an effort to demarcate a narrow

conception of German-ness; after decades of feeling socially and politically silenced, it seemed rather a project to reclaim political voice and recognition in the name of a wider racialised, European identity against strongly rising cultural diversity and the alleged threat of Islam. I discuss this further in Chapter 10. One of the recurrent themes in both countries is the fact that nationalist backlash was often strong where there were actually few cultural others. I have pointed to this, for instance, with respect to British constituency-level voting results (see Chapter 6). This was similar in eastern Germany where lower percentages of foreigners or refugees among the German population were indicatively associated with higher voting results for the AfD (see Appendix Figures A8e-A8g; Appendix Tables A7b, A7c, also for the following). In west-German constituencies and districts, the strength of rightist nationalism showed hardly any relation to actual levels of cultural diversity. But when drawing on the relative change of districts' shares of refugees among the population between 2014 and 2016, bivariate and multiple regressions hinted at a possible positive relation between some districts' AfD support and the increase of cultural newcomers.

On the one hand, therefore, rightist nationalism might involve certain (national-level) perceptions of social and demographic issues that are detached from actual local circumstances. As discussed above, also the German anti-refugee backlash following sexual attacks on women was disproportionately strong in the east, even though these attacks occurred in western cities and eastern population percentages of refugees were low. On the other hand, there were subtle indications that some of rightist nationalism's regional appeal might rather be understood in a more dynamic way, namely in light of relative *increases* in cultural difference at moments of strong migration (see Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Otto and Steinhardt 2017: 22). Importantly, throughout the post-war period, eastern Germany had faced much lower levels of cultural diversity, so that the recent soaring migration meant, in relative terms, an even stronger increase of racialised newcomers in the east. While actual levels of diverse others in a given area could be negatively or not at all related to rightist nationalist affinities, there was nevertheless a certain attentiveness to relative increases over time.

As before at the national level (see also Chapter 10), and as seen through the individuals in both countries' longitudinal samples, the economic dimension did not account for rightist nationalism at the level of electoral constituencies either. British and German local unemployment figures seemed by themselves unrelated to the strength of, respectively, UKIP in 2015 or AfD in 2017 (see Appendix Figures A8b, A8; for the following, Appendix Tables A7a-A7c). When included in linear regression models with other contextual variables, unemployment was estimated to be negatively related to the strength of rightist nationalism in areas of England and western Germany. It was not the case, therefore, that localities with higher unemployment would show a greater support for rightist nationalism.

Fourth, this moment was important for the mainstreaming of rightist nationalist positions. Both the early 1990s and the mid-2010s saw large-scale migration into Germany, and both time frames also witnessed a surging rightist nationalism and a right-shifting conservatism. But the political landscape was different. In the 1990s, Kohl's Union was already firmly situated within the socio-cultural right, while the Republicans possessed a certain gravity but did not effect a general change of direction within conservatism. A quarter of a century later, the (initially) more moderate AfD found the right flank wide open, as Merkel's Union had moved relatively far into the centre. The public fears around the "refugee crisis" helped the AfD to become a mass phenomenon even while opening its "presentable" face to increasingly radical language and associations. This swiftly increased the pressure on Merkel and prompted conservatism to adopt more exclusivist claims and policies (e.g. BBC 2016a; Der Spiegel 2016a: sections 1, 2; 2016b; Schuler 2015). Half a year after her symbolic slogan, "We can do it", even Merkel's position had moved significantly towards limiting the number of newcomers (Weiland 2016; see also: CDU-CSU 2017: 63). Rightist nationalism now held real weight to aggravate political discourse and pull the political mainstream towards its positions. Like UKIP during Cameron's relatively moderate stance (see Bale 2018), also the German nationalist right benefited from an overall centrist conservatism at a time of large-scale migration.

Yet although the AfD's rhetoric and focus on immigration changed, rightist nationalism's themes remained fundamentally the same. In light of migration and a shifting public climate, it was thus conservatism that again moved a long way towards nationalism. Both movements on the political right shared many of the general claims and even parts of the rhetoric. But the AfD employed in most cases harsher language, emphasised its concern with the preservation of the nation more strongly, and rejected asylum completely. Conservatism remained committed to offering protection in principle but went to some lengths to exclude several countries from eligibility (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016a; see also: CDU-CSU 2017: 62-3). Conservatism's policy changes and ensuing consequences seemed to satisfy nationalism's demands. Far from winning national elections, the AfD had nevertheless achieved what UKIP simultaneously accomplished in the UK: a drastic shift of the Overton Window and a clear rightward movement of mainstream conservatism, leading to momentous political changes.

10 Conclusions: rebuilding racialised nation and political rights

In this final chapter, I return to and contrast some the observations and recurrent patterns relating to both countries' nationalisms that I have outlined over the previous chapters, and frame the main findings and arguments of the thesis. One aim of these chapters was to make sense of sample nationalists' lives in Britain and Germany over the last decades, and to interpret how they might have perceived the changing socio-economic and political landscapes around them. In the first part of this chapter, I offer an interpretive account of their experiences based on their longitudinal data. I focus on how their socio-economic and political grievances might have informed their desire for exclusive racialised solidarities. In the second part, I further elaborate the dissertation's theoretical framework of rightist nationalism's four features. These conceptual pieces, and their specific emphases, emerged inductively from the individual- and macro-level data analysis embedded within changing British and German historical contexts; they are the original result of placing these two countries and their nationalisms in a longitudinal, detailed contrast. Yet this theoretical architecture might also be useful for thinking about how social, political, and racialised dynamics can interact within rightist nationalism more broadly. They further speak to longer-term social developments around class, nation, and "race", which I address in the third part. Here I present the dissertation's main arguments: I argue, first, that both countries' rightist nationalisms can be understood as different expressions of racialised nation-building, and second, that they are also indicative of the longer-term, macro-historical tension between class and nation that has recently tilted towards nation, culture, and "race". In the final section I further argue that refugees and humanitarian migration pose a specific threat to rightist nationalism's vision of belonging. I end by suggesting that the contrast between both countries, and their relation to Europe, shone a light on two different faces of rightist nationalism: Britain's broadly moving from "race" to ethnicity, and Germany's from ethnicity to "race".

I Social location and racialised solidarities

As discussed in previous chapters, I find that ideal-typical sample nationalists in these two countries were not simply located in the lowest socio-economic positions. But they faced a real risk of dropping, especially when facing adverse economic circumstances. The contrast between both samples highlighted different sides of this general characteristic, and it emphasised rightist nationalists' relative absence of higher educational degrees and, especially in the German case, the weight of further regional disparities. The vast majority of nationalists in the British sample did not have university or college degrees, and only relatively few German nationalists had completed all years of high school. Those in east Germany were better educated, but less so than other east Germans; and they very rarely had access to occupations with high security and flexibility. The contrast over time also accentuated rightist nationalists' socio-economic stagnation, particularly in Britain and east Germany.

These findings speak to, but subtly challenge, a long-standing strand of explaining rightist nationalism's appeal. This is one that focuses on the so-called *losers of modernisation* – or more recently: *globalisation* – and individuals whom Ford and Goodwin (2014b: 278; see also: 2014a: 10, 125, 159, 175-6) have identified as the “left-behind”: ‘older, working-class, white voters who lack the educational qualifications, incomes and skills that are needed to adapt and thrive amid a modern post-industrial economy’ (for a concise overview of the “modernisation losers” thesis, see Rydgren 2007: 247-50; cf. also: Antonucci 2017: 213-6, 224-5; Betz 1994: 165, 176-7; Hobolt 2016: 1260, 1265, 1273; Rydgren 2013: 5-9; Spruyt et al. 2016: 337). It is instructive to note that the rightist nationalists in these longitudinal samples did not fit this picture all too neatly. Even with a narrowed, ideal-typical focus on their routine and manual occupations, rightist nationalists were on average hardly older than others (younger in the German case), and of both lower and middle school-leaving education. In this respect, these individuals rather hinted at studies

suggesting that also intermediate levels of school qualification can be typical of nationalism support (e.g. Antonucci et al. 2017: 221-2; Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 429-30). The left-behind thesis is useful as it theorises one way in which social location may connect with socio-political perceptions and values. Yet it implicitly identifies all of the “left-behind” as likely rightist nationalism supporters, even if, as some of the argument’s proponents acknowledge themselves, many individuals in low socio-economic positions might completely disengage from politics or back leftist parties (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 214; Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 162). There is, in other words, a certain disconnect between identifying ideal-typical nationalism supporters in a general sense and explaining the fact that most of them do not support rightist nationalism. Moreover, a near-exclusive focus on these “left-behind” groups can elide nationalism’s crucial racialised dimensions (Bhambra 2017a: 217 and *passim*); and it draws attention away from nationalists’ agency – and the consequences of their actions – by viewing their rejection of cultural diversity essentially as a diffuse projection of economic insecurity on scapegoats who happen to be racialised others.

My analysis of the previous chapters does not dismiss the importance of socio-economic background for an understanding of rightist nationalism. But it is in accordance with, for instance, Michael Mann’s (e.g. 2004: 19-23, 159-60, 171-2, 190-1) non-materialist analysis of inter-war fascists’ backgrounds, which suggests a Weberian (e.g. Weber 1978: 302-7) view beyond narrow class-focused explanations that includes wider social locations and ideas of status. I also do not seek to provide a general explanation of rightist nationalism support. Instead, I make sense of my findings through an interpretive account of how these specific individuals in the longitudinal samples might have experienced these decades and formed their affinities for rightist nationalism. As discussed in Chapter 1, I thus depart from a different epistemological perspective than is usually adopted when analysing contemporary rightist nationalism, namely one broadly following approaches of Weberian understanding and Geertzian contrast (see Weber 1978: 4-15; Geertz 1971: Ch. 1). Yet some elements still comport with wider explanations such as the

left-behind thesis. For one thing, Ford and Goodwin (2014a: e.g. 126-7) point to the problem of growing political disenchantment. I, too, find rightist nationalists in both countries to be highly suspicious of governmental politics and their countries' democratic procedures. Based on their historically embedded longitudinal data, I have argued that their feelings of long-standing socio-economic injustice turned into a sense of being politically disregarded, silenced, and disparaged.

Similarly, their relatively low degrees of economic security during troubled times might have informed a sense of social fragility that was not limited to those in the lowest economic positions (see e.g. Antonucci et al. 2017). For these individuals, actual status decline was perhaps less of an issue than facing constant uncertainty and longer-term limitations in their social mobility. This was, in other words, rather a status threat in relative terms. Beyond material considerations, Hall (1995: 17) reminds us with reference to Gellner, blocked social mobility can involve feelings of humiliation and fear for one's children's life chances. This echoes something of Weber's idea of status, potentially linked to socio-economic position but more immediately expressed through social esteem, privileges, and lifestyles (see Weber 1978: 305-7). I thus understand the sample's rightist nationalists as characterised by both a desire to (re-)gain what they saw as their rightful political recognition and a concern with maintaining their social status to not sink further to the bottom of perceived social hierarchies. Regarding themselves "second-class citizens", they saw both their social and political positions – and those of their children and future racialised compatriots – under constant threat.

These individuals' socio-economic and political grievances were embedded in deeper, longer-term developments involving class and nation, as I outline below. As other social and economic sources of identity diminished over the past decades, accompanied by globalised challenges to the ordinary world, national belonging became more and more important (see e.g. Gidron and Hall 2017: 62; Skey 2013: 95). At the same time, from rightist nationalists' perspective, those rights and opportunities that they were striving to attain, but to which they never held proper access, were now being handed out to racialised outsiders. In rightist nationalists'

eyes, these did not belong to the increasingly important nation and were undeserving of its benefits; and instead of receiving the recognition to which they felt entitled, nationalists were now asked to welcome these diverse newcomers into the nation. Yet the latter were not just a projection of rightist nationalists' insecurities. They posed an active threat, as potential competitors for welfare, political rights, and social status (see broadly: Wimmer 1997: 30, 32). Especially since the 2000s, rightist nationalism also constructed them as a security threat.

In a less tangible yet important way, moreover, cultural diversity epitomises a changing, cosmopolitan, globalised, multicultural world (see Betz 1994: 173). This world threatens to undermine the nation's ability to demarcate its own boundaries of belonging while simultaneously changing the face and very basis of what constitutes nation and "home". With other social identities declining, this "home" became increasingly important for rightist nationalists in the sample who – themselves white and without migratory background – imbued the nation with racialised meaning. Similar to other historic contexts (see e.g. Bashi Treitler 2013; Riga 2019), rightist nationalists' concern with maintaining the own social status and retrieving political rights now became entangled with the need to distinguish themselves from diverse others who embodied a growing bottom striving upward. '[W]hite men do not want their lives, their self-image, or their property threatened', wrote James Baldwin (1964: 55). Reversing the own status threat meant a deepening of racialised solidarity and re-inscription of legitimate national belonging; and it meant the transformation of perhaps unequally distributed rights of citizens into claims to racialised privileges. Based on this interpretation, I thus argue that relative socio-economic status threat and experienced injustice paired over time with nationalists' feeling of political abandonment, and illustrate this further below. They felt the need to regain political rights and recognition, and to defend these against racialised outsiders whom they saw as challenging the legitimate basis of national belonging, which constituted their most crucial pillar of social identity.

