

The Sack of Rome, 1527

Judith Hook



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Studied primarily within an Italian context, the sack of Rome is seen to have played a substantial part in the imposition of a Spanish hegemony in Italy. This, in brief, summarises the conclusion of my thesis which is concerned with the impact of the sack on Italy. I therefore show how in the negotiations leading up to the League of Cognac, in the League itself and in its operations some idea of Italy, as more than a geographical location, played a large part. Further, I demonstrate that what may be called 'treachery' to this idea of Italy, on the part of Ferrara, Siena, Mantua and the Colonna showed Charles V and the duke of Bourbon how to attack and capture Rome and how this capture led to the sack of the city. In this section I consider the complexities of some family obligations and relationships which played such an important part in politics within Italy at this time. I also describe the Rome of Clement VII and his court. Here I argue that because of the financial straits of the papacy, in his policies, for which he has been almost universally blamed, Clement VII had little choice and that when he could exercise choice he acted as a 'good Italian'. After considering the disaster of the sack and its impact upon Rome and the imperial army, I look at its broader effects. After the sack of Rome the Italians ceased to act in unity. In the Church State the sack brought immediate chaos, a chaos which opened the way to the disintegration of the League of Cognac, as Venice was tempted to intervene, thus dissipating her energies and antagonising the pope. This was followed by the reimposition of stronger and more effective papal authority. In Tuscany the sack was equally disruptive and the whole state of Florence broke down into its smallest component units. And, again, chaos was followed by the order of an autocratic regime such as had been previously unknown. Both in the Church State and, more directly, in Florence, the pope was dependent on an alliance with the emperor in order to restore order, and this is but one indication of many that after the sack of Rome the emperor was all-powerful in Italy. The argument concludes, therefore, with a brief description of the peace treaties of 1529-30 and of the imperial coronation at Bologna.



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PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

PHYSICS 309

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to ignore the sack of Rome. That in 1527 the city of the popes was subjected to one of the worst sacks in recorded military history at the hands of the army of Charles V is a fact which sooner or later faces the general historian of the sixteenth century. Not only was it, 'one of the most frightful and dramatic events of the century',⁽¹⁾ but the effects of the sack were to be felt throughout Europe for many years. It was to affect decisively the course of the reformation in England; it created a mood of distinct unease in Spain;⁽²⁾ and it contributed greatly to the imposition of a Spanish hegemony in Italy and Europe⁽³⁾ and, in consequence, to the failure of the Italian reformation. It is with Italy that this study is concerned and with the impact of the sack of Rome on Italian political life.

The relevance of the history of Italy, in the second and third decades of the sixteenth century, to the more general development of Europe is self-evident, for these twenty years saw the failure of the French to establish a permanent foothold in the peninsula, which fell under the almost total control of the Castillian-dominated empire of Charles V. The emperor's path to hegemony in Italy is well-known; the battle of Pavia, Morone's conspiracy, the sack of Rome, the defection of Doria, the break-up of the Italian League, the Peace of Cambrai, the seige of Florence and the imperial coronation at Bologna. Here, it is possible to consider, in detail, only two of these incidents, the sack of Rome and the break-up of the Italian League. Of course, it is possible to show that ultimately the sack of Rome made little difference, that the struggle between Hapsburg and Valois in Italy was already over, leaving the advantage with the former, and that, with the removal of French influence from Italy, the Italian powers could no longer resist an imperial, or, as it turned out, a Spanish hegemony.⁽⁴⁾ In the end much remained unchanged or was altered only temporarily and much would have changed whether/

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1. F.C. Spooner in The New Cambridge Modern History, (Cambridge 1962) ii.344.
 2. This is partially considered below p. 308-9.
 3. For an expression of this view see, for example, E.M. Jamison, C.M. Ady, K.D. Vernon and C.S. Terry, Italy Medieval and Modern. A History, (Oxford 1919), 235, 237, M.D. Cantimori, 'L'Influence du Manifeste de Charles-Quint contre Clement VII (1526) et de quelques documents similaires de la litterature philoprotestante et Anti-curiale d'Italie' in Charles Quint et son temps, (1959), 133-141.
 4. For the importance of the distinction between the two see below p. 324-9.

whether or not Bourbon had been able to avoid the sack of Rome. Nevertheless the events of 1525-7, of high significance and lasting importance in themselves, also illustrate with peculiar vividness the complexity of political life in the Italian peninsula at this period.

Most of the sources used for this study originate in Italy. That is, even when not written by Italians, they are written by contemporary observers of the Italian scene or are based on Italian reports. This use of, in the main, Italian sources may well have affected the emphasis of this study, for contemporary Italians, with a highly-developed sense of the colourful and episodic,⁽¹⁾ limit their reports, observations, histories and remarks to what was regarded as important. Lucca, for instance, is scarcely mentioned and then only in derogatory terms,⁽²⁾ and, although Siena was of importance, Italian contemporaries pay scant attention to that city. Again, incidents which do not bear directly on the Italian scene are omitted in this study and so, although it would be impossible to consider Italy after the sack of Rome without mentioning Lautrec's Neapolitan expedition, that episode is not discussed in any detail since it was almost entirely a French and Spanish affair.

Covering this period there is a wealth of diplomatic material dealing with a succession of delicate and complicated negotiations, some of which issued in such agreements as the Treaty of Madrid, the League of Cognac, the Treaty of Barcelona and the Peace of Cambrai,⁽³⁾ and others which proved abortive. The League members tended to retain resident ambassadors at the courts of other members and to supplement them with extraordinary embassies to deal with specific questions; Venice, for instance, had four resident ambassadors with Clement VII between 1525 and 1531, the poet Domenico Venier (b.1517), Francesco Pesaro, Antonio Soriano and Marcantonio Venier, but also sent three extraordinary embassies to the pope during the same period. There were English ambassadors in Spain and Rome, a papal nuncio to Francis I and to/

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1. An example of this is the widespread interest in the skirmish at Governolo in which Giovanni de' Medici received his fatal wound. See below p. 53.
 2. E.g. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 13. Lucca appears to have been anti-imperial, Cal. S.P. Spanish, 1527-9, 264-5.
 3. See below p. 32, 34-5, 253, 318-9.

to Venice,⁽¹⁾ another papal nuncio to Charles V, and representatives of the emperor throughout Europe. In Italy the emperor had various ambassadors and agents: Carraciolo and Sanchez at Venice, Sessa⁽²⁾ at Rome, Lope de Soria at Genoa, Ferrara, Hurtado da Mendoza, Don Hugo da Moncada, and the abbot of Najera in Lombardy. There were special negotiations between France and Spain, between France and England and between England and Spain. The papal correspondence at this date, particularly that conducted by Giberti, is especially valuable, since the pope was involved in so many negotiations simultaneously. Many of the most distinguished literary figures in Italy were active in the diplomatic world; Guicciardini, Machiavelli, Vettori, Castiglione, Navagero, and Nerli among them.⁽³⁾

There are many eye-witness accounts of the sack of Rome. Some are strictly contemporary; the accounts found in Sanuto's Diarii, the letters of Gonzaga, Como and Gattinara,⁽⁴⁾ the account by the Frenchman, Jean Cave,⁽⁵⁾ or the German, Cornelius de Fine,⁽⁶⁾ Others are more literary, the product of/

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Acciaiuoli
1. Ruberto Acciaiuoli, son of Donato Acciaiuoli and Maria Pazzi, d.1547, and Altobello Averoldi. Averoldi, who came from an ancient and respected family in Bergamo was born about 1468. He had studied at Pavia and Parma before moving to Rome. In 1497 he was made bishop of Pola and in 1505 Julius II sent him as vice-legate to Bologna, a position he also held under Leo X. In 1517 he was sent as nuncio to Venice where he remained until 1523. Between 1523 and 1524 he was once more vice-legate of Bologna where he restored the beautiful little church of S.Michele in Bosco. In May 1526 Clement sent him once more to Venice. He died in 1531. For his humanist culture see E. Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance, (London 1967), 99 seqq.
 2. Don Luis Fernandez de Cordoba, became by his marriage in 1520 with Elvira de Cordoba y Figuera, the only daughter of Gonsalvo, the duke of Sessa. He was present at the surrender of Granada in 1492, and then went to Flanders to join the court of Charles. He gained the emperor's favour by his prowess in tournaments and other knightly exercises and was sent as imperial ambassador to Rome in 1522. He died in 1526 (18 August) and was succeeded by his secretary Juan Perez.
 3. The bulk of the papal correspondence for this period, concerning foreign affairs, is to be found in A.S.V. Fondo Pio n.53, n.54, Lettere di Ministri della S.Sede. See also Guicciardini, Carteggi, Castiglione, Lettere. Nerli's letters, preserved in the Archivio di Stato at Modena, are of little general interest.
 4. Printed in Milanese, Sacco.
 5. Printed in Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'École Française de Rome (1896), 355 seqq.
 6. The diary of Cornelius de Fine which covers the years 1511-1531 is preserved in the Vatican Library, MS.Cod.Ottob.Lat.1613 and in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

of later reflection, like Giovio's account, or the many poetic descriptions of the sack,⁽¹⁾ and in these the literary quality of the work often tends towards perversion of the truth. The most notorious case of this is, of course, to be found in Cellini's autobiography.⁽²⁾ Other accounts, although not by eye-witnesses make use of materials provided by witnesses of the sack. Such an account is that of Brantôme⁽³⁾ who claimed that his material came from oral and written contemporary accounts and, in particular, from Spanish sources. A similar type of account is that of Buonaparte which, although not published until 1756 and, apparently a compilation, is usually accurate. Contemporary chronicles have been freely used but they tend to be very parochial in outlook.

Finally, use has been made of the general histories of the period. Guicciardini's monumental Storia d'Italia, Paruta's Dell'Istorie Veneziane, Varchi's Storia Fiorentina and Guazzo's Historie are among them. Here allowance has to be made for local and personal bias and for inaccuracies - Varchi is notoriously unreliable over dates - but these histories are invaluable in placing the sack of Rome in its Italian perspective and sometimes give detailed information not readily available elsewhere.

The use of Italian sources reveals that there is a considerable difference between strictly contemporary records, often highly critical of Charles V, and those records and reminiscences dating from after the imperial coronation. To take but one example; although the sack of Rome is assumed to be the direct responsibility of Charles V by practically every Italian observer writing before 1530, after that date it is never suggested that blame can be attached to anyone except the safely dead Bourbon.⁽⁴⁾

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1. For these see below p. 312-5.
 2. Transl. George Bull, The Autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini (London 1956).
 3. Brantôme, Oeuvres.
 4. Bourbon's unpopularity increased as the emperor's decreased. In 1562 the Council of Trent ordered that Bourbon's body be exhumed on the grounds that he died excommunicate. A. Lebey, Le Connétable de Bourbon (Paris 1904), 444, and see below p. 315.

Interest in the sack of Rome never completely died - witness the publication at Cologne in 1756 of Buonaparte's account, and two years later republication of L. Guicciardini's, Sacco di Roma, but this interest was inevitably revived at the time of the Risorgimento. This resulted in the publication, or republication, of many of the contemporary records of the sack. Of these publications the most important was that of Carlo Milanese, who, in 1867, published a collection of these records, including the important letters of Cardinal Como and of G.B. Gattinara.⁽¹⁾

The last separate account of the sack of Rome was that of Schulz, published in 1894⁽²⁾ with additional documentation, but although it contained a valuable bibliography it was a short and disappointing record, and is of little general interest. Orano set out to provide a full documentation and history of the sack of Rome. The first volume, containing Alberini's account, previously only available in manuscript, was published in 1895 in the Archivio della R. Società Romana di storia patria⁽³⁾ and in book form in 1901 but this volume was also to be the last.⁽⁴⁾ In recent years there has been no full account of the sack although descriptions of it have inevitably been included in studies of Rome, the papacy, and of Charles V. Of these the best account is to be found in P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento (Bologna 1948) but Pecchai gives no details of his sources and cannot relate the sack of Rome to a more general Italian or European context.

For the interrelation of Italian and European affairs no satisfactory work exists. On the rivalry of Francis I and Charles V no general work has appeared since that of F.M. Mignet, La Rivalité de Charles-Quint et de Francois Ier (Paris 1875) which is now out-of-date. Two French works cover the diplomatic/

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1. Ed. C. Milanese, Il sacco di Roma del MDXXVII. Narrazioni di Contemporanei (Florence 1867).
 2. Schulz, Der Sacco di Roma.
 3. Archivio della R. Società Romana di storia patria, xviii. 321-398.
 4. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, (Rome 1901). The second volume was to deal with the 'sacco nella letteratura' and volume vi a description of same in 1527 from the artistic point of view, according to Pastor, Papacy, ix. 388.

diplomatic history of France at least until 1526; G. Jacqueton, La Politique extérieure de Louise de Savoy (Paris 1892) and H. Hauser, Le Traité de Madrid et la cession de la Bourgogne à Charles-Quint (Dijon 1912). For the military history of the period the most useful work is still Piero Pieri, La crisi militare italiana nel rinascimento (Naples 1934). For Charles V himself recourse must be had to Brandi's biography.⁽¹⁾ For Brandi the Italian wars were essentially the result of dynastic preoccupations, turning on the question of Charles V's Burgundian inheritance.⁽²⁾ Italy was no more than a battlefield where the struggle between Hapsburg and Valois was played out. He regarded the imperial idea, so marked in correspondence relating to Italy, as an idea imposed on the emperor by Gattinara. In no sense does he see the struggle between Charles V and Clement VII as an extension of the old papal-imperial struggle which had dominated Italian history for so long. He regarded Burgundy as the key to Charles V's policies, rather than Charles's position as emperor with all that that implied both in a European context and more particularly in the Italian political and intellectual world.

According to Lord Acton, 'Nothing causes more error and unfairness in men's view of history than the interest which is inspired by individual characters'.⁽³⁾ This study of the sack of Rome in its Italian setting to some extent modifies the impression left by Brandi's great biography, concentrating less on the personality of Charles V, of Francis I or even of Clement VII, and more on the context within which they were operating and of which they were often curiously ignorant.⁽⁴⁾ But the early sixteenth century is an age in which/

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1. The edition used is K. Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, transl. C.V. Wedgwood (London 1965).
 2. This idea had already found expression in H. Hauser, Le Traité de Madrid et la cession de la Bourgogne à Charles-Quint (Dijon 1912) especially pp. 20-27.
 3. Quoted in D. Mathew, Lord Acton and his Times (London 1968), 91.
 4. Clement less so than Francis I or Charles V but even Clement could be naive in his relations with, for instance, Vespasiano Colonna.

which personalities do obtrude and are of importance; how else can one explain the position held by Wolsey and the respect felt for him throughout Europe? By showing how limited was his field of action this study attempts to partially rehabilitate Clement VII, who, apart from Vettori who was devoted to the entire Medici family, found few apologists even among his contemporaries.

I have made no attempt to translate sums of money mentioned in the text into modern equivalents. Even were it possible I doubt if it would be helpful. When writing about large sums of money contemporaries were often inaccurate. It is clear that frequently the Venetian and papal ducat, the scudo, crown and florin are treated as equivalent in value even when they were not. Yet, when they wanted to, the same contemporaries could be very exact about the value of the various currencies they were forced to deal in. Where it is clear that such a specific use is in question I have incorporated it into the text. On all other occasions sums are given in ducats.

In quotations I have not modernised the spelling nor the punctuation unless it has clarified the passage. Place names are given their modern spelling, with the exception of Melegnano which, in its sixteenth century context, is better known as Marignano. Borgo San Donnino is referred to by its modern name of Fidenza which it was given in 1907.

CHAPTER I

Italy after Morone's Conspiracy

'..... se bene li inimici danno speranza di pace
tamen è tanto el desiderio che hanno di consulare
Italia et successive di fare la Monarchia, che, obliti
graviorum rerum, mentre cerchano di addormentare ognuno
con buone parole, attendono con tutte le forze da altra
banda a fare con effecto el contraio.'

Guicciardini, Carteggi, x.200-1

Other countries had always had interests in Italy; ⁽¹⁾ in 1327 Sardinia, in 1406 Sicily had passed to the crown of Aragon; the French had been interested in Asti since the fourteenth century and had controlled Genoa for various periods since 1491. The Swiss held lands in Lombardy and the Hapsburgs ruled the Alto Adige, Trieste and Fiume. Since 1494 a struggle had been going on between Spain and France for control both of Naples and of Milan and ever since the fall of Constantinople there had been a real threat of Turkish invasion. But, even by 1525, it was still not clear that control over the political future of Italy had passed from Italian hands. Although the peninsula remained politically divided and therefore weak, Italy as a whole was both prosperous and powerful. Two dominant Italian powers had emerged, the papacy and Venice, for Naples was now linked to the fortunes of the Spanish monarchy, Florence was temporarily subjected to a Medici regime based in Rome, and the resources of the duchy of Milan had been exhausted in the struggle for control of Lombardy.

That Venice remained a great European power cannot be doubted. On the mainland, since the fourteenth century she had owned Vicenza, Feltre and Bassano, and in the first half of the fifteenth century she had added to her dominion Verona, Padua, Udine, Friuli, Brescia, Bergamo, Ravenna, Crema, Rovigo and the Polesine. Yet for a quarter of a century Venice had been under pressure from all quarters, not least from the Turks, against whom she had solicited aid from France as early as 1500. Between 1494 and 1503 Venice was scarcely touched by the Italian conflict but thereafter, threatened both on her eastern and western frontiers, she abandoned the eastern policy to 'defend Italy', leaning always towards a French alliance since both had a common enemy in the emperor. Until 1508 the Venetians profited from every Italian disaster; out of the Neapolitan conflict they gained Trani, Brindisi and Otranto, from Milan they took Cremona, while the ruin of Cesare Borgia made them the dominant threat in the Romagna. The League of Cambrai of 1508, although admittedly anti-Venetian, did little to weaken Venetian power in Italy. But there can be little doubt that the war which resulted from this League marked a turning-point in Italian history. It led to the first major defeat of the Venetians and to a decline in French power in northern Italy. Contemporary historians are unanimous in commenting that the war thereafter entered a more/

1. For a discussion of this question in relation to the theory of 'balance of power' in Italy before 1494 see M.P. Gilmore, The World of Humanism, (New York 1952) 139-144.

more brutal phase, as Italy became a mere field for exploitation by foreign powers with interests in the peninsula.

Nonetheless, the war demonstrated the enormous resilience of Venice and its viability as a mainland state. It was clear that to erode Venetian power to such an extent that she would no longer be a threat to any other power, bent on expansion in Italy, would be no easy task. Surprisingly, the population of the mainland provinces proved to be uncharacteristically loyal. In Il Principe Machiavelli strongly criticised Venetian methods of governing the mainland territories which, he said, 'tolsero loro tutto lo Stato';⁽¹⁾ but the Venetian recovery, after the overwhelming defeat at Agnadello (14 May 1509) was due in a large measure to popular support. During the war the Venetians had also proved themselves masters at supplying an army. At the siege of Padua, (July-October 1509), despite the loss of the heavy artillery at Agnadello and despite the fact that their principal munitions factory at Brescia was in enemy hands, the Venetians were able to supply better artillery than that possessed by the allies.

Venice retained her position as a great European power through her commercial strength, her remarkable stability and the solidarity of her subjects. The same cannot be said of her main contender for supremacy in Italy - the papal see. The Church State suffered from a constant financial crisis,⁽²⁾ frequent changes in regime, disorder, disloyalty and outright rebellion among her subjects. The strength of the papacy lay in the international position of the popes with all its attendant prestige, from a belief that the Church State was a great untapped bank on which other powers could draw in financing their wars, and from the extent and geographical location of the Church State. Straddling and dividing Italy as it did the Church State drew the popes both north and south and into every war in Italy as they tried to defend conflicting interests.⁽³⁾

Since the time of Alexander VI it had been clear that the only sure defence/

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1. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, ed. L.A. Burd (Oxford 1891), 330.
 2. See below p. 132-140.
 3. See below p. 241-269.

defence against an ultramontane power lay in the creation of a strong Church State, but, despite the efforts of successive popes, by 1525 this ideal had not been achieved. Many enclaves of particularism remained to cause trouble in the ensuing years. There had been no solution to the problem of maintaining continuity in a government which, although headed by one man, had no hereditary element. Administrations tended to be elderly and conservative, and changed with each successive occupant of St. Peter's chair. Drawn from diverse backgrounds, the popes succeeded late in life with totally different interests to maintain than those of the Church State. A vacancy might therefore lead to a total change in foreign or domestic policy, and because the popes tended to be elderly on succession vacancies were common. Between 1503 and 1526 there were four vacancies each provoking a partial collapse of papal power. On the death of Alexander VI, despite the administrative reforms of Cesare Borgia in the Church State, the Vitelli returned to Città de Castello, Gianpaolo Baglioni forced his way back into Perugia, while Piombino, Urbino, Pesaro, Camerino and Sinigaglia all took back their local signori. On the death of Julius II, Gianpaolo Baglioni again seized the occasion to return to Perugia and it is significant that one of the reasons put forward for the elevation of Giovanni de' Medici to the pontificate as Leo X was that he might create a powerful central Italian state. But again, on the death of Leo in 1521, the duke of Urbino repossessed himself of his duchy, except the fortress of San Leo, took Perugia and drove out Gentile Baglioni, and threatened Siena and Florence. A minor war broke out when the Florentines advanced on Perugia and Giovanni de' Medici retook Montefeltre. It was in vain that the Sacred College ordered the cessation of hostilities until the arrival of Adrian VI, for it lacked either the authority or the resources to raise an effective papal army to check the chaos in the Church State. Sigismondo Varano re-entered Camerino and the duke of Ferrara inevitably threatened Modena and Reggio.⁽¹⁾ The short reign of Adrian VI was followed by a vacancy of unprecedented length. Este wasted no time in turning the vacancy to account and moved against Modena and Reggio. It was due only to the energetic measures of Guicciardini that Modena did not fall but Reggio and Rubiera capitulated as soon as the duke presented himself.

It is possible that a stable state could have survived these interregna/

1. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 1-2.

interregna without incident but, even after the campaigns of Cesare Borgia, the Church State was by no means consolidated. In the south family frictions and quarrels, particularly between the Colonna and the Orsini,⁽¹⁾ in the Romagna the ambitions of the petty tyrants and the vicars of the Church, and in the north the problems of Bologna, Ferrara and Urbino made the Church State one of the most constantly disturbed areas in Europe.

Clement's hand as pope should have been strengthened by the fact that he ruled both the Church State and Florence, whose wealth was famous, but already by 1525 the decline of Florence, in relation to other powers, was marked. Since 1494 she had passed from crisis to crisis: changes of regime, the war with Pisa, alarming and endemic financial troubles, a protracted quarrel with the duke of Urbino, and almost constant border conflict with Siena.

Siena and Florence were constantly at odds, ostensibly over such disputed territories as Montepulciano, and over the unfortunate habit each had of protecting and fostering the ambitions of the fuorusciti from the other. These minor conflicts were a symptom of a deeper hostility. Although Siena had long played a commercial role far inferior to that of Florence, she was jealous of an independence which, it was justly feared, was threatened by Florentine ambition. The border between the two states was perpetually disturbed, and gave ample opportunity for the intermention of external powers. In addition, any internal change in the regime of Siena, tended to produce international complications for the Orsini, the Medici and, to a lesser extent, the French had links with one of the dominant factions and the imperialists with another.⁽²⁾

Of the other smaller Italian states Urbino should be mentioned here, for, in the person of its duke, Urbino was to play a significant role in the events of the pontificate of Clement VII. Situated in the centre of the Romagna, and closely involved with Venice, Ferrara and Perugia, the problem of Urbino was hardly distinguishable from that of the rest of the Church State. It had been material for the ambitions of Cesare Borgia, who had taken it in 1502, but it was not until the pontificate of Leo X that the duchy became a factor of real importance in Italian politics. The fact that the duke of Urbino had defaulted in his obligations to the papacy and seems to have been in communication with the French emphasises the difficulties faced by the popes in dealing with the semi-independent states within their borders. There is no doubt that Leo was/

1. See below p. 75-81.

2. See below p. 16-17.

was forced to take action against Urbino but the long war depleted papal resources⁽¹⁾ and the substitution of Lorenzo de' Medici for della Rovere as duke created apprehension in France and Spain that central Italy would become a hereditary Medici state. But perhaps the most unfortunate consequence was the hatred instilled into Francesco della Rovere for all the Medici. In the event Clement VII would embark on a war allied to a power whose captain-general was determined to do all in his power to bring down the Medici family.

Within this Italian context we have to consider two major confrontations. The first, which was of European significance, is that between Hapsburg and Valois. The second is between the dissolving campanalismo of even the smallest Italian cities and the centralised government of Charles V who could not bear that Italy should thwart him in his twin crusades against the Turk and heresy. Although aware from personal experience of the difficulties of a large, centralised government,⁽²⁾ there is nothing to indicate that Charles had any sympathy with the small political unit. Ambassadors from small Italian states talking vaguely about 'liberty' reminded the emperor and his advisers of nothing so much as the revolt of the comuneros.⁽³⁾ The emperor never understood the real nature of the divisions which continued to perpetuate discord in Italy, which is hardly surprising since they were a constant source of amazement to his subordinates. At least one of his advisers was prepared to equate the Italian divisions with the worst kind of moral iniquity and to argue that the plague was a just punishment for the failure of Italy to unite under the imperial aegis.⁽⁴⁾

1. See below p. 135.

2. See, for example, Charles V's remark to Castiglione and Salviati in December 1525 that he wanted no more states for himself, 'anzi che avea pur troppo Stato', Castiglione, Lettere, ii.12, a demonstrable truth which does not seem to have modified his policy at all in these early years.

3. See, for example, Sessa's comments on events in Siena, 4 May 1525, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 149 and ibid. 1527-9, 265.

4. Lope de Soria, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 716, see also ibid. 1525-26, 365. It was a view endorsed by the French, Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii.1049.

For the events under review were played out in the grim context of an epidemic of plague which can be paralleled only by the Black Death, an epidemic caused by famine and consequent malnutrition. The causes of this were the deprivations of large armies and a series of remarkably bad harvests. Plague was spread rapidly throughout Italy by the armies of both sides and all efforts made by Italian governments to halt the contagion proved to be useless.⁽¹⁾

In Italy any crisis was liable to create a famine. In these years shortages and deprivation became general and could not be alleviated by governments whose total resources were bound up in a war effort and who were suffering from the general shortage of specie.⁽²⁾ Only Sicily managed to sustain her output of grain in this period. Year after year, particularly in Lombardy and the Church State, the ravages of the armies, the activities of bandits, destroyed crops before they could be harvested. Apart from the difficulties brought about by prolonged warfare, natural disasters account for some of the scarcity. Throughout Italy, 1527 was universally remembered, not only because Rome was sacked, but also for the exceedingly poor harvest. Summer came very late; even in April there was snow in the north and in central Italy, accompanied and followed by heavy rains which continued into May. The Po flooded and destroyed the crops in the Mantovano.⁽³⁾ June and July were also cold and wet,⁽⁴⁾ 'e nel Patrimonio, che suole essere tanto de grano non si trovava acino!⁽⁵⁾ In June, normally the harvest month, the corn standing in the fields was still green, 'ne punto danno segno di maturarse!⁽⁶⁾ By the following spring the hospitals in Venice were crowded out with peasants/

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1. For details of the plague epidemic see below Appendix.
 2. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 13. At Venice currency problems were increased by an influx of debased foreign currency, Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 166.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 162, 198.
 4. Brigozzo, 'Cronaca', 469, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 283.
 5. 'Memorie Perugine de Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt. 2,311.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 314.

peasants dying of starvation and in the autumn there was famine throughout the Romagna, Lombardy and Tuscany where Florence was forced to shut her gates against the starving contadini.⁽¹⁾ Price controls had to be imposed everywhere. In December 1527 rationing was introduced in Venice; the price of corn was fixed and arrangements were made for the free distribution of bread to the poor.⁽²⁾ In March 1528 the price of corn was fixed at Padua, Treviso, and Vicenza.⁽³⁾ Throughout Europe the harvest was bad in two successive years; it failed in the Regno and in Spain in 1528-9; there was no surplus corn in northern Europe and Venice was unable to import any from Turkey.⁽⁴⁾ Venice was in fact driven to seek corn farther and farther afield. In recognition of the necessity of procuring wheat substantial bounties were promised to anyone who managed to import any and the state amended its normal requirements that maritime insurances effected at Venice should only be valid on vessels which were either Venetian property or Venetian-built, in favour of all vessels importing grain.⁽⁵⁾ Only Sicily and France produced even a small surplus in these years; from France Cardinal Cybo tried to import grain for the relief of Italy and Genoa armed four extra vessels to import grain from Sicily.⁽⁶⁾

Natural disasters contributed but part of the sufferings endured in Italy. There was warfare which seemed to drag on with no end in sight and warfare meant huge, unpaid, unfed armies marauding through the countryside. With the exception of Lucca and Piombino, there was no state in Italy which did not suffer in some degree from these armies; Milan, Naples, Florence and the Church State were the worst affected.⁽⁷⁾ Nor could it be maintained that/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 202, 294, xlix. 121, 126, 128, Braudel, Monde Méditerranée, 278, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 164.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 409, 413-4.
 3. *Ibid.* xlvii. 85.
 4. *Ibid.* xlvi. 275, Molini, Documenti, ii. 228.
 5. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 92, 99. For Venice see also Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 656.
 6. Molini, Documenti, ii. 87, Guazzo, Historie, 71. For the situation in Milan in February 1528 see Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 570-1.
 7. E.g. Catani, Ricordi, 222.

that the war had brought political profit; fought basically to prevent the imperial domination of Italy it ended, through exhaustion, with the imperialists more firmly entrenched in power than ever.

The crushing French defeat at Pavia in some ways had not improved the imperial position in Italy. The apparent downfall of the French cause impressed on the Italians, overnight, as no anti-imperial propaganda had so far done, the tremendous threat which Charles V represented to Italy.⁽¹⁾ Matters were not improved by the fact that Charles, as the Italians were not slow to perceive, could provide a legal cloak for almost anything he might choose to do. As Guicciardini pointed out, the imperial position in relation to Italy was so ill-defined that almost any extension of power by the emperor might be justified, 'che può colorare questo appetito (for an extension of his control) con fondamenti di ragione, perchè in un certo modo el dominio di tutto el mondo appartiene a Cesare, et si può provare la giustitia sua con tali argomenti che non è meraviglia che lui ... si persuada potere lecitamente occupare tutti gli stati d'altri'.⁽²⁾ To make matters worse, the success at Pavia had released from the imperial chancery where the anti-French⁽³⁾ and anti-papal Gattinara was at his most powerful, a flood of propaganda proclaiming the messianic mission of the emperor, Valdes claimed the victory as the gift of God. Now the emperor would be able to press on to recapture Constantinople and Jerusalem. The whole world would soon be united under the just rule of Charles V.⁽⁴⁾

Despite constant professions of goodwill towards the Italian states, it seems certain that, at least by early 1525, Charles V had become convinced/

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1. For the opinion of Guicciardini and Machiavelli see Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton 1965), 241: 'After the victory of the forces of Charles V over the French in the battle of Pavia in 1525, both Guicciardini and Machiavelli were convinced that ... the basic requirement for political action by any Italian state was to break the hold of Charles V over Italy'. Pavia also left a profound impression on Giberti, 'Il concorso grande delle cose che mi hanno quasi tolto da me pensando alla potenza della fortuna che abbia in un subito depresso un tanto Re in estrema miseria'. Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii. 834.
 2. Ed. P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di F. Guicciardini, 48. Gattinara's views on the emperor and imperialism in Europe were characteristically Italian, and not as unique as Brandi implies. Brandi, Charles V, 90-91, 153-154. See below p. 20.
 3. For Gattinara's very low opinion of Francis I see Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 30-2.
 4. M. Bataillon, Erasme et l'Espagne (Paris 1937), 243-6, has a full account of the reaction in Spain to the news of Pavia.

convinced that to achieve a general peace, a council of the church, and a crusade against the Turkish empire, which now threatened his dominions on three fronts, he must first gain complete control in Italy. In February, 1526 the Venetians were informed by a 'very reliable' source that, 'Cesare non è mai come sua Maestà ha ditto per tuor impresa contra infideli, se prima non haverà distrutta overo messo ad obedientia doi Stati, videlicet la Illustrissima Signoria de Venetia et signor fiorentini, non mancando di menezar etiam al Papa'.⁽¹⁾ In this sense Charles certainly desired the 'monarchia d'Italia'. Without a doubt he could dispense with the actual title but the power he must have. Most of the emperor's advisers on Italian affairs were of the same opinion, notably Gattinara, Moncada, Lannoy, Perez and Lope de Soria.⁽²⁾

Within three months of Pavia the implications of all this in real terms was seen in a series of events at Siena. On 6th April 1525 a band of Ghibelline Libertini led by Girolamo Severino murdered the Medici and French supported Alessandro Bichi, recognised head of the republic, who had been installed with the assistant of the duke of Albany.⁽³⁾ Everything which had been done since Bichi's accession to power was annulled; the Monte de' Nobili Reggenti which Bichi had created by amalgamating the Nove, the Gentiluomini, and the Popolo was dissolved. A new Balia was created and a new magistracy, the fifteen, later twenty-one, Conservatori di Libertà.⁽⁴⁾ The revolution represented a complete victory for the Ghibelline faction and a month later Sessa, the imperial ambassador at Rome, was ordered to Siena to help set up the government, although this was not a task he undertook with much enthusiasm.⁽⁵⁾ The Siennese/

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 840.

2. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 36-7, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 447, Brandi, Charles V, 205-206.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 138, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 282.

4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 159-160.

5. Ibid. 149.

Siennese were busily proclaiming their unswerving loyalty to the emperor and although Sessa took a very pessimistic view of the whole affair,⁽¹⁾ Charles was already being encouraged to think of the Siennese as his subjects, 'the Emperor may command them as he would the inhabitants of Valladolid or of any other town in Spain'.⁽²⁾ To the Italian states, Florence and the papacy in particular, it appeared that the fall and exile of the Noveschi⁽³⁾ from Siena represented an extension of imperial influence in central Italy which it was impossible to countenance.

It seemed likely that the Italian states would unite in common opposition to the emperor. Yet it was apparent that no longer would this be sufficient. The fate of Italy must depend on the intervention of other powers against Charles V, France, if at all possible, but failing that England or Turkey.⁽⁴⁾ Italy could not rely on her own mercenary armies to halt the spread of imperial power. After Pavia, France was flattered as the potential saviour of Italy by all the Italian states and not just by francophile Florence.⁽⁵⁾ In December 1526 Acciaiuoli told Francis I that the whole strength of Italy united was no longer enough to resist Charles V; 'mi pare che lo stato della impresa sia ridotto in termine per la malvagia nostra fortuna, che, se la Maestà Vostra non versa a questo tratto la possanza tutta di Francia e lo intelletto e l'animo alla salute comune, l'Italia sarà sotto il servizio del l'Imperatore in brevissimo tempo'.⁽⁶⁾

Yet if France were to be persuaded to intervene once more in Italian politics it would not be to save Italy for Italy's sake. France and Spain would fight for possession of Milan and, on a broader field, for control of Italy, as part of a much wider struggle, a struggle over Burgundy, a struggle to prevent the encirclement of France and a struggle for control of the Mediterranean. To gain control of the inland sea, an offensive policy partially/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 203.

2. ibid. 247.

3. Bichi was a member of the Monte de' Nove.

4. As the imperialists were well aware, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 267, ibid. 1527-9, 56.

5. E.g. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 212.

6. Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii. 864.

partially inherited from Ferdinand of Aragon, had now become an integral part of imperial policy for it was essential to the defence of the rich granary of Sicily which fed the empire.⁽¹⁾ In April 1525 Lope de Soria pointed out that, sooner or later, the imperialists would have to capture Marseilles, the major French ship-building port on the Mediterranean coast, 'so as to have the command of the Mediterranean, ensure navigation, do away with pirates, and remove all causes of anxiety to Genoa, Naples and Sicily'.⁽²⁾ Imperial concern over control of the sea and the interest in Naples explain the pronounced imperial hostility to Venice. The Venetians and the French who saw the drift of imperial policy reacted by strengthening their ties with Turkey,⁽³⁾ struck at the sea-ports of Naples, at Genoa, at Sicily and above all at Sardinia, that vital but weak link in the Spanish sea-defences. Since it was as important to Turkey and Venice as it was to France that control of the Mediterranean should not fall to Charles V, despite considerable internal strains, based on a divergence of interests in Italy,⁽⁴⁾ the alliance between France and Venice survived and the Turkish interest in the outcome of events in Italy was maintained.

Meanwhile the capture of the French king, the destruction of his army and the presence of the imperial army in the duchy of Milan, had done nothing to solve the two most pressing problems of the imperialists in Italy, dissension among their leaders and the lack of supplies and money with which to pay the army. Pay of the army, or, more accurately, failure to pay the army, is a distressing theme which runs through all negotiations in the years 1525-30.⁽⁵⁾ Although, in theory, overwhelmingly powerful, the imperialists were so weakened by their inability to keep up with army pay that at critical moments they were driven to negotiate, often to the imperial disadvantage.

Thus Pavia was followed by immediate peace negotiations with the aim of extracting money from those powers who were prepared to finance a general/

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1. For a supporting interpretation see, for example, Giuseppe Coniglio, Il Regno di Napoli al Tempo di Carlo V, (Naples 1951), 250-2.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 137-8.
 3. E.g. ibid. 1527-9, 150.
 4. It was, for instance, obvious that French and Venetian aims in Naples were incompatible and there was a considerable divergence in their views over Milan. For a more detailed investigation see below p. 27-8.
 5. It was a common phenomenon throughout the century.

general pacification of Italy. On 29 March Najera informed the emperor that the principle business of the imperialists, since the battle of Pavia, had been to procure from the Italian states the 600,000 ducats already owing to the army on the day of the battle. He reported that he was 'very much afraid that it will be necessary, in the end, to appeal to force, for the parties do not seem inclined to pay'.⁽¹⁾ After the battle Lannoy dispatched Schomberg to negotiate peace with the pope, 'perché il viceré e gli altri capitani avevano per allora due pensieri: l'uno di provvedere a' danari per sodisfare l'esercito ... l'altro di condurre la persona del re di Francia in luogo che la difficoltà del guardarlo non gli avesse a tenere in continuo travaglio'.⁽²⁾ In order to apply a little pressure to Clement and to relieve their own supply difficulties the imperialists simultaneously sent 400 lances and 8,000 lansquenets to take up quarters in the Piacentino. The Colonna, meanwhile, attacked Orsini territory.

An agreement was hurriedly signed between Clement and the imperialists on 1 April 1525 by which both sides made substantial concessions. There were important financial clauses; Florence, which was included, paid 100,000 ducats and Clement agreed to pay a further 100,000 if the viceroy persuaded Ferrara to restore Reggio and Rubiera. To Clement's benefit, apart from the rather vague clauses concerning Ferrara, there was an agreement to defend Sforza in the duchy of Milan, the imperial troops were to be withdrawn from the Church State, the papal rights in Naples were upheld and it was arranged that salt, purchased by the duchy of Milan from Cervia, should be paid for at the price agreed between Leo X and Francis I and confirmed by the emperor in 1521. Charles V was to ratify the agreement within four months.

Financial agreements were also the basis of treaties made with other Italian states; Lucca was taken into imperial protection on the payment of 10,000 ducats, Montferrat on payment of 15,000 ducats and Siena on payment of the same sum. Francesco Sforza was to pay 600,000 ducats for the investiture of the duchy of Milan.

Whether the imperialists ever intended to observe the peace is doubtful. Lannoy advised the emperor not to ratify the agreement and Charles appears to have acted on his advice. In his instructions to his lieutenants in Italy, the emperor did not speak of peace, but rather of punishment, of chastisement,/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 105.

2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 273.

chastisement, particularly in relation to the pope, Venice, and Florence.⁽¹⁾ Lannoy continued to support Ferrara and the pro-imperial party in Seina and never removed his troops from the Church State.

The inability of the imperial commanders to find satisfactory quarters for their troops, who were forced to live off the country, scarcely endeared them to the Italians. By July Clement showed every sign of tearing up his agreement with the emperor for Pescara was still quartering the majority of his troops on the Church State. The rest of the army was quartered in Piedmont where it proved to be highly unpopular; 'Only the other day, at Turin, because a Spaniard ... happened to kick a dog in the street, the people rose in arms, killed five or six soldiers'.⁽²⁾ Clement placed the worst possible construction on the behaviour of the imperialists against whom he was already working, for he reported that he had heard, 'che le parole di tutta la Corte di Cesare erano pieno di mala disposizione contro alle cose d'Italia; e seppe anche i capitani dello exercito suo cercavano di persuadergli che per assicurarsi totalmente l'Italia era bene fare restituire Modena al Duca di Ferrara, rimettere i Bentivoglieri a Bologna, pigliare il dominio di Firenze, di Siena e di Lucca, come terre appartenenti a l'Impero'.⁽³⁾

As Charles had no wish to ratify his treaties with the Italian powers Morone's⁽⁴⁾ conspiracy proved extremely useful; while complaining bitterly of the ill-usage he had received from Sforza, the emperor was able to point out that although the Italian powers had no reason to suspect him, he had reason to suspect them, for there was clear proof that they had been working against his interests in Italy. It was but one more reason to delay ratifying treaties made by his lieutenants and which were, in any case, now out of date.⁽⁵⁾

The likelihood of success for Morone's conspiracy had depended on the divisions among the imperial commanders, resulting from Lannoy's removal of Francis I to Spain without the knowledge or consent of Pescara and Bourbon, /

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1. E.g. His instructions to Lannoy after Pavia in A. Bardi, 'Carlo V e l'Assedio de Firenze', A.S.I. 5th ser., xi, 22.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 223-224.
 3. Quoted in ed. P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di Francesco Guicciardini, 17.
 4. See below p.21. Discontent among the imperialists was turned to account by Girolamo Morone, High Chancellor of Milan, who began to plot against Charles V.
 5. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 4-5.

Bourbon, of his claiming major responsibility for the victory at Pavia, and on the disappointment of Pescara whose great services to Charles V had gone unrewarded. In the light of his knowledge of the situation and of his friendship with Pescara, Morone, the chancellor of Milan, relying upon the promises of French aid made by Louise of Savoy, began to plot against Charles V. Clement and Giberti suggested to Morone a general Italian league; with the consent of Venice and of Francesco Sforza, Pescara was to be made king of Naples, on condition that he took the military management of the enterprise; the duke of Milan was to be secured in his dominions and the forces of the league would drive all imperial and French troops out of Italy. When the project was put before him Pescara affected to accept and perhaps really intended to do so, but eventually he revealed all to Charles V. Morone was arrested on 15 October and Pescara immediately demanded entrance to Milan. The city assented and on 2 November the imperialists entered Milan, Sforza retiring to the castello.⁽¹⁾

After imperial occupation the city of Milan retained as much of its independence as it had done under the Sforza. The autonomy which the city had first acquired in 1515 had been unaffected by any subsequent events. Since, as far as it is possible to be certain, the majority of the Milanese remained obstinately anti-imperial, the occupying forces were at a considerable disadvantage. The imperialists expected to be able to pay their troops from taxation of Milan but found that money could be raised only after protracted arguments, negotiation and threats.⁽²⁾ The inhabitants of the rest of the duchy were subjected to the same treatment. In November 1525 the imperialists could only find labourers for the new siege works by threatening to sack the small towns around the capital.⁽³⁾ Despite threats, the Milanese officials were refusing to exercise their offices in the imperial name.⁽⁴⁾ On 21 November the Senate pointed out that Sforza had not yet been found guilty, 'e però havendone Vostra Excellentia exhortati ad conservare iustitia, questo serio principio di fare/

1. Burigozzo, 'Cronaca', 448-449, Cal S.P. Venetian 1520-6, 501.

2. See below p. 142.

3. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 325.

4. Ibid. xl. 329-330.

fare contrari effecti, chè (se) cominziono ad fare il torto verso di noi, se potria credere che male a li altri se administrasse ragione'.⁽¹⁾ The commune continued to honour loans which had been made against the treasury of the duchy although the imperialists wanted to appropriate this money.⁽²⁾ At the beginning of January the Milanese again informed the imperialists that they would swear no oath to Charles V while the city was still occupied by imperial troops.⁽³⁾ Since force, however, remained in imperial hands, it was only a question of time before Milan had to give way. At the end of January, after six of the city parishes had agreed to swear an oath of fidelity, imperialist troops were garrisoned on the remaining recalcitrant twelve parishes⁽⁴⁾ and Spanish troops began sacking the suburbs.⁽⁵⁾ At the end of February Sforza's officials were forcibly removed and replaced by imperial nominees who were to hold office in the emperor's name. On 24 February the population of Milan finally took a new oath of fidelity to these officials.⁽⁶⁾ The imperialists could therefore fairly be regarded as the masters of Milan and it was this fact which was preoccupying the other European powers.

The importance of Milan lay not so much in her wealth, which a quarter-century of warfare had rendered negligible, as in the strategic interest which other countries had in Lombardy. By 1525 this meant the interest of France and Spain, for, after 1515, the Swiss were too weak to intervene decisively in the duchy, although they had a considerable interest in preventing it falling to the emperor, and Venice was no longer expanding into Lombardy. But the emperor and the French remained peculiarly obstinate over Milan and neither was prepared to abandon its control to the other. Charles V could not permit France to hold the duchy for, if she did, communication between Austria and Spain by the most direct route was impossible, Genoa would be lost to the imperialists and Naples was directly threatened. On the other hand if Milan were held by Charles V he could contain Venice, maintain an imperialist-minded government in Genoa and dominate Italy.⁽⁷⁾

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 343.

2. Ibid. 408.

3. Ibid. 606, 631, Cal S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 523.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 725.

5. Ibid. 738.

6. Ibid. xli. 42.

7. L. Marini, La Spagna in Italia nell'Età di Carlo V (Bologna 1961), 83-84.

This last was what the Italian states feared.⁽¹⁾ For this reason the period under consideration is that during which the 'Libertà di Milano' can be identified with the 'Libertà d'Italia', the latter phrase being used by the Italians not to indicate any real unity but rather to mean the liberty to continue to exist free from the domination of any ultramontane power. But already the threat of such a barbarian domination was forcing the different states, Venice, Florence, the Church State, Ferrara, Mantua, into a novel definition of the word, 'Italia'. Threatened, either by the great power complex of Charles V or by Francis I and the resources which both could command, the Italian states were forced into alliances of interest which aimed to provide comparable resources. Under these pressures 'Italia' came to mean not only what it had always meant, a geographical location whose inhabitants had been privileged to share to a greater degree than elsewhere the benefits of Romanisation, but also an area commonly threatened, meeting the threat with a common defence and pooled resources.⁽²⁾ By 1525 the Italians saw that they would stand or fall together and on more than one occasion during the next five years were able to subordinate the particular to the general interest. In this sense the army raised under the terms of the League of Cognac, itself an outstanding example of this subordination of the particular interest, was the first Italian army⁽³⁾ the Italian powers were prepared to accept, and, indeed, after the Treaty of Madrid none seriously challenged, the Spanish right to Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, but none welcomed the Spanish presence in Milan. If, therefore, Charles aim was the pacification of Italy, Gattinara was right when he advised the emperor not to take Milan for himself.⁽⁴⁾ In December 1525/

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1. 'Gli animi Italiani non potevano per modo alcuno soffrire la servitù sforzata; la quale cosa gli pareva propinqua se S.Maestà avesse il reame di Napoli e lo stato di Milano'. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 12.
 2. For a partial discussion of this question from one contemporary point of view see V. Ilardi, 'Italianità' among some Italian intellectuals in the early sixteenth century', Traditio, xii, 338-367.
 3. For a similar view see Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 149, 'Never in those years was a war entered on in Italy, with a more willing and cheerful spirit. That spring there was something new in the air. There was already something national about the enterprise, even if the nation had yet to come into being'.
 4. Brandi, Charles V, 206. Charles was given quite the opposite advice by his military advisers in Italy. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 365. F. Chadbod, Lo Stato di Milano nel prima metà del Secolo XVI (Rome 1954), 26.

December 1525 Clement explained to Charles, 'per li ministri (di Carlo) in Italia, el ducato di Milano fu levato al duca et egli nel castello assediato, et la obedientia redutta a nome di Cesare, la qual cosa tolse ogni speranza et ogni disegno ad ogniuno di potere mai piu quietare ... con ... apparantia manifesta della ruinia de Italia'.⁽¹⁾ The Venetians were determined that Milan should go neither to Charles nor to his brother.⁽²⁾ The possibility that Charles might give the duchy to the Archduke Ferdinand was a real threat to Venice which at the time of the previous emperor, Maximilian, had experienced the vulnerability of her virtually indefensible northern border and of the reality of imperial pretensions in northern Italy. It was well-known that the archduke had been campaigning vigorously to be given Milan,⁽³⁾ and in January 1526 he dispatched Salamanca, his most influential councillor, to ask the emperor for the duchy.⁽⁴⁾ On 23 January it was reported from Austria that Ferdinand thought of nothing but getting the duchy for himself and that at a time when he was under considerable pressure on his eastern frontier Ferdinand should be prepared to dispatch Frundsberg and his lansquenets into Italy was indeed evidence of the archduke's serious intent.⁽⁵⁾

The possibility that Ferdinand might have Milan was but one imperial alternative. Martin de Salinas and Mendoza advised Charles V to take the duchy for himself. There is little evidence of the emperor's real intentions but it is even possible that, as Gattinara advised, he envisaged from the beginning a restoration of Sforza, although, as early as November 1525, Pescara was instructed that offices in the duchy should be held directly in the emperor's name.⁽⁶⁾ Yet another contender was Bourbon, who was led to believe that he would be given Milan in compensation for his confiscated French estates and for the loss/

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1. Quoted in F. Chadbod, Lo Stato di Milano nel prima metà del Secolo XVI (Rome 1954), 27.
 2. Lanz, Correspondenz, 323-4.
 3. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 28.
 4. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt. 1, 857.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 680, 726.
 6. Ibid. 329.

loss of the Queen-dowager of Portugal, Charles' sister, previously promised to Bourbon as his wife but now destined for Francis I. Bourbon's claim was consistently resisted by Clement VII but he had some support from the English who might have been able to induce the pope to accept Bourbon as duke of Milan as the price of peace in Italy.⁽¹⁾ Castiglione was convinced that peace in Italy would be impossible were the duchy not given to Bourbon. Aware that having broken his word to Bourbon over the marriage of his sister, he would only be able to retain the duke's loyalty if he honoured his promise in relation to Milan, Charles was unable to accept any Italian plans for the duchy. In December 1525 Clement tried to break the now-existing dead-lock over Milan. Believing that Sforza's implication in Morone's conspiracy made him unacceptable to the emperor, the pope suggested that Federico Gonzaga should replace him and Mantua be given to Bourbon, a Gonzaga descendant through his mother. Somewhat tactlessly Clement also offered Federico the crown of Naples but this the marquis had the sense to decline. In any case, since Bourbon would not agree to it, the emperor had to veto the whole project.⁽²⁾

It was clear that if the Italian powers were serious about Milan their only chance lay in an appeal to arms and that quickly before the fall of the citadels of Milan and Cremona should leave the imperialists more firmly entrenched than ever. Yet this was not a task to be embarked on lightly. It would be no easy labour to dislodge the imperialists from Italy. At this period, when only in exceptional circumstances were armies risked in a full-scale battle, the advantage lay always with the occupying power which could only be defeated if it had not had time to fortify the principle strategic positions, or if it proved unable to endure protracted sieges, starvation or disease. The imperial position in Naples was strong although Charles still lacked control of the sea routes. All of the duchy of Milan, save the citadels of Cremona and Milan, was in imperial hands, guarded by a veteran Spanish army of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, distributed between Alessandria, Pavia, Cremona, Lodi and Milan, which, after the death of Pescara, had been placed under the control of his nephew, del Gusto and of Antonio da Leyva.⁽³⁾ Genoa, also, was in imperial/

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1. Neither France nor Venice would accept. For this interesting episode see Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii. 850, Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 82, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 526.
 2. A. Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma (Milan 1908), 15.
 3. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 11.

imperial hands; there was a pro-imperial government in Siena and in Ferrara; Mantua was terrorised to the extent of being unable to declare against Charles V, while even the Lucchesi were paying the emperor vast sums of money and refusing to declare either for or against him.⁽¹⁾ Italy was divided and exhausted and France had been morally shattered by the disaster of Pavia. From the beginning the attempt made, under the terms of the League of Cognac to dislodge the imperialists from Italy had the appearance of a foolhardy, although inevitable, exercise.

1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 13.

CHAPTER II

The Italian League and Clement VII

'Cosi ha facto sempre chi ha governato questa impresa: tardo nelle deliberationi, tardissimo nelle executione, in modo che habbiamo perso tucte le occasione'.

Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 195

Many months, occupied in negotiation, stretched between the disaster at Pavia and the signing at Cognac of what became known as the Italian League. The League remained in existence from May 1526 until the signing of the Peace of Cambrai in 1529.⁽¹⁾ Three of the original signatories survived as nominal allies until this date; France, which chose to use rather than to fulfil her obligations to the League, the bankrupt duke of Milan, totally dependent on Venetian subsidies, and Venice. It was Venetian diplomacy which was chiefly responsible, first, for the creation of the League and, finally, for keeping it alive, despite adverse circumstances and serious defections. Venice always hoped for the inclusion of Ferrara but, of those approached, only the pope, Venice, France and Milan became open belligerents before April 1527 when Florence, which, originally, had not been named for fear of damaging her trade with the emperor's dominions, also declared for the League. England was favourable to the League, had indeed been one of its chief instigators, and continued to indicate that she might eventually join it. Mantua vacillated⁽²⁾ and Lucca, although, according to the⁽³⁾ imperialists favouring the League, remained neutral throughout.

um The complication of the negotiations leading to the signing of the League of Cognac can to some extent be clarified by examining the motives of the signatories. Remarkable is the constant determination of Clement VII, Venice, and, of course, Sforza that Milan should be freed from foreign control. Clement, indeed, professed to believe that the sole purpose of the League was the restoration of Sforza to Milan.⁽⁴⁾ It is highly dubious whether Francis I supported this policy. French adherence to a league, ostensibly directed towards the establishment of an independent Milanese state, did not represent the abandonment of French claims to the duchy. For Francis, the League represented an opportunity to continue his struggle with Charles V, largely at Italian expense. The necessary inclusion of France made it impossible to define a single objective. The Italian League came into existence and survived, /

1. See below p. 318-9.

2. See below p. 73-4.

3. For Lucca see Cal S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 264-5.

4. Ibid. 513.

survived, as a loose military alliance of states who for many different reasons were opposing the armies of Charles V in Italy. French interests were directed towards Genoa, Naples and the eventual restoration of French power in Milan. Clement VII feared that the Church State would be isolated between a Spanish Milan and a Spanish Naples, that Charles V as emperor would make a reality of his territorial pretensions in Lombardy, Central Italy and Tuscany in particular, in Siena, Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, that he would come in person to Italy and summon the general council which Clement personally dreaded. Venice was apprehensive about the dangers of invasion from the north. Her constant preoccupation was that the Archduke Ferdinand might replace Sforza as duke of Milan thus leaving Venice open to constant invasion from the north and erosion of her northern and western boundaries. It was scarcely a generation since the Emperor Maximilian had made his erratic forays into northern Italy to re-establish his rights in the Veneto.⁽¹⁾ In Apulia also, the emperor and Venice had conflicting interests. As for Sforza, fear alone drove him into the League, for there was no doubt about his complicity in Morone's conspiracy. Sforza respected and admired Clement VII, indeed was one of the few contemporaries who did, but he equally respected Charles V. He was never able to trust France, Venice, which he suspected of having designs on Cremona, Ferrara or Mantua while he heartily despised and disliked the duke of Urbino. His only aim was to recover his duchy.⁽²⁾

It was, above all, France, which proved to be the weak link in the League she was supposed to strengthen and uphold. The League was entered into by the Italian states with enthusiasm, with a belief in the destiny of Italy freed from foreign domination, and with the conviction that there were general interests which overrode the particular. There is no indication that Francis shared any of this enthusiasm, nor is there any reason why he should have. From the first he imposed his own particular interests on the League and interpreted his role in it as he saw fit. He never lived up to Italian expectations of him. Thus gradually, every member of the League, infected by the French example, seems to have become concerned first for the territorial/

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1. E.g. Guicciardini 'Sulla proposta di alleanza fatto da Carlo V ai Veneziani' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi, 136-137.
 2. See Sanuto, Diarii, xlix, 151 and Cal S.P. Milan, i.459 for Sforza's opinion of the other Italian powers and see Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i.152 for Capponi's opinion of the motives behind the League.

territorial integrity of its own states, thought only of removing the fighting as far away as possible, and was often to prove incapable, even in the interests of military strategy, of subordinating the particular to the general interest.⁽¹⁾

Initially, also, the political, economic and military exhaustion of France hampered negotiations for a League as did the fact that separate talks were going on about the release of Francis I which could not be jeopardised. The papacy was in the middle of an acute financial crisis⁽²⁾ and, moreover, Clement VII, unlike his prospective allies,⁽³⁾ was deeply preoccupied by the Turkish advance. At a critical period, December 1525, when it really appeared that Clement would decide against the emperor, he heard that the Turk had launched 60 vessels. For some days thereafter his attitude to the projected League was very hostile.⁽⁴⁾

Since, for the greater part of 1525, French diplomatic efforts were directed towards the difficult talks which were to culminate in the Treaty of Madrid, France played little part in the early negotiations for an Italian League, although, immediately she received news of the battle of Pavia, Louise of Savoy dispatched an envoy to ask Venice to join in an attempt to recover Francis I.⁽⁵⁾ In Italy, however, only twenty days after Pavia, a league was projected between Venice, the papacy, Florence, Siena, Lucca, Mantua and Milan.⁽⁶⁾ Venice scarcely believed in the feasibility of a league, without the inclusion of Ferrara, of which she was a strong advocate, but, as matters stood, it was impossible to conceive of a league which could include both the papacy and Ferrara and their disputed claims to Modena and Reggio.⁽⁷⁾

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1. For a general discussion of this question see V. Ilardi, 'Italianità' among some Italian intellectuals in the early sixteenth century', Traditio, xii, 338-367.
 2. See below p. 136.
 3. Venetian relationships with the Turk were, temporarily, good and, according to Paruta, could have been even better, had not the republic, in a spirit of great self-sacrifice refused military assistance offered by the Sultan. Paruta, Istorie, 581. See also Sanuto, Diarii, xliii, 50.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xl, 624.
 5. Paruta, Istorie, 399, 401.
 6. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvi, 273.
 7. See below p. 104-5.

By the summer of 1525 conditions were ripe for the forming of an alliance which would include the pope if not Ferrara. Clement was angered by the failure of the emperor to restore Reggio or Rubiera or to make a satisfactory arrangement about the purchase of salt for the duchy of Milan.⁽¹⁾ By July Carraciolo was convinced that the English were working against the emperor⁽²⁾ and at the end of the month Alberto Pio da Carpi, who had been forced to leave Rome, at the insistence of Sessa, when Clement signed his previous agreement with the imperialists, returned to the city.⁽³⁾ On 22 August the Venetian ambassador, Domenico Venier, informed his government that the pope was very enthusiastic about any projected League, particularly one of which France would be a member.⁽⁴⁾

The imperialists were unable to obtain any direct information about the negotiations but it was observed that communication between Rome, Venice and Milan was very frequent, that Giberti's influence with the pope was on the increase, while Venice was putting her state on a war-footing.⁽⁵⁾ By the end of August Charles knew of the projected League⁽⁶⁾ and an attempt was rapidly made to try and prevent an open breach between pope and emperor. Sessa was instructed to tell Clement that a satisfactory answer to all his demands, in particular those relating to Reggio and Rubiera, was imminent.⁽⁷⁾

On 1 September the French ambassadors at Venice first spoke of a league to which France would contribute 40,000 ducats and which would guarantee Sforza in Milan. Naples was to be taken from Charles V and Venice would retain the towns she held in Apulia.⁽⁸⁾ Venice was dubious believing that the success of any alliance would depend on papal adherence and this was not yet certain.⁽⁹⁾ Despite his implication in Morone's conspiracy, and considerable pressure from England and Venice, Clement's position was not clear.⁽¹⁰⁾

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 237-8.
 2. Ibid. 251.
 3. Ibid. 264.
 4. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-6, 474.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 265, 280, 292, 307. For Giberti see below p. 130-1.
 6. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-6, 473.
 7. 23 August 1525. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 301.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 87.
 9. Ibid. 201.
 10. Ibid. 201-2, 220.

The imperialists, meanwhile, despite hard work by their agents, and in particular by Sanchez in Venice, whose principal diplomatic activity during this period consisted in purloining letters to the Milanese ambassador,⁽¹⁾ were unable to obtain any solid information about the projected league. At the imperial court, where Italy was held to have a special relationship with the emperor, underhand negotiation of this kind was regarded as treacherous and, long before the discovery of Morone's conspiracy, imperial servants in Italy were talking of punishing the Italians for intriguing together. In September Mendoza spoke of the need for some demonstration along these lines clearly intending an occupation of the city of Milan.⁽²⁾

The discovery of Morone's conspiracy was regarded as a god-sent opportunity to, 'conquer the whole of Italy, and give these people the punishment they so richly deserve for their treacherous acts'.⁽³⁾ From the Italian point of view the discovery of the conspiracy ended all hope of keeping negotiations secret, since, in his confession, Morone gave a complete account of negotiations as far as they had progressed.⁽⁴⁾ Clement's position with regard to the emperor was considerably weakened and it can have been in no happy frame of mind that he received Sessa and Mendoza on 20 October. He took the opportunity to complain once more about the continued presence of the imperial army in the Church State, made a passing reference to the failure to restore Reggio and Rubiera and warned Charles not to attempt to take over the duchy of Milan permanently.⁽⁵⁾

By the middle of November Clement was showing considerable enthusiasm for the League. The occupation of the duchy of Milan and the threat that that state would fall entirely into imperial hands were the specific causes.⁽⁶⁾ When, on 13 November, Clement was told by the Venetian ambassador that there was a real danger of the citadel of Milan falling he spoke of raising 3,000 infantry, of fortifying Piacenza and of employing the Swiss.⁽⁷⁾ Clement maintained, however, that there were objections to the projected terms of the League; presumably on advice from Doria, he refused to accept the control/

1. E.g. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 307.

2. Ibid. 347.

3. Ibid. 365, 15 October 1525.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 203, 218.

5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 378.

6. See Guicciardini's advice to Clement in P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di Francesco Guicciardini, 46-51.

7. Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 344-5.

control of Genoa by the French and he objected to the 100,000 ducats pension which Francis wanted from the kingdom of Naples.⁽¹⁾ Despite these objections, on 10 December, Clement signed a defensive league with Venice, both on his own behalf and on behalf of Florence, although he asked that it be kept a secret and continued his negotiations with the imperialists.⁽²⁾ By the end of the next week Clement had before him the draft proposals for a league with much the same terms as those finally signed in May, but the pope announced his intention of waiting to see what new proposals Herrera would bring from Spain before finally committing himself.⁽³⁾ Herrera arrived on 20 December, but, it did not take Clement long to discover that, although he spoke many fair words on the subject of Reggio and Rubiera, he had no authorisation at all for restoring Sforza to his duchy. Clement therefore told Herrera and Sessa that before he could come to any agreement with them they must write to Charles for his consent to the restoration of Sforza and the departure of imperial troops from the Milanese.⁽⁴⁾

Although the Treaty of Madrid⁽⁵⁾ was signed on 14 January news of it did not reach Rome until 20 February.⁽⁶⁾ It was believed at the papal court that Francis would never observe its stringent terms⁽⁷⁾ and could not in reason be bound by them. Clement reacted swiftly to the news and two days later dispatched Paolo Vettori, general of the papal galleys, to await the return of Francis I to his native land. Vettori's public commission was to congratulate the king on his release but, privately and circumspectly, he was to encourage Francis to join the Italian League. He was to avoid any indication, before Francis declared himself, that Clement was considering breaking with the emperor. Those instructions⁽⁸⁾ are couched in such terms as to make it clear that Clement's only real concern was the duchy of Milan. Vettori was to ask what the pope/

1. 27 November 1527, Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 409-410.

2. Ibid. 475, Paruta, Istorie, 401.

3. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-6, 509-510.

4. Ibid. 510-511.

5. By this treaty Francis I bought his freedom under extremely harsh conditions; the surrender of Burgundy, his two eldest sons to be given as hostages, the restoration of Bourbon.

6. The news reached Brescia on 2 February and took the Venetians by surprise, Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 772-773.

7. E.g. Guicciardini's opinion in P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di Francesco Guicciardini, 59.

8. The instructions were drafted by Guicciardini, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 146.

should do in the event of Charles granting the duchy to Bourbon and was to sound the French king on the subject of Sforza. Vettori did not complete the mission, dying on the journey, he was replaced by Capino da Capo of Mantua.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile the protonotary, Uberto da Gambara, was sent to England to induce Henry VIII to enter the League and to use his influence to prevent Francis observing the Treaty of Madrid.⁽²⁾ Venice, for her part, dispatched Andrea Rossi, to Francis⁽³⁾ and urged her ambassador in England, Spinelli, to persuade Henry VIII to join the League.⁽⁴⁾

At the end of March Francis finally promised Capino that he would pay the Swiss to attack the imperialists in Milan.⁽⁵⁾ He announced himself as enthusiastic about the projected league but was anxious that Henry VIII should agree to become protector of it.⁽⁶⁾ By the beginning of April it was clear that Francis would not observe the Treaty of Madrid and would join an Italian League⁽⁷⁾ and, on 1 May, the French king informed the papal and Venetian ambassadors at Cognac that England would also join.⁽⁸⁾ In Italy French dilatoriness was causing grave concern for it was clear that the castello of Milan could not hold out much longer. Before news of the signing of the League of Cognac could reach Rome it had already been decided that papal and Venetian troops would try to relieve the castello alone.⁽⁹⁾ But Capino was now able to report that, although the viceroy, Lannoy, had arrived with new proposals from the emperor, the Italian ambassadors were merely awaiting the mandates from Rome and Venice in order to conclude an agreement.⁽¹⁰⁾ The mandates arrived together on 10 May⁽¹¹⁾ and, although it was at/

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1. P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di Francesco Guicciardini, 63-4, Molini, Documenti, i. 201.
 2. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 146.
 3. Paruta, Istorie, 404.
 4. Ibid. 405.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.128v.
 6. Ibid. f.129, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 948.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.197v., ibid. n.53 ff.129-30.
 8. Ibid. n.54 f.89v.
 9. Ibid. f.214.
 10. Ibid. n.53 ff.130v.-131.
 11. Ibid. f.131v. in Council the same day Francis announced in the presence of Lannoy that he would not cede Burgundy to Charles V, H. Hauser, Le Traité de Madrid et la Cession de la Bourgogne a Charles-Quint (Dijon 1912), 5.

at first intended to sign the agreements on the same day, a delay was caused by arguments on three counts. Francis wished to insert a provision that if, as was permitted under the terms of the League, Charles were to come to Italy to be crowned, he might bring with him no more than 1,000 unarmed cavalry. There were also French objections to the financial clauses of the draft alliance. Clement, for his part, wanted an assurance that were he to grant the investiture of Naples, either to Charles V or to a French candidate, he would be given a permanent estate in Naples in lieu of the census.⁽¹⁾ Although England was proving to be considerably less enthusiastic than Francis I had led the Italians to expect,⁽²⁾ Henry VIII finally agreed to become protector and conservator of the League in return for an estate in Naples for himself of 30,000 ducats and one for Wolsey in Milan of 10,000 ducats.⁽³⁾

X
By 17 May all difficulties had been overcome⁽⁴⁾ and in the final version of the League of Cognac (22 May 1526) these matters were dealt with. Charles V was to be permitted to come to Italy but only with such troops as the papacy and Venice might approve. He was to be permitted to join the League if he agreed to the repatriation of the French princes⁽⁵⁾ for a reasonable ransom, to the restoration of Milan to Sforza and to the payment of imperial debts to Henry VIII. For the 'conservation de Italia et di Stati di Collegadi' an army of 2,500 lances, 40,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry was to be put into the field, the pope supplying 700 lances, and 8,000 infantry. France would contribute 40,000 ducats a month, 500 lances and 1,000 cavalry, and, as soon as war broke out, an additional 3,000 lances, Venice 800-1,000 lances, 1,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, Milan 400 lances, 300 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, /

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.134_v.-135. According to Giannone the annual census was agreed in 1265 as 8,000 ounces of gold, 6,000 for Naples, 2,000 for Sicily, and the white palfrey, which was also presented yearly. Transl. Captain J. Ogilvie, Pietro Giannone, The Civil History of the Kingdom of Naples (London 1729) ii.31.
 2. E.g. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.206, 207_v.
 3. Ibid. f.136.
 4. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 148.
 5. The two eldest sons of Francis I had, under the terms of the Treaty of Madrid, been exchanged as hostages for their father at San Sebastian on 17 April 1526. See above p. 32.

infantry, 'et perchè non potrà cussì dar esso Duchà al presente, il Papa et la Signoria d'oggi per lui adesso' 4,000 infantry. Clement was promised an annual pension of 40,000 ducats from the Regno whether or not Charles V were to enter the League. The League navy was to consist of 28 galleys, 3 provided by the pope, 12 by France and 13 by Venice. Since the core of the French infantry force would be Swiss, it was agreed that the support of the Swiss cantons must be purchased and the Swiss were guaranteed all the rights and pensions which they had previously held in Milan. As no overt statement against the emperor could be made for as long as the pious hope remained that he would join a league obviously directed against him, the agreements were rather vague on the subject of objectives; Sforza was to keep Milan and was to be provided with a royal bride in the hope of providing a direct heir but, should no such happy event transpire, the duchy was to go to Massimiliano Sforza who was still languishing in his French prison. Asti was to go to France, Alberto Pio was to be restored to his estates, the Medici were to be protected in Florence and the French interest maintained in Genoa. In other words it was hoped to revert to a situation extant in Italy before the battle of Pavia.⁽¹⁾

On 13 June the Sacred College unanimously approved the League of Cognac which had already been ratified by the pope and the Venetians.⁽²⁾ At first Clement was a very keen member of the League;⁽³⁾ at least three weeks previously the pope had begun preparations for war. Guicciardini was appointed lieutenant-general to the army, Guido Rangoni was ordered to raise 6,000 soldiers and to send them to Piacenza, 5 or 6,000 Swiss, under the castellan of Mus, were to be brought down to relieve the beleaguered duke of Milan, arrangements were made for the Orsini to raise troops as a defence against a possible attack by the Colonna, and Clement announced that he was prepared to suspend operations against Ferrara for ten months.⁽⁴⁾

On 16 June Moncada, who had encountered Guicciardini, speeding northwards, on his journey, reached Rome. The following day Clement had an interview/

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1. For a summary of the terms of the League see Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 443-5.
 2. Ibid. xli. 626, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 995.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 626. He had begun new fortifications in Parma and Piacenza in February. Ibid xl. 800, 864.
 4. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 149, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 312.

interview with Moncada and Sessa during which he declared he would not lay down his arms until 'the Emperor left Italy free, restored the French king's sons on fair conditions, and paid what he owed to the king of England'.⁽¹⁾ He refused even to consider the possibility of a separate agreement between himself and the emperor. Moncada, who had an ample brief to make substantial concessions,⁽²⁾ returned on the following day and offered on the emperor's behalf to do whatever Clement wished both as to the duchy of Milan and to resolving the emperor's differences with Venice. Charles V would also agree to the departure of the imperial army from Italy provided Clement and other Italian powers made up its arrears of pay.⁽³⁾ Clement's only reply was that he must leave time for the other League ambassadors to write home before giving a formal answer.⁽⁴⁾ Moncada became more pressing but was again told, on 20 June, that nothing could be decided without the participation of all the confederates.⁽⁵⁾ On 26 June, realising that nothing could be gained from Clement, Moncada retired to Colonna territory. He was followed by Sessa who had first presented the palfrey, traditionally required as quitrent for the Regno, but without the census.⁽⁶⁾

Despite the pope's firm stand on this occasion, both the French and the Venetian ambassadors suspected Clement of weakening and it was suggested that the dispatch of a substantial cash sum from England might strengthen his resolve.⁽⁷⁾ Clement had been bitterly disappointed by the only offer of assistance made by Henry VIII, a loan of 25,000 ducats a month.⁽⁸⁾ In Italian terms the English were always to prove defaulters on their studiously vague promises and there is no doubt that Clement believed he was badly let down by Henry VIII and Wolsey. Letters from Rome to England constantly begged for help, for money, for a diversion in Flanders or Navarre, for assistance in making peace.⁽⁹⁾ Since none/

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1. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1009, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.223.
 2. See below p. 84-5.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.223-223v. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1009-1010.
 4. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1009-1010.
 5. Ibid.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.235.
 7. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1011.
 8. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.228-228v.
 9. See the letters in A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53, n.54 passim and in Cal. S.P. Milan, 1.449.

none of these pleas for help were answered Clement's attitude towards England became very embittered and this, as much as the imperial domination of Italy after 1527, was to have its effect when Henry VIII needed the pope's assistance in annulling his marriage to Katherine of Aragon.