Education, worldview, roots

This interpretive account of sample nationalists' experience and perception might be accompanied by a more abstract one, focusing on the question of education not just in its socio-economic dimension but also in its possible outlook on the world and the nation more widely, and in relation to Gellnerian notions of roots. In both countries, rightist nationalists were overall characterised by a relative absence of higher education. This might have contributed to a sense of fragile social status. Those confined to school-leaving qualifications were less flexible and had fewer safety nets in unforeseen circumstances. At the same time, many (globalised) opportunities for upward mobility remained foreclosed, while the pressure to acquire higher education kept growing (see Betz 1994: 29-33; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 213). Yet Ivarsflaten and Stubager (2013: 135) suggest that 'the connection between education and populist radical right support may not primarily be about material concerns, but that it could be more ideational in nature'. They find that higher education reduces 'the likelihood of viewing immigration and ethnic heterogeneity as a social ill' (ibid.)¹³. This is not just so because higher education might provide status mobility and opportunities, but also because, they argue, education is notably related to the "libertarian-authoritarian" dimension of political attitudes, rather than that of economic left-right distinctions (Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013: 123). Viewed from this perspective, '[e]ducation is a signal of worldview, not just material prosperity' (Kaufmann 2019: 198). Also others have pointed to the connection between education and not just wider liberal notions of tolerance or open-mindedness, but also specifically a focus on individualism rather than authority and uniformity (Stenner 2009: 142-3, 145; Weakliem 2002: esp. 153; see also: Betz 1994: 178, 180). Furthermore, individuals who hold preferences for harsh law-and-order policies or wider authoritarian views, such as support for the death penalty, are also more likely to incline towards rightist nationalism (e.g. Goodwin and Heath 2016a; Kaufmann 2019: 198-9). Those with more liberal attitudes tend to be of better education (and often, but not necessarily, in higher-paid jobs, see Kaufmann 2019: 198), and are also

¹³ This was historically not necessarily the case, as Mann (2004: 166; see also: 78-9) shows with regard to highly educated Nazis and fascism-supporting universities. The wider social and axiological context, in which education is embedded, matters.

less likely to attach much significance to national or ethnic identifications (ibid.: 153-4).

Liberalism's distance from cultural communities is no accident but grounded in philosophical and social transformations of the past centuries. As Gellner appositely remarks, the enlightenment's critique of the Platonic regime, with its hierarchies surrounding morality and social place, was 'culture-blind'; it generated a cold vision of knowledge and the world, created atomistic individuals whose human identity was 'universal and devoid of links with either cultural or political boundaries' (Gellner 1998b: 64; see also: 67-8; 1998a: 3-5, 66). Yet historically and today, and especially when other identities and certainties break away, universalised individualism might be hard to bear. Its obverse, which emerged in the romanticist reaction to the enlightenment, offers a warm and organic view of knowledge and the world, of cultural specificities, of *Gemeinschaft* and the familiar nation (Gellner 1993: 116-7, 120; 1998a: 3-6, 21-2; 1998b: 64-70). This is a rooted, down-to-earth vision that offers closeness and familiarity. A nationalism so conceived is a 'repudiation of bloodless cosmopolitanism' (Gellner 1998b: 73; see also: 1990: 131, 133). Instead of an atomistic liberalism, blind to culture and roots, it welcomes an authoritarian 'submission or incorporation in a continuous entity greater, more persistent and more legitimate than the isolated self' (Gellner 1990: 133).

This tension between enlightenment thought and the romanticist backlash might have reverberated in political contestations in the real world of post-unification Germany. Here, rightist nationalism's enemies were 'liberalism and universalism, the western, Anglo-American culture which is considered decadent, as well as foreigners, asylum seekers, and other minorities' (Winkler and Schumann 1998: 102). But as the last chapters have shown, a concern with the cosmopolitan threat to cultural identity was also a recurrent theme in the UK, where especially English nationalism stylised Europe as both an epitome of historic decline (e.g. Wellings 2010: 490, see below) and a globalised attack on sovereignty, national identity, and (historical) roots. Globalisation constituted a threat to a racialised nationalism even beyond the feared dilution of cultural identity through migration,

or its economic impact. It also represents, as Spruyt et al. (2016: 337) point out, 'a cultural evolution in which a particular cosmopolitan identity is being actively promoted'. As Europe increasingly grew together – in part symbolised by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which triggered considerable concerns especially within the British right (see Gamble 1995: 21; discussed in Chapter 4) – new divisions between its citizens gained importance: 'a sophisticated elite of *Europeans*' who travelled the continent and potentially studied or worked internationally, on the one hand, and those 'whose lack of skills, education, training, opportunity or means kept them firmly rooted where they were' (Judt 2007: 757, original emphasis; see also: Lee et al. 2018: 144, 158).

The experience of socio-economic stagnation, which I find as a characteristic of the longitudinal samples' nationalists, might thus be accompanied by geographical stuck-ness and by a certain perception of the world. Not being able to leave neighbourhoods – to 'lack exit options' – or, more generally, being restricted by lower education in 'the ability to adjust to problematic reality' (Rydgren 2013: 6; see also: Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 212-13), might make (perceived) changes to the everyday surroundings feel particularly disruptive. It might also foster a sense of abandonment by wider, more mobile society (Betz 1994: 177). Some of this has been confirmed by Lee et al. (2018) who found that only in places in Britain that saw cultural or economic change, individuals who were less mobile and more locally bound were somewhat more likely to support the Leave campaign (in addition to related education effects). As my own analysis shows, constituency-level UKIP vote shares in 2015 were positively related (R-squared .36) to regional percentages of people without passports in 2011, even if the latter variable's effect diminished when controlling for other variables due to its correlation with education (based on data from Hawkins et al. 2015; Nomis 2014; 2013b). A global, cosmopolitan liberalism, driven by ever-growing education, has increasingly become the new standard, and borders and limitations are theoretically removed (see Betz 1994: 176). But with their rare access to higher education, rightist nationalists hardly benefitted or participated in these new opportunities for the educated individual.

Gellner (1998b: 73-4) outlines a process in which the dislocating, “bloodless” enlightenment individualism abolished the old Platonic order with its firm hierarchies and clearly defined social places. But not only did this universalism disregard and uproot local culture and ethnic boundaries of human associations, thus leading ‘to a great preoccupation with *roots*’ (Gellner 1998b: 74, original emphasis; see also: 64, 67-8, 73). This notion of roots – particularly when connected to ideas of rural soil – was also used to exclude those urban elites who were ‘too advantageously placed given the new rules of the game (meritocracy, semantic work, high valuation of mental agility)’ (Gellner 1998b: 74). Those rootless, educated elites were, of course, not uncommonly also identified by religion, and then “blood” (Gellner 1998b: 73); and historically as well as today also populism’s anti-elite and anti-urban elements can carry anti-Semitic undertones (e.g. Berlin et al. 1968: 158, 169, 175). When educated liberal elites form, contra the universalist spirit, exclusive circles (cf. Gellner 1998b: 68) which are often located in urbanised high-wage hubs (Lee et al. 2018: 147), while scorning local culture and identifications, then for those stuck in a place, this place might become ever more important. National community can also be built from the (territorial) ground up, so that ‘it is viewed as solidarity among the familiar ones who live in a borough or village that becomes a mini-model of the nation’ (Wimmer 1997: 31). Opposed to an educated, cosmopolitan elitism with a focus on individual performance, in other words, stands ‘[a]n ethnic sense of national identity [which] is inflected by locale and region, rooted in characteristics handed down from generation to generation’ (Kaufmann 2019: 153; see also: 152). When one cannot leave so easily, it might become even more essential that the ground on which one stands – the region and country, the community that is so familiar – should not be exposed to rapid change.

I suggest, therefore, that above account of rightist nationalists’ long-standing socio-economic worries, coupled with a sense of political betrayal and a desire to protect what they perceived as racialised political rights, might be accompanied by a second interpretation of their data: largely limited to school-leaving education, and with little social and geographical mobility, they saw growing cosmopolitan,

individualised, and globalised pressures as an attack on their local and national home. Confronted with a cold and culture-blind liberalism, embodied by socio-political shifts and growing diversity, they perceived their roots as something to be preserved in its proper place – geographically, socially, and culturally.

II Rightist nationalism's key features revisited

These interpretations of the sample individuals' experiences and possible perceptions of the past decades shed some light on longer-term developments involving class and nation. I discuss these below. But first I return to the dissertation's main theoretical contribution, namely my conceptualisation of rightist nationalism's four key features: racialisation, a populist struggle for political recognition, a concern with disorder, and a selective retrieval of national histories. These core features have been informed by rightist nationalist movements' claims, the socio-economic and political context, and my understanding of sample nationalists' experiences embedded within. They emerged originally and inductively from placing Britain and Germany in a contrast (see Geertz 1971; Kennedy 2013: Introduction), attentive to the details of their recent histories and the ways in which they 'form a kind of commentary on one another's character', as Geertz (1971: 4) had put it.

Starting from this not commonly adopted epistemological position, their contrast allowed me to see, for instance, differences in their racialised dynamics. I suggest below that German nationalism had traditionally held a more German-centred focus and moved over time – even within the post-unification period – towards embedding German identity within a broader European identity. Britain moved the opposite way, from a wider "race"-based outlook towards a specifically British or even English one. A concern with order and disorder was visible in both places, and frequently linked to issues of migration and culture, and, especially in the British case, sovereignty and Europe. In Britain, also nationalism's quest for political recognition was predominantly couched in terms of both migration and the polarising

problem of Britain's status within Europe. Germany's populist impulse was perhaps more strongly related to specific socio-economic and political disappointments in the east, where nationalists might still regard themselves as "second-class citizens" and viewed the alleged threat posed by cultural newcomers also in light of their own long-standing struggle for political recognition. West-German nationalists had faced racialised others for a much longer time. They might have wished to assert their political voice from the perspective that the government had neglected their socio-cultural concerns – and stigmatised their ideological positions and political choices – for decades. Britain's and Germany's contrast showed, moreover, differences in the ways that the political right sought to selectively retrieve or re-imagine historic interpretations. Britain's traditional outlook rested on greatness and independence, particularly when faced with its post-war decline. But more recently it grew increasingly concerned with challenges to its (colonial) legacy. This more defensive outlook was always characteristic of German nationalism. Its attempts to reinterpret historic understandings revolved in the post-war era principally around the Nazi era, and held often more pronounced revisionist undertones. The four key features are also a useful way further making sense of the way the sample individuals might have transformed socio-economic and political grievances into exclusive racialised solidarities. In this section, I highlight a number of findings and key problems that illustrate the workings and interconnections of rightist nationalism's four conceptual pieces.

The racialised dimension

One main finding of the dissertation, which emerges recurrently from the data, and is broadly in line with Weber's more complex conception of socio-economic background and Mann's (2004) understanding of inter-war fascists, is that there is no direct line from socio-economic issues to rightist nationalism. As previous chapters have shown, this became apparent in both countries' negative relationship between

unemployment and rightist nationalist voting results at the national and constituency level; and throughout these years, nationalists in the longitudinal samples were rarely unemployed and not confined to the lowest socio-economic positions. Their existing economic worries were with few exceptions (see Chapter 8) rarely addressed by rightist nationalist actors, and UKIP and AfD even proposed economically liberal aims. In the previous section, I have thus interpreted sample nationalists' socio-economic positions as feeding into their political world-views and concerns not directly but through a wider sense of social and political betrayal and abandonment. They were characterised most strongly by their deep disenchantment with their countries' governments and democracies, and their rejection of European integration and immigrants, which became particularly prevalent in key moments that brought political and cultural challenges. These worries were accurately captured by their preferred nationalist parties, whose core concerns revolved around preserving the basis of belonging and political rights of the racialised nation.

Similar to fascism followers (see Mann 2004: 22), these rightist nationalists endorsed parties against their own economic interests. From this material perspective, they might have been motivated by priorities captured by Weberian value rationality (see Weber 1978: 24-6, also for the following). I understand value-rational convictions – in this case, for instance, the aim to establish a culturally homogenous and ordered nation, even if unsuccessful or to their own economic disadvantage – to be at the forefront of sample nationalists' political choices. But especially their concerns about political exclusion might also have played into an instrumentally rational preference for parties that promised to restore the political recognition of the "true people". In other words, their political affinities were, like those of Mann's fascists, 'driven by both value and instrumental rationality ... [, although] the former predominated' (Mann 2004: 22; see also: e.g. 8, 21, 228, 357; on connections between both forms of rationality, see Weber 1978: 26).


As indicated in Chapter 4, studies of rightist nationalism frequently highlight its ideal-typical working-class element. Yet perhaps the most crucial but often neglected aspect in the discussion of rightist nationalism's social locations is its low

degree of cultural and physical diversity. The rightist nationalists in the longitudinal samples were predominantly white and UK-born, or born in Germany and without parental “migratory background”. Social surveys sometimes include relatively few respondents from diverse backgrounds (see e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 158). This was especially the case for the longitudinal samples (see Chapter 3). Seen through these samples, rightist nationalists’ “whiteness” hardly differed from that of other followers of political movements; but rightist nationalism’s – and, to a lesser degree, conservatism’s – much lower diversity became fully apparent in the samples of the full survey waves (see Appendix Tables A1a, A4a; see also: Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 158-60). In line with Bhabra’s (2017a) argument, in both countries and arguably elsewhere (e.g. Riga 2019: 69-70), rightist nationalism is not first and foremost about material or class issues, but about “race”. As I suggest below, broadly analogous to Baldwin’s (1964: 17) America, “race” and not class now defines the pivotal national identity that predominantly white rightist nationalists perceive as threatened. Whiteness and claims to an essentialised cultural identity are increasingly becoming the principal identification that serves as a mechanism of differentiation from the social bottom embodied by diverse others. There is a racialised element in rightist nationalism’s social locations, but also in its political assumptions and traditions, and indeed in the histories and self-understandings of the very nations it seeks to preserve (see Chapter 2).