On receiving the news of the signing of the League of Cognac the Venetian Senate had written to the pope urging him to begin a war of liberation in Italy. For some time the Venetian army of 10,000 infantry, 900 lances and 800 cavalry, which had been reformed and improved by the duke of Urbino,⁽¹⁾ and to which Pesaro had been appointed proveditor, had been ready. It had recently transferred to Chiari in the Bresciano to await the arrival of the papal and Swiss troops.⁽²⁾

Their arrival was somewhat delayed. Clement's original contribution to the Italian League was in negotiating over the Swiss infantry with the castellan of Mus, a proverbially unreliable ally, and the traditional enemy of the Grisons whose goodwill it was essential to maintain. The castellan's only policy lay in selling his impregnable position, dominating Lake Como, to the highest bidder. On 28 May Clement felt able to inform Venice that the castellan would hold the passes against an anticipated invasion of lansquenets and that the papal treasury had provided 20,000 ducats in Bologna with which to raise infantry.⁽³⁾ The Venetians were dubious about trying to raise Swiss troops through the offices of the castellan and the inefficient Veroli, bishop of Lodi, but, when the Venetian ambassador questioned Clement on 2 June, he was assured that the pope was making every effort to ensure the speedy arrival of the Swiss.⁽⁴⁾ Guido Rangoni had raised 5,000 infantry including 1,800 arquebusiers and archers, and had already been ordered to Parma, preparatory to joining with the Venetians,⁽⁵⁾ and on 17 June Guicciardini joined the mass of the papal army at Piacenza.⁽⁶⁾

Venetian intelligence about the imperialists in Lombardy indicated that/

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1. L. Celli, 'L'ordinanza militari nella repubblica Veneta nel secolo xvi', Nuova Antologia, cxxxvii, 498, Paruta, Istorie, 409.
 2. Paruta, Istorie, 409.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 431.
 4. Ibid. 483.
 5. Paruta, Istorie, 409, Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 522, 524, 541, 595-597.
 6. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 153.

that their army was weak, small and badly paid while the whole of the local population was ready to rise as soon as a liberating army approached.⁽¹⁾ In June the Venetian cavalry was already able to prevent the imperialists using any mill outside of Milan so causing an acute shortage of flour in the city.⁽²⁾ An attack in Lombardy was, therefore, the first part of an elaborate plan of campaign drawn up by the confederates. The attack was to be made by Venetian and papal forces aided by French mercenaries and subsidies and by the promised Anglo-French invasion of Flanders or Spain. Simultaneously attacks were to be made on Genoa, on Siena, using the fuorusciti, on Naples, using the Orsini, and on the Regno, using the Venetian fleet.⁽³⁾ This excellent but theoretical plan failed to take account of the French king's inability to fulfil his rasher promises or of possible imperial countermanceuvres; threats against Rome from the south or against Florence from the north. As it was, the instability of Florence, the protracted quarrel with Ferrara and threats by the Colonna⁽⁴⁾ had already combined to delay the pope's preparations. At the end of June the papal army, consisting of 600 lances, 600 cavalry and 8,000 infantry under the immediate command of Guido Rangoni, Vitelli and Giovanni de' Medici were still at Piacenza and the agreement with the Swiss had not been concluded,⁽⁵⁾ although Clement had agreed to raise his contribution of troops in Lombardy to 10,000 and to raise another 1,000 infantry for the defence of Rome.⁽⁶⁾ Since the imperialists, the Venetians and the pope were now all recruiting in the same area progress in making up units was necessarily slow.⁽⁷⁾

The campaign was weakened by the lack of overall command. Urbino, in theory one of the best of living generals, was nothing more than captain-general of the Venetians, although he was soon to demand the title of captain-general of the League,⁽⁸⁾ but, since none in the papal army was his equal in age, rank/

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1. E.g. Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 415-8, 474, 497, 499, 541, 608-610, 723, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.147v. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix.69.
 2. Burigozzo, 'Cronaca', 458.
 3. F. Bennato, 'La partecipazione militare di Venezia alla Lega di Cognac', Arch. Ven. lviii. 70-71.
 4. See below p. 84, 107-9, 274-6.
 5. F. Bennato, 'La partecipazione militare di Venezia alla Lega di Cognac', Arch. Ven. lviii. 71, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.233, n.53 ff.145, 148, Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 541.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 594, 715.
 7. Traditionally Venice always recruited from the Val di Lamone, Umbria, Urbino, and the March of Ancona.
 8. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 36.

rank or experience, he considered he had a natural right to make all the decisions. On the papal side there was no captain-general to counterbalance Urbino's claims, since Clement was anxious not to offend Federigo Gonzaga who, theoretically, should have held such an appointment.⁽¹⁾ The papal lieutenant-general, Guicciardini, was despised by Urbino as a civilian who had no right to concern himself in military affairs and Guido Rangoni and Vitelli were distrusted by the duke because of their inadequate grasp of the theory of war.⁽²⁾ In consequence there was constant bickering about strategy in which Urbino refused to have anything other than the final word.⁽³⁾ Since Guicciardini would not always submit to Urbino's decisions every disagreement had to be referred back to Venice and Rome for discussion. In the evening of 21 June all the League ambassadors were suddenly summoned to the Venetian senate to resolve one of these quarrels. Urbino, who valued numerical superiority above all things, had asked the papal captains to cross the Po with him to make a direct advance on Milan. The papal generals, on the other hand, wanted to cross the Po at a point further west and to approach Milan from the opposite direction. Several days⁽⁴⁾ had therefore to be wasted, writing to Rome to urge Clement to give his consent to the Venetian plan.⁽⁵⁾ As if this kind of delay were not bad enough, Urbino was hampered at every turn by spies sent into his camp, both by his own masters, the Venetians, and by the pope.

The refusal of the papal captains and above all of Guicciardini to agree implicitly to any plan Urbino might put forward had political repercussions. The Venetians were convinced that Clement was deliberately hindering the progress of the campaign and suspected him of secret negotiations with the imperialists,⁽⁶⁾ while Clement, for his part, suspected that the Venetians cared for nothing/

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1. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 36. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 156 and for Gonzaga see below p. 73-4.
 2. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 36. For the kind of incident which Guicciardini's civilian status and ignorance of military customs could provoke see Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 236-9. His efficiency was not popular with the military commanders who worked under a customary and acknowledged system of corruption.
 3. All Florentine contemporaries, biased by continued disagreements over San Leo and by hostility to Venice, Urbino's employer, had a low opinion of Urbino's capabilities.
 4. It took at least 8 days to send a message of this kind and to get a reply.
 5. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1019, 1024.
 6. Ibid. 1024, Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 701.

nothing but the protection of their own borders. Both Venice and the pope were already irritated by the failure of Francis I to do much more than make large promises for there was no sign of the expected French troops, 'de quali havremo di bisogno perchè Cesare non dormi' ⁽¹⁾

Despite these disagreements, but by using the time-honoured method of treachery from within rather than attack and siege according to the 'rules of war', on 24 June Urbino having crossed the Adda scored a notable success and took Lodi, a town vital to the defence of Milan. ⁽²⁾ The ease with which the city was persuaded to support the League is partially explained by the ill-treatment Lodi had suffered at the hands of occupying imperial troops. ⁽³⁾ The capture of Lodi opened the way for an immediate advance on Milan and Pavia, guarded by Lodrone with 1,000 lansquenets, ⁽⁴⁾ 'perchè queste città, situate come in triangolo, sono vicine l'una all'altra venti miglia'. ⁽⁵⁾ It also left Cremona peculiarly vulnerable to attack. Most important of all it ended all argument about the joining of the two armies; on the same day the papal army crossed the Po and took Sant'Angelo. ⁽⁶⁾ On 26 June it joined with Urbino ⁽⁷⁾ and the two armies lodged near old Lodi, intending to move on to Milan with speed. Guicciardini always remained convinced that if an attack had now been made the League army would have been able to go on to total victory. His hopes foundered on the not entirely misplaced and very fashionable judgement of Urbino that Italian infantry alone, without Swiss or German reinforcements, could be considered useless for the purpose of attacking a well-defended city. He refused even to consider an attack on Milan before the arrival of the expected Swiss. ⁽⁸⁾ Advance was therefore very slow; on 28 June to Marignano ⁽⁹⁾ but here again there was a delay until/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.234.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1027, Senuto, Diarii, xli. 701. See also Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 28 'La città era bene fortificata et una di quelle che sempre si era disegnato che gli imperiali avessino a difendere insino allo estremo'.
 3. They were mainly Neapolitan regulars.
 4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.234.
 5. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 28.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.149.
 7. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 577.
 8. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.260-1.
 9. Now Melegnano.

until on 3 July the army advanced to San Donato, half-way between Milan and Marignano. The following day it was at San Martino, only three miles from Milan, and, at last, the first 500 Swiss arrived.⁽¹⁾

On 7 July an assault was finally made on the suburbs of Milan. In numerous skirmishes the League forces, in particular the bande nere, had the better of the enemy and it was assumed that on the following day an attempt would be made to relieve the castello, but, at five in the evening, Urbino told Guicciardini that he intended to retire. He had no intention of risking the Venetian army so far from the borders of Venice until all the Swiss had arrived. The papal commanders disagreed with Urbino, for they were certain that Milan could be taken, but without Urbino's troops they were powerless and had to agree to the ignominious retreat to Marignano.⁽²⁾ This incident only worsened the strained relations between Urbino and Guicciardini,⁽³⁾ since, on the eve of the attack, Bourbon, who with 800 soldiers had disembarked at Genoa where he had raised 800,000 ducats on bills of exchange, took the opportunity to enter the city.⁽⁴⁾ Guicciardini's irritation was increased when, on 16 July, 500 bocche inuite, sent out of the castello of Milan, managed to pass through the imperial siege-works with practically no difficulty.⁽⁵⁾

It was generally believed that, in withdrawing from Milan, Urbino had acted under instructions from Venice, but the Venetian Senate itself was appalled by Urbino's failure to press the attack and the duke had to dispatch Luigi Gonzaga to Venice to justify his decision to withdraw.⁽⁶⁾ Despite constant pressure, Urbino refused to attack Milan again although he did succeed in taking Monza and its castello.⁽⁷⁾ Although the rest of the Swiss had not yet arrived, on 15 July it was decided that, once they had reached the camp, an advance would be made either to Chiaravalle or to Cassano. Urbino's plan was to divide the army in two in order/

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1. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 154.
 2. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.149v.-150v.
 3. For an account of their quarrel that evening see Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 155-6. Guicciardini never forgave Urbino e.g. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 44-45.
 4. Burigozzo, 'Cronaca', 461.
 5. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 11.
 6. Paruta, Istorie, 411.
 7. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 589.

order to blockade Milan and for this he was convinced he would need at least 12,000 Swiss.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, on 22 July, he removed from Marignano to Casaretto on the Lambro where he set up a strongly fortified camp again promising, on 23 July, to attack Milan the following night.⁽²⁾ The decision came too late for in despair, on 24 July, Sforza surrendered on the best terms he could and withdrew to Lodi.

Almost simultaneously it was learnt that the Grisons were so annoyed at the League's employment of the castellan of Mus, that they would only agree to hold the passes against the expected lansquenets for a fortnight, unless their differences with the castellan were settled and a fresh agreement had to be negotiated with them.⁽³⁾ Victory which had seemed so close had been snatched away. The Swiss had still not arrived and the condition of the papal army left much to be desired; the officers were often incompetent,⁽⁴⁾ there was need of a first-class captain of artillery⁽⁵⁾ and a review of the troops revealed that none of the companies were up to full strength. The highest proportion of vacancies was among the troops of Guido Rangoni, who was too indulgent to his subordinates, but neither Vitelli nor even Giovanni de' Medici could be totally absolved from blame.⁽⁶⁾ Rangoni and Medici were constantly quarrelling,⁽⁷⁾ so frequently indeed that Guicciardini begged Giberti to dispatch Paolo d'Arezzo, in whom Medici had great confidence, in order to compose their differences.⁽⁸⁾ Even the arrival of the bulk of the Swiss under the castellan of Mus brought fresh problems, for the pay of the Swiss fell due immediately, Guicciardini had no money with which to meet their demands and it was well-known that the Swiss would brook no delay over pay nor put up with any undue hardship.⁽⁹⁾ In addition Guicciardini discovered that they had been hired at a ridiculously high rate.⁽¹⁰⁾ The normal rate of pay/

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1. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 5.
 2. Ibid. 32-33.
 3. Ibid. 18-19, 114-116.
 4. Ibid. 104.
 5. Ibid. 7.
 6. Ibid. 19-20.
 7. Ibid. 105, 112.
 8. Ibid. 112.
 9. Montluc, Commentaires, 338, 'Ils ne se payent pas de paroles'.
 10. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 28-30, 197.

pay for the infantry was about $3\frac{1}{2}$ ducats a month, usually payable monthly although this was a matter for negotiation.⁽¹⁾ But there were considerable variations; the Swiss and the lansquenets tended to be very expensive, particularly those employed by the pope, with the result that dissatisfied Venetian infantry defected to the papal forces.⁽²⁾ Then the castellan of Mus demanded 3,000 ducats he claimed to have spent on the League's behalf and to ensure that he got it he arrested two Venetian ambassadors who were attempting to cross Lake Como into France and held them ransom.⁽³⁾

The lack of interest shown by France was beginning to disturb members of the Italian League. Guicciardini and Giberti continually urged Acciaiuoli to spur the French king to action. They suspected that Francis was hoping to achieve his ends by diplomatic channels, relying on the activity of the Italians to put sufficient pressure on the emperor.⁽⁴⁾ Although Francis had dispatched Langey to the Swiss, he had been sent with insufficient funds. At the beginning of August there was no sign in Italy of Saluzzo or of the French fleet, nor of the promised French diversion in Flanders. The Grisons, convinced that the French were indifferent to Italian affairs, began to show signs of allying with the imperialists, just as rumours were beginning that the emperor intended to dispatch lansquenets into Italy.⁽⁵⁾

Meanwhile in Tuscany the League had been no more successful. An attack on Siena and especially on its Ghibelline government had always been an integral part of the League's plan of campaign just as the maintenance of a favourable or sympathetic government there had become an integral part of the imperial defence system. It was probably unwise to risk an attack on Siena since it exposed the papacy on two fronts and broadened the theatre of the war. On the other hand, the imperialists there appeared most vulnerable, an attack would supposedly divert at least some of the imperial resources from Lombardy, while pleasing Florence, and, like all fuorusciti, those of Siena were extremely optimistic about the chances of success.

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1. The Venetians paid their infantry at this time every 36 days, Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 104.
 2. See for example, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 154-5.
 3. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 87-89, 115.
 4. *Ibid.* 112.
 5. *Ibid.* 114-116.

Although the imperialists had been surprisingly conciliatory over the whole subject of the restoration of the Sienese fuorusciti⁽¹⁾ the hostility of both the pope and Florence to the new regime was marked. The Orsini, Clement's allies, were in open conflict with Siena over the county of Pitigliano which Siena claimed was part of her territory and held unjustly by the Orsini.⁽²⁾ Apart from protecting the fuorusciti, Clement had spent considerable sums in purchasing supporters in Siena, had decreed that no visitor or pilgrim to Rome should pass through Siena, and had done nothing to prevent Florentine raids on Sienese territory.⁽³⁾

At an early date Siena had become aware of the pope's offensive preparations. At least two conspiracies were uncovered in the city and, acting under the instructions of the magistrates, G.B. Palmieri, who held a condotta of 100 infantry from Siena, had approached the pope, pretending that he could hand over a gate of the city to an invading army.⁽⁴⁾ He was thus able to keep Siena informed about all the papal preparations.

The troops to be used against Siena, in addition to the numerous and inevitable fuorusciti, were all provided by the pope and were captained by five Italians, Virginio Orsini, Lodovico Orsini, count of Pitigliano and his son, Gentile Baglioni and Giovanni da Sassatello.⁽⁵⁾ The army was sizeable, 600 cavalry, 8,000 infantry, for the most part Florentine, and nine pieces of artillery, but there was no attempt to set up a supply line and these forces were quite insufficient to besiege Siena if it were not taken by fraud. Although Doria was to supply support from the sea he only succeeded in taking Talamone a small port, which had been purchased by Siena in 1303, and Port'Ercole, the only other port in Sienese territory, and a town whose possession was constantly disputed by Florence and Siena. Altogether the expedition was to turn out an expensive/

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1. Giberti from Rome, 4 July 1526, 'Credo anche Senesi saranno accordati far quasi tutto quello nostro Signore dimandava, Perche il signore Don Ugo ha fatto piu volte offerire a Sua Santita di far rimetter li fuorusciti, e restituirgli li loro ben mettendo il governo della Citta in mano di persone confidenti di Sua Santita. Deve venir qua il signore Vespasiano Colonna per andare a Siena a far questa restitutione'. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.249v. See also Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 215.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 265.
 3. La Guerra di Camollia, 47.
 4. Ibid. 48-9, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 41-42.
 5. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 42.

expensive fiasco which brought great discredit to the pope and to the League and which earned Clement inexpedient hostility in Florence. Having failed to capture Montalcino and Monteroni, on the main road to Siena, on 17 June the papal army took up position outside the city at Porta Camollia. There was no rising in Siena and the fuorusciti began to quarrel among themselves. Aldello Piacedi and Giovanni Martinozzi left the camp and returned, the one to Florence and the other to Rome. Siena, although only garrisoned by 300 infantry and 60 cavalry, under the command of Giulio Colonna, was stoutly defended, morale being raised in the classical Tuscan fashion by summoning the populace to arms, public prayers, vigils and fasts. The keys of the city were ceremoniously handed over to the Virgin.⁽¹⁾ The papal troops, meanwhile, settled down into a protracted and expensive siege, finally abandoned on 25 July and ending in a rout of the papal forces at Porta Camollia.⁽²⁾ The net result of the campaign had been to ensure the total hostility of Siena to the Italian League; the city subsequently refused even to accept ambassadors from Saluzzo.⁽³⁾

The expense of the campaign was also not without effect for the war had long been making intolerable demands on the papal treasury. Apart from making up the French deficiencies over the pay of the Swiss, and the extraordinary expense of the campaign against the Colonna,⁽⁴⁾ the treasury had the continued expense of the papal army in Lombardy.⁽⁵⁾ On 24 August Guicciardini calculated his expenses, including the quota of French Swiss; the Swiss, officially 13,000 men, were costing 62,000 ducats a month, and their officers between 3 and 4,000 ducats a month. It was clear that if it could be done without offending the entire Swiss nation these numbers would have to be drastically reduced.⁽⁶⁾ There were 10,000 Italian infantry in Piacenza and Modena and 500 lansquenets in camp at Cremona⁽⁷⁾ in addition to the cavalry.

Despite the depressing results of the land campaigns the League retained one major advantage - domination of the sea. The League fleets denied the/

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1. B.N.MS. Italien 15, f.654, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 42-43, 57, La Guerra di Camollia, 51, 68-70.
 2. Guazzo, Historie, 36-9, B.N.MS. Italien 15, f.655.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 350.
 4. See below p. 84-6.
 5. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 108, 175, 178.
 6. Ibid. 183.
 7. Ibid. 197. The other 500 were paid by Venice.

the imperialists much needed supplies, particularly in Lombardy, threatened Genoa, impeded communication and gave to the League troops an essential mobility which had some effect on military operations in Italy.

At the beginning of the war, Venice chose Luigi Armero as proveditor of the fleet and dispatched him to Corfu to join Giovanni Moro who was anchored there with the full Venetian naval forces. From there Armero detached thirteen galleys and sailed for Civitavecchia where he was to unite with the French and papal fleets, the whole League navy having been placed under the command of Pedro Navarro. Armero united with Andrea Doria, who had entered papal service under a condotta of eight galleys, at Terracina on 28 August.⁽¹⁾ From Terracina they sailed to Leghorn where they were joined by Pedro Navarro and the sixteen galleys of France, and to Portovenere, a town devoted to the Doria family⁽²⁾ which, together with La Spezia and Monaco, immediately surrendered to the allies. The fleets now separated, the Venetians and Doria going to Portofino and Navarro to Savona which was also taken over by the League.⁽³⁾

Genoa, isolated from the rest of the imperial forces in Italy, now became the fleets' preoccupation, for Navarro hoped to take the city by a combined use of sea and land forces. By August 1526 he had succeeded in blockading the port. On the last day of the month Doria reported from Livorno that nine ships entering Genoa had been captured, eight loaded with grain and one with ammunition.⁽⁴⁾ A fleet of some fifty-six vessels was now engaged in the blockade.⁽⁵⁾ Pedro Navarro was arming two of the large ships captured in August and another eleven galleons were expected from the ship-yards of Marseilles where they were being fitted out.⁽⁶⁾ The failure of Urbino to send a supporting land-force was a constant frustration since the fleets had secret intelligence that Genoa would surrender/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 544, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1091.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 354.
 3. Paruta, Istorie, 412-5.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 544. They were disarmed and had the sails and rudders removed. The cargo was discharged at Leghorn. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.9.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 555.
 6. Ibid. 763, xliii. 185.

surrender should such a force appear,⁽¹⁾ and knew that an imperial fleet was expected from Spain which they would have to pursue, abandoning the siege.⁽²⁾

By the end of the month the fleets had succeeded in capturing a total of thirty-four vessels,⁽³⁾ belonging for the most part to the imperial Fregosi⁽⁴⁾ but, on 16 November, it was learned that an imperial fleet, with the viceroy and 10,000 infantry aboard, had reached Corsica.⁽⁵⁾ The blockade would therefore have to be temporarily abandoned while the imperialists were searched out. Constant contrary winds prevented any ships from leaving harbour and Doria had to watch, powerless, when, on 22 November, the imperial fleet sailed past within twenty miles of Genoa. Only one imperial galley was sunk before the Spaniards escaped south⁽⁶⁾ but fear of pursuit prevented Lannoy from disembarking at San Stefano so that not all was completely lost.

In Lombardy the League was being pulled in two directions, towards Cremona where the fortress was still held for Sforza and towards Genoa. Both cities could be taken, but each would require the total resources at the command of the League commanders and there were strong political reasons why Cremona should be the first city to be attacked. Its capture would satisfy Venice, who now felt that her western border was very vulnerable, and should ensure that Sforza would not try to make a separate peace with the imperialists. But there were, of course, equally strong arguments in favour of throwing all the League's resources into the capture of Genoa, the sole major northern Italian port available for the imperialists to use. Although the fleets were being so successful before Genoa, without a land army of at least 6,000, the commanders did not feel strong enough to launch an attack on the city which had managed to raise a defence of at least 4,000 infantry.⁽⁷⁾ Urbino was perfectly ready to promise such assistance once Cremona had fallen or Saluzzo had arrived but would release no troops before/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 261. The tenacity of Genoa may be explained by the threat of Charles V that if the city surrendered 'senza esser sforzati' all Genoese property within the imperial domains would be seized. See below p. 301-2.
 2. A.S.V.MS.Arm. i - xviii vol. 6522, f.94.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 763.
 4. A.S.V.MS.Arm. i - xviii vol. 6522, f.94.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 271, 319.
 6. Ibid. 409-410.
 7. Ibid. xlii. 586, 593.

before then.⁽¹⁾ The siege of Cremona which was defended by the courageous and able Spanish captain, Corradino, proved to be both expensive and tedious. On 1 September the Venetians were told that the chief papal engineer needed at least 1,000 new sappers and more gunpowder to complete his mines⁽²⁾ and the following day there came a fresh demand for money, 'per non si trovar un soldo'.⁽³⁾ On 4 September Pesaro again wrote for money and reported that work on the mines was being considerably slowed down since, for lack of money, he had been unable to hire any sappers from Piacenza.⁽⁴⁾ Although Cremona was defended by only 1,500 men, by the middle of September 13,000 infantry, 300 lances, 400 light cavalry and 2,000 sappers were engaged in the siege of the city, inching slowly forward over the approaches.⁽⁵⁾

If the French reinforcements had shown any sign of arriving it would have been possible to send troops to Genoa but, at the beginning of September, Saluzzo had advanced no farther than Asti⁽⁶⁾ and he was not expected to reach the camp for another three weeks.⁽⁷⁾

Although Saluzzo finally appeared on 25 September,⁽⁸⁾ with 500 lances and 4,000 first-class infantry France continued to be a great disappointment. Promises and good words came in plenty and Henry VIII was bombarded by requests from France that he should come immediately to the League's assistance. But all requests from the pope that aid should be sent speedily were ignored, even after the Colonna raid.⁽⁹⁾ In October it was reported, 'the King of England will do nothing, and the King of France no more than he is obliged and even then slowly'.⁽¹⁰⁾ In his correspondence Giberti was unable to disguise the contempt he felt for the French king who could stand idly by while the pope was assaulted in his own city of Rome. He referred bitterly to the 'esortationi, che il Christianissimo/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.9, Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 29.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 545.
 3. Ibid. 550.
 4. Ibid. 568.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.8v.-9.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 595.
 7. Ibid. 658.
 8. Ibid. 746.
 9. See below p. 86-90.
 10. Cal. S.P. Milan, i.449.

Christianissimo fa a quello serenissimo Re (Henry VIII) di rissentirsi dell' ingiuria di Sua Santità et diffenderla in questo pericolo', and remarked that, 'li ha Sua Santità grandissimo obbligo, et piu gli ne haverà, se anche non solo con parole, ma con essemplio piu gagliardo provocasse la Maestà Sua'.⁽¹⁾ The Venetians felt that Francis had failed to comprehend the dangers resulting from the raid and urged Francis to send immediate assistance to Italy, 'Questi sariano tempi per la gran importantia de le cosse che il Re et tuti vni Signori del consiglio fusseno in alcuno loco capace de tuti, et se atendesse ad ben consigliar et proveder al bisogno comune et non ad piaceri, quali se togliono poi quando vi e la tranquillità'.⁽²⁾ The pope was, in any case, making his own difficulties for the alliance. By the middle of September, he had wearied of the protracted siege of Cremona and wished to abandon it in favour of an attack on Genoa.⁽³⁾ He believed that the capture of that city would protect him from the imperial fleet whose arrival had terrified all Rome, where it was generally believed that the pope would soon flee the city.⁽⁴⁾ It is improbable that Clement ever seriously considered such a move but, despite the recent pacification of the Colonna,⁽⁵⁾ he feared an attack from the south, and, in an attempt to provide for the defence of Rome, on 19 September asked for the dispatch from the League camp of 300-400 lances, 4,000-5,000 Swiss and either Vitelli or Giovanni de' Medici.⁽⁶⁾ After the Colonna raid, Clement again asked that troops should be sent at once although it would have taken nearly a month for them to reach Rome.⁽⁷⁾ Guicciardini had begun to arrange for Vitelli to leave immediately⁽⁸⁾ but then, from fear of losing Cremona, was instructed by Giberti to delay the departure of the troops.⁽⁹⁾ It was Clement's intention to observe the truce no more than nominally and to leave his entire forces at the League's disposal, ostensibly under the French/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.45. For similar sentiments, expressed by Guicciardini see Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 200-201.
 2. Molini, Documenti, i. 238.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 668, Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 28-29.
 4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.5, n.53 f.9v.
 5. See below p. 85-6.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 682, 741.
 7. Ibid. 699, 700.
 8. Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 49.
 9. Ibid. 52-3.

French flag, but paid from Rome, but news of the arrival of the Spanish fleet forced a change of plan and Clement decided to leave no more than 4,000 infantry under Giovanni de' Medici in Lombardy. Guicciardini was to retire south of the Po to guard the northern boundary of the Church State.⁽¹⁾ Doria, however, who had initially been recalled to Civitavecchia had, by 20 October, been permitted to rejoin the allied fleets.⁽²⁾

The pope had been encouraged to persevere in the alliance by signs that the defence of Cremona was at last weakening. A proposal for a negotiated surrender was tendered by the defence on 22 September but its terms were so liberal to the imperialists that they were flatly rejected.⁽³⁾ The following day a cease-fire was agreed to for a month and it was arranged that if help had not come at the end of that period Cremona would surrender.⁽⁴⁾ Vitelli, therefore, did little damage to the League cause in Lombardy when he left for Rome the same day taking with him 200 of his cavalry, but the Venetians strenuously opposed Guicciardini's request that a further 5,000 troops should be sent after him to defend Rome.⁽⁵⁾ The Venetians, like many contemporaries, including Guicciardini himself, never seemed to realise that the war had to be won in the south as well as in Lombardy and always failed to take account of the real dangers that the pope faced from the Regno. Despite Venetian opposition, on 1 October 2,000 good Swiss infantry were dispatched to Rome.⁽⁶⁾ On 7 October Guicciardini left Cremona and moved to Lodi,⁽⁷⁾ and on the following day to Piacenza, whence he dispatched 3,000 fresh infantry to Rome.⁽⁸⁾

As if dissensions between the allies were not bad enough the League commanders were having their customary difficulties over mercenary troops. From the opening of the campaign the Swiss and the Grisons had proved as much of a liability as an asset. Late in arriving, they clamoured constantly for money, /

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1. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 63-4, 81-3, x. 168.
 2. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.19v, Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 126.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 698.
 4. Ibid. 708-710. The defenders were permitted to go either to Germany or to Naples although Clement was not enthusiastic for them to travel through the Church State.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 713.
 6. Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 67-8.
 7. Ibid. x. 91.
 8. Ibid. 92.

money, threatening to desert whenever they were not immediately satisfied,⁽¹⁾ but, since the Swiss and the Grisons were an important buffer against the imperialists in the north, it was impossible to offend them. At the beginning of every month a fresh agreement had to be made with the Swiss in order to persuade them to continue in service, and, on 25 November, 1,000 finally deserted, the first of many who would leave during the coming winter.⁽²⁾ The Venetians, in particular, were suffering heavy desertions, since they were finding it difficult to pay their troops; often 40 or 50 days elapsed between pays.⁽³⁾

The camp on the Lambro, whither the bulk of the army had retired, was proving unsatisfactory but every attempt to move was thwarted by the weather.⁽⁴⁾ The project of Genoa had to be abandoned for news was coming through of Frundsberg's imminent descent into Italy. Throughout the summer there had been talk of this levy of lansquenets, made in the Tyrol for the emperor, but it had never been certain that this was more than a rumour. The certain news of their arrival at Trent⁽⁵⁾ now petrified the Italians and paralysed all League activity. General Italian reactions were vividly expressed by the contemporary poet, Giovanni Guidiccioni, a literary client of Cardinal Farnese;

Ecco che move orribilmente il piede
e scende, quasi un rapido torrente,
dagli alti monti nova ingorda gente
per far di noi più dolorosa prede;
per acquistar col nostro sangue fede
a lo sfrenato lor furor ardente,
ecco ch'Italia, misera, dolente,
l'ultime notti a mezzo giorno vede.⁽⁶⁾

The entire spy-service of Venice was devoted to discovering the route which the/

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1. E.g. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 135, xliv. 668, 674.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 330. They asked for and were refused more money for winter clothing.
 3. Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 95, 100.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 138, Molini, Documenti, i. 241.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 103.
 6. G. Guidiccioni, Rime, ed. E. Chiorboli (Bari 1912), 4.



the lansquenets would take. While France attempted to bribe the Grisons to hold their passes, particularly the Valtellina, against the lansquenets,⁽¹⁾ Venice, convinced that Frundsberg intended to invade the Veneto,⁽²⁾ used her resources to fortify the northern boundary. Inevitably this had an effect on the army in Lombardy from which some companies of cavalry were withdrawn⁽³⁾ and for which less money could now be spared, for Venice was feeling the expense of the war; on 5 October the state had to launch a Monte del Sussidio to raise money.⁽⁴⁾ On 8 November Saluzzo asked Venice for a loan of 10,000 ducats which she was unable to give.⁽⁵⁾ The castellan of Nus had also to be purchased by the payment of 5,000 ducats, half by the pope and half by Venice, nominally a ransom for the Venetian ambassadors who were still in the castellan's hands, and by a condotta of 400 infantry with which he was to guard Lake Como.⁽⁶⁾

Since there was not time to close all the passes the defence of Venice was at first centred on Bassano for it was believed that Frundsberg would attack down the Valsugana. Accordingly, Agostino da Mula was appointed proveditor general of the Veneto,⁽⁷⁾ the Brenta was blocked, the bridge at Cismondi Grappa was out, and the road rendered impassable.⁽⁸⁾ Rumours continued to multiply about the lansquenets. With the Valsugana closed, their most likely passage was down the Adige to Verona.⁽⁹⁾ Venetian troops were therefore transferred into the Veronese and, when Frundsberg moved down the western route into the Mantovano, were hurriedly shipped across Lake Garda to Salò.⁽¹⁰⁾ On 19 November there was no longer any doubt that the lansquenets would pass down the Val Sabbia to Mantua, by 22 November they were only six miles from that city,⁽¹¹⁾ and the marquis was supplying them with food and armaments by way of the Mincio.⁽¹²⁾ The Venetians now learnt that Frundsberg's army consisted of at least 16,000 men, more even than had been feared and it was clear that they intended to cross the Po. Apart from a/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.19v.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliiii. 169.
 3. Paruta, Istorie, 423.
 4. La Civiltà Veneziana del Rinascimento (Venice, 1958), 216.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliiii. 198.
 6. Paruta, Istorie, 423, see above p. 43.
 7. Paruta, Istorie, 423.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xliiii. 218.
 9. Ibid. 234.
 10. Ibid. 270, Paruta, Istorie, 423.
 11. Sanuto, Diarii, xliiii. 271, 292.
 12. Ibid. 305.

a Cremonese fuoruscito, Niccolò Varolo, who had joined them with 200 first-class cavalry, they had few horses and no artillery.⁽¹⁾ Yet it was ominous that such horse as were accompanying the lansquenets were artillery horse for this could only mean that they would be supplied with some of the valuable artillery of Alfonso d'Este who, it was rumoured, was about to open hostilities against the League by attacking Modena.

Pressure both from the pope and from Venice had forced the duke of Urbino to take some action against Frundsberg, although this meant entering into a campaign with weakened troops at the worst season of the year, when, under normal circumstances, the armies should have been resting and preparing for the spring campaign.

As they were not strong enough to risk a battle, Urbino and Giovanni de'Medici hoped solely to prevent a conjunction between Bourbon and Frundsberg. At Venetian instigation, Urbino, having ordered Camillo Orsini to Vicenza, moved his own troops to Piatella to try to keep Bourbon's troops tied down, while Giovanni de'Medici with his light cavalry crossed the country and made contact with the lansquenets close to Mantua.⁽²⁾ Saluzzo remained with 10,000 Swiss infantry, in camp on the Adda close to Cassano.⁽³⁾ Nothing much was gained for, on 23 November, the lansquenets hurried south to Borgoforte where they had arranged with Gonzaga for a bridge of boats by which they might cross the Po.⁽⁴⁾ While they were still crossing the river they were attacked by Urbino who had advanced from the west.⁽⁵⁾ But, harried though they were, and despite heavy snow falls,⁽⁶⁾ by 27 November all of the lansquenets had crossed the Po, were within the boundaries of the Church State and appeared to be advancing on Modena.⁽⁷⁾ In this peculiarly fruitless campaign Giovanni de'Medici had suffered a fatal wound. Whatever his merits as a commander and destructive though his troops might be,⁽⁸⁾ Giovanni was one of the few Italian military commanders of genius still alive and fighting/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.46v. Guazzo, Historie, 47.
 2. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 65, Guazzo, Historie, 47.
 3. Paruta, Istorie, 424.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 306.
 5. Ibid. 316.
 6. E. Hutton, Aretino, Scourge of Princes (London 1922), 91.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 332.
 8. Ibid. xlv. 75.

fighting for the League. His bande nere, 4,000 of those Italian infantry so despised by the duke of Urbino, owed much of their esprit de corps to Giovanni's superlative training and leadership, and, as they had proved during the assault on Milan, were the best troops at the League's disposal.⁽¹⁾ Giovanni's death was universally mourned, not least by his kinsman, the pope, now left without a military spokesman of authority in the League camp to counterbalance Urbino, who had merely been confirmed in his customary prudence by the fate of Giovanni.

Shortly after Medici's death Frundsberg, in heavy rain, and without the supplies he had anticipated from Bourbon, made his way upstream into the Piacentino. Here, between Castel San Giovanni and Fidenza he lodged his men for four months in appalling conditions.⁽²⁾

Medici's death and Frundsberg's arrival, the Colonna raid, heavy desertions, particularly among the Swiss, and approaching winter ended the League's offensive. The initiative was never recovered. All the troops were now engaged in purely defensive operations. Saluzzo took up quarters at Parma, Urbino at Casalmaggiore and Guido Rangoni, now the leading papal commander, at Piacenza.⁽³⁾ Throughout all subsequent military operations four things hampered the League; the incompetence of its generals, particularly of Urbino and Saluzzo, the lack of money and supplies, the division of political command and the need to defend so many towns and fortresses that the resources of the armies were constantly depleted.

Saluzzo was, by all accounts, incompetent, incapable of maintaining discipline. His aristocratic background and training told against him, and although he was personally courageous he had little idea of strategy or tactics. To make matters worse, due to the inefficiencies of the home government Saluzzo was rarely in a position to pay his troops.⁽⁴⁾ The majority of these were good, well-trained men, but many of the officers were Italian adventurers, whose only aim was to make a profit from the war.⁽⁵⁾ In consequence there was a regrettable/

1. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 73.

2. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 70-1, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.60 and see below p. 142-3.

3. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 102.

4. Senuto, Diarii, xliii. 311.

5. Ibid. xlii. 746, xlv. 75.

regrettable tendency for discipline to break down in Saluzzo's army, and there was much unauthorised pillaging and robbing, particularly within the Church State.⁽¹⁾

Urbino had already proved a liability to the League. He was not, strictly speaking, an incompetent general; indeed on questions of discipline and supply he was a master and he had played a prominent part in the reorganisation of the Venetian army. He was courteous in council and prepared to listen to advice.⁽²⁾ An independent Venetian observer spoke highly of his skill and knowledge and of his relationship with his troops.⁽³⁾ Yet he did not shine when it came to matters of strategy, his ideas were dominated by the remembrance of the battle of Agnadello, and of the loss of the entire Venetian mainland territory on that one day,⁽⁴⁾ he was unimaginative about everything except supposed plots against his person, and was incapable of planning a successful offensive campaign. His natural caution and belief in the desirability of limited objectives made him an excellent servant of Venice, never noted for rash policies.⁽⁵⁾ Urbino's attitude to the Medici and towards Florence was unrepentently hostile, an attitude which was generally reciprocated,⁽⁶⁾ and it was popularly believed that Urbino would use his position in the League armies to recover the district of Montefeltre and the town of San Leo from Florence. A friend of Duke Alfonso of Ferrara and traditionally the enemy of Sforza,⁽⁷⁾ as duke of Sora a Neapolitan subject, Urbino would have been a natural ally for Charles V had the situation not been complicated by claims of Ascanio Colonna to the duchy of Urbino.

Urbino and Guicciardini were temperamentally unsuited to working together, not least because Guicciardini regarded everything in terms of the need to defend the Church State, an almost impossible proposition. The defence of the northern part of the Church State was based on strategic fortresses, guarding the main/

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 311.

2. Ibid. xlix. 31.

3. Ibid. 151.

4. E.g. *ibid.* 28, 31.

5. E.g. *ibid.* 28.

6. Ibid. 151. For the reason see above p. 39.

7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 151. Montefeltre was the mountainous region between the Marecchia and the Foglia.

main routes to the south. There were many of these and to defend them all adequately required so much man-power that it was unrealistic to consider keeping a large field army as well. Guicciardini and Rangoni did their best, but they could not avoid withdrawing troops into the towns of the Church State at moments of crisis. So, on 28 November, Guicciardini demanded 1,000 infantry from the League camp.⁽¹⁾ Urbino would only release 500 men but had to send 500 ducats so that Guicciardini could make up the number. The duke of Milan sent an additional 400 ducats and on 24 December Guicciardini was sent four pieces of heavy artillery by Saluzzo.⁽²⁾

Politically the League was also running into difficulties. It was generally felt, in particular by Clement VII, desperate for financial assistance and afraid of a Florentine rebellion,⁽³⁾ that France was still proving to be the weakest member of the alliance. At the beginning of December Acciaiuoli complained to Francis that the pope and Florence had already contributed more to the League than they had been obliged to and asked Francis what he proposed to do about Frundsberg's army. In his reply Francis managed to avoid making any concrete promises about additional help to the League.⁽⁴⁾ Five days later Acciaiuoli asked for the dispatch of money to Clement and for 8,000-10,000 Swiss to counterbalance Frundsberg's lansquenets.⁽⁵⁾ Failing all else, the League tried to persuade Francis to move to Lyons so as to be close to Italy.⁽⁶⁾ But Francis continued to display a notable lack of concern. In despair, Acciaiuoli reported to Giberti and Salviati on 22 January that, despite the urgent needs of Italy, he had been unable to talk with the king who had been absent for twelve days hunting.⁽⁷⁾ In fact, Francis was engaged in delicate negotiations with Henry VIII over the possibility of a marriage between his second son and Princess Mary and/

1. Sanuto, Diarri, xliii. 349.

2. *Ibid.* 375, 515.

3. *Ibid.* 670, 'Il Papa è in timidità et dubita di Cesarei, dice voler far vita da prete attendono alli officii divini et a le messe dicendo il re Christianissimo non ha fatto il suo debito per la impresa'. Cal. S.P. Milan, i. 470.

4. Canestrini et Désjardins, Négociations, ii. 846-7, 11 December 1526.

5. *Ibid.* 865.

6. *Ibid.* 881.

7. *Ibid.* 893.

and a joint attack on Flanders, negotiations which he was afraid Italian importunity would jeopardise. So anxious was Clement becoming that, in February 1527, Langey was dispatched to France to try to speed up the French king's preparations and to warn him that the papal treasury could support no more than one month's further fighting.⁽¹⁾ Since his negotiations with Henry VIII had taken a favourable turn, Francis was now not unwilling to send at least some immediate assistance. He promised to raise more infantry for use in Italy and dispatched 20,000 ducats with a promise of a further 50,000 to Clement VII. Money was also sent for the French troops already in Italy, the Swiss were ordered to prepare for a descent into Italy, while the duke of Milan was assured that Francis lived only to see him restored to his duchy.⁽²⁾

In Urbino's camp as Casalmaggiore December and January were passed in constructing bridges with which the Venetian army could cross the Po, once permission arrived from Venice.⁽³⁾ While in Rome Clement pleaded with the Venetian ambassador that permission be granted for the papal and Venetian armies to join,⁽⁴⁾ from Modena Guicciardini bombarded Averoldi, the papal nuncio to Venice, with anxious letters asking that these orders to Urbino to cross the Po might be dispatched with all speed.⁽⁵⁾ Clement, who was now engaged in full-scale conflict in the south,⁽⁶⁾ was anxious to protect his northern frontier but Venice still feared an imperial attack on Bergamo, where refortification was incomplete,⁽⁷⁾ Brescia and Verona, and would not authorise Urbino to leave Lombardy. Urbino was making his own difficulties for he had managed to convince himself that the pope and emperor were plotting to give his duchy to Ferrara and he asked Venice to take his state under her protection. If not he threatened to give up his condotta.⁽⁸⁾ Altogether Guicciardini and Rangoni were in despair. Aware as they were of the political vulnerability of Florence, /

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.47-48y.
 2. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 176.
 3. Ibid. xliii. 618, xliv. 7.
 4. Ibid. 614.
 5. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 165-6.
 6. Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a. ff.511, 513 and see below p. 93-101.
 7. Sanuto, Diarri, xliii. 614.
 8. Ibid. 597-8.

Florence, should the imperialists choose to march into Tuscany, and of the pope's financial straits, they knew that if Urbino did not soon cross the Po only a miracle would prevent Clement coming to an agreement with the imperialists.

By the middle of January Venetian intelligence was assured that the imperial armies would march into Tuscany and Venice promised Guicciardini that, provided there was no possibility of a surprise attack on the Veneto, Urbino would be sent to the aid of Florence and the pope.⁽¹⁾ On 20 January Saluzzo and Guicciardini accordingly travelled to Casalmaggiore to discuss the question with Urbino, who, however, on the previous day, had abandoned the army and retired to Gazzuolo pleading ill-health.⁽²⁾ It was not until the end of the month that the duke would return to Casalmaggiore and here, on 30 January, he and Contarini, the Venetian provveditor, entered into consultation with Guicciardini, Giovanni Vettori and Saluzzo.⁽³⁾ Consultations lasted two days ending in a decision that the League forces should cross to the south bank of the Po by a new bridge, to be constructed at Cremona, as this would force Frundsberg to move away from Piacenza.⁽⁴⁾ Urbino proposed that, once Bourbon had moved, the papal army should provide for the guard of Modena and Parma and then fall back on Bologna, while he, with the Venetian troops, would follow Bourbon at a distance of about twenty-five miles. His plan suited Venice which would thus still be protected by Urbino's army but not the pope who saw that the road into Tuscany and Rome was left open to Bourbon.⁽⁵⁾

The bulk of the defence would therefore fall on the papal and French troops who, it seemed, would be forced to concentrate on the defence of the major cities, breaking up their field armies and reducing their mobility. A compromise was reached by providing skeleton garrisons in all towns which were to be reinforced if threatened by the imperial troops.⁽⁶⁾ To reduce the importance of man-power/

1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.42.

2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 114-5.

3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 9.

4. Ibid. 24.

5. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 117, 121-2.

6. E.g. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a.f.514.

man-power considerable work was done on the fortifications of all the papal towns. At Piacenza, in February, 6,000 sappers were at work on the defences.⁽¹⁾ At Modena completely new fortifications, approved by Guido Rangoni and Federigo da Bozzoli, were being constructed throughout February, the old castellations on the city wall being removed and replaced by a new wall with four permanent bastions.⁽²⁾ The organisation of the papal defences was as efficient as could be expected and extremely effective. In the event Bourbon was not able to risk an attack on any papal town in the north of the Church State. In the Po valley Guicciardini had so organised his troops as to make the best use of the material available; a fleet of boats had been built in January by which the commanders were able to move their troops swiftly between Piacenza, Parma, Reggio, Modena and Bologna the key fortress-towns in the papal defence system.⁽³⁾ These arrangements had not been easy; there was constant friction between the papal towns and the League army which increased the difficulties of Guicciardini and Saluzzo. Bologna proved particularly difficult. Despite genuine efforts on Saluzzo's part to discipline his army and to prevent any plundering,⁽⁴⁾ the populace refused to have any troops billeted in private houses.⁽⁵⁾ However, by mid-February, the papal defence was completely organised;⁽⁶⁾ on 20 February Federigo da Bozzoli declared that the towns of the Romagna were now well-provided for, and, on this basis, Guicciardini released him and sent him to Florence to organise the defences there. On 22 February Bourbon reached Fidenza.⁽⁷⁾ Immediately, Saluzzo and the papal troops, having established that the Venetians would guard Parma, made for Bologna, while Guido Rangoni moved his troops from Piacenza to Modena (23 February).⁽⁸⁾

As instructed by Venice, Urbino had crossed the Po for Parma on 5 March, but there remained immobile until the second week in March when the imperialists/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 52.
 2. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.539.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 694.
 4. Ibid. xliv. 363.
 5. Ibid. 454 and see below p. 242.
 6. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.514, 'Io non credo che possano fare buono effecto alcuno perche tutte queste terre bene guardata e perche questi di la Lega pronti a soccorrere ogni luogo dove sia di bisogno'. 20 February 1527.
 7. Then Borgo San Donnino.
 8. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 117-8, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 33, Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a ff.534, 539, 542.

imperialists captured Bussetto which was amply provisioned for a year, from the French garrison holding it.⁽¹⁾ On the following day, therefore, Urbino had to leave to recover Bussetto⁽²⁾ but, as soon as this fortress, along with Castel l'Arquato, had been taken, Urbino returned to Parma, once more pleading sickness as an excuse for his inactivity.⁽³⁾ It was not until 14 March that the duke's mysterious disease was diagnosed as gout, but he still maintained that he could not move as he had no litter for transport and would have to send to Caiazzo's widow to ask her to loan him one.⁽⁴⁾ He seemed to be losing control not only over himself but over the whole campaign. When, three days later, Agnello arrived in the Venetian camp, he was appalled by the way the army had been allowed to degenerate. There was no discipline or order at all, no supplies were reaching the camp, and the commanders were blaming each other for selecting the site. Heavy snow was adding to supply problems since the horses could not be put out to graze but would have to be supplied with corn from elsewhere.⁽⁵⁾ It was not until the end of the month that, abandoning such unsatisfactory lodgings, Urbino moved to Reggio, ten miles from the imperial camp.⁽⁶⁾

By the middle of March Guicciardini and Saluzzo knew that Bourbon would enter the Romagna.⁽⁷⁾ Their position was difficult; pay was owing to the Swiss who would not leave Bologna without it. In the end their pay had to be covered by a personal loan of Guicciardini's.⁽⁸⁾ On 1 April, Saluzzo and Guicciardini, with the French and the Swiss, left for Imola. Vettori and Ugo da Peppoli remained to guard Bologna with the bande nere,⁽⁹⁾ and on 3 April they were joined by Guido Rangoni who had brought 1,500 infantry, 100 lances and 200 cavalry from Modena and Piacenza.⁽¹⁰⁾

Already, however, the whole military situation had been complicated by the first defection from the Italian League. The papal truce with the council of Naples⁽¹¹⁾ threatened the alliance at its most vulnerable point. It was no/

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 295.
 2. Ibid. 296.
 3. Ibid. 296-7.
 4. Ibid. 297.
 5. Ibid. 325, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 119.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 133.
 7. Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a ff.598-9.
 8. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 118, 124.
 9. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 448, 476.
 10. Ibid. 451, Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.9a f.34.
 11. See below p. 102-3.

no longer possible to attempt to co-ordinate the papal, French and Venetian troops nor to block Bourbon's advance. From Bourbon's point of view the truce could not have come at a better moment, for the Venetian senate, angered by the pope's action and afraid that Bourbon might accept the truce and attack the Veneto, ordered Urbino to unite immediately with Saluzzo and to restrict his activities to protecting the Venetian state. On no account was he to risk an attack on Bourbon.⁽¹⁾

When news of the truce arrived in France the wrath of Francis I knew no bounds. He railed against the pope and warned Acciaiuoli that Charles would depose Clement and make him once more a simple priest.⁽²⁾ In defending the pope Acciaiuoli emphasised again and again that the truce had been made purely for financial reasons, but this was an excuse which Francis I found he could easily dismiss.⁽³⁾ The French king was peculiarly annoyed because he had now definitely decided on an attack on the Regno.⁽⁴⁾ After a month of complaints and reproaches, Francis spoke to Acciaiuoli about his intention of sending enough troops both to conquer the Regno and to recover Lombardy. To this Acciaiuoli, whose patience was wearing thin, replied; 'Molto meglio era aver fatto per l'adietro quello dite voler fare di presente; perchè, se lo avesse fatto, aresti vinto a questa ora l'impresa, e il Papa non aria avuto causa di accordarsi'.⁽⁵⁾

It was at least clear that, despite the papal defection, Venice, with some support from England and France, would fight on and, it was hoped by both Venice and France, that Ferrara might now be induced to join the League.⁽⁶⁾ Venice had even suggested to France the terms of a new confederation. A further 30,000 infantry would be raised, the cost to be borne equally by the two countries. Francis was prepared to agree, on condition that Venice would bear half the cost of a Neapolitan expedition. Each country would provide sixteen galleys for the purpose.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, at a time when the League was significantly weakened by/

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1. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 33. 'The truce is not only inopportune but injurious to all Italy', ibid. 53, Paruta, Istorie, 441.
 2. Canestrini et Désjardins, Négociations, ii. 902-4.
 3. Ibid. 906-7.
 4. Ibid. 913, 928.
 5. Ibid. 928.
 6. Ibid. 913 and see below p. 111-3.
 7. F. Berrato, 'La partecipazione militare di Venezia alla Lega di Cognac' Arch. Ven. lviii. 80-81.

by the defection of one of its members, its aims and objectives suffered a considerable extension which it was dubious whether the resources of the main participants could sustain.

Nevertheless, provision for an immediate invasion of the Regno, henceforward became an integral part of the League's programme, the price of continued French participation, and was included in the agreement when, on 25 April, Clement, panic-stricken by Bourbon's continued advance, attempted to readhere to the League. This was done through the Venetian and French residents at Rome who agreed, on behalf of their governments, that the pope should be subsidised in his war effort. Venice was to give the pope 15,000 ducats immediately and France and Venice together would contribute 30,000 ducats a month to the papal treasury, thereafter. The Venetians were to equip a second fleet with which to invade the Regno.⁽¹⁾ This treaty, which had been principally brought about by Henry VIII's envoy, Sir John Russell,⁽²⁾ who was to be handed Faenza as security for Clement, was never ratified. The Venetians warmly castigated their ambassador for taking on any such obligation, without prior consultation and on 29 April Doge Andrea Gritti told Averoldi that Venice could not accept the new agreements.⁽³⁾

Clement had already been roused to great activity; he announced his intention of creating three new cardinals and began to levy troops. Since his truce with Naples was still in operation, despite the inclusion of a provision in the agreement of 25 April for a joint papal and French invasion of the Regno, he planned to take the offensive by sending Renzo da Ceri on a fresh expedition against Siena. It was thus hoped that Bourbon's advance would be halted in Tuscany, but Bourbon had already left Arezzo and was advancing on Viterbo.⁽⁴⁾

Meanwhile on 17 April Guicciardini persuaded Saluzzo to move to/

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1. B.M. Cotton MS. Vitellius B ix. ff.104-106v.
 2. Sir John Russell, 1st earl of Bedford (1486?-1555). In his youth he had travelled widely on the continent and had learnt several languages, including Spanish. He was made a gentleman of the privy chamber by Henry VII on the recommendation of Philip of Burgundy. From 1516 onwards Russell was constantly employed on diplomatic missions. In 1525 he was sent on a mission to the Regno but got caught up in events in northern Italy, was present at Pavia and remained in Milan after the battle. On 2 January 1527 he was sent as ambassador to Clement, but left Rome before the sack.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 579.
 4. See below p. 164-5.

to Brisighella⁽¹⁾ and Urbino was at last on the move. On 15 April the Venetians had moved to Cento⁽²⁾ but Urbino refused to make any further move until he could be certain which route the imperialists would take and whether Bourbon would observe the truce for, if he did, he would be certain to invade Venetian territory.⁽³⁾ On 16 April Urbino was informed by Guicciardini of the imperial advance towards Tuscany and urged to make all possible speed for Florence.⁽⁴⁾ Lorenzo Cybo arrived in camp on the following day with the same advice;⁽⁵⁾

'Al che el Capitano zeneral rispose eramo per far ogni cossa per conservation di le terre del Pontefice e di signori fiorentini, tuttavia con conservation del stado di la Illustrissima Signoria, la qual conservation era mantener questo exercito'.⁽⁶⁾

When Urbino is blamed for his refusal ever to take the offensive against the imperialists, it should be remembered that he was throughout the prisoner of the demands of Venice that under no circumstances should Venetian territory be endangered. Within these terms Urbino had been extremely successful. At no time did an imperial army set foot on Venetian territory for the imperial commanders knew that, if they did so, Urbino would then be forced by Venice to attack them. For good or ill the defence of the Venetian state rested for the greatest part on Urbino's army and, had this been destroyed in open battle or even wasted away in small campaigns, Venice would have been defenceless before the armies of Charles V. It is also more than likely that if Urbino had risked a battle it would have been with disastrous consequences. Bourbon's army most certainly had begun to degenerate into a disorganised rabble but Urbino's was little better. He had never received the full complement of Swiss he had hoped for, the only fully trained the professional troops he could depend on, apart from the bande nere, and the only soldiery who could be relied on to stand up to the fully trained professional lansquenets and Spanish infantry. Although/

1. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 129.

2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 515.

3. Ibid. 526.

4. Ibid. 527-8.

5. Ibid. 529, 536.

6. Ibid. 536.

Although numbers in the Venetian army were kept more or less up to strength, this was only through constant recruitment, so that the bulk of Urbino's troops were raw and untrained. Over the winter discipline in the army had degenerated alarmingly⁽¹⁾ and, in the campaign of 1527, Urbino's troops attracted adverse comment wherever they passed. It was common knowledge, 'che le sue genti arrecano maggiore danno a'contadini, che paura a'soldati; sanno meglio predare i campi, che prendergli; vogliono piuttosto assediare e votare le terre che gli ricevano, che assaltare e combattere quelle che via gli cacciano'.⁽²⁾

It is in the light of this that Urbino's subsequent activities should be considered. Although his army was now suffering badly from lack of supplies, Urbino preferred to wait in the region of Bologna until some certain news was received about the progress of negotiations between Bourbon and Lannoy. On 20 April the definite news of the breakdown of negotiations arrived in the League camp, then still on the outskirts of Bologna.⁽³⁾

Urbino was now convinced that any question of an accord could be discounted and that, in order to prevent the fall of Florence, he must march into Tuscany. It was agreed that Saluzzo should cross the Appenines continuing up the Val de Lamone and Urbino by the Val di Sasso. The artillery would be left at Bologna together with the majority of the lances who could guard Bologna, Modena and Venice against a surprise attack from Ferrara or Milan.⁽⁴⁾ Urbino's decision to act now may well have been affected by a definite promise from Florence to surrender San Leo to him.⁽⁵⁾ If so Florence had not acted a moment too soon because it was not until Bourbon was in sight of the city, on the day of the 'Tumulto del Venerdì' (26 April), that the League army reached Florence.⁽⁶⁾

1. See above p. 55.

2. According to Capponi, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 152 although his opinion of Urbino's capacities as a general was no higher.

3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 544-5.

4. Ibid. 556-7.


5. Ibid. 569. The subject had been under discussion for some time e.g. ibid. xliv. 85.

6. For this see below p. 279.

The presence of the League army in Tuscany had one distinct political advantage for, on 28 April, Florence which had been on the point of doing so for several weeks, finally entered the League, a triumphant success for Venetian diplomacy. Florence would provide 5,000 infantry, 300 lances and 500 cavalry.⁽¹⁾

As soon as the news of Bourbon's departure from Florentine territory was known at Florence, hurried plans were made. On 25 April Guido Rangoni, with his own cavalry, that of Caiazzo (a total of 500)⁽²⁾ and 5,000 papal and Florentine infantry set out immediately for Rome. They were to be followed on 1 May by the rest of the army and it was hoped that if Bourbon were to take his artillery with him he would be overtaken before he reached Rome. Even if he were not it was still supposed Rangoni would reach Rome before it was captured.⁽³⁾ The plan was nearly successful; Rangoni and his light cavalry reached Rome on the same day as the imperialists but seeing that they could do nothing they retired to Otricoli.⁽⁴⁾ The bulk of the army had meanwhile left Florence on 3 May, reached Arezzo that evening, and advanced south. Urbino's troops moved into the contado of Perugia to Magione which they reached between the 8 and 10 May. Considerable damage was done; Saluzzo, who had advanced by much the same route, on 6 May sacked Passignano and reached Pieve on 7 May which refused him supplies. He took it by force, killing more than 800 in the process, and sacked the town.⁽⁵⁾ Urbino was still at Magione sending to Perugia for supplies.⁽⁶⁾ The duke had every intention of using this opportunity to rid Perugia of a regime which he believed was hostile to him. When the city of Perugia sent representatives to explain that because of the famine they could give no supplies, Urbino's price for leaving the contado, which his army was systematically devastating, was the departure of Gentile Baglioni. On 13 May, therefore, Gentile and his adherents went into exile. On the same day Urbino left via Todi towards Orvieto and Viterbo to await news from Rome and instructions from Venice⁽⁷⁾ for, by this time, he knew of the disaster which had occurred at Rome.

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1. F. Bennato, 'La Partecipazione militare di Venezia nella Lega di Cognac'. Arch. Ven. lviii. 83, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 9, xlv. 543.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 75.
 3. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v.137. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 40.
 4. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v.141.
 5. 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 313-4, La Presa di Roma, 135.
 6. 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 315.
 7. Ibid. 316, Paruta, Istorie, 458.



CHAPTER III

Clement VII, the Colonna and Charles V

'Pontifex privavit Columnam et Columna privabit Pontificem'.

L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1210

Although the Italian League aspired to represent the whole of Italy, there were many who disagreed most profoundly both with its aims and with its underlying assumptions. Nothing reveals more clearly the political complexity and the divisions of 16th-century Italy than the differing attitudes which were adopted towards the emperor by the members of the League and their opponents. Those who had profited from the anti-Turkish and anti-French policies of Ferdinand of Aragon spoke, in relation to Charles V, of the 'buona mente di Cesare'.⁽¹⁾ Others looked at the success of Spanish armies in Italy and spoke of the emperor's desire for the, 'monarchia d'Italia'.⁽²⁾ It was forgotten that, at the time of the Catholic Kings, the Spaniards had been reluctantly drawn into Italy to counterbalance the French and to check the developing Turkish sea-power. Rather, the memory of the struggle against French hegemony made the Italian powers regard with suspicion the aggrandisement of yet another ultramontane power.

Those Italians who feared the 'monarchia d'Italia' and those who relied on the 'buona mente' were united in believing Italy to be the emperor's first concern, indeed, like Gattinara, they believed that the very nature of emperorship involved Italy as the primary factor.⁽³⁾ In his study of Charles V Brandi argued that Gattinara influenced the emperor into developing an Italian policy.⁽⁴⁾ Since God had called Charles to be the first prince in Christendom, so Gattinara's argument ran, it was only fitting that the emperor should concern himself first with Italy.⁽⁵⁾ But Gattinara was expressing no more than a political commonplace of the time. Acciaiuoli on one occasion even went so far as to maintain that Charles V would sooner lose Austria than abandon the conquest of Italy.⁽⁶⁾ It is doubtful whether Gattinara's highflown sentiments about the nature of the/

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1. Castiglione's obsession with the 'buona mente di Cesare' is well-known, e.g. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 5.
 2. E.g. Acciaiuoli in A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.36v, Vettori, Sommario, 341.
 3. E.g. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 341.
 4. Brandi, Charles V, 90-91, 153-4, 205-6.
 5. *Ibid.* 154.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.37v. 'L'apetito di Cesare e tanto perduto in questa occupatione d'Italia che piu presto amarebbe perder l'Austria, e l'altre provincie vicine che restare inferiore di questa impresa, e pero qualunque somma di danari potra cumulare, li voltera prima per la subversione d'Italia'.

the imperial office had any effect on Charles V who, although he had inherited a vigorous Italian policy from his grandfather, was concerned with Italy only in so far as it affected his plans for dealing with the triple menace of the Turk, the Valois and Lutheran Germany.

Within Italy no contemporary was able to distinguish between the executive and administrative powers of the empire. It was generally believed that the emperor's servants acted at all times under definite instructions. The emperor certainly aimed to gain control of Italy in order to neutralise it and, whenever possible, Charles gave the fullest possible instructions to his servants, but communications were long and untrustworthy,⁽¹⁾ in the winter often non-existent, and inevitably the emperor had to leave his servants considerable latitude of action. At times the margin they were left was so great⁽²⁾ that they accused the emperor of virtual neglect. Yet even neglect could be preferable to some of the detailed instructions received. The emperor's total ignorance of Italy was constantly revealed in these instructions; in September 1525 Mendoza pointed out to Charles V that the peace arrangements he had made with the papacy and Milan were unworkable. Charles had promised to withdraw his troops both from the Church State and from the duchy of Milan but Mantua and Montferrat which he had designated as quarters for the infantry had no room for them.⁽³⁾

Despite his remoteness, Charles was aware that, as emperor, he stood in a peculiar historical relationship to Italy where the ancient struggle between pope and emperor, long exhausted in the rest of Europe, was still a reality. In 1525 there were many who remembered the Emperor Maximilian and his wild schemes to unite in one person the supreme power of both pontiff and emperor. Charles' anachronistic imperial pretensions in the end were of more importance in Italy than they were in Germany for, as Guicciardini pointed out, they enabled/

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1. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 45. It took at least five weeks for news to reach Spain from Italy in the summer, ibid. 63. At the beginning of February 1526 the imperialists in Milan had gone two months without any message from Spain, Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 760. See also Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 494, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 25, 31.
 2. E.g. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 4-5.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 347.

enabled him to adopt a peculiarly arrogant view of the papacy and the church which fitted in well with his general policies.⁽¹⁾ To put it at its lowest level, Charles V was able to employ against a recalcitrant papacy the very spiritual weapons the pope himself might hope to use. This arrogant attitude towards the papacy was fostered by the emperor's belief that Adrian VI and Clement VII were imperial clients. From the beginning this basic misconception was to bedevil the relations of Charles V and Clement VII. Charles believed that, because he had lent his voice to secure the election of Clement VII, the pope must henceforth act as an imperial agent in the same way he had done as a cardinal or as Pompeo Colonna, despite his obligations as an ecclesiastic, seemed able to do.⁽²⁾

But, within months of Clement's election, it became clear that the interests of the papacy and the empire would conflict, even were the pope to remain totally unmoved by threats made by the emperor elsewhere in Italy. In some degree this conflict was an ecclesiastical dispute over patronage and provisions in Spain and the Regno, but which could have been a subject for negotiation. The same could not be said of the dispute over Siena and the Colonna where the complexities of Italian politics inevitably and involuntarily brought the pope and the emperor into conflict. The Medici were bound by a system of mutual obligation to the party in Siena most opposed to imperial interests, and the imperial party in Siena was, by a similar pattern of relationship and obligation, bound to the emperor and to the Colonna,⁽³⁾ the traditional enemies of the Medici and the papal allies, the Orsini. In Siena feelings ran high. The pro-imperial party was bitterly anti-papal and regarded Charles V as a liberator, while Clement VII, who had supported Albany's introduction of Alessandro Bichi as head/

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1. '... sa ancora che lo imperadore ha una certa conessita' con la Chiesa, che in uno certo modo gli appartiene pensare alla reformazione e buoni ordini di quella', F. Guicciardini, 'Sulla proposta di alleanza fatta di Carlo V a Clemente VII' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi (Bari 1933), 154-5.
 2. E.g. Alfonso de Valdés, Dialogo de Mercurio y Caron (Madrid 1929), 64. for an official expression of this idea.
 3. The Colonna had, for example, sheltered Alfonso Petrucci, whose brother, Borghese, had been driven from the government of Siena at the instigation of Leo X.

head of the Sienese republic,⁽¹⁾ was referred to as a tyrant.⁽²⁾ Again, in Siena, governments were notoriously unstable, liable to topple with the slightest change in international politics, able to survive at all only by external props. Here, as over the 'stato' of the Colonna Clement was unable to act either in the interests of the papacy or of his family without offending imperial interests.⁽³⁾

As it became apparent that Clement would not always act according to imperial interests there were open to Charles V two courses. He might use his imperial power, political and spiritual, to depose the pope and replace him by a more compliant one. This was the plan favoured by Pompeo Colonna and eventually sanctioned by the emperor. The alternative was to reduce the papacy to such a state of dependence on the empire that no pope could henceforth pursue an independent policy. The prerequisite for either course of action was the capture of Rome and of Clement VII.

Guicciardini inclined to the view that the emperor would take the second way. He constantly advised against trusting Charles V⁽⁴⁾ who, he said, would begin by depriving Clement of Florence and then of the Church State. Then, wanting a pope on whom he could rely, he would, 'deporti (Clement VII) per via di uno concilio, o pure con uno concilio limitare di sorte la autorità de'pontefici che tu abbia a restare più presto vescovo di Roma che papa'.⁽⁵⁾ The Florentine ambassador to Spain, less susceptible to the imperial charm than Castiglione, was of the same opinion.⁽⁶⁾ An extensive correspondence and prolonged diplomatic activity between Rome and Spain reveal both Charles V and Clement VII as unwilling to reach a complete break, although Clement may well have been misled by the consistently optimistic reports which were transmitted from Spain by/

1. See above p.16 and below p. 299-300.

2. E.g. La Guerra di Camollia, 44.

3. Alberi, Relazioni, ser.2, vol.iii. 132-3.

4. Guicciardini, 'Giustificazione della politica di Clement VII' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi, (Bari 1933), 201, P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di F. Guicciardini, 16.

5. Guicciardini, 'Sulla proposta di alleanza fatta da Carlo V a Clemente VII' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi (Bari 1933), 156.

6. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 203.

by Castiglione. Both pope and emperor adopted from preference devious methods of attack. Neither party was totally committed to hostilities. Charles V was usually willing to offer substantial concessions for the sake of papal support. It was unfortunate that the imperial occupation of Milan made it impossible for Clement to trust the emperor's intentions for the rest of Italy.

Clement's attitude to the duchy of Milan was consistent. During the pontificate of Leo X when Clement, as Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, had played a substantial part in forming papal policy, the papacy had been determined on the restoration of Sforza to Milan. Milan must be ruled, neither by France nor by Spain, but by its own native dukes. During the early years of his own pontificate, in his correspondence with the emperor, Clement VII turned again and again to the question of Milan. In December 1525, following the imperial occupation of Milan, Clement immediately urged Charles to restore Sforza as this would be the only sure path to peace in Italy. He warned the emperor that the delay in ratifying his agreements with the Italian powers coupled with the behaviour of the imperialists over Milan, 'causavano infinite suspizioni; alle quali ancora che il Papa non potesse indursi a credere per la opinione stabilita, che ha di S.Maesta, non potea pero far che gli altri non le credessero; ne potea negare, essendo Papa, e Italiano agli altri Italiani, che lo supplicavano a non abandonar Italia, ad essere universal padre di tutti'.⁽¹⁾ In a brief of 23 June 1526, after recalling that, following the battle of Pavia, he had paid the imperialists 100,000 ducats on condition that the confederation between pope and emperor was ratified and that the imperial forces would not enter Milan, and that neither condition had been fulfilled, Clement who had already recalled the legate, Giovanni Salviati,⁽²⁾ justified his resort to arms. He was not obliged, he said, to follow the emperor in his errors and it was Charles V's hostile attitude to the duke of Milan which had obliged him to join the Italian League for the common defence of Italy.⁽³⁾ This brief was not received by Charles V until 20 August at a time when the 'anti-Italian' Lannoy was in great favour⁽⁴⁾ and/

1. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 11.

2. Ibid. 56. He had been sent to Spain to arrange for ratification of the articles agreed by the viceroy.

3. Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 217.

4. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 61.

and after he had already (13 August) publically announced that the aggression of the pope, France and other Italian powers had forced him to take up arms. Nevertheless, the papal brief, which even the Venetian ambassador, Navagero, thought was unnecessarily strongly worded, gave rise in Charles V to grave resentment, carefully fanned by Gattinara. The emperor's first reaction was to talk vaguely and wildly to all the League ambassadors in Spain about a general council and a universal peace. He reminded the French ambassador in particular that if his master had kept his promises all would yet be well and warned that he would not return the French princes, 'Even if compelled by force to abandon all his realms'.⁽¹⁾

In the same spirit of rancour, in mid-September, the emperor penned a tactless reply to Clement VII. Charles claimed that his only aim since his accession had been peace and that if he had not been frustrated by France he would have turned his armies against the Turk. As far as Milan was concerned there were many reasons for his behaviour and the only legal right which Sforza had to the duchy was the investiture granted by Charles' great-grandfather. Having mentioned the possibility that Milan might be given to Bourbon, Charles made an equally tactless appeal from the pope to a general council.⁽²⁾ The threat of a general council, long one of Gattinara's dearest projects,⁽³⁾ was to become the chief weapon against the pope. On 6 October Charles wrote to the Sacred College and again spoke of a council.⁽⁴⁾ Meanwhile, in Spain, the more prominent theologians had spent the summer compiling answers to a detailed questionnaire which included such pertinent questions as; to what limits was an emperor obliged to obey a pope? whether it was always obligatory to pay annates? whether under provocation one might make war on the pope?⁽⁵⁾ Clement countered the emperor's/

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1. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 603-4.
 2. Lenz, Correspondenz, i. 219-221. For the discussion of the general council in Spain see Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 75, 79.
 3. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 62, 'The Chancellor has always advocated this scheme, being of opinion that he would be appointed judge, both by reason of his influence with the Emperor and his knowledge of canon law, in which he believes himself supreme'.
 4. Lenz, Correspondenz, i. 221, Sanuto, Diarri, xliii. 580
 5. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 61.

emperor's references to a council by setting on foot research in the Vatican archives which led to the 'discovery' of the bulls which forbade an emperor to hold the Regno, Lombardy or Tuscany.⁽¹⁾

There was a further reason for the inability of pope and emperor to come to an agreement - the Spanish army's arrears of pay. Unable or unwilling to raise the substantial sum needed to pay off arrears, already owing in 1525 and continually mounting, Charles V was determined that Italy should pay them. Francis I, always a troublemaker, alleged that the emperor had told him, 'he had no fear of being in want of money in Italy, as he could exact from the Italians what he liked'.⁽²⁾ Whether Charles V was ever so imprudent as to utter these words in the presence of the French king is not known, but the emperor's actions seem to lend colour to the allegation. Of the sums actually disbursed to the imperial army only a small proportion came from Spain and much of that was originally destined for other purposes. Constantly Charles offered to withdraw his army from Italy, but only on condition that the pope or some other Italian power should first pay off its substantial arrears.⁽³⁾

The imperial servants in Italy were united in wishing, if possible, to deliver the monarchy of Italy into the emperor's hands. In July 1526 Bourbon's secretary spoke of the intention to make Charles, 'seigneur et maistre de tout Italie'.⁽⁴⁾ Don Ugo da Moncada was convinced that the emperor could rightfully claim the monarchy.⁽⁵⁾ His conviction of the rightness of the cause made Moncada sadly willing to participate in acts of violence against the pope although his personal leanings were all towards peace; 'dieu scait, combien je desire la paix/

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xl. 174.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt. 1, 948. Charles provided a different version of this story, 'on arriving in France, ... he (Francis) sent to tell the Pope that at that private conference he (the Emperor) requested him (the King) to call a council, and depose the Pope. This the Emperor vowed he had never said ... the King of France said to him that they would go to Italy, and be masters there, and then at Rome make the Pope the Emperor's chaplain'. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-1526, 604.
 3. E.g. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt. 1, 1010.
 4. Lenz, Correspondenz, i. 218.
 5. For his attitude in general see Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 37.

paix universelle, ainsi que je l'ai souvent dit a votre majeste ... C'est a quoi je m'occupe considerant, en laissant a part que dieu est mal servi par la guerre entre les chretiens, que la paix convien a v.m.⁽¹⁾ He urged the need to make concessions over Ferrara and over Sforza and, like all imperial advisers of integrity, warned Charles that he must provide for his army in Lombardy.⁽²⁾

Moncada's views were shared by many of Charles Neapolitan servants whose natural concern was with the welfare of the Regno. Not the least of these was Giel Guasto who welcomed Lannoy's truce⁽³⁾ as the fulfillment of all he had been working for; 'Tucto el tempo chio ho andato in la guerra sempre ho desiderato la pace in la christianità perche ipso sara meglio servito et dicta guerra se coverta contra infedeli ..'⁽⁴⁾

The Neapolitans were not the only Italian servants of Charles to be troubled by divided loyalties. Others suffered through their joint allegiance to pope and emperor, notably the marquess of Mantua, the duke of Ferrara, the Colonna family and other princes of the Campagna. The question of Ferrara will be dealt with elsewhere⁽⁵⁾ but Federico Gonzaga was in much the same position as Alfonso d'Este. Both were unwilling to commit themselves to either side for fear that they should have backed a loser.

The weakness of Mantua in relation to other Italian states played into Charles V's hand and made Federico Gonzaga his covert ally who afforded vital assistance at a crucial moment, in the hope that he might be rewarded with a position of greater prestige in Italy.

Under Leo X, Gonzaga had learned the displeasure of the pope by harbouring the dispossessed della Rovere family,⁽⁶⁾ but Leo, like Clement, was always anxious to detach Federico from both France and Spain. Gonzaga's price was his appointment as captain-general of the Church, and, in an agreement made in December 1520, Federico Gonzaga agreed to take service against anyone, including the emperor, his legitimate sovereign, from whom he held the marquessate of Mantua./

1. Lans, Correspondenz, i. 212.

2. Ibid.

3. See below p. 102.

4. Letter to the pope, 31 March 1527, printed in Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 174-5.

5. See below, chapter iv.

6. See above p. 10-12.

Mantua. As a reward Ercole Gonzaga was appointed bishop of Mantua. In August 1523, Federico was confirmed in his title of captain-general of the Church and of Florence with a condotta of 10,000 ducats a year for three years. But Gonzaga's marquisate was an imperial fief and he could never be persuaded into offensive action against the emperor.

There were indications that in any conflict Gonzaga would veer towards the imperialists. In June 1526 there was talk of renewing Gonzaga's title of captain-general and of sending him to join the League army. It was then found impossible to produce the document in which the marquess had agreed to take service against the emperor. Investigation showed that the document had been extracted from the papal archives by Mantuan agents⁽¹⁾ and destroyed.⁽²⁾

Inevitably, during the siege of Cremona,⁽³⁾ assistance was given to the imperialists which originated in Mantuan territory, although the marquess blandly denied that he was in any way implicated. He also refused any assistance to the League.⁽⁴⁾ Gonzaga proceeded to grant Frundsberg free passage, concentrated all available boats at Borgoforte to ease the crossing of the Po for the lansquenets, and provided Frundsberg with supplies, putting his entire state on a war-footing in order to do so.⁽⁵⁾ In February 1527 he was supplying Bourbon with food, excusing himself to Venice on the grounds that the duke was 'propinquo al suo stado'.⁽⁶⁾ This frequently provoked rumours that the marquess would declare openly for Charles,⁽⁷⁾ but he never did and his vacillation, in the end, angered the emperor who remarked of Gonzaga that all his 'words and deeds seem to be enveloped in dissimulation'.⁽⁸⁾

A far more satisfactory ally was Cardinal Pompeo Colonna. By 1525 Colonna had evolved a plan which, it seemed, could solve all the emperor's Italian problems. The plan provided for the capture of Rome and of Clement VII and for/

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1. Including Castiglione.
 2. P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento, 37.
 3. See above p. 48-50.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 550, 552, 557, xliii. 316, 325.
 5. Ibid. xliii. 316, Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, 4.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 203.
 7. E.g. ibid. xliii. 353.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 1.

for the deposition of the latter. He was to be replaced by an imperialist on whom Charles would be able to rely to summon a general council.

To understand the vital role played by Pompeo Colonna and by other members of his family between 1525 and 1527 it is necessary to consider the position of the Roman barons, both of the Orsini and the Colonna connexions, who throughout the 16th century presented the papacy with major political problems.

The control that the two rival factions exercised over the Campagna constantly nullified papal attempts at good government.⁽¹⁾ They were constantly at war, matching sizeable armies against each other. They sheltered fugitives from justice and they hindered all economic development. Their constant faction fights, and the incessant brigandage which was permitted, even when it was not actually committed, by the Roman barons would have been sufficient to have reduced prosperity in the area over a protracted length of time. In addition, as Rome grew in size, so there became available a better market for meat and dairy produce. Since meat brought immediate profit the Roman barons tended to place more and more of their land under pasture. By the beginning of the 16th century Rome was totally dependent on imported wheat, and when wheat imports were delayed or prevented the city was reduced quickly to famine level.⁽²⁾ To counteract this danger the popes made constant efforts to revive grain production in the Campagna which were systematically sabotaged by the Roman barons.⁽³⁾ In 1523 Clement VII experienced the full power of the opposition of the Roman barons to papal policy when, in the bull Ad Sacram, confirming previous bulls of Sixtus IV and Julius II, he forbade all proprietors living within 10 miles of Rome to keep more than 125 'vacche rosse'.⁽⁴⁾

Although both the Orsini and the Colonna were united in opposing these agricultural measures the Colonna were in a special position. Through the Gaetani, an important family within the Colonna complex, they had opposed yet another project of successive popes, the draining of the Pontine marshes. As/

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1. See above p. 11.
 2. E.g. D. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge in the Court of Rome 1509-14 (London 1965),⁹ for the wheat shortage of 1504-5.
 3. For details of these attempts see Delumeau, Rome, 566-8.
 4. Ibid. 568, Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, i. 212-3.

As dukes of Sermonetta, from the time of Martin V the Gaetani had prevented the draining of that portion which stretched from Monte Circeo to the Lepini hills. Leo X had offered to compensate the Gaetani for any loss suffered but the plan collapsed in the face of their exorbitant demands and the practical difficulties involved.⁽¹⁾

There were many reasons why the Roman princes and barons had survived as overt rivals of the papacy, capable of conducting damaging independent policies. Their territorial rights were extensive and consolidated, carrying with them rights of jurisdiction which made the Colonna and Orsini sovereign within the confines of their own properties. Contemporaries spoke of the Colonna or Orsini 'stato'. By 1527 the Colonna controlled Genzano, Nemi, Nettuno, Ardea, Castelnuovo di Porta, Civitella, Paliano, Marino, Grottaferrata, Rocca di Papa and many other adjacent properties. In 1492 the combined annual income from Orsini and Colonna territories was reckoned as 25,000 gold florins a year, that is more than the income of Lucca or Piombino, and twice as much as the income of Asti or Faenza.⁽²⁾ The Roman barons resembled the tyrants of the Romagna; living like princes each baron kept up a court of his own. Many played an important role in the development of humanism in Italy and as patrons of the visual arts. Alviano, who surrounded himself with a circle of scholars in whom he took great pleasure, and Pescara, both turned their hands to writing, and Pescara's wife, Vittoria Colonna, was one of the most distinguished figures of the Italian renaissance.⁽³⁾

From their earliest youth all the Roman barons had the best military education available. Camillo Orsini, the son of the marquis of Pescara, for instance, was sent to study under Pitigliano, Alviano and GianIacomo Trivulzio.⁽⁴⁾ Many, like Alviano, showed distinct military genius and their value as condottieri rose accordingly.

Additional strength came through a complicated structure of marriage and relationship which, within the terms of their own family policies, united the Colonna and Orsini to most of the major families in Italy. On the whole the/

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1. Delumeau, Rome, 579.
 2. P. Pecchi, Roma nel Cinquecento, 267.
 3. D.B.I. under Alviano, E.I.
 4. Sansovino, Casa Orsini, i. 7.

the Orsini married into Guelf, the Colonna into Ghibelline families. Such marriages brought both sides in the contract considerable obligations. The Medici had twice married into the Orsini family; in one of the most splendid wedding ceremonies of the fifteenth century Lorenzo the Magnificent had married Clarice Orsini and their son Piero married Alfonsina, the daughter of Roberto Orsini. Henceforward the ties between the Medici and Orsini families were particularly strong. Franciscotto Orsini was brought up at the court of Lorenzo as one of the closest relatives of the Medici family.⁽¹⁾ After the fall of the Medici in 1494 the Orsini worked actively for their restoration to Florence. In 1497, 1500, 1501 and 1505 members of the Orsini family were engaged in military attempts against the Florentine republic because they were, 'di parentade e di benivolenza congiunta con la famiglia de' Medici'.⁽²⁾ But these family alliances were often far-flung and sometimes incompatible. Camillo Orsini of Bracciano, having first married within the Orsini clan, a common practice which helped consolidate the large properties of the barons, made a second political marriage with a daughter of Gian Paolo Baglioni. The mere fact of this marriage rendered him suspect to Leo X and Camillo was forced to flee to the Spanish for protection. Subsequently his ties with Gian Paolo involved him in the restoration of that tyrant to Perugia, after Leo's death.⁽³⁾

This incident illustrates the danger to the papacy which came from the alliance of the Roman barons with foreign and other Italian powers. The Colonna and the Orsini ignored the fact that their legal obligations as citizens of the papal state were incompatible with engagements of a military or political nature which they entered into elsewhere. For both the Orsini and the Colonna allies were easy to come by, for not only could the Roman barons provide valuable armies, but they could at any moment neutralise papal policy by an attack on or occupation of Rome, tying down detachments of papal troops. In 1494, long before Charles VIII reached Rome, the city was virtually besieged by the Colonna and the Savelli, and Alexander VI had to keep, as a defence against them, 200 lances and a troop of Neapolitan cavalry.⁽⁴⁾ The price of an alliance usually/

1. Sansovino, Casa Orsina, i. 6.

2. Giovio, Vita Leo X, 103. See also D.B.I. under Alviano.

3. Sansovino, Casa Orsina, i. 7.

4. G.L. Moncallero, Il Cardinal Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena (Florence 1953), 97, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, i. 97-99.

usually included a provision that the barons concerned would be included in any peace treaty and the Colonna family boast that for centuries no European peace treaty was complete without their signature. Agreements of this nature were common among the condottieri who frequently entered into military engagements in order to recover forfeited territories. Federigo da Bozzoli, one of the better League commanders, threatened to leave French service when Francis I failed to include in a projected peace treaty with Charles V a stipulation that Bozzoli's confiscated lands should be restored.⁽¹⁾

The Colonna generally took service with the Spanish, the Orsini are found most frequently in the service of Venice or France, an alliance into which Virginio Orsini led his family in 1497. But the alliance with France was a natural consequence of the antipathy between France and the Colonna which was so acute that it was thought impolitic to admit the Colonna to the discussions at Magione for fear of offending the French.⁽²⁾ On occasion the alliance brought tangible political benefit; in 1503 while Giangiordano Orsini, who held a condotta from the French king was absent in the Regno his estates were threatened by Cesare Borgia. French intervention forced Cesare to turn his attack from Bracciano to Ceri and to leave Giangiordano's lands unmolested.⁽³⁾

There were two reasons for the alliance with Venice. The first was obvious; Venice was a good employer and was renowned for fulfilling her obligations. The second was the fact that both the Orsini and Venice were anti-imperial. Much of Venetian territory was threatened both by imperial pretensions and by imperial power. In consequence many of the Orsini family served Venice long and well. The most distinguished was Pitigliano, but in 1509 Giulio Orsini was given a Venetian condotta⁽⁴⁾ and the fame of Renzo da Ceri dated from 1510 when he was given a Venetian condotta.⁽⁵⁾ Alviano, who had been brought up in the households of Virginio and Napoleone Orsini, faithfully served Venice from 1507 onwards, and for his loyalty suffered imprisonment by the French from 1509-1513.⁽⁶⁾

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 116.
 2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, ii. 52-53.
 3. Ibid. ii. 63-65.
 4. Ibid. ii. 261.
 5. E.I.
 6. E.I. D.B.I.

Consistent supporters of Venice, by the first quarter of the 16th century the Orsini were in a position considerably less complicated than that of the Colonna, for the papacy and the Orsini had now entered into an unwritten alliance based upon significant geographical facts. In 1522 the Orsini controlled a large territory to the north-west of Rome which included some of the most important fortresses of the Campagna; Ceri,⁽¹⁾ Palo, which they held from 1330 until 1573,⁽²⁾ Cerveteri, one of the Cybo castles, purchased in 1492 and held by the family until 1674,⁽³⁾ Anguillara and Bracciano. The Orsini therefore controlled all routes leading north from Rome including the roads to Civitavecchia and Florence. The effectiveness of this control was demonstrated in 1527; in the first week of June the count of Anguillara took the Orsini over to the imperial side and forced the League army to move from Vetralla, 'perché non si potria far venir victualie da loco alcuno al campo che non fussero impedita da quelli da Bracciano'.⁽⁴⁾ The supply route with Florence was vital, for the merchant class of Florence fed and clothed Rome; even Julius II had been unable to break with the Florentines,⁽⁵⁾ and both Leo X and Clement VII had to govern Florence from Rome.

Aside from the Ghibelline tradition of the Colonna family, the geographical location of their estates made an alliance with the papacy unlikely, for the Colonna were most vulnerable to attack from Naples where, by 1527, much of their land lay. The Colonna and the Orsini by this date dominated two factions of the Roman barons, their territory roughly divided by the Tiber with Colonna support coming from the Gaetani and the Conti and that of the Orsini from the Savelli.

As far as territorial control was concerned there was thus little reason for the Orsini and Colonna to come into conflict. This arose from other causes./

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1. 'terra antichissima, e per la fortezza del sito suo molto celebrata, perché è posta in su uno masso anzi più presto in su uno poggio tutto d'un sasso intero'. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, ii. 64.
 2. Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, i. 186.
 3. Ibid. 189.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 309-311.
 5. Nardi, Historie, 136.

causes. First was the disputed right of the Colonna to their properties. The Colonna power had had a vast extension in the grants made by Martin V to his family; Ardea, Marsico, Nettuno, Astura, Soriano, Paliano, Frascati, Pietraperzia, Marino and Rocca di Papa. Of these the fortunes of Ardea are not atypical. In the 15th century it fell into papal hands and was reconquered by Raimondo Orsini. Martin V took it from the Orsini to give it to the Colonna who in turn gave it to the Cesarini. There might therefore be four claimants to the property.⁽¹⁾ In addition to these grants, Martin V persuaded Giovanna of Naples to grant his brothers rich fiefs in the Regno which linked the fortunes of the Colonna family with the fortunes of the kingdom of Naples and made it an essential factor in their political life that they remain on good terms with the de facto government of that kingdom. The importance of this became even more evident when Eugenius IV revoked all the grants of Martin V and asked for the restitution of the property of the Holy See. Thereafter the Colonna held their land in the Church State not of right but by force, and the history of their relationship with the papacy turns on their struggle to recover their rights, a struggle which was not finally concluded until 1561-2 when their property was fully restored.⁽²⁾ In this struggle the effective agents of the papacy were the Orsini, who were called in, even by Alexander VI, to counterbalance the Colonna power, Alexander having confirmed in his bull Dudum iniquitatis filii the anti-Colonna legislation of Eugenius IV.⁽³⁾

This attempt of the Colonna to recover their rights was but one aspect of a seemingly unending struggle between the two factions for power, not over the commune of Rome, but in the curia, the Patrimony and the Regno. Power in the curia became of paramount importance as the influence of the commune of Rome declined to virtual nullity and the government of the city was taken over by papal officials.⁽⁴⁾ By the 16th century the curia was the centre of power, of peculiar value from the point of view of patronage. As both Guicciardini and Machiavelli recognised, in the struggles of the Orsini and the Colonna, the/

1. Tomassetti, Campagna Romagna, i. 101-2.

2. E.I., Peter Partner, The Papal State under Martin V (London 1958) passim.

3. Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, i. 330.

4. See below p. 126-7.

the cardinals of the two families were of great importance. Machiavelli explained the success of Julius II, in subjecting the Roman barons to papal control, to that pope's refusal to appoint cardinals from either family, 'perche questi nutriscono in Roma e fuori le parti e quelli baroni sono sforzati a difenderle'.⁽¹⁾ Guicciardini also remarked on the success of Julius II and strongly criticised Leo X for reversing the policy by his elevation of Franciscotto Orsini and Pompeo Colonna in 1517.⁽²⁾

Yet, in all the years of struggle for power, apart from Pompeo Colonna, not one of the Roman barons was able to propose a coherent political plan. Pompeo alone understood that he could achieve the power he sought less by military force, though this too had its place, than by organising the sympathies of the Roman populace against the papacy, by appealing against Clement VII to a general council, by allying with the emperor and by organising discontent against Clement VII in Florence and Siena. In doing so Pompeo disrupted every plan or enterprise of Clement VII to such an extent that it is possible to believe the apocryphal story that on hearing of Pompeo's death Clement remarked, 'Hora potemo dire che siamo papa'.⁽³⁾

Born at Rome in 1479 of Prince Girolamo Colonna, Pompeo made a name for himself as a soldier⁽⁴⁾ and only pressure from his relatives induced him to embark on an ecclesiastical career. Bishop of Rieti, by 1507 he had become protonotary to the apostolic chamber and in 1508 was made abbot of Subiaco and Grottaferrata. But his relations with Julius II who refused to make him a cardinal, were strained. It had always been a Colonna expedient to try to seize military control of Rome during moments of crisis,⁽⁵⁾ and the Colonna family had frequently championed to Roman populace; in 1494 Prospero Colonna complained bitterly to Charles VIII about the behaviour of French troops in Rome. Pompeo Colonna was the first member of his family to turn this tradition to political/

1. Machiavelli, Il Principe, ed. L.A. Burd (Oxford 1891), 251-2.

2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 34-5.

3. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 392.

4. E.I. Giovio, Vita P. Colonna, passim.

5. E.g. in 1493 during the affair of the Cybo castles and again in 1503 on the death of Alexander VI.

? = P. Colonna

political advantage. He clearly grasped the importance that the commune and, above all, the populace of Rome, might have in a struggle with the papacy. In 1511, during the grave illness of Julius II, Pompeo allied with the more republican members of the Roman commune led by Marco Antonio Altieri.⁽¹⁾ Entering the Campidoglio Pompeo appealed to the Roman people to throw off the papal yoke and restore their ancient liberties.⁽²⁾ Although, on this occasion, Pompeo had no success, mainly because he had overestimated the power of the Roman commune, he continued to build up a substantial following among the dissatisfied elements of Roman society. The papacy was forced to take notice of his activities and, in an attempt to counter Pompeo in Rome, Clement VII insisted that the Roman magistracies should be held by his unsuccessful and unpopular nominees.⁽³⁾ Although Clement thus ensured that a rebellion of the Roman commune would not again be staged under the leadership of the magistrates, it became increasingly likely that the Roman opposition would look towards Pompeo Colonna as a champion of discontent.

For sometime Pompeo was unable to act. As punishment for his part in the rising of 1511 he was deprived of his dignities and it was not until 1517 that Leo X restored them and created him cardinal.⁽⁴⁾ For the remaining years of Leo's pontificate, and throughout the brief reign of Adrian VI, Pompeo played no prominent part in politics. During the conclave, which followed the death of Adrian, Clement is said to have purchased Pompeo's vote by a promise of the vice-chancery and the Palazzo Venezia but Colonna was also influenced by the threat that an Orsini pope might be elected.⁽⁵⁾

Despite this vote for Clement, there is no doubt that Pompeo immediately afterwards aspired to the papacy himself. For him it became essential that/

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1. Marco Antonio Altieri, a member of an old Roman family, was born in 1450. He had a distinguished public career, being made castellan of the rocca of Viterbo in 1482, and conservator of the commune of Rome in 1511. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 26-7.
 2. Ibid. E.I. under Roma, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iii. 118-9.
 3. In 1526 the three conservatori were Pietro Matuzzi, Mario Perusco and Ippolito Scarzo. The last two were not even Roman by birth and Scarzo had started his career as a physician in Anguillara. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 220-1. For the government of Rome see below chapter 5.
 4. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 34-5.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.5 ff.2v-5.

that either Clement should be deposed or that he should be killed.⁽¹⁾ To either end his energies were henceforward directed. Charles V connived with Pompeo in his plans. There is little doubt that in the event of Clement's death or removal Pompeo Colonna would have been created pope with imperial support.⁽²⁾ Even after the sack of Rome, when Charles was forced to realise it would be impossible to get rid of Clement without creating a schism, Pompeo continued to campaign for the papal tiara. On 30 September 1527 it was reported that Colonna had formed an alliance with the lansquenets, 'in the hope that one of these days, if not paid their arrears, they will mutiny, and murder the Pope'.⁽³⁾

Pompeio's constant appeals to a general council, that most cherished of imperial dreams, were an astute political gesture. They allied Colonna closely with the policies of Charles V and put constant pressure on Clement. The whole question of a council was a recurrent thorn in the side of each successive occupant of St. Peter's chair. It was an automatic weapon used by any enemy of the pope. Nor was it an idle threat; only a chain of unpredictable circumstances had prevented the French-inspired conciliabulum of Pisa escalating into a genuine general council. It is possible that Clement VII feared Charles V's appeals to a general council more than he feared the imperial armies. It was a weapon which neither Charles nor Colonna neglected and it was effective propaganda at a time when the Lutheran threat made the calling of a council a self-evident necessity. Pompeo's appeals were usually made on notices pinned to the church doors of Rome where they might be expected to have the greatest affect.⁽⁴⁾

By 1525 Colonna was able to check Clement whenever he wished. Within the church he had a considerable number of supporters, particularly among the clergy of the southern Church State, and in the Sacred College itself,⁽⁵⁾ where he was/

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1. 'Pompeio Colonna avesse conspirato nella morte violenta del pontefice, disegnando anche costretti con la violenza e con l'armi i cardinali a eleggerlo'. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 79.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 84.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 409. The threat was taken seriously enough for specific arrangements to be made for Clement to escape from Rome if the need arose.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 89 and see below p. 93.
 5. E.g. in February 1527 it was a conspiracy of priests which threatened to deliver Terracina into Colonna's hands. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 213. Somebody also appears to have been conspiring against the pope in Orvieto and Viterbo, and Colonna may well have been involved in that episode. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 93, B.N.M.S. Italian, n.13 f.134.

was supported by the older cardinals. In Rome papal authority was openly flouted and there was constant unrest. As Albany withdrew from Naples accompanied by the Orsini, on 2 March 1525 at Abbadia Tre Fontane they came upon a band of the Colonna whose numbers were swollen by the guards and servants of the duke of Sessa. The Orsini and Albany fled into the city of Rome but were pursued. A conflict broke out within sight of the Vatican, palaces were turned into fortresses and the partisans of both sides joined in, 'con grande indignazione del pontefice, che all'autorità sua non fusse avuto rispetto'.⁽¹⁾ Apart from this particular pitched battle there were frequent riots in which the Colonna and the Spanish were implicated.⁽²⁾

By June 1526 when Moncada arrived from Spain, the Colonna were talking openly of attacking Clement in Rome. News of this threat had penetrated to Milan where it was reported and generally believed that Pompeo Colonna had laid siege to the pope in Castel Sant'Angelo.⁽³⁾ Moncada had been ordered to collaborate with Pompeo Colonna if all else failed. He was first, however, to attempt a negotiated settlement with Clement and was permitted to make considerable concessions. As far as the peace with France was concerned, Moncada was instructed to say that Charles would accept two million ducats in lieu of Burgundy. If Clement objected to this sum, 'antes que romper con su santidad, de la qual depende la buena conclusion de todas los otros negocios' he might reduce the sum to one and a half million. Moncada was to promise, on condition that Clement paid for imperial neutrality, that the emperor would not assist Ferrara if Clement attacked Reggio and Rubiera. Charles was prepared to come to some arrangement over the question of salt for the duchy of Milan and over the Neapolitan benefices. Most important of all the emperor at this stage was prepared to countenance the restoration of Sforza, preferably with some compensation for Bourbon, although even this was not to be insisted on. Only if all Moncada's attempts to win over Clement failed, was he to approach Ferrara, Siena and the Colonna. He might then follow a suggestion of Pompeo Colonna to raise insurrection against the pope in Florence, Rome, Siena and the Church State. In/

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1. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 271, 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 306.
 2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 40-1 and see below p. 139.
 3. Sanuto, Diarri, xli. 474.

In any case Moncada was to keep Colonna fully informed about all the negotiations.⁽¹⁾

On both 18 and 19 June Moncada had an unsuccessful audience with Clement⁽²⁾ and, realising that no concessions could, in fact, be expected, on 20 June left Rome with Sessa to negotiate with the Colonna to whom he showed papers from the emperor authorising an attack on Rome.⁽³⁾ The Spanish alliance with the Colonna was now an open secret. In the last week of June Ascanio and Vespasiano Colonna, from the safety of their fortresses, were speaking of raising a revolution in Rome, of bringing troops from Naples and with these, the troops they were recruiting⁽⁴⁾ and the peasants off their properties, 'entrefont ung jours dedans Rome avec mil hommes'.⁽⁵⁾ Hearing of the Colonna preparations, Clement sent Sanga to France to ask both for a subsidy and an immediate diversion in Flanders or the Pyrenees⁽⁶⁾ and began to raise 6,000 infantry under the overall command of the count of Anguillara. For a month they were lodged inactive in Rome at Porta San Giovanni.⁽⁷⁾ Then, in an attempt to get Clement to disband his troops, Vespasiano Colonna, whom Clement favoured to the extent of trying to arrange a marriage for him with Giulia Gonzaga, arrived in Rome on 22 August to negotiate a truce. The terms were not unfavourable to the Colonna. At least one intelligent provision was included; the Colonna would not take up arms against the church except on behalf of the emperor, in which case they would surrender their possessions in the Church State. This was the only logical way in which the dual alliance of the Colonna could be resolved. It was also reasonable to specify that Clement would not attack the Colonna estates, nor permit the Orsini to do so, for had this provision been observed the outbreak of any major incident through Orsini-Colonna rivalry could have been prevented. It was agreed that the Colonna should retire to the Regno and should remove all soldiers from their lands in the Church State. In return Clement gave the Colonna permission to/

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1. Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 212-216.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 664.
 3. Molini, Documenti, i. 205-6, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 84, Baeca, Don Hugo de Moncada, 60.
 4. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 40.
 5. Molini, Documenti, i. 205, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.154v.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.154v.
 7. Guazzo, Historie, 47.

to serve the emperor against any who attacked the Regno and granted a full pardon to the whole Colonna faction.⁽¹⁾

The pope immediately disbanded his troops, thereby facilitating Pompeo's plans for the capture of Rome. The Colonna never intended to keep the truce which had been made with the express intention of disarming Clement.⁽²⁾ As soon as Pompeo was sure that Clement was indeed disbanding his forces, he dispatched Cesare Filettino, with the light cavalry, to Anagni where Clement had 200 regular infantry and 100 cavalry.⁽³⁾ He had no wish to capture the fortress but was anxious to break all the communication routes to Rome.⁽⁴⁾ He was completely successful.

Writing on 14 September Moncada informed the emperor of all that had happened and outlined the Colonna plan. Moncada had persuaded the council of Naples to supply troops, under Ascanio Colonna, on the pretext that they were to be used to relieve Siena, 'para con vuestra merced nuestra determinacion es de entrar en Roma'.⁽⁵⁾ Of the troops raised, 800 cavalry and 2,000 infantry were supplied and paid by the council of Naples, 1,000 were tenants of the Colonna and 2,000 had been raised *secretly* in the Abruzzi. Another 1,000 infantry were to be transported to Ostia by the Neapolitan fleet.⁽⁶⁾ Two days later Moncada informed the council of Naples of his real intentions but by this time it was too late to prevent him.⁽⁷⁾

Communications between Rome and Naples had been successfully interrupted and no news of the Colonna movements reached Rome until the late evening of 19 September.⁽⁸⁾ Immediately, Clement ordered that the gates of the city be closed and that troops be raised on the following morning, but these measures were taken too late. The Colonna, led by Ascanio, Vespasiano and Pompeo and accompanied by Moncada, Mario Orsini,⁽⁹⁾ and the Roman, Cesare de'Sabbatini,⁽¹⁰⁾ marched all through the beautiful moonlit night, covering sixty miles in/

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1. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 75-6.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, p.1111.
 3. Sanuto, Diarri, xlii. 681.
 4. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 78, Guazzo, Historie, 48.
 5. Baeca, Don Hugo de Moncada, 452, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, p.1111.
 6. For the numbers involved see Baeca, Don Hugo de Moncada, 452, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, p.1111, p.1120, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.12v.
 7. Baeca, Don Hugo de Moncada, 464.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 516.
 9. Sanuto, Diarri, xlii. 724.
 10. Guazzo, Historie, 48.

in twenty-four hours, to reach Rome at dawn.⁽¹⁾ Accounts of the raid are confused about the entry of the Colonna into the city. There are no eye-witness accounts of an event which occurred in the least densely populated area of Rome.⁽²⁾ At least two gates, Porta San Giovanni in Lateran and Porta San Paolo, and, possibly, a third were captured in the early hours of the morning, when the gates were opened to let out the mules and other beasts of burden which brought wood into the city each day. Within the city the first intimation that anything was amiss was the sight of an army pouring into Rome through Porta San Giovanni, as far as Sant'Apostoli where the soldiers retired into Palazzo Colonna to rest.⁽³⁾

As soon as Clement heard that the Colonna had entered Rome, he dispatched Cardinals Campeggio, Cesarini, and Jacobazzi to the Capitol to ask the people of Rome to take up arms on his behalf.⁽⁴⁾ As an ally of Colonna, Jacobazzi might have been able to carry some weight with the Roman people but in fact Clement's request was rejected, and Renzo da Ceri's son, Gian Paolo Orsini, was unable to raise any troops for the papal defence.⁽⁵⁾ The Colonna had already made certain that Rome would not support the pope and the passage of their army through the city rapidly took on the character of a triumphal march, 'gli artefici, siccome quelli che non avevano alcuna paura, senza serrare le botteghe, sparsi sulla riva del fiume Tevere, stavano a vederli passare'.⁽⁶⁾ Pompeo sent his own herald to tell the citizens there was nothing to fear and to urge them to rise in his support, 'perchè non venivano ai danni di questa città, che era anco loro patria, ma per la libertà sua'.⁽⁷⁾ In the morning, the Colonna forces gathered at the church of SS. Cosmas and Damian, Pompeo remaining in Palazzo Colonna.⁽⁸⁾ Crossing the bridges of the Isola Tiberina into Trastevere the Colonna progressed

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 690, Vettori, Sommario, 368, Dorez, Le Sac de Rome, 38
 2. E.g. Guazzo, Historie, 48 which records that the nearest houses to the gates were 500 feet away.
 3. Guazzo, Historie, 48, Orano, Sacco di Roma, 216, Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 724, Vettori, Sommario, 368.
 4. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 225.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 690, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 277, Baeca, Don Hugo da Moncada, 67.
 7. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 224, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 277.
 8. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 79.

progressed up the Lungara towards the Borgo. At Porta San Spirito they met the only resistance which had so far been shown. Although the Swiss Guard, at Clement's request, had retired with the artillery into Castel Sant'Angelo,⁽¹⁾ Stefano Colonna, Ettore Romano and Francesco Salamone, with little more than 100 infantry,⁽²⁾ were able to hold the gate for about an hour.⁽³⁾ The Colonna finally circumvented the gate by passing over a broken portion of the city wall, through the vineyards of Cardinal Armellino.⁽⁴⁾ The Colonna were now able to thrust back the defenders and moved up the Borgo Vecchio to the Vatican and St. Peter's, where Clement, who, like Pompeo, had not failed to draw parallels with 13th century history, 'abbandonata da tutti, era disposto di morire nella sua sedia'. Only urgent entreaties of the cardinals, Filippo Strozzi and the Venetian ambassador, moved him to flee into Castel Sant'Angelo at about five o'clock in the afternoon.⁽⁵⁾

The main purpose of the attack, the capture of Clement, had therefore failed. The soldiers resorted to plundering the Borgo, or at least such parts of it as were out of reach of the guns of Castel Sant'Angelo. Nor was this sacking motivated entirely by gain. In Berni's⁽⁶⁾ apartments the Colonna were rifling his correspondence and were about to carry off such letters of Giberti as were to be found there when they were interrupted by a sudden alarm.⁽⁷⁾ Since the only possible motive for the theft of this correspondence was political - to discover more about the Italian League and papal commitments to foreign powers - and since this correspondence could only be of real value to the imperial/

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1. Guazzo, Historie, 48, Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 725.
 2. Estimates varied, Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 700, 724, 727, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 79.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 724.
 4. Ibid. 700, Vettori, Sommario, 368 states specifically that the wall was broken. They also had the advantage in that they were here on elevated ground. The information that this was a good point to attack was obviously passed on to Bourbon who made use of it.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 690, Vettori, Sommario, 368, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.13.
 6. Francesco Berni, the poet, had moved to Rome from his native Florence in 1517, to enter the service of his relative, Bibbiena. By 1523 he had obtained the protection of Sanga and had entered the service of Giberti, to whom he was devoted. In his capacity as secretary to Giberti he was an eyewitness of all the important events in Rome, including the sack of May 1527. Some reflections on these events occur in his writings.
 7. F. Giammaria Mazzuchelli, 'Vita di Francesco Berni' printed in F. Berni, Orlando Innamorato di Matteo M. Bojardo in Classici Italiani vol. 12 (Milan 1806), xxiii.

imperial government, this incident merely serves to emphasise the amount of collusion between the imperialists and the Colonna during the raid. Apart from this, in all, about one third of the Borgo, the area stretching as far as Palazzo Ancona, was sacked. Losses were reckoned at about 300,000 ducats⁽¹⁾ before the looting was brought to an end by a sally from the castle in which some property was recovered and about 60 prisoners, including Mario Orsini, were taken.⁽²⁾ Losses had been considerable; the Vatican and St. Peter's were stripped.⁽³⁾ Even the tapestries of Raphael were taken from the Sistine chapel.⁽⁴⁾ Armellino's palace was one of the first to be looted.⁽⁵⁾ The dwelling of Sadoletto, who had taken refuge in the castle, was plundered, although his library was left intact.⁽⁶⁾ In the Vatican only Campeggio's apartments were left untouched; Ridolfi and Berni lost everything; Giberti had removed some articles of value but still suffered substantial losses, particularly in his collection of porcelain which was shattered. Sanga lost most of his property.⁽⁷⁾ Even the lodgings of imperialists, like Albergato⁽⁸⁾ and Chierigato,⁽⁹⁾ were plundered.⁽¹⁰⁾

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.13v. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 700, 728.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 725-6. Cesare Colonna was taken but escaped.
 3. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 79.
 4. P. Pecchai, Roma nel cinquecento, 35.
 5. 'Memorie perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 308.
 6. R. Douglas, Jacopo Sadoletto, 45.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.127v. Giammaria Mazzuchelli, 'Vita di Francesco Berni' printed in F. Berni, Orlando Innamorato di Matteo M.Bojardo in Classici Italiani (Milan 1806) vol.12, xxiii, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 332.
 8. Vianesio Albergato was born at Bologna at the end of the fifteenth century and began his career in the curia c.1516. He remained throughout his life the official representative of Bologna at Rome. Early in his career he was sent to Spain as papal nuncio and returned to Italy with Adrian VI. He was always opposed to Clement VII and his policies.
 9. Francesco Chierigato was born at Vicenza in 1479 and was used by the emperor in connection with various politico-religious affairs. In 1522 he was present at the Diet of Nuremberg charged with the difficult task of demanding aid against the Turks and the execution of the Edict of Worms against Luther. In 1520 Erasmus believed him important enough to address to him a special letter, defending himself from charges that he had encouraged Luther. A. Renaudet, Erasmus et L'Italie, (Geneva 1954), 141.
 10. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 79, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 332 quoting Girolamo Negro, secretary of Cardinal Cornaro.

To add to the confusion, all the prisoners in the Borgo escaped and proceeded to do their own plundering.⁽¹⁾

In normal circumstances the pope should have been able to withstand siege in Castel Sant'Angelo indefinitely but the retrenchment policy of the administration and the inefficiency of the castellan, Giulio de' Medici, had together ensured that the castello was completely unsupplied.⁽²⁾ Niccolò Ridolfi and Innocenzo Cybo were sent as hostages to the Colonna while Moncada came to Castel Sant'Angelo to parley.⁽³⁾ Talks went on all day but Moncada insisted that Castel Sant'Angelo should be surrendered to the emperor.⁽⁴⁾ Since Clement felt that no clearer evidence of the emperor's determination to control central Italy could have been offered the request was refused.⁽⁵⁾ All that could be agreed to was a truce until three o'clock on the following afternoon.⁽⁶⁾ Moncada then reopened talks, warning that he would bombard the castle and even ordered guns into position.⁽⁷⁾ Colonna meanwhile kept his troops drawn up in battle order in the Baths of Diocletian.⁽⁸⁾

After consultation with the cardinals, Clement, on 22 September, again summoned Moncada and continued in negotiation, 'andando Sua Santita schermando, et allegando la cosa per migliorare la conditione nostra et far l'accordo con piu vantaggio, et men vergogna che era possibile'.⁽⁹⁾ The cardinals, on the whole, were opposed to an agreement, but they were overruled by Clement who saw that the only course open to him was to make a virtue of necessity.⁽¹⁰⁾

The truce arranged displeased Pompeo Colonna for, although it granted his family and adherents plenary absolution, it achieved none of his aims and even made provision that he and the Colonna army should retire to the Regno. From the imperial point of view it was ideal, however; it provided for a cessation of hostilities for four months in the duchy of Milan, the Regno, Genoa, Florence, /

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xlii. 702.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 58, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v.79
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.14.
 4. Sanuto, Diarri, xlii. 726.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.14v.
 6. Sanuto, Diarri, xlii. 726.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.14v.
 8. Guazzo, Historie, 48.
 9. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.14v.
 10. Ibid. f.16.

Florence, Ferrara and Siena, and Clement promised to withdraw his troops within the confines of the Church State.⁽¹⁾ In return Don Ugo agreed to withdraw his troops from papal territory. Clement was forced to give two hostages, Filippo Strozzi and a son of Salviati.⁽²⁾ Yet this was less than Moncada had intended; on 22 September he told the Ferrarese ambassador that he had been forced to come to an agreement; the Colonna had misled him into believing that there would be an armed uprising in his favour inside Rome and he had lost control over his troops once looting began in the Borgo.⁽³⁾

It was already apparent that the attack, having failed, had been a grave political error. Public opinion in Italy turned sharply against the imperial cause. Realising this, Moncada warned the emperor to express to Clement, through Castiglione, his great grief at what had happened. The Colonna had few, if any, Italian sympathisers. Isabella d'Este who had been resident in Rome during the attack was profoundly shocked and peculiarly displeased that Vespasiano Colonna, whose marriage with Giulia Gonzaga she had previously sponsored, had taken part in the raid. She subsequently refused to take part in the marriage festivities of the couple.⁽⁴⁾ The Colonna openly asserted that, in sacking the holy places of Rome, they had acted under explicit instructions from the emperor⁽⁵⁾ and the raid caused a temporary resurgence in papal popularity at Rome which had not entirely evaporated in the following May. In the night of 3-4 October there was an alarm that the Colonna were planning to return to Rome to sack it. All of Rome rose to the papal defence and there were shouts of, 'Chiesia' and 'Viva papa Clemente', uncommon enough sounds in Rome at this period.⁽⁶⁾ The city remained in arms throughout the night.⁽⁷⁾ At the end of December the Romans were prepared to provide/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 722, Molini, Documenti, i. 229.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 722. Salviati's son was later ransomed for 30,000 ducats. The failure to ransom Filippo Strozzi was to have important political repercussions. See below p. 281.
 3. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 4, see also Orano, Sacco di Roma, 226.
 4. Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, 35.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.17.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 50, L. & P. Henry VIII.iv. pt.2, 1140, Arch. Cap.MS. Arm. xiv. tom.7 f.2.
 7. It was suggested that Clement had raised the alarm in order to test the Roman reaction, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.83.

provide for the defence of the city against the Colonna.⁽¹⁾ People speculated fearfully on the possible consequences of the Colonna raid. It was thought highly probable that the emperor would be encouraged to more ambitious projects. A contemporary commented that, had he the means, Charles would come to Italy immediately, 'poi che vederà essere così facile lo expugnare Roma et ridur il Papa de la sua'.⁽²⁾

The fact that the Colonna made no immediate move towards withdrawing to the Regno but continued to occupy their own properties in the environs of Rome⁽³⁾ lent credence to such speculations. Clement appeared to be keeping his side of the bargain. He withdrew troops from the League army in Lombardy; on 2 October Vitelli arrived in Rome with 400 lances and a band of Swiss. With these Clement fortified Porta San Spirito, the hills of San Onofrio and the Sistine bridge.⁽⁴⁾

In Spain, whither news of the raid had been brought by Mendoza on 25 October, the Colonna raid was as unpopular as it had proved to be in Italy. Charles found himself in difficulties with the cortes which asked for a reassurance that any money granted would really be used for an expedition against the Turk and not for another campaign against the pope.⁽⁵⁾ Charles was forced to maintain that the whole affair had taken place without his knowledge. To Castiglione the emperor excused himself by maintaining that, 'vedendosi tutto il mondo contra, e una guerra accesa senza sua colpa, e stando circondato da tanti inimici, non potea rifiutar quelli, che si offerivano di volerlo servire, accenando i Colonnese'. Although the emperor had decided to send Ferramosca to Italy to treat with the pope he significantly failed to send a ratification of Moncada's truce, on the grounds that Clement had not disbanded his troops. To this Castiglione, who had been greatly disturbed by the Colonna raid replied with some acerbity, 'che'l Papa/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 580.
 2. *Ibid.* xlii. 70.
 3. 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 309.
 4. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studi ... sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 6 and see above p. 49-50.
 5. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 29. See also Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 143, 145, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 136.

Papa avesse ragione a star sospeso fin che non avea la confirmazione di S.Maesta, atteso quello che s'era fatto nella Lega conclusa col Duca di Sessa, e non osservata, e medisamente com'era successo la promessa de'Sigg. Colonnesei'.⁽¹⁾

The pope's position was indeed very difficult. The Venetians were opposed to any punitive expedition against the Colonna⁽²⁾ but, if law and order were to be upheld in the Church State, Clement could not afford to ignore so overt an affront to papal authority as the Colonna raid. He knew that for as long as the Colonna remained in alliance with the emperor any attack on them would worsen his relations with the imperialists in Naples. He feared the arrival of the viceroy and the long-awaited Spanish fleet.⁽³⁾ Nevertheless he acted with uncharacteristic vigour; a permanent committee of five cardinals for war and another of five for the public treasury were named.⁽⁴⁾ By 12 October Clement had a force of 300 cavalry and 6,000 infantry in Rome.⁽⁵⁾ On 7 November he opened a process against the Colonna citing Pompeo, on pain of deprivation, to appear within nine days to answer charges against him which ranged back to the first weeks of Clement's pontificate.⁽⁶⁾ Pompeo, who was in the Regno, failed to appear and countered with an appeal to a general council. Proceedings against him began on 16 November and on 21 November he was sentenced to the deprivation of all his benefices and dignities.⁽⁷⁾ On 14 November a similar citation was delivered for Ascanio, Vespasiano and Giovanni Colonna, Pietro Francesco Macello, Cesare Gaetano and Jacobo de Zambecarii.⁽⁸⁾ They also failed to appear and were forbidden, with all members of the Colonna family, to the fourth generation, to hold any benefice.⁽⁹⁾

Meanwhile, on 1 November, Vitelli with the captains Luca Antonio da Terni/

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1. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 97-100.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1153.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.18 and see above p. 50.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 447, G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 6.
 5. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 7.
 6. See the copy of the citation in Arch. Cap.MS.Arm. xiv. tom.7 ff.89-101v.
 7. Eubel, Hierarchica Cattolica, iii. 16.
 8. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.45v., Arch.Cap.MS.Arm. xiv. tom.7 ff.102-105v.
 9. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium', f.84, Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 236, 320, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 89, Gattinara maintained that the sentence implied an excommunication of the emperor, Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 145-6.

Terni and Battisto Corso, 9,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry opened a military campaign against the Colonna with an attack on Grottaferrata and Marino. By 10 November Vitelli had taken Marino, Grottaferrata, Frascati, Montefucino, Valmontone, Genazzano, Cave, Giuliano di Roma, and Roccapriora.⁽¹⁾ In the general confusion the opportunity was seized for unauthorised private expeditions; papal supporters from Priverno attacked Sonnino, Giuliano, San Stefano,⁽²⁾ San Lorenzo and Vallecorsa.⁽³⁾ The inhabitants of Velletri who, since 1505, had been quarrelling with the Colonna on the subject of the boundaries of Nemi, destroyed Marino completely.⁽⁴⁾ Rocca di Papa, which had been sold to the Colonna by the Annibaldi in 1425, was likewise destroyed by Vitelli though the actual Rocca was not taken and remained standing.⁽⁵⁾ Ceccano, Supino and Rocca San Stefano were all razed to the ground⁽⁶⁾ as was Subiaco, the favourite residence of Cardinal Pompeo and one of the earliest centres of printing in Italy.⁽⁷⁾

The Colonna had now lost all their property in the Church State except for the rocche of Montefortino and Paliano, but in order to achieve this Clement had had to put into the field an army which, including the cost of the troops in Lombardy, was costing 60,000 ducats a month.⁽⁸⁾ The Colonna had been driven into even closer alliance with the emperor, for the only hope of recovering their property was through imperial support, and they had increased their pressure on Bourbon, urging him to march south.⁽⁹⁾ In the second week of November the council of Naples dispatched Musscetola to the pope to try to persuade him to desist from/

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1. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii ... sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 11, Guazzo, Historie, 50, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.83v. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.37.
 2. I have not identified this San Stefano. There were several places of this name in the area.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.37.
 4. Guazzo, Historie, 50, Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, i. 371. After the sack of Rome Ascanio Colonna tried to force Velletri to make reparations, estimating them at 26,000 ducats. On 14 November 1527, after the intervention of Cardinal del Valle, Velletri agreed to pay. Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, iv. 216.
 5. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.83v. Guazzo, Historie, 50.
 6. Guazzo, Historie, 50.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.5 f.12v.
 8. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1164.
 9. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 228-9. See below p. 160-1.

from his punishment of the Colonna.⁽¹⁾ Moncada warned Clement that any action against the Colonna would be construed as an attack on the emperor⁽²⁾ and in December Clement was told, 'Pontifex privavit Columnam et Columna privabit Pontificem'.⁽³⁾

In December Colonna again appealed to a general council which was to be summoned at Spiers.⁽⁴⁾ He now claimed that Clement had acquired the papacy by simony and that Julius II had issued a bull permitting the cardinals to summon a simoniacal pope before a general council.⁽⁵⁾ This finally pressed Clement into extending hostilities even to the point of attacking Naples through the person of Lannoy. The viceroy, having put in at San Stefano reached Gaeta at the end of November.⁽⁶⁾ Clement immediately dispatched Quinones to consult with Lannoy over the possibility of a truce. Lannoy asked that a papal ambassador with a mandate to make peace be sent to him.⁽⁷⁾ There seemed to be little hope that the viceroy was sincere in seeking peace. Letters from Lannoy to the council of Naples which were intercepted by papal spies had already announced his intention of capturing Rome,⁽⁸⁾ and it was popularly rumoured that he was telling his soldiers to expect no other pay than the sack of Rome and Florence.⁽⁹⁾ Since Clement refused to pardon the Colonna and since every proposal of peace made by the viceroy included the provision that the Colonna be pardoned, it did not look as though the negotiations would come to any satisfactory issue.⁽¹⁰⁾ The pope began to make renewed efforts in the field; an order was issued for an extra 3,000 infantry to be raised and Cardinal Trivulzio was dispatched as legate to the army, which he joined on 10 December. On 12 December a monition against all invaders of the Holy See was published.⁽¹¹⁾

On the same day Quinones returned from Naples and informed Clement of the/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.41v.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1164.
 3. Ibid. 1210.
 4. Ibid. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 579-80.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 614, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1187-8.
 6. Schulz, Der Sacco di Roma, 83, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.52v.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.52v.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 514-5.
 9. Ibid. 40.
 10. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 615, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1202, 1257, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.61v.
 11. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 447, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1207, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 359, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 7.

the viceroy's terms; a truce for six months, the surrender of Parma, Piacenza and Ostia or Civitavecchia and the payment of a large sum of money. Alberto Pio⁽¹⁾ was insistent that Clement should not accept these terms which virtually amounted to an abolition of the temporal possessions of the Holy See, and warned Clement that if he did he would free the imperialists for an attack on Florence or Rome.⁽²⁾ Giberti also disapproved but realised the necessity.⁽³⁾ Both Florence, where Clement feared a rebellion,⁽⁴⁾ and the majority of the cardinals were anxious for an early peace.

On 11 January Quinones returned to the viceroy, reaching his quarters at Coprano on 15 January.⁽⁵⁾ If an accommodation had been possible Clement would have made it but Lannoy put forward no possible peace proposals. He was now asking for all the fortresses he had originally mentioned as well as Pisa or Leghorn and would speak only of a peace. A truce was out of the question. Inevitably he demanded the restoration of the Colonna as a first condition.⁽⁶⁾ Clement, who was determined never to restore the Colonna, now relied on the expected arrival of Renzo da Ceri with the 20,000 ducats he was expected to bring from France, but to the pope's bitter disappointment Renzo arrived empty-handed.⁽⁷⁾ Simultaneously, Clement heard of Lannoy's new financial demands; the pope was to provide 200,000 ducats with which to pay Frundsberg's lansquenets and 200,000 to pay the Spanish troops in Lombardy.⁽⁸⁾ Clement considered that 200,000 ducats for the Spaniards was excessive but he was prepared to pay a portion of the sum and even offered to restore the Colonna property provided that they remained fuorusciti of the Church State. To the restoration of Pompeo Colonna to the dignity of cardinal he would not agree.⁽⁹⁾

Lannoy was having his own, unexpected difficulties. The council of Naples was reluctant to embark on a costly war with the pope, who might use this as an excuse to summon the French and the Anjou claimant of Naples, Vaudémont, into the Regno, where there was still a strong Angevin party, and pressed Lannoy to continue negotiations./

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1. For Alberto Pio see below p. 129.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1209, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.57-57v.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.58, 'siamo sforzati a pigliar non conditioni d'accordo, ma leggi di servitu'.
 4. See below p. 274-6.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 37.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.61v.
 7. Ibid. 65v.-66.
 8. Ibid. 65v.
 9. Ibid. 70v.

negotiations. Officially Moncada's truce was still in operation and Clement had made no attack on Neapolitan territory. Indeed, throughout the subsequent campaign, Moncada refused to take part on the grounds that he had no wish to violate his own truce.⁽¹⁾ The council were well aware that Clement was extremely reluctant to commit himself openly against the viceroy and that he had turned down a French-inspired proposal of Renzo da Ceri for a Neapolitan campaign.⁽²⁾ The furthest Clement would go was to include the viceroy in an excommunication of all the barons of the Regno⁽³⁾ a move which had been forced on him by a temporary resurgence of Colonna power. With Lannoy's assistance they had captured Coprano and Pontecorvo, 'le chiavi di Campagna',⁽⁴⁾ and had attempted Anagni.⁽⁵⁾

Lannoy shared neither the scruples of the council of Naples, nor of Moncada. Advancing from Coprano with 1,600 lansquenets, 4,000 Spaniards and 10,000 Italian mercenaries⁽⁶⁾ and, without waiting for the expiry of Moncada's truce, he laid seige to the papal town of Frosinone, 'residenza principale della Campagna'.⁽⁷⁾ Under the generalship of Renzo da Ceri the bulk of the papal troops had been positioned at Ferentino, about five miles north of Frosinone, which was garrisoned with 1,500 of the bande nere and 100 light cavalry under Alessandro Vitelli.⁽⁸⁾

Although Frosinone was not a fortified town, its location on a steep hill provided a perfect natural defence and Lannoy was unable to bring the artillery within range of the town. His only advantage was the lack of supplies on the papal side, for the Colonna were able to impede all the supply routes to the papal camp and to Frosinone which had not been supplied for a siege.⁽⁹⁾

On 2 February Stefano Colonna tried to relieve Frosinone by force. He was attacked by four bands of imperial troops against whom he scored so notable a victory that in the early hours of the morning the imperialists had to retreat/

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1. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1276.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 646.
 3. Ibid. 614.
 4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.55.
 5. Ibid. f.62v.
 6. Ibid. n.54 f.48v.
 7. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 103.
 8. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.48v.-49.
 9. Ibid. n.53 f.71, n.54 ff.48v.-49.

retreat to Coprano dragging their most valuable artillery by hand.⁽¹⁾ Here the imperialists began rapidly to draw up fresh fortifications and to construct a bridge across the Liri.⁽²⁾

The viceroy and the Colonna were no more successful in their attempt to use the abbot of Farfa, Napoleone Orsini, who had been induced to defect from the papal cause. It had been hoped that he would launch an attack on papal property to the north of Rome at the same time as the attack was being launched in the south of the papal state, but Clement had forestalled Farfa, had captured him at Bracciano and imprisoned him in Castel Sant'Angelo.⁽³⁾

The papal army at Frosinone and Ferentino waited for the heavy artillery and reinforcements to arrive before launching an attack on the Regno. The viceroy fell back on Gaeta.⁽⁴⁾ Renzo now had the support of the papal and Venetian navies which, lying off the coasts of the Regno, were able to inflict considerable damage on imperial shipping and on coastal towns including Salerno and Mola, a fortress of Vespasiano Colonna.⁽⁵⁾ A French fleet with Vaudémont, the Neapolitan and the Sicilian fuorusciti aboard, had put to sea from Civitavecchia and was expected any day.⁽⁶⁾

In the first week of March, Renzo advanced into the Regno and captured Tagliacozzo while the Neapolitan fuorusciti advanced on L'Aquila which was captured and provided with a papal vice-legate.⁽⁷⁾ Since the provinces of the Regno had not been supplied or prepared for an invasion and the local population failed to rally to the imperial cause Renzo met little resistance⁽⁸⁾ but the war progressed very slowly; the fleet, without reinforcements, could do little more than hold the places it had first taken, the weather was terrible and the land-army could not be supplied.⁽⁹⁾

Inevitably peace talks continued for, although Clement had received a gift/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.55-55v. 60v.-61v. Guazzo, Historie, 53, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 212.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 212-213.
 3. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 104.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 77.
 6. Ibid. 75.
 7. Ibid. 77, 92.
 8. Ibid. 166.
 9. Ibid. 92.

gift of 30,000 ducats from Venice, one of 30,000 from England and one of 30,000 from France, the financial pressure of the war was appalling.⁽¹⁾ In addition the pope feared that Bourbon was about to attack Florence and did not believe the Medici regime could survive there if Bourbon once entered Tuscany.⁽²⁾ Clement had been bitterly disillusioned by the failure of any of the League powers to react to the Colonna raid. He reasoned that if this insult to the papacy could not provoke assistance there was little to be hoped for.⁽³⁾ Giberti was urging Clement to come to an agreement now when, in the face of defeat, Lannoy might be more reasonable.⁽⁴⁾

The war in Naples had not diminished the quantity of negotiations nor the number of embassies that passed between the two parties. The English envoys, Sir Gregory Casale and Sir John Russell, were particularly active.⁽⁵⁾ Russell had recently arrived from England with 30,000 ducats for the pope⁽⁶⁾ and had instructions from Henry VIII to proceed to the viceroy, to request him to desist from hostilities against the pope and to stipulate a truce for which Clement was to pay nothing.⁽⁷⁾ It would have flattered Henry VIII and Wolsey had they been able to play an effective role in bringing peace to Italy and Clement had expressed a desire that Henry should act as an arbiter between himself and the emperor.⁽⁸⁾

At the end of January Lannoy dispatched Cesare Ferramosca, a Neapolitan subject of the emperor, who had landed at Gaeta from Spain on 20 January,⁽⁹⁾ to Rome with fresh demands. Ferramosca reached Rome on 25 January.⁽¹⁰⁾ The demand for the surrender of the papal towns had not changed but Clement was also to pay/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.53. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-1533, 23, Cal. S.P. Milan, i. 474, Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 604.
 2. 'He says if he is the cause of bringing an army into Tuscany, all his relatives will be banished'. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1299, see also Sanuto, Diarii, xliiv. 210.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.49v.
 4. Ibid. f.81.
 5. E.g. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1300, Cal. S.P. Milan, i. 489-90.
 6. See above.
 7. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 24.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xliiii. 580.
 9. Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 230.
 10. Ibid.

pay 150,000 ducats, restore the Colonna, accept Bourbon as duke of Milan and furnish the emperor with 300 lances, 400 cavalry and 4,000 infantry for use in Italy.⁽¹⁾ When these proposals were put to them the cardinals agreed that a suspension of hostilities would be desirable but rejected Lannoy's terms. The most they would do was agree to a suspension of hostilities for eight days while a messenger was sent to Venice to seek Venetian agreement which they could be fairly certain would not be forthcoming.⁽²⁾ Clement told the Venetian ambassador that he was very anxious to conclude a truce for he could no longer afford to support the war⁽³⁾ but the ambassador had warned him that the Venetian senate would strongly oppose any agreement.⁽⁴⁾ In order to try to prevent Clement coming to an agreement Venice offered a further 30,000 ducats to the pope⁽⁵⁾ and sent an urgent message to France. On 16 February Acciaiuoli had an embarrassing interview with Francis I who complained bitterly of the pope's conduct. It seemed incredible that Clement should be considering making a truce now that there was some chance of the League winning. Francis maintained that neither he nor Venice would ever sign a truce with the emperor, even were the pope to become 'un Cappelmano di Cesare'.⁽⁶⁾

Clement, however, was moved neither by Venetian promises nor by French sarcasm, nor even by his own military successes. It was in the north that the pope who, like Guicciardini, knew that 'in questo caso, chi vincerà in Lombardia vincerà per tucto'⁽⁷⁾ hoped to see the League make substantial gains and instead the whole weight of papal and Florentine diplomacy had to be spent in persuading the Venetian government even to order Urbino to cross the Po.⁽⁸⁾ Financially every day weighed heavier and heavier on the pope who was already paying for the war with the English, French and Venetian subsidies alone. Every effort was made to/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.73-4, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1260.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1260, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.75v.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.53v.
 4. Ibid. f.53.
 5. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1301, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 97.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.53v.-54 and see above p. 56-7.
 7. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 128.
 8. See above p. 57-8.

to try to impress on the French and English governments the extent of Clement's indigency. Acciaiuoli warned that it would only be a short time until the pope would have to go begging for his own food.⁽¹⁾ On 21 February Russell and Ferramosca brought more reasonable proposals from the viceroy. Lannoy, it appeared, was ready to agree to a truce either for one year or for three. Although Russell was opposed to the proposal unless Venice also agreed to a truce, Clement warned that he would accept the terms if Venice and France did not support him financially.⁽²⁾ Speculation about the possibility of a truce was the main burden of letters to Venice from Rome in the first week of March. Venice attempted to accommodate Clement over the defence of Florence; Pisano was instructed to send 3,000 troops there immediately and to exhort Urbino to unite with the papal and French troops.⁽³⁾ It was hoped that the arrival of French subsidies (20,000 ducats for Clement and 50,000 towards the war in Naples), brought by Langey in the second week of March, would hold Clement to the League but the pope maintained that the sum was too little for his needs.⁽⁴⁾

Even the successes of the papal army in the Regno were petering out. For over a month, while negotiations continued with Lannoy, the army remained inactive at Popoli. Supplies were bad and hunger so general that more than half the infantry deserted before the army moved to the coastal towns. Inefficiency and dishonesty were rife among the commanders who consistently demanded full pay for companies it was known were not even up to half-strength, 'ne ha saputo Sua Santità immaginarsi tituli tanti veti honorati, che hebbi potuto sodisfare all'ambitione di molti, li quali come non hanno ottenuto subito che chiedavano, ha minacciato di passar dall'altre parte, et uno di questi è il Conte d'Anguillara ... e il simile voleva ... il signor Gio. Antonio Orsini'.⁽⁵⁾

1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.63.

2. Cal. S.P. Milan, i. 489, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 148.

3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 272-3.

4. Ibid. 275, 277, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.99v.

5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.100-100v.

Although the imperial resident envoy, Perez, was in disgrace, after his delivery of the emperor's letter on 12 December which had contained such tactless references to a general council,⁽¹⁾ Clement continued to meet in secret with Ferramosca, who returned on 11 March, and discussed with Giberti the possibility of a truce.⁽²⁾ On 15 March the pope decided to accept Lannoy's latest terms and concluded the agreement on the following day. France and England were permitted to join before 10 April and Venice before 22 March.⁽³⁾ On 25 March Lannoy with an escort of cavalry entered Rome to ratify the truce.⁽⁴⁾

Clement had specified that there should be no mention of a payment to be made by the pope for the truce in the capitulations, for Clement and Giberti were afraid that the other League members might question how the pope could afford to pay for a truce when he could not afford to pay for a war. However, by a secret agreement, Clement arranged to pay 60,000 ducats to Frundsberg's lansquenets. It was hoped that if the agreement ever became public the papal agents would be able to suggest that the money was for the ransoms of Filippo Strozzi and Giacomo Salviati.⁽⁵⁾

The truce could have been a disaster for the Colonna. Had it been observed they would have been ruined.⁽⁶⁾ It recognised the status quo at a time when the papal armies had had considerable success. The Colonna were specifically exempted from the benefits of the truce. They were permitted only to retain such property as they still held on 15 March and Lannoy had to promise that they would make no more attacks on the Church State. In contrast Clement was able/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 93. For the well-known history of this letter see Brandi, Charles V, 250-2, and for the unfortunate hopes which the document raised among Italian reformers see D. Cantimori, 'L'Influence du manifeste de Charles Quint contre Clément VII et de quelques documents similaires de la littérature philoprotestante et anticuriale d'Italie', in Charles-Quint et son temps (Paris 1959).
 2. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 275, 277.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.99v., Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 125.
 4. Cornelius de Fine 'Diarium' f.89v.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.104v.-105v. and see above p. 91.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 136.

able to do something for the fuorusciti of Siena. Although it was agreed that the government of Siena would remain unchanged and that Port'Ercole would be restored to the Sienese state, the fuorusciti were to be allowed to enjoy their property. (1)

In fact, within the Church State, no attempt was ever made by the imperialists to observe the truce. By the last week in March the Colonna had reoccupied Castel Gandolfo and had launched a full-scale attack on the Orsini. (2) In the north Bourbon and da Leyva ignored the truce completely. Once again it was to be only the council of Naples which would attempt to observe the truce, and in the next few months the opinions of Neapolitan councillors were to seem remarkably insignificant.

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1. For the capture of Port'Ercole by Doria see above p. 44. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 313. The agreement which was to last for eight months named Henry VIII of England as 'conservatore, protettore et fideiussore' and provided for a suspension of hostilities. Both sides would abandon their conquests and retire within their confines.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 313.

CHAPTER IV

Ferrara and Clement VII

'... el Duca di Ferrara, con tucti li minacci che fa, non è per dimostrasi contro al Papa, se già non ci vede in rovina, perché la compagnia sua con costoro sarebbe alla fine che lui metessi el corpo et loro trahessino gli utili'.

Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 86

Since the late fifteenth century the rivalry of the papacy and Ferrara had bedevilled all diplomatic activity within Italy. The years 1525-30 were no exception. Indeed, if anything the situation had worsened.

Ferrara owed its existence to its position on the commercial route between Bologna and Venice, to its value as a market town, and, particularly with changing methods of warfare, to its strategic position, for Ferrara, permanently protected by the Po, was a perfect natural fortress. The legal position of the papacy and Ferrara was peculiarly difficult; supposedly included in the territory given to the papacy by Pepin III (756) and Charlemagne (773), Ferrara was again conveyed to the church by the Countess Matilda in 1107. While formally acknowledging a papal overlordship, Ferrara governed itself as an independent commune until, in the thirteenth century, it fell under the control of the Este family, imperial subjects through their hereditary fief, situated some 40 miles north of Ferrara. From 1208 until 1597 the Estensi ruled Ferrara, technically as vassals of the papacy, but practically as independent lords with the title of marquess or (after 1470) of duke, their power reaching its greatest extent under Niccolò III (1393-1441), who governed not only Ferrara but also Rovigo, Modena, Reggio, Parma and, briefly, Milan. Herein lay the seeds of future dissension with the papacy for, in the sixteenth century, it was over Modena and Reggio that the popes and Ferrara quarrelled. The Este family held these two cities by imperial investiture until they were captured by Julius II. Almost immediately, they were ceded by Julius to the Emperor Maximilian, who sold them to Leo X. After the battle of Marignano, Leo had promised to return them to Alfonso d'Este, but it was a promise that was never kept.⁽¹⁾

Within Modena and Reggio there remained a large body of the population attached to the cause of Este, a fatal weakness from the point of view of papal defence. At Modena the Carandini and Foiani were opposed to papal government and, in the surrounding countryside, there were many powerful princes who supported the claims of Este. Almost the entire hill area of the contado was in sympathy with the duke.⁽²⁾ When, in April 1516, Guicciardini was appointed governor of Modena he found little to suggest the city would be anything but difficult/

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1. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iii. 27-29, 74-75, 255, 328-329.
 2. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 65, Modena Arch. Udite Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a f.111.

difficult to hold against Este. Of his new subjects he wrote; 'Trovo li animi loro tanto sollevati e pieni di sospetto, e credo ancora di mala volontà, che in ogni piccola occasione che avessino, ritornerebbono a'primi termini'.⁽¹⁾

In 1527 it was indeed the citizens of Modena who expelled the papal governor and garrison and admitted Este.⁽²⁾ In Reggio, also, Este had his supporters, the Bebbi, and the city was as factious and divided as Modena with the Scaioli and their adherents supporting ecclesiastical government.⁽³⁾

Another area of territorial conflict was the region around Carpi, the hereditary fief of the Pio family, which had long been coveted by the Este. Their hostility to the Pio family inevitably drove the latter into the papal camp, a factor of some importance in this period for Alberto Pio da Carpi, who had been driven from his lands by Este in 1511, was one of the closest advisers of Leo X and of Clement VII.⁽⁴⁾

Difficulties with the papacy also recurred from time to time over the salt-works run by the Este in the Comacchio, which, it was felt, operated to the prejudice of the papal salt-works at Cervia, now a major source of income to the Holy See, and the question of the salt from the Comacchio was used as a pretext by Julius II for war with Ferrara. There were always difficulties over taxes placed on papal goods travelling via the Po through Ferrarese territory.

Increasingly the position of Ferrara was a threat to the papacy. At the time of the French invasion of 1515 and again, during the War of Urbino, Alfonso d'Este made common cause with the enemy. During the pontificates of Leo X and Clement VII a further problem presented itself, for Ferrara became the refuge for fuorusciti from the Medici regime at Florence and the centre of plots against that regime.⁽⁵⁾

From the time of Martin V, papal policy in central Italy had been determined by the ancient history of the Church State. Naturally the popes extended their/

1. Guicciardini, Carteggi, i. 272.

2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 249 and see below p. 242-3.

3. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 75.

4. See below p. 129.

5. See below p. 274.

their territorial control outwards from Rome, gaining control over a larger and larger area, an expansion which was legally justified by an appeal to the donations of property made by Pepin III and Charlemagne. These donations provided the outer limit of papal ambition, but they included Ferrara, and, most certainly, Modena and Reggio, which, unlike Ferrara, had been for long periods under direct papal rule. In the early sixteenth century only Alexander VI and Adrian VI did not attempt to recover territory from Ferrara. Alexander VI, indeed, in order to marry his daughter to Alfonso d'Este had had to make substantial concessions; Lucrezia was to bring in dowry Cento and Pieve di Cento,⁽¹⁾ and, when a delay occurred in handing these over, Cesare Borgia placed in the hands of Duke Ercole d'Este Russi, Solero and Granarolo, the key to the Romagna. Alexander's position was perhaps reasonable; given that it was becoming increasingly clear that as Ferrara was unassailable, defended not only by her geographical position and the loyalty of her subjects but also by the superb artillery cast by Alfonso d'Este and the elaborate fortifications he had constructed, some modus vivendi must be discovered. Julius II preferred to attempt the subjection of Ferrara by force, but, in this, he was ultimately unsuccessful; on several occasions between 1511 and 1512 Ferrarese towns were taken but the duchy was never in any real danger and, on Julius' death, Alfonso recaptured Reggio and Modena. Leo X was no more successful than his predecessor in his attempts on the duchy, which he intended to give to Giuliano de' Medici,⁽²⁾ and the project of taking the capital by treachery in 1520 ended in ignominious failure. On Leo's death Este occupied Bondeno, Finale nell'Emilia, Lugo and Bagnacavallo.⁽³⁾ Adrian VI, who, according to Guicciardini, as a foreigner did not understand the situation, was disposed to show leniency to Este, who, in return, gave him his loyal support. On 17 October 1522 Este was invested with the duchy of Ferrara, including the disputed territories of San Felice and Finale,⁽⁴⁾ and Adrian was only prevented from throwing in Reggio and Modena for good measure by the combined opposition of the whole college of cardinals.⁽⁵⁾

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1. They were held by Este, with the rest of his lands, until 1598.
 2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 63-5.
 3. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 2.
 4. They had been detached from the territory of Modena originally by Leo X as a gift to Alberto Pio. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 81, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 161, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 171, 174.
 5. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 161.

There was little reason to hope that Clement VII would share Adrian's lenient views, if only because of the strong ties between Alfonso d'Este and the Colonna. They had assisted in thwarting Julius II's attempt to arrest Este, in repayment for his refusal to hand over Fabrizio Colonna to the French after the battle of Ravenna.⁽¹⁾ As Clement VII's relations with Charles V grew worse so did Alfonso d'Este approach closer to an imperial alliance. This was uncharacteristic, for Ferrara, despite the dual allegiance of her dukes to pope and emperor, had, traditionally, been a French ally, protected by Louis XII against Julius II, and, at the time of the imperial election (17 June 1519), Alfonso d'Este was still allied to France. By his agreement with Leo X of 8 May 1521 Charles V promised to assist the pope in the recovery of Ferrara. It was only after the French defeat at Bicocca (27 April 1522) that Este received Girolamo Adorno, ambassador for Charles V, bearer of the imperial investiture and of a promise to restore Modena and Reggio.⁽²⁾

As far as the emperor was concerned Ferrara was an important ally. It was with good reason that Alfonso d'Este had chosen as his heroic emblem a bomb-shell, symbolizing concealed power propitiously released. In the opinion of Charles V the duke of Ferrara was outstanding among the Italian princes for his skill both in civic administration and in diplomacy.⁽³⁾ For the duke, therefore, the emperor already had a certain sympathy. Moreover, Este's lands which marched with the Veneto and the Church State, were an important buffer. The duke was a dangerous enemy to have on the confines of Milan where he could permanently tie down even the most efficient army. He was reputed to be wealthy and certainly had desirable artillery at his command.⁽⁴⁾ He even had substantial propaganda value. There were reports from Spain in August 1526 of discussions by theologians seeking to justify a war with Clement VII on the grounds that successive popes had unjustly made war on Ferrara.⁽⁵⁾ For all these reasons it was clear that the emperor should go to considerable lengths in order to win Este as an ally. Indeed, in September 1526, Moncada went so far as to advise Charles/

1. Vettori, Sommario, 296, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iii. 211-213.

2. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvi. 275.

3. E. Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance, (London 1967), 108, 110 and figs. 81, 82.

4. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvi. 275.

5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 582.

Charles V that the whole success of the imperial cause in Italy depended on a declaration by Ferrara for Charles V.⁽¹⁾

On the other hand, Ferrara was by no means totally committed to the emperor for Charles and his advisers displayed an annoying tendency to abandon Este in pursuit of higher objects; in his agreement with Clement of 1 April 1525 the viceroy had promised to persuade Este to restore Reggio and Rubiera to the pope. For this Clement was to pay 100,000 ducats.⁽²⁾ On the 18 May Sessa was urging the emperor to fulfill this obligation, an action which he felt would be of the greatest benefit to the imperial cause in Italy.⁽³⁾ The duke of Ferrara's objects were limited; Reggio, Rubiera, Modena and Carpi and for these he would continue his negotiations with both sides, indefinitely if possible, although he was anxious to prevent his talks with members of the League from coming to the notice of the emperor.⁽⁴⁾ In his negotiations with the papacy the duke of Ferrara had consistent advocates in the Venetians, with whom he had been friendly for some time and whose relations with the popes had been as strained as those of Ferrara.⁽⁵⁾ Moreover, Venice was well aware of the strategic value of Este's territory in relation to the Veneto.

It was a natural consequence of the renewed friendliness of the pope and Venice in 1526 that Venice should press Clement VII to enter into negotiation with Ferrara. Although Clement already suspected that Ferrara was in alliance with the emperor,⁽⁶⁾ he agreed to talks, and asked Venice to arrange a five-month truce with the duke.⁽⁷⁾ Este opened the talks by asking for a suspension of any discussions concerning Reggio and Modena but, to this, Clement would not agree;⁽⁸⁾ it was only reluctantly, under pressure from both France and Venice, that the pope relented slightly, 'non voler tanto le suspensione ma ordinar le cose del Duca in modo che sempre stessero bene e con lui fare una tale unione che avesse/

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1. Baeca, Don Hugo da Moncada, 451, Brandi, Charles V, 256. Gattinara's views, described here by Brandi, were shared by many of the emperor's advisers.
 2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, iv. 275-277.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 158.
 4. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1290.
 5. See below p. 217.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 466.
 7. Ibid. 467.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xli. 585.

avesse sempre d'essere unito al Papa'.⁽¹⁾ But Este remained adamant that, for the time being at least, he must retain Reggio and Rubiera and Clement broke off negotiations. In May the pope suggested a new basis for agreement; Este was to surrender all the territory he had recovered during the two previous vacancies and, in return, would be granted lands of equivalent value in the Romagna.⁽²⁾ This was a plan sponsored by Guicciardini, long an advocate of a papal accommodation of Ferrara. Guicciardini had experienced at first hand the difficulties of the extant situation. He was convinced that some agreement might be reached on the basis of the surrender of Modena and Reggio for Ravenna,⁽³⁾ Modena and Reggio being indispensable to the papal defence system, but the project was not acceptable to Este. Negotiations still continued to revolve round these two cities and the possibility of a marriage between Catherine de'Medici and one of the Este.⁽⁴⁾ At the same time it was clear to the League commanders that Este was already making serious military preparations.⁽⁵⁾

On 27 September Guicciardini heard that Este was gathering troops round Carpi, preparatory to an attack on Modena.⁽⁶⁾ The fact that this threatened attack was planned at a date so close to the Colonna raid⁽⁷⁾ indicates some degree of collaboration between Este and the Colonna although the former had still not declared openly for the emperor. It is more than likely that Este was fulfilling an obligation to the Colonna which he felt he could not escape, rather than acting deliberately on behalf of Charles V.⁽⁸⁾

An unexpected benefit from the Colonna raid was Clement's sudden readiness to resume negotiations with Ferrara. The pope now declared that he was ready to cede Modena and Reggio on payment of 200,000 ducats, but the duke, whose negotiations with the emperor on the same subject were prospering, maintained that the sum must be considerably reduced. Meanwhile, he had signed a treaty with Charles V for the investiture of Modena, Reggio and Rubiera and the grant of all the confiscated property of Alberto Pio. Este was to be created imperial captain-general in Italy and his eldest son, Ercole was to marry the emperor's/

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1. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvi. 280.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 6, 131.
 4. Ibid. 176, B.N.MS. Italien 15 f.656.
 5. Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 23.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 763. For threats to Modena see also Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 235.
 7. See above p. 86-8.
 8. See above p. 107.

emperor's illegitimate daughter, Margaret. On 3 October 1526, the Ferrarese ambassador to Spain received the coveted investiture.

In his ignorance Clement continued to negotiate,⁽¹⁾ and Francis I, in a moment of temporary enthusiasm for the League, sent Ugo da Peppoli to facilitate the negotiations.⁽²⁾ On 13 November Guicciardini received a papal brief giving him full authority to negotiate and conclude a treaty with Este, and, on 17 November, the lieutenant-general, optimistic about the possible outcome of talks,⁽³⁾ sent an envoy to prepare conversations with the duke and to ascertain whether it was worth while Guicciardini making the journey to Ferrara in person. Three days later the envoy returned with many kind messages from the duke who claimed that he desired a treaty above all things,⁽⁴⁾ but, on 22 November, the imperial agreement with Ferrara became known.⁽⁵⁾ Guicciardini was already on his way to Ferrara, but on 25 November, riding just beyond Cento, he was waylaid by the duke's councillor, Iacopo Alvaratto, who informed him of the agreement and warned him that it was useless to go on.⁽⁶⁾ In fact it was not until 30 December that Moncada and Este agreed on the final details; Margaret of Austria was to be legitimatized and given to Don Ercole as bride. She was to bring with her Carpi and Novi as a dowry. Este was to be given Carpi immediately as a security and the emperor promised assistance in recovering Novi; no peace would be made unless Ferrara was included; in any peace involving France the emperor would insist that the French repay money (90,000 ducats) owing to Este from previous wars; Este would pay the emperor 200,000 ducats for Modena and give immediate military assistance to the imperialists.⁽⁷⁾

On 16 February Este instructed his ambassador at Rome to break off negotiations with the pope.⁽⁸⁾ Subsequent historians justifiably regarded this as the turning point in the war, for, without assistance from Ferrara, the imperialists would not have survived.⁽⁹⁾ From the moment Frundsberg entered Italy/

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1. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 4-6.
 2. Ibid. 7, Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 151.
 3. Guicciardini, Carteggi, x. 151.
 4. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 164.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.48, G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 9.
 6. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 164-5, Sanuto, Diarii. xliii. 116.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.43v.-45.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 15.
 9. E.g. Segni, Vita Capponi. 296.