Also constituency- and district-level analyses indicated a greater electoral strength of rightist nationalism in areas with low cultural diversity, at least in Britain and east Germany, and where refugees’ numbers had been rising strongly (see Chapters 6 and 9). Figures 10.1 and 10.2 show that both countries’ national statistics of the last decades showed overall little resemblance between the unemployment rate and the electoral trends of rightist nationalism; and this is also largely true for other economic indicators such as GDP growth, or net disposable household income growth minus inflation. Instead, the important complementary finding that emerges from this longitudinal macro-level data is that, in both Britain and Germany, rightist nationalist successes coincided much more closely with immigration trends. Yet this


relationship looked different in both countries. In Britain, nationalism’s electoral fortunes showed a slow, long-term growth that, at least until the EU referendum, broadly mirrored the overall steady rise of net migration. In Germany, by contrast, nationalist successes tended to fluctuate around low percentages but increased strongly, relatively speaking, with the two major immigration spikes in the early 1990s and mid-2010s.

Figure 10.1: net migration, unemployment, and nationalist results, UK, 1991-2019



Notes: nationalist results include: National Front, BNP, UKIP, Brexit Party. Source: Audickas et al. 2020; Eurostat 2019a; 2019b; House of Commons Library 2001-2020.

Figure 10.2: net migration, unemployment, and nationalist results, Germany, 1983-2019



Notes: nationalist results include: NPD, DVU, Republicans, AfD. Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019; Eurostat 2019a; 2019b.

This view of national-level trajectories elides, of course, the various contextual nuances that I have discussed over the course of the last chapters. A consideration of some of these points to a macro-level pattern that looks different in both places but is broadly analogous with respect to its connections between increasing cultural diversity, rightist nationalism’s growing appeal, and the wider political environment. In both countries, key moments of migration were not only accompanied by a rising nationalist challenge, but, importantly, also by a right-shifting conservatism. This was visible, for instance, in Germany’s late 1980s, early 1990s and mid-2010s, and Britain’s 1960s, late 1990s, early 2000s, and mid-2010s. Furthermore, in 1997 and 1998, respectively, both Britain and Germany elected a leftist government that reached for the centre. In Britain, conservatism reacted with a sharp turn towards anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic, and populist positions before striving for a more moderate face under Cameron. As Bale (2018) argues, this may have created an opening for UKIP’s growing appeal, which eventually exerted enough

pressure on Cameron to initiate the EU referendum. In Germany, net migration was low during these years, so that much of the political debate centred on other social and economic issues. Also here conservatism undertook, after some years of hesitation, steps towards modernisation and social liberalisation with Merkel. In the face of soaring migration and growing nationalism it then shifted back towards the socio-cultural right during the “refugee crisis”.

The contrast of both countries’ somewhat different trajectories over time thus pointed to common pattern of conservatism’s drastic recalibration in opposition, its eventual move away from harsh socio-cultural standpoints in the 2000s, and not only a growing nationalist appeal but also a wider right-shifting political landscape (including conservatism) during times of high migration pressure. In line with literature discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Arzheimer 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Lengfeld and Dilger 2018), my findings at all three levels of analysis suggest the importance of socio-cultural rather than economic concerns for understanding the problem of rightist nationalism. This is a deeply racialised one, which can infuse the wider political environment. Yet the last chapters have also pointed to occasions in which the individuals in the longitudinal samples have voiced a sense of having been silenced and disparaged politically.

Political abandonment, selective histories, and the threat of disorder

It is instructive to note that sample respondents in both Britain and Germany experienced their countries’ most significant economic (and in Britain additionally socio-cultural) challenges in the early (Germany) or late (UK) 2000s under a centre-left government. The longitudinal data shows that in these years they also voiced strong feelings of having been failed by political parties and procedures. Occasional nationalists’ political journeys over these decades show, moreover, that in both countries they frequently expressed no preference for any of the existing political choices; but they also moved away from centre-left parties especially in the early

2000s, without ever to return (see Appendix Tables A3f, A6d). I interpret this as one contextually embedded way in which these individuals' middle and lower socio-economic positions, relative stagnation, and existing economic worries connected with a sense of having been abandoned politically (see e.g. Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 213-14). From their view, these centre-left governments neither improved their economic position nor fulfilled their expectations of politically recognising and addressing their concerns. Instead, German nationalists, predominantly "ethnic Germans" without migration history, faced the most severe micro-economic insecurity since reunification, and witnessed welfare cuts rather than support by Schröder's government at a time when net migration was still substantial. At least before the economic crisis, British nationalists faced fewer economic pressures but observed unprecedented migration increases under a centrist Labour government that seemed to care neither about working-class interests nor about the British public's rising concerns about migration (see Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 131; 2014b: 280-1).

In both cases, they might have felt that they – despite embodying the nation or "people" – had been "damaged", as Isaiah Berlin (in Berlin et al. 1968: 175) put it, and disregarded by their governments. They thus expressed something of rightist nationalism's populist impulse. Seemingly excluded by their governments and confronted with the left's apparent contempt for their concerns, they had to fight for political recognition that was handed out to those who did not need or deserve it: the privileged, the educated, those taking advantage of cosmopolitan lifestyles, and cultural newcomers entering the country. In this context, socio-economic abandonment soon translated into social and political exclusion. Indicative of wider political changes (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014b: 280), many sample nationalists further retreated from politics, waiting for an opportunity to regain what they perceived as their political rights as rightful members of the racialised nation.

I have previously outlined Britain's and Germany's contrasting nation-building traditions, their racialised and imperial histories, their opposing relation to fascism, and the post-war political positions – British anti-fascist pride and German historic

guilt – that sprang from these. The last chapters have also illustrated some of the ways in which especially German rightist nationalism sought to downplay, deny, or even positively inflect parts of Germany's Nazi legacy. Faced with this recent past, the desire to re-imagine history was always strong in German nationalism, which had to constantly navigate the borders of legally feasible claims. But signs of this were also visible in Britain. Here, rightist nationalism selectively focused on a positive interpretation of Britain's colonial and post-colonial history, and essentialised values and traditions. These came again more clearly to the fore around the Brexit years (see Chapter 6). But also the wider political right portrayed Britain as strong, self-sufficient, and independent. Importantly, as the Empire continued its decline, a rightist glorification of British sovereignty turned increasingly against Europe (see Gamble 2003: 26, 29), which drew rightist nationalism's appeal into the political mainstream.

In Part 1 of the thesis I have discussed the ways in which Europe stood for economic, political, and racialised issues. Especially the political right also saw the EU as the embodiment of Britain's decay (Wellings 2010: 489, 490, 498, 501). Britain turned from an imperial power that held influence also over Europe to a racialised island threatened by the globalised ghosts that it evoked, and confronted with the European symbol of its downfall right at its doorstep. Germany, by contrast, had abandoned its ambitions to swallow the continent in war, and now navigated its new post-war role within Europe. The conservative right soon called for greater pride and confidence, yet always firmly grounded within the EU and its predecessors. Even German rightist nationalism, which moved between different degrees of Euroscepticism, rarely focused on Europe as the main adversary; instead, and as discussed in Chapter 9, it increasingly understood itself as part of a wider European civilisation to be united against, for instance, the alleged threat of Islam. In some sense, therefore, Europe was a pivotal point in both countries' post-war histories that brought about a certain reversal of Britain's and Germany's traditional outlook on the world and their place within it. One increasingly folded in on itself with a nostalgic view of past greatness, while the other sought to erase the stigma of its past by

becoming the epitome of the European project. The contrast of both countries illuminates how these sketched histories might matter for the ways in which the characters of British and German nationalism, embedded in the wider political landscapes, developed over time.

I have also highlighted rightist nationalism's characteristic of being especially concentrated in certain regional strongholds, due both to longer-term historical patterns or recent political developments. In Germany, the east-west dynamic represents perhaps the most visible fault line – but of course the nationalist right has recently come to the surface in all parts of the country. Britain presented a different expression of this regional aspect with more discernible differences between its national constituents. Here an English rightist nationalism – couched in British language – had to compete with local nationalisms, as well as particularly Scotland's long-standing opposition to English-dominated British politics. England, on the other hand, understood itself long as synonymous with Britain (Gamble 2003: 3, 18-20). England thus experienced Britain's post-war decline especially strongly while having to negotiate its own identity when faced with devolution of the Union's other parts. What is more, despite constituting a clear demographic majority within Britain, England has no own political representation – a fact that rightist nationalism has repeatedly lamented (e.g. BNP 2010: 39-40; UKIP 2017: 58-60; 2015: 56). For rightist nationalism, this apparent English political exclusion – expressed in a different way in east Germans' lack of representation and status as “second-class citizens” – constitutes a political grievance and sense of betrayal by political leaders. I thus argue that rightist nationalism's appeal also includes regionally and historically specific struggles for political recognition. Another sense of grievance comes from perceived attacks on the cherished nation's heritage and greatness. Where nationalist parties retrieve selective historical interpretations to preserve a glorified image of the nation, individuals may perceive, for instance, the removal of historic statues as acts to undermine their identity, and to further curtail their rights in favour of those of racialised others. A threat to national(ist) histories represents, moreover, an attack on a taken-for-granted order.

Rightist nationalism's concern about order and disorder derives from conservative precepts of stability, authority, and security (see Chapter 2). It frequently expresses itself in its emphasis on community problems, social decay, drug abuse, crime, and law enforcement. Especially in its neo-fascist guise, rightist nationalism traditionally demanded draconic sentences. But the weight that less extreme movements, such as UKIP or the AfD, placed on law and order was sometimes surpassed by conservative parties. Particularly rightist nationalism interprets the threat of disorder as intertwined with its other historical, political, and racialised concerns. This is where the four key features can shed a light on how rightist nationalism operates in the real world. I now outline some of the ways in which they can interact empirically, with a focus on how racialisation suffuses rightist nationalism's other features.

Rightist nationalism's sense of overlapping exclusions

Rightist nationalism's aversion to disorder becomes most forceful when it intertwines with cultural issues. It constructs physical and cultural diversity, or even Europe's influence, not only as a symbolic threat to national values and control, but also as a dangerous force of radical change and instability. As previous chapters have shown, rightist nationalism (and, at times, conservatism) associates immigration very concretely with crime, unrest, or terrorism (see e.g. AfD 2017: 22, 24, 30; BNP 2010: 4, 16, 18-20; NPD 2010: 18-19; UKIP 2015: 11, 13, 53). It thus propagates the need to protect the nation from the disorder and danger that cultural diversity allegedly entails. I have outlined, moreover, how both countries' nationalist parties charged intellectual and cosmopolitan elites with damaging national histories, reputation, and traditions, and accused them of undermining national sovereignty and integrity. The preservation of the nation, and the order and assurance it promises, can be especially important when confronted with globalised challenges (Skey 2013: 87-8), and when national belonging is the principal source of social identity. From nationalism's

perspective, political and cultural elites allegedly threatened this important traditional and ordered national self-understanding; and by allowing immigrants to enter, they purportedly aimed to drive the “real people” from their social place within the nation, curb their political participation and citizens’ welfare, and plan their racial and cultural replacement. Liberalism and pluralism posed a dangerous disruption of the nation’s way of being and the rightful order of the everyday. To preserve the social order, rightist nationalism transformed endangered rights that should be available to all citizens into racialised privileges of those who “truly belong”.

The racialisation of crime and disorder has a longer history. In the British inter-war years, for instance, even very small numbers of racialised others were seen as source of social decay (Solomos 1993: 48). This became even more widespread in the post-war era following Commonwealth migration (see e.g. Gilroy 2000: Ch. 3). The longitudinal samples used in this thesis hint at subtle differences between British and German individuals and their specific concerns about crime. While British individuals’ worries about being affected by crime decreased over time and in line with the context of declining crime estimates, German respondents seemed more concerned about crime developments as migration soared in the mid-2010s. Rightist nationalism’s predilection for order thus adds another dimension to its racialised character; it infuses nationalism’s unease about physical and cultural difference with a deeper concern about a loss of control, social disruption and decay, and threats to public safety.

Its racialised feature also connects with rightist nationalism’s populist impulse, that is, its sense of political abandonment and devaluation, and the concomitant claim to political rights and recognition. This could be observed, for instance, in Donald Trump’s recent concerns about the votes allegedly cast by undocumented migrants. A decade earlier, the BNP (2010: 4, 16) claimed not only that immigration would soon turn ‘indigenous British people ... [into] a minority’, subsequently followed by their ‘extinction’; the party also called for a re-examination of all citizenship awards under Blair, arguing that Labour had ‘orchestrated mass immigration to forcibly change Britain’s demographics and to gerrymander elections’.

Similar claims were advanced also by German nationalist parties such as the NPD (2010: 5, 13). Rightist nationalism thus intertwines its concerns about social and demographic change with those about political exclusion and legitimacy. It invokes a sense of ceding political control to racial or cultural outsiders. Put more generally, for rightist nationalism, nation and “the people” are congruent (see Mann 2005: 3), and it constructs both in a racialised way. Mann’s (e.g. 2005: Ch. 3; 2004: 33-4; 1995) work demonstrates the central issue of political participation and transition to democracy that underlies his analysis of nationalism – first liberal, then organic – from the 18th century. Rightist nationalism’s populist impulse deepens the concern about political recognition and highlights the political stakes attached to belonging to the racialised nation.