Italy Este provided invaluable material assistance. This, in the end, proved disastrous to the League, for it enabled the lansquenets to cross the Po in time to prevent their destruction by the duke of Urbino and Giovanni de' Medici. In the third week of November, even before his negotiations with the imperialists were complete, Este had loaded on boards, for Frundsberg's benefit, 20 pieces of artillery and 800 stail of flour.⁽¹⁾ The provision of artillery was of particular importance, for Urbino and Giovanni de' Medici had based their strategy on the assumption that the lansquenets had none, an assumption which was to prove fatal to Giovanni.⁽²⁾ Despite this timely assistance, the imperialists could never really be satisfied with Este's behaviour, for he consistently refused to take command of their armies, to give direct military assistance, or to take the field in person, as he was bound by his agreements to do.⁽³⁾ As Guicciardini noted, the duke of Ferrara had carefully avoided making any agreement which committed him to paying out substantial sums of ready cash.⁽⁴⁾ Guicciardini and Guido Rangoni were agreed in thinking, rightly as it turned out, that the only military exercises in which the duke would involve himself would be the recovery of Modena and Carpi.⁽⁵⁾

Accordingly, in January 1527, both Guicciardini and the French ambassador were still imploring Clement to come to an agreement with Este.⁽⁶⁾ Henry VIII of England had also dispatched Sir John Russell to exhort Ferrara to join the League but, while on his journey to Ferrara, Russell was captured by the imperialists and was only released in April.⁽⁷⁾ Meanwhile, until the end of February, secret negotiations had continued between the pope and Ferrara; Clement had even agreed to the sale of Modena for 50,000 ducats if Venice and France would bear the cost/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 317, 325, Canestrini et Desjardins, Negotiations, ii. 860.
 2. See above p. 53.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 88-89.
 4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.42v.-45.
 5. Ibid. f.42v. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 329, xliv. 55.
 6. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 15; for Guicciardini's opinions on the question of Ferrara see, for example, 'Sulla proposta di alleanza fatta da Carlo V a Clemente VII' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi (Bari, 1933), 160.
 7. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 16-17.

cost of a condotta for the duke.⁽¹⁾ It was suggested that the duke might surrender all rights in Reggio in exchange for Ravenna but to this Este would not agree on the grounds that the annual income of Reggio was 22,000 ducats and that of Ravenna only 16,000.⁽²⁾ Guillaume du Bellay (Langey) was dispatched from France to both Ferrara and Rome and made considerable, though unavailing efforts, to persuade Clement to add Cervia to this offer.⁽³⁾

Meanwhile, at the vital period when Bourbon had no other resources on which to draw, Este provided him with invaluable material assistance. At the beginning of March the duke agreed to provide Bourbon with at least six pieces of heavy artillery and their complement of powder and ammunition, flour, provisions, and transport. Within a week eight cannon with ammunition, and twelve boat-loads of bread were ready for dispatch to the imperialists. In addition, the duke had promised to provide the back-pay for the Spanish garrison at Carpi when he took it over, thus releasing the troops for service with Bourbon.⁽⁴⁾ Again, at the end of the month, Ferrara gave the army 1,000 sacks of wheat and as many again of flour, 20,000 pounds of gunpowder, 1,000 pounds of saltpetre and 30 horses with their harness for the field artillery, with an additional 15,000 ducats. In recompense, on 7 March, Najera handed over Carpi to the duke⁽⁵⁾ who installed his own governor and 400 troops.⁽⁶⁾ In the meantime Este had been making as many difficulties as possible for the papal governors in the Romagna, without overtly commencing hostilities. Grain, intended for Modena, where there was a severe shortage, was confiscated in transit across Ferrarese territory, nominally in retaliation for a confiscation by the Modenese of supplies which had been bound for Carpi's Spanish garrison.⁽⁷⁾ The occupation of Carpi presented novel problems of defence for the papal commanders, whose resources were now stretched to their limits, for, in the hills around Carpi were many small castles and villages/

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1. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 ff.65v-66.
 2. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 294.
 3. Ibid. 295.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 88-91, Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.597.
 5. Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.581, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 130-131.
 6. Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.595.
 7. Ibid. ff.589, 597.

villages dependent on the jurisdiction of that town which Clement undertook to defend on behalf of Alberto Pio. Instructions were sent to Modena that these places must be protected, for Este was threatening to occupy them. From Bologna a commissioner, Bernardo da Carrera, was sent to the area to supervise the defence and ten companies of troops were dispatched, from those remaining at Modena, where the defence was consequently weakened.⁽¹⁾ This was unfortunate for, from the beginning of April onwards, it was clear that it would only be a matter of time before Modena itself was attacked and Nerli, papal governor at Modena, was certain that his resources would be insufficient to meet such an attack. At a crucial point in the general war he was, therefore, inundating Salviati, Guicciardini and Giberti with requests for assistance for Modena.⁽²⁾

On 26 February, through the Mantuan ambassador, Venice had obtained the vital information that Este did not intend to march with Bourbon⁽³⁾ but, on 11 March, the English ambassador returned to Venice from Ferrara and reported a total lack of success in his negotiations with the duke.⁽⁴⁾ However, Venice was still not completely discouraged and news of the papal-imperial truce of 15 March led to renewed talks. Venice and France joined in making substantial offers to Ferrara, for it was now feared that if Bourbon were to observe the truce he would attack Venice in the Padovano, Vicentino or Polesine.⁽⁵⁾

There was, however, no marked change in Este's attitude until after the sack of Rome when, as the likelihood of Clement's adherence to the imperialists increased daily, Este began to lend a sympathetic ear to the confederates. The duke, who had captured Modena,⁽⁶⁾ was well aware that, if necessary, Charles would choose an alliance with Clement VII rather than maintain his obligations to Ferrara, and, as early as March, Sanchez had prophesied that, were Clement to make peace with the emperor, Este would join the League.⁽⁷⁾ Este realised, after the sack of Rome, when the imperialists consistently disregarded his advice,⁽⁸⁾ that/

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1. Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n. 8a. f.132, n. 9a. ff.74-5.
 2. E.g. *ibid.* n. 8a. ff.92, 98, 114, 115. See above p. 58-9.
 3. Sanuto, *Diarii*, xliv. 176.
 4. *Ibid.* 249.
 5. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul Sacco di Roma', *Arch. Ven.* xvii. 25.
 6. See below p. 243.
 7. *Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9*, 94-5.
 8. *Ibid.* 606.

that he was honoured by the emperor only for as long as he was useful. By June the duke was speaking of joining the League and becoming a 'good Italian' and the following month informed the imperialists, that, under no conditions would he take control of the imperial army.⁽¹⁾ On the strength of this, Lautrec approached the duke asking for a gift of 200,000 ducats. In return, Este demanded from the League; protection from the imperialists, absolution for all injuries done either to Clement or to his predecessors, the surrender by the papacy of all rights to Ferrara, Modena or Reggio, restitution of the Polesine,⁽²⁾ which was in Venetian hands, together with the right to manufacture salt in the Comacchio, the bishopric of Modena and the archbishopric of Ferrara for his son, Ippolito.⁽³⁾ On this basis negotiations continued; in October 1527 Venice dispatched as ambassador to Ferrara the distinguished and experienced Gasparo Contarini,⁽⁴⁾ who, having previously been Venetian proveditor in the Polesine, had a peculiar knowledge of Ferrarese problems. At Este's court Contarini joined Sir Gregory Casale who had received an ample brief from Wolsey to treat with the duke. After lengthy talks, on 14 November Ferrara adhered to the League, the agreement being published on the following day.⁽⁵⁾ Even then Este can hardly be described as throwing caution to the winds since, on the same day, he made a formal protest that he had only acted under compulsion for the preservation of his estates.⁽⁶⁾ In fact he was making substantial territorial gains; he was to be granted possession of Ferrara, Modena, Reggio/

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1. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1460.
 2. The Polesine had been obtained by Venice in 1483 and good government had endeared the population of the province to Venetian rule. After the battle of Vailà the Polesine had been occupied by Alfonso d'Este but was recovered by Venice within six months. In 1513 Este once more took the Polesine with the assistance of Cardona's Spanish troops. Alviano recaptured it for Venice in 1514. G. Bronziero, Istoria delle origini e condizioni de luoghi principali del Polesine di Rovigo, (Venice, 1747), 47-8.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 452.
 4. Contarini, the son of a trader with the Levant, was born in 1483. He had a first-class education, studying Latin under Sabellico and Logic under Antonio Giustinian and Lorenzo Bragadin. At Padua he studied Greek under Musuro and philosophy under Pietro Pomponaccio. During his period as proveditor he became an expert on irrigation systems and hydraulics. In 1528 he was appointed ambassador to Clement VII.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 457, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1610.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 605.

Reggio and Rubiera in which the cardinals at Parma, on behalf of the pope, surrendered all rights; he was granted the right to extract salt from the Comacchio, Francis I promised to do everything in his power to ensure that Ferrara should retain Carpi, and Novi and Cortignola were thrown in as compensation for all the years during which the papacy had retained control of Modena. Venice and Florence promised the restoration of all former Ferrarese property, now held by them, and Venice, in addition, promised the surrender of the residence of the papal legate in Venice which had previously belonged to Ferrara and which Venice had been forced to surrender to Julius II. Renée of France was to be given as a bride to Alfonso's son Ercole, and Ippolito d'Este was to be promoted to the Sacred College.⁽¹⁾ In return, Este promised to provide 100 lances, 2,000 cavalry and 6,000 ducats a month for six months, to grant free passage and provisions to the League armies, to prevent the passage of imperial troops, ambassadors and couriers across his territory and to 'do all he can for the Pope's liberation'.⁽²⁾

At the end of February 1528 Este received six ambassadors of the League; Cybo, as papal legate, although without authority from Clement, the Seigneur de Vaux from France, Casale from England, Gasparo Contarini from Venice, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi from Florence and Massimiliano Stampa from Milan. By granting further concessions and by offering to make Alfonso d'Este lieutenant-general of the League armies they tried to persuade him to take a more active part in the fighting. If nothing better, it was hoped he would raise his contribution to 10,000 ducats a month but he could only be persuaded to agree to the payment of 6,000 ducats as previously arranged.⁽³⁾ For Este now perceived that he was in danger from the imperialists, who might return to Lombardy from Rome,⁽⁴⁾ and tried to cover himself by keeping the imperialists informed of all his negotiations with League members.⁽⁵⁾

The reaction of Clement to the news of these negotiations indicates how Ferrara and its relations with the papacy had become a running sore likely to/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 457, Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 329.

2. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 329, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 462.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 604-5.

4. Ibid. 604.

5. Ibid. 605.

to infect any other negotiations in progress in Italy. By May 1528 Clement had plenty of reason to quarrel with Venice⁽¹⁾, but the matter over which he threatened a breach was Ferrara. He warned Venice that if she did restore Este's palace he would withdraw his legate from Venice.⁽²⁾

For Clement, despite patched-up agreements, never forgave Este for the role he had played in the defeat of the Italian League. In 1530 Contarini reported that the pope's attitude to Ferrara was still unashamedly hostile; Clement held Este personally responsible for the sack of Rome, believing that, without his timely assistance, Bourbon would never have reached Rome.⁽³⁾ Yet in many ways the role which Este had played was uncharacteristic. He had no more love for the emperor than he had for the pope, and it was only because his hand was forced that he acted in support of the imperialists. It is clear that, by 1525, one had to be either for the emperor or against him. There was no satisfactory neutral ground. There existed in Italy a confrontation of two axes which cut across the whole peninsula, one for and one against the emperor. It was a situation which had arisen out of the peculiar problems of defence faced by small states in Italy, by fuorusciti and unpopular governments who bound themselves in alliance to states who already had other obligations. Thus Ferrara allied with the emperor to defend his own state against the pope, but in doing so he became involved in the defence of the Colonna, of an imperialist minded government in Genoa and Siena, of imperial interests in Milan and the Regno, and in supporting the interests of an odd collection of fuorusciti, including the Bentivoglii of Bologna. The alliance also involved opposition to Venice although Ferrara's natural friends were the Venetians and the French. The novel situation was the alliance of these two powers with the pope. Because Clement VII was a member of the Italian League Este was driven into an alliance with Charles V, which was always uneasy and unsatisfactory, and which was abandoned at the very earliest opportunity.

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1. See below p. 217 seq.
 2. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 138-9.
 3. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii, vol. 3, 267.

CHAPTER V

'Rome and Clement VII'

'Un Papato composto di rispetti,
Di considerazioni e di discorsi,
Di più, di poi, di ma, di sì, di forsi,
Di pur, di assai parole senza effetti
.... D'innocenza, e di buona intenzione;
Ch'è quasi come dir, semplicità;
Lo dirò pur, vedrete che pian piano
Fara canonizza Papa Adriano'.

Sonnet attributed to Berni.

Printed in F. Berni, Opere Burlesche di M. Francesco Berni
(Milan 1806), 122.

Until comparatively recent times the most striking feature in any map of the city of Rome is the contrast between the ancient and modern centres of population. Ancient Rome had been a city of seven hills on whose slopes it had been built, but the destruction of the ancient aqueducts by the Goths forced the medieval population of the city down into the less healthy area along the banks of the Tiber. Since the city limits were still determined by the old city wall, Rome was unique among medieval towns of a comparable size in containing villas, vineyards, deer parks and large areas of waste ground within its boundaries. At the time of the sack of Rome a considerable proportion of the population was employed within the city walls as vinedressers, cowherds and gardeners⁽¹⁾ and seasonable employment was provided for Lombard peasants who came every year to dig the vineyards.⁽²⁾ As late as the mid-17th century there was little extension beyond the city walls except along the Lungara and between Porta Posterula and Porta Aurelia. There was a total contrast between the almost deserted area of ancient Roman settlement, with practically no buildings other than ruins and ecclesiastical monuments, and the densely populated and disorganised town which, even in 1527, retained much of its medieval character.

Perpetually involved in baronial feuds, medieval Rome was not a peaceful city. Before the 15th century the main architectural need was fortification. But in the fifteenth and succeeding centuries the popes began rebuilding the city and thereby ultimately weakened its defences. New thoroughfares were driven through Rome, new bridges were built, access and communication were improved. As a result, by 1527, Rome was becoming a city of great beauty, which, by a synthesis of the ancient and modern, made a fitting centre for the Christian world. In the early stages of the wars of the sixteenth century Rome was immune from the miseries endured by other Italian cities and became a second home to many refugees from the north. Giovio speaks of a colony of these refugees established within the neighbourhood of Campo dei Fiori,⁽³⁾ and in 1523 Gradenigo estimated at 10,000 the number of new houses built by refugees from Lombardy in Rome, since the election of Leo X.⁽⁴⁾

1. 'Descriptio Urbis' passim.

2. Cellini, Life, 53-4.

3. Pastor, Papacy, viii. 126.

4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 67, Delumeau, Rome, 212. Delumeau estimates that Northern Italians formed about 30% of the population of Rome in 1527, ibid. 211. See Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 459, 'ogni uomo correva quivi come in porto sicuro; e chi aveva dinari comprava offizi e di quelle entrate viveva comodamente'.

Medieval Rome was unusual in having a ready-made city-wall. Other cities had to build their own fortifications but Rome made use of the wall built by Aurelius and Probus and restored by Honorius. The upkeep of this wall was a primary drain on papal finance; nearly all the medieval popes who lived in Rome devoted a great deal of attention to the maintenance and repair of the Aurelian wall which was never allowed to deteriorate.⁽¹⁾

In 1527 the Borgo and Trastevere were completely separate and to go from one to another it was necessary to go out by Porta Settimania, cross the virtually uninhabited area by the river, and enter the Borgo through Porta San Spirito. Alternatively, one could cross the Tiber and make the journey along the east bank, re-crossing at Ponte Sant'Angelo. Much of Trastevere was laid out as gardens. Its geographical limit was determined on the west by the hills which began immediately beyond Porta Aurelia.

With the exception of Trastevere and the Borgo Leonino, the population of Rome was mainly concentrated in the rioni east of the Tiber in the area enclosed by the Capitoline hill to the south, Via del Babuino to the east and by the river on the west, an area of crooked streets and narrow alleys with few clearly defined thoroughfares. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the population spread northwards along the east bank but remained at its densest in the rioni nearest the Tiber between Ponte Sant'Angelo and Piazza Navona, around Santa Maria Rotunda, and in the area between Campo dei Fiori and the Capitoline hill.⁽²⁾ Outside this area were at least three nuclei of population which were practically self-sufficient; the quarter of San Giovanni in Lateran, which was connected to the Campidoglio only by unsatisfactory and rough roads, Suburra, north of the Coliseum, whose centre was the church of San Pietro in Vincula, and the Forum di Nerva which housed the Arca Noe market.

The Borgo Leonino came under papal jurisdiction and was independent of the Roman commune with which it was not incorporated until 1586. It was not an area of dense population. Apart from the many inns and taverns,⁽³⁾ it was an aristocratic quarter of many large palaces. The census of 1527 records a population of 4926 and only 563 dwelling houses. Of this population 500 people/

1. Top. e Urb. 202-3, Magnuson, Roman Quattrocento Architecture, 15-16.

2. Magnuson, Roman Quattrocento Architecture, 11, 'Descriptio Urbis', 394-518.

3. 'Descriptio Urbis', 446-466.

people were inmates of Santo Spirito, 700 of the papal household, and 240 were members of the Swiss guard. Castel Sant'Angelo returned 85 bocche. The households of the cardinals absorbed even more of the population; Cardinal Orsini had a household of 200, Rangoni and Ridolfi of 150 each. Cardinal Campeggio, who occupied Palazzo Torlonia on Piazza San Giacomo Scossacavalli, had a household of 130, and both Armellino in the Borgo Vecchio and Accolti (Ancona), who had bought Raphael's house on the Borgo Nuovo, had households of 100. De Cessis had 60 dependents and Aracoeli also had 60. Giberti had a household of 80. Other important households included those of the bishop of Zara (30), Filippo Strozzi (25) and Schomberg (30). There were remarkably few small traders or industrialists in the Borgo, apart from numerous apothecaries.⁽¹⁾

In front of St. Peter's, which was still in the process of being rebuilt, there opened five roads; Borgo Nuovo, built by Alexander VI, Borgo Vecchio, Borgo Sant'Angelo, Borgo Santo Spirito and Borgo Pio. In this area there were to be found many hospitals, monasteries and hostels for pilgrims. Borgo Vecchio and Borgo Nuovo, together with Piazza S. Giacomo Scossacavalli were already enriched with beautiful palaces, among them the Penitenzieri (begun 1480) and Palazzo Soderini. Along Borgo Sant'Angelo stretched many gardens from which one could look out over the Roman prati.⁽²⁾

From the Borgo, crossing Ponte Sant'Angelo, one entered Rione Ponte. Here two roads took one into the populated district; Canale di Ponte and Via di Panico which stretched to Monte Giordano. The whole district of Ponte was the most lively of the city. Here was the financial centre of Rome, here were the banchi, and here lived bankers, merchants, curialists, litterati, jewellers, booksellers and the most popular courtesans. The governor normally resided in Ponte where, in Tor di Nona, were the city dungeons.⁽³⁾ The most famous engravers, silversmiths and artists also resided in Ponte for the papal mint was located there and attracted them. During the pontificate of Leo X northern Italians had settled in the area and had erected new buildings of which many were remarkable for their great beauty; Palazzo Cicciporci, built for Giulio Alteriori in 1521, Palazzo Lante ai Capretari, built by Jacopo Sansovino and Palazzo Maccaroni, built by Giulio/

1. 'Descriptio Urbis', 446-466.

2. Magnuson, Roman Quattrocento Architecture, 13.

3. See below p. 126.

Giulio Romano for the Cenci family, were among them.⁽¹⁾

Parione was an aristocratic district. Here were to be found some of the greatest of the great palaces. Apart from the Cancellaria, there were three palaces of the Massimi, destroyed during the sack of Rome, Palazzo Millini in Via dell'Anima and Palazzo Sanguigni between S. Apollinare and Piazza Navona, the market-place of Rome. Many pastry-cooks had settled here, often French in origin, who supplied luxury goods to the great palaces.⁽²⁾

Rione San Eustachio was the home of the University which dated from the pontificate of Eugenius IV. The University palace, the Sapienza, had been begun during the pontificate of Leo X to a design of Michelangelo but was still incomplete in 1527. It was also the centre of various industries, most notably of soap manufacture. The adjoining Rione Pigna was very distinguished; from the earliest times the Altieri, the Astalli and the Leni had had their palaces there, and Rione Sant'Angelo, which was dominated by the Santa Croce family, was scarcely less aristocratic. Ripa, on the other hand, although important as a port and full of ancient ruins, was undistinguished and the enormous Rione Campitelli which stretched from the Campidoglio to the city wall, was largely uninhabited. Rione Trevi stretched on the right side of what is now the Corso as far as Piazza Colonna and the Quirinal (Monte Cavallo). In the middle ages this had been covered by vineyards but these were being gradually replaced by villas.

Campo Marzio was the area which experienced most expansion in the sixteenth century. Its development was fostered by the existence of Ripetta, a port with traffic nearly as intense as that of Ripa Grande, and by Clement's development of Piazza del Popolo, Via Lata, Via dei Popoli and Via del Babuino. After 1520 the rione became a favoured site for new houses and workshops for artists and artisans. By contrast, even in 1527, Rione Monte was virtually uninhabited while Trastevere with its many ancient fortified houses, towers and religious buildings retained a characteristically medieval appearance.

From the point of view of defence the weak points of Rome were its gates and its bridges. There were too many gates for them all to be defended adequately./

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1. Pastor, Papacy, viii. 131.
 2. 'Descriptio Urbis', 453-466.

adequately, but the size and geography of Rome made them all essential for there were many approaches to the city. Travelling from the north or from Ancona via Farfa, along the Via Flaminia, a visitor entered the city by Porta del Popolo (Flaminia) the principal entrance to Rome. To the east, the next gate on the Aurelian wall was the Pinciana also giving access to the north, and by which ran the old Vergine aqueduct. Farther east were Porta Salaria and Porta S. Agnese (Numantina) through which, after passing the baths of Diocletian, a road ran out to the church of S. Agnese in Agone. Stretching south-east for some distance there was a tract of wall before the gate of San Lorenzo, named for the access it gave to the important church of San Lorenzo Fuori Muros. The Via Praenestina and the Via Labinica entered the city from the east through Porta Maggiore, whence a road ran to the populated quarter around Santa Maria Maggiore. South-east, Porta San Giovanni in Lateran gave access to the important church of the same name which lay almost on the city-wall. Due south was Porta Latina and beyond that the Porta Appia. The last gate on the Aurelian wall was Porta San Paolo through which passed travellers to Ostia.

Of the gates of Trastevere the most southerly was Porta Portuensis and on the west was the Porta Aurelia. To the north the Lungara, connecting Trastevere with the Borgo Leonino, passed through Porta Settimania which had been rebuilt by Alexander VI.⁽¹⁾ The Lungara entered the Borgo through Porta Santo Spirito. Beyond this gate, to the north, was Porta Posterula and, on the northern wall itself, were the two gates of the Pertosa and the Vaticana. On the east were Porta San Pietro and Porta di Castel Sant'Angelo.

Even by 1527 Rome had a surprising number of bridges. North of the city and outside the walls the Tiber was bridged by Ponte Molle, a medieval bridge which gave access to the Via Flaminia, the Via Cassia and the Via Clodia. In origin a classical bridge, the ends had been demolished and replaced with wood which could easily be removed for defensive purposes.⁽²⁾ Within the walls of Rome the first bridge was at Castel Sant'Angelo which gave access to the Borgo.⁽³⁾ The Sistine bridge was built on the site of the old Pons Agrippae which fell into disuse in the middle ages and was rebuilt by Sixtus IV and Julius II.⁽⁴⁾ Downstream/

1. Top. e Urb. 363.

2. Ibid. 199.

3. Ibid. 200.

4. Ibid. Ed. O. Tommasini, Diario della città di Roma di Stefano Infessura scribasenato (Rome 1890), 76.

Downstream were the two bridges of the Isola Tiberina.⁽¹⁾ Immediately below the Isola Tiberina was the Ponte S. Maria, the largest bridge in Rome which had been frequently rebuilt and only ceased to function in 1598 when the eastern end fell down.⁽²⁾ It was the quickest route from the Campidoglio to Trastevere.

These bridges crossed what was the main commercial thoroughfare of Rome and its environs. The Tiber was a vital channel of communication, particularly since there was no adequate road to any coastal port. Large vessels bound for Rome halted at Civitavecchia where they were unloaded into small boats which made their way to Ostia and up the Tiber. For this reason it could well be observed, as late as 1564, that; 'Si Rome était privée de son fleuve elle périrait de faim en trois jours et serait abandonnée par ces habitants'.⁽³⁾

The Campidoglio and the Vatican were linked by two roads, the Via Peregrinorum and the Via Papale. The latter was the road used by the pope after his coronation, when he proceeded from St. Peter's to the Lateran in solemn procession, for the ceremony known as il possesso when he assumed the temporal power of the papacy.⁽⁴⁾ The traveller reaching Rome from the north had the choice of two roads by which to enter the city; the Via Trionfale which led across Monte Mario to the Borgo near the Vatican, or the Flaminia which passed through Porto del Popolo. From Piazza del Popolo the traveller might either pass direct down the Via Lata to the Campidoglio or take the Via dei Popoli to Piazza Navona. This complex of roads was the work of Clement VII and proved of great importance in the subsequent development of Rome. Two roads ran along the Tiber, the Lungara on the north bank of the river and the Via Giulia on the south, which ran from the new church of San Giovanni dei Fiorentini to the Sistine bridge.

A complete census of the population of the city, taken just before the sack of Rome, has survived.⁽⁵⁾ From the whole city a population of 55,035 was returned⁽⁶⁾ of whom 4,926 lived in the Borgo and 4,927 in Trastevere. Elsewhere the population/

1. Top. e Urb. 200, 353.

2. Ibid. 200-1.

3. Quoted in Delumeau, Rome, 121.

4. Magnuson, Roman Quattrocento Architecture, 23.

5. For the date and accuracy of the census see, 'Descriptio Urbis'.

6. Peculiar circumstances reduced the population immediately before the sack; three cardinals, Colonna, Salviati and Trivulzio were absent, some Roman citizens were in the papal camp and many of the Colonna adherents were fuorusciti.

population was concentrated between Via del Babuino and Via Lata, on the Campidoglio, and the banks of the Tiber where 40,506 of the remainder lived. The Jewish population obviously inhabited a separate ghetto divided between the Rioni S. Angelo (1209), Ripa (127) and Regola (192).⁽¹⁾ This Jewish community had grown considerably during the pontificates of Alexander VI and Julius II who had welcomed refugees from Spain, Portugal, Sicily and Provence.⁽²⁾ However, difficulties over assimilation had immediately occurred, and it was not until 1524 that Clement VII was able to bring peace to the two Jewish communities, the immigrants and the original Roman Jewish community; on 12 December he approved the, 'Capitoli di Daniel da Pisa' which gave a common regulation to both communities and resolved many points of contention.⁽³⁾ In an essentially cosmopolitan society the Jews were but one element. From the census of 1527 it is clear that a large proportion of the population of Rome was foreign and that at least 20% of the city's inhabitants came from outside Italy. As throughout the sixteenth century, the most important of the non-Italian nations were those from the Iberian peninsula.⁽⁴⁾ In the February before the sack of Rome, Russell⁽⁵⁾ estimated that there were as many as 7,000 Spaniards living in Rome, although this is more than double the figure of between 2,000 and 3,000 given by Alberto Pio at about the same date.⁽⁶⁾ Whatever the exact figure, the Spanish nation was large enough to cause considerable problems over defence in 1527. In January the Spanish were asked to give a security of 500,000 ducats that, in the event of Rome being attacked, the Spanish nationals would make no move to help the invaders. They finally avoided paying the security and were exempted from musters of the militia, after they had promised not to assist the imperialists.⁽⁷⁾ The Germans likewise, as imperial subjects, posed a problem, for they also were present in Rome in large numbers. They were engaged mainly in the hotel industry or in the meat trade but/

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1. 'Descriptio Urbis'.
 2. Delumeau, Rome, 216. B. Croce, La Spagna nella vita italiana durante la rinascenza, (Bari 1917), 85-6.
 3. Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 51.
 4. 'Descriptio Urbis'. The place of origin is given for 573 persons. Of these, 234 were from the Iberian peninsula.
 5. For Russell see above p. 99.
 6. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1286, Molini, Documenti, i. 205.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 39-40, 174.

but the first two printers in Rome in 1467 had been Teutonic in origin and Germans had continued to dominate the printing industry.⁽¹⁾ There were still important German financiers in Rome although Clement had broken the monopolising control which the Fugger had held over papal finances since 1495. The papal guard was, of course, entirely Teutonic in composition and at least 10% of the household of Leo X was German.⁽²⁾

One essential fact emerges from a study of the 1527 census; the economic prosperity of the vast majority of Roman citizens, of whatever nationality, was dependent on the fortunes of the papacy. Rome was neither a major industrial nor commercial town. It was not even a port; the Tiber, shallow, narrow and rapid was not accessible to ships of a large burden for there is no tide and the constant winding of the river made sailing difficult and slow. Very many Romans were employed directly by the papacy, the cardinals or the Roman nobility. For the census the cardinal-palaces alone returned 3,111 inmates.⁽³⁾ The only significant industry in Rome was the hotel industry which depended on pilgrims, embassies and legal visitors. In 1527 236 'osterie, taverne, alberghi' and 'locande' were recorded.⁽⁴⁾ The importance of the industry had long been recognised by the papacy and constant efforts had been made to provide for the safety of visitors to Rome. A desire to extend this safety to the roads leading to Rome had been a significant factor in the extension of papal authority throughout the Church State.⁽⁵⁾ Julius II and Leo X both made considerable efforts, in defiance of the Roman barons, to rid the pilgrim routes of bandits and their constructive edicts had been reinforced by Clement VII in the bull In Sancta of 12 June 1524, which also made efforts to ensure the safety of visitors inside Rome.⁽⁶⁾ Apart from this tourist trade, the vast majority of Roman citizens were employed in service industries of one kind or another, as cobblers, bakers, watermen, washerwomen, barbers, provision merchants, /

1. Delumeau, Rome, 203.

2. Ibid. 203-4.

3. 'Descriptio Urbis'.

4. Ibid.

5. M. Romani, Pellegrini e Viaggiatori nell'Economia di Roma dal xiv al xvii secolo (Milan 1948), 17-19.

6. Ibid. 21, MS. Chigi G.II 39 f.392.

merchants, and clothiers. Few crafts were practised; a pottery industry, dominated by immigrants from Bergamo, was centred in Rione Regule and there were some weavers, principally in Campo Marzio and Trastevere. A luxury craft, largely dependent on ecclesiastical demands, was that of the jewellers and goldsmiths who are found associated with the merchants of Rione Parione.⁽¹⁾ Some builders and masons resided in the city though considerably fewer than the amount of new building in Rome would lead one to expect. Those who did live in the city were concentrated in the region of Campo Marzio.⁽²⁾

Rome, therefore, depended for its prosperity on the papacy and yet, during the pontificate of Clement VII, anti-papalism in the city was so marked that it could be turned to the imperial advantage almost at will. Of course anti-papalism at Rome was endemic and theocratic government was always seen as a tyranny, usurpation and intrusion, but yet peculiar circumstances made Clement, with the possible exception of Adrian VI, the most hated of all sixteenth century popes. He had, it is true, a genius for being misunderstood. From the beginning of his pontificate he appeared to show surprising weakness. His inability to pursue a firm and fixed course of action or even to maintain consistent good government in Rome, the Church State and Florence were frequently commented on. Yet Clement was unfortunate in the time of his accession to the chair of St. Peter. Despite the evident necessity during the preceding two hundred years, the papacy had failed to develop institutions of government which would relieve some of the mounting pressure of business. No pope, however conscientious could hope to deal alone with all the increased business accruing to Rome. It was only in the course of the sixteenth century, and for the most part after the death of Clement, that institutions like the congregations were developed which in the end alleviated much of the responsibility of the papacy.⁽³⁾ Clement VII was able, hard-working, conscientious, and high-principled. To the end he never wavered in his desire to elevate the papacy above the common round of political life that the pope might act as arbiter between the nations, rather than a participant in their quarrels. For all his ability, Clement VII was unable to deal effectively with any of the/

1. 'Descriptio Urbis', Cellini, Life, passim.

2. 'Descriptio Urbis'.

3. The congregations, which were principally the creation of Sixtus V (1585-90), were commissions composed of cardinals and of specialists, charged with recommending decisions to be taken by the papacy.

the problems which faced him because there were too many; foreign policy, the spread of Lutheranism⁽¹⁾ and other forms of religious dissent, reform of the church, the Turkish advance, piracy in the Mediterranean, the government of Florence, and, most immediately, brigandage and lawlessness in the Campagna, unrest in Rome and a severe economic crisis which brought the papacy to the verge of bankruptcy and, for a while, absorbed all other problems in itself.

The hatred felt in Rome for Clement was not the result of his lack of concern for the city. Throughout the early years of his pontificate Clement showed considerable interest in the development and government of Rome, although his attention was primarily directed to the improvement of existing amenities. Little new building can be attributed to his pontificate and not a single new church was built during it, although a special visitation of three bishops was ordered in 1524 to arrange for the repair, rebuilding and proper use of every church in Rome.⁽²⁾ The roads and streets of Rome received special attention. New roads were built, existing regulations about the old ones were rigidly enforced and a special personnel was created to keep all the thoroughfares of Rome clean and to remove refuse.⁽³⁾

In the government of Rome the papacy was now unchallenged although the city continued to be administered by two different sets of officials, those of the papacy and those of the commune. The papal officials who together cost the papacy some 90,000 ducats a year⁽⁴⁾ consisted of the prefect, whose role by this date was purely nominal, the castellan of Sant'Angelo, the captain of the papal guard and the governor of Rome. The governor, the most important administrator in Rome was head of papal justice in the city; he had authority over two prisons, the Corta Savelli and the Tor di Nona, and was charged with keeping order in the city. For this purpose he had a corps of police at his disposal. The commune of Rome retained its own councils, the Consiglio Secreto or Ordinario which was made up of the different municipal magistrates and the Consiglio Grande which/

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1. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 133 emphasizes Clement's preoccupation with Luther.
 2. Copy of the bull Romanus Pontifex in MS. Chigi G.II, f.39. The wars and plagues of recent years are described as a punishment for the disrepair into which the churches had fallen and for a failure to observe canonical hours.
 3. Delumeau, Rome, 244.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser.ii. vol. 3, 139.

which contained the same personnel with the addition of the Roman notables. Liaison between the commune and the papacy was made by the conservators. There were three of these who were replaced once a quarter. Nearly always members of the nobility, they watched prices, maintained the water supply, presided over the councils and supervised the senator, who presided over the Capitol law-court. One further vestigial office survived, that of the gonfaloniere del popolo romano which had become an hereditary and purely honorific title in the Cesarini family. The policing of the city was largely the responsibility of each of the 13 rioni and their elected civic chiefs who selected constables to maintain law and order in their own districts.⁽¹⁾ Apart from the work of the police, both of the commune and the papacy, the most important work in the city was done by the magistri viarum. An ancient institution which at the time of Martin V had been described as 'multo temporis decursus neglectum',⁽²⁾ the office had been revived by Nicholas V and Sixtus IV. The magistri viarum were responsible for paving and cleaning the streets, for the provision of a water-supply, for the maintenance of the city-walls and the prevention of illegal building.⁽³⁾

Since the government of Rome was now under papal control and the old spirit of the Roman commune all but extinguished, conflict over the city government was not the source of friction in Rome, and it is elsewhere that the reasons for Clement's unpopularity must be sought. Some unrest was certainly occasioned by the predominance of Florentines in Roman life, and in the administration of the Church State.⁽⁴⁾ It has been estimated that by 1527 more than 13% of the Roman population was Tuscan in origin.⁽⁵⁾ Even under the Borgia popes Rome never suffered a comparable invasion of immigrants to that during the pontificates of the two Medici. The first depositor-general of Leo X was Filippo Strozzi and the treasury and datariat were held by Tuscans throughout his pontificate.⁽⁶⁾ The banking system of Rome had become dominated by Florentine financiers. By 1527 there were at/

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1. Delumeau, Rome, 19-22.
 2. Top. e Urb. 368, Magnuson, Roman Quattrocento Architecture, 35.
 3. Magnuson, Roman Quattrocento Architecture, 36-7, Top. e Urb. 357
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 86.
 5. Delumeau, Rome, 207 using the figures of the 'Descriptio Urbis'.
 6. Delumeau, Rome, 208.

at least 30 Florentine bankers in Rione Ponte.⁽¹⁾ In 1520 the alum mines of Tolfa passed to Florentine control and in 1524 Florentines replaced the Fugger as papal bankers.⁽²⁾ Filippo Strozzi was deeply involved in every commercial enterprise at Rome, and together with the Siennese Agostino Chigi could control the whole financial life of the city.⁽³⁾ So dominant were Florentines at Rome that Tuscan became the official language of the papal court,⁽⁴⁾ and every one of the hostages handed over to the imperial army in 1527 was a Tuscan by birth.⁽⁵⁾ Culturally Florentines were of the greatest importance, for almost all the architects of Renaissance Rome came from Tuscany; Andrea Sansovino, Baldassare Peruzzi, the Sangallo and Michelangelo among them. Although the responsibility for this influx was as much that of Leo X as of Clement VII, the latter seems to have suffered by comparison with his Medici predecessor. The liberality of Leo X had endeared him to the Romans who did not care by what inexpedient financial measures this liberality was financed.⁽⁶⁾ Leo was lucky in that his pontificate coincided with a period in which plague, dearth and warfare were unknown to the city. On the contrary Rome profited from the disorders in the rest of Italy by the influx of wealthy refugees.⁽⁷⁾ With the populace as a whole Leo had further ingratiated himself by the mistaken policy of creating Roman cardinals. Indeed Leo's popularity was such that he was the first pope to whom a statue was erected in the Campidoglio. Clement VII⁽⁸⁾ although, with the possible exception of Lorenzo the Magnificent, the cleverest of his family, had a character which was not appreciated in Rome. The continence for which he was renowned brought him no popularity. At Clement's court there were no musicians nor fools, he never hunted and rarely went out. He even disliked the public celebration of mass which he performed far more infrequently than his predecessors.⁽⁹⁾

If Clement's court was notable it was for the number of advisers by whom/

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1. 'Descriptio Urbis' 427-466.
 2. Delumeau, Rome, 849.
 3. P. Pecchi, Roma nel Cinquecento, 280.
 4. Delumeau, Rome, 211.
 5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 198.
 6. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol 3, 126.
 7. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 459 and see above p. 117.
 8. Giulio dei Medici, b. 1478. Elected pope 1523. d. 1534.
 9. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 126-7.

whom the pope was surrounded. It suited Clement's temperament to delay as long as possible and to consult a wide spectrum of opinion before coming to a decision. Unlike other rulers the popes could call on talent from any country in the Christian world to assist in the government of the Church and Clement made full use of this potential. First and foremost, though, came family and clan solidarity, and at the core of Clement's court were the Medici relatives. There were the three cardinal-nephews, Cybo, Ridolfi, and Salviati, although only Salviati, a man of considerable wisdom and experience in politics, with a leaning towards the imperialist cause,⁽¹⁾ was regularly used by Clement in council.⁽²⁾ Both Salviati and Ridolfi favoured Venice and the Venetian alliance.⁽³⁾ Then there were the Strozzi, Filippo and Clarice, and, when Filippo had departed to Naples as a hostage,⁽⁴⁾ Clarice was constantly with the pope, tearfully demanding that he pursue a policy which would restore her husband to her.⁽⁵⁾

Apart from his family, Clement's most intimate advisers were Schomberg, the Datary Giberti,⁽⁶⁾ Armellino, Benedetto Accolti,⁽⁷⁾ Cardinal Accolti,⁽⁸⁾ the Genoese, Agostino Foglietta, Alberto Pio and, at a later date, Guicciardini. Schomberg was a native of Saxony but had arrived in Italy while he was still young to study law. In Florence he fell under the spell of Savonarola and entered the Dominican order. In 1520 Leo X made him archbishop of Capua and Clement appointed him as/

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1. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 113, 'è molto servitor dell'Imperatore'.
 2. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 270-80.
 3. Ibid.
 4. See above p.91 . Clarice de'Medici was the sister of Duke Lorenzo of Urbino. A capable and intelligent woman, she disliked Clement.
 5. Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. 502.
 6. In origin the datariat was the office where the date was appended to papal bulls. Later the datary acquired a monopoly in conferring benefices, dispensations for marriage etc. By Giberti's time the datariat was one of the most over-worked of papal offices and the datary had become a person of the greatest importance. Giberti was the only holder of the office who was not a cardinal.
 7. Benedetto Accolti was a consistent supporter of the Medici. He had been created abbreviatore apostolico by Leo X and secretary by Clement. In 1527 he purchased the cardinal's hat. In 1530 he was created bishop of Cadice, Policastro, Borino and Cremona. In 1532 he was created archbishop of Ravenna and in the same year he purchased the legation of the March of Ancona. He was deprived for malgovernment in 1534.
 8. Cardinal of Ancona. A constant companion of Clement throughout his troubles, the friend of Sadoleto.

as his secretary of state. Schomberg was now in his fifties, a mature and experienced man, but a convinced imperialist.⁽¹⁾ His sympathies were so entirely with the emperor that Castiglione assured Ferramosca that he could speak freely to Schomberg about anything.⁽²⁾ There was a tendency for Clement to dispense with Schomberg's services, therefore, whenever he was contemplating an anti-imperial move, as in October 1525, when all business was being handled by Giberti and Alberto Pio.⁽³⁾ On Giberti, some twenty-five years Schomberg's junior, Clement tended to rely more and more, and in all matters concerning ecclesiastical questions he accepted Giberti's decisions without question.⁽⁴⁾ Giberti's policies were pro-French, his opinions totally incompatible with those of Schomberg. His origins were Genoese, his father, a supporter of Venice, having been summoned to Rome on the accession of Julius II. From his father Giberti inherited a great love of Venice⁽⁵⁾ and a policy of preventing the predominance of any one power in Italy. Giberti's sympathy with the French dates from the battle of Pavia by which he was profoundly impressed⁽⁶⁾ but he never really liked the political life, and seems, in this respect, to have shared many of Clement's feelings. A member of the Oratorio del Divino Amore, he counted among his friends Sadoletto, Contarini, Gaetano da Thiene, Caraffa, Bembo, Vittoria Colonna and Reginald de la Pole. This last friendship perhaps explains Giberti's great admiration of England and of Henry VIII from whom he always hoped a great deal, although these hopes were to/

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1. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 128.
 2. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 113. For Ferramosca see above p. 99.
 3. Gal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 355. In May, when Clement favoured the imperialists the reverse had been true, *ibid.* 149.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 128.
 5. On his election as bishop of Verona he wrote to Doge Gritti that he would be pleased to spend his latter days in Venetian territory, 'alla quale sono stato sempre devotissimo, parendomi vedere in essa la viva imagine dell'antica grandezza, e della vera liberta' d'Italia'. Quoted in T. Pandolfi, 'Giovane Matteo Giberti e l'ultima difesa della liberta' d'Italia negl'anni 1521-5'. Arch. della R. Soc. Rom. di St. Patria, xxxiv. 171 which should be consulted for Giberti's career.
 6. Canestrini et Desjardins, Negociations, ii. 834.

to prove illusory.⁽¹⁾ For obvious reasons Charles V always disliked Giberti and his influence with Clement VII. In December 1525 the emperor was complaining to Castiglione, 'che il Papa quando era Cardinal de' Medici, era Papa, e che adesso che è Papa, vuole che un altro sia Papa per lui, accenandomi il Datario'.⁽²⁾

On 29 January 1526 Guicciardini left Florence for Rome whither he had been summoned by Clement VII, ostensibly to discuss the affairs of the Romagna.⁽³⁾ He reached Rome in early February and henceforward he became one of the pope's most important advisers; he was said to read all the papal correspondence.⁽⁴⁾ His closely reasoned arguments for following an anti-imperial policy, bolstered the position of Giberti, who had welcomed his arrival in Rome for this reason.⁽⁵⁾ Guicciardini constantly advised against trusting the emperor. As far as the pope was concerned he recognised only two possible aims, a general peace and the security and stability of Italy. Everything else should be subordinated to achieving these two ends, even if it meant temporarily laying aside laudable projects for church reform. Believing that the interests of the pope and of the whole of Italy were identical Guicciardini argued that if Charles V threatened Milan the pope should take up arms in self-defence.⁽⁶⁾

Even apart from these distinguished figures there was no lack at Rome among the ecclesiastics of acute minds, practised in affairs, to whom Clement might turn for advice. He relied on Sadoleto sufficiently for Castiglione to advise Ferramosca to court him assiduously,⁽⁷⁾ but Sadoleto, although having a deep and enduring concern for the peace of Europe, was politically neutral⁽⁸⁾ and his neutrality can only have reinforced the pope's natural caution.

Among the cardinals resident in Rome there were distinct pressure groups./

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1. See above p. 34, 36-7, 99-101.
 2. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 9 and see ibid. 27.
 3. P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di F. Guicciardini, 21, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 143, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 800.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii. xlv. 850.
 5. Ibid. 800.
 6. E.g. P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di F. Guicciardini, 60-1, F. Guicciardini, 'Sulla proposta di alleanza fatto da Carlo V ai Veneziani' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi (Bari 1933), 136-144.
 7. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 113.
 8. R. Douglas, Jacopo Sadoleto, 10-11.

groups. There were the young cardinals, represented by Farnese, who was anti-imperial and pro-Venetian although he had little sympathy with France, and who had connections with the Orsini family.⁽¹⁾ Opposed to Farnese were the Colonna supporters, including Jacobazzi and Dal Monte.⁽²⁾ There were the legalists like Cardinal Pucci, a great canon lawyer, famous for his support of established usage, and the pro-English cardinals, Accolti, Dal Monte and the gentle and pro-Erasman Campeggio,⁽³⁾ who had become well-versed in the affairs of the Holy See during the pontificate of Adrian VI.⁽⁴⁾ Clement appears to have consulted all these groups, particularly at moments of crisis. In December 1526 he was in daily consultation with a group composed of Farnese, Dal Monte, Campeggio, Dal Valle and Orsini,⁽⁵⁾ and in January Farnese was among his more important advisers.⁽⁶⁾

Among all these conflicting interests Clement had to preserve a balance. Overwhelmed as he was, by work and by advice, it is scarcely surprising that on occasion he found decisions difficult to make, or that Francesco Gonzaga should compare him to a boat buffeted hither and thither by contrary winds.⁽⁷⁾ Yet Clement's main difficulties were occasioned by his financial problems and this applies as much to his relations with the city of Rome as to the wider field of papal affairs. Apart from one Italian monograph⁽⁸⁾ the finances of the pontificate of Clement VII have scarcely been considered, despite the grave state of the papal treasury at this period, and few have noted that the gravest crisis of the modern church coincided with its gravest financial crisis. The vacillation for which contemporaries blamed Clement VII was mainly caused by a constant financial/

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1. His son and his sister had married into the Orsini and his mother had been a Gaetani. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 130. He favoured the French alliance in the autumn of 1525, Sanuto, Diarii, xl. 201.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 39.
 3. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1740, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 690, A. Renaudet, Erasme et l'Italie (Geneva 1954), 159, 162 and passim.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 107.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 447.
 6. Ibid. 633.
 7. Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. 502.
 8. Monaco, Camera Apostolica.

financial problem, hand-to-mouth expedients and a complete failure to achieve a permanent solution to the papacy's economic problems. By 1527 the pope was bankrupt, as the long period that elapsed between the completion of negotiations and the payments of Clement's ransom was to show. In order to make the first payment Clement had to borrow 196,000 ducats from Genoese and Catalan bankers at 25% interest against the security of his silver, Benevento and the titles of the Regno and he was never able to fulfil the ransom; in September 1527 he paid an additional 100,000 ducats but, after 6 December and a payment of 145,000 ducats, nothing further was received.⁽¹⁾ It had been made clear to the imperialists, who had relied on Clement to make up their own financial deficiencies, that Clement had spoken nothing but the truth when he told Bourbon, in April 1527, that to expect any additional payment to the 100,000 ducats already disbursed was as realistic as expecting heaven and earth to meet.⁽²⁾

As far as the Italian League was concerned, the financial difficulties of the papacy between 1525 and 1527 were to prove critical. Clement was imprisoned by his own financial need at a time when it was politically, morally and militarily imperative that he should act promptly and authoritatively. To understand the position in these years it is necessary to look briefly at the financial history of the papacy in the previous quarter century.

The papacy then enjoyed two different sources of income, the temporal and the spiritual. As a temporal sovereign the pope ruled a state which paid taxes. These taxes before the pontificate of Clement VII were largely indirect; the customs of Rome, feudal dues, the dogane delle pecore, income from the alum mines at Tolfa, revenues from the demesnes, and sales of grain and salt. In the mid-fifteenth century the spiritual revenues of the church had begun to diminish rapidly, but the development of the apostolic datariat and the increase in revenue through this office⁽³⁾ partially compensated for the decline. In addition, over the same period, a third source of income had been developed, the sale of/

1. Delumeau, Rome, 760 and see below p. 205-210.

2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 138, 167. Varchi says of Clement in early 1527 that he did not have a single 'quattrino', Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 101 but there were many popular misconceptions about papal wealth. Venice for instance, was certainly misled by the optimistic report of Domenico Trevisano on the finances of Julius II who was described as having, 'modo di avere quanti danari vuole'. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 33.

3. See above p. 129.

of offices. In 1471 at least 650 venal offices brought in an income of 100,000 ducats a year, but this figure was constantly increased, particularly by Alexander VI and Leo X, until on the latter's death there were about 2,150 venal office-holders at the papal court.⁽¹⁾

The income from these three sources was inadequate and unreliable. Spiritual revenues fluctuated wildly. Estimated at 133,000 ducats in 1492⁽²⁾ estimates fell to 90,000 in 1517,⁽³⁾ and rose to 200,000 in 1521.⁽⁴⁾ In 1525 the figure had fallen once more to 122,418 ducats⁽⁵⁾ and in 1526 it was estimated at 130,000.⁽⁶⁾ Temporal revenues did increase slowly and steadily from 144,400 ducats in 1492⁽⁷⁾ to 295,763 in 1525⁽⁸⁾ and to 369,000 in 1526 of which one-third (118,000 ducats) came from the city of Rome,⁽⁹⁾ but the papal revenues were still insufficient to meet anything but the most normal needs of the Church State. With an average annual income of between 420,000 and 450,000 ducats⁽¹⁰⁾ and an ordinary expenditure of about 410,000 ducats⁽¹¹⁾ the popes could not afford any military operations at all, least of all the expensive ones in which they were involved in the early sixteenth century. Wars were not the only disastrous consumers of papal income; conclaves were ruinous,⁽¹²⁾ vast sums had to be spent on keeping peace in the city during interregna, rewards and gratuities were, by custom, paid to the commune.⁽¹³⁾ Coronations, funerals and all other state occasions could be very costly; at the coronation of Leo X 40,000 ducats were spent on cloth⁽¹⁴⁾ that is one-tenth of the total papal revenue (420,000 ducats in 1517).⁽¹⁵⁾

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1. Delumeau, Rome, 768-774.
 2. *Ibid.* f. p.756.
 3. *Ibid.*
 4. *Ibid.*
 5. Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 19.
 6. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 132.
 7. Delumeau, Rome, f. p.756.
 8. Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 19.
 9. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 132, 139.
 10. At a time when Cardinal Armellino had an annual income of 200,000 ducats, D.B.I.; Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 19. In 1526 Foscari guessed that the total papal income was 500,000 ducats. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 130.
 11. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 130.
 12. The conclave of Leo X cost 80,000 ducats, Nardi, Historie, 161.
 13. Delumeau, Rome, 758-9.
 14. *Ibid.* 759.
 15. *Ibid.* f. p.756.

However, these extraordinary expenditures had always existed and had there been no other drains on papal finance the situation might not have got beyond control. Yet one Renaissance pope after another embarked on expensive projects the papal treasury could not sustain. Julius II, with his grandiose projects for the rebuilding of St. Peter's, spent 70,653 gold ducats on the building between 1503 and 1513.⁽¹⁾ This figure is immense considering that, in order to save money on building costs, Julius continued the long-established custom of using the ancient monuments of Rome as quarries for materials.⁽²⁾ Leo X squandered money as if the papacy had no financial problem at all. While playing the part of a Renaissance Maecenas, he took a prominent part in the Italian wars and embarked on the pointless and profitless war of Urbino.⁽³⁾ In order to remain solvent Leo relied on the financial acumen of Cardinal Armellino who, by finding immediate answers to Leo's problems, acquired a disastrous political power. Even Armellino, with all his financial talent was unable to perform the impossible and, by the time of Leo's death, the finances of the papacy were exhausted. Armellino himself estimated the papal debt at 80,660 ducats and Leo's personal debts at over half a million more.⁽⁴⁾ During the conclave which followed Leo's death there were not even sufficient funds to continue the proper government of the Church State. The cardinals were forced to pawn all the papal jewels and ecclesiastical ornaments, even the famous tapestries of Raphael.⁽⁵⁾ The election of Adrian VI, on 9 January 1522, brought no immediate relief. While awaiting his arrival from Spain, the Sacred College contrived to produce unparalleled confusion in the Church State; government was carried on by three cardinals who were changed every month. Under such a regime financial reform or economy was impossible. The financial exigency was so great that on one occasion 50 ducats, needed to pay an envoy to Perugia, could only be raised by pledging some altar lights.⁽⁶⁾

Despite heavy retrenchment, Adrian VI left no more than 2,000 ducats,⁽⁷⁾ and/

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1. Pastor, Papacy, vi. 483.
 2. For this practice see Top. e Urb. 352.
 3. See above p. 11-12.
 4. P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento, 5.
 5. Ibid. 9, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 3.
 6. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 50.
 7. Ibid. 216.

and Clement VII, therefore, inherited vast financial problems. The ordinary revenues were still pawned, an arrangement entered into by Leo, who is said to have spent the income of three pontificates, his own, Julius II's and Clement's.⁽¹⁾ To his credit, Clement was to begin the great work of re-organisation of the papal finances, often to his own disadvantage. From the beginning he set his face against the increasing venality of papal government.⁽²⁾ By 1525 the only means Clement had for raising immediate cash was to create more cardinals, but this, on principle, he refused to do, despite the advice of all those close to him. Vettori observes that, had it not been for political pressures, Clement would have preferred to impoverish the church and to begin a thorough reform of the administration.⁽³⁾

Nevertheless, circumstances conspired to make Clement play a continued part in the Italian wars. He was forced to purchase temporary truces at ruinous cost; in 1525 he paid Charles V 50,000 ducats so that the emperor might withdraw his troops from Parma and Piacenza.⁽⁴⁾ In April 1527 he paid over 100,000 ducats, raised through the Strozzi and Salviati banks,⁽⁵⁾ to persuade Bourbon to return to Milan. Both payments were the more costly in that neither had the desired effect. Even after the sack of Rome and the vast drain on his resources for his ransom, Clement was forced into additional expenditure; the war against Florence is said to have cost him 1,500,000 ducats.⁽⁶⁾

The political instability, throughout Clement's pontificate, only increased his financial difficulties. There seems to have been a genuine shortage of specie in the months preceding the Colonna raid and the sack of Rome.⁽⁷⁾ The Colonna raid ruined the pope's credit and made it impossible for him to raise loans at Rome.⁽⁸⁾ When, in November 1526, news came that the viceroy had landed at/

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xliii. 15, Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 269.
 2. Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 57.
 3. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 423-5.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 132 and see above p. 19.
 5. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 53. It is doubtful whether any other banker would have loaned at this juncture.
 6. Delumeau, Rome, 760.
 7. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.77. Giberti attributes the shortage to the concealment of money by people who were afraid of an attack on Rome.
 8. Sanuto, Diarri, xliii. 257.

at Porta San Stefano there was a rush to convert property into gold.⁽¹⁾ According to Casale, money was so scarce that it was difficult to raise even 1,000 ducats in cash.⁽²⁾ The merchants and the cardinals would make no loans in this critical period,⁽³⁾ and property sold at well below its real value.⁽⁴⁾

In the first quarter of the sixteenth century two men grappled with the problem of the papal finances; Julius II and Armellino. Of the two, Julius, who was advised by Raffaello Riario and who did not believe in impoverishing his successors to maintain his own solvency, was the more successful. His method was to put the papal finances on a more business-like footing.⁽⁵⁾ Money was earmarked for specific purposes, in particular the rebuilding of St. Peter's.⁽⁶⁾ By the simple device of insisting that the census be paid at the market rate of the ducat (13½ carlini in 1510) instead of at the traditional rate of 10 carlini he immediately raised papal income significantly.⁽⁷⁾ Simultaneously, he tried to rationalise the papal coinage by casting a new coin, the giulio, to replace the now devalued carlino, which would be worth 10 to the ducat,⁽⁸⁾ a move welcomed by the Venetians.⁽⁹⁾ But since the balance between gold and silver was widening at an alarming rate the giulio devalued extremely fast; in 1504 Julius had estimated 83¾ of his new coins to the pound weight of gold but, by 1508, this had increased to 87¾ and by 1529 to 89.⁽¹⁰⁾ Strict saving was a permanent part of Julius's method; the Venetians observed of his pontificate; 'In Roma non corre danaro, come prima. I cardinali attendono a cumulare per il papato, e il papa non apre mai lo scrigno'.⁽¹¹⁾ As a result, Julius was able to leave a considerable treasure though it is unlikely to have been as much as the 300 millions of common report, or indeed anything/

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1. These included Guillaume du Bellay (Langey) Schulz, Der Sacco di Rome, 83, 100.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 258.
 4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.71v.
 5. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 33.
 6. Ibid. 34.
 7. Ibid. 33.
 8. Ibid. Delumeau, Rome, 658, Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 62.
 9. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 35.
 10. Delumeau, Rome, 658.
 11. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 35.

anything like it.⁽¹⁾

Armellino, the financial adviser of the two Medici popes, was unable to prevent Leo X from squandering the fortune Julius had left. His very considerable financial talents had to be directed towards preventing first Leo and then Clement from becoming totally insolvent. Particularly during the pontificate of Clement, whose own financial understanding was by no means negligible, he utilised and developed some sound financial devices. The appropriation of money towards specific ends was continued; in 1524, for instance, a special college of forty curial officials was set up to oversee the rebuilding of St. Peter's and to see that money destined for that purpose should not be misappropriated.⁽²⁾ In 1526 Armellino was partially instrumental in setting up the Monte della Fede, the first public debt of the papacy, which at 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ % represented a more economical method of borrowing than hand-to-mouth loans raised with individual bankers who often charged interest at 40%. A real effort was made to exploit the alum mines at Tolfa to papal profit.⁽³⁾

Yet, although economically sound, many of Armellino's schemes were politically disastrous. At a time when the papacy was making real progress towards establishing control throughout the Church State, Armellino subjected this previously immune area to a savage fiscal policy. Taxes were imposed on cereals, meat, shops, Roman wines, salt and immigrants. In 1516 he advised the imposition of a salt tax which, although it would have brought in 25,000 ducats, aroused such strong opposition in the Romagna that Leo was forced to abandon the project./

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1. Nardi, Historie, 161. It is worth noting that Julius's efforts to improve the finances of the Church State, also played a part in the rupture with Ferrara. The pretext for this quarrel was the Ferrarese salt-works at Commachio from which salt was being supplied to the duchy of Milan. Julius claimed that Alfonso was thus infringing the papal monopoly of supplying salt to Milan from the papal salt-works at Cervia. See above p. 104-5.
 2. MS. Chigi, G.II, 39 f.391.
 3. D.B.I. under Armellino-Medici. For details of the Monte see Delumeau, Rome, 791-2. The alum mines at Tolfa had been discovered by Giovanni de Castro in 1462 and purchased by Pius II for 17,000 ducats. Until this time, all alum, indispensable in the cloth industries, had come from the Orient. Agostino Chigi did a great deal to develop the Tolfa alum mines.

project. In June 1517 it was Armellino who suggested selling 31 cardinal's hats in order to raise ready cash. In 1519 his fiscal policy resulted in actual rebellion in the Church State at Fabriano, which, after the sack of that city by the Spanish, was unable to meet Armellino's fresh impositions.

It was, however, at Rome that Armellino's policy had the most damaging effect. The Roman clergy were heavily taxed and absenteeism among the clerics was fined.⁽¹⁾ The tariffs of customs dues were almost doubled; in 1484 farmers of the customs had paid 34,000 ducats but in 1535 they were paying 72,000 ducats.⁽²⁾ The macinato, a tax on flour, was introduced.⁽³⁾ Although he personally owned a chain of hotels and butchers shops, Armellino persecuted the hoteliers and butchers of Rome with excessive taxation, finally driving the butchers into an open revolt which revealed how deeply the imperialists, through the agency of Colonna, had become involved in the politics of Rome. Threatened with arrest, the butchers took refuge with Sessa, who forced the papal police to withdraw and successfully pressed the government to remove the tax.⁽⁴⁾ In 1525 Clement recruited a special personnel to clean the roads and keep the sewers open and sought to finance this by a heavy tax on artisans and tradesmen.⁽⁵⁾ The populace of Rome was particularly annoyed by the heavy tax imposed on all Roman wines.⁽⁶⁾

Some measures were acutely mistimed; taxes on merchants were imposed at a time when they had already suffered substantial losses in the war and were waiting for a return on some of their enterprises.⁽⁷⁾ Other measures were merely mismanaged; at a time of shortage Clement had corn imported from Sicily only to find that by the time the supplies arrived the shortage was over so that, in order to sell the/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 87, bull of December 1524, Romanus Pontifex, copy in MS. Chigi, G.II 39 f.327.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 87. Foscari guessed that by 1526 Clement had made 2,500 ducats from increased customs dues. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 126-7. In the 16th century farmers of the customs included Filippo Strozzi, Bindo Altoviti, G.F. Rinaldi, Giovanni Ubaldini and Francesco Capponi.
 3. Delumeau, Rome, 828.
 4. D.B.I. under Armellino-Medici, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 311.
 5. Delumeau, Rome, 244.
 6. D.Orano, Sacco di Roma, 217.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 86.

the imported grain without loss, the price of corn had to be artificially raised.⁽¹⁾ Throughout his pontificate the whole question of price-fixing and rationing of wheat caused friction between Clement and Rome, for it was an obvious source of additional papal income. The kind of profit that could be made is indicated by Perez, who, in January 1527, reported that the pope was proposing to sell at a price of 5½ ducats the ruggio corn he had imported for 1½ ducats the ruggio.⁽²⁾ The sale of food monopolies artificially elevated the prices of vital commodities at a time when they were in any case high and were rising steadily.⁽³⁾ From the beginning of January 1527 the food shortage was so acute that it is almost certainly one of the reasons why Clement dismissed his mercenaries.⁽⁴⁾ In January and February grain was selling at between 6 and 9 ducats the ruggio and by March and April this had risen to 10 ducats.⁽⁵⁾

Although Clement did much to improve the city of Rome this also caused discontent for, 'aveva a molti le loro case per dirizzare le strade di Roma, senza pagarle, rovinate'.⁽⁶⁾ Even with increased taxation Clement was forced into other expedients to save money; as early as January 1525 Armellino was cutting the salaries and allowances of papal ambassadors⁽⁷⁾ and by June 1526 the diplomatic service was even denied the necessary cash to send dispatches by post, the quickest means of communication.⁽⁸⁾ For several months the Roman officials and professors at the University of Rome received no salary.⁽⁹⁾ The Swiss guard also went unpaid and resorted to dubious means of their own to support themselves.⁽¹⁰⁾ Pressures of the war meant the frequent presence of papal soldiers in Rome and the behaviour of the bande nere when billeted on civilian populations was so notorious that their arrival in Rome caused panic and the closure of many shops.⁽¹¹⁾

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1. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 126-7, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 38.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 13.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 86, Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 64.
 4. D.Orano, Sacco di Roma, 88.
 5. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.94v. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 277.
 6. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 86.
 7. A.S.V. MS. AA. ARM. i-xviii vol. 6522, f.34.
 8. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.1, 1009.
 9. It is not clear why not. Traditionally the salaries of the university professors were paid for by the 'gabella dello studio', a tax on all foreign wines entering Rome.
 10. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 86.
 11. Cellini, Life, 69, D.Orano, Sacco di Roma, 231.

For a variety of reasons, therefore, Clement was acutely unpopular at Rome, so unpopular that it was to be to the imperial advantage in September 1526 and May 1527. The events of September 1526 bring the difficulties of the papacy with its widely diffused responsibilities into sharp relief. Chronically short of money, Clement was advised of the offensive activities of the Colonna at the same time as news arrived of the disaster at Mohacs.⁽¹⁾ This last produced in the pope one of his sincere, if theatrical, changes of mood. Even while trying to make arrangements to meet the Colonna threat, he was ordering the resident ambassadors to tell their rulers to make a general peace, 'offerendosi Sua Santità andar in persona contra turchi; e come vicario di Cristo vol far vittima di la sua persona'.⁽²⁾ The financial difficulties of the papacy were now so acute that the best Clement could really hope for was a peace or a truce as soon as possible. But his attitude could not help but be ambivalent; Clement was forced to realise that even though war was economically unfeasible it must be prosecuted.⁽³⁾ Bankruptcy therefore became daily more likely. By December 1526 the papal armies could only be paid by pawning and selling the Medici family property, by raising forced loans from friends, courtiers and curial officials, and by the sale of church property.⁽⁴⁾

It is in the context of this financial desperation and of the growing hostility to the papacy at Rome and to some degree in the Church State as a whole that Clement's actions and policies between 1525 and 1529 must be considered. It is essential to realise what was rarely understood at the time, and even when understood, rarely appreciated, that at every turn Clement's hands were tied both by his own financial embarrassments and by his own high principles which precluded his resorting to the more obvious means of raising cash without risking his popularity in the seat of papal government.

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1. At the battle of Mohacs (29 August 1526) the Hungarian army under Louis II was annihilated by the Ottoman forces of Soliman the Magnificent.
 2. Sanuto, *Diarii*, xlii. 682.
 3. See above p. 92-4.
 4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.48v., 56v., 71v., *Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529*, 57, Sanuto, *Diarii*, xliii. 257, 700, 738. He was even prepared to pawn Ravenna to the Venetians.

CHAPTER VI

Bourbon's March on Rome

'Experience has shown that the soldiers of that nation (Germany) will not move without pay'.

Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 739

Bourbon's arrival in Milan⁽¹⁾ struck terror into the hearts of the League commanders, and particularly into that of Urbino, but, at first, it appeared Bourbon would be unable to make anything of the chaos he found. From the first he quarrelled with del Guasto and da Leyva who were only too ready to hand over responsibility to him. Bourbon was as anxious to avoid the responsibility, for he was unimpressed by the quality of the soldiery guarding Milan. In his opinion they had been badly led and discipline had been relaxed to such an extent that he seemed to be dealing with a rabble rather than an army.⁽²⁾

Fruntsberg was in the Piacentino and Bourbon was anxious to unite with him. But, since August, his time had been spent in fruitless negotiation with the army which refused to leave Milan before its arrears of pay were made up.⁽³⁾ There were constant alarms that Milan would be handed over to the imperial soldiery to sack in lieu of payment. Until mid-December Bourbon restrained his troops and merely threatened a sack in order to extract fresh supplies through the mediation of Francesco Visconti and other Ghibelline members of the Milanese aristocracy. However, with the advent of Fruntsberg, the financial pressures on Bourbon had become very great and he countenanced the looting of monasteries and shops which began on 15 December. On 17 December Visconti and another gentleman were seized and held ransom for 10,000 ducats.⁽⁴⁾ On 29 December 73 Milanese aristocrats were summoned before the captain of justice and when, as was expected, they failed to appear their goods were confiscated.⁽⁵⁾ Silver from the churches was melted down and cast into coinage.⁽⁶⁾ Altogether 40,000 ducats were raised from Milan and a further 20,000 in ransom money from Morone. But, given that Bourbon had also to pay Fruntsberg's troops these sums were totally inadequate. Before they would even leave Milan, the Spanish troops demanded two months of their back pay, already in arrears, a sum which amounted to over 62,000 ducats. At a suggestion of da Leyva, additional cash was raised from the officers of the army; Bourbon, for example, paid 3,000 ducats out of/

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1. See above p. 41
 2. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 3.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 433.
 4. Ibid. 477.
 5. Ibid. 565.
 6. Ibid. 566.

of his own pocket and da Leyva and del Guasto pawned all their jewels in order to contribute.⁽¹⁾

So, on 2 January 1527, the Spaniards were finally persuaded to leave Milan. Da Leyva, with 10,000 infantry was to remain as governor.⁽²⁾ Two bands of the veteran lansquenets were left at Pavia.⁽³⁾ Bourbon, now turned his attention to the problem of Frundsberg's army which the emperor had released into Italy without any clear instructions as to how it was to be paid. Already over two months had passed without the lansquenets receiving any pay, that is there were estimated arrears of 93,000 ducats. The lansquenets lacked even the most essential supplies; there was, for instance, a desperate shortage of footwear. There were rumours of mutiny as the lansquenets publically threatened to descend on Milan and to remain there until they were paid.⁽⁴⁾ There seemed to be little Bourbon could do. Nothing had been heard from Spain, although he was daily expecting bills of exchange. Communications within Italy were totally disrupted and he could not even make contact with the viceroy.⁽⁵⁾ Bourbon was only able to prevent a mutiny of the lansquenets by promising a florin and a ducat to each soldier which would not be deducted from their arrears, and, when even this sum failed to materialise, the lansquenets had to be purchased with a ducat and a pair of shoes per man, 18,000 pairs of shoes having been seized in Milan for this purpose.⁽⁶⁾

On 14 January, together with del Guasto and Orange, for the first time Bourbon met Frundsberg in council, to discuss the subject of the lansquenets and the future plan of campaign.⁽⁷⁾

Now, as throughout the entire campaign, it was decided that the army should live off the country. Bourbon let it be known that any locality which refused supplies would be attacked, but that those who gave voluntarily would not be molested.⁽⁸⁾ Special officials were created to see that these dispositions were/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 69-70, A. Lebey, Le Connétable de Bourbon (Paris 1904), 396.
 2. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.29v. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 678.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 678.
 4. Ibid. 672-6, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 15.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 16, 38-9. After January when Moncada's truce expired Giberti refused passports to couriers of the viceroy.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 15-16, Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 618, 690-1, ibid. xlii. 141, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.52.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 672-6.
 8. This was common and accepted practice. See M. Keen, The Laws of War in the Middle Ages. (London 1965). 82-3.

were obeyed. The army was, thus, protected from total starvation⁽¹⁾ although the horses continued to suffer from lack of fodder.⁽²⁾

The recurrent problem of supply was but one of a series of difficulties with which the army was beset. These problems could not but be increased by the very serious disputes over authority. The difficulty of operating without the physical presence of Charles V was a problem endemic to the whole empire which in Italy during the subsequent months became acute. Here the emperor had many agents operating - Bourbon, da Leyva in Milan, the Colonna, Lannoy, the Neapolitan council and Este, but there was no one, central, co-ordinating authority. Although a plan existed for an overall military strategy, it foundered on the weakness of individual links and on the difficulty of communication. Questions about authority were always being raised - was the viceroy the representative of the emperor's person throughout Italy or did his authority merely extend to Naples? This was a question openly canvassed in the streets of Ferrara where it was argued on Bourbon's behalf, 'che'l Vicerè non lo pol obligar in Italia, perchè se lui è Vicerè a Napoli, lui è vice Imperator in Italia'.⁽³⁾ To overcome this difficulty it had been hoped to create Alfonso d'Este lieutenant-general of the imperial troops in Italy so that he might co-ordinate the campaigns of Lannoy and Bourbon. Este, however, steadfastly refused the appointment,⁽⁴⁾ Bourbon was offended that the offer had ever been made, and questions were once more raised about his authority even within the highest ranks of his own army. There is little doubt that privately Charles V authorised Bourbon to do whatever he liked in Italy, and, in particular, authorised an attack on Rome, /

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1. Supplies came from Mantua and Ferrara almost daily, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 203, 210, in February Bourbon had bread from Fidenza, *ibid.* 57, and fourteen cartloads of supplies, including some hay for the horses, veal, chickens, wine and cheese from Reggio, *ibid.* 198. At the beginning of March the supply of bread came from Correggio, *ibid.* 201.
 2. *Ibid.* 216-7. This was principally due to the bad weather since the animals could not sustain themselves by grazing.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 354.
 4. See above p. 109-113.