Rightist nationalists frequently voice populist demands for a more direct inclusion of “the people” in the political process, typically through elements of participatory democracy (see Canovan 1981: Ch. 5; Mudde 2007: 151-3; Rydgren 2007: 246). As long as they can be sure of their status as what they perceive as legitimate national majority, they seek to leverage its democratic weight. I have just stated that rightist nationalism equates nation and “the people”. But this needs to be qualified. Strictly speaking, both entities are not entirely congruent, as rightist nationalism not only excludes racialised outsiders but also certain elites. It seeks to transcend class differences within nation or “people”, but can only do so after having removed these elites from legitimate belonging. While leftist populism defines its elites in terms of economic class, the populist impulse within rightist nationalism veers into another direction. It is not directed primarily at the very rich (see Bonikowski et al. 2018: 11), who are, in fact, not uncommonly among its leaders or sponsors. Its populist demand to political rights and visibility rather aims at political and cultural elites.

Often characterised by a relative absence of higher education, rightist nationalism targets intellectuals, science, the “politically correct” media, the political mainstream, or “rootless” cosmopolitans. It suspects conspiracies between these cultural or cosmopolitan elites and immigrants or diverse communities (see e.g.

Bonikowski 2016a: 428; 2016b: 10-11, 14; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 5, 12; Judis 2016: 15). One example of these claims was provided by the BNP above. Similar allegations of an orchestration of Germany's "population replacement" were launched against Merkel's government during the recent "refugee crisis". Another example lay in UKIP's campaign for the 2004 EU election, which combined criticism of "the metropolitan political elite" with that of the EU's influence over Britain and the problem of "uncontrollable EU immigration" (Ford and Goodwin 2014a: 46). Rightist nationalism thrives in the tension between emphasising and resolving certain class exploitations – framed mainly in terms of education, urban-rural divides, technocracy, or cosmopolitanism – which it connects with a wider unease about social and cultural diversity.

Rightist nationalism's features of racialisation and populist struggle for political recognition can also generate a strong intersectional appeal to multiple senses of exploitation, or, in Bonikowski's (in Bonikowski et al. 2018: 17; see also: 3, 6; Bonikowski 2017) words, to 'channel diffuse grievances, both economic and cultural, into powerful out-group resentments'. Mann (2005: Ch. 3) discusses in detail how liberal nationalisms tended to negotiate and reconcile the tension between class and nation. In ethnic or organic nationalism, including fascism, on the other hand, ethnicity predominated over class. It promised to suppress and transcend class distinctions within the nation, but frequently reinforced both appeals by infusing ethnic distinctions with class differences and resentment (Mann 2005: 5, 6, 31; see also: 2004: 14-16, 34; Smith 1991: 12). This tension between, and mutual amplification of, class and nation is a broader Gellnerian idea (e.g. Gellner 1990: 93-6, 121; see also: Chs. 2-4; Hall 2019: 53). Post-war rightist nationalism speaks to both class and nation in various ways. It intertwines, for instance, the feeling that the racialised nation is under threat with a populist sense of political abandonment, and with the view that cultural elites betray or take advantage of the national people while seemingly treating it with contempt.

Yet rightist nationalism provides another source of threatened identity through its aim to retrieve certain historical narratives or legacies. It is especially

concerned with those racialised aspects of national heritage that have come increasingly under attack. Trump's reference to America's "glory days" or past greatness carry connotations of white privilege (see broadly: Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016: 973; Bonikowski et al. 2018: 17). The same is true for similar references to ideals of past demographic compositions, social order, or an interpretation of Brexit to regain proper "British" control (e.g. Bhambra 2017a). But another sense of deprivation may be invoked when specific racialised histories – such as colonialism, Empire, or the Nazi era – become further unravelled. This was visible, for instance, in the demolition of statues of British historic figures due to their association with slavery. In Germany, confrontation with the country's past may go the other way, for example through the erection of the Berlin Holocaust memorial. Rightist nationalism, already having to contend with demographic and national change, construes this as an attack on national memory itself, on crucial historical narratives that it may have viewed with pride (Britain) or sought to partially vindicate (Germany). Also here it seems to be cosmopolitan and politically correct elites who not only disparage rightist nationalists due to their political views and educational backgrounds, but also dismantle important sources of national identification and legacy.

This, too, might play into populism's moral thrust. As discussed in Chapter 2, I do not primarily locate populism's moral appeal within the people-elite dichotomy. I rather see the distinctive moral core of the populist impulse in the demand to be seen and heard in the face of a felt political abandonment and disparagement. Yet this can become extended within rightist nationalism, which views cosmopolitan elites and immigrants as standing for something fundamentally bad and repulsive. In its perception, they not only undermine democracy or political rights, but taint and subvert national identity, betray roots and country, endanger public order, curtail sovereignty, or impose political correctness. In the eyes of rightist nationalism, elites are not just corrupt but are, together with diverse communities, corrupting the nation's very essence, its racialised and normative identity, its memory and history. The populist impulse thus infuses rightist nationalism's political project with a sense

of moral urgency. These sketched connections between the core features help make sense how rightist nationalism frames its interrelated senses of social, economic, political, and cultural dislocation. But the four conceptual pieces also speak to longer-term processes that I view as crucial for an understanding of post-war rightist nationalism.

III Racialised nation-building and the decline of class

In this section, I return to a brief discussion of the deeper movements of nation, class, and “race”. I outline the main arguments of the thesis, namely that the post-war development of British and German rightist nationalism can be understood as 1) an expression of racialised nation-building in the face of strongly growing diversity and the expansion of civic political solidarity to cultural newcomers, and 2) an expression of the long-standing, macro-historical struggle between class and nation, with the former declining and the latter gaining in importance.

These interrelated, slightly abstracted ways of making sense of recent British and German rightist nationalisms draw on various elements at which I have hinted previously. Both countries’ post-war periods saw certain moments of strongly rising migration, an extension of rights to diverse communities, and expressions of political grievance and abandonment. I have also outlined that these moments further witnessed an emboldened nationalist response and – for instance in Britain’s early 1960s and Germany’s early 1990s – reforms to immigration, nationality, or asylum laws (Gamble 2003: 65-7; Ramet 1999: 74). I argue that both countries’ recent decades were characterised by efforts to redefine and rebuild the nation according to racialised principles of belonging. This stands in the longer-term tradition of historical moments in which growing diversity was met with nationalist backlash and racism (see e.g. Affeldt 2010; Engelken 2010; Solomos 1993: Ch. 2), and especially when political rights were extended to racialised outsiders (see Riga 2019; Wimmer 1997: 30). Britain’s and Germany’s post-war nation-building moments thus express

something of the close relationship between nationalism and the struggle for political rights, as elaborated by Michael Mann (e.g. 2005: Ch. 3). His analysis also shows that, to some extent, organic or ethnic nationalism constituted a contextually contingent response to earlier liberal or civic nation-building. This, in turn, signified broader social developments such as transnational enlightenment universalism being countered by romanticism (e.g. Gellner 1998b: 64-70), which was particularly powerful in Germany (Eatwell 2003: 27). From this perspective, the recent rightist nationalism represents, in Malešević's (2019: 7) sense, the latest variation of much deeper, longer-term processes. It is racialised nation-building and an allocation of political rights against cosmopolitanism and liberalism, and also more recent iterations of globalisation and multiculturalism. The contrast of both cases illuminates different sides of this process. It was perhaps more gradual and subtle in the UK – at least until Brexit – and was characterised by rebuilding both (English) nation, and sovereignty and control, also against perceived European domination. Germany, on the other hand, saw two very distinctive nation-building moments in the early 1990s and mid-2010s, which were fundamentally about redefining and reclaiming the racialised basis of legitimate national belonging and political inclusion against large numbers of cultural newcomers.

As Mann (2004: 81) points out, not only liberalism but also socialism is transnational and was fiercely attacked by the authoritarian right of the early 20th century. I have indicated in Chapter 2 that the ideas of class and nation engaged in a more general, long-standing struggle, which played its part in the different emerging forms of liberal and organic nation-building of the past centuries. But not only with the fall of the Soviet Union – and the East-German regime a year earlier – class has lost influence over the past decades. Also the socio-political developments under both countries' centre-left governments of the early 2000s may have played their part. Even though inequality persists, many (European) countries have witnessed the decline of leftist parties which struggled to mobilise on existing economic problems (Judt 2007: 742). This was also the case in Britain and Germany where Labour and especially the SPD experienced a longer-term electoral downturn. They came to

power in the late 1990s only with centrist programmes, and increasingly moved away from working-class concerns (see e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014a: Ch. 3). Both countries' – but perhaps especially Britain's – last decades were also more generally characterised by a declining salience of class division within society (Gamble 2018: 1226; Kaufmann 2019: 206, 208).

The individuals in the longitudinal samples expressed some of this. Their rather stable socio-economic backgrounds showed little relation to their political choices; and the occupational backgrounds of respondents favouring parties left and right of the (economic) centre were overall quite similar during these decades (see Appendix Tables A2d, A2e, A5d, A5e). While on a year-on-year basis party preferences remained fairly consistent, over nearly three decades many respondents in both samples switched between preferences for the mainstream left and right. For instance, 57 percent of those British respondents who at least once expressed a preference or voted for the Tories also voiced a preference for Labour at least once (and 53 percent the other way around). Overall 27 percent of the British sample at least once expressed a preference for Conservatives (but not Labour), 32 percent for Labour (but not Conservatives), and 36 percent for both. The German sample showed a similar development. About 41 percent of those who at least once preferred the conservative Union also identified at another time with the Social Democrats (39 percent vice versa). During these three decades, 31 percent of sample respondents expressed at least once a preference for the Union (but not SPD), 34 percent for the SPD (but not Union), and 22 percent for both. As discussed previously, the samples' rightist nationalists held economic concerns for a long time; yet their favoured nationalist parties hardly touched economic issues for most years and – in the case of UKIP and AfD – even held rather market-liberal positions.

Not only Britain's and Germany's last decades were thus characterised by two connected developments: class faced a decreasing ability to mobilise politically and to frame key issues; and it also receded as a focus in defining social identities and political subjectivities. I suggest that, as the political gravity of its main competitor decreases, nation becomes even more important as source of identification, and

especially for people who experience multiple senses of social dislocation and abandonment (see Rydgren 2013: 8-9; see also: Gidron and Hall 2017: 62; Spruyt et al. 2016: 343). This is a macro-historical, Gellnerian observation that draws on the long-standing tension between class and nation. In a more general sense, class no longer offers an immediate way of making sense of the world – it is nation that has acquired, to use Mann's (2012: 6-9; 2004: 78-9) concept, more and more ideological power to provide meaning at times of crisis and uncertainty. This is also because class, like liberalism and cosmopolitanism, and perhaps even multiculturalism, is culture-blind (see Gellner 1998a: 66; 1998b: 64-8; see also: Hall 2013: 6-7; Mann 2005: 13). It does not promise the emotional comfort and romantic appeal that can be found in nation, culture, or "race", particularly in the face of current globalised challenges. In the recent past, nation was arguably always a strong unit of identification, and it is certainly now (see Gellner 1990: 54, 55; Malešević 2019: e.g. 8, 24, 67). For some, it is the only source of meaning and identity that is left. This makes perceived attacks on its history and taken-for-granted order, and the prospect of political exclusion, especially threatening.

Political thinkers offer a similar view of the decline of nation's alternatives. Jacques Rancière (1999: 117-121; 1992: 63-4) theorises a social process that took the name of "worker" or "proletarian" from cultural others and reduced them to their much more restrictive identity as "immigrant". This, he argues, is one expression of the wider collapse of emancipatory politics; a shared mode of political mobilisation in the name of class and a wider "us" lost its democratic power in favour of "race". Echoing Rancière's argument about the necessity of conflict within politics, Chantal Mouffe (2018: e.g. 5, 22, 35, 45, 82) calls for a wider leftist populism to re-politicise collective emancipatory democracy – not only but also in the economic dimension – to counter rightist nationalism. These are different ways of framing the issue: the conception of "the people" in terms of class or a wider democratic unity has become de-politicised. What used to be political or socio-economic problems, and could be politicised as such, become interpreted in terms of "race" and culture. I suggest that

nation-building as a response to growing diversity and challenges to legitimate belonging thus takes an increasingly racialised aspect.

This leads to three further arguments of the thesis. First, in an abstract sense, the role that class has played for nation has been replaced by “race”. Today the competing interests of class less commonly limit and define the basis of national belonging – instead, physical and cultural markers become increasingly important for what nation means today. Rightist nationalism does not find the “real people” in the working class but in the class of those who belong on the basis of blood or essentialised culture. But very broadly analogous to class, also a racialised nation excludes certain elites – not economic but cultural and intellectual ones – from “the people” (see above). Both class and “race” could thus frame the nation’s populist demand for political recognition.

Second, and even if the thesis speaks to this rather briefly, my findings suggest that it is important to understand rightist nationalism in relation to the conservative right and the wider political landscape (see e.g. Bale 2018). The last decades have illustrated processes of mainstreaming nationalist positions at various levels. Individuals in the longitudinal samples hinted at some switches between preferences for nationalist and conservative parties, but more clearly so in the British sample. After the EU referendum, for instance, when the British Conservatives were embracing more exclusivist and Eurosceptic positions (e.g. Gamble 2018: 1121-2), many respondents who had preferred UKIP moved back to their conservative home. Appendix Tables A3f and A6d show, moreover, that throughout these years, a visible share of occasional nationalists held preferences for other political parties, and around one fifth (Germany) to one quarter (UK) for conservative ones. This shows that not only rightist nationalist parties frequently attract former conservative activists (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014b: 282; Lees 2018: 300), but also voters who held previously conservative affinities (e.g. Betz 194: 145). At the level of constituencies, especially England (and Wales) hinted at a structural move of areas’ vote for UKIP in 2015 or Brexit in 2016 towards support for the Conservatives in 2017

(analysis based on data from Apostolova et al. 2019; Hawkins et al. 2015; House of Commons Library 2017).