Rome, irrespective of Lannoy's truce, if the duke felt, 'strong enough for the undertaking'.⁽¹⁾ Bourbon was sure enough in his own mind that he had the emperor's authority for all that he chose to do that he had authority to overrule the viceroy⁽²⁾ but the trouble was that this authority was never made public. Thus, when Bourbon seemed to be deliberately disobeying Lannoy, in rejecting his truce, some officers at least in the army, particularly the Neapolitans, found themselves in a peculiarly delicate position. Indeed del Guasto and other captains refused to continue in service with the army, 'lest they should disobey the imperial mandates respecting the obedience of the truce'.⁽³⁾ The position was never made clear because Charles did not want it to be clear; he deliberately misled Castiglione who told Giberti that Ferramosca was bringing with him from Spain letters which instructed Bourbon to obey the viceroy in all things.⁽⁴⁾ But if there were political advantages to be gained in this way there were distinct disadvantages as well. The confidence of the Italian powers was undermined; on at least one occasion Clement VII complained that he did not know with whom he was supposed to treat and therefore could not do so.⁽⁵⁾ Alarcon believed that arguments about these matters greatly impaired the efficiency of the army and, after the sack of Rome, when his own lansquenets were refusing to accept that the viceroy had any authority over them,⁽⁶⁾ he suggested that the solution would be to appoint the same person as viceroy and as commander-in-chief of the armies,⁽⁷⁾ but it was not in fact until after news of Bourbon's death had reached Spain, that Lannoy received from the emperor authority over all matters in Italy, 'di tal maniera che se lo imperatore medesimo ci fosse stato in persona non haveria potuto far più'.⁽⁸⁾

Lannoy and Bourbon, who had been on bad personal terms ever since Lannoy had removed Francis I to Spain without Bourbon's knowledge, were constantly at cross-/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 133.
2. '... se ne mente chi vuol dir che io non habbia più auctorità del Vicere datami per la Maestà del Imperador'. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 516.
3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 135, Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 233. On del Guasto's part at least this may have been only an excuse. He had been quarrelling with Bourbon for months and was in general disagreement with the emperor's Italian ambitions, Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 74, 81.
4. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.104-104v.
5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 518-9.
6. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 489.
7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 479.
8. Sanuto, Diarii. xlvi. 223.

cross-purposes. They did not trust and did not understand each other.⁽¹⁾ So opposed was Lannoy to Bourbon's interests that he had recently campaigned to prevent Bourbon marrying the emperor's sister, an incident which had done nothing to improve relations between the two men.⁽²⁾

Equipped with scaling-ladders and six pieces of field artillery, the Spaniards crossed the Po between 28 and 30 January and attacked the suburbs of Piacenza where they halted work on the fortifications.⁽³⁾ In the third week of February they joined with Frundsberg's lansquenets. It might have been supposed that the campaign would open with an attack on Piacenza, a key-town in the papal defence system,⁽⁴⁾ long-contended by the empire and papacy⁽⁵⁾ and the gateway to the Via Emilia. The duke of Ferrara dissuaded Bourbon from an attack, doubtless for the reasons advanced by del Guasto; the city, defended by Guido Rangoni was strongly fortified with a garrison of 6,000 men.⁽⁶⁾

There had long been talk of the danger to Rome from the army in Lombardy. At the end of November 1526 Federico Gonzaga warned Isabella d'Este to leave Rome; 'pargli già di vedere et Fiorenza et Roma sottosopra, et Roma depredata', he said of the lansquenets.⁽⁷⁾ Idle threats had been made by prominent imperialists like Vives who, in December, had warned the pope that he would lose Rome⁽⁸⁾ or/

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1. E.g. Sanuto, Diarii, xliiii. 136.
 2. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1520-6, 508.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 7, 14.
 4. It was one of the fortress towns to be surrendered by Clement to the imperialists as security for his ransom. See below p. 203.
 5. Traditionally a part of the duchy of Milan it was claimed as an imperial fief. Julius II produced from the Vatican archives documents purporting to show that, with Parma, it had been given to the Countess Matilda and persuaded Maximilian to surrender his rights in the two towns. After Julius' death they were occupied by the viceroy who later returned them to Leo X on payment of 30,000 ducats.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 57, La Presa di Roma, 122, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 92.
 7. A. Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, (Milan 1908), 49.
 8. M. Bataillon, Erasme et l'Espagne (Paris 1937), 250.

or the duke of Sessa who, on hearing of the pope's adhesion to the Italian League, had been beside himself with rage. He warned then that punishment would be meted out to the ungrateful Medici pope who owed his tiara to Charles V.⁽¹⁾

Clearly an attack on papal rather than Venetian territory was contemplated from the beginning⁽²⁾ and we must now consider at what point Rome became the armies' objective. An attack on Rome might have been intended from the moment Bourbon left Milan; Rome, it was believed, could provide money to pay the soldiers, an attack there might force Clement to abandon the League even if the pope were not actually captured. An attack on Florence might have served both these objects but an attack on Rome stood a better chance of military success since there would be assistance from Naples. But Naples was one reason the imperial commanders were reluctant to travel as far south as Rome. They feared the army might subsequently descend on the Regno and live off it in the way the Spaniards had lived off Milan.⁽³⁾

The progress of events in the Regno is of vital importance in understanding Bourbon's movements. Much as Lannoy and Bourbon disliked each other, they had co-ordinated a plan of action which provided for a dual attack on the papacy; Lannoy and the Colonna would attack from the south⁽⁴⁾ while Bourbon would attack from the north campaigning through the Church State. Only as Lannoy began to fail in the Neapolitan campaign⁽⁵⁾ did the need for a swift attack on Rome by Bourbon become apparent. It is certain that no definite plan for the campaign Bourbon was eventually to prosecute existed when the imperial armies left Milan. On 20 December Bourbon told the Mantuan representative that he was intending to attack Piacenza and Parma but that if there were any difficulty he would move slowly to Bologna, 'et ivi voria dinari, e poi a Firenze, e de longo a Roma Et che da l'altro conto il S. Vicerè si ritroverà contra il Papa'.⁽⁶⁾

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1. A. Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, (Milan 1908), 26.
 2. Ibid. 53. Bourbon told della Torre that Venice was too strong to attack.
 3. F. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 118.
 4. See, for example, the instructions from Spain which reached Bourbon in the middle of March, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 133 and a letter from the Venetian ambassador in Valladolid written on 18 April, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 372, also Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 514-515.
 5. See above p. 97-8.
 6. A. Lucio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, (Milan 1908).

The possibility of a revolution in Florence, under the imperial aegis, had certainly been considered.⁽¹⁾ The idea of Florence as the point at which to attack the papacy had always been in the commanders' minds and they were using the promise of a sack of Florence to encourage the army to advance.⁽²⁾ Yet, as late as 18 February, the army council was still debating whether or not they should take Bologna, 'or go to Florence, which is the thing the soldiers desire most'.⁽³⁾ It was already known that the Colonna and the viceroy would be making an attack on Rome⁽⁴⁾, but Bourbon continued to negotiate with the Florentine fuorusciti.⁽⁵⁾ In the second week of March Bourbon received letters from Lannoy urging him to advance on Rome from the north and promising an attack from Naples, letters presumably written at a time when Lannoy was about to enter into a truce with Clement and at a time when he was in no position to contemplate an effective attack on Rome at all.⁽⁶⁾ By this date, Bourbon, influenced by the disastrous turn of events in the Regno, had already decided to march on Rome for, on 11 March, Sanchez reported that Bourbon had informed him he was going to advance on Rome by forced marches.⁽⁷⁾ Alfonso d'Este was known to be an advocate of a direct attack on Rome and his many conversations with Bourbon doubtless affected the imperial commander's decision.⁽⁸⁾

At this point it is important to establish the nature of the imperial army. Both the official and the unofficial sources confirm that the army was large by sixteenth century standards, and Bourbon's success stems partly from the sheer weight of numbers in the imperial armies. On 3 March Najera reported that the army consisted of 700 lances (about 3,500 men), 800 light cavalry, 10,000/

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1. See below p.
 2. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 201, Modena Arch. Edicti Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.539.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 71. For the attitude of the soldiers see Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 207, 'Haveano da li spagnoli per lo campo che volevano andar a sachizar Fiorenza'.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 71.
 5. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 99 and see below p.
 6. See above p.98-102. For the letters see Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 132-3.
 7. Ibid. 96.
 8. But Bourbon was capable of arriving at the decision by himself. Contemporaries probably overestimated Este's influence. E.g. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i, 100.

10,000 lansquenets, 5,000 Spaniards and 3,000 Italians.⁽¹⁾ At the end of the first week in March the armies were joined by two companies of Spanish infantry and a few cavalry from Carpi⁽²⁾ but were still weak in the cavalry which were essential both for foraging and for scouting. Throughout the campaigns of the following months the imperialists seem to have been short of horses of all types, for haulage, transport, scouting and fighting. As Bourbon moved south he was constantly joined by Italian adventurers so that, by the time he reached Rome, the number of Italian infantry had grown to roughly 4,000.⁽³⁾ It was said that the army contained about 40,000 men when it reached Arezzo⁽⁴⁾ but this must have been an overestimate and a more accurate figure is that given when the army reached Viterbo; 30,000 men of whom it was said that only 22,000 had any claim to be considered soldiers.⁽⁵⁾

Yet of this 22,000, the hard core were professionals, well-trained and seasoned, brave and accustomed to victory,⁽⁶⁾ campaigning away from home in a alien country where their only loyalty was to their comrades. Despite great hardships, the lansquenets and the Spaniards developed and retained an esprit de corps never shared by the Italian troops in either the imperial or in the League army, with the possible exception of the bande nere. Frundsberg's lansquenets were some of the best infantry to have been seen in the field in Italy, at a time when, following the battles of Marignano and Pavia the reputation of the Swiss was already declining. As soon as Frundsberg entered Italy Federico Gonzaga sent his agent to inspect his army. The report sent back to Mantua was full of praise for the lansquenets, particularly for the mounted soldiers who were prepared to fight on foot if necessary.⁽⁷⁾ Discipline in these early months was first class; there were no serious outbreaks of looting, mainly because Frundsberg went out of his way to ensure that his troops were well-supplied.⁽⁸⁾

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 91. The figure for the infantry is probably an overestimate. Compare Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 267 which gives 4,000 Spaniards and 2,000 Italians at the beginning of March.
 2. See above p. 110-2.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 75.
 4. Catani, Ricordi, 222.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 218.
 6. Ibid. xli. 693-4, Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 199.
 7. A. Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, (Milan 1908), 40.
 8. See above p.

Everyone who came in contact with the lansquenets was impressed. Federigo⁽¹⁾ Gonzaga described them as, 'una bella banda che spezzera ogni resistenza', and Guicciardini admired their constancy, resilience and bravery.⁽²⁾ It was not until after the sack of Rome that the lansquenets acquired their unengiable reputation for brutality. Then they became the incarnation of all that the Italians implied by their use of the word, 'barbari' to describe the non-Italian nations.

The lansquenets were organised in regiments made up of colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and regimental staff with a varying number of companies, commanded by captains and their subalterns, the lieutenants and ensigns. A company or 'colour' numbered about 200 men.⁽³⁾ The captains were famous for their concern for the welfare of their men and always took measures to ensure that they should be paid. Pay fell due every 30 days and, while the pay of the Spaniards and Italians was falling into arrears, the demands of the lansquenets serving in Milan were regularly met up to December 1525.⁽⁴⁾ Amongst the more notable features of the lansquenets were their disciplinary code, which admitted the right of the rank and file to judge matters which touched the honour of the whole company, /

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1. A. Luzio, Isabella d'Este e il Sacco di Roma, (Milan 1908), 49.
 2. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 199.
 3. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 423.
 4. Ibid.

company, and the women who marched with the regiments and had a definite place in the army's corporate life.

Camp-followers were also of importance in the Spanish army. It fell to the women to bake the bread which fed the armies, and they also ran mobile stores, supplying necessaries to the soldiers while on campaign. Both armies also had their share of camp-boys, military apprentices who learnt their trade while performing such services as burnishing armour for the true soldiers. But this vast additional army, although useful, brought with it its own problems as far as lodgings and supplies were concerned, and could seriously hinder a campaign when speed was essential.⁽¹⁾

From Pavia to the battle of Rocroi (1648) the Spanish army was held to be the finest in Europe, with a reputation of invincibility. Its success stemmed from Gonsalvo's reforms which had been initiated during the Neapolitan campaigns of 1503. The most important change had been the abolition of a system by which commands were only temporary, existing no longer than the day of battle, over numerous companies, most of them feudal levies of varying size. Gonsalvo professionalised the Spanish army forming it into battalions of infantry under colonels who remained in command after each battle. Every battalion was divided into five companies of about 200 men each.⁽²⁾ Adopting the best points of the Swiss system, the Spanish infantry fought with a combination of pike and musket. They were among the first troops to make skilled use of artillery in battle.⁽³⁾ In addition, the Spaniards serving under Bourbon were for the most part Pescara's veterans. Many had served in Italy since 1509 and were used to hardship and the vigorous discipline for which Pescara was famous.⁽⁴⁾

Despite Gonsalvo's reforms it appears that both armies were still top-heavy with the expensive⁽⁵⁾ luxury of too high a ratio of officers to men. Had the/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 245 and see below p. 162.
 2. Gerald de Gaury, The Grand Captain (London 1955), 84.
 3. E.g. Giovio, Vita Pescara, 223.
 4. Ibid. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 423.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 696. The rate of pay is here given as 480 ducats p.a. for a captain, 70 ducats for a lieutenant and 8 for a sergeant, but the officers were always the last to be paid.

the armies been kept up to paper strength there would have been one captain to every 200 men but it is clear that the figure was always closer to one captain for every 100-150 men.⁽¹⁾ Alarcon estimated that the total cost of the army could be reduced by one-third if the number of officers was cut down to an efficient level.⁽²⁾ and another of the imperial captains agreed that the number of officers in the Spanish army could be reduced without impairing efficiency.⁽³⁾ Indeed, the effectiveness of the army as a fighting force might even be improved, since many of the officers owed their appointment to favour rather than merit, and were sometimes in command of different nationalities of whose languages and customs they were completely ignorant.⁽⁴⁾ Apart from these senior officers the armies had various other staff attached to them - drummers, trumpeters, physicians and clerks.⁽⁵⁾

Bourbon divided the overall command between Orange, Frundsberg and del Guasto. Orange was entrusted with the vanguard and the command of the lances and light cavalry, del Guasto with the Spanish infantry, while Frundsberg remained responsible for his own lansquenets. These leaders were all men of outstanding merit. Harsh words have been written about the duke of Bourbon, not least by his contemporaries who accused him of treachery, double-dealing, and self-interest.⁽⁶⁾ Certainly he was avaricious and unscrupulous and, in his relations with Francis I, he showed a marked failure to come to terms with reality.⁽⁷⁾ But for all this he was capable of loyalty and of considerable sacrifices in the imperial service. He was distinguished by his, 'liberalité,/'

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 423. This states that although there were 7,000 Spaniards on the pay-roll, only 5,000 were actually serving. There were 32 captains. For the lansquenets the official figure was one captain to 200 men.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 479.
 3. Ibid. 696.
 4. Ibid. 263, Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 78, 199.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 696.
 6. E.g. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 80.
 7. See, for example, his demand that his property should be declared sovereign, a demand which, 'est chose fort estrange come il s'ose ingerer a faire telles demandes que les propres enfans de France n'oseroient demander'. M. Champollion-Figeac, Captivité du roi Francois Ier (Paris 1847), 284-90.

'liberalità, astutia e animosità' and in his military capabilities.⁽¹⁾ With his soldiers, who admired his courage, for he was, like Giovanni de' Medici, never backward in courting danger, he was extremely popular.⁽²⁾ As a leader in battle he must have been impressive with his silver surtunic, his beard newly cut in the Spanish fashion as a compliment to his adopted country, and his yellow, black and white standard with its motto of 'Esperance, Esperance'.⁽³⁾ Despite Bourbon's unpopularity in Spain, Charles V thought highly of him, much too highly according to da Leyva, probably the most efficient and competent of Charles's servants in Italy; 'at times the Duke did many things, and might, if left alone, have done others, detrimental to the Imperial service; had it not been for (da Leyva's) opposition on many occasions, the Emperor's affairs in Italy might have been worse than they are now'.⁽⁴⁾

Da Leyva thought more highly of George Frundsberg,⁽⁵⁾ a man renowned for his great height and strength,⁽⁶⁾ who had been one of the principal creators of the lansquenets, had experience of warfare in Italy dating from 1499 and, a Lutheran of conviction,⁽⁷⁾ was trusted, feared and obeyed by his men in the most adverse circumstances. In the early months of 1527 Frundsberg alone was responsible for the high morale of the lansquenets on whose behalf he mortgaged his entire personal fortune.⁽⁸⁾ He proved to be an utterly loyal and devoted servant of the emperor and a capable and chivalrous soldier. He lost one son during the sack of Rome and saw another destroyed by wounds and disease in the campaign in Lombardy.⁽⁹⁾ But for all his loyalty to the imperial cause, Frundsberg/

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 186, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 255-6.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 240, Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 301-2 records a chorus of song of his army,
'Calla, Calla, Julio Cesar, Annibal y Scipion
Viva la fama de Bourbon'.
 3. Brantôme, Oeuvres, ii. 328-30.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 529.
 5. B. at Mündelheim, near Memmingen.
 6. Brantôme, Oeuvres, ii. 18.
 7. He is said to have told Luther at the Diet of Worms, 'Little monk, thou hast a fight before thee which we, whose trade is war, never faced the like of'. J.A. Froude, Lectures on the Council of Trent (London 1914), 53.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 649.
 9. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 753, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 423.

Fruntsberg must bear a heavy responsibility for the element of brutality and gratuitous cruelty in his army which the sack of Rome unleashed. He spoke constantly of his personal desire to murder the pope and of strangling each of the cardinals with a silk cord.⁽¹⁾ Nor was he the ideal subordinate; from the time of his arrival in Italy Fruntsberg believed that he had been cheated by Bourbon from whom he was expecting supplies. Bourbon had refused to extend any kind of help to the lansquenets and Fruntsberg retaliated by threatening Bourbon; if supplies and money were not forthcoming he would attack Bologna in order to satisfy his men.⁽²⁾ But, whatever difficulties he made, because he was one of the few men alive who could control an army of lansquenets, Bourbon could no more dispense with Fruntsberg than he could with Gian d'Urbina whose influence with the Spaniards was phenomenal. The Spanish soldiers loved and genuinely respected Urbina who was thus as essential as Fruntsberg when questions of discipline arose. A man often cruel and always arrogant, Urbina was still a brilliant soldier and a great favourite with the emperor.⁽³⁾ Del Guasto, who was a brave commander and an honourable servant of Charles V, suffers in comparison with Fruntsberg and Urbina, for although a brave commander, much loved by the army, he was never able to maintain discipline.⁽⁴⁾ Orange, who became famous for his liberality to and care of his men, had influence over the Spaniards, although the lansquenets found him unsympathetic. Tall, fair-haired and blue-eyed and known for his incurable love of gaming, in 1527 Orange was still only in his twenty-fifth year and appeared to have a brilliant career ahead of him. Like Bourbon, he had been alienated by Francis I, who had impolitic, if understandable, designs on his territories, and had been imprisoned when attempting to escape from France. Released under the terms of the Treaty of Madrid, Orange joined Bourbon in Italy. He was brave, although impatient, and took a personal part in every engagement, but he was capable of taking advice/

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 293, Brantôme, Oeuvres, ii. 19.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 451, 317.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 826, 131, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 96, Como in Milanese, Sacco, 490.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, xxxvii. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 3.

advice from fellow officers and of restraining his natural impulse towards action.⁽¹⁾ He had a highly developed sense of responsibility and of service to the imperial cause and made no personal gains from the sack of Rome.⁽²⁾

Not the least of Bourbon's difficulties was that his army was made up of two, if not three different armies and suffered greatly from internal stresses and jealousies. The difficulties faced by Charles V, in ruling an international empire, are nowhere seen more clearly than in this army, made up of Spanish, German and Italian troops, all essentially loyal to the emperor but representing totally different traditions. With each nation different problems arose, different settlements had to be made. In the Spanish army the most prominent captains were Alonso de Gayoso, Rodrigo da Ripalda,⁽³⁾ Vergara, Corradino, who conducted the defence of Cremona,⁽⁴⁾ G.B. Gattinara who was subsequently to become commissary general to the imperial army in Rome and the count of Giaro. The Italians were led by Fabrizio Maramaldo, Caiazzo, Federico Carafa, Marc Antonio Colonna, Luigi Culla, Federigo Cartala, and Ferrante Gonzaga, who joined the army on 28 February,⁽⁵⁾ an excellent officer, whose obvious talents led to a steady rise in his career, until he finally succeeded Orange as captain-general of the Imperial army.⁽⁶⁾

On 22 February, by-passing Piacenza, the army passed on to Firenzuola and Fidenza. Both places suffered at the hands of the soldiers, particularly at those of the anti-clerical lansquenets, who were using every opportunity for gratuitous sacrilege.⁽⁷⁾ Thereafter the army made rapid progress, at the rate of about 10 miles a day, until 3 March. No delays were made for bridges to be/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 241. Varchi remarks how hard it was for a man of his nature to resist risking the whole fortune of Naples on a single battle, Storia Fiorentina, i. 297, Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 288-9.
 2. Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 285.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 247.
 4. See above p. 48. He had previously served as a captain of the lansquenets in Milan. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 423.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 90-1.
 6. Giuseppe Salvioli, 'Nuovi Studii ... sul sacco di Rome', Arch. Ven. xvii. 14. Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 292, Nardi, Historie, 225.
 7. La Presa di Roma, 122, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1233, Modena Arch. Udidi Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a f.544.

be thrown across rivers which were forded.⁽¹⁾ On the morning of 1 March the army reached Ponte di Reno and, in the evening, Marsaglia where Bourbon sent to ask Ferrara to build a bridge over the Panaro at Finale.⁽²⁾ Up till now the armies had suffered no real supply problems, although there was always a shortage of bread, but it was generally believed that Bourbon's real problems would only begin once he had left the vicinity of Ferrara.⁽³⁾ The weather the next day was terrible and completely disorganised the armies. Many of the carts had to be abandoned in the mud. In the evening the troops had hardly advanced beyond the river Secchia and had to be most unsatisfactorily lodged.⁽⁴⁾ Bourbon, however, pressed on to Bastiglia⁽⁵⁾ and on 5-6 March crossed the Panaro, the old river boundary of the Church State, by bridges which had been prepared by Ferrara as requested.⁽⁶⁾ The crossing of the Panaro was the last major operation of the army for some time. From 5 until 8 March it was encamped at Buonporto⁽⁷⁾ and on 9 March halted at San Giovanni, a Bolognese fortress, twelve miles from that city. The citizens of Bologna are alleged to have proposed ransoming their city, but, before they were able to come to any agreement with Bourbon, his soldiers had swept through the contado burning and pillaging wherever they passed.⁽⁸⁾ A halt was called at San Giovanni since heavy rain and unseasonable snow made further progress impossible.⁽⁹⁾ During the delay important talks between Bourbon and Alfonso d'Este took place on the border between Modena and Ferrara. Although daily supplies came from Ferrara subsistence for a large part was from/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 88, Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a, ff.539, 542, 544.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 216-7, G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi Studii ... sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 17.
 3. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a ff.557-8.
 4. Ibid. f.561.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 218-9.
 6. Ibid. 245, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 88.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 45, 88, 130-1, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 117-8, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 227.
 8. S. Muzzi, Annali della Città di Bologna (Bologna 1844) vi. 215.
 9. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 134-5, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 291, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 95-107, Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 231. The weather was bad throughout March and April, e.g. Burigozzo, 'Cronaca', 466 and see below p. 196.

from the surrounding countryside.⁽¹⁾ The period was used for a reorganisation of the army in preparation for a swift march over the Appenines. Among the major problems was that of the camp-followers whose numbers were said to be not less than 25,000, 'che è una cosa di far stupir il mondo, il veder lo infinito numero di femine et altre bagaiarie'.⁽²⁾ Most of this vast additional army was ordered away although each company was allowed to keep three prostitutes.⁽³⁾ Seventy wounded were abandoned at Ferrara. For the coming march each five infantrymen were issued with a horse which was to carry five days supplies.⁽⁴⁾

It was probably on 13 March that Najera brought to camp 15,000 ducats which had been lent by Ferrarese bankers. This sum was distributed among Frundsberg's lansquenets who would not agree to any part of the sum going to the Spaniards. Immediately Bourbon was faced by a mutiny, begun by the Spaniards who believed they had been badly dealt with, but subsequently the lansquenets joined in. Bourbon was for a while in real danger and was forced into hiding in Frundsberg's quarters.⁽⁵⁾ The Spaniards took all the money that could be found in Bourbon's lodgings, which proved to be no more than 400 ducats,⁽⁶⁾ and, since it was apparent that the army would not be quieted except by cash, the army captains exerted themselves in trying to get as good terms as possible. Gian d'Urbina managed to persuade the Spanish troops to accept one ducat per head but the lansquenets would accept no less than one half-month's pay. Najera and del Vasto were therefore dispatched once more to Ferrara where they managed to raise a further loan of 12,000 ducats.⁽⁷⁾ They were back in camp on 15 March, when the money was divided equally between the two parts of the army, two ducats being given to each man.⁽⁸⁾ The following day there was another mutiny and the armies presented their own terms to their officers. The spokesmen declared that they would not/

1. Buonaparte in Milanesi, Sacco, 291, M. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 118.

2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 245.

3. Ibid. 266.

4. Ibid. 267.

5. Buonaparte in Milanesi, Sacco, 29, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 119
Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 131-2, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 293, Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.597, 598.

6. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 302.

7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 132, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 302.

8. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a f.600.

not move unless Bourbon would promise more money on account when the army was within sight of Florence and would pay all their arrears, a sum which would amount to about 150,000 ducats on 21 April.⁽¹⁾ Knowing that such an engagement would be impossible to fulfill Bourbon refused to make it. So hard did Frundsberg work to pacify the lansquenets that he was struck by a fit and it was feared that he would either die or be forced to remain at Ferrara. If this were to happen Najera reported; 'we shall not know how to deal with these Germans, he being the only man who has any influence over them'.⁽²⁾ Final pacification, according to Ferramosca, could only be reached by a promise of the commanders that the army might enjoy, 'la loix de Mahomet', that is the right to recoup their losses by plunder and sack.⁽³⁾

The council of war had decided, in the light of the impregnability of Bologna and the imminence of the Venetian forces, that an advance should be made towards Florence, with no halt, by way of Sasso.⁽⁴⁾ Bourbon addressed his men and informed them of this decision, emphasising still that an attack would be made on Florence.⁽⁵⁾

The agreement reached by Lannoy and Clement VII on 15 March should have halted Bourbon's advance but the pope had been fooled by the viceroy and Bourbon who were acting in collusion.⁽⁶⁾ The official imperial version maintains Lannoy's innocence; the viceroy in good faith sent his envoy, Cesare Ferramosca, with a bribe of 60,000 ducats made up by the pope, the Florentines and Lannoy himself with which to pay Bourbon's army to retreat.⁽⁷⁾ On 23 March Najera and del Guasto/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 132.
 2. Ibid. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 119.
 3. Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 231.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 130. Bologna was supposed to be untakeable, Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 13.
 5. La Presa di Roma, 122.
 6. This was the accepted contemporary viewpoint. The viceroy's reputation and by implication that of the emperor were only rescued by subsequent historians, beginning with Varchi.
 7. The sum is given specifically by Giberti in A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.107, see also Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 427, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 102-4.

Guasto who were at Ferrara heard of Ferramosca's arrival in camp and on 24 March returned themselves. All remaining troops in Ferrara were also ordered back to camp.⁽¹⁾

On 25 March Bourbon called a council of war where he ordered his officers to engage their men to return home in accordance with the terms of the truce and Ferramosca laboured, at some risk to himself, to persuade the men to accept the truce.⁽²⁾ First the Spaniards and then the lansquenets refused to go back, since, 'their common interest lies in an advance upon the Roman territory, as otherwise they will never be paid'.⁽³⁾

Most contemporaries suggest that Bourbon was disguising the truth when he told Ferramosca that he could not retreat. Venetian intelligence had even been informed of what would happen before the event⁽⁴⁾ and several contemporaries suggest that Bourbon had suborned his captains to arrange for a mutiny on this occasion and to demand an additional 90,000 ducats.⁽⁵⁾ Bourbon went out of his way to ensure that Clement was informed in detail about the mutiny.⁽⁶⁾ Lannoy and Bourbon had always realised that a truce with the pope was the only remaining way to raise money⁽⁷⁾ and this mutiny proved to be a highly profitable move; on the basis of the soldiers' disaffection Lannoy and Bourbon were able to raise from Florence an immediate payment of 80,000 ducats with the promise of an additional 70,000 in May.⁽⁸⁾

We must now consider the involvement of the viceroy with Bourbon in the/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 354.
 2. Ferramosca's own report is printed in Lanz, Correspondenz, i. 231. Ferramosca was not party to the secret agreement between Bourbon and Lannoy.
 3. Ibid. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 134.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 355, 'Questa ... non mi è stata nova, perche già prima havevamo per bona via che se haveva a risolvere per questo verso'.
 5. For the actual sum see A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.107, Vettori, Sommario, 375 and in Milanese, Sacco, 427, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 63.
 6. See his letter of 31 March 1527 printed in Schulz, Der Sacco di Roma, 173.
 7. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1292, 'Letters from Bourbon to the Viceroy have been intercepted, asking him to come to an agreement with the Pope as soon as possible, that he may the sooner send money'.
 8. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 429. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, gives the total figure as 100,000.

the following weeks for it tends to suggest that Lannoy who was famous for his diplomatic coups, closeness, secrecy and dissimulation⁽¹⁾, had never intended to abide by his agreement with the pope. After he had removed to Siena the Venetians were sent two reports dated 28 April and 1 May. It is obvious that, had he wished to, Lannoy could have used Siena to block Bourbon's advance south. But his demands to the city, as relayed to Venice, reveal him as fully identified with Bourbon's campaign and with the extension of imperial power in Italy. He asked the city of Siena for the use of all Siennese troops, both cavalry and infantry, for twenty pieces of artillery for the army, for supplies for the imperial camp and for billets for the imperial army in Siena and its contado. These demands were not altered but only reiterated by Bourbon on his arrival two days later. On 28 April the viceroy at Siena, 'ebbe avviso come il papa facea far gente et che non havea ancora accumulato numero, et se ne facea beffe de tal provisione'.⁽²⁾ A few days later the surviving documents clearly reveal Lannoy as the organiser of a plan of campaign which had been adapted rather than altered; a joint attack from the north and the south. Pompeo Colonna and Moncada informed the viceroy of the plan to capture Rome and it was on this information that Bourbon acted. It was arranged that Colonna and Moncada would reach Rome on 10 May. They urged Bourbon to leave his artillery at Siena since they would bring artillery with them.⁽³⁾ On the same evening the Colonna would arrange for a band of their supporters to march on Campo Marzio and by the cry of 'Colonna' it was hoped they would raise a riot during which Porta del Popolo would be opened to the armies. Cardinal dal Monte had promised his support and Pompeo Colonna asked to be kept hourly advised of the progress of the armies so that he could unite with Bourbon. Unfortunately Bourbon arrived at Rome four days early and, for practical reasons, was unable to wait for Colonna.⁽⁴⁾ Also, some of the detailed planning must have gone wrong at Rome for the Colonna fuorusciti were unable to gain permission to re-enter the city and details of the plot came to the notice of the Roman authorities, although they had no time/

1. Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 276.

2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 24-6.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 243.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 39-40 and see below p. 165-6, 174.

time for a thorough investigation.⁽¹⁾ But, throughout these vital days, Lannoy had sent on information about the movements of the Colonna and about the progress of the pope's defence measures, while pressing Siena to give Bourbon even more assistance.⁽²⁾ Lannoy's behaviour contrasts strongly with that of the members of the council of Naples who hampered Lannoy's activities and forced him to disguise his real intentions. The council refused to countenance any breach of the truce with the pope and tried to prevent the activities of the Colonna and of Moncada. It explicitly forbade the Colonna to go to Rome and refused to allow the Neapolitan army to be used in any undertaking.⁽³⁾

Clearly, in his Italian policy the emperor was coming into conflict with some of his most prominent Italian servants who found that their role as Italians interfered with their expected duties as imperial citizens. Of the Neapolitans the most prominent critic of the emperor was now del Guasto whose disaffection was public knowledge; 'el Marchese del Guasto è malcontento di Cesare per piu conti; et el modo del vivere suo è diverso da quello di chi l'ha allevato, perché fa professione di amico di Italiani'.⁽⁴⁾ But evidently Charles V had decided to dispense with Neapolitan advice for information from Spain revealed that Bourbon and Lannoy had total imperial support. On 12 May Navagero reported to Venice that the eight month truce was disapproved of both by the emperor and by his ministers; 'they censure the Viceroy to the utmost, and praise the Duke of Bourbon to the skies, solely because they think he will not keep it'. Charles took care to warn the nuncio that Bourbon would not observe the truce, 'a proof that he wishes him thus to do. The Emperor's confessor also says so much about this and speaks so strongly against the Pope, as to render it very evident that the truce and the peace desired by the Imperialists, so long as they have any hope of obtaining their ends, is to admit of no equals, choosing everybody to be subject to them, and themselves the masters of Italy and the world'.⁽⁵⁾

On 31 March Bourbon had explained to the pope, in a letter from San Giovanni, /

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1. 'Lettre de Guillaume du Bellay', 410.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 39-40.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 203, 243.
 4. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ix. 74.
 5. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 63-4.

Giovanni, that it was quite impossible to halt the army but that he hoped Clement, for his part, would observe the truce.⁽¹⁾ Six boat-loads of food and 200 oxen to pull the army carts had been dispatched from Ferrara. Although the animals were of inferior quality and rain and snow had turned the roads to mud⁽²⁾ Bourbon, on astrologers' advice, decided to advance, covering the seven miles from San Giovanni to the bridge over the Reno at the western boundary of Bologna.⁽³⁾ An unsuccessful attempt was made by papal troops to prevent the imperialists crossing the bridge and Bourbon spent the last night of March on the hill of San Luca overlooking the city.⁽⁴⁾ The weather had not improved and it was impossible to march either by Sasso and Prato or by the direct route to Florence over the Futa pass.⁽⁵⁾ Bourbon, therefore, took the easiest route down the Via Emilia into the Romagna where supplies were plentiful. In the Bolognese contado he left a wake of destruction; trees were cut down and more than 2,000 houses burnt.⁽⁶⁾ On 4 April Bourbon was at Castel San Pietro d'Emilia the border of Bolognese territory.⁽⁷⁾ The following day he skirted Imola, which had been reinforced by French troops from Bologna, and, a little beyond the city, set up camp on the Via Emilia.⁽⁸⁾ Leaving a trail of burning hamlets behind it⁽⁹⁾ the army fanned out into the countryside in search of supplies. From Imola Bourbon turned due north as if to attack the Veneto and on 7 April he lodged at Castel Guelfo di Bologna.⁽¹⁰⁾ Bourbon had intended to advance from here, to cross the Lamone and to attack Villafranca in the contado of Forlì but found the rivers which here intersect the terrain too swollen by the recent rains. And so he turned his attention to Cortignola, a well-fortified papal town, which had angered/

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1. Schulz, Der Sacco di Roma, 173-4. On the same day del Guasto wrote to congratulate the pope on the truce and to suggest a crusade.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 359, 463.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 130, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 106, G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 22.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 447.
 5. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 106.
 6. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.107v., Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 359, 329.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 451.
 8. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1357, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 436, 466.
 9. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 473, 478, 499.
 10. Ibid. 477.

angered the soldiers by first promising supplies and then refusing them.⁽¹⁾ After a brief assault Cortignola surrendered by agreement. The terms of the agreement were not kept and the castle was ransacked although many of the defenders, fearing reprisals from Urbino, deserted to the imperial service.⁽²⁾ The imperialists found less food than they had hoped for in Cortignola, but what there was was distributed freely through the army.⁽³⁾ Russi and Granarola were taken by force, while the army remained centred at Cortignola where Bourbon left a garrison of 200 and a Spanish governor.⁽⁴⁾ Henceforward the army's pace quickened; since Siena had promised to supply artillery as needed, the heavy artillery was also left at Cortignola,⁽⁵⁾ and Bourbon turned south. Crossing the Via Emilia, he brought the army to Meldola, a castle of Alberto da Carpi, close to Forlì.⁽⁶⁾ The damage done by the army was already estimated at 500,000 ducats;⁽⁷⁾ Meldola was taken and burnt and signs of the sack were still visible twenty years later.⁽⁸⁾ Civitella di Romagna, the next settlement up the valley, 'debole e piccolo castello della Chiesa' was taken by agreement and ransacked.⁽⁹⁾ Still climbing through the Appenines the army passed through Galatea, S. Sofia, a Florentine town, reached on 16 April, and S. Pietro in Bagno (17 April) ransacking and burning them all.⁽¹⁰⁾

Pieve San Stefano (18 April), which is situated only a few miles to the south of the point where the Tiber rises, was the first fortress to oppose Bourbon effectively.⁽¹¹⁾ Although it had been scantily provisioned and contained only 50 pounds of gunpowder, the town managed to repulse the lansquenets four times.⁽¹²⁾

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 502, 518.
 2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 127, G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 24.
 3. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 519.
 4. Ibid. 497, 502, 519.
 5. Ibid. 515, 519, 526, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 107.
 6. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 107.
 7. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1362. Damage to Campeggio's see of Bologna was estimated at 4,000 ducats.
 8. Guazzo, Historie, 55.
 9. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 107, La Presa di Roma, 124.
 10. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 109, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 127, Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 515, 529.
 11. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 109, La Presa di Roma, 129.
 12. Sanuto, Diarri, xliv. 555.

While encamped outside the town, Bourbon was joined by Lannoy who had suffered an eventful journey to camp.⁽¹⁾ He brought with him from the pope and Florence the promise of 150,000 ducats but the financial demands of the army had already risen to 240,000 ducats and would soon reach 300,000.⁽²⁾ Promising to obtain it Lannoy retired to Siena on 25 April.⁽³⁾

Bourbon now advanced towards Arezzo and did great damage to the Aretine contado⁽⁴⁾ but the following night the armies left towards Florence.⁽⁵⁾ By this time the soldiers were totally exhausted; for many days they had eaten nothing but grass. Bread and wine were unheard of luxuries.⁽⁶⁾ Meeting no opposition, the army crossed the plain of Arezzo through Montedoglio, Anghiari, Castiglione, Tabocchi and Tirina to Montevarchi (22 April). It was apparent that Florence was threatened as the army continued north to San Giovanni Valdarno. At Buonconvento the author of La Presa di Roma believed that Bourbon first revealed to the army his intention of capturing the pope.⁽⁷⁾

The League continued to believe that the attack would be on Florence, both closer and wealthier than Rome,⁽⁸⁾ but, on the day after the 'Tumulto del Venerdì',⁽⁹⁾ Bourbon, who had approached almost within sight of the city, realising that his hopes of entering it had been foiled by Urbino, turned aside to fulfil the second part of the imperial plan, the capture of Rome. At first Bourbon had some difficulty in persuading the Spaniards to follow him, but Gian d'Urbina quelled an incipient mutiny⁽¹⁰⁾ and, crossing the Arno, the army passed down the Val d'Ombra into the state of Siena. Here, Bourbon abandoned the carriages, heavy baggage, light artillery and remaining camp-followers.⁽¹¹⁾

There was constant rain which prevented the soldiers from travelling on/

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1. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 381-2 for an account with a list of sources, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 149.
 2. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 381-2.
 3. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium', f.90v.
 4. Catani, Ricordi, 222, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 302.
 5. Catani, Ricordi, 222, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 110.
 6. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 110, La Presa di Roma, 129, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 231, 556.
 7. La Presa di Roma, 130-132.
 8. Ibid. 133.
 9. See below p. 279.
 10. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 231-2.
 11. Vettori, Sommario, 378, 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 313.

on horseback⁽¹⁾ but this scarcely hampered the armies' progress down the old Via Cassia. From 27 April on the soldiers moved with incredible speed, averaging between 20 and 40 miles a day.⁽²⁾ No natural obstacle halted the advance; the river Paglia, swollen by late snowfalls and the heavy rain was forded, the soldiers clinging together in groups of 30 or 50 or onto the horses' tails and on 1 May the army had reached Acquapendente.⁽³⁾ Passing through Bolsena, the army reached Montefiascone which denied it entrance, was taken and sacked.⁽⁴⁾ Hoping to avoid any similar delay Orange sent ahead to Viterbo, then held in fee by the Knights of Jerusalem, to arrange a night's lodging for the army. This move was completely successful and on the night of 3 May the army lodged at Viterbo in great comfort⁽⁵⁾ although the imperial commanders were unable to prevent the massacre of the friars at the church of Madonna della Quercia 1½ miles to the north-east of the city.⁽⁶⁾ Ronciglione was also given over to the lansquenets and sacked.⁽⁷⁾

On 4 May, a Saturday, the imperialists made their first appearance in the Campagna. A few cavalry sent out from Rome to reconnoitre surprised some of the imperial light cavalry in the vanguard and took some ten prisoners.⁽⁸⁾ That night the army was at Isola Farnese only seven miles from Rome.⁽⁹⁾ The following night the officers lodged in Villa Madama with the army encamped in the fields close by between Porta San Spirito and Porta San Pancrazio.⁽¹⁰⁾ Bourbon had now to decide whether or not to launch an immediate attack; he was aware that Colonna who could open the city to him, or provide artillery, would not reach Rome for another five days.⁽¹¹⁾ Without Colonna the possibility of success seemed remote./

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 232.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 212, Burigozzo, 'Cronaca' 468, La Presa di Roma, 135, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 232.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 232, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 153-4, La Presa di Roma, 134.
 4. La Presa di Roma, 134.
 5. Guazzo, Historie, 66.
 6. La Presa di Roma, 134, Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. 505, 'Memorie perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I., xvi. pt.2, 313.
 7. La Presa di Roma, 134, Guazzo, Historie, 66, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 195.
 9. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 495.
 10. Ibid. 496, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95.
 11. Sanuto. Diarii. xlv. 39-40.

remote, but Bourbon had neither the money nor the supplies to permit him to wait that long and he feared the advancing League army. The fate of his armies, of the imperial cause in Italy, of the papacy and Rome hung in the balance while he made his decision.



CHAPTER VII

The Sack of Rome

'La ruina di questa desolatissima città'.

Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 235.

For those who believed in Divine Providence or in the capricious activities of the goddess Fortuna, it was clear that, in 1527, disaster was threatening Rome. Clement's patience had been tried by the arrival in Rome of the Siense fanatic, Brandano, clothed in sackcloth with a halter round his neck, a crucifix in one hand and a death's head in the other. Apart from prophesying the death of the pope and the destruction of Rome, Brandano, never one to mince words, spoke of Clement in the most scurrilous terms. Duly imprisoned, he continued to fortell the imminent doom of the city.⁽¹⁾ Ominous portents had not been lacking; a mule was said to have given birth in the Cancellaria, a part of the covered way between Castel Sant'Angelo and the Vatican fell down, a statue had broken spontaneously, and the host, reserved in the papal chapel on Good Friday, 1526, was found the following morning on the ground.⁽²⁾

Portents, however, are notoriously difficult to interpret before the event and it is difficult to believe that the thorough sack of Rome was anything other than a disastrous accident, arising from an attempt to gain political control of the pope. Militarily speaking the opportunity should never have arisen. It was rare for a town to be taken by assault.⁽³⁾ At Rome, it is true, the situation was unusual: the defences of the city were out of date and essentially medieval and the city wall was too long to be defended by the artillery of the papal armoury⁽⁴⁾ or to be adequately manned with the forces available.⁽⁵⁾ Yet, on this occasion, the enemy could only approach from the north bank of the Tiber, the breaching of a city-wall was uncommon and Bourbon had deliberately abandoned at Cortignola and Siena the artillery which, under normal circumstances, would have been essential.⁽⁶⁾ No-one believed the wall could be breached without artillery;/

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1. Brandano's bizarre career did not end with this imprisonment. After the sack of Rome he went to Spain on a pilgrimage to shrines of the Virgin and here managed to fall foul of the Inquisition. Back, in Siena, between 1550 and 1552 he ran a campaign against the building of the Spanish fortress, resorting in the end to direct action against the builders. He died during the siege of Siena in May 1554.
 2. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 174-7. For a description of the last event, written three days after it occurred, see Sanuto, Diarri, xli. 143.
 3. But Perez had thought that Rome would not be able to withstand the imperial troops. His confidence was not shared by the army itself. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 173.
 4. Ibid. 7.
 5. See above p. 120-1
 6. See above p. 162-3, 164

artillery; Bourbon expected to gain access by scaling it. If the city were not taken immediately a siege would be out of the question for it was known that the army was so ill-supplied that it could not have lasted two days without replenishment⁽¹⁾ and in two days the League army would have reached Rome. In the unlikely event of an army breaking into the Borgo or Trastevere the city bridges could be cut and the rest of Rome saved. Such considerations apart, had Bourbon survived, he would almost certainly have prevented the sack of the captured city. A sack meant the certain destruction of an army and for this reason all experienced military leaders went to extraordinary lengths to prevent sacks occurring.⁽²⁾

Of the Romans, few seem to have believed that Rome would be taken, though some of the prudent like Cardinal Como,⁽³⁾ Sadoletto and Filippo Strozzi left the city before Bourbon reached it.⁽⁴⁾ Clement who had refused to accept a suggestion made by Cardinal Farnese in January that he should leave Rome,⁽⁵⁾ publically declared his belief in the city's inviolability and posted guards at the gates to prevent a panic exodus.⁽⁶⁾ He would not even permit merchants to transfer their goods to a safer place.⁽⁷⁾ For the average Roman citizen it seemed that, in the unlikely event of Rome being taken, the situation would scarcely differ from that during the Colonna raid. Vettori reports that it was commonly said that if the imperialists did capture Rome then the emperor would come and take up his residence there and the Romans, 'dovere avere quelle medesimi comodità, onori e utili, che avevano del dominio de'preti'.⁽⁸⁾

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 156, 159, 163, 170. It had not been properly supplied since February. See above p. 156 seq.
 2. E.g. da Leyva's refusal to permit the sack of Milan in 1526, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v.25.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 168.
 4. Sadoletto left either on 16 or 17 April, R. Douglas, Jacopo Sadoletto, 52. Strozzi left on 4 May, 'con gran fatica', Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 128.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 633, 646.
 6. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 432, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 173.
 7. Some private citizens did ship goods to Ancona, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 173, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 173.
 8. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 435.

Some preparations towards the defence of Rome had been initiated in January, when Cardinals Orsini and Cesarini were given a special responsibility for the government of the city⁽¹⁾ and a survey was made of all available men, arms and supplies in Rome. At this time the Romans promised to raise 4,000 infantry at the expense of the commune. It was then intended to take away arms from imperial subjects living in Rome and to remove the doors from their houses. Plans were supposedly made for barricading the streets in the event of an attack although nothing came of this in May. An arrangement for wheat rationing was made.⁽²⁾ On 1 January Clement had paid tribute to the military abilities of Orazio Baglioni by releasing him from Castel Sant'Angelo in order to organise the defence of Rome in conjunction with Renzo da Ceri and Camillo Orsini⁽³⁾ but Renzo and Orazio were incapable of working well together.⁽⁴⁾ Clement was temporarily lulled into security by Lannoy's truce and by the negotiations which preceded it, and nothing could compensate for the lack of professional troops. For about a week before Bourbon's arrival, Clement was in consultation with the city of Rome. On 26 April he sent Cardinals Farnese, Orsini and Cesarini to ask for a gift of 60,000 ducats from the commune and threatened to leave Rome if it was not forthcoming.⁽⁵⁾ Within three days, the Roman citizens had agreed to this gift, but only on condition that their 60,000 ducats should be regarded as a third, the other two-thirds being made up by the prelates and courtiers.⁽⁶⁾ It is doubtful whether there was time for all of this to be collected although of the courtiers some at least made their contribution; Casale pawned his boat and all his jewels to pay it.⁽⁷⁾ As a last desperate measure, on 3 May Clement agreed to the simoniacal creation of six new cardinals.⁽⁸⁾

Probably on the same day, although the meeting may have taken place as late/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 42.
 2. Ibid. 12-13, Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 548, 700, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.34v.
 3. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.65, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 60.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 338.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 162.
 6. Ibid. 170.
 7. A. Lebey, Le Connétable de Bourbon (Paris 1904), 426 n.1.
 8. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95.

late as 4 May, Clement summoned the consiglio pubblico of Rome.⁽¹⁾ As an unusually large number chose to attend, the Palazzo dei Conservatori could not be used and the meeting took place in the church of Santa Maria d'Aracoeli, which adjoined the Capitol, and which had long represented the political centre of Rome.⁽²⁾ At this meeting Clement, through the medium of four of the cardinals, urged the people of Rome to defend themselves. It would only be necessary to maintain the defence for three days at the most, as the League army was so close. As a proof of his good intentions, Clement offered to leave the Borgo and the protection offered by Castel Sant'Angelo and to take up residence in Palazzo Venezia.⁽³⁾

The Roman people went away from this meeting determined to defend themselves.⁽⁴⁾ Alberini claims that subsequently they disobeyed the instructions of Renzo da Ceri. In this he differs from Guicciardini who implies that Renzo was negligent and largely responsible for the subsequent disaster.⁽⁵⁾ But Guicciardini had a low opinion of generals, apart from Gonsalvo, and Renzo da Ceri, although not a distinguished offensive soldier, lacked neither competence nor courage and had made a considerable name for himself in defensive warfare.⁽⁶⁾ He was prevented by the Roman populace from cutting the bridges across the Tiber, a move which probably would have saved Rome,⁽⁷⁾ and time was denied him in which to build the kind of defence works he knew how to use to advantage and which might have delayed the imperial armies indefinitely. All that he was able to do was to reinforce the weaker parts of the Leonine wall and to erect defensive works actually within the Vatican in the great court of the Belvedere.⁽⁸⁾ There is every/

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1. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95 implies that it was 4 May. See also D. Orano Sacco di Roma, 238 and for the consiglio pubblico see above p. 126.
 2. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 239. In the Middle Ages the Senate met there; it was there that Charles of Anjou convoked the Roman parliament; there the defence against Henry VII was organized; Cola di Rienzo held his meetings there.
 3. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 239-40, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 60.
 4. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 60.
 5. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 137-8.
 6. Son of Giovanni Orsini, in 1511 he had commanded the energetic defence of Treviso and in 1513-14, with less than 3,000 men he held Crema against the Spanish. During the imperial invasion of France he was largely responsible for the successful defence of Marseilles. E.I. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i.70.
 7. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 244-5.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 129-130.

every reason to believe that Renzo's work was considerably hampered by the Roman populace, who not only had their own ideas about the conduct of operations,⁽¹⁾ but were engaged in trying to come to a private agreement with Bourbon.⁽²⁾ The commune had been asked either to remove all arms from members of the Spanish colony or to expel them from Rome but this request was refused on the grounds that the commune was not at war with the emperor.⁽³⁾

According to the ancient ordinances of the city, in a time of crisis every caporione should have sounded the drum for the assembly of all able-bodied men. There should, therefore, have been thirteen companies ready for action. In fact only six made any appearance at all and the quality of these left much to be desired. Renzo was forced to raid the cardinal-palaces and impress artisans for troops to make up the numbers.⁽⁴⁾ For the nerve of the defence he had to rely on 4,000 infantry, 2,000 of the Swiss guard and about 2,000 of the bande nere who, somehow or other, had survived in Rome during the past two months, even, in some cases, resorting to selling their armour to support themselves.⁽⁵⁾ Since relations between the Swiss guard and the bande nere were so bad than in the past few weeks they had held an armed affray in which 20 people were killed, Renzo must have had some difficulty in using them as a combined fighting force.⁽⁶⁾

The aristocracy, the cardinals and the merchants were meanwhile competing with Renzo for troops of their own to guard their palaces. The Florentine merchant, Alessandro del Bene, raised 50, among them Benvenuto Cellini,⁽⁷⁾ Cardinal Cesarini 200⁽⁸⁾ and Cardinal Piccolomini 150.⁽⁹⁾ Since an attack by the Colonna/

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1. It was suggested that a sortie be made against the imperial camp, D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 246.
 2. Two separate sets of three ambassadors were elected to negotiate with Bourbon. The first were prevented by Renzo from leaving the city. It included Marco Antonio Altieri who was seized, tortured and later ransomed by his son for 300 ducats. The second had not even reached Trastevere when the enemy broke into the city. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 245 and n.1, D.B.I. under M.A. Altieri.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 174.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 129.
 5. P. Pecchai, Roma nel cinquecento, 425-6, Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 431, Gattinara in ibid. 499, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 91.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 137.
 7. Cellini, Life, 70.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 187.
 9. Ibid. 186.

Colonna was still expected, Renzo believed it was essential to man the whole length of the city wall and posted along it a motley collection of Roman citizens, monks and priests, although he warned the pope not to expect too much from an army of such a nature. Although Renzo subsequently brought round his infantry to instruct the new recruits in the art of defence many of them wandered away and abandoned their posts either to show off their new military trappings or because no-one had brought them any food.⁽¹⁾

In the disposition of his troops, given that he believed he must defend the whole city wall, Renzo had made the best of a difficult situation. His artillery was concentrated where it would be most effective and his troops were well distributed, the best being retained to defend the Borgo. The command of the wall was distributed thus; at Belvedere, Simone Tibaldi, a brave young Roman, and the Bolognese Gianbattista,⁽²⁾ between Porta San Spirito and Porta Posterula was Captain Lucantonio Tomassoni, a lieutenant of Giovanni de' Medici, who commanded the bande nere, with Captain Giulio of Ferrara in charge of the artillery and Sergeant Salvaloglio directing the battery.⁽³⁾ The two sculptors Lorenzo Lorenzotto and Raffaello da Montelupi acted as bombardiers. Also in command here were the Florentine, Niccolò and Giovanlione da Fano, caporione of Ponte, 'quel guerrier valente'.⁽⁴⁾ As reinforcements there were 1,000 men from Rione Parione under Cammillo Orsini and the ensign Cristoforo Bufalo.⁽⁵⁾ The Swiss were drawn up towards Porta Pertosa. In Trastevere, at Porta Aurelia, under Valerio and Gian Paolo Orsini⁽⁶⁾ were the captains Romano Corso, Mario Napoletano, Niccolò count of Tolentino, and some caporioni.⁽⁷⁾ At Porta Settimania were some caporioni with their troops and 200 gentlemen cavalry commanded by Giovanni Antonio Orsini, Giovanni Battista Savelli, Girolamo Mattei, Rannuccio Farnese, Pier Paolo Tebaldi, Paolo Santacroce, Fabio Petrucci, Giulio Valatti and Mariano Castellani. Orazio Baglioni had been given command of the defence of Trastevere but also had/

1. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 256-7.

2. La Presa di Roma, 142, Cornelius de Fine 'Diarium' f.95, Guazzo, Historie, 50.

3. La Presa di Roma, 142.

4. Ibid.

5. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 252.

6. Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.95v.

7. La Presa di Roma, 152.

had responsibility for the area between Ponte Molle and Campo Marzio with Antonio Santacroce and some caparioni. Some artillery in the Vatican was put in the charge of Stefano Colonna whose infantry was to defend the papal palace; other guns were placed on Monte San Spirito, the Via Giulia, the Sistine bridge, at S. Pietro in Montorio. There was also the heavy artillery of Castel Sant'Angelo.⁽¹⁾ Almost all of the artillery was able to cover the area of San Spirito. It is clear that, far from being negligent in his provisions for defence, Renzo da Ceri had made a realistic assessment of the weakness at San Spirito and was making reasonable efforts to prevent the enemy exploiting this weakness.

On 5 May Bourbon lodged his armies in the fields on Monte Mario, the highest of the Janiculum hills, to the north of Rome.⁽²⁾ Orange with his light cavalry and some infantry was lodged at Ponte Molle but it was impossible to cross the Tiber for the bridge was securely defended and when some of the lansquenets attempted to cross their vessel was sunk by Orazio Baglioni.⁽³⁾ Although, as a formality,⁽⁴⁾ a herald was sent to Renzo da Ceri demanding free passage through Rome to Naples and a ransom for the city of 300,000 ducats,⁽⁵⁾ Bourbon intended an immediate assault. After one or two skirmishes in which the imperialists suffered heavy losses from the artillery fire of Castel Sant'Angelo,⁽⁶⁾ Bourbon summoned his captains and urged on them the need for an attack. He was persuaded by them to defer the assault until the following day.⁽⁷⁾

Accordingly, at about midnight, having inspected the walls, Bourbon drew/

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1. La Presa di Roma, 143-4.
 2. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 138, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 156.
 3. La Presa di Roma, 136, Schulz, Der Sacco di Roma, 104.
 4. Protocol demanded that the first step of a commander whose forces appeared before a town was to send a formal summons for its surrender. M. Keen, The Laws of War in the Middle Ages (London 1965), 120.
 5. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 138, letter printed in Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. p.503, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 232, ed. John E. Longhurst, Alfonso de Valdes and the Sack of Rome (Albuquerque 1952), 57, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 196.
 6. 'Lettre de Guillaume du Bellay', 410.
 7. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 432.

drew up his army and gave the usual harangue.⁽¹⁾ The captains issued their battle orders and the troops began to construct wooden scaling ladders to use on the morrow.⁽²⁾ Bourbon spent the rest of the night reviewing his motley army.⁽³⁾ It was of an impressive size but badly equipped. There was no artillery nor supplies of any kind and most of the men were clothed or half-clothed in rags. At least one factor in the imperial success was to be the sheer desperation of the troops. Sigismondo della Torre, vividly described the situation, 'hessendo noi conduti in loco angustio et carestio, et havendo dinanzi un Tevere et una Roma, et intendendo che drieto calvachava un grosso exercito, si penso essere necessario tentare la fortuna'.⁽⁴⁾

In Rome the night was spent in terror, the defenders springing to the alert at every sound, for the possibility that the city might be taken by treachery was uppermost in everyone's mind.⁽⁵⁾

The attack began at about 4 a.m.⁽⁶⁾ with a battery of arquebus fire from both sides, lasting for about an hour, while the imperialists tried to place ladders against the walls.⁽⁷⁾ Sciarra Colonna, with one division of light cavalry and two squadrons of Italian infantry invested Ponte Molle.⁽⁸⁾ An assault under the overall command of Melchior Frumásberg was ordered at three points; the Belvedere, Porta Pertosa and between Porta Torrione and Porta San Spirito.⁽⁹⁾ The assault at the first two points was merely a feint to draw away the defenders from what was in effect the weakest point of the defence. At Porta S. Spirito, behind the vineyards of Cardinal Armellino, the walls were lower, as the Colonna had discovered in 1526, and there was a slight elevation from which to attack.⁽¹⁰⁾

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1. There are several versions: Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 432, Buonaparte in *ibid.* 320, La Presa di Roma, 139, Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 104.
 2. Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 104, A. Lebey, Le Connétable de Bourbon, (Paris 1904), 424.
 3. Guazzo, Historie, 66, Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 308.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 232.
 5. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 395, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium', f.96.
 6. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 138, Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 104.
 7. 'Lettre de Guillaume du Bellay', 410.
 8. Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 104.
 9. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 143, 185-6, 214, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 178, Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 433, D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 248-9, Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 104.
 10. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 180-1 and see above p.88

There was an additional weakness; part of the wall just here was formed by a small private house which, although camouflaged, had not been adequately strengthened. A gun-port of slightly larger diameter than was normal served as a window and there was another small aperture. It was at this point that the imperialists pressed their attack.⁽¹⁾ It was suggested at the time that Stefano Colonna, who was on guard at this point, had betrayed the weakness to the enemy.⁽²⁾ No other recorded incident in Stefano's career would lead one to suppose him capable of treachery, but the otherwise reliable Venetian report of 1 May stated that Pompeo Colonna had two nephews in Rome who were prepared to betray the city.⁽³⁾

Bourbon, who was easily picked out by his white surtunic, rode out in front of his troops.⁽⁴⁾ Making as little noise as possible the Spanish, as was usual, gave the assault,⁽⁵⁾ but the brunt of the main attack at S. Spirito was borne by the lansquenets and 300 lances under the command of Orange and Gonzaga. Here, as at the Belvedere the lansquenets were vigorously repelled. Old and frail as he was Cardinal Pucci remained constantly in the forefront encouraging the defenders. The imperialists were within range of the artillery of Castel Sant'Angelo and the Swiss guard made up the core of the defence.⁽⁶⁾ Here Captain Niccolò was killed by an arquebus shot. Immediately, his sergeant, Salvaloglio, summoned aid and was joined by Giovanlione da Fermo.⁽⁷⁾ In the fighting which followed the papal troops managed to capture five imperial banners which were sent to the Vatican, and the imperialists suffered considerable casualties.⁽⁸⁾

The imperial numerical superiority was beginning to tell however and Salvaloglio went in search of Renzo da Ceri who himself came to direct operations at S. Spirito.⁽⁹⁾ He directed Salvaloglio to go in search of reinforcements. When/

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 180-3.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 186.
 3. Ibid. 39. They are not named.
 4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 178.
 5. Ibid. 180, La Presa di Roma, 141.
 6. Vettori, Sommario, 379, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 185-6, 232.
 7. La Presa di Roma, 142.
 8. Ibid. 143, 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 396, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 214. Letter printed in Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. p.505.
 9. La Presa di Roma, 143.

When the sergeant returned it was to report that there were none available. Renzo therefore ordered him to instruct the gunners at Monte San Spirito to fire on the imperial flank.⁽¹⁾

Already, however, such a move had become futile; a thick fog rising from the marshes crippled the defence.⁽²⁾ From the imperial point of view the one disadvantage of an attack on S. Spirito had been that it was within range of the guns of Castel Sant'Angelo. These were now effectively silenced along with all the field artillery.⁽³⁾ The defenders were reduced to hurling rocks and stones from the walls onto the enemy, abusing them with such names as, 'Judei, perfidi, Marrani, Hispani, Luterani'.⁽⁴⁾

A lull in the fighting occurred while the imperial troops went in search of implements with which to tear down the wall.⁽⁵⁾ Then the fighting was renewed with even greater ferocity; Fabrizio Maramaldo is said to have killed deserters with his own hand.⁽⁶⁾ Immediately there followed what was to prove the major disaster of the day, the death of Bourbon. Had he lived it is possible that he would have been able to keep the army under control, have restricted its activities to normal pillaging and looting and not subjected Rome to the terrors of a sack. Many contemporaries, among them Gattinara and Salazar, believed so.⁽⁷⁾ As it was the army which broke into Rome was virtually leaderless. The excesses of the sack were caused by lack of control over the troops, a control which despite appearances, Bourbon had never lost. He had been able to prevent the army which habitually swore by 'the glorious sack of Florence',⁽⁸⁾ from attacking that town, and he had been able to permit the soldiers to live by pillaging and/

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1. La Presa di Roma, 144.
 2. For a discussion of the authorities which describe the fog see Pastor, Papacy, ix. 389 n.1.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 143, 186.
 4. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 397.
 5. Letter printed in Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. p.505.
 6. La Presa di Roma, 145.
 7. Ibid. 163, Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 515, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 196, La Presa e Lamento di Roma in Curiosita Letterarie (Bologna 1890) vol. 236, 363. See also the opinion of one of his soldiers some thirty years later that Bourbon would have prevented the worst excesses of the sack, 'car c'estoit un capitaine sage et advise politic, et avoit un'ame qui n'eust voulu recevoir aucun reproche, encor qu'il aimast le soldat et l'eust voulu contanter, mais selon le droit de guerre leur eust permis le sac pour deux ou trois jours'. Brantôme, Oeuvres, i. 321-2.
 8. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 17.

and looting on their way south without losing control or delaying the armies' progress.⁽¹⁾

His death occurred suddenly as he was leading forward the lansquenets and urging them to scale the wall. He was holding a ladder when he was shot down by an arquebus.⁽²⁾ His death became immediately known, both to the defenders who immediately began to cry, 'Victory',⁽³⁾ and to the imperial armies where the news caused widespread panic which was calmed, with difficulty, by Ferrante Gonzaga. After a temporary lull the fighting was resumed.⁽⁴⁾ Both the imperialists and the defenders fought bravely for about an hour but the imperial advantage of numbers made itself felt. As each party of attackers grew tired they were relieved so that the pressure of the attack never slackened,⁽⁵⁾ and the numbers involved were so great that the imperialists were able to pull down the wall with their bare hands.⁽⁶⁾ For the first time it was felt by the defenders that Rome might be lost.⁽⁷⁾

Between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. just as the fog was lifting the imperialists broke into Rome.⁽⁸⁾ Probably the Venetian witnesses were right in claiming that entry was made almost simultaneously at the three points of the original attack.⁽⁹⁾ L. Guicciardini records that a courageous band of Spaniards broke through the small house where the wall was certainly breached and that the lansquenets entered over the wall at S. Spirito.⁽¹⁰⁾ Another tradition records that entry was made through a breach in the walls of the Belvedere.⁽¹¹⁾

To all intents and purposes the defence collapsed as soon as the wall was breached. Although Renzo da Ceri and Orazio Baglioni tried to kill all deserters from the wall⁽¹²⁾ the Roman populace rushed immediately to their/

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1. See above p. 143-165.
 2. Letter printed in Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. p.505, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 184, Vettori, Sommario, 379. For details of Bourbon's death see Pastor, Papacy, ix. 391 n.1.
 3. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 258.
 4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 186, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 232.
 5. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 186.
 6. Vettori, Sommario, 379.
 7. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 187.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 91, xlvi. 130, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 212.
 9. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 214, xlvi. 130.
 10. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 187.
 11. An imperialist's version in Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 233. See also *ibid.* 91.
 12. Cellini, Life, 71.

their houses to fortify them, the majority crossing the Sistine bridge into Rome and abandoning the Borgo.⁽¹⁾ Many tried to escape by boat and were drowned.⁽²⁾ Some of the regular papal troops immediately joined the enemy but the Swiss guard and at least some of the Roman militia fought heroically against terrible odds. Of the company of Lucentonio Tommassoni not ten survived and he himself was twice wounded before being carried to safety in Castel Sant'Angelo. Giulio Ferrara was killed with all his company and the company of Antonio Santacroce was destroyed. Of the young students from Collegio Capranica, who had rushed to the walls to assist in the defence not one survived. The Swiss took up their position by the obelisk, then still standing not far from Campo Santo. There was considerable resistance but in the end these troops were annihilated.⁽³⁾ A few of the Guelf barons among them Giovanni Antonio Orsini, Giovanni Battista Savelli, Valerio Orsini, Ettore Troiano and Girolamo Mattei were successful in organising a defence force at the Sistine bridge. With the protection of the guns of Castel Sant'Angelo and 200 men, they were able to prevent the imperialists from crossing into Rome until they were put to flight by Orange.⁽⁴⁾ Montegiordano, which was Orsini territory, and Montefiore had been fired by the Spaniards and the flames could be seen all over Rome.⁽⁵⁾

Clement, meanwhile, had been attending mass and praying in the Vatican whence he was hustled as the enemy made their way into the city. As he fled along the covered way to Castel Sant'Angelo, accompanied by Cardinal Farnese, who was so infirm that he had to be assisted, and by Paolo Giovio he could see the battle raging below and was even fired at by the Spanish troops.⁽⁶⁾ Castel Sant'Angelo was virtually unsupplied and had to be rapidly provisioned from the nearby shops while the battle was going on.⁽⁷⁾ Crowds of people were trying to make/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 91, 165, 186, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 189, ed. L. Dorez 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 397.
 2. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 397.
 3. Ibid. 398, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 123, 167, La Presa di Roma, 147, letter printed in Pastor, Papacy, App. ix. p.505, Giovio, Vita Colonna, 91.
 4. La Presa di Roma, 150-2, Guazzo, Historie, 67.
 5. Guazzo, Historie, 67-8.
 6. Giovio, Vita Colonna, 191, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 195, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 131.
 7. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 190.

make their way into the castle which was already crowded with refugees and a garrison of some 350 soldiers.⁽¹⁾ It was with difficulty the drawbridge was raised and, even so, many continued to press forward and fell into the moat.⁽²⁾

The imperialists swept through the Leonine city, led by Gian d'Urbina, who ordered them to kill all who crossed their path;⁽³⁾ all the inmates of the Ospedale di Santo Spirito were killed, many of them being thrown into the Tiber still alive⁽⁴⁾ and so were the orphans of the Pieta.⁽⁵⁾ The inmates of the prisons, including that famous ecclesiastical bandit, the abbot of Farfa, escaped, and became part of the general confusion.⁽⁶⁾

The impetus of the attack pushed forward to Castel Sant'Angelo where many were cut down or pushed into the moat. Since the crowds were still too great for the portcullis to be lowered a few bands of Spaniards pushed through the crowds and, although under constant fire from the castle, rode as far as Tor di Nona where they were blocked by the Roman defences.⁽⁷⁾

The imperialists had captured some 20 pieces of artillery in the Borgo⁽⁸⁾ but they could not hope to occupy their position for long since the guns of Sant'Angelo were still trained on the army. In a council of war held in the palace of Cardinal Cornaro⁽⁹⁾ it was decided to transfer the attack to Trastevere./

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1. See below p. 198-9.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 131, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 190.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 195, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 131. In a city taken by storm, according to the law of war, no quarter was given, and almost any licence was condoned, although churches and churchmen were technically secure. M. Keen, The Laws of War in the Middle Ages (London 1965), 121-122.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 167, 186.
 5. *Ibid.* 167.
 6. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 398.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 131.
 8. *Ibid.* xlv. 233.
 9. *Ibid.* xlvi. 132.

Trastevere. Orange and Urbina had gone to great lengths to maintain control over their army which was still perfectly disciplined.⁽¹⁾ There had been no pillaging and all horses in the Borgo had been destroyed so that booty could not be carried away.⁽²⁾ Najera was dispatched to Trastevere to reconnoitre and ask the inhabitants to send an envoy to negotiate a surrender and ransom. Since no satisfactory answer was received an entry had to be made by force.⁽³⁾

Porta Aurelia was battered down while the Italian infantry, under Luigi Gonzaga, made their way through the vineyards to Porta Settimania.⁽⁴⁾ They broke through the wall, opened the gates and having rejoined the rest of the troops advanced on the Sistine bridge.⁽⁵⁾ An advance party of about 1,000 arquebuziers was sent ahead but excessive precautions were unnecessary since the bridge had been more or less abandoned.⁽⁶⁾ Between 11 o'clock and midnight the imperialists entered Rome.⁽⁷⁾

The imperialists reached Campo dei Fiori without incident. Although some plundering had begun the armies were still fairly controlled and took up positions; the lansquenets on Campo dei Fiori the Spaniards on Piazza Navona. The latter were the first to break away for booty but were swiftly followed by the lansquenets, 'qui andò in qua, qui in là dove li veniva più comodo per guadagnare'.⁽⁸⁾

It seems impossible to exaggerate the horrors of the sack which impressed every witness. For one who lived through it, 'l'inferno è piu bella cosa da veder'.⁽⁹⁾ The two things which most appalled contemporaries were the sacrilege committed and the excessive greed displayed. It is significant that in all the accounts of the sack there is not one mention of any act of pity or humanity/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 212.

2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 131.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 212. This is Najera's own account but I have found no other reference to this incident.

4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 197, Giovio, Vita Colonna, 191.

5. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 199, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 219, Vettori, Sommario, 380.

6. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 199, Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. p.505.

7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 91, 219, D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 261.

8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 145.

9. Ibid. 219.

humanity on the part of the imperialists other than that prisoners were sometimes able to beg ransom money from the armies.⁽¹⁾

In the first instance there was no end to the slaughter and it was only the consideration that profits might be made from ransome that persuaded the Spaniards to begin taking prisoners and to get the lansquenets to follow their example.⁽²⁾

It was initially supposed that the sack would be directed specifically against the French, the Guelfs and the Orsini, and that as in the previous year, imperialist supporters would be safe.⁽³⁾ As soon as the imperialists had broken into Rome, and at some personal risk, Gianpaolo Orsini, Renzo's son rode to the nunnery of S. Cosimato in Mica Aurea where his sister was a nun. His intention was to take her away to safety with the rest of his family, 'perche quelli nimici eran in particolare capitali nemici del sanghe Ursine'.⁽⁴⁾

In fact no-one's allegiance saved him. The lucky ones were those who had relatives or friends among the captains in the imperial armies. Such a one was the humanist poet, Tranquillo Mosso of Casalmaggiore, the former tutor of Pierluigi Farnese who protected his mentor's house with some of his own troops. A quarter of the rest of Farnese's company he had to use to prevent his own house being sacked. It was used as a store for booty.⁽⁵⁾ Apart from such lucky individuals none was immune or protected from the armies. Even Valdès reveals, that apart from the Spanish church of Santiago and the home of the imperial ambassador which was ransomed for 2,400 ducats,⁽⁶⁾ there was not a single major church or house in Rome that was not pillaged.⁽⁷⁾ Although a friend of the Colonna,/

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1. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 41.
 2. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 200.
 3. See above p. 86-90. Although some imperialists had suffered in September, 1526.
 4. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.57v.
 5. G. Drei, I Farnese. Grandezza e Decadenza di una dinastia italiana (Rome 1954), 13-14.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 196-7.
'Some Spaniards who took shelter in the embassy are now contributing towards the ransom but still Perez' share will be at least 600, which he is now trying to procure on bills as he has no money and is very poor'.
 7. Ed. John E. Longhurst, Alfonso de Valdès and the Sack of Rome, (Albuquerque 1952), 63.

Colonna, Marcantonio Casanova was unable to save himself from capture and death.⁽¹⁾

Some merchants and bankers seem to have preserved their property intact although it is not clear who they were. Since the lansquenets accepted bank-notes in lieu of cash it is obvious that there were bankers able to advance money in Rome even immediately after the sack.⁽²⁾ In particular, there is a suggestion that the German bankers of Rome were protected during the sack. Afterwards they advanced ransom money to friends and clients against adequate securities.⁽³⁾ Other buildings were ransomed but protection was never complete. Although the nunnery of S. Lorenzo was ransomed and had an imperial guard set over it, it was frequently menaced by bands of soldiers, usually drunk, who tried to break in. Eventually, even here, the pressure became too great and, on condition that no-one should be harmed, the nuns had to open the gates to a band of soldiers who claimed they were looking for secular property which had been left in the monastery for safe-keeping.⁽⁴⁾

Almost all the major palaces were sacked. The Cancellaria was the first but it was quickly followed by the cardinal-palaces on Campo dei Fiori.⁽⁵⁾ Here Cardinal del Monte's palace was burned down.⁽⁶⁾ A detachment of the army went immediately to the house of the ambassador of Portugal, the strongest fortress in Rome, where a number of merchants had stored property in the hope that it would not be attacked.⁽⁷⁾ A minor diplomatic battle was waged by the ambassador who, heroically proclaiming that he needed no protection other than the flag of the king of Portugal, refused to ransom himself or his palace. The palace was sacked, the ambassador captured and only rescued through the good offices of Gian d'Urbina.⁽⁸⁾ The total loss in the sack of the palace was/

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1. G.P. Valeriano, De litteratorum infelicitate, 66-67.
 2. E.g. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 478.
 3. Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 380.
 4. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 ff.60v.-61.
 5. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 472.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 99.
 7. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 472, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 197.
 8. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 473, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 133.

was estimated at 500,000 ducats, 'perche ere tenuto lo più sicuro palazzo di Roma e li erano quasi tutti li gentiluomini romani, et denari et robe sottile de mercanti, e tutti li pegni di pregio delli Giudei'.⁽¹⁾

For about a week the palaces of the Ghibelline cardinals stood untouched. Many had either taken refuge or deposited goods there for safe-keeping; nearly 600 were ransomed in dal Valle's palace.⁽²⁾ They came from all ranks of society though most notably from the Roman nobility and ecclesiastics, but there were also servants, prostitutes, one baker, a smith, three tailors, four lawyers, a surgeon, a herbalist and a bookseller.⁽³⁾ Eight Jews had also put either themselves or their property into dal Valle's safe-keeping.⁽⁴⁾ Protection both here and at the other Ghibelline palaces was purchased and Spanish captains were taken in to prevent an attack. Having observed the value of the property stored in each palace they immediately demanded a ransom of 100,000 ducats for each palace, but in the end, apart from separate compositions made by refugees within the palaces,⁽⁵⁾ Cesarino's was ransomed for 45,000 ducats, dal Valle's for 35,000, Enkevoirt's⁽⁶⁾ for 40,000 and Siena's for 35,000.⁽⁷⁾ The ransoms seem to have been paid by those within the palaces able to advance ready cash⁽⁸⁾ but the obligation to refund this was divided among the wealthiest refugees. Two hundred and ninety-two contributed at dal Valle's, the cardinal himself making the largest contribution of 7,000 ducats. The Count Venturi paid 1,200, Giovanni Daniel, Michel da Lante and Filippo Agnelli 1,000 each, Carjaval, Francesco Benci, Pietro Gentile and Pietro Lambert 800.⁽⁹⁾

Even these ransoms proved useless since the lansquenets demanded an equal/

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1. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 474.
 2. Arch. Cap. MS. Arm. tom. xiv. 7 ff.123v-131.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. E.g. the archbishop of Corfu in Cesarini's palace who paid 11,000 ducats, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 216.
 6. Wilhelm von Enkevoirt. Entered papal chancery under Julius II, scriptor apostolic and procurator for Charles V. He was a friend of Erasmus. In 1523 he was created cardinal.
 7. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 475-6.
 8. Arch. Cap. MS. Arm. tom. xiv. 7 ff.123v-131.
 9. Ibid. ff.134v-136. The same kind of agreement was made at Palazzo Sant'Apostoli where Sanga contributed 100 ducats. A.S.V. MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.126-126v.

equal sum which none of the cardinals could raise and their palaces were sacked while Siena was led out into the Borgo and was publically ransomed again for 5,000 ducats.⁽¹⁾ The loss of goods from the palaces of dal Valle and Cesarino was valued at 200,000 ducats each, that from Siena's and Enkevoirt's 150,000 ducats apiece.⁽²⁾

For some time it seemed that the palace of Sant'apostali would not be touched since Isabella Gonzaga was staying in it. She is said to have taken under her roof more than 2,000 refugees, including Sanga and his family.⁽³⁾ The palace had been turned into a small fortress with new defence works all round it.⁽⁴⁾ As soon as Rome was taken Alessandro Gonzaga rushed to the palace to save it, taking with him the Spaniard Don Alonso da Cordova. Cordova showed a greed no less insatiable than that of his compatriots in the army and immediately demanded a ransom of 100,000 ducats for the refugees in the palace.⁽⁵⁾ Bargaining over the exact sum went on for two days until two separate amounts of 40,000 ducats and 12,000 were agreed on.⁽⁶⁾ Of this, 20,000 went to Alessandro Gonzaga and 20,000 to Cordova, 2,000 went to pay of four of the lansquenets, while a rumour, current at the time, claimed that 10,000 went to Isabella's son, Ferrante.⁽⁷⁾ In addition, the Venetian ambassador, who had taken refuge with Isabella, having made an unsuccessful demand for diplomatic immunity, was ransomed for 5,000 ducats.⁽⁸⁾ Despite this composition, the palace was constantly threatened by the lansquenets and on two occasions Ferrante Gonzaga was forced to fetch Orange to use his authority to prevent the sack of the building.⁽⁹⁾ As it was, as soon as Isabella left for Ostia on 18 May, the palace was sacked.⁽¹⁰⁾

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1. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 477.
 2. Ibid. 479.
 3. Ibid. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.123v.
 4. 'murate tutte le porte con bastioni', Como in Milanese, Sacco, 479.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid. 481. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 185 gives 15,000 ducats not 12,000.
 7. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 480-1.
 8. Ibid. 481. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 215-6.
 9. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 482, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 166.
 10. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 183, 185, Como in Milanese, Sacco, 482.

Torture was common in order to gain knowledge of hidden treasure. Some, like Girolamo Camerino or the Florentine, Ansoldi, killed themselves, being unwilling to endure further torments.⁽¹⁾ One of the proposed new cardinals, Cuppis, who had changed 20,000 ducats into gold in order to purchase his elevation, was forced under torture to hand the money over to the Spaniards.⁽²⁾ A peculiarly touching letter written by Giorgio Borassi to his brothers in Venice records how the Spaniards had originally placed a ransom of 1,000 ducats on his head. After torturing him to no effect they realistically reduced the amount to 140 ducats which he begged his brothers to send, 'io ho perso tutto, ma di questo non mi curo. Io non voria morir si tosto'.⁽³⁾

For a large number of the imperial soldiers the sack became a religious vendetta. Luther had long predicted the destruction of Rome, and the Lutheran captains had continually reminded their troops of this fact.⁽⁴⁾ In Frundsberg's army there was a very large Lutheran element.⁽⁵⁾ Among these was the German veteran, Grunwald who proclaimed that he intended to eviscerate the pope that Luther might be justified and Clement punished for clouding the word of God with falsehood.⁽⁶⁾ Before the sack, Clement had spoken of these Lutheran soldiers optimistically, 'che per esser gl'inimici Luterani, Iddio haverli con senza misterio condotti nel principal luogo della sua santa Religione, per fargli un notabil esempio tagliare tutti a pezzi'.⁽⁷⁾ Valdés subsequently explained Bourbon's inability to halt the advance of his soldiers as the result of the strong Lutheran element in the armies, 'porque los alemanos esteran ya determinados de vengerse de Roma par el grande odio que le tenian'.⁽⁸⁾

Once inside Rome the Lutheran lansquenets ran riot; the Host was trampled/

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 224-5, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 192.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 19.
 3. Ibid. xlv. 237.
 4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 59, 166, 179.
 5. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.60, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 76. For Lutheran outrages in Milan see Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 418.
 6. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 46.
 7. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 171.
 8. Alfonso de Valdés, Dialogo de Mercurio y Caron (Madrid 1929), 76.

trampled underfoot; ⁽¹⁾ nunneries were violated; ⁽²⁾ monasteries, like the Minerva, were plundered. ⁽³⁾ At the monastery of S. Pietro in Vincula damage worth 30,000 ducats is recorded. ⁽⁴⁾ Churches, attractive to the looters because of their wealthy furnishings, and monasteries where many had taken sanctuary or left goods for protection, suffered particularly. ⁽⁵⁾ St. Peter's was turned into a stable for the cavalry ⁽⁶⁾ and the new church of the Florentines, San Giovanni, became a barracks. ⁽⁷⁾ Indeed the majority of religious buildings in Rome were desecrated in this manner being used for barracks, storehouses or stables. At S. Cosimato in Mica Aurea the oratory was used as a shambles and the cloister housed the animals before they were slaughtered. ⁽⁸⁾ Some of the most holy relics in Rome were used as targets by the arquebusiers, or destroyed, ⁽⁹⁾ and many more would have been lost had it not been for the piety of individual Romans who rescued them; ⁽¹⁰⁾ the head of John the Baptist from San Silvestro in Capite was preserved in an old urn. ⁽¹¹⁾

A priest was killed for refusing to communicate an ass ⁽¹²⁾ Cardinal Aracoeli was given a mock funeral and was borne through the streets in a coffin by the lansquenets. ⁽¹³⁾ A lansquenet is said to have fixed the spear that pierced the side of Christ to his own lance and to have ridden through the Borgo with it, 'con derisione'. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Rome had for so long been the centre of the Christian world/

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 202, MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 ff.59-59v.
 2. Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 365, MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 ff.55 seq.
 3. Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 365.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 166.
 5. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.122v.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 166.
 7. A fact mentioned in S. Muzzi, Annali della Citta di Bologna (Bologna 1844), vi.219.
 8. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.59.
 9. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.123, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 202.
 10. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 ff.59-59v, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 202.
 11. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 485.
 12. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 227.
 13. Ibid. 226, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 145 recounts his capture.
 14. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 192. For other incidents see ibid. 218, Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 185.

world that contemporaries recorded with shock that for over a month no mass was said in the city, that no bell or clock sounded⁽¹⁾ and that not one chalice survived in the city with which to say mass.⁽²⁾

Religious mania and desire for profit in the army redounded on the heads of the Ghibelline ecclesiastics; the fate of Siena has already been mentioned. Cardinal della Minerva, general of the Dominicans, was captured by the lansquenets and carried in triumph through Rome.⁽³⁾ The bishop of Potentia, a convinced imperialist, who had dressed up in full ecclesiastical regalia to greet the lansquenets with shouts of, 'Viva l'imperio, viva Colonna!' was cut down and killed.⁽⁴⁾

As the lansquenets and the Spaniards began to quarrel among themselves so the horrors of the sack increased. The Germans accused the Spaniards of breaking the Law of War.⁽⁵⁾ A Spanish company engaged in looting a shop tried to prevent a company of lansquenets from joining them. The Germans immediately burnt down the shop with all inside it.⁽⁶⁾ By 24 May the lansquenets and the Spaniards were attacking each others lodgings.⁽⁷⁾ Since it was impossible to come to any agreement over the sharing of profits, most people had to pay ransoms twice over, once to the lansquenets and once to the Spaniards;⁽⁸⁾ the Florentine Bernardo Bracci, having agreed to pay 7,000 ducats was forced to pay a second ransom of 5,000.⁽⁹⁾

Ransoms were set on every individual over the age of three whenever there was even the remotest possibility of getting the money.⁽¹⁰⁾ In every case they/

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1. Ed. John E. Longhurst, Alfonso de Valdés and the Sack of Rome, (Albuquerque 1952), 75.
 2. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 40, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 370.
 3. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 483.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 140.
 5. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 200.
 6. Ibid. 205-6.
 7. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 524.
 8. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 234.
 9. Ibid. 227.
 10. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 39.

they were extremely high particularly when one considers the difficulty of raising ready money. Cardinal Siena's brother first paid 5,000 ducats and was then tortured to force him to pay a further 5,000, 'et fu costretto per non aver denaro, darli una cedola di banco'.⁽¹⁾ Five thousand ducats was the normal amount asked for a high-place churchman but more was extorted when it could be obtained; Ponzetti paid 20,000 ducats,⁽²⁾ Cardinal de Trani 40,000,⁽³⁾ Giustinian paid 10,000 ducats while even secretaries to ambassadors were ransomed for 150 ducats each.⁽⁴⁾

While the wealthier members of the community do not appear to have had too much difficulty in raising money, for the middle-classes the effort was often ruinous. Giovan Battista Alberini was ransomed for a sum of 400 ducats. Before the sack he had certainly been worth much more than this in assets for he had been offered 2,000 ducats for a house in Rione S. Eustachio. He now had to sell the same house for only 200 ducats.⁽⁵⁾ This kind of malpractice, which was virtually forced on people by the situation arising from the sack, was extremely common and led to considerable administrative confusion. Clement VII later issued permission for contracts made during the sack to be rescinded and set up a commission of cardinals to try each case, but so many were pending before the court that in 1535 the Alberini family was still waiting for judgement.⁽⁶⁾

A market in benefices and offices sprang up under the pressure to raise ransom money. The scriptoria, with a usual market price of 3,000 ducats, sold for 700.⁽⁷⁾ In fact the price of offices dropped so low that of the 300,000 ducats-worth which fell into papal hands through deaths during the sack none could be realised. As far as benefices were concerned more than 30,000 ducats/

1. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 478.

2. Ibid. 483.

3. Ibid. 484.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 216.

5. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 85-87.

6. Ibid. 99, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 140.

7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 140, 297. The scriptoria was an office in the Cancellaria; the scrittori copied out the text of papal letters in the appropriate script (cancellaresca).

ducats worth is said to have passed into Spanish hands.⁽¹⁾ Subsequently Clement refused to recognise any of these dealings.

Those who could not pay their ransoms suffered severely. Christopher Macellio, a Venetian patrician, was captured and all his movable property was taken. Having nothing left with which to pay his ransom he was tied by the Spaniards to a tree-trunk, and had a finger-nail pulled out every day until he eventually died worn-out by pain, hunger, and exhaustion.⁽²⁾ The painter, Parmigiano, was compelled to execute a large number of drawings in lieu of the ransom he could not pay the lansquenets.⁽³⁾

By 9 May the army captains were making efforts to regain control over their troops. The League army was within a day's march and it was reasonable to assume that it would attack Rome, even allowing for the chronic caution of the duke of Urbino.⁽⁴⁾ Cardinal Como, writing from Civitavecchia was not correct in claiming that Orange had little success in restoring order, 'li soldatio dicevano che morto Borbone non avevano alcuno superiore'.⁽⁵⁾ Angelo Sanuto, also writing from Civitavecchia on 19 May, said that the sack had only lasted for three days.⁽⁶⁾ Probably the sack lasted for about a week with the army being brought under some kind of military discipline after three days.⁽⁷⁾ Orange had never been entirely without authority; he was able to stop the sack of Sant'Apostoli and of the Vatican Library.⁽⁸⁾ After five days he was able to mount a very heavy guard on Castel Sant'Angelo and to lodge the troops with some/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 140.
 2. G.P. Valeriano, De litteratorum infelicitate, 7. It has rarely been possible to check any of his accounts which seem, however, to be representative.
 3. Giorgio Vasari, Lives of the Painters, ed. Mrs. Jonathan Foster (London 1851), 363.
 4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 208.
 5. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 471, 489.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 218.
 7. Salazar says 9 or 10 days, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 196. See also Cola Colleine, a Roman from Trastevere, in Arch. Cap. MS. Arm. tom. xiv. 7 f.2.
 8. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 481-2, 485.

some semblance of order, the lansquenets in the Borgo and the Spaniards in the Banchi,⁽¹⁾ although on 12 May there was still no guard on the city-gates⁽²⁾ and on 19 May Gattinara wrote that each man was his own master.⁽³⁾

Orange's task was made harder by the inevitable pillagers who followed the army. They sacked and ransacked what the army had left, even the spice shops, 'con rompere et gettare tutte le scattole et vasi per terra in modo che non si troveria per dieci ducati un'oncia di spezeria per tutta Roma'.⁽⁴⁾

The first relief to the Roman populace was the arrival of Ascanio, Vespasiano and Pompeo Colonna with 8,000 men, on 10 May. Pompeo opened his palace to refugees among them the imperial cardinals⁽⁵⁾ and many nuns.⁽⁶⁾ He paid ransoms for many people, even for those who came from Guelf families.⁽⁷⁾ As soon as they entered Rome the Colonna troops joined in the general pillaging but Pompeo is said to have put a stop to it at the earliest opportunity.⁽⁸⁾ He seems, indeed, to have been genuinely moved not only by the fate of Rome but also by the plight of Clement and after being summoned by the pope and reconciled to him, Colonna laboured unceasingly for Clement's release and the freedom of Rome. Yet his hostility towards Clement had been displayed during the sack. He had burnt the papal vineyards at Ponte Milvio to which Clement was peculiarly attached,⁽⁹⁾ an action which Clement interpreted as repayment for his burning of the Colonna castles in the Campagna.⁽¹⁰⁾ Pompeo is also supposed to have been responsible for the burning of Villa Madama which Clement had had built on the north of Monte Mario while he was still a cardinal.⁽¹¹⁾

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 208 says after three days but the Venetian account says specifically that it was on 11 May. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 114, 132, 133.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 166, 168.
 3. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 504.
 4. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 477, 484.
 5. Ibid. 478, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 219, 339, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 199.
 6. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 485.
 7. According to the adulatory account in Giovio, Vita Colonna, 193.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 165, 167.
 9. His rare excursions outside Rome were to these vineyards, Albèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 127.
 10. Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 392.
 11. Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, iii. 14.

For a fortnight there was no effective civil government in Rome⁽¹⁾ but gradually some form of de facto organisation began to evolve. The army was lodged with the lansquenets in the Borgo and the Spaniards on the other side of the Tiber around Campo dei Fiori.⁽²⁾ The supreme executive body of the army was the army council which at the end of May consisted of Orange, Hesse, Captain Corradino, Ferrante Gonzaga, Najera, the German-born Lodovico da Lodrone, Gian d'Urbina, Pompeo and Vespasiano Colonna, Morone and Gattinara.⁽³⁾ As it was feared all civil officials would leave Rome the council elected La Mothe de Noyers civil governor of the city,⁽⁴⁾ and on 16 May lodged him in Como's palace in Campo dei Fiori.⁽⁵⁾ At the same time they created an imperial auditore di camera an office which it was essential should be revived if the administration in the city were to continue at all. Even during a conclave the auditore di camera had often to continue his work.⁽⁶⁾ On 19 May Gattinara wrote to the emperor asking for instructions about the government of Rome, 'e se in detta città ha da essere alcuna forma di sede apostolica o non'.⁽⁷⁾ By 20 May a guard of Italian soldiers had been stationed at Ponte Milvio and of lansquenets at Tor di Nona, but the army was still undisciplined.⁽⁸⁾ Despite all efforts by the imperial commanders the civil government of Rome was not to recover for over a year. In most of the public records of Rome at this period there is at least a nine-month lacuna.⁽⁹⁾ The responsibility for this breakdown in government was clearly the imperialists' since their suggestions for a permanent government of the city by the Colonna, were, in the circumstances, bizarre. They proved unacceptable to Clement, who, on being asked to appoint Pompeo Colonna papal/

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1. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 41.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 114, 132.
 3. Como in Milanesi, Sacco, 489.
 4. Gattinara in ibid. 518. The governor dealt with criminal cases in the city of Rome and was responsible for the maintenance of public order.
 5. Como in ibid. 489, Sanuto, Diarii xlv. 235.
 6. Como in Milanesi, Sacco, 489. It was essentially a legal office.
 7. Gattinara in ibid. 517.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 192.
 9. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 11.

papal legate in the city replied that, 'the Imperial army can do as they please, since they are the masters; he himself will neither authorise nor consent to such an arrangement'.⁽¹⁾

It is impossible to tell how many died in the sack. Contemporary guesses are wild and do not seem to be based on any accurate lists.⁽²⁾ A Spanish sapper, captured by the League, claimed that on the north bank of the Tiber alone he had buried 9,800 corpses and had thrown another 2,000 into the river.⁽³⁾ Ecclesiastics, curial officials and lawyers suffered proportionately high losses.⁽⁴⁾ Starvation and plague added to the toll. The final departure of the imperial army brought further loss of population and investment. Since they feared reprisals from the Roman populace, many from the Spanish and German nations left the city. In January Campeggio promised security to all foreigners in Rome but Perez noted that most Spaniards were still migrating to Naples and that he intended to follow them as soon as the last imperial soldier had left Rome.⁽⁵⁾ By this date the population of the city had been almost halved.⁽⁶⁾

The cultural life of Rome had been immeasurably harmed. Beautiful palaces like those of the Massimi or Cardinal Como⁽⁷⁾ were destroyed. Artistic monuments were attacked either for their religious significance or their pecuniary value. Paintings and church ornaments suffered particularly. Whole libraries were lost; Gieronimo Negro lost all his work,⁽⁸⁾ Accolti's famous collection was destroyed in its entirety as were those of Giraldi and Giles of Viterbo, the famous Augustinian preacher, who lost the manuscript of his, Historia xx saeculorum. The library of Angelo Colucci, so rich in Greek, Latin and Hebrew works, was dispersed.⁽⁹⁾ The Paduan scholar and professor of the Sapienza, Augusto/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 249.

2. E.g. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 166.

3. Ibid. 210.

4. See for example the list in ibid. 209-210.

5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 535.

6. From 60,000 to 32,000. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 228, 'Descriptio Urbis', 380, K.J. Beloch, Bevölkerungsgeschichte Italiens (Berlin 1965), ii. 9.

7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 166, 168.

8. Sadoleto, Letters, 195.

9. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 373-4. For Colucci's library see Francesco Flamini, Il Cinquecento, 102.

Augusto Valdo, saw his precious books and his work on Pliny used to light kitchen fires and never forgave the emperor. (1)

The records of the apostolic chamber were ransacked and considerable damage was done there. (2) Since the reign of Sixtus IV the archives had been located on the ground floor of the Vatican in the 'Secret Library'. Here were kept the records of the chamber, the papal registers and the most valuable books in the papal collection. The value of these last was well-known to Roman pillagers and many were stolen during the sack. (3) The imperialists took all books with valuable covers or else tore the books from their bindings. Among volumes to suffer in this way was Henry VIII's Assertio. (4) Even twenty years after the sack the Vatican library was still repurchasing volumes lost at the time. (5) In the archives much was totally destroyed, in particular financial documents, suffering from the wrath of the Roman populace with Armellino's fiscal measures and of the Lutheran soldiers with Peter's pence. (6) Clement himself, who subsequently testified to the losses, (7) referred to documents which were deliberately removed from the papal archives. (8) The search and sack would have extended further into the Vatican library had Orange not commissioned it as his wardrobe. (9) It was extended, however, to the private archives of the bankers. In the Banchi all the records were emptied into the street, 'et da castello se vedeva la strada de Banchi fino alla zecca coperta de scritte, che pareva fosse fiocato'. (10)

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1. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 374, G.P. Valeriano, De litteratorum infelicitate, 18. On the other hand Giovio's tale that much of his work was lost in the Sack of Rome seems to have been an invention, so that his work might logically be compared with that of Livy. P. Giovio, La Vita del Gran Capitano, ed. L. Domenichi (Bari 1931), 7, E.I.
 2. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 39, Como in Milanese, Sacco, 487, Delumeau, Rome, 689, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 137, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 200, 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 367.
 3. 'Le Sac de Rome.... de Jean Cave', 367.
 4. Ibid. 372.
 5. Ibid. 371-2.
 6. Ibid. 365-6. Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 23.
 7. Monaco, Camera Apostolica, 23.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 510, 512, 516. Clement claimed that some of the documents would have cleared him of imperial calumnies. See also, T. Pandolfi, 'Giovanni Matteo Giberti e l'ultima difesa della liberta d'Italia' in Arch. della R. Soc. Romana di Storia Patria, xxxiv. 181 for the loss of Alexander's correspondence.
 9. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 487-8.
 10. Sanuto, Diarii xlvi. 137, Como in Milanese, Sacco, 487-488.

The Sapienza was completely ruined. The artistic and intellectual circles of Rome lost many of their members. Benvenuto Cellini, Raffaello da Montelupo and Lorenzo Lotto found employment as gunners in Castel Sant'Angelo, and, according to Vasari, Baldassare Peruzzi, architect of the Farnesina, escaped death at the hands of the lansquenets by painting a portrait of Bourbon, but they were peculiarly lucky. The school of Raphael was completely broken up; the spirits of Vincenzio di San Gimignano and of his companion, Schizzone, were completely broken, the former returned to his native town and the latter died shortly afterwards. Polidoro fled from the city and his friend and colleague the painter Maturino, died of plague while Perino del Vaga and Giulio Clivio were tortured and robbed of all that they possessed. The Florentine painter, Gianbattista Rosso, was captured by the lansquenets and despoiled of his possessions, being used by them as a beast of burden until he managed to escape to Perugia. The painter, Parmigiano, barely escaped with his life and left the city for Bologna. Paolo Bombace, the eminent Greek scholar, master of Erasmus, friend of Aldo, secretary of Cardinal Pucci, was fleeing with his master to Castel Sant'Angelo as the imperialists broke into Rome, was overtaken and killed. Agostino Foglietta, one of the closest and most esteemed of the papal advisers, had been killed by an arquebus shot during the capture of Rome. The new and swiftly developing arts of engraving and intaglio suffered many losses; among those who lost everything in the sack was Raphael's Bolognese engraver, Marcantonio Rainaudi, who fled, empty-handed to his native city.⁽¹⁾

Rome was denuded of almost all movable wealth for, since there had been no fear of the city being captured, nothing had been properly concealed.⁽²⁾ Some hurried efforts had been made to hide valuables in sewers or wells or to transfer them to churches, monasteries, cardinal-palaces or the houses of Spaniards/

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1. Francesco Flamini, Il Cinquecento, 95, Muzzi, Annali della Città di Bologna (1884) vi. 220, Giorgio Vasari, Lives of the Painters, ed. Mrs. Jonathan Foster (London 1851), 109, 167, 300, 312, 363-4, 477, 505, Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 9, Renaudet, Erasme et l'Italie (Geneva 1954), 76.
 2. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 237-40.

Spaniards or Germans.⁽¹⁾ Pesaro reckoned that even property which had been hidden had generally been discovered. It was true that most of the big houses and palaces had secret hiding-places within them but the majority of these had only been installed during the panic following the Colonna raid. There were too many servants, carpenters, and builders who were willing to trade their knowledge of such secrets for their life, liberty or money.⁽²⁾ Treasure which was not hidden had often been entrusted to friars for safe-keeping but all of their monasteries were sacked.⁽³⁾ Contemporaries reckoned that between 7 and 12 million gold ducats were lost to the city.⁽⁴⁾

Hardly a house in Rome was left undamaged and the longer the occupation went on the worse such damage became.⁽⁵⁾ Large parts of the city were burnt down and many houses completely destroyed. The Vatican was almost completely gutted and in many places burnt.⁽⁶⁾ In the months that followed such houses as had survived the sack, both in Rome and in the surrounding countryside, were frequently ransacked and every combustible fitting, including beds and mattresses was seized for firewood.⁽⁷⁾ The Peruginese chronicler estimated that 13,600 houses had been destroyed not counting those which had been despoiled of their window and door frames.⁽⁸⁾

Trade had been brought to a standstill. Shops were emptied of their stocks which frequently were merely trampled underfoot. The only shops to survive the sack were three or four of the apothecaries which the imperial commanders had had shut up before the sack began. These were subsequently ransomed by their owners who inevitably made a great profit⁽⁹⁾ since of the 100-150 apothecaries/

1. 'Le Sac de Rome de Jean Cave', 393-4.

2. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 138, MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.580, G.P. Valeriano, De litteratorum infelicitate, 68.

3. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 138.

4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 237, Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 233.

5. Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 41.

6. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 90, 196, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 198.

7. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.580.

8. 'Ricordi della città di Perugia dal 1527 al 1550 di Cesare di Giovanello Bontempi' A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 326.

9. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 137.

apothecaries and herbalists in Rome only these survived.⁽¹⁾ All those who owned cattle, horses or sheep in Rome lost them, and this meant a loss of livelihood for the many herdsmen and shepherds who had been employed in the city.⁽²⁾

Plague followed almost immediately on the sack resulting directly from the administrative chaos into which the city had been plunged. Practically no sanitary arrangements were made in a city which suffered chronically from lack of a good water supply; the stench in the streets was unbearable; bodies lay about the streets unburied, heaped so high in places that they obstructed the road; cellars were full of corpses,⁽³⁾ graves had been opened in search of hidden treasure,⁽⁴⁾ drains and sewers lay uncovered as the hottest season of the year approached.⁽⁵⁾ Among the first victims of the plague was Antonio Gambarà.⁽⁶⁾ By 23 May four members of Bourbon's household were dead.⁽⁷⁾ By the beginning of June the epidemic was raging;⁽⁸⁾ five members of the Alberini family died within days of each other.⁽⁹⁾ At the end of June the death toll had mounted to 200 daily.⁽¹⁰⁾ It was not until October that the plague could be said to be over.⁽¹¹⁾

Resistance to disease had been lowered by the water and food shortage which, despite imports of grain from Naples, soon reached famine proportions. There was no wine to be had and water had to be rationed.⁽¹²⁾ There had been a shortage of grain from April onwards⁽¹³⁾ and the sack had totally dislocated the economic life of the city where every baker or artisan had been taken prisoner/

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1. These were presumably located in the Borgo, 'Descriptio Urbis' passim.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 138.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 198, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 168, 188, 235, 313, Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 52, Direptio Expugnatae Urbis, 42.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 198, F. Berni, Orlando Innamerato di Matteo M. Bojardo (Milan 1806), i. 273.
 5. There was also an unusual amount of rain, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 184, 283, xlvi. 141.
 6. Ibid. xlv. 235, Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 525.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 236.
 8. Ibid. 301.
 9. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 90.
 10. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 248.
 11. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 210.
 12. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.60.
 13. A.S.V. Fondo Pio n.53 f.112v. Grain cost 10 ducats the ruggio in April.

prisoner or disappeared.⁽¹⁾ Since the Church State was in disruption and the French still controlled the sea⁽²⁾ normal imports of wheat were interrupted and its price in Rome soon rose to between 30 and 40 ducats a ruggio.⁽³⁾ Bread cost a ducat a loaf, fowls when they could be had two ducats.⁽⁴⁾ The cavalry horses were being fed on grass and green corn.⁽⁵⁾ While the imperial soldiers considered driving the remainder of the Roman population out of the city to relieve the situation⁽⁶⁾ they sacked houses once more in search of food and wine. People took to hiding bread in the mattresses of those sick with plague.⁽⁷⁾ Even those who had paid ransoms did not escape the imperialists. Salazar remarked that it was hard having paid 2,500 ducats ransom that he should have his rooms searched at any moment.⁽⁸⁾ At the beginning of June he reported that the poor were dying in the streets of hunger.⁽⁹⁾ In December Alarcon spoke of the shortage of wheat; hardly any was reaching Rome except from Sicily. For this reason it was essential that Sicily be heavily defended against invasion.⁽¹⁰⁾ After the departure of the imperialists it became virtually impossible to import wheat. The Spanish garrison at Ostia either seized the cargo of all vessels entering the Tiber or charged prohibitive tolls while the piratical activities of Napoleone Orsini accounted for any boats which managed to get past the Spaniards.⁽¹¹⁾ Rome was not free of the threat of famine for several years; in the following August Clement had to import 25,000 loads of corn to Rome at a time when it was selling for more than 20 ducats the ruggio;⁽¹²⁾ in February 1529, despite fresh imports, grain still cost 16 ducats a ruggio,⁽¹³⁾ and as late as 1533 shortage was acute, 'il popolo che gridava et la matina nelle piazze si uccideva per lo pane'.⁽¹⁴⁾

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1. Letter quoted in D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 88.
 2. Andrea Doria still had control of Civitavecchia.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 301, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 239.
 4. Letter quoted in D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 88.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 239-40.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 301.
 7. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 297.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 242.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 481. For the famine see also ibid. 538.
 11. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii, 348-9 and see below p. 253
 12. Sanuto, Diarii, xlviii. 383, Alberi Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, p.262.
 13. Sanuto, Diarii, l. 14.
 14. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 410.

The billeting of troops was the worst hardship for they had to be supported from resources which were already depleted. Alberini describes how, when in September 1527 four soldiers were allocated to his house, he was forced to sell the remaining stock of family wine, his only remaining asset, in order to keep them.⁽¹⁾ More and more houses were deserted as citizens left Rome from fear of having troops billeted on them.⁽²⁾

In January 1528 Perez reported that the havoc wrought by these troops was so great, their continued occupation was so burdensome, that the whole of Rome would soon be reduced to ruins.⁽³⁾ It was certainly half-way towards this stage, an occupied city with no corporate life, no valid administration and no recognised justice. After the entry of the imperialists into Rome the pope, normally the head of the civic administration, had become totally cut off from the city, incarcerated in his fortress of Castel Sant'Angelo. This ancient building, originally built as a mausoleum by the Emperor Hadrian, had long been the principal fortress of Rome and had played an important part in the defence of the city, even at the time of the Gothic invasion. Throughout the Middle Ages the popes had used it as a fortress and as a prison but in the Renaissance it was much altered and developed as a papal residence. Alexander VI made extensive alterations. Under the direction of Antonio da Sangallo, the whole building was completely refortified in the new style with parapets and towers. It was surrounded by a wall and a ditch, the old Porta Aenea was closed up, and a new gate was built. A strong tower was added to command Ponte Sant'Angelo and the outworks of the castle were strengthened.⁽⁴⁾

In 1526 it had served Clement as a refuge, and now again he had managed to escape out of imperial hands into the virtually impregnable castle, along with many other distinguished refugees. Of the cardinals then in Rome all but dal Valle, Aracoeli, Cesarini, Minerva, Trani and Enkevoirt took refuge in the castle.⁽⁵⁾ Cardinal Pucci, who was running from Santo Spirito to the fortress, /

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1. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 92-3.
 2. Gal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 538.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Pastor, Papacy, vi. 168-9.
 5. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 190.

fortress, was trampled underfoot by the crowd and had to be hauled up into the castle through a window.⁽¹⁾ Cardinal Armellino, who had been burying the most important papal jewels in his garden when the imperialists broke into the city, had also to be hauled up in a basket.⁽²⁾ Giovan Tommaso Manfredi and Camillo Orsini climbed the wall into the castle but Camillo subsequently escaped through the Belvedere and made his way to Spoleto.⁽³⁾ Among other notables of importance to take refuge in Castel Sant'Angelo were Jacopo Salviati, Giberti, with his secretary Francesco Berni, Orazio Baglioni, Schomberg and Alberto Pio. But, as far as possible, shelter had been restricted for supplies were limited. Accommodation was found for about 950 including 350 soldiers. There were supplies of grain and wine for a month which could be supplemented by some salt-meat, horse and donkey meat and cheese. Quarters were extremely crowded and uncomfortable. The Venetians slept eight to a room with Cardinal Pisano, taking it in turn to do guard duty.⁽⁴⁾

The castle had always been well-provided with artillery and all the guns were still operational. There was at first a shortage of fine powder for the arquebuses but this deficiency was soon made good and as there was no lack of spirit among the picked troops who under the joint command of Orazio Baglioni and Renzo da Ceri were incarcerated with the papal court, there were daily sallies from the castle and the guns maintained a constant fire which kept the imperialists out of at least a third of the Borgo.⁽⁵⁾ Antonio da Santa Corce was put in charge of the guns.⁽⁶⁾

Some compensation for the discomfort and some relief of the tedium was given by the military and spiritual exercises in which the inmates of Castel Sant'Angelo participated. Francesco Pesaro remarked that the atmosphere was like a house of religion, 'ogni zorno se salmiza in castello, et se diceva litanie, et tutte le hore de di et la nocte continuamente doi legeva et psalmista'./

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1. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 190, Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 143.
 2. D.B.I. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 191.
 3. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 192, Francesco Sansovino, De gli Huomini Illustri di Casa Orsini (Venice 1565) i. 7.
 4. They did not have a change of clothes between them. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 132, Buonaparte in Milanese, Sacco, 393.
 5. La Presa di Roma, 155, Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 132.
 6. Cellini, Life, 71.

Clement and many of the cardinals celebrated mass frequently.⁽¹⁾

On the imperial side the siege of the castle was entrusted to Gian d'Urbina and his Spaniards. The siege-works, which were begun within a week, had to be built by the soldiers themselves since there were no engineers in the imperial camp and no money to hire new ones.⁽²⁾ The Spaniards worked hard, assisted by a few professionals whom the Colonna were able to provide, and on 27 May the castle was completely invested, the fortifications stretching from Porta S. Spirito to the Tiber.⁽³⁾ A bridge of boats on the Tiber replaced Ponte Sant'Angelo which was within range of the papal artillery.⁽⁴⁾ Six mines were begun against the castle of which only two had any chance of success and one of these was ruined by a countermine.⁽⁵⁾ None was allowed to pass the siege-works; Giovio, who was at this time with the pope, recalls an old woman who was captured while trying to bring a gift of lettuces to the pope, and was strangled in view of the castle.⁽⁶⁾ At considerable risk to those who carried them, messages did, however, pass out of the citadel and by one means or another some word was sent to the League camp every night.⁽⁷⁾

Although Rome was now in imperial hands and it seemed likely that before long the pope would be too, still the imperial captains had hoped for a better issue to events. Many questions remained unanswered; the army was still unpaid and even more uncontrolled than it had been during the preceding two years; Colonna's desires were unsatisfied; the League army was close enough to launch an assault at any moment, while the mind and will of the emperor far away in Spain were as unclear as ever.⁽⁸⁾ It was now becoming apparent that Clement was a positive embarrassment; were he to be removed from Castel Sant'Angelo either voluntarily or by force it was difficult to know what to do with him for if he left Rome a schism would almost certainly follow.⁽⁹⁾

Just as had been feared, the sack of Rome weakened the imperial army./

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 132.
 2. Ibid. 133, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 215-6.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 216, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 312.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 312.
 5. Ibid. xlvi. 134.
 6. Giovio, Vita Colonna, 192.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 133, xlv. 310.
 8. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 517.
 9. Ibid.

Gattinara, the commissar-general to the imperial army, reported that the army was useless, thinking of nothing but sack and destruction.⁽¹⁾ For months the imperial commanders would have to be involved in finding a solution which would both reimpose some control on the army and satisfy Clement VII. At first their efforts seemed merely to heighten the disagreement and disaffection in the armies. Mutinies by the Spanish, resentful that the bulk of the money to be extracted from Clement VII was to be handed over to the lansquenets,⁽²⁾ were an almost daily occurrence and on 18 May del Guasto and Lannoy had to flee the city from fear that reprisals would be taken against them.⁽³⁾

The officers in the army, where they exerted authority at all, did so only with difficulty and were hampered by the refusal of the armies to acknowledge one single commander as a successor to Bourbon. At the end of May the lansquenets were refusing to acknowledge the viceroy's authority while the Spaniards would take orders from none but Urbina.⁽⁴⁾ As the months passed and the troops remained unpaid, problems over discipline increased. The officers were soon so terrified of their own troops that they refused to share their quarters.⁽⁵⁾ Anxiously the imperial leaders waited for the army to break up, as stragglers made off to the Regno with their newly acquired wealth. By 19 May about 2,500 of the Spanish soldiers had deserted⁽⁶⁾ taking with them in chains any prisoner who had not yet redeemed himself.⁽⁷⁾ As the months passed desertions increased in frequency, especially from the unpaid lances who tended to descend on the Regno and live off the country.⁽⁸⁾

The sack of Rome had merely accentuated every problem of organisation with which the imperial commanders had had to contend since the occupation of Milan. Supplies and finance were still wanting. Food supplies in Rome were so bad that the soldiers inevitably went hungry and vented their rage in pillaging and/

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1. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 528.
 2. See below p. 204, 206.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 133, 166, 316, Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 523-4.
 4. Como in Milanese, Sacco, 489, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 316.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 410.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 183, 218, Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 504.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 131.
 8. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 504.

and looting throughout Rome. The treasury of Naples was exhausted⁽¹⁾ and Alarcon and Orange had no greater success than Bourbon in extracting money from Charles V. The army was still over-weighted, with too high a proportion of officers to men, and the senior officers lacked adequate imperial authority. The number of irregular profiteers who joined the army had, inevitably, increased after the sack. In December 1527 Alarcon mentioned all these problems and strongly advised the emperor to try to solve some of them. He urged Charles to give both the vicerealty and the command of the armies to the same person and to decrease the number of captains in the army. The lances should be reformed and their captains prevented from handing over their companies to civilians. The numbers of the Italian infantry should be frozen, 'because although the Spaniards are destructive enough, experience shows that 4,000 Italians waste more and destroy more in two months than 10,000 of any other nation in four'. Finally, Alarcon expressed himself with an almost religious intensity on the subject of arrears of pay. If money were not sent then the daily murders, violence and plunder would inevitably increase and, 'God will not permit that the Emperor's greatness and power be maintained by such wicked means, nor is it just that Christendom, having the remedy in its hands, tolerate it for any length of time'.⁽²⁾ Alarcon was peculiarly sensitive to the sufferings of the populace of Rome. He realised all the injustices which billeting involved and in September experimented with issuing the infantry with petty cash daily so that they might purchase rather than steal food,⁽³⁾ but anything done in this line could only be a stop-gap measure. The imperative need was to get the imperial army out of Rome.

Negotiations with Clement VII began almost as soon as the imperialists entered Rome and went on for months, the most prominent participants for the imperialists being Pompeo Colonna and Morone. On 7 May Schomberg wrote in the pope's name, requesting that either Bartolomeo Gattinara or Najera, accompanied by an officer from the imperial army, should go to the castle to treat.⁽⁴⁾ On the same day Gattinara visited Clement to make known to him the demands of the armies/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 301, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 504.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 479-481.
 3. Ibid. 391-2.
 4. Ibid. 213.

armies and for the next four days he acted as go-between. On the papal side negotiations were carried on by the pope and his immediate advisers and by representatives of the four classes incarcerated in Castel Sant'Angelo, Giberti, on behalf of the prelates, Alberto Pio for the ambassadors, Casale, a Roman by birth, for the citizens and Giuliano Leno for the merchants and artisans.⁽¹⁾ Although the imperialists began by demanding that Clement and his court should go to Spain or the Regno negotiations were principally financial. Since the imperial soldiery did not want Clement freed before the payment of their arrears, about 300,000 ducats, and since Clement at first claimed that he could raise no more than 10,000 ducats, even after selling everything in Castel Sant'Angelo, the discussions seemed unprofitable.⁽²⁾ During the following weeks the substance of the imperial demand was unchanged; Clement must pay 300,000 ducats and go either to the Regno or Spain. Both sides were waiting on events. Clement wished to see what the League would do on his behalf,⁽³⁾ the imperialists were waiting for instructions or money from Spain.

Agreement was approached on 17 May. Clement was to pay 100,000 ducats immediately, 50,000 within twenty days and 50,000 within a month. As security he was to hand over nine hostages and the vital fortresses of Piacenza, Parma, Modena, Civitavecchia, Ostia and Castel Sant'Angelo.⁽⁴⁾ The money was to be raised on loans from bankers against the security of a promised tax on the Church State, which was to raise 200,000 ducats.⁽⁵⁾ The lansquenets were induced to accept this agreement by Orange's promise that they would be paid the rest of their arrears within a month and that if they were not Parma and Piacenza would be handed over to them in pawn.⁽⁶⁾

On 20 May Gattinara, Najera, and Vespasiano Colonna went to Castel Sant'Angelo, hoping to have the capitulation signed, but as Clement could not raise sufficient funds, four more days passed negotiating and obtaining security from bankers.⁽⁷⁾ On 24 May Clement, who had encouraging news of the League movements,

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 226.
 2. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 505-8, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 143.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 214.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 234.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 210, Delumeau, Rome, 760.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 235, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 213.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 213.

movements, with the consent of a majority of cardinals,⁽¹⁾ asked for a six-day term within which he might not be bound to the agreement if help came to him.⁽²⁾ Although this type of agreement was very common the army council refused Clement's request.

The imperialists, having also heard of the League army's advance, increased their efforts to shut off Castel Sant'Angelo. Only self-interest prompted the soldiers to do this; they had no intention of losing Clement's ransom money. To complete their preparations a messenger was sent to the council of Naples asking for reinforcements, provisions and guns with which to bombard Castel Sant'Angelo.⁽³⁾

On 28 May Lannoy reached Rome whither he had been summoned by Najera, against the wishes of Orange.⁽⁴⁾ The army distrusted him and refused to accept his authority while he showed a marked reluctance to get embroiled with the soldiers or to assist their commanders. Annoyed that Orange was exercising the powers of commander-in-chief without authority from the emperor he made no alternative suggestion about the command.⁽⁵⁾ With such an obstructive attitude he was unable to solve even one of the problems facing the imperial commanders and, on 6 June, left the city, ostensibly because of a mutiny by the Spanish infantry, who suspected him of favouring the lansquenets. He retired to the Colonna castle of Città Lavinia, eighteen miles from Rome⁽⁶⁾ whence he was continually urged to return by Alarcon, Moncada and Najera.⁽⁷⁾

A supposedly final agreement with Clement VII was signed by the imperial commanders on 6 June and Alarcon, with three companies of Spanish infantry and three of lansquenets, took possession of Castel Sant'Angelo on the following day. The papal garrison left, and those remaining with the pope retired to the keep of the fortress.⁽⁸⁾ The households of the pope and the cardinals were substantially/

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1. It was opposed by Campeggio, Accolti, de Cessis and Rangoni.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 214-5.
 3. Ibid. 215.
 4. Ibid. 226-7, 233.
 5. Ibid. 233.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 233, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 197, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 314, 316.
 7. E.g. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 247.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 282, xlvi. 135.

substantially reduced; Clement retained ten servants and the cardinals four amongst them all.⁽¹⁾ The terms of the agreement were similar to those of 17 May; Castel Sant'Angelo with its armaments, Ostia, Civitavecchia, Civita Castellana, Piacenza, Parma and Modena were to be surrendered. Clement's ransom and that of all those in Castel Sant'Angelo with him, was set at 400,000 ducats, 80,000 to be paid immediately, half in cash and half in plate, 20,000 within six days, 150,000 within 20 days to be raised from Genoese bankers against the security of the tithes of the Regno, and the remainder to be collected with the assistance of the imperial army from the promised tax on the Church State, excluding the Campagna. As a security for this sum Clement handed over the hostages, Cardinal Dal Monte, Cardinal Pucci, the archbishop of Pisa, Giberti, Jacopo Salviati, Lorenzo Ridolfi and Simone da Ricasoli, probably chosen for their relationships with wealthy Florentine financiers. Clement agreed to restore the Colonna to their possessions, to reinstate Cardinal Colonna and to remove all ecclesiastical censures from the imperial armies.⁽²⁾

Difficulties were immediately encountered about the first two payments of the ransom. Even after melting down all the movable silver ornaments in the castle, both his own and the cardinals, and sending for the famous treasure of Loretto, Clement still had to sell off church property and to raise an expensive loan, paying interest at 25%, from Genoese bankers,⁽³⁾ against the security of Benevento and the tithes of the Regno. On 6 July he raised a loan with Grimaldi and Sanchez which was to cause him considerable subsequent embarrassment. After the pope's flight from Castel Sant'Angelo the two bankers sued him in court, fearing that he would default on the repayment of the loan.⁽⁴⁾

Other provisions of the agreement could not be carried out. Of the fortresses promised as security, Civita Castellana was held by the League, Doria, who was still holding Civitavecchia, refused to surrender it unless he was paid 15,000 ducats still owing on his condotta from the pope, and Parma and Piacenza refused to surrender to the imperialists.⁽⁵⁾

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 390.

2. Ibid. 317, Arch. Cap. MS. Arm. xiv. tom. 7, ff.116-119, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 231-3.

3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 198, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 251, Delumeau, Rome, 760.

4. P. Pecchai, Roma nel cinquecento, 41-2.

5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 316, Omont, Suites du Sac de Roma, 18, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 147-8.

The behaviour of the imperial troops had shown no marked improvement as a result of Clement's capitulation. Indeed, on the very evening the agreement was signed the Spanish troops mutinied.⁽¹⁾ From plate extracted from Castel Sant'Angelo money was hastily coined with which to pay the troops and so get them out of starving Rome.⁽²⁾ The original 80,000 ducats had been paid by Clement and handed over to the lansquenets but, on 23 June, he still could not produce the additional 20,000, which were to have been paid by 12 June, and which would also have been handed over to the lansquenets. Clement was trying to coin money from his remaining silver ornaments and had, in the meantime, dispatched Schomberg to Naples, to try to borrow both this sum against the pope's security and an additional 50,000 ducats which were to be handed to the Spaniards, restless that the lansquenets were being so obviously favoured.⁽³⁾ In the last week of June bills of exchange for 100,000 ducats arrived from Spain for the imperial commanders⁽⁴⁾ but, on 15 August, Clement had still paid no more than the first instalment of his ransom.⁽⁵⁾

Partially satisfied by this and by the money from Spain, to the undisguised joy of the Romans the imperial army left Rome on 10 July, leaving behind only 2,000 troops to guard the city and Castel Sant'Angelo. Two days later Cardinal Farnese, who had managed to obtain a safe-conduct from the imperial commanders, left the castle and went to join the free cardinals in the Romagna.⁽⁶⁾ On 25 September, however, the imperial troops began to return, first the lansquenets and then, three days later, the Spaniards, clamouring for the payment of the **fest** of their arrears. Morone and Del Guasto tried to intervene, engaging to give the lansquenets two and a half months of their arrears.⁽⁷⁾ Many of the populace again fled from the city but the troops returned quietly enough to their lodgings.⁽⁸⁾ The cavalry were always more amenable/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 242.
 2. Ibid. 244.
 3. Ibid. 248.
 4. Ibid. 253.
 5. Ibid. 322.
 6. M. Drei, I Farnese, Grandezza e decadenza di una dinastia italiana (Rome 1954), 14 and see below p. 244-5
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 397.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 186, 222-3, Arch. Cap. MS. Arm. xiv. tom. 7 f.2.

amenable to discipline than the infantry and the lances were persuaded to retire once more from Rome to Nepi and Sutri.⁽¹⁾

The infantry continued to concentrate their efforts on extracting the maximum amount from Clement and from their own superiors. The army was now in a terrible state. It had been dramatically weakened by deaths and desertions; there were only 6,500 lansquenets and 2,500 Spaniards in Rome. The Spaniards, in particular, were deserting in large numbers to the Regno where, despite efforts to prevent them leaving Italy, they were taking ship for Spain.⁽²⁾ As early as June the Venetians had captured a caraval bound from Ancona to Ferrara with thirteen Spanish soldiers on board who were leaving with their booty which included eight valuable horses.⁽³⁾ On 7 November 400 Spaniards left Rome together.⁽⁴⁾

At the beginning of October, money sent from Naples as del Guasto and Morone had promised, paid two months' arrears of the lansquenets.⁽⁵⁾ But the morale of the army remained very low and discipline, particularly among the lansquenets, was practically non-existent. Alarcon, whose ungrateful task it had been all these months to mediate between Clement and the common soldiers, was totally dispirited. On 22 October he decided to address his Spaniards. In a tone of deep moral indignation he urged them to come to some agreement about the pope's release and reminded them that, 'essendo Christiani quanto de ignominia li era a tenir un Papa pregione essendo vassalli de lo Imperatore, quanto carico gli torneva adosso a tenerelo contra la mente et ordine del suo signore et essendo soldati di Sua Maestà, condotti per conservar et agrandir le cose di quella, quanto gli preiudicavano et già gli haveano preiudicato, col perder tempo in questa città'.⁽⁶⁾ He further reminded them of the plague and of the other disasters which had befallen members of the army, all of which he attributed to divine justice as a punishment for the sack of Rome.⁽⁷⁾ With the/

1. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 223.

2. Ibid. 300.

3. Ibid. xlv. 412.

4. Ibid. xlvi. 317.

5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 422. This is presumably the money to which Perez referred on 23 October, *ibid.* 429.

6. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 296-7.

7. Ibid.

the Spaniards, who left Rome for lodgings outside the city on the Viterbo road,⁽¹⁾ he had considerable success but the lansquenets still refused to leave Rome.⁽²⁾ Pompeo Colonna, who was now the only person with any remaining influence over the lansquenets was promising them another pay to be raised by Clement from among his servants and ministers, and it was hoped that with this the promise of comfortable quarters at Viterbo where they could forage for themselves and the provision of an adequate artillery force they could be induced to quit Rome. The need was great for the abbot of Farfa's raids on Spanish personnel were becoming more outrageous every day.⁽³⁾ On 19 October a council of war, consisting of Colonna, Quinones, Alarcon, de Veyre and Morone with all the captains of the cavalry and foot, had decided that a punitive expedition should be launched against him without delay and that the army would then go on to pursue the armies of the League.⁽⁴⁾

The chief financial difficulty was the 250,000 ducats still owing on Clement's ransom. The bankers would lend no more and it was obvious that there was little hope of raising so vast a sum from the Church State, unless Clement was granted his liberty.

Not until 26 November did Clement agree to fresh capitulations. Clement now had some money, raised by creating eight new cardinals.⁽⁵⁾ The agreements, which had the authority of the emperor, freely admitted that while the captains of the imperial army were anxious to release Clement their troops were not and would not be so until they had been paid their full arrears. The emperor declared himself as willing to have the pope restored to his full spiritual and temporal power and both parties expressed a desire for a general peace to be followed by a council of the church and a war against the Turk. Clement again engaged to hand over the security fortresses and hostages to the lansquenets. He/

1. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 280, 293.

2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 429.

3. Ibid. 429.

4. Ibid. 427-8.

5. They were Antonio Sanseverino, Giovanni Carafi, Andrea Matteo Palmieri, Antoine du Prat, Henry Cardona, Gieronimo Grimaldi, Piero Gonzaga, and Sigismondo Pappagoda.

He promised to pay 73,000 scudi in gold and 169,000 in other money within ten days at the end of which he would be released and Castel Sant'Angelo restored to him. He would then pay immediately 35,000 scudi and the army would leave Rome and never return. A fortnight later Clement would pay 44,984 for three months, thereafter 50,000 scudi a month and during the following three months a total of 65,000 ducats. In order to raise money the pope undertook to sell to the soldiers one-tenth of the ecclesiastical property of Naples, the profits of the sale being divided between pope and emperor. The imperialists were confirmed in all the property they had acquired since the sack and it was guaranteed that no reprisals would be taken against them. ⁽¹⁾

Despite the promises made by Cardinal Colonna to the lansquenets they still showed no signs of leaving Rome when, on 1 December, Perez informed the emperor that they refused to leave Rome unless they were paid in full. ⁽²⁾ The behaviour of the lansquenets had deteriorated after the papal hostages escaped out of their clutches on 30 November. Fresh conferences with the pope were immediately initiated and yet another agreement was signed; within two weeks Clement would pay the lansquenets 110,000 ducats and the Spaniards 35,000. ⁽³⁾ The two cardinals (Orsini and de Cessis) already in Pompeo Colonna's palace would remain there in his custody and a third would join them to take the place of Giberti and Jacopo Salviati who had fled from Rome. Before being given back Castel Sant'Angelo Clement was to place three more cardinals in the hands of Colonna and Alarcon. ⁽⁴⁾

Although cardinals Pisani, Trivulzio and Gaddi were duly handed over to Alarcon and subsequently taken to Naples where they were imprisoned in Castelnuovo, ⁽⁵⁾ the agreement ran into difficulties for Clement was unable to find pledges and guarantees for cash he still owed on his previous engagements. ⁽⁶⁾ Alarcon, realising/

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1. Molini, Documenti, 273-277, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 361, Schulz, Sacco di Roma, 177-187.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 361, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 464.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 488-9.
 4. Orsini and de Cessis to Colonna and Trivulzio, Pisano and Gaddi to Alarcon. Colonna gave securities for the good behaviour of de Cessis and Orsini and kept them on his own properties close to Rome. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 261, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 489.
 5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 261.
 6. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 490.

realising the pope's difficulties and that the army was virtually insatiable suggested the pope escape from Rome. The opportunity was provided on 6 December and Clement seized it, fleeing first to Capranica. Cardinal Campeggio remained as legate in Rome.⁽¹⁾ On 8 December Clement reached Orvieto, a perfect natural fortress, built on volcanic rock, which in the middle ages had been a Guelph stronghold and a frequent refuge for the popes.⁽²⁾

On the same day Orange returned from Naples⁽³⁾ and on 1 January was officially appointed captain-general of the army.⁽⁴⁾ Several of the Spaniards in imperial service were opposed to this appointment, notably Najera and Perez, and the lansquenets were at first reluctant to accept his authority.

Out of the money paid by the new cardinals for their appointment and handed to the imperial captains as part of the pope's ransom, the army had now received 47,000 ducats. A demand was sent to Orvieto for the further 50,000 ducats due on 17 January,⁽⁵⁾ and the pope's escape was made the excuse for fresh outrages in the Campagna. Between 22 and 24 December, when they once more returned to Rome, the Spaniards tried to occupy Velletri. Clement was extremely annoyed and remonstrated strongly with the imperial agents both about Velletri and a proposed attack on Sermonetta.⁽⁶⁾

Although the Spaniards had now returned to Rome both they and the Italians were ready to obey their commanders but the lansquenets were as intractable as ever.⁽⁷⁾ Lautrec's advance⁽⁸⁾ made it imperative that the army be moved from Rome to the Regno. In an attempt to break the dead-lock, on 3 January Cardinal Colonna offered to pay the lansquenets three months of their arrears and to give a bonus of thirteen gold ducats for each officer. Most of the day was spent in council, /

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 494.

2. 'Ricordi della Citta di Perugia dal 1527 al 1550 di Cesare di Giovanello Bontempi', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 235, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 261.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 495.

4. Ibid. 526.

5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 445.

6. Ibid. 445-6, Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 20-1.

7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 535.

8. See below p. 227-9.

council, discussing this proposal and the appointments of Orange as captain-general and del Guasto as commander of the infantry.⁽¹⁾ No decision had been made when the council, which was held out of doors, was broken up by a bitter wind and heavy rain.⁽²⁾ Despite continued thunderstorms, the consultation was resumed on the following day but again nothing was decided. It was only on 5 January that the lansquenets agreed to accept Orange's appointment and the financial terms of Colonna's offer.⁽³⁾

This arrangement had been made on the assumption that Clement would be paying 50,000 ducats in the middle of the month, which would be added to 20,000 ducats which had arrived from Naples on 10 January, but Campeggio made it clear that Clement would never be able to meet this obligation.⁽⁴⁾ Pompeo Colonna, foreseeing trouble, left the city⁽⁵⁾ while on 17 January the lansquenets met in council. Rome waited in terror for the sacking to begin again.⁽⁶⁾ Ambassadors from the lansquenets were sent to Orange who disclaimed all responsibility for the promises of Colonna and del Guasto which had been made without his authority.⁽⁷⁾ The lansquenets immediately mutinied and it was not until 20 January that Orange once more had them under control. On 18 January he suggested that after paying each of the lansquenets two ducats he should go, with some of their representatives, to Naples to see whether money could be obtained there. For three days the offer was considered. The mood of the lansquenets was ugly and they were spending their time in looting the wine and food shops which had reopened on Piazza Giudei and Campo dei Fiori. Many Romans began moving their goods into Castel Sant'Angelo for safe-keeping. Finally the lansquenets agreed to wait for ten days. If they were not paid then they would return home.⁽⁸⁾ The following day they received their two ducats,⁽⁹⁾ and on 29 January it was learnt that Orange/

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1. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 23.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid. 24.
 4. Ibid. 27.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 534.
 6. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 28.
 7. Ibid. 29.
 8. Ibid. 29-30, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 545.
 9. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 30, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 581.

Orange had managed to extract from the treasury of Naples an advance of 105,000 ducats and from private bankers (including the son of Agostino Chigi) the promise of an equal amount.⁽¹⁾

Discipline, however, was still slack and incidents were occurring in the Campagna daily, where, against the orders of their officers, the men were plundering for food.⁽²⁾ Since Pompeo Colonna was one of those who suffered most from these raids his relations with the imperialists deteriorated.⁽³⁾

On 11 February Orange and del Guasto returned from Naples with money sufficient to pay off another two months of arrears and were at last able to persuade the lansquenets that they must march at once.⁽⁴⁾ By 13 February preparations were under way for the imperial departure from Rome.⁽⁵⁾ It was Lautrec's advance which saved Rome from the total destruction Perez had threatened. In recognition of this fact the Romans subsequently raised a statue to the French general on the Capitol.⁽⁶⁾

After an occupation which had lasted for some eight months, on Sunday 16 February, the Spaniards, the Italian infantry and the cavalry left Rome.⁽⁷⁾ The lansquenets left on the following day.⁽⁸⁾ Already the imperial commanders had recovered authority over their troops, and the evacuation of Rome took place in the most orderly fashion. The soldiers were forbidden to sack or pillage, and throughout Rome, on countless improvised gibbets hung grim reminders that the imperial commanders meant to be obeyed.⁽⁹⁾


As the lansquenets left, at 11 a.m. the Orsini, under the leadership of the abbot of Farfa and Amico de'Arsooli broke into the city and subjected it to all the horrors of a second sack.⁽¹⁰⁾ They rushed through the city, taking reprisals on all stragglers from the imperial army, including the sick, who had been/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 559. Chigi lent the money on a security of estates in the Regno.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 582.
 3. Ibid. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 30.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 592.
 5. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 37, Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 602.
 6. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 52.
 7. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 645.
 8. Ibid. 619, 645.
 9. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 350. Alberini saw Gian d'Urbina hang three pillagers from a shop sign.
 10. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 646, Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 39.

been abandoned in Roman hospitals.⁽¹⁾ Boats at Ripa, which were loading property of the Spaniards were seized and their crews made captive. A boat, already on its way down the Tiber, laden with cannon and the property of Gian d'Urbina was sunk.⁽²⁾ Pillaging extended from Rome to Ostia.⁽³⁾ Fourteen boats which had been bringing much needed corn and wine to Rome retreated on hearing of Farfa's arrival, although the conservators of the city begged them to return and unload their cargo.⁽⁴⁾ Having exhausted the possibilities of the private vendetta the Orsini turned their attention to a thorough sack of the ghetto.⁽⁵⁾

Campeggio, the sole remaining papal representative in Rome, implored Orsini to leave.⁽⁶⁾ Clement immediately sent Giovanni Corradi and a detachment of troops, to try to restore order in the city.⁽⁷⁾ Strenuous efforts were made to mitigate the distress of Rome caused by the scarcity of provisions and to guard against a renewed onslaught of plague. Heavy penalties were placed on those who sold corn at extortionate rates and Andrea Doria was employed to guard the coasts against pirates.⁽⁸⁾ The long months of degradation and destruction were over. Gradually papal government would once more make itself felt in the religious capital of Europe. But the blow which the papacy had suffered had been a severe one whose effects would be felt for many years. The economic development of the city had been severely interrupted, the whole physical aspect of Rome had changed and was to go on changing as a new city grew up to replace all that had been lost in the sack; new buildings were erected, old ones were repaired and refaced, and a new defence system was created to remedy the proved defects of the old. The population had changed. Many had died, or had left the city never to return. The artistic and literary circles were gone for good. For Rome at least the sack had been of the gravest consequence, a scar on her history which would long be recalled in the popular and literary tradition of the city.

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 646, 649, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 266.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 646-7, Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 39, D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 352.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 266.
 4. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 40.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ibid. 43.
 8. Pastor, Papacy, x. 14.



CHAPTER VIII

The Italian League after the Sack of Rome

'Costoro vogliono ch'io faccia l'Imperatore
Signore d'Italia e io lo farò'.

Pastor, Papacy, x. 21 n. 1.

I. Venice and the Italian League after the Sack of Rome

From the first, the Italian League was both a highly sophisticated and an artificial creation which carried within itself the seeds of destruction. The allies were pursuing totally incompatible policies with disastrous consequences. Thus, none saw more clearly than Venice that the destruction of the papacy as an independent power was a threat to Italy as a whole and peculiarly a threat to the Venetian state. When, on 11 May, news reached the republic of the sack of Rome terror struck the city, 'non per respecto del Papa, che so vorria ridotto in peggiori termini, ma perchè l'Italia vien tutta in potere dell'imperadore'.⁽¹⁾ The news was met by a vigorous determination that Clement should be rescued if this could be done without endangering the League army.⁽²⁾ On 15 May the senate instructed Pisano, 'che'l sii col signor capitano general et vedi di andar con lo exercito verso Roma, perchè non soccorendo il Papa, si pol dir Italia sia persa'.⁽³⁾ Venice was quick to realise that only an overwhelming League victory at this point could ensure the freedom of Italy from imperial control. The Venetians wrote to Florence urging the city to stay firm to the League and to succour the pope. The French supported Venice in bringing pressure to bear on Florence, for Francis I now considered it imperative that Florence should contribute fully to the League.⁽⁴⁾

In reality the new republican regime⁽⁵⁾ at Florence had little choice. The threats being made at Rome by the imperial army that it would return and sack Florence, and the warnings from France that this could happen, did not go unheeded. The economic losses which Florence had suffered through the sack of Rome⁽⁶⁾ made it impossible to offend France, now the major repository of Florentine wealth. French help might well be needed to prevent a Medici restoration. The chief protagonists of extreme republicanism in Florence were aware of all these arguments⁽⁷⁾ but an attempt was first made to come to some agreement with the/

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1. Giuseppe Salvioli, 'Nuovi Studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 29.
 2. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 213.
 3. Ibid. 111.
 4. Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii. 959.
 5. See below p. 281-2.
 6. See below p. 280.
 7. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 34-7.

the imperialists. Negotiations were opened simultaneously with Charles and Lannoy, but the viceroy referred the Florentines directly to the imperial commanders in Rome.⁽¹⁾ When it was clear that these negotiations would be unsuccessful, on 22 June, after a vigorous discussion, Florence bound herself by a new treaty to the League, to which she promised she would contribute 4,000 infantry and 400 cavalry.⁽²⁾

Yet this Florentine promise of assistance was of little help to Venice where, even before the end of May, news arrived through Vicenza and Trent, that the Archduke Ferdinand was coming to Italy with an army of 20,000 men, 'et lecto dicte lettere, tutti rimasseno stupefatti, vedendo le cose andare male'.⁽³⁾ Arrangements were made to lend the duke of Milan 6,000 ducats and letters were sent to Francis I optimistically urging him to dispatch 10,000 Swiss, 'et far altro, perchè non si facendo presto indubitamente li cesarei se faranno signori de Italia'.⁽⁴⁾

It is possible that, without this swift diplomatic action on the part of Venice, the Italian League would have collapsed completely. For once, the Venetians managed to impress a sense of urgency on Francis I who was stung into swift action. News of the disaster to Rome did not reach Paris until 22 May but on 4 June Francis spoke in detail of his plan to send Lautrec to Italy⁽⁵⁾ and by the end of the month a new alliance had been agreed to by France, Venice, Florence and Milan.⁽⁶⁾ Under its terms Francis undertook to hire the invaluable Doria, giving him a condotta of eight galleys.⁽⁷⁾

Immediately after the sack of Rome Venice had also been active in negotiations with Ferrara and Mantua. In November 1527 Este was finally induced to join the League and promised to contribute 100 lances, 200 cavalry and 6,000 ducats a month for six months.⁽⁸⁾

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1. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 69-70.
 2. Ibid. 71, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 157.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 211.
 4. Ibid. 212-3.
 5. Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii. 950, 955-7.
 6. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 69.
 7. Paruta, Istorie, 46.
 8. For details see above p. 114-5.

Both Venice and France were always anxious that Mantua should declare in favour of the League, as this might prevent a second descent of lansquenets into Italy.⁽¹⁾ Gonzaga who had received vivid eye-witness accounts from his own family, had been shaken by the news of the sack of Rome, and had written to Venice urging the signory to rescue the pope.⁽²⁾ He was at first unwilling to join the League since he wished to be appointed captain-general, in the absence of Lautrec, and to this Venice could not agree for fear of offending the duke of Urbino.⁽³⁾ It was, therefore, not until 7 December 1527 that the proximity of the French army spurred Gonzaga into coming to terms. Even then Lautrec had to make substantial concessions and received little assistance in return; Gonzaga promised 80 lances for six months but would only agree to prevent the passage of imperial troops through his territories if he judged it to be feasible. In return the League agreed to protect Mantua and to include Gonzaga in any eventual peace treaty. He was to retain his empty title of captain-general of the church at a salary of 2,500 ducats a month, was granted annual pensions from Milan, Naples and Venice and substantial trading benefits in all the states of the League, including those of the pope.⁽⁴⁾

In the military sphere Venice maintained all her obligations to the League and even went beyond them, trying to make up for the failings of one ally or another. On 2 June Venice dispatched 50,000 ducats to the League camp of which only 15,000 was her own contribution; 30,000 was spent on behalf of Francis I who had failed to send any money.⁽⁵⁾ As the papacy had effectively ceased to be an ally and as Francis I was so dilatory in his assistance, Venice came to be the most important member of the League, for which her support was wholehearted. Before the advent of Lautrec and the first effective Florentine assistance, she carried, virtually alone, the burden of the defence against the imperialists. With/

1. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 329.

2. Ibid. xlv. 131.

3. Paruta, Istorie, 476.

4. An agreement made by the pro-League cardinals and not by Clement. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 366-7, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 493, and see below p. 244.

5. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 283. The other 5,000 ducats are not accounted for. They may represent payments to the remaining papal troops in the League army or money sent on behalf of the eternally impecunious Sforza.

With the arrival of Lautrec the demands on Venice increased at a time when she could least afford it. The upkeep of the navy and defences against the Mediterranean pirates were costing more every year,⁽¹⁾ the harvest of 1527 was as disastrous in the Veneto as elsewhere in Italy,⁽²⁾ and made it impossible for Venice to provision her forces adequately save at terrible expense. Had the imperialists launched an attack on Venice immediately after the sack of Rome or in the autumn or winter of 1527 the mainland power of the republic might have been permanently destroyed.⁽³⁾

Despite all this, despite the fact that Venice was the ally of the pope and genuinely concerned that he should be rescued, it was impossible for her to resist acting on a different and incompatible political level. Since time immemorial Venice had been at odds with the papacy over Ravenna, Cervia, the Romagna and over questions concerning provisions to benefices. Clement was helpless in Rome and the whole administration of the Church State appeared to be crumbling. Continuing in the old pattern of Italian politics and ignoring the ideals on which the Italian League was supposedly founded, Venice made use of the situation as she would have made use of any interregnum in the church. On 25 June she took over Ravenna and on 16 July Cervia,⁽⁴⁾ and thereafter there was little possibility that the pope would readhere to the Italian League.

Almost the first action of Clement, on regaining his freedom, was to dispatch the archbishop of Manfredonia to Venice to demand the restoration of Ravenna and Cervia.⁽⁵⁾ Even before this, on 17 December 1527, Pisano had an audience with the pope at Orvieto, the first direct contact the Venetians had had with Clement since the capture of Rome. Clement spoke of his desire for a general peace, of the possibility that he might go to Spain, but most fully of his desire that Ravenna and Cervia be restored. On the ambassador's departure Gambara warned him of the importance of Ravenna and Cervia to the pope.⁽⁶⁾ On 13 January a papal brief demanded the immediate restoration of the two towns and complained that Venice/

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1. Paruta, Istorie, 477.
 2. See above p. 13.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 595, 656-7.
 4. For the details see below p. 266-8.
 5. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt. 2, 1651.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 393-4.

Venice was appointing to benefices in a way which violated the agreements made with Julius II.⁽¹⁾

Venetian stubbornness over Ravenna and Cervia exasperated her allies and put a considerable strain on the alliance. Neither England nor France was prepared to accept the Venetian position. On 2 February Pesaro reported to Venice that Lautrec, who had just received a large dose of papal rancour on the subject, had urged that Venice try to accommodate Clement over Ravenna and Cervia.⁽²⁾ In February letters from Henry VIII and in April letters from Wolsey asked for their immediate restitution.⁽³⁾ Despite Venetian attempts to explain that the two towns had been taken with the consent both of Francis I and of Casale, to prevent them falling into imperial hands, and that it was impossible to restore them while the war lasted,⁽⁴⁾ the French and English ambassadors pressed, almost daily, for their restitution.⁽⁵⁾ Even Sforza, dependent as he was on Venetian subsidies, began to urge the restoration of the two towns in the hope that Clement would then join the League; 'a cazar spagnuoli de Italia; non che'l non volesse che la Signoria le avesse lei avanti il Papa, ma dice per bene de Italia'.⁽⁶⁾

Although a strong party, led by the influential Domenico Trevisano, always argued in favour of a restoration of Ravenna and Cervia, on the grounds that both justice and utility demanded it, they were invariably overruled in the Venetian senate⁽⁷⁾ and Venice remained unmoved by any pressure either of the pope or of her allies. On 18 May Gasparo Contarini⁽⁸⁾ was dispatched to Clement to try to persuade him to re-enter the League. If Clement raised the question of Ravenna and Cervia he was to try and explain that the Venetian retention of the two towns/

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 489-90.

2. Ibid. 558.

3. Ibid. xlvii. 248, 289, 363, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1772.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 289, 334.

5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 685, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-1533, 139, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 474.

6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlviii. 139.

7. For a summary of Trevisano's arguments see Paruta, Istorie, 482-7.

8. For Contarini see above p. 114. He remained at the papal court until December 1529.

towns was, for the present, beneficial both to the pope and to the League. Hopefully, in the same breath, he was to ask for permission to levy troops in the Church State and to tax the Venetian clergy.⁽¹⁾ In the meantime Venice was doing her best to ensure that Clement would not retake either town by using armed force in combination with the fuorusciti. Every threat of any such action was met by strengthening the defences of the two towns.⁽²⁾ Contarini's mission to the pope was curiously ill-timed. Clement was already threatening to recall his legate from Venice, not only because of the breach over Ravenna and Cervia, and taxation of the clergy, but also because, in the recent agreement with Ferrara, Venice had conceded to Este his house in Venice of which he had been deprived by Julius II and which was now the residence of the papal legate.⁽³⁾ On 23 May Clement had informed the French ambassador that he would never adhere to the League before he had recovered Ravenna and Cervia⁽⁴⁾ and reiterated his position in a public audience of all the League ambassadors on 7 June.⁽⁵⁾

Clement's rancour with Venice only increased as the months passed. In June 1528 Casale spoke of the pope's extraordinary ill-humour as far as Ravenna and Cervia were concerned and reported that the pope believed that he had been fooled by all the League members on this subject. Every refusal by Venice to restore the two towns was only improving the imperial position and looked extremely bad at a time when the imperialists had entered into really serious discussions about the restoration of Ostia and Civitavecchia.⁽⁶⁾ At the end of the month Clement warned the Venetians that if they did not restore Ravenna and Cervia immediately he would ally with the emperor.⁽⁷⁾ Francis I was acutely aware of this possibility and, as news filtered through of Lautrec's reverses before Naples, he implored/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 685, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 138.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 665, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 1-2, 8 and see below p. 267-8.
 3. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 138-9, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 474 and see above p. 115.
 4. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 139.
 5. Ibid. 151-2.
 6. Molini, Documenti, ii. 40. See also Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 337 for the same opinions expressed by Clement in July.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 721-2.

implored Venice to restore Ravenna and Cervia to the pope, promising both to grant lands of an equivalent value in Apulia and to do everything in his power to ensure that Venice should recover the two towns after Clement's death.⁽¹⁾ But, on 27 August, Venice declared unequivocally that she had no intention of ever restoring either Ravenna or Cervia.⁽²⁾

Meanwhile, over ecclesiastical questions, Venice also seemed bent on offending the pope. Immediately after the sack of Rome, some provision had to be made for the administration of those ecclesiastical benefices and estates whose incumbents were absent, missing or dead at Rome, but the Venetian solution was scarcely tactful. On 10 June Venice demanded that administrators of these estates should take their customary stipends and pay the rest of the income into the Venetian treasury.⁽³⁾ On 17 August the republic resumed the right to appoint her own bishops - a right which had been surrendered to Julius II - and, when Clement bestowed the bishopric of Treviso on Cardinal Pisano, refused to let him take possession of his see.⁽⁴⁾ There was continual friction over appointments to benefices⁽⁵⁾ and over unauthorised taxation of the clergy.⁽⁶⁾ In April 1528 a tax of 10,000 ducats was imposed on the clergy without papal permission. When informed of this Clement replied with monitory letters of complaint.⁽⁷⁾ In June once more he expressed his disapproval of the tax and of the republic's interference in elections to bishoprics.⁽⁸⁾ But the financial difficulties of Venice were now so serious that the republic had perforce to go on taxing the clergy along with the rest of the Venetian population. Relations between the pope and Venice grew/

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 473.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 2032.
 3. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 295.
 4. Ibid. xlvi. 128, La civiltà Veneziana del Rinascimento (Venice 1957), 216.
 5. E.g. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 503.
 6. Ibid. xlvi. 128, l. 379, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 139.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 657, 677.
 8. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 128.

grew steadily worse. Even in May 1529 when Venice needed papal support in the peace negotiations with Charles it was proposed that another unauthorised tax of the clergy should be made, on the rather gloomy grounds that Clement could hardly be any more annoyed.⁽¹⁾ The French watched these actions of the Venetians with considerable alarm and Francis I, recognising that it was probably futile to expect Venice to behave sensibly over Ravenna and Cervia, begged the Venetians at least to be tactful over ecclesiastical matters. Although it was never a popular move some attempt was made by the doge to oblige the French in this,⁽²⁾ but the effort did little to pacify the pope. 'Costoro' he is reported to have said of the Venetians, 'vogliono ch'io faccia l'Imperatore Signore d'Italia e io lo farò'.⁽³⁾

II. The League Army after the sack of Rome

The imperial captains in Rome were aware of and worried by the proximity of the League army whose numbers approached 40,000⁽⁴⁾ but, for all the activity in which it engaged, they might well have ignored it, rendered inactive as it was by internal disagreements. Guicciardini, no longer protected by the authority of Rome, found that his strictness, arrogance and civilian manners, which had inspired hatred in the papal captains, were paying bad dividends. He was treated with insolence and insubordination.⁽⁵⁾ His relations with the duke of Urbino had deteriorated after the pope's downfall, but in this he was not alone since most of the commanders frankly disagreed with Urbino's dilatory tactics and those of them who could exercise individual initiative did so. While the careful Urbino, now beginning to worry about the security of his own state and those of his friends and supporters in the Romagna, halted at Casalina and/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, I. 379.
 2. Ibid. xlvii. 125-6. In a dispute over the appointment to the bishopric of Cividale di Belluno the doge said, 'non si dia far questo al presente per non irritar el Papa contra di nui, et si vuol temporizar, sicome ha detto il re Cristianissimo'.
 3. Quoted in Pastor, Papacy, x. 21 n. 1.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 218.
 5. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 177.

and hesitated about an advance, he was being urged by his employers, the Venetians, and by some of the other commanders in his army to attack Rome and rescue the pope before the imperialists could complete their siege works around Castel Sant'Angelo.⁽¹⁾ On 12 May, in open disagreement with Urbino, Federigo da Bozzoli declared in the council of war that, with only 150 lances and 200 cavalry, he would attempt the liberation of the pope and cardinals.⁽²⁾ Since Urbino could not prevent an attempt which everyone else had approved⁽³⁾ and which he doubtless expected to fail, it was agreed that Bozzoli and Saluzzo might make the attempt. They left on the same day with inadequate forces, not more than 1,500 men. As the whole success of the enterprise depended on secrecy the two commanders took different routes; Bozzoli was to pass through Narni, Civita Castellana and Nepi while Saluzzo would take the Orvieto-Viterbo road, meeting up with Bozzoli between Sutri and Monterosi. Given the lack of planning, it is scarcely surprising that this effort failed. By 17 May Bozzoli was back in camp, blaming his failure on the fall of a horse.⁽⁴⁾

Thus, another five days had been wasted, while the imperialists strengthened their fortifications. With no firm plan, on 18 May Urbino ordered an advance and the following day the army reached Casale. Constantly speaking of the need to rescue the pope but delaying the attempt from day to day, on 22 May Urbino authorised the League army, which had been joined by Filippino Doria with 500 infantry,⁽⁵⁾ to advance to Isola Farnese. Here it was learned that the imperial siege works around Castel Sant'Angelo were nearly complete and it was decided that no further advance should be made, for Urbino, who once more denounced the lack of good pikemen, would not attack an adequately defended city before he had 16,000 Swiss in addition to the 5,000 he already had, 10,000 Italians, 3,000 sappers and a large force of artillery.⁽⁶⁾ In this decision he was supported by the Venetian provveditor, Vettori.⁽⁷⁾

The army, therefore, remained at Isola Farnese, suffering from the bad weather, the shortages and the deprivation which were affecting the imperialists/

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1. Paruta, Istorie, 454, Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 103, 108.
 2. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 108.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid. 108, 132, 164, 184, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 214.
 5. Sanuto, Diarri, xlv. 206.
 6. Ibid. 164, 183, 184, 206, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 ff.114-114v.
 7. Paruta, Istorie, 458.

imperialists in Rome. The soldiers were so hungry that it was impossible to prevent them from sacking the surrounding countryside. Inevitably plague attacked the camp since nearly all were suffering from undernourishment; on 24 May five men died and orders were given for the soldiers to sleep out in the open to reduce the spread of infection.⁽¹⁾ This could only be a temporary measure, however; in the face of hunger and plague the League army was being rapidly enervated. On 1 June the army began to retreat towards Viterbo,⁽²⁾ having abandoned all hope of rescuing the pope;

'Il campo de la lega le ruine

Mira d'appresso e'l pianto e'grido sente,

E dove ir dovria inanzi, torna indietro

e prender lascia il successor di Pietro'.⁽³⁾

On the same night Alessandro Vitelli and Piermaria Rossi with their 200 light cavalry deserted to the imperialists.⁽⁴⁾ Four days later the army had reached Vetralla, ten miles from Viterbo, and it was planned to fortify Civitavecchia, Bracciano, Civita Castellana and Nepi with one band each of Saluzzo's troops. The army was being continually depleted; on 5 June Caiazzo, who, as a papal commander, had seen his source of pay cut off, left with Guido Rangoni, for Modena where Rangoni had interests of his own to defend. The bande nere and many of the Florentine infantry were deserting in large numbers. It had also been learnt that the Orsini count of Anguillara was planning to defect to the imperialists. By 5 June the army had lost between 7,000 and 8,000 infantry.⁽⁵⁾

On 11 June the army moved to Bagnai⁽⁶⁾ and two days later to Bolsena.⁽⁷⁾ In the following days the retreat into the Church State continued towards Orvieto (17 June)⁽⁸⁾ and Foligno (1 October).⁽⁹⁾ Here the army turned south towards Spoleto, /

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 184, 207.