Yet the clearest signs of the mainstreaming of rightist nationalist preferences and ideological positions were visible at the national level. As briefly indicated in previous chapters, several key moments of the past decades showed the increasing adoption of anti-diversity claims by conservative actors, at times also accompanied by a more general movement of the political landscape. This was especially observable in Britain's early 2000s and mid-2010s (see e.g. Bale and Partos 2014: 611-12; Gamble 2018; Shabi 2019) and Germany's mid-2010s (see Marx and Naumann 2018). Importantly, the relationship between the post-war nationalist and conservative right was mainly characterised by a socio-cultural move of the latter. Rightist nationalism in its various guises changed its language according to what level of radicalism was permissible in a given context; but its core aim – to preserve and restore the racialised nation – remained fundamentally the same. Instead it was conservatism that changed its standpoints regarding diversity (and in the British case: Europe) at certain key nation-building moments.

These movements of the conservative right are part of the wider developments around the tension between class and nation. To some degree, rightist nationalism can come to the surface as a response to shorter-term challenges such as economic crises or, more importantly, cultural change and a seeming threat to political rights. Those perceived threats can entail moments of nation-building to reclaim racialised privileges and belonging. But underneath these more reactive moments lie, broadly in Malešević's (2019: e.g. 276, 278; for the following see also: 4, 5, 7, 8-15, 33) sense, important longer-term processes. He sees nationalism's increasing strength in its historical, organisational, ideological, and micro-interactive groundedness, which is also based in the nation-state's expanding locus of sovereignty, political legitimacy, and social solidarity. I would add to this account that the growing social weight assigned to nation – and culture and "race" – has also been generated by the decline of class as a pillar of social and political identification.

The third point to highlight thus suggests a subtle adjustment to the question of understanding the recent “rise of the right” from a macro-historical perspective. I would argue that rather than chiefly viewing nationalism’s ascent in absolute terms, we might also be seeing the decline of class, its counterweight, and perhaps its replacement with “race”. I suggest, in other words, to slightly expand a longer-term view of the nation’s increasing dominance by also seeing it as relative to the developments of its historical competitor. Every iteration of nation-building moments in the face of growing diversity, and its politicisation, further tips the balance away from class, and towards racialised identifications and interpretations, and their growing normalisation. This implies, moreover, that also in recent years, we might not have simply witnessed a *rise* of rightist nationalism but rather its increasing hold of mainstream political understandings and identifications. It might not only be growing numbers of voters flogging to much more radical positions, but a deeper move of the political centre into territory previously occupied by rightist nationalism.

I have traced the shape of the nationalist right through both countries’ analytical key moments. These have delineated how rightist nationalism’s four features developed over the course of the recent decades, that is, on what issues its struggle for political recognition focused, with what national histories and ascribed attributes it was concerned, what problems rightist nationalism perceived as bringing chaos and disruption, and how its racialised claims excluded diverse others. But these moments can also be viewed as recent layers of ideological and political expressions of longer social processes. They build on deeper sediments of regional histories, repeating moments of (racialised) nation-building, and the tension between class and nation that were at work throughout the wider post-war period and the past centuries. This is captured, for instance, within the foci of the dissertation’s key moments and chapters. The UK faced a Conservative crisis over Europe in the early 1990s, which sparked the birth of a more Europe-focused nationalism in the shape of UKIP. It was then concerned with immigration and economic problems under New Labour. But its struggle over Europe, now closely entwined with the issue of migration, emerged again in the mid-2010s and reached its height with the EU

referendum, tensions within Conservatism, and a mainstreamed rightist nationalism. Similarly, Germany was confronted with a major moment of nation-building, unprecedented migration, and rightist violence in the early 1990s. The following years were dominated by economic issues, also partially under a centre-left government. But in the mid-2010s, Germany faced once again soaring migration, and rightist nationalism breaking from the underground into the middle of society, with both violence and parliamentary representation.

Given the longitudinal nature of the data, the sample respondents' perceptions might themselves shed some light on these political and ideological sediments. Throughout the last decades, rightist nationalists harboured deep-seated economic worries, the feeling of having been politically abandoned, and critical views about Europe or immigration. But their views still indicated some variation according to context. The longitudinal, historically embedded use of the panel data thus allowed me to interpret how respondents' perspectives on these social and political issues might have changed throughout the chosen key moments. This is epitomised by the chant of "We are the people". Potentially employed by the same individuals in very different situations, it always expressed a fervent east-German protest against the authorities. What was at first a political demand to challenge an oppressive regime turned into an economic challenge to a seemingly western-dominated, unjust welfare reform. Finally it emerged as a racialised claim against refugees and politicians who were seen as undermining and betraying "the people". It hinted, moreover, at a move from class to "race" and nation over the course of these years. A claim to nation-building in both moments, its politically and economically inflected aspect of 1989/1990 turned into a deeply racialised one by the mid-2010s.

In an instructive discussion of how to view modernist theories of nationalism from a longer-term historical perspective, Malešević (e.g. 2019: 60-3) outlines how pre-modern ideas or symbols could, despite general (cultural) incommensurability, provide some of the building blocks for modern nationalism's ideological underpinnings. Also because I am mainly focused on rather recent years, this precise point is not quite the one I seek to make here. But a slightly shorter-term view of

Britain's and Germany's histories of the past centuries (including both countries' traditions of "race" and empire, see Chapter 2), and especially of the post-war period, show how also wider political and ideological developments can build on each other and inform the ways in which current rightist nationalism responds to contemporary challenges. As indicated by Malešević (2019: 7; see also: 5-6, 278-9), therefore, I, too, understand post-war rightist nationalism not just as a short-term outburst in reaction to predominantly cultural and political challenges, but also as the latest sediment of longer-term historical processes. It needs to be understood within the deep-rooted tension between nation, class, and "race".

IV Refugees, Europe, and the two faces of rightist nationalism

In this discussion it is useful to take a closer look at the cultural diversity that rightist nationalism constructs as a fundamental threat, and how these newcomers might have been perceived in Britain and Germany. The two countries had diverging histories of migration. The UK had experienced the presence of racialised difference – especially through Irish, Jewish, and black immigrants – for some centuries (see Solomos 1993: Chs. 2, 3). Although low in numbers, these newcomers were frequently met with legal, social, or violent exclusion. Post-war Commonwealth migration not only encountered public resistance, but also a further curtailment of British citizenship, geared at an unofficial exclusion of "non-white" colonial subjects (see Bhabra 2017b: 96-7). The UK's position thus expressed a tension between a relatively open imperial understanding of citizenship rights and its gradual restriction to preserve a racialised notion of "Britishness". Yet even from a rightist nationalist perspective, post-war Commonwealth migration could be understood as a consequence of the country's imperial identity and history. Migration soared under Blair from the late 1990s, initially from the Commonwealth and international asylum claims, and from 2004 onwards especially from eastern Europe. Even if parts of the British public and the political right held more negative views, at least from Labour's

perspective it was assumed that these migrants would boost the economy (see Kaufmann 2019: 151). There was, in other words, a certain expectation that these recent immigrants would enter the country to work. But as I discuss below, European migrants were more difficult to reject. Especially those from the new eastern member states represented the EU's ever-growing expansion and influence.

As indicated in Chapter 2, Germany's colonial tradition was much more short-lived and ended with the First World War. From the 1950s, West Germany accepted "guest workers" from southern Europe, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, amongst others. These immigrants helped drive the country's post-war "economic miracle"; but even if they were supposed to be "guests", many stayed in the country (see Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 139). Also East Germany received guest workers, largely from eastern Europe or other socialist countries such as Vietnam or Cuba. Yet these were far lower in numbers, and most returned to their home countries. Around the time of reunification in 1990, several different strands of migration occurred simultaneously: in addition to economic migrants, also East Germans, east-European "ethnic Germans", and asylum seekers from Yugoslavia and beyond moved into western Germany, together constituting an unprecedented rise in migration numbers (see Figure 10.2 above; see also: BPB 2018a; 2018b). As discussed in Chapter 7, especially non-European refugees were soon met with widespread violence in both parts of the country, and already more openly in the east. The next one and a half decades saw comparatively low net migration. But during the recent "refugee crisis", Germany experienced its second major migration peak, again including a large proportion of asylum seekers, and again facing a strong burst in rightist nationalist violence (see Appendix Figures A6d, A6g).

Both countries thus had different experiences with migration. Britain's long tradition of encountering racialised difference proved no inoculation against nationalist backlash, as, for example, the rise in hate crimes after the EU referendum demonstrated. But migration in Britain had been a slower, long-term phenomenon; and for a long time it had occurred for comprehensible reasons, be it due to Empire or for work. Germany had also received immigrants for work reasons, and others

were considered “ethnic Germans”, whose right to enter the country was written in blood. But in contrast to the UK, a large share of Germany’s newcomers in both migration spikes were refugees who arrived in great numbers over a short period of time. These faced the brunt of nationalist violence.

Two points are worth emphasising in this respect. First, a political rejection of humanitarian migration was common to both Britain and Germany. The former was very reluctant, for instance, to allow entry of refugees from Germany in the 1930s, and at the end of the war welcomed displaced people only under work contracts and if they proved their worth to society (Solomos 1993: 47, 55). Also in following decades the UK rarely took steps towards accepting refugees, especially when they came from outside the Commonwealth. In the early 1990s, Britain restricted asylum claims while they soared in Germany and elsewhere (Judt 2007: 683); at the turn of the millennium, the Conservatives – but also Labour – focused increasingly on the issue of asylum and its alleged abuse (see Conservative Party 2005: 1, 19; see also: Bale and Partos 2014: 611-12; Kaufmann 2019: 151; Shabi 2019: paras. 13-16); and during the “refugee crisis” of the mid-2010s, Britain received only small numbers of asylum seekers. Also German politics showed considerable unease with respect to refugees who could not immediately be identified as “German”. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Kohl’s Union found clear words against suspected “asylum abuse” (CDU-CSU 1994: 43, 47; 1990: 19; 1987: 18), and, together with the liberal FDP and the Social Democrats, changed Germany’s asylum law in 1993 (see BPB 2013: section 2). As indicated in Chapter 9, during the “refugee crisis” of 2015/2016, Merkel’s Union-SPD government abandoned its welcoming stance within months (Weiland 2016) and sought to restrict the number of asylum seekers by widening the list of “safe countries of origin” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016a).

Second, German governments were nevertheless much more limited in their options to reject refugees. This was arguably partly due to Germany’s geographic location; but also its historic responsibility associated with its Nazi legacy had resulted in a traditionally very open stance towards asylum (e.g. Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: 139). As a consequence, Germany faced several hundreds of thousands of refugees

in each year of the two migration spikes (see BPB 2018a). For the UK, on the other hand, its lauded liberal and democratic tradition did not seem a sufficient reason to receive asylum seekers in numbers remotely comparable to those of Germany or other countries. Again both countries' histories continued to delineate some of the duties and limits of their humanitarian responses.

Although especially the nationalist and conservative right agitated also against other immigrants and racialised communities, refugees frequently faced the most vitriol – even in the UK where asylum was largely a symbolic issue. How might this be understood? For one thing, particularly during the recent “refugee crisis”, the majority arrived from Muslim countries. Over the previous decade, Islamophobia had been rising, not only on the nationalist right but also within the socio-political mainstream. Amidst increasing terrorist attacks, particularly the political right thus portrayed refugees not only as threat to national identity but also as concrete security risk. As their primary purpose to enter their host countries was not related to work or any other reason deemed inherently “legitimate” for Britain or Germany, the political right questioned asylum seekers' social contribution and benefit, and propagated the threat that they supposedly posed.

But refugees also embodied a more general problem, namely the tension between the nation's control over borders and global (moral) pressures, and Europe's difficulties in addressing this tension. Citizens were asked to welcome refugees in the name of post-war human rights following their forced displacement through war. This humanitarian migration thus represented something different that was requested of the nation: to welcome people in need for what appeared to be the most abstract reasons – at least from a nationalist viewpoint that aimed to preserve national glory rather than address the question of potential historical accountability. Being embedded in the EU meant, moreover, that member states had formally no choice but keep their borders open and accept their quota of refugees. In reality, of course, most countries soon found ways to reduce their share of newcomers. Britain accepted only very few during this time. But Germany allowed large numbers to enter, welcomingly at first but soon increasingly reluctantly. It could not escape its

historical responsibility; but this national stigma and the related recourse to universal human rights might have been perceived as an affront by some of those who saw their own status endangered and felt that they were still fighting for political and social rights that had been promised but never been delivered.

I thus suggest that humanitarian migration stood for a certain nationalist helplessness in the face of international obligation. Additionally, however, it was also unclear how the own nation would be affected. '[T]he status of refugee', Agamben (2008: 92) writes, 'has always been considered a temporary condition that ought to lead either to naturalization or to repatriation'. As these newcomers could not be repatriated, there was thus an implicit understanding that they might stay indefinitely and maybe even become citizens. In doing so, they would inevitably change the very face of nationalism's racialised nation. For rightist nationalism, the demand to welcome diverse refugees imposes a particular vision of the nation – one that is open, changing, and increasingly multicultural. It thus endangers the nation's basis of belonging, which requires a rebuilding of its racialised foundations. But from rightist nationalism's view, refugees also pose a concrete risk and source of disorder, undeservedly attain rights and privileges to which not all "true nationals" have access while being derided by political and cultural elites, and embody a resented reading of history and historic responsibility, whether due to the legacies of Empire or those of Nazism. I thus argue that, at least in Germany and Britain, refugees embody challenges relating to all four of rightist nationalism's core features.

While the UK overall accepted few refugees over the past decades, and certainly compared to Germany, European migration might have evoked similar associations for British nationalism. UKIP's rhetoric frequently aimed at Romanians and Bulgarians, and the post-referendum backlash targeted eastern Europeans more generally. The English right claimed that these newcomers were entering the country to take advantage of social welfare rather than to work, and thus questioned their social value. Due to freedom of movement, EU migrants could not be denied entry after an initial moratorium. Nationalists could but watch while the numbers of east-European immigrants grew, who might access rights and benefits that nationalists

would have liked to claim as their own prerogatives. Here, too, the inability to restrict access of EU migrants was imposed through international obligations. Europe's influence over British sovereignty had no relation to the latter's own history but constituted, from nationalism's perspective, a detrimental imposition of a globalised world, and a symbol of Britain's decline and England's uncertain future (e.g. Gamble 2003: 20, 25-9; Wellings 2010: 501). While growing numbers of refugees epitomised nationalist fears in both Germany and Britain, only Germany faced substantial numbers in its two major migration spikes. In Britain, the issue of refugees was overall a theoretical problem. Instead, the perceived threat of Europe seemed to capture some of the same complexities.

The contrast between both countries illuminates the crucial role that the question of Europe played in their socio-political landscapes; and, broadly analogously to Kennedy's (2013: 218, 222) analysis, it exemplifies two different faces of how rightist nationalism could develop in the post-war period. In line with their opposing longer-term histories of nation-building, both countries approached Europe from inverse angles – in some sense they, like Geertz's (1971: 4) cases, 'bow in opposite directions'. Britain moved from exerting influence over the world and Europe, combined with an identity as the paragon of anti-fascism (Eatwell 2003: 21, 327), to a position of deep Euroscepticism. Germany moved the other way, from attempts to dominate and destroy Europe to representing the heart of its Union, driving its growing integration. For Britain, Europe symbolised national decline and foreign control, for Germany a chance for absolution. Both countries' relation to Europe encapsulates the struggles of their nationalisms: Britain's wrestles with a lost glory, and Germany's with historic guilt and stigma. A sense of nostalgia is inherent in both. On the whole, Britain's view of Europe was more politically inflected – always conceiving it as a variously constructed challenge to sovereignty – while Germany constructed Europe more strongly as a cultural issue whose identity must defended metonymically together with Germany's.

Europe thus also played a role in the two countries' racialised expressions over time. Somewhat abstracted and empirically imperfect, British nationalism

presented for a long time a closer proximity to white nationalism, revolving around “race”, Empire, and British and European civilisation. In the recent past, however, it moved towards an ethnic focus, juxtaposing especially England against Europe and, implicitly, the rest of the UK. Its principal concerns revolved around British (or rather: English) culture and national self-understanding, border control, and sovereignty. Conversely, Germany displayed a long-standing conflation of “race” and nation, and held on to this essentialised ethnic nationalism around “true German-ness” also in the post-war period. But in recent decades it moved increasingly towards a wider white nationalism that positioned Germany firmly within Europe against immigrants, refugees, and Islam in order to retrieve its racialised notions of legitimate belonging, culture, and political rights. History has shown that both ethnic and white nationalism can be virulent. Confronted with globalised challenges of recent years, Britain – and particularly England – is increasingly becoming an island in itself, while Germany is mobilising the “fortress Europe”. At the time of writing, Britain is discussing the prospect of sending back refugees from France across the Channel. Yet in the foreseeable future, particularly the Mediterranean Sea is likely to see a rising loss of life, while Europe – and Germany in its middle – gradually retreats from its commitment to human rights and the lessons it learned two generations ago.


In this final chapter I have aimed to outline the deeper historical socio-economic developments against whose background Britain’s and Germany’s recent rightist nationalisms have to be understood. Rightist nationalism draws on longer-term social shifts and layers upon layers of cultural and ideological traditions. This includes both countries’ relationship with Europe, and the various ways in which historical legacies and interpretations, struggles for political recognition and social order, and racialised traditions have played out over the past decades and centuries. I have argued that an important way of making sense of post-war rightist nationalism lies in the declining ability of class to capture current social dislocations, while nation grows ever more important for the formation of identities and political subjectivities. Instead of economic inequality, people increasingly conceive nation as the pivot of injustice and exploitation. This is how I have interpreted the sample nationalists’

socio-economic and political journeys. They deemed cultural issues, such as cleansing the nation of foreign elements, more important than addressing economic inequality within the nation. Related to this is the challenge posed to the basis of national belonging by growing diversity, and the expansion of civic and humanitarian rights to newcomers. Rather than economic or political definitions of the nation, its constructions in the name of “race” and culture increasingly gain the upper hand, and infuse the political mainstream. The moments outlined in previous chapters thus represent different facets of post-war rightist nationalism’s racialised nation-building efforts.

Appendix


I Appendix figures

Figure A1a: Gini coefficient, UK, 1977-2017




Source: ONS 2019.

Figure A1b: GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, UK, 1956-2017 (percent)




Source: Eurostat 2019b; OECD 2021; The World Bank 2019.

Figure A1c: GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, UK, 1991-2017 (percent)




Source: Eurostat 2019b; OECD 2021; The World Bank 2019.

Figure A2a: “living comfortably” (percent), UK longitudinal sample, 1991-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 1760-1880 (overall long. sample), 410-710 (Tory sympathisers), 270-290 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen key moments. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Figure A2b: “financial expectation: better off” (percent), UK longitudinal sample, 1991-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 1760-1880 (overall long. sample), 410-710 (Tory sympathisers), 270-290 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen key moments. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Figure A2c: financial perceptions and unemployment (%), overall UK long. sample, 1991-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 1760-1880. Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen key moments. University of Essex 2019. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Figure A2d: financial perceptions (%), conservatives, UK longitudinal sample, 1991-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 410-710. Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen key moments. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Figure A2e: financial perceptions (%), occasional nationalists, UK longitudinal sample, 1991-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 270-290. Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen key moments. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Figure A2f: retirement over time (percent), UK longitudinal sample, 1991-2017



Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 1760-1880 (overall long. sample), 410-710 (Tory sympathisers), 270-290 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen key moments. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Figure A3a: net migration and foreign(-born) population, UK, 1960-2017




Source: Eurostat 2019a; OECD 2020a; 2020b.

Figure A3b: net migration and foreign(-born) population, UK, 1991-2017




Source: Eurostat 2019a; OECD 2020a; 2020b.

Figure A3c: turnout in general and European elections, UK, 1970-2019




Notes: 1974 number is average of both general elections in that year. Source: Audickas et al. 2020: 25, 52.

Figure A3d: general election vote shares, UK, 1970-2019




Notes: 1974 numbers are average of both general elections in that year. Source: Audickas et al. 2020; House of Commons Library 2001-2020.

Figure A3e: European election vote shares, UK, 1979-2019




Source: Audickas et al. 2020; House of Commons Library 2001-2020.

Figure A3f: unemployment and nationalist election results (percent), UK, 1991-2019




Note: nationalist results include: National Front, BNP, UKIP, Brexit Party. Source: Audickas et al. 2020; Eurostat 2019b; House of Commons Library 2001-2020.

Figure A3g: net migration, foreign population, and nationalist results, UK, 1991-2019




Note: nationalist results include: National Front, BNP, UKIP, Brexit Party. Source: Audickas et al. 2020; Eurostat 2019a; House of Commons Library 2001-2020; OECD 2020a; 2020b.

Figure A4a: GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, Germany, 1960-2017 (percent)




Notes: Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: Eurostat 2019b; OECD 2021; The World Bank 2019.

Figure A4b: GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, Germany, 1990-2017 (percent)




Notes: Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: Eurostat 2019b; OECD 2021; The World Bank 2019.

Figure A5a: strong worries about wider economy, German long. sample, 1990-2017 (percent)




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 2180-2210 (overall long. sample), 310-480 (Union sympathisers), 160 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A5b: strong worries about own economic situation, German long. sample, 1990-2017 (%)




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 2180-2210 (overall long. sample), 310-480 (Union sympathisers), 160 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A5c: unemployment rate, east and west Germany, 1992-2017




Notes: Berlin included in east. Source: BPB 2019a.

Figure A6a: turnout in federal and European elections, Germany, 1972-2019




Notes: numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019.

Figure A6b: federal election vote shares, Germany, 1972-2017




Notes: numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. "The Left" includes earlier results of PDS and WASG. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019; 2018b.

Figure A6c: European election vote shares, Germany, 1979-2019




Notes: numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. "The Left" includes earlier results of PDS and WASG. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019.

Figure A6d: rightist extremist crimes, Germany, 1990-2017




Notes: due to methodology change in 2001, comparison with earlier years is limited. Source: Staud 2018.

Figure A6e: GDP growth, unemployment, and nationalist results (percent), Germany, 1984-2019




Notes: nationalist results include: NPD, DVU, Republicans, AfD. Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019; Eurostat 2019b; OECD 2021.

Figure A6f: net migration and nationalist election results, Germany, 1984-2019




Notes: nationalist results include: NPD, DVU, Republicans, AfD. Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019; Eurostat 2019a.

Figure A6g: asylum applications and violent extremist crimes, Germany, 1990-2017




Notes: numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Extremist crimes: due to methodology change in 2001, comparison with earlier years is limited. Source: BPB 2020; Staud 2018.

Figure A6h: net migration, asylum applications, and pop. percentages, Germany, 1970-2017




Notes: 2005 gap in foreign-born due to change counting adjustment. Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: BPB 2020; Destatis 2019a; 2019b; Eurostat 2019a; OECD 2020a.

Figure A6i: net migration, asylum applications, and pop. percentages, Germany, 1990-2017




Notes: 2005 gap in foreign-born due to change counting adjustment. Numbers before 1991 refer to West Germany. Source: BPB 2020; Destatis 2019a; 2019b; Eurostat 2019a; OECD 2020a.

Figure A7a: strong worries about migration, German longitudinal sample, 1999-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 2180-2200 (overall long. sample), 390-480 (Union sympathisers), 160 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A7b: strong worries about migration and economy, German long. sample, 1990-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 2180-2210. Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A7c: strong worries about migration and economy, German Union followers, 1990-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 310-480. Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A7d: strong worries about migration and economy, German occ. nationalists, 1990-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 160. Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A7e: strong worries about crime developments, German long. sample 1994-2017




Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10) = 2160-2210 (overall long. sample), 330-480 (Union sympathisers), 160 (occasional nationalists). Percentages rounded. Not all years are chosen analytical moments. Source: SOEP 2019.

Figure A8a: net migration and (lagged) unemployment, UK and Germany




Notes: adjusted R-squared results from linear regressions: UK = .45; lagged unempl. = .43; Germany = .42; lagged unempl. = .54. Source: Eurostat 2019a; 2019b.

Figure A8b: British constituency-level 2015 UKIP vote and 2011 unemployment rate




Notes: N = 573. English and Welsh constituencies only. Adjusted R-squared = .01. Source: Hawkins et al. 2015; Nomis 2013a.

Figure A8c: British constituency-level 2015 UKIP vote and 2011 share of UK-born population




Notes: N = 573. English and Welsh constituencies only. Adjusted R-squared = .29. Source: Hawkins et al. 2015; House of Commons Library 2011.

Figure A8d: German constituency-level AfD vote and unemployment, 2017




Notes: N = 298. Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Prenzlauer Berg Ost was excluded due to being part east and west. Some metropolitan constituencies (mainly in the west) have aggregate unemployment values for the overall city areas. Adjusted R-squared for all of Germany = .03; for western constituencies = .04; for eastern constituencies = .04. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017a; 2017b.

Figure A8e: German constituency-level 2017 AfD vote and 2015 foreign population




Notes: N = 298. Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Prenzlauer Berg Ost was excluded due to being part east and west. Some metropolitan constituencies (mainly in the west) have aggregate foreign-population values for the overall city areas. Adjusted R-squared for all of Germany = .21; for western constituencies = .00; for eastern constituencies = .23. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017a; 2017b.

Figure A8f: German district-level 2017 AfD vote and refugees, % of pop., 2016




Notes: N = 399. Berlin excluded due to being neither east nor west. One outlier (Schweinfurt, Stadt) excluded. Adjusted R-squared for all of Germany = .11; for western districts = .06; for eastern districts = .13. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018a; Destatis 2018.

Figure A8g: German district-level 2017 AfD vote and % refugee change, 2014-2016




Notes: N = 395. Berlin excluded due to being neither east nor west. Five outliers excluded. Adjusted R-squared for all of Germany = .11; for western districts = .00; for eastern districts = .21. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018a; Destatis 2018.

Figure A8h: anti-refugee incidents, German, total, January 2015 – February 2017




Notes: during this time the source recorded 3,335 incidents against refugees, 11 of which were suspected cases. Source: Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2018.

Figure A8i: anti-refugee incidents, Germany, Jan 2015 – Feb 2017, per 1 Mil inhabitants




Source: Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2018, divided by regional population data (December 2015) from Destatis 2017.

Figure A8j: German constituency-level vote share AfD, 2017, and % of foreigners, 2015



Notes: N=298. Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Prenzlauer Berg Ost was excluded due to being part East and West. Source: Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017a; 2017b.

Figure A8k: German constituency-level AfD and NPD vote shares, 2013 and 2017



Notes: N=298. Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Prenzlauer Berg Ost was excluded due to being part east and west. N=287 for graphs that include NPD 2017, since the NPD did not compete in Berlin constituencies in 2017. Adjusted R-squared values from top-left, clockwise: .35; .78; .81; .32. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017b; 2016a; 2016b.