2. Ibid. 282.

3. Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, c. xxxiii 5.55.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 247, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 234.

5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 284, 309-310.

6. Ibid. 321.

7. Ibid. 334.

8. Ibid. 390, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.117v.

9. Ibid. xlvi. 86, 178.

Spoleto, whence an expensive and unsuccessful attack was launched on Monte Rotundo, defended by 700 Spanish cavalry.⁽¹⁾ Narni, Terni and Amelia were recovered but only after they had been abandoned by the imperialists.⁽²⁾ At the beginning of November, as winter set in, the League troops were encamped at Todi.⁽³⁾

Meanwhile the Venetian senate had taken a very severe attitude towards the conduct of Urbino and Vettori, the latter was summoned to Venice for a public inquiry and Urbino was censured. The duke retaliated by threatening to give up his condotta, and only agreed to renew it for two years when Venice took his state under her protection. His wife and son were sent, more or less as hostages, to live in Venice.⁽⁴⁾

In Lombardy, where, on receipt of the news from Rome, da Leyva had shut himself up in Milan,⁽⁵⁾ the League army's activities had degenerated into a series of pointless and fruitless campaigns, mainly because Venice was reluctant to risk her troops in any major engagement. Bad weather hampered operations, there was a great shortage of provisions, little co-ordination, bad leadership and, as during every campaign in Lombardy, large diversions had to be made in order to cross the many rivers with which the Lombardy plain is watered, a problem which grew worse as winter approached.⁽⁶⁾ The League armies were facing experienced and seasoned troops, under a brilliant and highly experienced general, who had now mastered the technique of campaigning in Lombardy. Venetian troops had remained based at Marignano, where, at the end of the summer, the army had been infected by plague.⁽⁷⁾ Possibly as many as 70% of the troops were invalided at one time, involving Venice in constant expense as she tried to keep her regiments up to strength.⁽⁸⁾

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 241, 294-6.

2. Ibid. 204.

3. Ibid. 293.

4. Paruta, Istorie, 459-460.

5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 169.

6. Ibid. 158-159.

7. See below, Appendix.

8. 1,650 additional troops were dispatched to camp at one time, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 90.

The arrival of Lautrec and the recovery of Genoa⁽¹⁾ temporarily raised morale. Lautrec was no novice to Italian campaigns; he had accompanied Louis XII to Italy in 1514 and had been named guardian of the council of Pisa. He was present at the battle of Ravenna where he had been left for dead on the battlefield and he had distinguished himself at Marignano. In 1516 he had been appointed lieutenant-general in Italy.⁽²⁾ His bravery, justice and loyalty were never in question, but like many of the French noble commanders he was both proud and obstinate and found it difficult to take advice from anyone.⁽³⁾ Now, although he brought with him a force of 1,000 French lances, 8,000 Swiss, 6,000 Gascons and 10,000 infantry who had been raised by Pedro Navarro, from the first he was to be hampered by the inadequacy of his troops. There had been considerable trouble in raising so many new recruits, particularly arquebusiers, of whom there was a chronic shortage in France, and who represented at least one quarter of the infantry regiments.⁽⁴⁾

Lautrec, who reached Susa in the first week of August, began his campaign by the capture of Bosco and Alessandria in which he was assisted by 1,200 of the picked Venetian infantry who had helped to restore Fregosi to Genoa.⁽⁵⁾ Alessandro was handed over to Sforza and despite very bad weather, Vigevano was besieged and taken.⁽⁶⁾ Crossing the Ticino, Lautrec occupied Abbiategrasso and restored it to Sforza. Having joined with the Venetian forces, Lautrec attacked Pavia, which was defended by Ludovico Belioso's Italians, and captured it by agreement, on 5 October, although it was with considerable difficulty that the League commanders prevented their men from embarking on a systematic sack of the town as a revenge for the French defeat of 1525.⁽⁷⁾

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1. See below p. 303.
 2. For his career see Nouvelle Biographie Générale (Paris, 1855-66), Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 236.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 236.
 4. Montluc, Commentaires, 355, de Fourquevaux, Instructions, xxix, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 236, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 43.
 5. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 90, Paruta, Istorie, 465, Montluc, Commentaires, 361, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 65-69 and see below p. 303.
 6. Montluc, Commentaires, 361.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 236, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 44, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 418-9. Pesaro suggested that Belioso had deliberately betrayed Pavia to the League, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 118, 148, 158.

However, Lautrec's arrival proved not an unmixed blessing. Fresh dissensions broke out immediately among the allies; Venice urged an attack on Milan, Lautrec wished to march straight for the Regno whither Renzo da Ceri had already been dispatched with 6,000 infantry, while first Cybo and then Ridolfi urged Lautrec to rescue the pope.⁽¹⁾ Apart from the more obvious attractions of such a scheme, Lautrec had no wish to offend two powerful cardinals and appeared to react favourably to their suggestion, but when he asked Pesaro whether the Venetian army from Lombardy would join in such an expedition, the proveditor told him that if Venetian forces joined in a march to the south da Leyva would recover all that had so far been gained in Lombardy.⁽²⁾ By 9 October Pesaro was able to present definite instructions from Venice that, should Lautrec proceed further south, at least 15,000 infantry must remain in Lombardy with Urbino.⁽³⁾ Sforza, as usual, refused to contemplate any strategy other than an immediate attack on Milan.⁽⁴⁾ He was undoubtedly correct. Sforza and Guicciardini alone had learnt from experience that to succeed against the imperialists every effort must be concentrated on the centres of their defence, in the north Milan, in the south Naples. Failure to take either meant total failure.

No-one heeded Sforza's plea. On 14 October Lautrec moved from Pavia crossed the Olona and the Lambro to Landriano, though this proved to be an unsatisfactory lodging,⁽⁵⁾ and, on 17 October, Lautrec and Pesaro moved south once more in order to cross the Po.⁽⁶⁾ Leaving Contarini at Landriano with less than 3,500 troops, for there had been many desertions, Lautrec and Pesaro crossed the Po and lodged at Castel San Giovanni.⁽⁷⁾

The capabilities of Da Leyva, who by sheer innate ability had risen from the rank of private soldier, were now becoming apparent.⁽⁸⁾ Profiting from Lautrec's arrival and the consequent diversion of Venetian forces, he occupied Abbiategrasso/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 169-170, 188.
 2. *Ibid.* 170.
 3. *Ibid.* 190.
 4. *Ibid.* 211, 215.
 5. *Ibid.* 214.
 6. *Ibid.* 223.
 7. *Ibid.* 228.
 8. Montluc, Commentaires, 355. He had been born in Navarre.

Abbiategrasso and garrisoned it with Italian infantry.⁽¹⁾ This episode necessitated a change of plan for the League. On the evening of 27 October, only four days after it had been taken, Contarini moved his Venetian troops from Landriano to Abbiategrasso which surrendered. The Venetian commanders were unable to prevent their troops from pillaging the town.⁽²⁾

Lautrec who had advanced from San Giovanni to Piacenza was joined on 28 October by Vaudemont, with 3,000 lansquenets as reinforcements, and ordered Pedro Navarro to leave the immediate area of Milan and join him there.⁽³⁾ Two days later he rescinded the order and permitted Navarro to stay north of the Po in order to attack Monza.⁽⁴⁾ Although he knew that they had insufficient troops to attack the city Contarini advanced from Abbiategrasso to join Navarro at Monza.⁽⁵⁾ Da Leyva again forestalled the League and strengthened Monza with 1,000 troops while Contarini and Urbino, who had rejoined the army in Lombardy, retired to Cassano which they intended to fortify.⁽⁶⁾ Defended on one side by the Adda and with only one road approaching it, Cassano remained one of the major Venetian bases until the end of the war. It proved easy to fortify, a bridge was kept in readiness for any crossing into Giaradda and it was a convenient spot from which to succour either Lodi or Pavia and to defend the whole of the Veneto.⁽⁷⁾

On 7 November Lautrec moved south from Piacenza to Firenzuola, where he was at last joined by Navarro⁽⁸⁾ and two days later they moved to Parma,⁽⁹⁾ virtually abandoning Lombardy, apart from a few enclaves of Venetian and Milanese troops, totalling no more than 8,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 300 lances to confront the equally powerful da Leyva in his entrenched positions.⁽¹⁰⁾ Lautrec had with him or was joined by the cream of the League armies: 1,000 lances, 1,000/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 243, 249.
 2. Ibid. 257, 259.
 3. Ibid. 257, 259.
 4. Ibid. 264-5.
 5. Ibid. 268-9, 271.
 6. Ibid. 282-4.
 7. Paruta, Istorie, 550.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 284.
 9. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 540.
 10. Ibid. 540.

1,000 light horse, 2,000 Italian adventurers and about 10,000 infantry.⁽¹⁾ In consequence, at the beginning of December, da Leyva was able to make an important gain, control over the city of Novara, where the citadel had always been held by the imperialists.⁽²⁾ Contarini was now given permission by Venice to advance up the Adda, which would facilitate transport, to try to capture Lecco, which the castellan of Mus was already besieging.⁽³⁾ The enterprise was once more a costly fiasco, for on 26 December da Leyva managed to reinforce Lecco.⁽⁴⁾ The incident had important repercussions since it was now clear to the castellan of Mus that his only chance of gaining Lecco, which he had long coveted, was adherence to the imperialists. They proved willing to grant Lecco to the castellan for the union of his forces with the imperial armies immediately threatened Bergamo, the League cavalry being too weak to protect the contado.⁽⁵⁾ At a relatively small cost, da Leyva, in one brilliant move, had protected himself from attack from the north, secured fresh supplies for the garrison at Milan, an immediate cash payment of 30,000 ducats and a promise of 3,000 paid infantry for the next three months.⁽⁶⁾

On 14 December Lautrec in company with Guido Rangoni, Paolo Camillo Trivulzio, Ugo da Peppoli and Vaudémont finally left Parma for Reggio,⁽⁷⁾ Modena (17 December),⁽⁸⁾ and Bologna (19 December).⁽⁹⁾ This advance was now welcomed by Venice which distrusted Florence and believed that the presence of Lautrec in Tuscany would keep that city faithful to the League,⁽¹⁰⁾ and Florence did indeed welcome the news.⁽¹¹⁾ The towns of the Church State, however, were not so enthusiastic. The memory of the passage of the armies of Bourbon and Urbino was too recent. When Lautrec's reinforcements, lansquenets hired by France, arrived at Bologna they were kept out of the city by force.⁽¹²⁾ Having sent on his artillery in advance/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 540.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 346.
 3. Ibid. 356.
 4. Ibid. 400.
 5. Ibid. xlvii. 201, 194.
 6. Ibid. 203-4.
 7. Ibid. xlvi. 381.
 8. Ibid. 391.
 9. Ibid. 398.
 10. Ibid. 409-410.
 11. Ibid. 416.
 12. Ibid. 459.

advance Lautrec left Bologna on 9 January for Imola, which, despite heavy rain, he reached two days later. Here the castello, which had fallen to the imperialists, was recovered and handed over to the papal governor in Imola.⁽¹⁾ On 13 January Lautrec was at Faenza⁽²⁾ and three days later at Forlì.⁽³⁾ Here a diversion was made to recover Rimini for the pope, in the vain hope that this would induce him to declare for the League and, on 19 January, Rimini surrendered by agreement.⁽⁴⁾ For the first time the League seemed to be having some success. This was principally due to the fact that the political initiative had passed from Venice to France and the military initiative from Urbino to Lautrec. The extent to which Venice had lost control of the whole enterprise had been clear from the moment Lautrec first appeared in Lombardy; the wooing of the pope initiated by Lautrec, the powerlessness of Venice to prevent the departure of the French from Lombardy, though this was contrary to her whole strategy, and even the removal of Sigismondo Malatesta, a Venetian client, from Rimini, all show the decline of Venetian influence. Whatever might be the common pretence, the resistance to the imperialists in Italy was no longer being conducted by a league of Italian states united for the preservation of the 'Libertà d'Italia'. The war henceforth was conducted by the French, the war of Hapsburg against Valois in which the Italians played only a subsidiary role. In January 1528 Lautrec's secretary told the ambassador of Lucca, 'il mondo è hora in due parti et bixogna chiariate se voi siete francesi o imperiali, et siando francesi farne demonstratione et contribuire mese per mese come fanno li altri'.⁽⁵⁾

The naval supremacy of the League was still having an effect. With the capture of Castel Genoese and the surrender of Sassari, the League, by the end of January, threatened imperial control of Sardinia, an essential unit in the empire of Charles V⁽⁶⁾ and vital to communications between Spain and Italy. Its fall would have threatened the entire defence system against the Turk, whose/

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 468.

2. Ibid. 489.

3. Ibid. 499.

4. Ibid. 507-508. For Rimini see below p. 268-9.

5. M. Berengo, Nobili e mercanti nella Lucca del Cinquecento (Turin 1965), 16.

6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 501, 507, 512.

whose assistance it was believed France and Venice were soliciting, but at the end of February, much to imperial surprise, the League fleet broke up for refitting, the Venetians to Corfù, the French to Marseilles and Doria to Genoa.⁽¹⁾

Lautrec had, meanwhile, hastened south. On 9 and 10 February he crossed the Tronto, the northern river boundary of the Regno, and six days after entering Neapolitan territory he had reduced the whole of the Abruzzi. L'Aquila was taken by Pedro Navarro, without any resistance.⁽²⁾ All the towns of Apulia followed suit by surrendering to Lautrec.⁽³⁾

In Lombardy, however, the inadequate League troops were unable to stem any imperial advance, for all the Venetian troops were tied down in the defence of Bergamo and its contado.⁽⁴⁾ In March and April rumours began about a new imperial army which was being raised in Germany for the invasion of Italy.⁽⁵⁾ Immediately attempts were made to secure the passes,⁽⁶⁾ Bergamo, Vicenza, and Verona were reinforced, a provveditor was sent to Brescia, and the garrisons of Ravenna and Cervia, which it was expected the pope would try to recover in the event of an invasion, were reinforced.⁽⁷⁾ It was hoped that the duke of Milan would take some vigorous action in Lombardy but, as usual, his finances were so weak that he could do nothing without first raising a loan from Venice,⁽⁸⁾ which was forced to take the responsibility of defending such parts of his duchy as he still controlled.⁽⁹⁾ On 10 April Venice dispatched to Sforza's aid 3 companies of infantry, 150 lances and 100 cavalry.⁽¹⁰⁾

Urbino, with the Venetian army in Lombardy alone, was too weak to adopt more/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 599.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1755.
 3. Ibid. 1807. On 16 March 1528 Lautrec attacked the imperial army at Troia, but failed to defeat it. The imperialists fell back on Naples, were overwhelmingly defeated at sea in the battle of Capo d'Orso and had to endure a two month siege.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 117. It was always a difficult city to defend, ibid. xlviii. 70.
 5. Ibid. xlvii. 125, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 664.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 154.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 665, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 204, 208, 219-222, 226, 254, 268, 282, 285, 376, 402, 412.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 208, 213.
 9. Ibid. 213.
 10. Ibid. 225, 259.

more than a defensive strategy. He planned to leave sufficient garrisons to hold Bergamo, Verona, and Vicenza, and to keep the rest of the army together behind fortifications in some suitable place.⁽¹⁾

On 27 April imperial reinforcements, under the duke of Brunswick, some 25,000 strong, entered Italy from Trent.⁽²⁾ Having crossed the Adige on 14 May,⁽³⁾ they fanned out through the Veronese as far as Bardolino on Lake Garda, imposing fines and ransoms on every place; the inhabitants of Salò expelled their Venetian provveditor and paid a ransom of 10,000 ducats.⁽⁴⁾ Crossing Brescian territory and the river Oglio they entered the Bergamasco, supplied by the marquis of Mantua who excused himself to Venice on the grounds that the lansquenets would otherwise have ravaged his territories,⁽⁵⁾ while da Leyva advanced to join them.⁽⁶⁾ They marched slowly, for Brunswick was awaiting reinforcements of 3,000 Italian infantry, which were being raised in the Mantovano by Luigi Gonzaga and Piero da Bozzoli. In the confusion caused by the arrival of Brunswick da Leyva retook the citadel of Pavia.⁽⁷⁾

Venice immediately increased her own troops and, in particular, strengthened her light cavalry. To do so she had to cast far afield, yet another indication of the exhaustion of Italian resources; troops were brought from Greece and Dalmatia and 500 cavalry were sent for from Turkey, 'and that they (might) not appear to be such (Venice) remitted (to Constantinople) cloth and other accoutrements for them to be dressed in the Albanian fashion'.⁽⁸⁾ Francis I was asked to raise an additional 6,000 lansquenets which would be paid by Venice.⁽⁹⁾ Proveditori were dispatched to the principle Venetian cities with extra troops.⁽¹⁰⁾ In the field/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 321, 395.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 686, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 133-4.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 428.
 4. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 138, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 505, 507, 517, 530, 532, 544.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 505, 507, 530.
 6. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 154.
 7. Ibid. 138, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 684.
 8. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 134, 136, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 695, Paruta Istorie, 499, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 354. Albanians also accounted for a large part of the regular Venetian army. Braudel, Monde Méditerranée, 25.
 9. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 134.
 10. Paruta, Istorie, 499, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 665.

field the Venetians were already under considerable pressure, and, in order to strengthen the defences of her own territory, Venice proposed withdrawing troops from the duchy of Milan. The Venetian proposal was greeted with horror, not only by Duke Francesco who accused Venice of treachery, but also by Teodoro Trivulzio who regarded these troops as essential for the preservation of Genoa.⁽¹⁾ But the Venetian army was now hardly strong enough to protect the Veneto, let alone to take offensive action and da Leyva was able to recover Abbiategrosso with almost no effort. On 26 May Urbino withdrew from Cassano into the Bergamasco in order to protect Bergamo, Lodi and Brescia⁽²⁾ and on 28 May the duke warned Venice that the garrison of Bergamo was more than one half under strength.⁽³⁾

Brunswick's arrival was greeted with little enthusiasm by the imperialists in Milan. Da Leyva, whose army of about 5,000 men⁽⁴⁾ had achieved its successes, despite great deprivation,⁽⁵⁾ through loyalty and discipline, and who rightly believed himself better off with a small number of troops he had some hope of supporting than with a starving, undisciplined army beyond reasonable control, worried about how he was going to pay and feed Brunswick's men.⁽⁶⁾ His worst fears were to be realised. On 1 June, when Brunswick had reached Pontevico, his men refused to be any further unless they were paid at least one-half their arrears.⁽⁷⁾ At the beginning of July Brunswick was desperate and his army, although engaged with da Leyva in the unsuccessful siege of Lodi, was virtually useless since the lansquenets spent most of their time in clamouring for pay which neither Brunswick nor da Leyva could produce.⁽⁸⁾ Theoretically, Brunswick should by now have been on his way to Naples where, it had been hoped, he would relieve the desperately besieged city, but any hope of this was abandoned when it became apparent that the lansquenets would always refuse to leave Lombardy.⁽⁹⁾ Da Leyva resigned himself/

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1. Samuto, Diarri, xlvii. 412.
 2. Ibid. 545, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 695.
 3. Samuto, Diarri, xlvii. 549.
 4. Ibid. xlviii. 226.
 5. Ibid. xlv. 169.
 6. Ibid. xlvii. 493-4.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 707 714.
 8. Ibid. 732-4.
 9. Ibid. 750.

himself to making efforts towards retaining the cream of Brunswick's army and hastening the inevitable desertion of the remainder. By the end of August the bulk of the lansquenets were already on their way home.⁽¹⁾

As a counterbalance to Brunswick, Francis I dispatched to the League reinforcements of 12,000 Swiss and 1,000 lansquenets under Francis de Bourbon, count of St. Paul, a general with little previous military experience,⁽²⁾ who was to prove as efficient as any other French general at destroying first a campaign and then an army. At the end of June St. Paul himself was still at Lyons but had dispatched some 2,500 of his lansquenets into Italy over the Great St. Bernard pass.⁽³⁾ However, despite St. Paul's arrival, June really saw the end of the war in Italy, for in this month Doria's condotta ended and he passed into imperial service. Clement had always warned Francis not to lose Doria⁽⁴⁾ for until this date the League had retained control of the sea. Without Doria, even the powerful Venetian fleet was not strong enough to ensure a supremacy for the League and without such supremacy it was pointless to think in terms of land expeditions to Naples, for, experience had shown that it was impossible to supply an army in Naples by an overland route through Italy. Nor with the loss of control of the sea was it certain that Genoa would not succumb to the imperialists.

There was no question of Doria having defected. The period of his condotta which he had entered into with Francis immediately after the sack of Rome,⁽⁵⁾ had come to an end and he was unable to get France to renew it on terms favourable enough to himself. The nature of his occupation was such that he could not afford to remain unemployed for any length of time; he had to spend 150 ducats a day just to keep his fleet in being.⁽⁶⁾ Before coming to an agreement with the emperor Doria had made serious efforts to persuade the pope to employ him.⁽⁷⁾ Clement, who attempted to dissuade Doria from taking service with the emperor, /

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 774, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 312.

2. Paruta, Istorie, 499.

3. Sarute, Diarri, xlvi. 175, Segni, Storia Fiorentina, i. 107.

4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 333.

5. See above p. 215.

6. Molini, Documenti, ii. 36.

7. Ibid.

emperor, would gladly have engaged Doria but could afford no more than a condotta of two galleys while Doria insisted on a minimum of eight.⁽¹⁾

Among the League commanders Renzo da Ceri was the first to recognise Doria's loss as a major blow to the League. On 14 August, in a strongly worded letter to Francis I, he warned the king that Genoa would almost certainly now revert to the imperialists and he advised him to make immediate provisions against such an occurrence. Corsica should be taken into French hands, one hundred from the leading Genoese families be taken hostage, and all the fortresses in the Genoese state should be garrisoned with French troops.⁽²⁾ At the same time Trivulzio⁽³⁾ wrote to St. Paul urging him to send immediate reinforcements to Genoa⁽⁴⁾ and to Urbino asking for 2,000 Italian troops, since he believed that Doria would now direct all his energies to taking Genoa. This request widened the split between the allies, for Urbino, true to his conviction that his first task was to protect the Veneto and Venetian enterprises, maintained that none but French troops should be risked at Genoa.⁽⁵⁾

In the field confusion among the allies was great. All the armies in Lombardy had begun to feel the effects of the great scarcity and rise in commodity prices, common throughout the Italian mainland, which in this year was totally dependent on imported and hoarded grain.⁽⁶⁾ With the possibility of an imperial attack on the Veneto it was discovered that the defences of Bergamo needed a complete rebuilding⁽⁷⁾ while of the League-held towns in Lombardy only Alessandria and Lodi which da Leyva had unsuccessfully besieged from 18 to 29 July⁽⁸⁾ were in an adequate state of defence.⁽⁹⁾ St. Paul's reinforcements were tardy in arriving as he was forced to keep most of his troops in readiness to succour Genoa, and to further this enterprise on 5 July Contarini and Caiazzo with 2,000 infantry left to join him.⁽¹⁰⁾ On 21 July St. Paul had advanced only to Susa⁽¹¹⁾ and three/

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1. Molini, Documenti, ii. 38, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 302. This was the number he held from Francis I.
 2. Molini, Documenti, ii. 53.
 3. See below p. 303-5.
 4. Molini, Documenti, ii. 55-6.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 370-1.
 6. See above p. 14.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 173.
 8. Ibid. 123, 188.
 9. Ibid. 143-4.
 10. Ibid. 224.
 11. Ibid. 299.

three days later to Asti.⁽¹⁾ Here he planned to await Swiss reinforcements.⁽²⁾

The continued economic drain of the war was exacting a heavy toll at Venice which found it virtually impossible to keep up with payments to armies in the field. Almost all the units in Lombardy were heavily in arrears with their pay. Desertions were common and none of the infantry companies could be kept at full strength. Continuous recruiting hardly kept pace with losses. The Turkish troops which had been so eagerly anticipated turned out to be mutinous and quarrelsome.⁽³⁾ Apart from the need to maintain the fleet and to keep the army in Lombardy up to strength at a cost of some 67,000 ducats each month Venice was also committed to sending money to Renzo da Ceri in Naples for the defence of the towns she still held there - 10,000 ducats a month, money to Lautrec - 20,252 ducats a month, and was constantly supplying the bankrupt Sforza with ever-mounting loans.⁽⁴⁾

In August came the news of Lautrec's failure before Naples and of the French retreat.⁽⁵⁾ In Lombardy, on 20 August the French, Venetian and Milanese troops finally joined, preparatory to a crossing of the Adda.⁽⁶⁾ This took place three days later with a total force of less than 20,000 men⁽⁷⁾ insufficient even to break the imperial blockade of supplies to the League camp.⁽⁸⁾ On 27 August the League were, however, able to effect a crossing of the Lambrò, while da Leyva remained based at Marignano,⁽⁹⁾ but there were continual skirmishes during the crossing between the imperialists and the Venetians.⁽¹⁰⁾ On the same evening, /

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 304.
 2. Ibid. 327.
 3. Ibid. 304, 406.
 4. Sforza asked for a loan of 16,000 ducats on 28 July for instance, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 312, having already received 26,000 ducats in June, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-1533, 155.
 5. The French army besieging Naples was largely defeated by plague. On 16 August Lautrec himself succumbed and died, command passing to Saluzzo. On 28 August Saluzzo began the retreat from Naples culminating in the total defeat of the French army at Aversa by Orange.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 391.
 7. Ibid. 405-6.
 8. Ibid. 411.
 9. Ibid. 417.
 10. Ibid. 417-418.

evening, however, da Leyva returned to Milan.⁽¹⁾ On 28 August the Venetians advanced on Landriano⁽²⁾ and on the last day of the month attacked San Angelo⁽³⁾ which was captured on 3 September.⁽⁴⁾

On 8 September the Venetian army moved to besiege Pavia⁽⁵⁾ even as St. Paul received orders from Francis I to go immediately to the Regno to recover as much as possible of the French losses.⁽⁶⁾ Venice and France were already on the verge of a breach over the restitution of Ravenna and Cervia to the pope⁽⁷⁾ and over the question of French subsidies to the League army and now this instruction to St. Paul was interpreted as an outright betrayal. On 11 September in a council of war Urbino and Contarini pleaded with St. Paul not to leave⁽⁸⁾ but only the French general's inability to pay his troops induced him to remain in Lombardy. In the context of the knowledge that defections from the League might soon be expected, for Mantua and Ferrara were discovering a new-found enthusiasm for the imperial cause, on 13 September the allies began their battery of the walls of Pavia.⁽⁹⁾ On the same day came news of the loss of Genoa.⁽¹⁰⁾ The siege of Pavia did not progress well; Venice had provided insufficient funds so the commanders could not employ enough engineers and the army was without heavy artillery which could not be brought from the left bank of the Ticino. This considerably hampered the bombardment and, as it was impossible to launch an assault, the city did not fall until 19 September.⁽¹¹⁾ Two days later the fortress surrendered⁽¹²⁾ but apart from the propaganda value this was in many ways a meaningless victory. The city was already deserted and ruined. Nor had the capture done anything to solve the recurrent problems of concerting/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 422.
 2. Ibid. 423.
 3. Ibid. 438.
 4. Ibid. 443.
 5. Ibid. 469, 471.
 6. Ibid. 473.
 7. See above p. 219-221.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 477-8.
 9. Ibid. 481.
 10. Ibid. 484 and see below p. 304.
 11. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-1533, 169, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 497-8, 505, 509-510, 513, 515, 516-519, 521.
 12. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 525.

concerting action between the allies. The cautious Urbino wished to move surely from a strengthened Pavia to the capture of Abbiategrosso, San Giorgio, Monza, Como and Milan but St. Paul insisted on leaving immediately to recover Genoa whither he had been ordered by Francis I. ⁽¹⁾ On 27 September he left Pavia towards Tortona with 100 lances and 2,000 cavalry, promising to return if assistance to Genoa proved out of the question. Urbino meanwhile, with his 4,000 infantry, would remain in Pavia. ⁽²⁾ Simultaneously there were numerous desertions from the Venetian camp which could not be kept up to strength. The 350 Turkish cavalry who had already caused Venice considerable political embarrassment, left at the beginning of October, complaining that they had been the victims of discrimination. ⁽³⁾

Venice however had, after the capture of Pavia, been fired with enthusiasm, and optimistically suggested to Urbino that he attempt an attack on Milan. When Urbino sarcastically pointed out that in order to launch such an attack he would need at least 16,000 infantry and that he had scarcely 4,000 available, Venice promised ample reinforcements, both to make up the old regiments and to supply 3,000 new infantry. Urbino was promised that the rest of the troops needed would be supplied by Ferrara, the duke of Milan and Florence. ⁽⁴⁾ But winter was already close and it was impossible to contemplate a major offensive before the spring.

St. Paul's army had, meanwhile, advanced on Genoa but when there was no favourable rising in the city he withdrew ⁽⁵⁾ and returned towards Pavia. His troops had been decimated by plague and desertions and when he reached Alessandria in the second week of October he had no more than 1,000 left. ⁽⁶⁾ He flatly refused to rejoin Urbino ⁽⁷⁾ for he had received intelligence that Savona with its garrison of 1,000 French infantry was about to fall to Genoa and begged 1,500 troops from/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 534-5, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 235-6.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 6-7, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 236.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 14, 30-31, 36.
 4. Ibid. 28-30.
 5. Ibid. 47 and see below p. 305.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 58.
 7. Ibid. 64-5.

from Urbino with which to relieve that city.⁽¹⁾ On 25 October 800 troops, all that the Venetians could spare, left Pavia to join St. Paul⁽²⁾ but the French general felt that these were still an insufficient force and abandoned Savona to its fate.⁽³⁾

By the spring of 1529, the League, so arduously held together for three years, was practically in ruins. Militarily total defeat was in sight. France had virtually no army left in Italy. Only St. Paul, with his depleted resources in Lombardy, continued to display the French colours. Genoa and Naples were irrevocably lost, although the Venetians still bravely clung to their towns in Apulia. Florence was directly threatened. The imperial commanders seemed more powerful and united than ever.

But Venice was determined that, even if peace with the emperor must come, Charles should pay for it as expensively as possible. At the least he must acknowledge Sforza's right to the duchy of Milan. With this in view the winter was spent in a complete reorganisation of the army and of Venetian defences. Urbino's condotta was renewed with an increase of salary for three years, but as his absences from the army were now becoming so frequent that discipline was seriously affected, Giovanni Maria Fregosi was given a command immediately subordinate to the duke as governor-general of the Venetian militia. Caiazzo was appointed general of the cavalry and Antonio da Castello captain of the artillery. New captains were hired, and the number of galleys Venice was prepared to put at the disposal of the League was increased from sixteen to twenty. The towns in Apulia held by Venice were strengthened and in Lombardy work was begun on a bridge over the Adda by which an attack could be launched on Milan.⁽⁴⁾

In a joint meeting of all the League commanders at Lodi on 15 April it was decided that an attack must be made on Milan forthwith but da Leyva was forwarned in time to summon four companies of Spanish infantry from Genoa.⁽⁵⁾ In any case the/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 99-102, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 236 and see below p. 304-5.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 109, 112.
 3. Ibid. 112.
 4. Paruta, Istorie, 525-539.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 986.

the enterprise was impossible; not one of the League contingents was up to even half-strength and both money and provisions were scarce. St. Paul at Alessandria had no more than 300 cavalry, 3,000 infantry and 80 lances, Sforza at Lodi 200 cavalry and 2,000 infantry and the Venetians 500 lances, 500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry⁽¹⁾ and it was decided that all that could be done was to revert to the old plan and blockade Milan.⁽²⁾ The Venetians therefore, returned to Monza and Cassano and St. Paul began once more to move tentatively in the direction of Genoa. On 19 June in a surprise attack from Milan the imperialists gave battle to St. Paul at Landriano. The artillery was lost and St. Paul himself was taken prisoner.⁽³⁾ Urbino, at Monza, was threatened with a similar defeat and hurriedly withdrew behind the defences of Cassano. The defeat of St. Paul deprived the French of any further voice in Italian affairs and left Italy in the hands of Charles V.


The Italian League was effectively at an end now. Throughout there had been difficulties which may well be regarded as insuperable. Not least important was the sporadic interest of the French. Francis I never understood that the Italian League was the result, not of sympathy for him, but of fear of the emperor. As a result the French failed to appreciate the main objectives of the League, and intervened vigorously and continuously only when French interests were directly threatened while imperial pressure remained constant. The French failure to participate fully in the League was the more serious in that not one of the Italian powers had the resources necessary to sustain the kind of conflict which was being fought in Italy in these years. Quite simply the Italian states could not afford the massive armies, the new artillery and the new fortifications which novel methods of warfare demanded. Venice had been badly defeated at Agnadello and her recovery had been extremely costly, she was clearly in financial difficulties by the spring of 1527,⁽⁴⁾ the papacy was going through a financial crisis,⁽⁵⁾ Milan was bankrupt, and Florence was involved in her own struggle with the pope and the emperor.⁽⁶⁾ Once France failed to pay her/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 987.
 2. Paruta, Istorie, 548.
 3. Guazzo, Historie, 98, Paruta, Istorie, 550.
 4. E.g. Sanuto, Diarii, 1. 207, 238, 379 and see below p. 324-5.
 5. See above p. 133-140.
 6. See below p. 281-291.

her promised subsidies the League was financially non-viable.

Geography also had played its part in the League defeat for Italy, even before the struggle began, was encircled by the emperor. For as long as Charles V ruled Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and Austria he could pour reinforcements into Italy from more than one direction; the army which sacked Rome was made up of troops who had come from the furthest limits of Europe both eastward and westward. Even allowing for French reinforcements, the League armies had to be recruited from a far more restricted area. Geography also played its part in bringing about the destructive political divisions within the League, for, from the beginning, the allies had different objectives dependent upon the geographical relation of their states to the emperor's dominions. ⁽¹⁾ This conflict in aims had been at least partially responsible for the papal defection, the importance of which it would be difficult to overestimate, and which was probably the major factor in the League's failure. Venetian stubbornness over Ravenna and Cervia coupled with the choice of Urbino as captain-general had in the end insured papal adherence to Charles V, as surely as had the Florentine revolt.

1. See above p. 28.



CHAPTER IX

Clement VII and the Church State after
the Sack of Rome

'Tutto il paese è pieno di guerra, di peste, di fame,
la quale è sì grande in la Campagna, che infiniti
muorano, il resto che si sostenta vive d'herbe
poco manco di essere deserto e rovenato del tutto'.

A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.113

Following what, since the days of Martin V, had become the traditional lines of papal policy, from the opening months of his pontificate Clement had made sporadic efforts to reduce the Church State to dependence with uniform standards of justice and order. In contrast to Leo X and Alexander VI, the new pope had, consciously and publically, adopted a policy of refusing to aggrandise his family at the expense of the territorial rights of the Church. In the north Guicciardini had been active, imposing new standards of papal justice and attempting to eradicate the worst evils of factionalism and particularism. At Viterbo in 1524 a new constitution had been imposed and in the same year the pope intervened decisively in the affairs of Perugia, overthrowing the faction of Orazio Baglioni. In the south the hostility of Clement to the pretensions of the Roman barons was well-known.⁽¹⁾

Yet even before the sack of Rome there was considerable popular discontent within the Church State where, particularly in the north, the burden of war had lain very heavily; Piacenza, Parma, Modena and the surrounding countryside, had suffered terribly from the imperial occupation of 1525-6 and from the presence of the imperial army in the spring of 1527.⁽²⁾ Subsequently, the allied troops had been billeted in the northern cities for months on end and had caused widespread havoc. Simultaneously there had been heavy taxation in an area which had once been immune. Since the pontificate of Leo X the Church State had suffered from the savage fiscal policy of Armellino;⁽³⁾ taxes had been imposed on a wide variety of goods including cereals, wines, meat and salt. In 1516 the Romagna had been brought almost to the point of rebellion and Leo X had been forced to abandon a proposed new tax; in 1519 Fabriano had actually rebelled. In December 1526 Piacenza had been asked by the pope for a loan of 25,000 ducats, a normal year's income to the city treasury, and actually gave 6,000.⁽⁴⁾ Other factors exacerbated the situation, as at Florence,⁽⁵⁾ novel systems of fortification were introduced, which, apart from being expensive, involved the destruction of/

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1. See above chapter iii.
 2. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 13, Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.9a f.12.
 3. See above p. 138-40.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 526, 654.
 5. See below p. 277.

of many old landmarks and of much private property.⁽¹⁾ In the Church State, as in Tuscany,⁽²⁾ the League army was highly unpopular. At Bologna and Imola incidents occurred which provoked outright opposition to anything to do with the League. At Bologna, where every attempt of the League commanders to raise a loan had been frustrated, the populace armed itself in order to keep out the League army by force.⁽³⁾ With the possible exception of Saluzzo, the League commanders made no attempt to observe the customary regulations about billeting and the army became notorious for its cruelty.⁽⁴⁾ Again the presence of League troops in the city had meant a dearth of provisions, even of fresh water, since the aqueducts of the city had been deliberately destroyed in an attempt to flood the imperial camp.⁽⁵⁾ On 10 April 1527 Imola refused entry to Vettori who reported that all over the Romagna every city was denying admittance to League troops and, indeed, on the following day, Faenza closed its gates to Guido Rangoni and Ugo da Peppoli.⁽⁶⁾

After the sack of Rome it initially appeared as if the Church State would break up completely.⁽⁷⁾ None of the papal administrators could get letters of exchange honoured or raise cash elsewhere for their day to day administration; at Rimini the treasurer abandoned his office and fled to Venice.⁽⁸⁾ Papal officials had no instructions about how they were to act and were left in isolation to make the best of the worst possible situation.⁽⁹⁾ At Modena there had been disturbances and trouble since February when the Guelf Tassoni returned to the city, quarrelled/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 654, 'Qui in questa povera città (Piacenza) non gli e altro salvo in atendere a lo bastionare la terra continuamente, et a buttare per terra certi belli edificii quali erano fora di la terra, zoe la Chiesa di Nazareth, la Misericordia, Santo Antonio, Santo Lazaro et ogni altro edificio appresso la terra per doi miglia'
 2. See below p. 294.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 216-7, 454, *ibid.* xlvi. 459.
 4. *Ibid.* xliv. 476.
 5. *Ibid.* 329, 331 'Per essera Bologna mi par esser al purgatorio'.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 496.
 7. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 526.
 8. E. Benoist, Guichardin (Marseilles 1862), 410, Modena, Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.9a ff.161, 191.
 9. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.9a ff.163, 172, 192.

quarrelled with the Rangoni, led a movement refusing to accept the billeting of League soldiers within the city,⁽¹⁾ and renewed their quarrel with the Poiani.⁽²⁾ The population had assisted in the financing and building of new fortifications to strengthen the city defences⁽³⁾ but although it was said to be ready to defend itself against any attack by the imperialists it is clear that only the presence of a substantial papal garrison kept Modena loyal to the papacy.⁽⁴⁾ On 1 June the unpaid papal troops, whose pay had fallen due on 5 May, began to drift away and Lodovico Rangoni, who had been left in military control of the city, was unable to hold it with the 900 troops left at his disposal. When the duke of Ferrara, ignoring Venetian advice, threatened to devastate the harvest the Estensi party inside Modena offered the city to him and he took possession on 6 June.⁽⁵⁾

Venice took control of Ravenna and Cervia and occupied Parma and Piacenza in the name of the Church. Sigismondo Malatesta re-entered Rimini. Bologna expelled the papal governor and showed signs of recalling the Bentivoglieri;⁽⁶⁾ and Malatesta and Orazio Baglioni recovered power in Perugia. At Viterbo, the Ghibelline faction, led by Piero da Castel del Piero, Camillo Colonna and Ottaviano Spirito, assaulted the Guelfs and virtually destroyed the ruling party.⁽⁷⁾ Florence also attempted to intervene disruptively in the Church State, at Faenza and Forli, long objects of her ambition, where she feared an extension of Venetian influence. Immediately after the sack, she began to intrigue in Faenza and offered both towns assistance if they would revolt from the pope and place themselves under Florentine protection.⁽⁸⁾

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1. Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.8a f.545-6, 549, n.9a f.46.
 2. Ibid. n.8a f.546.
 3. Ibid. f.521.
 4. Ibid. ff.518-519.
 5. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi Studii sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 30
Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 148-9, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 253,
Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato, n.9a ff.153-5, n.8a f.98,
Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 249.
 6. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 526, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 255, 292.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 247.
 8. Ibid.

All normal government of the church broke down completely during the captivity of Clement and even after his escape. A forlorn attempt was made by a group of pro-League cardinals to govern in the papal name, as during a vacancy, the only possible precedent. Centred at Parma, they tried to salvage as much of the papal dignity as possible. Lautrec, whom they continually urged to rescue the pope, went out of his way to defer to them.⁽¹⁾ Despite the predicament of Clement, they remained staunchly anti-imperialist and instructed the Romagnol towns not to surrender to the imperialists, even if expressly ordered to do so by the pope.⁽²⁾ In July 1527 when the terms of the papal-imperial agreement became known Cybo and Cortona moved immediately to Parma and Piacenza to prevent their surrender to the imperialists.⁽³⁾ At the end of November, 1527, this group of cardinals comprised Farnese, Cortona, Cybo, Ridolfi and Gonzaga⁽⁴⁾ but they were so lacking in any real authority that the best they could do to advance the League was to permit Lautrec to extract what money he could from the papal towns, something he would probably have done in any case.

Where resident papal legates were already active they continued to represent papal authority and were sometimes even granted additional powers by Clement; Wolsey was granted full papal powers in England for the duration of the pope's captivity.⁽⁵⁾ Elsewhere the continuity of papal government was maintained by bishops who retired from Rome to their sees, sometimes the first occasion on which they had visited them; Accolti, for example, fled to Ancona where he exercised a considerable influence over civic affairs and attained an unusual/

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1. See above p. 227-9. They agreed to his extraction of money from Parma and to the alliance with Ferrara for whose terms they promised papal confirmation, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 170, 302, 326, 336, 337.
 2. Ibid. 327.
 3. See above p. 204-5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 292, Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 97.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 337. Cybo negotiated the League alliance with Ferrara, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 138, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 421 and see below p. 246. Sansovino considered that Cybo was the most important of the group. He says that it was Cybo who thwarted a move by Francis to get the cardinals to move to Avignon. Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 97.
 5. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1539.

unusual political importance.⁽¹⁾ But confusion was inevitable; within a month of the sack of Rome so many problems had arisen about provisions to benefices that Clement was urged to delegate this part of his authority to special officials.⁽²⁾

Those ecclesiastics who had been absent from Rome or who had subsequently escaped, formed the nucleus of a party which was strong enough to reassert papal independence. The pope is never so powerful as when in captivity and, from the first, Clement had been careful to preserve all the papal dignities intact. A bull of 15 July 1527 referred to the possibility that the pope might die while still in prison, and empowered the cardinals in the event of this happening to meet in Bologna, Perugia or Ancona for the election of a new pope, or, if these cities were under interdict or in open rebellion against the church, at Florence, Turin or Mantua.⁽³⁾ In this Clement had the full support of the Sacred College for, if Charles V had been trying to alienate the princes of the church he could have found no more effective means than the sack of Rome. The cardinals rallied to the pope and there was a marked change of attitude even in those who had formerly supported the emperor. In January 1529 Mai reported to Spain; 'The majority of the cardinals are unfriendly to me on account of the ruthless havoc committed by our soldiery throughout Italy from Piedmont to Apulia'.⁽⁴⁾ Quinones, recently created Cardinal Santacroce, had always been considered an imperialist but in March 1529 he warned Mai that he wished to behave like a good ecclesiastic, since, 'If he did not serve God first he could not serve the Emperor afterwards'.⁽⁵⁾ When, a few days later, the pope fell ill, the Sacred College, led by Farnese, who had been forced into a position of pre-eminence, which paved his own path to the papacy, made it quite plain that they would preserve the church's independence at any cost even that of a schism.⁽⁶⁾

Nevertheless, on arrival at Orvieto, Clement must have been tempted to/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi, 608.
 2. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1460.
 3. Ibid. 1481.
 4. Pastor, Papacy, x. 41.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 945.
 6. Ibid. 946. Independence from French and English interference as well as Spanish. The cardinals refused to countenance suggestions that they should move to Avignon.

to despair. He had no money and no means of carrying on the ordinary government of the church. He did not even have available a curial official with the necessary knowledge to write a brief.⁽¹⁾ The cardinals were absent, Clement's most reliable supporters still imperial hostages. At the end of December there were still only four cardinals with the pope although in January he summoned another three.⁽²⁾ But, of these seven, three were new appointments with little knowledge of the working of the Sacred College. In March Orsini and De Cessis, who had been held as securities were released⁽³⁾ and little by little things began to improve as numerous prelates found their way to Orvieto⁽⁴⁾ where the normal business of the Curia was resumed. But poverty was common to all, not least to the pope. On 23 January Roberto Boschetti visited Clement who told him, 'they have plundered me of all I possess, even the canopy above my bed is not mine, it is borrowed'.⁽⁵⁾ The English envoys were shocked by the pope's condition and horrified to be received by him, sitting on a form which had been covered with an old coverlet, 'not worth 20d'.⁽⁶⁾ Of the cardinals who had for the most part dismissed their personal servants⁽⁷⁾ only Piero Gonzaga was able to live according to his rank.⁽⁸⁾ It was remarked, however, that although the cardinals had been reduced to the customs of the early church their morals had suffered no similar radical change, 'et per uno iulio si venderebbe Christo'.⁽⁹⁾

There had been a complete revolution as far as the papal advisers were concerned. Giberti had left the court and had retired to his bishopric. Schomberg's influence had completely evaporated since the sack of Rome. Presumably Clement now found his pronounced pro-imperialism somewhat irritating./

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 378.
 2. Dal Monte, Spinola (Perugia), Accolti (Ravenna), Ridolfi, Trani, Gonzaga, and Pucci (Sanctorum Quator).
 3. Pastor, Papacy, x. 3 and see above p. 209.
 4. E.g. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 235.
 5. Pastor, Papacy, x. 2.
 6. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1819.
 7. Gal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 244.
 8. Pastor, Papacy, x. 4.
 9. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 488.

irritating. The pope's closest advisers were his secretary, the famous humanist Giovambattista, Sanga, the pro-French Salviati and Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, who Clement was subsequently to select as his successor. As far as Florence was concerned the greatest influence on the pope was, undoubtedly, his old friend, Cardinal Pucci, but he never showed any concern for matters which did not concern Florence directly.⁽¹⁾

It was impossible to see how the papal finances could ever recover, Clement was still burdened with enormous debts to the imperialists, the Church State was in total disorder, so devastated in parts that no taxation could be imposed, and the revenues from the valuable salt-pans at Cervia were in Venetian hands.⁽²⁾

Clement was pre-occupied with many other problems: with Florence; with the situation in Rome and the Church State; with his relations with the emperor. Against the background of the sack of Rome he was gradually evolving new policies while watching the progress of the Neapolitan expedition and the Lombardy campaigns. Not least, his mind was turning once more to church reform. On Palm Sunday 1528 he addressed the cardinals and prelates of the church on the need for reform of the Curia and spoke of the sack of Rome as just chastisement for the Church's sins.⁽³⁾

His continued residence in Orvieto put considerable strain on that city's resources.⁽⁴⁾ Famine threatened and it was decided that Clement should move to Viterbo where the fortress had come into papal hands once more at the beginning of April. On 3 March a deputation from Rome had visited Clement at Orvieto and invited him to return to the city whose desecrated churches had now been purified. Clement replied that scarcity and disorder, combined with the uncertain outcome of the Neapolitan war, made such a move impractical. When the delegates begged that at least the officials of the Ruota and Cancellaria might go back Clement agreed, after consultation with Campeggio.⁽⁵⁾ A few days later, Clement also/

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1. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 267-9, Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 169-170. There is a marked continuity in policy in the later years of Clement VII's pontificate and that of Paul III.
 2. See above p. 214-221.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 235.
 4. Ibid. xlvi. 580.
 5. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 46, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 96-7, 235, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 626.

also arranged for Gonzaga, de Cessis and Pucci to return to Rome⁽¹⁾ but, because of famine in the city, the officials in question delayed their return until the last days of April.⁽²⁾ In preparation for their arrival the imperial lodgings above the papal apartments in the Vatican were destroyed.⁽³⁾ Although a further deputation from Rome again begged the pope to return to his city, Clement felt that before he had regained control of the fortresses of Ostia and Civitavecchia, he would not be able to support the cost of defending Rome against a renewed attack from any quarter.⁽⁴⁾ Accordingly on 1 June he removed to Viterbo. In the same month, Cardinal Campeggio, who was to go as papal legate to England, was replaced at Rome by Farnese and Clement spoke of soon going there himself should it prove at all feasible.⁽⁵⁾ But renewed disturbances between the Orsini and the Colonna, which necessitated finding money for an escort of infantry and cavalry, again delayed the pope's departure and it was not until 22 September that Clement dispatched del Valle and Sanseverino to prepare the city for his return.⁽⁶⁾ On 5 October, having first created Quinones a cardinal, Clement left Viterbo where he had suffered a scarcity of all commodities, except water.⁽⁷⁾ That night the papal court was lodged at Nepi.⁽⁸⁾ On 6 October, in a severe thunderstorm⁽⁹⁾ Clement re-entered Rome, escorted by 200 infantry and 500 cavalry. He went first to St. Peter's to pray and thence to the Vatican. One of his first actions was to re-issue a proclamation forbidding reprisals against any imperial subject in Rome or the Church State,⁽¹⁰⁾ his previous instructions on this point having been more frequently honoured in the breach than the observance, particularly by the Orsini;⁽¹¹⁾ the abbot of Farfa who had given refuge to many Guelphs at Bracciano/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 235.
 2. Pastor, Papacy, x. 15, Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 46.
 3. Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 47.
 4. Pastor, Papacy, x. 19-20, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 359.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 127-8.
 6. Ibid. xlvi. 515, 542, xlix. 18.
 7. Ibid. xlvi. 128, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 353, Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 262.
 8. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 172.
 9. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 353.
 10. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 827.
 11. Molini, Documenti, ii. 21, Omont, Suites du Sac de Rome, 53 reports a case of vengeance taken on a Spaniard at Rome on 27 March 1528.

Bracciano had occupied himself in summarily executing any imperial subject who fell into his hands.⁽¹⁾

With Clement's return Rome seemed to revive. On the day after his return the pope summoned the cardinals and conservators in order to confer with them about the restoration of the city.⁽²⁾ Despite the desperate food shortage⁽³⁾ shops began to reopen and houses were rebuilt.⁽⁴⁾ On 14 October Clement summoned the cardinals to return to Rome but court life was voluntarily restricted.⁽⁵⁾ The terrible shortage of grain had an important effect on Clement's policies for continued famine kept the pope dependent on the good-will of the emperor who could licence the export of vital grain supplies from Sicily and Naples to Rome.⁽⁶⁾

This, however, was but one of a number of complex pressures which drove Clement into a closer understanding with the emperor. Outwardly the pope maintained an attitude of strict neutrality. He expressed himself at length and with impartial bitterness on the subject of both the League and the imperialists. He requested Venice to see that all League troops be removed from the Church State, 'maxime le genti fiorentini che fanno danni grandissimi'.⁽⁷⁾ When Florence, in turn, urged the pope to declare for the League her ambassadors were told that when one of the League armies had won a single victory Clement might consider such a declaration.⁽⁸⁾ Clement greeted Lautrec's expedition with a singular lack of enthusiasm, for, he pointed out that, as the League had failed to rescue him when he was in prison, it was pointless for Lautrec to advance now that he was at liberty. If Lautrec came to invade Naples he was merely jeopardising the/

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1. Guazzo, Historie, 69.
 2. Pastor, Papacy, x. 32.
 3. See above p. 196-7.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 134.
 5. Ibid. 134, 155; Pastor, Papacy, x. 29.
 6. E.g. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 2141, Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 157. For the question of the papacy and Sicilian wheat in general see D. Mack Smith, A History of Sicily. Medieval Sicily 800-1713 (London 1968) 162, 176.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 378.
 8. Ibid. 499.

the position of Francis's sons in Spain.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, when the Spanish envoy spoke of an alliance with Charles, Clement replied that he would first like to have his state and his friends returned to him, 'non dice Roma, perche l'è tutta ruinato et a habuto danno a 10 miliona d'oro'.⁽²⁾ In fact papal diplomacy was to be entirely directed towards a restoration of the states of the Church and of Florence. There was nothing surprising about this. It would have been surprising if Clement, or for that matter any other pope had pursued a different course. It was all very well for humanists and reformers to affirm that the strength of the papacy ultimately lay in divesting itself of its power.⁽³⁾ It would have required superhuman faith for a sixteenth-century pope to have acted on this assertion. Clement VII, it is clear, had his fair share of human weaknesses and he was above all things an Italian prince who wanted to be able to resist external domination of Italy. In addition he had to reckon with public opinion which, as even a reformer like Valdés realised, expected that a pope would protect and fight for his own;

'The people of Italy would look down on a pope who didn't wage war. They would think it a great insult if a single inch of Church land were lost'.⁽⁴⁾

Recognising this trend in papal diplomacy and hoping to regain the pope, the League held many vital towns for him in the Church State and Lautrec was persuaded to recover Rimini.⁽⁵⁾ Clement even toyed with the idea of getting the French to attack Siena on his behalf.⁽⁶⁾

These efforts by the League made the emperor aware at last that to win Clement over he would have to make substantial concessions. Originally his behaviour had not been conciliatory. On 21 July he first designated Pierre de Veyre ambassador to Italy, although de Veyre did not leave until 18 August. He was instructed to express to Clement the emperor's regret for the sack of Rome. But the sack was to be attributed to divine intervention and de Veyre was/

1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 383.

2. Ibid.

3. E.g. ed. P.S. & H.M. Allen, Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, denuo recognitum et auctum (Oxford 1906-34) vii. 78.

4. Ed. J. Longhurst, Alfonso de Valdés and the Sack of Rome (Albuquerque 1952), 34.

5. See below p. 268, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 567.

6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 449.

was to express the opinion that it had cleared away all obstacles to a universal peace and church reform and was to announce the emperor's intention of coming to Italy. Increasingly, however, Charles needed to conciliate the pope. The Turk was still threatening an invasion of Hungary and England and France had drawn closer together. By 30 April 1527 they had reached agreement on all outstanding differences and on 29 May Henry VIII had promised to subsidise the French campaign in Italy. Meanwhile at Burgos the French and English ambassadors acted in complete concord. On 21 January 1528 they took formal leave of the emperor, and on the following day England and France declared war on Spain.⁽¹⁾

With Clement the emperor had still made little progress. Although the pope's return to Rome was held to be a pro-imperial move,⁽²⁾ outwardly Clement still maintained his neutrality and continued his negotiations with both sides.⁽³⁾ The imperialists, therefore, now offered to restore Ravenna and Cervia at a price of 40,000-50,000 ducats, Modena for 25,000 and Reggio and Rubiera for a further 25,000.⁽⁴⁾

This was most likely to be a successful diplomatic move for Clement was single-minded in his determination to reassert the integrity of the Church State. On Good Friday 1528 he made his position symbolically clear when, in one day, he excommunicated Florence, Venice for her possession of Ravenna and Cervia, and Ferrara for her occupation of Modena and Reggio; and at the beginning of May he asked the marquis of Mantua to defend Parma and Piacenza for the papacy against either the League or the emperor.⁽⁵⁾ Meanwhile all citizens of the Church State serving in foreign armies were ordered home, a move obviously directed against the duke of Urbino, and stricter control was imposed on all towns within the Church State; the keys of each, normally held by the citizens, were to be handed over to the papal governor.⁽⁶⁾

In September 1528 Clement determined to begin making serious advances to the emperor, who by the end of the month had firmly promised a restoration of/

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1. Brandi, Charles V, 259-265.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 133. The news was greeted at Naples by public celebrations.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 969-70.
 4. Ibid. 977-8.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 426, 438, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 247.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 85.

of Medici rule in Florence.⁽¹⁾ Clement told Contarini that he was on good terms with Charles V, that Miguel Mai, the newly-appointed imperial ambassador, was expected from Spain, that it was anticipated he would restore Ostia and Civitavecchia and free the two cardinal-hostages, Pisano and Trivulzio.⁽²⁾ In response to this, on 1 October, the French ambassador promised Clement that Ravenna and Cervia would be restored as soon as he declared his adhesion to the League, and that Modena and Reggio would be restored simultaneously with the pope acting in French interests.⁽³⁾ But it was already clear that, if what the pope sought was a speedy reintegration of his state, his interests must lie with the emperor and by mid-October the only negotiations going forward at Rome were those between the pope and the imperialists.⁽⁴⁾ Fresh French proposals were made at the beginning of November⁽⁵⁾ but were not accepted by the pope who was already refusing to include the Venetians in his peace-talks.⁽⁶⁾ On 30 December Quinones arrived from Spain and was immediately provided with a lodging close to the papal apartments although he had brought no concrete proposals for peace.⁽⁷⁾ In January he left for Naples to negotiate for the surrender of Ostia and Civitavecchia, for the liberation of the hostages and for peace. His place at Rome was taken by Mai.⁽⁸⁾ A serious illness of the pope had released a flood of popular demonstrations against the emperor which convinced the imperialists that it would be expedient to release the cardinal hostages and surrender Civitavecchia and Ostia. Accordingly, on Easter Monday, 18,000 ducats were paid into the hands of the imperialists and the two towns were restored to the pope.⁽⁹⁾

The condition of the Church State was driving Clement towards an alliance with the emperor. The disruptive antics of the abbot of Farfa, who had declared himself as an adherent of France and a member of the League, were/

1. Pastor, Papacy, x. 26-8, Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 22.

2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 22.

3. Pastor, Papacy, x. 28.

4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 134.

5. Ibid., 184-6.

6. Ibid., 185.

7. Pastor, Papacy, x. 35.

8. Ibid., 38.

9. Ibid., 43.

were seriously hampering the restoration of papal authority in the Campagna. At the beginning of March he had captured two barges bringing vital supplies of corn to Rome. This action was condemned by the pope and by the whole of the Sacred College, who threatened to use the Colonna against the abbot. Salviati warned Casale that the outrages committed by the abbot would certainly compel the pope to become an imperialist as they would drive him into the arms of the Colonna.⁽¹⁾ But the emperor's main advantage remained his promise to restore the Medici to Florence, for Capponi fell in April⁽²⁾ and the consequent increased bitterness manifested against the Medici in Florence had convinced Clement that he could only recover the city by force.⁽³⁾ By the Treaty of Barcelona (29 June 1529) Charles virtually committed himself to creating a Medici principality in Tuscany, for it was agreed that Alessandro de' Medici should marry the emperor's daughter, Margaret. Charles promised to preserve the integrity of the duchy of Milan, although the whole question of Sforza's guilt was still to be decided. A total reintegration of the Church State was promised, including Ravenna, Cervia, Modena, Reggio and Rubiera. Ferrara was to forfeit his duchy and Charles agreed to assist Clement in executing this papal sentence. Agreement was reached over the related vexed questions of the census of Naples and provisions to Neapolitan bishoprics, the pope handing over to the emperor and his successors, nomination to 24 Neapolitan bishoprics.⁽⁴⁾

The emperor's support for the pope at this juncture was of vital importance for, as in Tuscany,⁽⁵⁾ within the Church State the sack of Rome was followed by rebellion and general political upheaval. On the whole, however, political change proved to be short-lived while economic decline, also associated with the sack, was more permanent. By 1527 the central papal government, basing its power on diversified forms of local autonomy, had become so effective that no revolutionary movement could achieve more than temporary success. The/

1. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 202.

2. See below p. 286.

3. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, 158-9.

4. Ibid. 160-1, Molini, Documenti, ii. 230, Pastor, Papacy, xi. 56-7.

5. See below p. 270-300.

The improvement in the government of the Church State had come not so much from centralising institutions, a policy which had been attempted with some success by Cesare Borgia, as from the introduction of constitutions enjoying papal protection and the replacement of bad governors by good. As the old tyrants and vicars were removed, they were replaced by papal nominees, but these men were often as powerful within their own area as the tyrants they replaced. Papal legates and governors received princely salaries; the presidents of the six legations (Bologna, the March, Romagna, Patrimony, Perugia, Campagna) each received a salary of 1,200 ducats a year, and as governor of Modena alone, Guicciardini received the same salary.⁽¹⁾ Theoretically the direct representatives of the papacy, the governors were subjected to no law or rule and they had total power over the life and death of their subjects; 'The Pope being far off and occupied with much greater affairs, his subjects can only have recourse to him at vast expense and with great difficulty, and very little likelihood of success, so they think it a lesser evil to bear the injuries done them by their governors than to seek a remedy, losing time and money and further provoking those who are in a position to damage them. Hence the Governor both is and seems the master of the city'.⁽²⁾ To enforce authority each of the presidents had at his command a detachment of the Swiss guard.⁽³⁾

In such a context, the collapse of the central government, although serious, did not mean total disaster. What happened depended on the quality of the papal representatives and on peculiar local conditions. It is clear that church reform had begun to yield some surprising dividends. The corruption and venality in Rome during former pontificates often led to a situation where the pope was forced to depend on corrupt administrators. Alexander VI, for instance, recognised the need for administrative reform in the Church State, but had few good servants among his cardinals. The high quality both of the Sacred College and of the pope's personal friends, servants and advisers, during Clement's pontificate led to better government of the Church's temporal possessions.⁽⁴⁾

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1. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 58, P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento, 202.
 2. Quoted in Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 58. For the kind of authority which a governor did exercise see Guicciardini's governorships in *ibid.* 64-84 and see Modena Arch. di Stato, Rettori dello Stato n.8a ff.601-2.
 3. P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento, 202.
 4. Few contemporaries were prepared to admit that such an improvement had taken place, e.g. Ed. J. Longhurst, Alfonso de Valdés and the Sack of Rome (Albuquerque 1952), 41.

There was no lack of potential support for the emperor in the Church State. In 1525 Guicciardini described the divisions in the Romagna wher; 'i pensieri e le pratiche sono volte a principi forestieri; i guelfi a Francia o a chi venisse con quello favore, l'altro allo imperatore; in modo che la verita e che la chiesa non ci ha parte ne amici, e questi ghibellini massime sono volti tutti a Cesare'.⁽¹⁾ But the emperor and his agents had never exploited this situation and the Church State benefited from the lack of political involvement of Charles V in this area. Apart from the imperial agreement with the Colonna and some use of the Bentivoglieri,⁽²⁾ Charles V had no agents in the Church State and failed to make use of the many fuorusciti available. At Perugia, for instance, he made no use of the Ghibelline Oddi nor of such Ghibelline towns as Foligno and Assisi. His lack of interest in the Church State contrasts with the attitude of the French who negotiated with various powerful families in the Romagna.⁽³⁾ So, apart from Ferrara, there was no single power able to effect a permanent change in the Church State, and, even here, an exception must be made, for Modena was captured with imperial assistance and was retained with the same support. Elsewhere Este was less successful. He had hoped to move on from Modena to Parma and Piacenza but the Spanish troops of de Leyva, who were to have helped him, refused to do so; his attempts to restore the Bentivoglieri to Bologna were an ignominious failure; and, even though it was with Este's connivance that Sigismondo Malatesta returned to Rimini, his stay was of a remarkably short duration.⁽⁴⁾

Although one of the immediate results of the sack of Rome had been the permanent immigration of many Roman citizens to the Roman castelli and particularly/

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1. Quoted in T. Pandolfi, 'Giovanni Matteo Giberti e l'ultima difesa della liberta d'Italia negli'anni 1524-1525', Arch. della R. Soc. Romana di Storia Patria, xxxiv, 212.
 2. See above chapter iii.
 3. E.g. with Guido Rangoni who had interests in Modena, Ravenna and Rimini, with Perugia, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 964 and with Valerio Orsini who had interests in the March of Ancona, Nardi, Historie, 199.
 4. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi Studi sul Sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xlvii. 30-31 and see below p. 268-9.

particularly to the papal and Orsini estates,⁽¹⁾ the sack, in combination with the antecedent war, famine and plague,⁽²⁾ nonetheless finally ruined the prosperity of the Campagna. In the following years land there changed hands for practically nothing.⁽³⁾ A commission of cardinals, authorised by Clement, sold off 30 church holdings in the Campagna, including whole communes like Riano and Ronciglione and were still only able to raise 192,855 scudi.⁽⁴⁾ The contado for 30-50 miles around Rome had been reduced to a wilderness.⁽⁵⁾ In July 1527 the imperial army had raided and sacked all the confines of Rome and had returned to Narni, a papal town with Orsini connections, to punish it for refusing free passage and supplies on the journey south.⁽⁶⁾ Narni was subjected to a terrible sack at the hands both of the imperialists and of the neighbouring Ternani, their traditional enemies, which lasted for two weeks and in October the town was described as, 'desolata dalle persone'. All the small neighbouring towns were similarly depopulated, burnt or destroyed.⁽⁷⁾ Terni, Sutri and Vetralla had all been sacked.⁽⁸⁾

In the Campagna banditry had always been a way of life for some but, with the breakdown of the civil government, all curbs on it were removed. In December 1527 communications between Rome and Orvieto were still so insecure that an armed cavalry escort was needed for any messenger, and, despite constant efforts by the pope, in the following March the road was still only kept open by armed force.⁽⁹⁾ The less reputable members of the Orsini family overtly encouraged and participated in acts of violence. In December Cardinal dal Monte, Cardinal/

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1. Tomassetti, Campagna Roma, i. 179, Cornelius de Fine, 'Diarium' f.98v., Delumeau, Rome, 527.
 2. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.113.
 3. Delumeau, Rome, 534, Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, i. 213, A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.119v.
 4. Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, i. 213.
 5. Molini, Documenti, ii. 21.
 6. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 324.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 241.
 8. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.53 f.119v, Tomassetti, Campagna Romana, iii. 188.
 9. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 520, 626, 635.

Cardinal Pucci and the bishop of Salamanca were captured and robbed by Mario Orsini at Bracciano.⁽¹⁾ The abbot of Farfa, Napoleone Orsini, presumably feeling that banditry on land was not yielding sufficient profit, took to piracy, and, having acquired two armed vessels, seized all merchant vessels entering or leaving the Tiber.⁽²⁾ Those ships which were lucky enough to escape his depredations were subjected to arbitrary tolls or to seizure of goods by the Spanish garrison at Ostia.⁽³⁾ The Colonna were using the opportunity provided by the collapse of civil government to increase and consolidate their territorial control in the Campagna. In early January 1528 Ascanio and Sciarra Colonna captured three castelli close to Orvieto.⁽⁴⁾ In April Sciarra, with 70 light cavalry and 700 infantry, was raiding the Campagna up to the very gates of Rome.⁽⁵⁾ The imperial army, based at Rome, also continued to create havoc; in the first week of January 1528 the imperialists sacked and burned five Colonna castles, including Velleteri.⁽⁶⁾

In April 1528 a situation arose which suggests very well the difficulties Clement experienced in recovering papal authority in the Church State. Vespasiano Colonna, having chosen this inopportune moment to die (13 March 1528), left all his property to his only child, Isabella, and desired that she should marry Ippolito de' Medici or Luigi Gonzaga. Regarding with horror the prospect of a Medici entering into so substantial a Colonna property, Ascanio Colonna claimed Vespasiano's inheritance through the male line of Prospero Colonna. Certainly the legal position was by no means clear,⁽⁷⁾ but Clement forestalled any action by Ascanio and occupied the disputed properties. To add insult to injury he effected the occupation with the assistance of the abbot of Farfa. The Colonna, the Savelli and Ottaviano Spirito immediately began to gather troops to use against Farfa.⁽⁸⁾ In April Sciarra Colonna, with 200 cavalry and 600 infantry, entered/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 520.
 2. Ibid. 560, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 202.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 348-9.
 4. Ibid. xlvi. 468.
 5. Ibid. xlvi. 336.
 6. Ibid. xlvi. 489.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 626, 868.
 8. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 18.

entered Vespasiano's estates and attacked Paliano which was guarded by Luigi Gonzaga with 300 infantry.⁽¹⁾ With inside help, on 4 May, the Colonna entered the town although they were unable to take the fortress. Gonzaga, who had been forewarned, immediately left the city in order to raise reinforcements.⁽²⁾ Clement had meanwhile offered protection to Isabella who, with her mother Giulia Gonzaga, took refuge in Rome,⁽³⁾ whither Clement had dispatched 400 troops for the defence of the city.⁽⁴⁾ The struggle continued with the Orsini being drawn in on the papal side. At the end of the first week of May Luigi Gonzaga forced his way back into Paliano, and recaptured many of its dependent villages.⁽⁵⁾ In September Sciarra Colonna captured and sacked Agnani, a papal town.⁽⁶⁾ On 22 September an attempt was made to capture Cardinal Orsini who barely escaped with his life to Civitacastellana.⁽⁷⁾ When Clement remonstrated with the Colonna about these latest outrages he was politely informed; 'che ne le terre di la Chiesa sono per haver a Soa Santita ogni rispetto et reverentia; ma nel vendicarsi di loro nemici non vogliono già mancare di fare quanto potranno'.⁽⁸⁾ Clement had hoped to persuade the emperor to assist him in defeating Sciarra, but this help was not forthcoming, and it was not until the end of October that the area was once more under papal control.⁽⁹⁾

Similar events caused disturbances in Camerino. This town, second in importance of the towns of the March, with an estimated income of 10,000 gold florins in 1492⁽¹⁰⁾ and vital to communications between Ancona and Rome, had,/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 359, D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 371.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 390, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 342.
 3. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 371.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvii. 336, 359.
 5. Ibid. 421, 439.
 6. Ibid. xlviii. 542.
 7. Ibid. xlix. 18.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ibid. xlix. 155, Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 158-9.
 10. P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento, 267.

had, for more than two centuries, been dominated by the Varano family, whose ruling member Giovanni Maria Varano, had been created duke of Camerino in 1515 by Leo X, whose niece, Caterina Cybo, had married Giovanni Maria. In August 1527 he died, leaving as his only child a daughter, Giulia, whom Clement had intended to succeed to Camerino, since the rival branch of the Camerino family were exiles in Ferrara and had married into the Estensi and Colonna families. In his will Giovanni Maria unexpectedly requested that Giulia should marry into this rival branch of the family.⁽¹⁾ It was a situation which, even in normal times, would have caused disturbance, and these were not normal. Giulia immediately became the coveted bride of every enterprising adventurer in Italy, including Guidobaldo della Rovere, who had been promised Giulia's hand by her mother, Caterina Cybo, against the wishes of the pope, the Sacred College, and Orazio Baglioni who wished to marry her to his son. With the duke of Urbino's consent, Orazio set out now for Camerino, which had meanwhile been attacked by Sciarra Colonna, acting for his cousin Ridolfi Varano, the illegitimate son of Duke Giovanni Maria, and Ercole Varano of Ferrara. For a year the duchy was devastated by the disputants until Ercole and Ridolfi were driven out by Guidobaldo della Rovere.⁽²⁾ During the vacancy which followed Clement's death, Caterina Cybo, flouting the wishes of the entire Sacred College, hurriedly married her daughter to Guidobaldo. This provided an excellent excuse for Paul III to excommunicate the two women and to make war on them, until, in 1542, the duchy was incorporated into the direct domain of the Church.⁽³⁾

The March of Ancona had always been one of the most prosperous areas of Italy.⁽⁴⁾ But, inevitably, it could not escape the disturbances of these months. Some time previously the Anconitani had captured Castelfidardo and had garrisoned it with 1,000 infantry whose captains included a number of exiles from Civitanova,

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1. E.I. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 228, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 393, Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 98-99.
 2. E.I. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 228, Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 99.
 3. Antonio Archi, Il Tramonto dei Principati in Italia (Bologna 1962), 38-9.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.3 pp.87-8.