II Appendix tables

Table A1a: born outside Britain (percent), UK longitudinal sample and society

	1991-1993	1997-2000	2003-2005	2008-2012	2013-2017
Overall long. sample*	5	5	5	5	5
Conservatives followers, long. sample	4	3	4	4	4
Labour followers, long. sample	4	5	6	6	6
Occasional nationalists, long. sample*	5	5	5	5	5
Overall samples, full survey waves	7	5	5	15	16
Conservatives followers, full survey	6	4	4	9	10
Labour followers, full survey waves	7	6	5	21	21
Actual nationalists, full survey waves	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	4
Occasional nationalists, full survey waves	4	4	3	4	5
Wider society	6.7	7.5	8.6	11.2	13.2

Notes: *Marked groups' diversity remains constant over time. N (averaged over course of moment and rounded to nearest 10): for overall longitudinal sample = 1860; for conservatives, long. sample = 450-640; for Labour followers, long. sample = 500-730; for occasional nationalists, long. sample = 290; for overall sample, full survey waves = 9720-42430; for conservatives, full waves = 2290-8470; for Labour followers, full waves = 2960-11550; for actual nationalists, full waves = 1540; for occasional nationalists, full waves = 440-4120. Strongly increasing diversity in 2008-2012 moment due to new respondents from UKHLS survey since 2009. Source: OECD 2020a; University of Essex 2019.

Table A1b: political preferences and gender, UK longitudinal sample & full survey waves (percent)

Percent female	1991-1993	1997-2000	2003-2005	2008-2012	2013-2017
Overall long. sample*	56	56	56	56	56
Conservatives, long. sample	56	56	55	55	55
Labour followers, long. sample	53	53	52	53	53
Actual nationalists, long. sample	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	45
Occasional nationalists, long. sample*	49	49	49	49	49
Full samples, full survey waves	53	54	54	54	54
Conservatives, full survey waves	53	53	52	53	52
Labour followers, full survey waves	51	53	53	55	56
Actual nationalists, full survey waves	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	43
Occasional nationalists, full survey waves	46	46	46	46	45

Notes: *Marked groups' gender distribution remains constant over time. N (average of year range and rounded to nearest 10): for overall longitudinal sample = 1880; for conservatives, long. sample = 460-650; for Labour followers, long. sample = 500-740; for actual nationalists, long. sample = 130; for occasional nationalists, long. sample = 290; for overall sample, full survey waves = 9900-41500; for conservatives, full waves = 2350-8510; for Labour followers, full waves = 3000-11240; for actual nationalists, full waves = 1950; for occasional nationalists, full waves = 450-4180. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2a: highest educational qualifications of conservatives, UK longitudinal sample (row %)

Moment	Univ. degree	Other higher	A-level etc.	GCSE etc.	Other lower	No qualif.	N
1991-1993	13	11	21	28	12	15	650
1997-2000	14	11	19	29	12	14	450
2003-2005	16	11	20	28	11	14	480
2008-2012	18	12	21	26	11	12	590
2013-2017	19	13	20	25	12	11	630

Notes: N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. The interval of 2008-2012 excludes year 2009 due to survey change; the period of 2013-2017 excludes year 2016 due to absence of vote variables. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2b: highest educational qualifications of Labour followers, UK longitudinal sample (row %)

Moment	Univ. degree	Other higher	A-level etc.	GCSE etc.	Other lower	No qualif.	N
1991-1993	16	9	18	23	12	22	560
1997-2000	19	10	19	22	11	19	730
2003-2005	22	9	19	20	12	18	560
2008-2012	23	10	19	20	13	15	530
2013-2017	24	10	19	21	12	15	500

Notes: N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. The interval of 2008-2012 excludes year 2009 due to survey change; the period of 2013-2017 excludes year 2016 due to absence of vote variables. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2c: highest educational qualifications of rightist nationalists, UK longitudinal sample (row %)

Moment	Univ. degree	Other higher	A-level etc.	GCSE etc.	Other lower	No qualif.	N
1991-1993	6	7	21	29	15	21	290
1997-2000	8	8	23	27	16	18	290
2003-2005	9	8	24	26	18	15	290
2008-2012	9	9	24	27	17	14	290
2013-2017	9	9	24	27	17	14	290
2013-2017*	9	8	23	30	16	13	130

Notes: *Rows 1-5 refer to occasional nationalists (see Chapter 3), while row 6 refers to the smaller group expressing a preference for UKIP or BNP in individual years (vote3+4). Occasional nationalists selected through variables vote3, vote4, vote8. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. The interval of 2008-2012 excludes year 2009 due to survey change. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2d: occupational backgrounds of conservatives, UK longitudinal sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher mgmt. & profess.	Lower mgmt. & profess.	Intermediate occupations	Small empl. & own account	Lower superv. & technical	Semi-routine	Routine	N
1991-1993	14	27	19	11	10	12	6	540
1997-2000	16	28	18	11	8	11	7	330
2003-2005	14	31	18	11	7	13	6	290
2008-2012	18	34	17	11	8	8	4	320
2013-2017	18	34	15	13	6	9	4	280
2008-2012#	15	30	18	12	7	13	6	510
2013-2017#	15	29	17	14	6	14	6	560

Notes: #Rows 7-8 include last information from retired individuals. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. The interval of 2008-2012 excludes year 2009 due to survey change; the period of 2013-2017 excludes year 2016 due to absence of vote variables. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2e: occupational backgrounds of Labour followers, UK longitudinal sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher mgmt. & profess.	Lower mgmt. & profess.	Intermediate occupations	Small empl. & own account	Lower superv. & technical	Semi-routine	Routine	N
1991-1993	11	28	16	7	12	13	12	430
1997-2000	14	29	14	9	9	14	11	570
2003-2005	15	32	12	8	8	14	10	390
2008-2012	17	33	12	7	7	14	9	310
2013-2017	18	31	12	9	7	16	8	250
2008-2012#	16	30	13	9	7	16	10	450
2013-2017#	15	28	13	10	7	16	11	420

Notes: #Rows 7-8 include last information from retired individuals. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. The interval of 2008-2012 excludes year 2009 due to survey change; the period of 2013-2017 excludes year 2016 due to absence of vote variables. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2f: occupational backgrounds of rightist nationalists, UK longitudinal sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher mgmt. & profess.	Lower mgmt. & profess.	Intermediate occupations	Small empl. & own account	Lower superv. & technical	Semi-routine	Routine	N
1991-1993	7	19	18	13	16	14	13	220
1997-2000	7	17	20	12	14	16	14	220
2003-2005	8	19	16	13	11	19	14	200
2008-2012	8	19	17	15	12	14	14	160
2013-2017	7	19	18	15	12	14	15	130
2008-2012#	8	18	16	15	11	19	13	240
2013-2017#	7	18	15	15	10	20	14	240

Notes: #Rows 7-8 include last information from retired individuals. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. The interval of 2008-2012 excludes year 2009 due to survey change. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A2g: economic situation, unemployment, and financial expectation, UK long. sample, 2008-2012 (%)

	2008	2009	2010*	2011*	2012*
Overall sample, unemployed	1	n/a	2	2	2
Tory followers, unemployed	1	n/a	1	1	1
Labour followers, unemployed	1	n/a	4	2	2
"No party", unemployed	x	n/a	5	4	2
Occ. Nationalists, unemployed	2	n/a	2	x	2
Unemployment rate (of active population)	5.6	7.6	7.8	8.1	7.9
Annual GDP growth	-0.3	-4.1	2.1	1.3	1.4
Annual inflation	3.5	2	2.5	3.9	2.6
Overall sample, fin. expectation: better off	15	n/a	14	12	14
Tory followers, fin. expectation: better off	14	n/a	15	12	13
Labour followers, fin. expectation: better off	15	n/a	12	12	12
"No party", fin. expectation: better off	14	n/a	14	10	14
Occ. Nationalists, fin. expectation: better off	15	n/a	16	10	13

Notes: *Years in UKHLS include small number of respondents from following year. N (rounded to nearest 10) for overall sample = 1770-1880; for Tory followers 550-620; for Labour followers 480-560; for those not favouring any party 180-300; for occasional nationalists 280-290. Source: Eurostat 2019b; OECD 2021; The World Bank 2019; University of Essex 2019.

Table A3a: government perception, overall UK longitudinal sample (row percent)

Year	<i>"Ordinary people don't really have a chance to influence what governments do."</i>				N	Government
	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	(Strongly) disagree		
1992	10	57	10	23	1870	Conservatives
1994*	13	60	9	18	1850	Conservatives
1996*	10	46	12	19	1870	Conservatives
1998	6	52	18	24	1870	Labour
2001*	9	48	16	26	1870	Labour
2003	13	53	14	21	1860	Labour
2006*	15	48	15	23	1850	Labour
	<i>"People like me don't have any say in what the government does."</i>					
	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	(Strongly) disagree		
2011/12	11	38	23	28	1860	Cons-LibDem
2014/15	11	38	23	28	1860	Cons-LibDem
2017/18	11	27	36	26	1820	Conservatives

Notes: *Year outside chosen key moments. N rounded to nearest 10. The formulation of the questions was different in the BHPS and UKHLS. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A3b: government perception, conservatives, UK longitudinal sample (row percent)

Year	<i>“Ordinary people don’t really have a chance to influence what governments do.”</i>				N	Government
	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	(Strongly) disagree		
1992#	5	50	13	32	650#	Conservatives
1994*	5	56	11	29	510	Conservatives
1996*	4	55	15	26	500	Conservatives
1998	7	54	17	23	450	Labour
2001*	11	50	15	24	460	Labour
2003	15	54	10	20	450	Labour
2006*	17	48	12	22	510	Labour
<i>“People like me don’t have any say in what the government does.”</i>						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	(Strongly) disagree		
2011/12	5	36	25	33	600	Cons-LibDem
2014/15	5	34	26	36	560	Cons-LibDem
2017/18	6	26	40	28	760	Conservatives

Notes: #In 1992 political preference does not include vote3. *Year outside chosen key moments. N rounded to nearest 10. The formulation of the questions was different in the BHPS and UKHLS. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A3c: government perception, rightist nationalists, UK longitudinal sample (row percent)

Year	<i>“Ordinary people don’t really have a chance to influence what governments do.”</i>				N	Government
	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	(Strongly) disagree		
1992	15	60	9	16	290	Conservatives
1994*	18	60	9	13	290	Conservatives
1996*	20	53	11	15	290	Conservatives
1998	12	58	14	16	290	Labour
2001*	13	52	15	20	290	Labour
2003	20	55	15	10	290	Labour
2006*	27	45	12	16	280	Labour
<i>“People like me don’t have any say in what the government does.”</i>						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	(Strongly) disagree		
2011/12	23	41	17	18	290	Cons-LibDem
2014/15	25	39	18	18	290	Cons-LibDem
2017/18	22	30	30	18	290	Conservatives
2014/15#	30	40	16	14	190	Cons-LibDem
2017/18#	17	33	29	21	70	Conservatives

Notes: *Year outside chosen moments. N rounded to nearest 10. Most years refer to occasional nationalists, but bottom years (marked with #) refer to respondents favouring UKIP or BNP in this very year. The formulation of the questions was different in the BHPS and UKHLS. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A3d: interest in politics and national turnout, UK (percent)

	1991-1993	1997-2000	2003-2005	2008-2012	2013-2017
Overall long. sample, very/fairly inter. in politics	53	n/a	46	49	52
Conservatives, very/fairly interested in politics	57	n/a	55	58	58
Labour followers, very/fairly inter. in politics	62	n/a	54	57	60
Occasional nationalists, very/fairly inter. in pol.	47	n/a	38	45	47
National turnout (UK), general elections	77.7 (1992)	71.4 (1997) 59.4 (2001*)	61.4 (2005)	65.1 (2010)	66.2 (2015) 68.8 (2017)
National turnout (UK), European elections	36.5 (1994*)	24 (1999)	38.5 (2004)	34.5 (2009)	35.4 (2014)

Notes: *Years outside key moments. N (average of year range and rounded to nearest 10) for overall sample = 1860-1870; for Conservatives followers = 480-650; for Labour followers = 500-570; for occasional nationalists = 290. Panel surveys do not contain variable vote6 (political interest) between 1997 and 2000 (BHPS Waves 7-10), and in 2016 (UKHLS Wave 8). Source: Audickas et al. (2020: 25, 52); University of Essex 2019.

Table A3e: preferences regarding Britain's membership in the EU, UK long. sample (percent)

Preference / year#	Overall long. sample	Conservatives*	Occasional nationalists
1999: UK's long-term aim: leave the EU	12	16	28
1999: UK's long-term aim: stay but reduce power	46	60	45
2002: UK's long-term aim: leave the EU	12	17	29
2002: UK's long-term aim: stay but reduce power	41	53	41
2006: UK's long-term aim: leave the EU	18	20	39
2006: UK's long-term aim: stay but reduce power	50	62	44
2016: Britain should leave the EU	51	57	90

Notes: #The years of 2002 and 2016 were just outside the chosen key moments, but number of respondents was only marginally lower. *The year 2016 did not hold the variables of political preference. In case of the Tory followers, I use information from 2015. N (rounded to nearest 10) for overall longitudinal sample: 1620-1730; for conservatives: 430-640; for occasional nationalists: 240-280. In 2016, I have excluded respondents who were undecided. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Table A3f: political preferences, occasional nationalists, UK longitudinal sample (column %)

Political preference of occasional nationalists	1991-1993	1997-2000	2003-2005	2008-2012	2013-2017
Conservatives	34	23	24	31	23
Labour	24	32	18	14	9
Liberal Democrats	22	16	19	10	3
Green	2	x	3	6	3
UKIP or BNP	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	46
"Other party"	2	2	9	14	x
No party preference	7	13	13	18	10

Notes: N (average of year range and rounded to nearest 10) = 290. In this case, the year 1992 is excluded from the first analytical moment (variable vote3 unavailable) for greater balance in N. I have suppressed the percentage when some years within the analytical moments had small counts. The resulting percentages were then generally low. "Other party" does not include regional ones such as the SNP, but does include UKIP or BNP in the waves until 2013. Preferences for rightist nationalist parties are only recorded in the last analytical moment. Source: University of Essex 2019.

Appendix Table A3g: election outcomes and sample preferences, 2015-2017 (percent)

<i>2015 general election</i>			
	UK election outcome	Longitudinal sample votes	Long. sample wider preferences
Conservatives	36.8	42	45
Labour	30.4	30	32
Liberal Democrats	7.9	10	8
Green Party	3.8	3	3
UKIP	12.6	10	8

<i>2016 EU referendum</i>		
	EU referendum outcome	EU referendum sample preferences
Remain	48.1	49
Leave	51.9	51

<i>2017 general election</i>			
	UK election outcome	Longitudinal sample votes	Long. sample wider preferences
Conservatives	42.3	46	48
Labour	40	33	31
Liberal Democrats	7.4	9	10
Green Party	1.6	3	2
UKIP	1.8	4	4

Notes: based on respondents who voiced a political preferences and/or said they had voted in the last election. N (rounded to nearest 10): election 2015: for sample votes = 950 (vote8); for wider party preferences = 1520 (vote3+4); 2016 referendum = 1730; election 2017: for sample votes = 790 (vote8); for wider party preferences = 1570 (vote3+4). Respondents contain small numbers from the following year (UKHLS wave structure). Source: Apostolova et al. 2019: 8; Audickas et al. 2020: 85; Hawkins et al. 2015: 11; University of Essex 2019.

Appendix Table A3h: views on EU membership, British longitudinal sample, 2016

	Remain	Leave	N
Conservatives*	43	57	640
Labour sympathisers*	64	36	470
LibDem supporters*	68	32	110
Green Party followers*	72	28	40
No party preference*	41	59	150
"Don't know"*	42	58	140
UKIP or BNP sympathisers*	4	96	120
Occasional nationalists	10	90	280
Overall sample	49	51	1730
National referendum result	48.1	51.9	n/a

Notes: N rounded to nearest 10. *Based on respondents who voiced political preferences (vote3+4) in 2015 (no vote variables in 2016). Respondents contain small numbers from the following year (UKHLS wave structure). Source: Audickas et al. 2020: 85; University of Essex 2019.

Table A4a: percent born outside Germany, German longitudinal sample and society

	1990-1994#	2001-2005	2007-2010	2014-2017
Overall long. sample*	7	7	7	7
Union followers, long. sample	4	4	4	5
SPD followers, long. sample	6	6	6	6
Occasional nationalists, long. sample*	5	5	5	5
Overall samples, full survey waves	19	12	11	27
Union followers, full survey waves	9	10	8	14
SPD followers, full survey waves	17	9	8	12
Actual nationalists, full survey waves♣	5	x	x	9
Occasional nationalists, full survey waves	8	5	4	8
Wider society‡	11	12.7	12.9	14

Notes: *Marked groups' diversity remains constant over time. #In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only very small differences. ♣I have suppressed the percentages of nationalism sympathisers born outside Germany when some years had only small counts. The percentages for the overall moments were usually low. N (average of year range and rounded to nearest 10) for overall longitudinal sample = 2010; for Union followers (long. sample) = 350-450; for SPD followers (long. sample) = 340-440; for occasional nationalists (long. sample) = 160; for full survey samples = 13530-29730; for Union followers (full survey) = 1890-4260; for SPD followers (full survey) = 2360-3780; for actual nationalists (full survey) = 90-480; for occasional nationalists (full survey) = 640-1460. ‡Macro-level data based on average for years of each moment. Moment 1 only contains data for 1994, and Moment 2 only contains data for years 2001-2004 due to data gap. Source: OECD 2020a; SOEP 2019.

Table A4b: political preferences and gender, German long. sample & full survey waves (percent)

Percent female	1990-1994#	2001-2005	2007-2010	2014-2017
Overall long. sample*	53	53	53	53
Union sympathisers, long. sample	47	47	45	48
SPD followers, long. sample	49	49	51	49
Actual nationalists, long. sample	x	x	x	29
Occasional nationalists, long. sample*	35	35	35	35
Full samples, full survey waves	51	52	53	53
Union sympathisers, full survey waves	47	46	48	49
SPD followers, full survey waves	46	48	49	49
Actual nationalists, full survey waves	25	24	26	33
Occasional nationalists, full survey waves	33	34	36	38

Notes: N (average of year range and rounded to nearest 10) for overall longitudinal sample = 2010; for Union followers (long. sample) = 350-450; for SPD followers (long. sample) = 340-440; for actual nationalists (long. sample, last moment) = 40; for occasional nationalists (long. sample) = 160; for full survey samples = 13530-29730; for Union followers (full survey) = 1890-4260; for SPD followers (full survey) = 2360-3780; for actual nationalists (full survey) = 90-480; for occasional nationalists (full survey) = 640-1460. I have suppressed the percentage when some years within the analytical moments had very small counts. In those cases the percentage was generally low. #In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only very small differences. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A5a: highest educational qualifications of Union followers, German long. sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher tertiary	Lower tert.	High school etc.	Secondary etc.	Elementary	N
1990-1994	10	6	8	29	46	340
2001-2005	14	10	8	30	39	420
2007-2010	15	10	7	28	40	410
2014-2017	15	10	7	28	40	440

Notes: N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only small differences. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A5b: highest educational qualifications of SPD followers, German long. sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher tertiary	Lower tert.	High school etc.	Secondary etc.	Elementary	N
1990-1994	10	5	8	25	49	430
2001-2005	12	8	9	26	45	411
2007-2010	11	8	8	25	47	340
2014-2017	11	9	8	23	49	330

Notes: N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only small differences. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A5c: highest educational qualifications of rightist nationalists, German long. sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher tertiary	Lower tert.	High school etc.	Secondary etc.	Elementary	N
1990-1994	7	4	10	40	38	160
2001-2005	9	9	7	36	38	160
2007-2010	9	10	7	35	38	160
2014-2017	9	10	7	35	38	160

Notes: N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A5d: occupational backgrounds of Union followers, German longitudinal sample (row %)

Moment	Higher mgmt. & profess.	Lower mgmt. & profess.	Routine clerical	Self-employed	Routine service&sales	Skilled manual	Semi-/ unskilled	N
1990-1994	16	22	15	7	13	19	6	260
2001-2005	19	26	15	9	10	13	7	260
2007-2010	18	26	16	9	9	12	7	210
2014-2017	20	27	16	9	8	10	9	170
2007-2010#	18	23	16	7	12	13	8	320
2014-2017#	18	23	16	8	11	11	10	370

Notes: #Rows 5-6 include last information from retired individuals. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only small differences. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A5e: occupational backgrounds of SPD followers, German longitudinal sample (row percent)

Moment	Higher mgmt. & profess.	Lower mgmt. & profess.	Routine clerical or Self-employed	Routine service&sales	Skilled manual	Semi-/ unskilled	N
1990-1994	16	21	15	12	20	15	340
2001-2005	16	26	18	12	16	11	260
2007-2010	16	27	15	13	16	12	180
2014-2017	18	26	16	14	16	10	120
2007-2010#	15	27	16	12	14	15	270
2014-2017#	14	26	17	11	14	17	270

Notes: #Rows 5-6 include last information from retired individuals. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only small differences. In certain years of some analytical moments, SPD followers had relatively low cell counts in "self-employed". I have thus combined this category with "routine clerical". Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A5f: occupational backgrounds of rightist nationalists, German longitudinal sample (row %)

Moment	Higher mgmt. & profess.	Lower mgmt. & profess.	Routine clerical	Self-employed	Routine service&sales	Skilled manual	Semi-/ unskilled	N
1990-1994	9	19	7	4	10	33	15	130
2001-2005	11	21	13	7	9	22	14	120
2007-2010	13	22	10	9	10	18	16	110
2014-2017	10	28	10	10	9	13	19	90
2007-2010#	13	21	10	9	11	16	19	140
2014-2017#	10	25	10	9	10	14	22	140

Notes: #Rows 5-6 include last information from retired individuals. Refers to occasional nationalists. N is average of survey waves, and rounded to nearest 10. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A6a: Satisfaction with democracy, German longitudinal sample (row percent)

Year	Very dissatisfied	Rather dissatisfied	Undecided	Rather satisfied	Very satisfied	N	Government
Overall sample							
2005	17	20	17	30	15	2200	SPD-Green
2010	14	22	20	32	13	2190	Union-SPD
2016	13	18	19	32	18	2190	Union-SPD
Union followers							
2005	13	16	14	37	20	430	SPD-Green
2010	6	13	19	41	21	450	Union-SPD
2016	5	13	17	38	26	430	Union-SPD
Occasional nationalists							
2005	40	17	11	22	9	160	SPD-Green
2010	27	19	18	27	9	160	Union-SPD
2016	32	16	17	21	14	160	Union-SPD

Notes: N rounded to nearest 10. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A6b: Satisfaction with democracy, German nationalists by east/west (row percent)

Year	Very/rather dissatisfied	Undecided	Very/rather satisfied	N	Government
West-German occasional nationalists					
2005	48	12	40	100	SPD-Green
2010	46	45	40	100	Union-SPD
2016	43	17	40	100	Union-SPD
East-German occasional nationalists					
2005	73	10	17	60	SPD-Green
2010	47	23	30	60	Union-SPD
2016	57	16	26	60	Union-SPD

Notes: N rounded to nearest 10. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A6c: interest in politics and national turnout, Germany (percent)

	1990-1994	2001-2005	2007-2010	2014-2017
Overall long. sample, (very) strong interest in politics	40	40	39	43
Union followers, (very) strong interest in politics#	51	59	59	58
Social Democrats followers, (very) strong inter. in politics#	50	51	52	55
Occasional nationalists, (very) strong interest in politics	46	48	46	54
National turnout (Ger), federal elections	77.8 (1990) 79 (1994)	79.1 (2002) 77.7 (2005)	70.8 (2009)	71.5 (2013*) 76.2 (2017)
National turnout (Ger), European elections	60 (1994)	43 (2004)	43.4 (2009)	48.1 (2014)

Notes: *Years outside key moments. N (average of year range and rounded to nearest 10) for overall sample = 2200-2210; for Union followers = 350-450; for SPD followers = 340-430; for occasional nationalists = 160. #In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; excluding the first two years results in only small differences. Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2019; 2018b: 8; SOEP 2019.

Table A6d: political preferences, occasional nationalists, German longitudinal sample (column %)

Political preference of occasional nationalists	1990-1994#	2001-2005	2007-2010	2014-2017
Union	15	25	22	16
Social Democrats	14	11	6	x
Left	x	3	5	x
Rightist nationalist parties	6	x	4	25
No party identification	51	52	57	47

Notes: N (rounded to nearest 10): 160. #In the first key moment, east-German respondents were asked about political preferences (Union, SPD) only from 1992; this case I have restricted the first moment to the years 1992-1993. I have suppressed the percentage when some years within the analytical moments had small counts. The resulting percentages were generally low. Source: SOEP 2019.

Table A7a: British constituency-level linear regressions of 2015 UKIP vote %, England and Wales

	England	Wales	England&Wales
Ec. Act., Unemployed, %, 2011	-0.595**	0.968	-0.474*
Pop. Born in the UK, in %, 2011	0.114***	0.161	0.111***
Turnout in %, 2015	-0.355***	-0.202	-0.353***
Level 4+ Qual. (Degree etc.), %, 2011	-0.389***	-0.240	-0.386***
Vote Share Cons in %, 2015	0.0778***	0.0298	0.0906***
Constant	37.76***	12.64	36.71***
Observations	533	40	573
R^2	0.647	0.646	0.640
Adjusted R^2	0.643	0.594	0.637
AIC	2824.0	182.1	3019.9
BIC	2849.7	192.2	3046.0

Source: Hawkins et al. 2015; House of Commons Library 2011; Nomis 2013a; 2013b.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7b: German constituency-level linear regressions of 2017 AfD vote %

	All of Germany	West	East
Unemployment Rate, 2017	-0.845***	-0.604***	0.116
Foreigners in %, 2015	-0.492***	-0.0351	-1.156**
Turnout in %, 2017	-0.532***	-0.387***	0.463*
High School Degree in %, 2015	-0.250***	-0.144***	-0.555***
Vote Share Union in %, 2017	-0.657***	-0.201***	-0.565*
Constant	93.67***	56.09***	26.95
Observations	299	245	53
R^2	0.564	0.357	0.587
Adjusted R^2	0.557	0.344	0.543
AIC	1626.4	1069.9	289.7
BIC	1648.6	1090.9	301.5

Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017a; 2017b.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7c: German district-level linear regressions of 2017 AfD vote %

	All of Germany	West	East
Employment Rate Total, 2017	0.624***	0.336***	0.184
Foreigners % of Population, 2016	-0.257***	0.0448	-1.563***
Change in Refugees, in %, 2014-2016	0.00432*	0.00351*	0.00359
Turnout in %, 2017	-0.343***	-0.310***	0.427***
Vote Share Union in %, 2017	-0.318***	-0.0163	-0.422***
Germans Aged 65 and Over in %, 2016	36.74***	-4.722	110.3***
Constant	8.804	15.77***	-23.70
Observations	401	324	76
R^2	0.611	0.295	0.675
Adjusted R^2	0.605	0.281	0.647
AIC	2114.2	1482.3	380.7
BIC	2142.2	1508.8	397.0

Source: Der Bundeswahlleiter 2018a; Destatis 2018.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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