Civitanova, south of Ancona. During the confusion which followed the sack of Rome the exiles, using troops from Castelfidardo, and without the consent of Ancona, made an attempt to take over Civitanova.⁽¹⁾ In several small towns the Ghibelline faction seized power from the reigning Guelfs. However, some semblance of papal authority in the March was swiftly recovered by Valerio Orsini. Having escaped from Rome during the sack he gathered a private army of veterans, under a condotta of Francis I, with which to defend the area.⁽²⁾ At Fermo, where he had important family connexions with the reigning Guelf Brancadori, and where the opposing faction led by Federigo Guerriero had seized power, refusing to acknowledge the authority of the papal vicelegate, Orsini successfully reimposed papal authority and destroyed the opposing faction. The same was done throughout the neighbouring towns.⁽³⁾

Ancona itself, always the richest and most independent of the communes of the March, was still in 1527 one of the most prosperous cities in Italy, remaining independent until 1532, with a mercantile elite of Jews and Florentines and a long tradition of commercial and cultural links with other trading cities, particularly Bologna and Venice. It was one of the principal ports for the east, full of merchants from every country, including Turkey, which kept up regular trade.⁽⁴⁾ In 1522 the city handled trade worth 500,000 ducats.⁽⁵⁾ The sack of Rome and the events which followed led to an immediate decline in Ancona's prosperity. Although the March was one of the most fertile areas in Italy shortage there was so acute in February 1528 that Accolti had to beg wheat for Ancona from Venice at the cost of declaring his support for the Venetian occupation of Ravenna and Cervia.⁽⁶⁾

The fortunes of Perugia appeared to be linked to the fortunes of Florence, /

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 207.
 2. Francesco Sansovino, De gli Huomini illustri di Casa Orsina (Venice 1565), i.84.
 3. Nardi, Istorie, 199.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.3, 87-88, P. Partner, The Papal State under Martin V, (London 1958), 179.
 5. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.3, 87.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 608.

Florence, for Perugia was the outward bastion of the Florentine defence system to the south and her existence as a semi-autonomous state suited a Florentine republican regime. The ruling Baglioni had strong ties with powerful families throughout Italy and had been favoured by the imperialist Adrian VI. They were related by marriage to the Sforza, Colonna, Orsini, Vitelli, Conti, and Farnese. In addition, the branch of the family to which Malatesta and Orazio belonged was that traditionally opposed to the Medici and the papacy and which counted on the support of the duke of Urbino. This was a most important alliance whose value had long been apparent. From 1503 onwards Gianpaolo Baglioni had worked towards some kind of understanding with the duke of Urbino and many believed that Gianpaolo had failed to prosecute the war of Urbino as vigorously as he should, due to an understanding with the duke. ⁽¹⁾

Perugia was the largest and richest of the Umbrian towns and was of the greatest importance to the papacy to whom a census of 4,000 ducats was paid each year. More than 100 castelli fell within the confines of Perugian jurisdiction, and, counting all the small villages, more than 200 places altogether. The income of the city was in the region of 38,000 ducats. ⁽²⁾ After more than a century of faction fights, surpassed only by those of Siena, Perugia was ruled in 1527 by a papal nominee, Gentile Baglioni who had been appointed by Clement in an attempt to put an end to the civil discord and who had never been popular in the city. In January 1527 there was public rejoicing at the news of the release of his rival, Orazio, from Castel Sant'Angelo. ⁽³⁾ The sack of Rome brought about a palace revolution at Perugia, of little lasting significance, for it changed nothing either in the nature of the government or in the relations of Perugia and the pope. An attempt by the commune to direct its own affairs was frustrated by the intrusion of the Baglioni into city politics. In the vacuum left after the departure of Gentile Baglioni on 13 May 1527 ⁽⁴⁾ some attempt was made to revive the old government of the commune, but it was to prove a shortlived experiment. On 25 June a new constitution was approved; the government was to/

1. D.B.I.

2. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 5 p.429.

3. 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani' A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 309.

4. See above p.65.

to consist of a council of 500 who were to deal with all important business. For the daily administration a council of 50 was to be selected, 'come altre volte era ragionato di fare; ma era stato impedito dalli superiori'.⁽¹⁾ On 12 June Orazio Baglioni, who had escaped from Rome, returned to Perugia, but at first was unable to influence the city as he would have liked, and it was at the command of the commune that on 17 June he made a solemn peace with Gentile.⁽²⁾ Meanwhile the commune continued to make every possible effort to break with papal government. Property once belonging to the commune but now in the possession of Armellino was repossessed as was the legate's palace, and all taxation within the state was henceforth to be paid to the commune and not to the church.⁽³⁾

Already, however, the Baglioni were disturbing the peace of Perugia. Within little more than two weeks of having sworn a solemn peace, in one of those internecine feuds to which the Baglioni family was addicted, Orazio had Gentile and two of his own nephews murdered, and followed this by the assassination of his cousin, Galeotto.⁽⁴⁾ These are colourful enough incidents but neither the lawlessness of the Baglioni nor the attempts of the commune to reassert its independence affected the gradual process by which, since the time of Julius II, the papacy had been acquiring control over Perugia. The relative position of the papacy and Perugia was such that it could only be a matter of time before Baglioni power was eroded. When the papacy was strong as under Julius II, Leo X and Paul III such erosion occurred. When it was weak, as during the period immediately following the sack of Rome there was an apparent resurgence of Baglioni power. The pretensions of the commune had been astutely weakened by successive popes in moments of strength, for by adapting and using the old institutions of government they incorporated Perugia into the Church State. The institutions of government became inextricably tied to papal institutions so that the commune and the papacy stood or fell together. Each advantage won by the papacy militarily over the Baglioni had been followed by the imposition of fresh organs of government until, eventually, by papal intervention Perugia was provided with a constitution opposed to the Baglioni tyranny and enjoying/

1. 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani' A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 317.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. 318-9.

4. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 136.

enjoying papal protection. Among the first acts of Julius II on entering Perugia had been the abolition of the Consiglio dei Dieci, abolished not because it was prejudicial to the church, but because it was incompatible with civil liberties and the legitimate power of the city magistrates.⁽¹⁾ Subsequently Machiavelli reported that this reform had been well-received, 'Il Legato di Perugia scrive continuamente al papa, come continuamente quella terra va di bene in meglio, e che l'universale non potrebbe più stare contento nè più ringraziare Iddio e la Sua Santità che ha preso sesto a trarli di servitu'.⁽²⁾ In 1515 Leo X forced the establishment of an annually elected magistracy, the, 'Dodici di Buono Governo'.⁽³⁾ After the fall of Gianpaolo Baglioni in 1520 Perugia was given another magistracy, the Undici Priori della Ecclesiastica Liberta.⁽⁴⁾

The very names of these magistracies illustrate the way in which the papacy set itself up as the better and lawful government. The papal success is largely explained by the weakness of the Baglioni within Perugia for the basis of their power was very slender. They commanded no popular support and the family was divided within itself, a fact of some importance in Italy, where family loyalty and solidarity was often vital in securing political power.⁽⁵⁾ Like all the signori the Baglioni were weakened by their own struggles with the fuorusciti. In the case of Perugia the situation was complicated by the fact that the city ruled a larger state which contained towns of mixed allegiance, never all loyal to the ruling faction in Perugia.⁽⁶⁾ It was as leaders of the Guelf faction that the Baglioni had first come to power, having the traditional support of the Guelf towns of Spoleto and Camerino. Against them were ranged the Ghibelline Oddi, who commanded the support of such traditional Ghibelline strongholds in Umbria as Foligno and Assisi. Much of the Baglioni energy was directed towards the extermination of Oddi influence inside and outside of Perugia, a process which, being by its nature disruptive of peace and order, was regarded with extreme disfavour by the papacy.

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1. A. Bonazzi, Storia di Perugia, 39, 42.
 2. Machiavelli, Second Legation to Rome, letter xxvii. Cesana 4 October 1506.
 3. A. Bonazzi, Storia di Perugia, 50.
 4. Ibid.
 5. E.g. the success of the Medici, Orsini, Colonna and Soderini.
 6. See above p. 261.

From the first Clement had supported Braccio and Sforza Baglioni in lightning raids on Perugian territory.⁽¹⁾ The ease with which the pope regained control of the city in 1529 demonstrates the slender basis of Baglioni power, its inability to resist any external attack and its lack of support in the city. A combination of military force and direct negotiation with the commune were all that was found necessary to effect the peaceful expulsion of Malatesta and Orazio. On 11 July as Orange advanced on the city an ultimatum was sent to Perugia by the pope, ordering the city to send away all League troops, 'che sua santità ci vuole mandare un legato e vuole ubbidienza'. If the city did not comply with the pope's wishes it would be attacked as anti-imperial by Orange, would be placed under interdict, would be deprived of its liberties and have the university closed.⁽²⁾

The city council at first refused to change its policy⁽³⁾ but, on 10 September, Malatesta was forced by the commune to come to a private agreement with Orange. The Perugians, he was told, had no desire to be rebels of the church or to bring down papal condemnation on themselves. They had already sent a separate embassy to the imperial camp.⁽⁴⁾ It was arranged that Malatesta and his mercenaries were to leave the city with their artillery and were to be allowed to remain in the pay of the Florentines. Orange promised not to impede their departure in any way and not to take reprisals on the property of Malatesta and his adherents which the pope had promised they might freely enjoy.⁽⁵⁾ Perugia thus returned to its previous relations with the Holy See and, on 11 September, Cardinal dal Monte took possession of the city in the pope's name.⁽⁶⁾

In the Church State the League army played a role of the greatest importance, particularly in the north. Here a parallel may effectively be drawn with the Tumulto del Venerdì when the League army intervened at a critical moment and/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 345.
 2. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 161, 'Ricordi della Citta di Perugia dal 1527 al 1530 di Giovanello Bontempi', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 334, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 97.
 3. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 161.
 4. Catani, Ricordi, 224-5.
 5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 99-100, Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 165, Pastor, Papacy, x. 70.
 6. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 165.

and prevented a change of government in Florence.⁽¹⁾ In the months after the sack of Rome the League controlled much of the Church State and continued to improve its position there by fortifying new towns and capturing those still held by the imperialists.⁽²⁾ Civit  Castellana which had been promised to the imperialists by Clement⁽³⁾ in fact was retained by the League.⁽⁴⁾ Venice was instrumental in preserving Parma, Piacenza and Bologna for the papacy. During Bourbon's campaign the relations of Clement and Bologna had been severely strained. There had been incidents concerning troops of the League army and the city,⁽⁵⁾ and, following the sack of Rome, papal authority in Bologna virtually collapsed. The commune expelled all the papal officials and when Casale reached the city in June he found it in upheaval. Preparations were being made to surrender Bologna to the imperialists. With difficulty he managed to raise 1,000 infantry to preserve Bologna as an ecclesiastical city and some of the money for their upkeep was supplied by Venice.⁽⁶⁾ Casale then moved on to Ferrara where he managed to extract from the duke a promise that he would not attack Bologna.⁽⁷⁾ Yet, even without the League's intervention, it is apparent that Bologna was now so much a part of the Church State and the papal party within the city so strong that Bologna would not have returned to the Bentivoglii permanently. An attempt to restore the family, which was to be facilitated by the marriage of a daughter of Annibale Bentivoglii to Lorenzo Malvezzi's son, was thwarted by the ecclesiastical party⁽⁸⁾ in Bologna, led by Ugo da Peppoli, which was powerful enough both to prevent the marriage and to force Lorenzo Malvezzi into voluntary exile,⁽⁹⁾ although disturbances provoked/

1. See below p. 279.

2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 535.

3. See above p. 205.

4. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 148.

5. See above p. 242.

6. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1459-60, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 255, Paruta, Istorie, 462.

7. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1460.

8. The members of the faction so styled themselves, despite the efforts of successive papal governors to maintain a neutral stand towards the factions.

9. Salvatore Muzzi, Annali della Citt  di Bologna, (Bologna 1844), vi. 221-222, Paruta, Istorie, 462.

provoked by the antipapal party continued into the spring of 1529.⁽¹⁾

Initially the intervention of the League in the affairs of Ravenna and Cervia was caused by fear that those two cities would fall to the imperialists. Venice, although her motives for intervention were undoubtedly mixed, had the approval of the League in preserving Ravenna against the peculiarly dangerous combination of the Rasponi fuorusciti and Guido Rangoni. In the early years of his pontificate Clement and his agents had dealt summarily with the Rasponi, who, under the leadership of Ostasio Rasponi, had dominated the government of Ravenna throughout the pontificate of Adrian VI to the perversion of all justice and good administration. Clement had exiled the Rasponi to Ancona and had encouraged all those who had fled from Ostasio's tyranny to return to Ravenna where Guicciardini, as president of the Romagna, had rescinded all acts of the Rasponi family.⁽²⁾

During the early months of 1527 the Rasponi moved to Ferrara, a haven for all refugees from Medici rule, where they negotiated both with the duke and the imperial army. They gained a promise of support from the garrison left by Bourbon at Cortignola, and, following the sack of Rome, began a career of terrorism in the Faventine and Ravenna contadi and of piracy at sea from hideouts in the Comacchio which represented a serious threat to Venetian shipping.⁽³⁾ As early as 24 May aid had been sought by Ravenna from Venice against the duke of Ferrara⁽⁴⁾ and in the first week of June Guido Rangoni arrived with his 400 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, joined with the Rasponi and demanded entrance to Ravenna.⁽⁵⁾ Since the papal representative in Ravenna, Jacobo Guicciardini was totally without resources to meet the threat and Ravenna was determined to keep out the Rasponi, aid was sought from Venice.⁽⁶⁾ The republic dispatched first her constable, Marc Antonio of Faenza, with 200 Venetian infantry and two galleys and, on a second request by the chancellor of Ravenna, who informed the Venetian senate that Ravenna/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, l. 183. For the government of Bologna by Guicciardini from 1531-4 see Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 216-233.
 2. Ed. C. Ricci, Cronache e Documenti, 59.
 3. *Ibid.* 61-2.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 197.
 5. *Ibid.* 325.
 6. Ed. C. Ricci, Cronache e Documenti, 60, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 160.

Ravenna wished to renounce her allegiance to the pope, Alessandro Gavardo with 600 ducats with which to raise troops who were to be handed over to Guicciardini and the commune and two fuste to help combat the Rasponi at sea.⁽¹⁾ On 15 June came the expected attack from the Rasponi, who had corrupted the castellan of Ravenna,⁽²⁾ assisted by Rangoni and by the Spanish garrison from Cortignola. Venice was forced to send fresh reinforcements, 300 infantry and 100 cavalry under Giovanni di Naldo who was instructed to hold the city in the name of the pope and the League.⁽³⁾ The castellan, whose plot had been discovered, surrendered for 400 ducats and Venetian forces occupied the citadel.⁽⁴⁾ The next move came from the city of Ravenna itself, for, in the absence of effective papal authorities, the city government was in chaos. There were faction fights; the property of the Rasponi in the city was sacked; there were disagreements between the citizens and the Venetian troops, and there was no money with which to carry on the government.⁽⁵⁾ An ambassador from the commune, Giovanni Donato, asked the Venetian Senate to take over the government of Ravenna and Venice complied by dispatching a provveditor to the city.⁽⁶⁾ At Cervia events followed a similar course.⁽⁷⁾ Of the two towns Cervia was probably the more valuable. Its contado was peculiarly fertile and its salt-pans one of the largest single sources of papal income, but its inclusion in the Church State was based on dubious legal precedents.⁽⁸⁾ Whatever the legal rights and wrongs of the case, as the months passed it became clear that only the desperate situation had induced Ravenna and Cervia to ask for Venetian assistance and Ravenna, in particular, had no intention of being absorbed into the Venetian empire. In the following months differences arose as Venice tried to use Ravenna to finance part of the Venetian garrison, tried/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 325.
 2. Ibid. 348, 374.
 3. Paruta, Istorie, 457, ed. C. Ricci, Cronache e Documenti, 65.
 4. Ed. C. Ricci, Cronache e Documenti, 66-68, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 348.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 334, Paruta, Istorie, 457.
 6. Paruta, Istorie, 457-8.
 7. Ibid. 458 and see above p. 214-221.
 8. Always a staunchly Ghibelline town, it had in 1384 come under the domination of the Malatesta of Rimini. In 1463 the Malatesta had surrendered it to Venice which retained it until 1509 when forced by Julius II to surrender it.

tried to rule the city directly from Venice, to remove cases from the law-courts of Ravenna to those of Venice, and to take over the grain supplies of the merchants of Ravenna. In December Venice was forced to concede to Ravenna the right to appoint its own officials, to agree to reduce the garrison maintained there, and to reduce the burden of taxation on the city.⁽¹⁾ In the following February fresh agreements had to be made and it is clear that Ravenna was now pressing Venice to permit the return of the despised Rasponi.⁽²⁾

Closely linked with events at Ravenna and Cervia was the situation at Rimini, where the League was responsible for recovering the city for the pope from Sigismondo Malatesta. Although lacking any genuine popular support, Sigismondo, Pandolfo's son, had already returned to Rimini in 1525, whence, in the following year he had been driven out by Clement.⁽³⁾ As soon as news arrived in Rimini of the sack of Rome, the principal families fled the city, taking with them all the food and money and valuables they could carry. With them went the city treasurer, leaving behind troops whose services had only been purchased for the month and Jacobo Guicciardini, the papal administrator, who had no means of raising funds in order to keep the soldiers' loyalty.⁽⁴⁾ Taking advantage of the situation, Sigismondo again returned and raised a defending force of 1,000 infantry and 80 cavalry.⁽⁵⁾ This, however, was no match for the army, which Lautrec, anxious to ingratiate himself with the pope, turned against Rimini in January 1528. On 19 January Sigismondo surrendered to the French leader by an agreement which he hoped would be binding on Clement, although its terms were so favourable to the Malatesta family that this was unlikely; Sigismondo would have been given Meldola, and other properties in the Romagna, his brothers would each have been given a livelihood, and his sister a dowry of 6,000 ducats.⁽⁶⁾ Certainly Clement never implemented the agreement and, using this as an excuse, Sigismondo returned to Rimini after Lautrec's departure south, but without external or internal/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 371-3.
 2. Ibid. 622.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 81.
 4. E. Benoist, Guichardin (Marseilles 1862), 410.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 506.
 6. Ibid. 508-9, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 567-8.

internal support his position was hopeless. In June, Clement, now making determined efforts to reassert papal authority, sent an army of 2,000 infantry of his own troops under the archbishop of Manfredonia against Sigismondo who surrendered on 15 June, taking refuge on Venetian territory.⁽¹⁾ This time, the terms which Sigismondo was able to make were considerably less advantageous. All that he, his family and his adherents were able to salvage in Rimini was the right to enjoy their personal property there.⁽²⁾

It is clear that the sack of Rome, contrary to expectation, far from leading to a decline in papal authority within the Church State, by providing once again the opportunity for a direct collision between the papacy and dissident elements of that state, led to a strengthening of the papal position. In this the events of 1527-9 bear a strong resemblance to events which had tended to occur over the previous fifty years whenever a vacancy occurred in the Holy See. With the death or incapacity of the pope, came a resurgence of all the old powers trying to regain previously held positions of independence. But on each occasion they were weaker and the papacy was stronger, so that it was becoming easier and easier to crush any attempt at rebellion, and once he had regained his liberty, Clement had only to reassert his full authority in order to reintegrate the Church State completely. This Venice failed to realise. Her attitude to the Church State was essentially outdated, for within the Church State the papacy was gradually coming to represent a tradition of good government, opposed to the old fashioned rule by faction and terror. The popes came to be accepted as the natural rulers of the area and gradually consolidated their position within the boundaries determined by the peace settlements of 1529-30, making the Church State one of the most loyal areas of Italy where rebellion was unknown until the great upheaval of the 19th century.

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlviii. 67, 102, 109, 113, 130, Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 238.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlviii. 132-5.

CHAPTER X

Florence, Tuscany and Genoa after the Sack of Rome

'.... la mala contentezza di quel popolo di
Firenze, il quale a questi giorni si è
mostrato di mala dispositione'.

A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.41

I Florence

The events which occurred at Florence between 1527 and 1530 stem directly from the sack of Rome but it is unnecessary to describe again either 'The last Florentine Republic' or the siege of Florence.⁽¹⁾ However, it will be useful to discuss the points of similarity between events in Florence and those elsewhere in Tuscany. Throughout the whole area a series of rebellions reflected the rejection of an unpopular domestic and foreign policy by politically impotent oppositions who resorted to rebellion, lacking other means of influencing the progress of events. Rebellion was of course endemic in the area, but the peculiar circumstances of 1527-30 meant that revolution was more successful than in the past. Tuscany broke down once more into a number of city-states united only by geography. It was a situation uncharacteristic of the period and anathema to Charles V and his successor, Philip II, who felt comfortable only in the company of princes, had no use for the city-state, and who, for a variety of reasons,⁽²⁾ were to exert their power and authority first in regathering the territorial elements of the Florentine state, secondly in creating from it a principality for the Medici family, and finally in uniting it with Siena into an even larger political unit.⁽³⁾

For most of the period between 1512 and 1527 Florence had little freedom of action, being ruled more or less directly by the Medici. In 1526 Clement VII could be described as, 'signore assoluto di Fiorenza',⁽⁴⁾ although he had increased his difficulties by including an extra 30 palleschi in the council responsible for the election of the Accoppiatori.⁽⁵⁾ The importance of Florence in international politics derived from the city's considerable wealth without which the Florentines Leo X and Clement VII would have been unable to finance their military and/

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1. For this see Cecil Roth, The Last Florentine Republic 1527-30 (London 1925) and his bibliography.
 2. See below p. 288-9.
 3. See below p. 291, 299-300.
 4. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.3, 129.
 5. The larger this council became the more likely it was that dissent would be registered in it.

and diplomatic enterprises.⁽¹⁾ It seems probable that the importance attached by the popes to this wealth enabled Florence to insist that she should never openly take part in a coalition against the French since the chief business and much of the capital of Florentine merchants was in France.⁽²⁾ Lack of freedom in Florence to decide on an independent policy extended to the smallest detail and had important practical consequences. Under Clement VII Cortona felt bound to refer any important question to Rome and significant military and political decisions were considerably delayed.⁽³⁾

In Florence, as at Rome,⁽⁴⁾ Clement suffered in contrast with Leo X whose pontificate had fortuitously corresponded with a period of relative prosperity in Florence not repeated at the time of Clement VII.⁽⁵⁾ Many of the major Florentine families had made considerable financial profit out of the pontificate of Leo who had borrowed at 40% interest vast sums from the Chigi, the Ridolfi, the Bini, the Salviati and the Gaddi.⁽⁶⁾ Leo had been equally fortunate in that his political intrigues had benefited Florence. He who spoke of the city as, 'the light of his eyes',⁽⁷⁾ had granted the whole state of Montefeltre and San Leo to Florence in recompense for that city's expenditure during the War of Urbino;⁽⁸⁾ and, from Lucca, Florence recovered Pietrasanta, lost since 1494.⁽⁹⁾ Clement's intrigues against Siena, which should have benefited Florence, were instead an expensive fiasco, the brunt of the cost being borne by Florence.⁽¹⁰⁾

Clement himself had governed Florence for Leo X very successfully. Consumed by a genuine patriotism,⁽¹¹⁾ Clement ruled justly and well. He brought/

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1. It was, for instance, through the Strozzi and Salviati banks that Clement raised a loan to pay off Bourbon in April 1527, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 53.
 2. For a discussion of this problem at an earlier period see F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 31.
 3. This was particularly true over the question of the duke of Urbino and San Leo. See above p. 64.
 4. See above p. 128.
 5. Vettori, Sommario, 300-301.
 6. D.B.I. under Armellino-Medici and see above p. 135-6.
 7. Instructions quoted in A. von Reumont, La Jeunesse de Catherine de Medecis, (Paris 1866), 8 n.1.
 8. Nardi, Historie, 166.
 9. Vettori, Sommario, 301.
 10. See above p. 43-5.
 11. Nardi, Historie, 174. He kept a scale-model of Florence in his room, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 39.

brought order into the administration of the treasury and limited expenditure.⁽¹⁾ He took constructive measures to prevent the flooding of the Arno and went some way towards modernising the city's defence system. He restored the appearance of liberty and some portion of reality; the magistrates were again chosen by lot. To the eternal regret of his enemies his life was one of unimpeachable virtue;

'.... fu costante opinione comunemente di ogn'uno che la nostra Città, sotto il reggimento de Medici non fusse mai governata con maggiore apparenza di libertà, ne con maggiore dissimulatione di principato'.⁽²⁾

Even at this felicitous period the position of the Medici in Florence was being seriously weakened by Pompeo Colonna, who, for more than a decade, had maintained an alliance with the Soderini the leading aristocratic opponents of the Medici. It was an alliance only conceivable in the confused world of Italian politics for the Soderini, although prominent in their opposition to the Medici, were also the leaders of the pro-French party in Florence. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that such an alliance existed and that the chief links were Cardinal Francesco Soderini and the deposed gonfaloniere of Florence Piero. The origins of the connexion can be traced, indeed, to the period of Soderini's rule in Florence, when the alliance was based on a common antipathy to the Medici-Orsini family. During 1504 and 1505 there were several debates in Florence as to whom the republic should engage as condottieri and as captains of the Florentine forces. Piero Soderini then favoured the appointment of members of the Colonna and Savelli families with Fabrizio Colonna as captain and it was generally believed in Florence, with foundation, that it was Francesco Soderini who was advocating the appointment of the Colonna and that he was negotiating with them without the authority of the Florentine government.⁽³⁾ In 1512 the Soderini were forced into exile but the penalties against them were extremely mild and Cardinal Soderini even acted as papal-legate in Rome for Leo X. However, during the conclave which followed Leo's death, the old antagonisms of the Soderini and the Medici came to the fore. Soderini and Medici emerged as/

1. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 85.

2. Nardi, Historie, 174.

3. For this information I am indebted to Mrs. Rosemary Pesman of the University of Sydney.

as rivals and Colonna, in uneasy alliance with the French cardinals, backed Soderini.⁽¹⁾ Soderini then raised the question of Giulio de' Medici's legitimization, questioned its legality, and suggested that it barred Medici from canonical election.⁽²⁾ This idea conceivably originated with Pompeo Colonna for he was to use it in his appeals to a general council. If Clement had been uncanonically elected Colonna claimed that a general council should depose him. Put forward by Soderini in 1521, the doubt about the legal position created a dead-lock in conclave. Pressure had to be put on Medici elsewhere and this was done in Florence where the Soderini staged a revolt which, although unsuccessful, convinced Medici that the conclave must be brought to a speedy end.⁽³⁾ Throughout the pontificate of Adrian VI, the Soderini maintained their attacks on the Medici and their supporters, in particular Armellino whom Cardinal Soderini accused of financial corruption.⁽⁴⁾

Cardinal Soderini and Cardinal Colonna were able to collaborate because of the efforts of Piero Soderini, the ex-gonfaloniere. His pardon was the price of Cardinal Soderini's vote in conclave for Leo X and in 1512 he was summoned to Rome.⁽⁵⁾ For the next ten years he was assiduously courted by the Colonna and took up residence on their territory. In 1516 he was joined by Cardinal Soderini who had been implicated in the Petrucci conspiracy. Apart from the Colonna, Piero was constantly visited by relatives and friends from Florence, and there can be little doubt that during these years the opposition party in Florence flourished under the protection of Cardinal Colonna. Even after Piero's death, in 1522, Pompeo continued to protect the Soderini. In the conclave following the death of Adrian VI he demanded the pardon of the Soderini as the price of Medici's election.⁽⁶⁾

After the death of Cardinal Soderini in 1524 the leadership of the Soderini seems to have devolved upon Gian Battista Soderini, then at Vicenza. Among his/

1. Nardi, Historie, 167, 175.

2. Ibid. 176.

3. Ibid. 176-9.

4. D.B.I. under Armellino-Medici.

5. Nardi, Historie, 161.

6. Giovio, Vita Colonna, 177, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 64.

his adherents he counted Baldassare Carducci, a declared enemy of the Medici who, since 1512, had been a distinguished teacher of civil law at Padua and now acted as a go-between for Soderini and Bourbon. Through Carducci, Soderini urged Bourbon to use his army to change the government of Florence.⁽¹⁾ Clement, who was not unaware of Carducci's activities, persuaded Venice to have him arrested.⁽²⁾

By these means an uprising in Florence was planned to coincide with Bourbon's arrival at the city, a common enough strategy in Italy. Guicciardini had always warned that Charles V would attempt to foment a dual revolution in Florence and Rome,⁽³⁾ Colonna certainly promised such an insurrection and Bourbon had long been in communication with the Florentine fuorusciti at Ferrara.⁽⁴⁾ As early as January 1527 Perez could state with confidence that, 'long before the lansquenets reach Florence a deputation is to go out to meet them with offers of money and conditions of peace'.⁽⁵⁾

In February, the Venetian ambassador at Florence warned that a rebellion in the city was certain if the imperial army went that way.⁽⁶⁾ The danger had certainly existed for many months; the Medici were always weakest when they began to lose support from within their own party since their control over elections to government posts became inadequate when the palleschi were split, and even in the early months of Clement's pontificate it was obvious that an opposition party was forming among the palleschi and other aristocrats who had distrusted the Medici ever since the restoration in 1512.⁽⁷⁾ A dozen picked Medici supporters were summoned to Rome to discuss the future government of Florence but, of these,

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 174.
 2. Ibid. 175. He was released after the Medici expulsion from Florence at the instance of Alessandro de'Pazzi.
 3. E.g. F. Guicciardini, 'Sulla Proposta di Alleanza fatta di Carlo V a Clemente VII' in Scritti Politici e Ricordi (Bari 1933), 157.
 4. L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 99.
 5. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 41. See also ibid. 171.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 92.
 7. F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 100-101, 106-108, 111, 117, 129, 131-5.

these, three strenuously opposed sending Ippolito to govern Florence under Cardinal Cortona.⁽¹⁾ As a 'subject' Cortona was unlikely to be much to the Florentine taste but he suffered from other inadequacies. Born at Cortona and educated at Rome, he had no real understanding of Florence or of Florentine politics. He gave the impression of being concerned only with pleasing Clement and Rome and careless of Florentine interests, 'e gli pareva che la grandezza dello stato consistesse in farsi obbedire, e chi li magistrati, non facessero cose alcuna senza suo ordine'.⁽²⁾ The opponents of Cortona suggested instead that the government be entrusted to the aristocrats and an annually elected gonfaloniere until Ippolito came of age.⁽³⁾ The Medici supporters had certainly expected that the benefits which accrued to Florence at the hands of Leo X would be renewed under Clement VII⁽⁴⁾ and in this they had been disappointed. There were many among them who, while favouring the Medici in general, had no wish to see their power increase in autocracy;⁽⁵⁾ of these the most distinguished was Salviati, but he was absent in Rome, and his place was taken by Niccolò Capponi, a great advocate of peace,⁽⁶⁾ Matteo Strozzi, Francesco Vettori, Luigi Guicciardini, Filippo Strozzi, Averardo and Piero Salviati, that is the palleschi intellectuals. But yet another division of the party, made up of Piero Alemanni, Filippo Buondelmonti, Pandolfo Corbinelli, Antonio Serristori and, possibly, Piero Ridolfi opposed the Medici regime as not being autocratic enough. These last Cortona had endeavoured to exclude from the government. The core of the cardinal's support came, apart from Ottaviano de' Medici, from Palle Rucellai and Baccio Valori.⁽⁷⁾

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1. Vettori, Sommario, 349-50.
 2. Vettori in Milanese, Sacco, 417-9, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 173.
 3. Vettori, Sommario, 349-50. There can be little doubt that Vettori was referring to the aristocrats when he spoke of the citizens. The three dissenters were Vettori himself, Lorenzo Strozzi and Ruberto Acciaiuoli.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 66.
 5. F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 100-101, 106-108, 111, 117, 129, 131-5.
 6. For economic reasons, Segni, Vita Capponi, 297.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 67, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 7-8.

There were thus a large number of potential defectors from the Medici who might be attracted into either the party led by Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi⁽¹⁾ and Alfonso Strozzi, a party which was entirely anti-Medici but offered no constructive alternative government, or the party of the Soderini, which, although paying lip-service to the principles of republicanism, existed primarily as an anti-Medici alliance.⁽²⁾ It is clear that the aristocrats, although opposed to the Medici over many issues, had no alternative policy, programme or form of government to offer. Basically they remained, as always in Florence, the most powerful single element in the city, but their lack of constructive policies, their inexperience, and inadequate financial backing, prevented them exercising this power to the full and the government of the city tended to fall into more and more extremist hands.

In 1526 and the early months of 1527 the likelihood of rebellion in Florence increased. Apart from the unsettling effect of the news of the death of Giovanni de' Medici, a kind of Florentine folk-hero, and of Bourbon's advance, plague, scarcity and shortage of work came at a time when Florence was being blatantly used as a bank by the League, which appeared to be doing little in return to protect Florence.⁽³⁾ Although not yet an official member of the League Florence was contributing 26,000 ducats every month to the League army.⁽⁴⁾ On 23 September 1526 Guicciardini had admitted that all the money he had so far spent in camp had come from Florence alone and that there had been no papal contribution.⁽⁵⁾ In the space of eight months, preceding the sack of Rome, Clement had extracted/

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1. The Albizzi were traditional opponents of the Medici and first conspired against them in 1433. For a modern account of the conspiracy see R. Roeder, 'Lorenzo de' Medici' in The Horizon Book of the Renaissance, (New York 1961) 146. Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi (1483-1537) was a frequenter of the Rucellai gardens, a supporter of the Medici in 1512, and the friend of Leo X who made him governor of Narni. By 1518 Albizzi had become a convinced opponent of the Medici. He played a prominent part in Florentine political life 1527-30. Exiled to Spoleto, on the death of Clement VII he broke his confines and went to Rome whence he played a prominent part in the political and military struggles of the exiles against the Medici. He was captured and executed in 1537. For his character see Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 178-9.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 68.
 3. Ibid. 95, B.N.MS. Italien 15 f.655, Segni, Vita Capponi, 297, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 172.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 95.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlii. 713.

extracted in all 220,000 ducats from Florence and, to find these sums, the city was forced to countenance the seizure of the goods of the guilds and of church plate, for extraordinary taxation of the city was already at a punitively high level.⁽¹⁾

Apart from direct subsidies to the League, Florence was also committed to heavy expenditure both on her own defences and on those of the subject towns, where she had to provide for internal security. The expense of the refortification of Florence was considerable. The whole system was modernised under the direction of Antonio da Sangallo, Federigo da Bozzoli, and Pedro Navarro who, in defiance of Florentine opinion ordered that, 'tutte le torri, le quali a guisa di ghirlanda la mura di Firenze intorno intorno incoronavano' be, 'ruvinate e gittate a terra' to make gun emplacements.⁽²⁾ Florence was provided with the best of modern defence works but they cost more than the city could afford; the expense of such fortifications was but one item which contributed to the increasing costs of warfare in Italy during the first half of the 16th century, costs which a state the size of Florence certainly could not afford. Then in the early months of 1527 Clement demanded additional sacrifices from the Florentine state with the fortification of the subject towns. The whole state was to be put on a war footing. Domenico Martelli was sent to fortify Empoli⁽³⁾ and Bozzoli with Lorenzo Cambi was sent to Prato.⁽⁴⁾ The frontier towns were all strengthened and a pro-Medici governor was sent to each one.⁽⁵⁾ Provisions were also taken for the defence of the Casentino.⁽⁶⁾

Throughout Clement's pontificate, therefore, a revolt in Florence against/

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1. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 19-20, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 81.
 2. J.R. Hale, Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy (London 1961), 221-2, Lucci Landucci, A Florentine Diary (London 1927), 291, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 96. Clement was as reluctant as anyone to spoil the appearance of the city, but deferred to military opinion in the end.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 96.
 4. Ibid. 97.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

against direct rule by the Medici had become increasingly likely. At the end of 1526 Florence declared her unwillingness to spend more on the war and Jacopo Salviati described the city as being in total confusion. Many of the major Florentine families had already left for Venice or Pisa.⁽¹⁾ Clement VII had no illusions about Florence and in December was reported to be contemplating a truce with the imperialists because of the danger of rebellion there.⁽²⁾ In various ways he tried to strengthen his position in the city. In the last days of 1526 he dispatched Ridolfi and Cybo to assist Cortona in the government but this proved to be a grave political mistake for Ridolfi was himself an aristocrat and had ties of blood, sympathy and obligation with the opposition to Clement VII. Ridolfi's covert support for Filippo Strozzi was to prove vital in the success of the Florentine rebellion in the following May;⁽³⁾ and Cybo was both a stranger and a foreigner.

In January the pope urged Venice to use her influence with the Florentines, particularly with the Florentine community resident in Venice, whom it was hoped to persuade to put pressure on the home government to support the League.⁽⁴⁾ Clement had little hope that any measure would have much influence on events in Florence and frequently expressed the opinion that Florence would make a separate agreement with the emperor.⁽⁵⁾ At the end of 1526, Florence, in accordance with the pope's prognostications, was urging him to accept any terms for peace proposed by the viceroy and warned him that if he did not Florence would.⁽⁶⁾ In February Clement showed the Venetian ambassador letters from Florence which threatened that, were the imperial army to approach Tuscany, 'se li dimanderano 100 milia ducati li darano 200 milia piu presto che esser sachizati'⁽⁷⁾ and there were many other signs of acute discontent in the city.⁽⁸⁾ In January 1527 the/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 448.
 2. Cal. S.P. Milan i. 470.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 94, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 172.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xliii. 632-633.
 5. E.g. ibid. 633, xliv. 92.
 6. L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 1209.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xliv. 98.
 8. A.S.V.MS. Fondo Pio n.54 f.41.

the Venetians had complied with Clement's request and dispatched their ambassador, Foscari, to Florence where he urged the city to defend itself vigorously. Ippolito de' Medici, aware of his tottering position in the city government, begged Foscari to make a declaration in favour of the Medici, but this was no part of Venetian policy. Foscari, however, gave little hope to the home government, warning that unless some drastic action were taken Florence would certainly seek a separate peace with the imperialists.⁽¹⁾ On 23 April Guicciardini reached Florence and found it already practically in revolt. In a full report which he wrote to Rome on the day after his arrival, Guicciardini prophesied that the Medici state would be ruined if nothing were done and warned that any delay would prove dangerous.⁽²⁾

These warnings were not without effect. At Venice it was finally realised that only the intervention of Urbino in Tuscany would hold Florence for the League.⁽³⁾ As it was, Urbino arrived only just in time (26 April) to crush the 'Tumulto del Venerdì'.⁽⁴⁾ This attempted coup was clearly a carefully planned rising in which both Bourbon and Pompeo Colonna were implicated,⁽⁵⁾ for if things had gone according to plan, rebellion at Florence should have opened the gates to the imperial army. Urbino's presence preserved Florence but it was clear that were anything to happen at Rome the days of the Medici in Florence were numbered. During the uprising they had failed to register any kind of support in Florence; only Baccio Valori and some half-a-dozen of his supporters had remained loyal to the regime during the crisis. Defections from the Medici party were significant; apart from Salviati, whose antipathy to the regime was notorious, Niccolò Capponi, a member of one of the most illustrious Florentine families, the Alemanni, the Strozzi and the Martelli were involved in the rebellion.⁽⁶⁾ The Strozzi and Capponi were bound as closely to the Medici as was any family in Florence, had played a prominent part in the restoration of that/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 11-13.
 2. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 172.
 3. See above p. 58.
 4. For details of the attempted revolt see Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 23-31.
 5. See above p. 272-4.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 583, 'Memorie Perugine de Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 312, Segni, Vita Capponi, 301, Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 37.

that family, and although absent from Florence, Filippo Strozzi was at this time one of the ruling Otto di Pratica.⁽¹⁾

The sack of Rome had a profound effect at Florence. Economically it was disastrous.⁽²⁾ In terms of trade alone, Florence lost weekly 8,000 ducats in Rome and 3,000 ducats in Naples.⁽³⁾ Florentines at Rome had been among the wealthiest citizens and had suffered proportionately in the sack. It was estimated that they lost no less than a million ducats. Offices in the curia, bought by Florentines to an estimated value of 350,000 ducats, could also be written off as a loss.⁽⁴⁾ Many had sent valuables to Rome for safe-keeping when Bourbon's army advanced on Florence, among them Jacopo Gherardi who lost practically everything in the sack and subsequently had to beg his daughter's dowry from the pope. Inevitably, every Florentine who lost anything by the sack of Rome tended to blame Clement VII personally.⁽⁵⁾ News of the sack reached Florence on 11 May.⁽⁶⁾ Many fled immediately to Venice or Lucca⁽⁷⁾ but others welcomed the opportunity now presented to get rid of the ruling government.⁽⁸⁾ Niccolò Capponi was already publically inciting the populace to rebel and although urged by Baccio Valori to do so Cortona hesitated to arrest so influential a citizen. Although the city was still full of troops these had seen their ultimate guarantee of pay cut off by the sack of Rome. Their commander offered to put down the movement in the city if Cortona would allow him 20,000 ducats, but the cardinal, unused to making/

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1. His wife was Clarice de' Medici whom he had married in 1508. As a result he had been banished from Florence by Soderini.
 2. Canestrini et Desjardins, Négociations, ii. 959.
 3. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 5, 420.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Vettori, Sommario, 381.
 6. For the date see Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 40. The news became generally known on 12 May, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 64.
 7. G. Salvioli, 'Nuovi studii sul sacco di Roma', Arch. Ven. xvii. 29.
 8. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 42, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 127.

making major decisions himself, delayed his reply.⁽¹⁾ The delay was fatal for, on 16 May, Filippo Strozzi reached Florence and induced Francesco del Nero, the treasurer, over whom he had a business hold, to send the funds in his charge into the house of Strozzi's brother. The moment at which Cortona could have acted had passed and the initiative had passed into the opposition's hands.⁽²⁾ It is clear that the defection of Filippo Strozzi was of the greatest importance, not only because of his own position, but because of those he brought with him into the opposition camp, above all Francesco Vettori and Matteo Strozzi. Through his friendship with Giovanfrancesco Ridolfi he was able to neutralise Cardinal Ridolfi who did nothing to assist Cortona at this crucial moment although he had been sent to Florence specifically to strengthen Cortona's hand.⁽³⁾

By the following evening the first stage of the rebellion was peacefully over. That morning Strozzi persuaded Cortona that the only way to avoid bloodshed was for the Medici to leave Florence without delay. In the late afternoon they left the city accompanied by Filippo Strozzi who was to escort them as far as Lucca,⁽⁴⁾ and take over the citadels of Pisa and Leghorn which the Medici had agreed to consign to the popular regime in return for their safe departure. It is some measure of the lack of support for the Medici in Florence that apart from Pietro Onofrio no-one thought it necessary to leave Florence with them. With the departure of the Medici effective power in the city passed to the Otto di Pratica who ordered all soldiers to keep their quarters for two days until it should be decided what direction the political situation would take.⁽⁵⁾

The Florentine state was now to pass through a series of vicissitudes all stemming from the sack of Rome. Ultimately, with the establishment of the principality of Alessandro de' Medici, the basic nature and constitution of Florence would be totally changed, the Medici achieving a power of which they/

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1. Segni, Vita Capponi, 302.
 2. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 44, Segni, Vita Capponi, 302-3.
 3. Segni, Vita Capponi, 304-5.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 155, Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 45.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 156.

they had never previously dreamed. In 1527, however, the city remained basically a very restricted oligarchy with power passing to the opposition. In the beginning concessions to popular feeling were as few as possible. Such changes as were projected were conservative and unimaginative; it was virtually unavoidable that a promise should be made of the restoration of the Consiglio maggiore, an essential and cherished element in the Florentine republican myth, but the arrangements for its meeting were delayed. In the meantime the Signoria was to be controlled by a council of 120 which was to have a life-span of four months and which would replace the old councils of 70 and 100. This would elect a committee which would organise and control the Consiglio maggiore for which every citizen over the age of 24 was eligible.⁽¹⁾ Once the Consiglio maggiore had met the old Dieci di Guerra was to replace the Otto di Pratica and the Consiglio degli Ottanta was also to be resurrected, 'come era solito avanti la tornata di Medici'.⁽²⁾

In the following days, however, it became obvious that the oligarchy was under pressure from those who were still excluded from the government and who, led by Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, united with the popular element in the city. There were few illusions about the group who had now seized power and who, according to Varchi, aimed at perpetuating a government by the few in the traditional Florentine manner, 'il quali essi chiamavano con nome greco, pensando che noi non l'intendiamo, aristocrazia; non vogliono costoro che la cacciata de' Medici a far liberi noi, ma serve solo a far grandi loro'.⁽³⁾ Various factors encouraged a general mistrust of the government; Clarice Strozzi returned to live in the Medici palace, taking the Duchessina Catherine with her. Cardinal Ridolfi and Ottaviano de' Medici returned to the city and were in constant consultation with Capponi.⁽⁴⁾ Disorder and unrest, fostered by fears of a Medici return, continued until the more prominent citizens realised that some major concession must be made. Accordingly the Consiglio maggiore was summoned a whole month earlier than was originally intended.⁽⁵⁾ It met on 21 May and more/

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1. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 46, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 147, Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 5, 413.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 156, 137-9.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 138, 178-179.
 4. Ibid. 139.
 5. Ibid. 141.

more than 2,500 people attended.⁽¹⁾ Opposition to the original creators of the revolution had increased with the failure of Filippo Strozzi to recover the two citadels of Pisa and Leghorn which were of vital importance to Florence as they controlled her outlet to the sea. When Strozzi reported his failure to recover them from the papal captains his whole policy of reconciliation with the Medici party was seriously discredited. He himself was recalled from Pisa and was replaced by two commissaries.⁽²⁾ Sharing some of Strozzi's discredit, on 28 May the old Signoria was forced from office and Niccolo Capponi was elected gonfaloniere.⁽³⁾ Anti-Medici hysteria rapidly gained ground in the city in the following months. It had long been the custom in Florence to display, hung up in the church of the Annunziata, wax images of prominent Florentines clad in rich costumes. Among others hung portraits of Leo X and Clement VII which the powerful pressure group for the 'arrabiati' or 'giovani' now had destroyed.⁽⁴⁾ The arms of the Medici were blotted out throughout the city, even in churches which owed most to the patronage of that family like San Lorenzo and San Marco.⁽⁵⁾ Demands were made to erase the well-known epitaph of Cosimo 'Pater Patriae'. The Medici palace was appropriated by the state and handed over to the Trustees of Minors, whose work, as a result of the plague, had greatly increased.⁽⁶⁾

In the following years Florence was to pass through all the extremes of a republican government, eventualities certainly not envisaged by those who took over power in May 1527. However, many of the personalities in power remained unchanged, even when they were influenced by strong pressure groups whose precise nature and composition cannot be determined. Tomasso Soderini and Alfonso Strozzi, for instance, remained prominent in government,⁽⁷⁾ and/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 142-4.
 2. Ibid. 146, Nardi, Historie, 196.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 157-161, Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 52-3.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 256, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 41-2.
 5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 257.
 6. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 97 and see below Appendix.
 7. Soderini was elected to the Venti from Santo Spirito in May 1527 and was on the shortlist for election as gonfaloniere as well as Strozzi, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 147, 159.

and acquired a reputation for moderation although they constantly supported the French alliance. One of the most prominent and vocal pressure groups in Florence was that of the 'giovani'. In December, alleging that many of the 'palleschi' were active in the government, in the panic following the pope's escape to Orvieto, they were able to force through the Signoria, against Capponi's wishes, a provision for the creation of a guard for the Palazzo della Signoria. ⁽¹⁾

It was inevitable that opposition to Capponi should be led by the Soderini faction for Capponi, a realist in politics who continued to consult with Guicciardini, a known supporter of the Medici, was not opposed to negotiation with Clement VII and the 'palleschi' to whom he was closely related through his marriage with Strozzi's sister. ⁽²⁾ Although Capponi was re-elected after his first thirteen months of office by 1528 opposition to the gonfaloniere was growing and had crystallised around Tommaso Soderini and Baldassare Carducci, the leader of the extreme republicans. ⁽³⁾ By the spring they had succeeded in totally discrediting the aristocrats. Most, like Filippo Strozzi and Luigi Alemanni left the city on some pretext or another. ⁽⁴⁾ This was highly regrettable for it meant the removal of many moderating influences in the city, drained away considerable wealth, and ended any hope of compromise between Clement and Florence. The pope, still pursuing a policy of neutrality, ⁽⁵⁾ and only too aware of the dangers of unleashing an ultramontane army against so eminently sackable a town as Florence, was always inclined to be conciliatory. In July stating that he had no intention of altering the state he had offered the city a/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 263-4, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 404.
 2. Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 189.
 3. Nardi, Historie, 203. Carducci had been on the shortlist at the time of Capponi's election, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 159.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 313, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 127. Luigi Alemanni (b. 1495) was unusual, being both anti-Medici and anti-French. A frequenter of the Rucellai gardens, and the friend of Machiavelli, he was one of the leaders of the conspiracy against the Medici in 1522. Afterwards he fled to Venice and France, returning to Florence in 1527. One of the principal Italian poets of his age, he came from a prominent Florentine family. His father had been gonfaloniere in 1490 and 1512. It was his knowledge of the character of Francis I that made Alemanni a vociferous opponent of the French alliance, but this made him suspect at Florence where it was supposed he must be a pallesco.
 5. See above p. 249-251.

a two-tenths tax on the clergy, asking only for the restoration of the defaced Medici insignia and for the return of the fuorusciti. This gesture was rudely rejected by Florence which refused even to admit the papal nuncio, the Florentine bishop Antonio Bonsi bearing the offer, into the city.⁽¹⁾ Circumstances pushed the government to more and more extreme measures; financial demands on the state were great at a time when the numbers of the aristocracy who shouldered the main burden of taxation were considerably depleted and the church inevitably fell victim to oppressive taxation. In October a tax was imposed on all ecclesiastical corporations, a tax which was technically illegal without papal consent.⁽²⁾

It was on questions of finance that the government was to founder. The causes of discontent which had provoked a revulsion against the Medici had not been miraculously removed and, indeed, the state was poorer than ever. By the spring of 1529 the cloth industry had virtually collapsed,⁽³⁾ since with the fall of Genoa⁽⁴⁾ it proved impossible to export to Lyons. As the transit of cloth through Venetian territory was forbidden, the only remaining outlets for Florentine exports were illegally through Mantua and the Brenner pass to Germany and through Ancona and Trieste to Flanders.⁽⁵⁾ Much Florentine capital was tied up in Lyons and could not be touched by the republic.⁽⁶⁾ There was constant fear that the city would be sacked and in March 1528, 'le popoli di Firenze cominziano a mormorare che sono in guerra. et quando erano sotto Medici stavano in pace.'⁽⁷⁾ Since January it had become impossible to disguise the financial crisis. The city was now so poor that the virtues of poverty had to be positively extolled; poverty prevented discord, plots, lasciviousness, luxury and tyranny. It was the only means of preserving the republican spirit and true liberty; 'nulla è infin più soave che nel suo povero albergo' to recount, 'alla sua picciola famigliuola le egregrie sue passate operazioni in difesa e in onor della/

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 294.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 248.
 3. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.5, 421.
 4. See below p.304.
 5. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.5, 421-2.
 6. Ibid. 422.
 7. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 156.

della sua patria'.⁽¹⁾ The war and siege of Florence completed the impoverishment of the Florentine state and in particular of the contado where the damage to agriculture was appalling;⁽²⁾ between July 1527 and January 1528 Florence spent 45,000 ducats on the war in addition to a contribution of between 12,000 and 15,000 ducats spent on Lautrec's war in Naples.⁽³⁾

As the months passed Florence continued to lose her richest and more moderate citizens; Ruberto Acciaiuoli, said to have capital of at least 25,000 ducats,⁽⁴⁾ Domenico Canigiani, Palle Rucellai, Giovanfrancesco Ridolfi, Alessandro and Luigi Cappei and Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, all of whom had originally been prominent in bringing about rebellion in Florence, left for Lucca and other members of the aristocracy deserted to the imperial camp.⁽⁵⁾ Capponi, a well-disposed and moderate man, had long formed a scheme for freeing the city by negotiation. Using Jacopo Salviati as a go-between he had opened up secret communications with Rome, but the discovery of this led to Capponi's fall in April 1529, and his successor the violent Francesco Carducci, was so opposed to Clement and the Medici that any possibility of accommodation could be ruled out.⁽⁶⁾ Thus the deposition of Capponi played into Clement's hands, for as long as Capponi remained in power Clement would have been unable to move against Florence with the support of those on whom a successful Medici restoration would depend, most notably Vettori, Guicciardini, Ruberto Acciaiuoli and Filippo Strozzi.⁽⁷⁾ As far as the aristocrats were concerned Capponi's dismissal removed from the Florentine regime the last shreds of respectability. Henceforward they would work with the pope towards a restoration of the old regime. Carducci's victory over Capponi signified the eclipse of the aristocrats in government, for he was/

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1. Oration of Luigi Alemanni to the Florentine militia, 29 January 1528, printed in M. Fancelli, Orazioni Politiche del Cinquecento (Bologna 1941), 1-6.
 2. F. Guicciardini, Dall'assedio di Firenze al secondo convegno di Clement VII e Carlo V, ed. A. Otetea (Aquila 1927), 3-4, Nardi, Historie, 227.
 3. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 5, 422.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 137, 141.
 6. Pastor, Papacy, x. 53.
 7. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 158-9.

was a man of lowly origins.⁽¹⁾ The government of the city now became dominated by the republican extremists, who, almost without exception, were elected to the magistracies as they fell vacant.⁽²⁾ Increased bitterness against the Medici was remarked, and by November 1529 the government was as tyrannical as ever a Medici government had dared to be.⁽³⁾ On 20 November the consiglio grande sanctioned a forced loan of 1,000 ducats by each of 40 men and of 500 each from another 40, and the sale of one third of all the ecclesiastical property in the city.⁽⁴⁾ Among the ruling classes of Florence there was little unanimity, particularly over questions of finance. Although by law all money acts had to have a two-thirds majority in the consiglio grande it was soon discovered that if this provision were retained it would be impossible to raise any money at all. The law had to be amended so that only a bare majority was necessary, 'accioche la tiepidezza ò l'avaritia de poco amorevoli cittadini potesse manco nuocere alla difensione della liberta'.⁽⁵⁾ By 1530 there were plenty of indications that the pendulum was beginning to swing back in favour of a Medici restoration. The most significant defector from the republican regime was Lorenzo, the son of Tommaso Soderini, who, on his return from Prato, had been corrupted by Baccio Valori, to whom he was passing information about all that went on in Florence.⁽⁶⁾ He was executed in July but other defectors were continually discovered and by August the palleschi supporters were coming out into the open.⁽⁷⁾ The significance of these defections which were centred on the person of Baccio Valori, who knew how to use them to the best advantage, is that they were directed towards a Medici restoration, and not towards a surrender to the imperial power of Charles V. The Florentines had always been more or less prepared to come to terms with the imperialists and to accept the authority of Charles V in Tuscany, if this did/

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1. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 138, Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 133.
 2. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 157, Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 133.
 3. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 172, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 127, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 194.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 173-4.
 5. Nardi, Historie, 209.
 6. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 314.
 7. Ibid. 315, 338.

did not involve a restoration of the Medici but it was on this one point that Charles was adamant.

It had been popularly supposed that the decision of Charles V to bring down the Florentine republican regime was made on the assumption that this would force Clement VII to abandon his attitude of neutrality and tie him firmly to the imperial cause in Italy. In fact, the subjection of Florence and the setting up of a Medici principality in central Italy was a logical extension of the emperor's Italian policies, and, to some degree, had been long planned. The tendency of Florence towards France, based on communal trading interests was notorious and was a constant danger to the emperor. Since 1494 it had been the first concern of every anti-French power in Italy to bolster up a Medici regime in Florence, for, if individual members of the Medici might flirt occasionally with the French alliance, and, in this, Clement was by no means unique, every Florentine republican regime had been totally reckless in pursuing the French alliance through thick and thin. It was clear that the chief supporters of republicanism in Florence, notably the Soderini, were also those most vocal in proclaiming Florentine adherence to the French cause⁽¹⁾ and that only the moderates and potential defectors among the palleschi, Vettori, Acciaiuoli and Guicciardini, had been outspoken in defiance of the emperor. As recently as 1512 a Spanish army had restored the Medici to power in Florence and Ferdinand of Aragon told Guicciardini that it had been done, 'per essersi presupposto lui e li altri Signori della Lega, che il Gonfalonieri fiorentino fussi si inclinato alle cose franzese, e inoltre potessi tanto nella Città, che mentre che lui fussi in quel magistrato, non potessino stare sicuri'.⁽²⁾

The geographical position of Florence could not be ignored for Florence was vital for communications within Italy. The one lesson which the Italian wars since 1494 had surely taught was that no-one could hope to control Naples and Milan without also controlling Florence and the Church State. The subjection of Florence was, therefore, essential for imperial success in Italy. In addition Charles had no sympathy with the city-state as his subsequent treatment of Siena was to show. It had been republicanism which had constantly thwarted him in/

1. E.g. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 34, 123-6, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 282.

2. Guicciardini, Carteggi, i. 106.

in Italy. Immediately after Pavia, apart from the pope, it was Venice, Florence, Lucca and Siena which were singled out for punishment.⁽¹⁾ Again, writing on 5 February 1527 the emperor instructed Lannoy, 'que sur toutes choses il ne devoit oublier les Florentins; car ils meritoient être si bien châtiés, qu'ils s'en souvinsent longtemps'.⁽²⁾ Immediately after the sack of Rome Perez had suggested that the emperor place a heavy tax on Florence, that he should demolish her fortifications and take Leghorn and Pisa from her,⁽³⁾ in the following April Sanchez was urging an attack on Florence to subject it to the 'Emperor's rule'⁽⁴⁾ and as early as June it was rumoured that Charles would restore the Medici to Florence by force.⁽⁵⁾ In August 1529 de Praet warned Charles that he should subject the Florentines before his coronation.⁽⁶⁾ In a letter to Granvelle, a few days later, de Praet commented on the pronounced pro-French bias of Florence; 'Les Florentins seraient toujours portés pour les Français et ennemis de l'Empereur, tant qu'il resterait une pierre sur l'autre en leur ville'.⁽⁷⁾

An expedition against Florence was thus a foregone conclusion even before the emperor left Spain. In the gradual recovery of the Florentine state the natural imperial antipathy to the small unit seems evident. Each Florentine subject town recovered was scrupulously restored into papal hands⁽⁸⁾ and it is probable that this was done, not from deference to Clement VII, but because it was on the large unit of the old Florentine state that Charles hoped to found a new Medici principality.

In fact, as was not uncommon in the emperor's experience, two strands of his policies were here in conflict. Opposed as he was to Clement as pope and to the powerful Medici-Orsini complex in the Church State,⁽⁹⁾ in Florence the emperor needed to bolster up the Medici regime. From the first the only basis for/

1. A. Bardi, 'Carlo V e l'Assedio di Firenze', A.S.I. (1893), 22.

2. Ibid. 23.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 204.

4. Ibid. 655.

5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 317.

6. A. Bardi, 'Carlo V e l'Assedio di Firenze', A.S.I. (1893), 40.

7. Ibid. 45.

8. Ibid. 57.

9. See above chapter iii.

for negotiation offered to the Florentines by the imperialists was a Medici restoration.⁽¹⁾ This imperial interest in a Medici restoration, the importance of which the ruling party in Florence consistently ignored even as late as August 1530,⁽²⁾ led to a fatal flaw in the Florentine defence system, since the Florentines had chosen as their captain-general Malatesta Baglioni, whose interest, as long as Clement remained pope, lay in not irrevocably offending the Medici.⁽³⁾ Thus, the basis of Malatesta's treachery was his promise to Orange at the beginning of August 1530, that if the Medici were not restored he and his men would leave Florence;⁽⁴⁾ and in the end it was to the pope and Orange that he maintained faith and not to the Florentine republic.⁽⁵⁾ Malatesta was trying to use his position in Florence to recover the ground he had lost in Perugia.⁽⁶⁾ Thus he asked specifically for a pardon for all subjects of the Church State who had fought for Florence and for the restoration of their confiscated property. Malatesta himself was to be permitted to return to Perugia, the fuorusciti of Perugia were to be expelled from the Church State and from Florence, and Malatesta was to make substantial personal property gains.⁽⁷⁾

In the end the sheer weight of the emperor's military superiority, Malatesta's treachery and the loss of the rest of the Florentine state, forced Florence to come to terms, but, even so, the imperialists could only have their way by agreeing to the fiction, 'che sia servata libertà'. The Medici were to be allowed to return as private citizens, their property was to be restored and their supporters released from prison. Many naively believed this agreement would be/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 25-28, 313, Alèri, Relazioni, ser. i. vol.2, 316, A. Bardi 'Carlo V e l'assedio di Firenze', A.S.I. (1893), 55.
 2. Florence told Orange on 2 August that under no circumstances whatsoever could the Medici return, 'ma ogni altra cosa che si fosse addimandata a servizio dell'imperatore, si disporebbono a concedere di buonissima voglia'. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. i. vol.2, 316.
 3. See above p. 260-4.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 324.
 5. Ibid. 337.
 6. See above p. 260-4.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 373-5.

be kept but in fact it was only to be a matter of time before there was a full Medici restoration. In their capitulation the Florentines had acknowledged the right of the emperor to stabilise their constitution and thus sealed their own fate.⁽¹⁾ Ominously enough, from the beginning Baccio Valori, the Medici representative in Florence, immediately began to disregard even the appearances of preserving republicanism, reproducing the worst excesses of the period of direct rule by Duke Lorenzo de' Medici.⁽²⁾ A restoration of the old Medici dominated government was effected by the simple and tried Florentine method: a Balia of twelve citizens backed by armed force. But worse was to follow. Charles V's method of stabilising the Florentine constitution was to create Alessandro de' Medici duke of Florence and this was accepted by the bulk of the aristocracy. Although Medici autocratic rule continued to be unpopular the events of the past three years had ensured the success of the Medici principality, for they had convinced the Florentine aristocracy, that while they did not love the Medici they could not exist without them. In 1527 the aristocrats had connived at the expulsion of the Medici; and they had accepted the rule of Capponi, who was, ultimately, one of their own. But the fall of Capponi and the emergence of the new regime had brought personal persecution and public disaster. The aristocrats had been excluded from office and had seen the government mismanaged in consequence. Their country, which must be at peace if their businesses on which its prosperity was based, were to flourish, had been plunged into an expensive war. The Florentine state had been lost, the Florentine treasury had been bankrupted. Henceforward the aristocrats would, on the whole, support the Medici regime, even accepting, almost without question, the suppression of their ancient liberties by the emperor and the absorption of Florence into a Tuscan principality.⁽³⁾

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1. Nardi, Historie, 227-8, Ridolfi, Guicciardini, 209-215.
 2. F. Guicciardini, Dall'Assedio di Firenze al secondo convegno di Clement VII e Carlo V, ed. A. Otetea (Aquila 1927), 6-8.
 3. For a discussion of the role of the aristocrats 1527-32 see F. Gilbert, 'Alcuni discorsi di uomini politici fiorentini e la politica di Clemente VII per la restaurazione medicea', A.S.I. (1935) vol. ii. 3-24.

II Tuscany

It has been pointed out that the major weakness of the city-state and, in particular, of Florence, was the narrowness of its political world⁽¹⁾ where the dominant city jealously guarded its right to exploit those brought under its rule. Whenever Florence was threatened, either by foreign invaders or by internal crises, or, as was common, by both at once, the subject towns would seize the opportunity to rebel in an attempt to regain lost freedom. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, in the world of consolidated territorial monarchies Florence no longer had the resources to defend both her independence and her subject territories. The passage of the vast armies of the emperor and of the League through Tuscany between 1527 and 1529, the disorganisation following the sack of Rome, weakened every extant political bond, broke down communications and created some form of political change in every major Tuscan town. By the mid-16th century the political complexion of Tuscany had been changed out of all recognition. Throughout the area there were parallel movements to that which occurred in Florence as the whole region fragmented into the smallest possible units. As Florence broke away from Rome, so places like Cortona, Arezzo and Pistoia broke away from control by Florence. But the enthusiastic acceptance at Florence of the virtues of freedom and republicanism did not lead her to accept with equanimity expressions of similar sentiments by the subject towns. Here it was expected, as it had always been expected, that while none of the subject towns was accorded a say in government all were to accept the physical and financial consequences of Florentine policy and of changes in the government of Florence.

There were a number of particular reasons why these Florentine expectations were not, in fact, to be fulfilled. There was little tradition of loyalty to Florence and least of all to a republican regime. The Medici had on the whole a better tradition of behaviour in the Florentine state. It had been a republican regime which had pursued the long and bitter struggle against Pisa at the beginning of the century; indeed recovery of the subject towns was the only policy which had ever been able to unit republican Florence. Over the months following the sack of Rome Florence was to show little genuine concern for her dependent towns. Adapting the imperial military strategy Florence concentrated her entire defence effort on the capital city, abandoning one by/

1. F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 45.

by one Arezzo, Prato and Pistoia, and Ferruccio's activities were constantly hampered by the insistence of the Signoria that he should abandon Tuscany and come to the aid of Florence.⁽¹⁾ Other commissioners and representatives of Florence, finding themselves abandoned and without any financial resources to carry on their government, were driven to make the best bargain they could with whoever they could. In February 1530 Carnesecchi, threatened by papal and imperial troops at Monte Poggiolo, Modigliana and Castrocaro had to borrow 600 ducats from the Florentine ambassador in Ferrara.⁽²⁾ The sack of Prato in 1512 was still remembered and it was common knowledge that Florence had failed to prevent this peculiarly horrid event but had not hesitated when it came to saving Florence itself. Fearing that they would suffer as Prato had suffered the Florentine subject towns tended to come to an independent agreement with Orange, whenever possible. Thus, in February 1530, Modigliana, without even offering any defence ransomed itself for 1,000 ducats,⁽³⁾ Dovadola, despite the fact that provision had been made for its defence, also ransomed itself,⁽⁴⁾ and although the garrison of Castrocaro, where the Florentine representative in the area was resident, put up a spirited defence, the town had surrendered to the imperialists within a week.⁽⁵⁾

The pope and the imperialists actively exploited the situation in Tuscany. Clement VII and Morone promoted rebellion wherever they could throughout Florentine territory,⁽⁶⁾ as did Orange and Baccio Valori.⁽⁷⁾ When cities rebelled Clement provided an alternative government, and when the pope failed to do so the want was supplied by the imperialists, their administrators being drawn from the vast number of Florentine exiles in attendance on the imperial army.⁽⁸⁾

One by one the Florentine towns were lost; Castel Fiorentino,⁽⁹⁾ Pietrasanta, /

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1. E.g. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 129, Nardi, Historie, 224.
 2. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. i. vol.2, 267-8.
 3. Ibid. 268.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 171.
 7. Ibid. 129.
 8. Ibid. 129, 157, 192, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 224.
 9. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 157.

Pietrasanta, ⁽¹⁾ Peccioli, Marti, Palaia, Forcoli, ⁽²⁾ and Arezzo - which was one of the first defectors. Traditionally an imperial town, opposed to Florentine dominion, and particularly to the Florentine republican regimes, Arezzo had only come under Florentine control at the end of the 14th century and had revolted in 1408, 1431 and again in 1502. In 1527 the town was showing marked opposition to Florentine policies which had already, in April, resulted in the sacking by the imperialists of several places within the Aretine contado including Castelnuovo, Capellano and Castelaccio. ⁽³⁾ Close behind Bourbon came the League army whose behaviour had had no more to recommend it than that of the imperialists. Arezzo took the initiative into its own hands. On 22 April 4,000 of the bande nere were at the gates of Arezzo demanding entrance; 'e per bene che loro fossero homeni da bene co l'armi in mano, niente di manco era si grande la fama di'loro cattivi portamenti e robbamenti' ⁽⁴⁾ that Arezzo was reluctant to admit them. Indeed they were glad when the arrival of the imperial light cavalry permitted the citizens to take up arms to keep out both the 'cattivi amici' and the enemy. ⁽⁵⁾ For as long as the League army was in the contado Arezzo was forced to supply it, 'Parte ne pagorono e parte ne missono a sacco, et fecono assai più cattivi portamenti che non avevono fatto ei nemici, et in fra le altre cose missono fuoco a Fontiano e preselo per forza et amazorvi 25 homeni per leggieri casgioni'. ⁽⁶⁾ In 1529, immediately before the Aretine breach with Florence, Arezzo was again to suffer from the ravages of a so-called friendly army; Maltesta Baglioni fell back on Arezzo from Perugia and his army caused considerable annoyance to the townsmen. ⁽⁷⁾

The attentions which Arezzo received from passing armies she owed partially to her position as a vital outpost of the Florentine defence system. So important was Arezzo that in 1529 Florence paid as much attention to the refortification of/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 157.
 2. Nardi, Historie, 217.
 3. Buonparte in Milanese, Sacco, 302.
 4. Catani, Ricordi, 222.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid. 223.
 7. Ibid. 225.

of Arezzo as to that of Florence.⁽¹⁾ Yet this also bred resentment; the operation was financed by Arezzo; 'con grande disagio di gli omeni di l'contado', and was not even done efficiently for in September there was neither artillery nor ammunition in the city.⁽²⁾ The financial hardship which this refortification of the city involved contrasted with the normally light load of taxation which subjection to Florence involved, for in a normal year the income to Florence from Arezzo was merely 2,800 ducats and, although this was a larger income than from any of the other subject towns, it was still a minimal sum in the total Florentine budget.⁽³⁾

Thus for a combination of reasons, all related in some way to the war, by 1529 the disloyalty of Arezzo was so notorious that Florence, not content with garrisoning the city, demanded 50 hostages as well.⁽⁴⁾ Yet at the critical period Florence did nothing to ensure the continued loyalty of Arezzo. Whatever the truth about the abandonment of the city it is obvious that, at the least, Arezzo was sacrificed for the preservation of Florence. Not only was Arezzo denied military support as Malatesta Baglioni fell back on Florence with his troops⁽⁵⁾ but even the Florentine civic authorities abandoned Arezzo to its own devices. In the evening of 18 September Iacopo Altoviti, the captain, and the commissary, Mariotto Segni, returned the keys of Arezzo to the priors of the city,⁽⁶⁾ and when, on the following day, after a demand from the imperialists for the surrender of the city, the priors asked Altoviti what they should do he virtually renounced all Florentine interest in Arezzo.⁽⁷⁾

Florence thus lost her entire position in Arezzo where, through the old machinery of the city government it was decided to negotiate with Orange on the/

1. Catani, Ricordi, 225.

2. Ibid. 225.

3. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.5, 417.

4. Catani, Ricordi, 225.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. 226, G. Spadari, Racconto della Ribellione Aretina del 1529, 245.

7. Catani, Ricordi, 226.

the basis of a demand for self-government.⁽¹⁾ Flags of the republic of Arezzo, which had been secretly manufactured in, and imported from Siena, were flown once more,⁽²⁾ and the city embarked on a cautious period of experimentation in independent government. The prime mover of the revolution was Count Rosso of Bevignano who had been summoned to Arezzo to assist in its defence by Simone Zati and who was well-known for his ambitious projects. He persuaded Arezzo to make a complete break with Florence and tried to place the city under imperial protection.⁽³⁾ Events were hastened by the war, for, by November, Florence was completely besieged and on 2 November Arezzo set up a new constitution, giving herself a pratica of sixteen who, with the priors, were to govern the city.⁽⁴⁾ Six officials were appointed to supervise military matters, 'dando lor tanto podestà quanta aveva tutto il popolo'. Six hundred infantry were raised who, with reinforcements provided by Orange, besieged the rocca which still held a skeleton Florentine garrison.⁽⁵⁾ The rocca surrendered on 21 May 1530 and the building was immediately pulled down.⁽⁶⁾ Florentine property in Arezzo was confiscated, new coins were cast and the arms of the emperor were set up throughout the city with the superscription, 'ut de manu inimicorum liberati, serviamus tibi'.⁽⁷⁾ In this spirit advances made by both papal and Florentine officials were consistently rejected. Systematically Arezzo began to recover its old territory; as Orange advanced on Castiglione Aretino faction fights had broken out between the citizens. At first they had asked Florence for means to defend themselves and for an arbiter of their disputes, but Florence had turned a deaf ear to these requests. Castiglione Aretino was taken by Orange and sacked, then was handed over to the papal authorities.⁽⁸⁾ Now the papal envoy was/

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1. Catani, Ricordi, 226, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 277.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 116.
 3. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 204-5, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 113.
 4. G. Spadari, Racconto della Ribellione Aretina del 1529, 246, 279.
 5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 186-7.
 6. Catani, Ricordi, 230-1.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 186-7.
 8. Ibid. 112-3, 116.

was expelled by the inhabitants of Arezzo under the leadership of Count Rosso and governors were sent to Bibbiena, Civitella and Bucina.⁽¹⁾ But although it was hoped that the pope and the emperor would look favourably on an independent Arezzo these hopes were dashed to the ground in May 1530, when Charles ordered the city to restore Medici rule.⁽²⁾ In August, on Clement's orders, peace was made between Arezzo and Florence; in October a papal nuncio took over the government on behalf of the Florentines;⁽³⁾ and although Clement had promised an indemnity for the rebels and that the citadel would not be rebuilt, he had Count Rosso executed as a traitor and had the citadel rebuilt at Aretine expense.⁽⁴⁾

Although the Florentine garrison put up a spirited defence against Orange, who had reached the city on 14 September, Cortona, originally a papal city which had been purchased by Florence, was convinced that it would be abandoned by the Florentines and so came to a secret agreement with the imperialists, paying a ransom of 20,000 ducats.⁽⁵⁾

Pistoia was not officially a Florentine subject town for, although the Florentines appointed her rectors, she preserved the right to appoint and to pay her own magistrates, paying Florence a tribute of 6,000 ducats a year.⁽⁶⁾ After news reached the city both of the sack of Rome and of the change of government at Florence events took the customary turn; the Cancellieri rose against the Pantiatichi.⁽⁷⁾ At Florence the Otto di Pratica reacted swiftly and ordered Filippo Strozzi to transfer immediately from Poggio to Pistoia⁽⁸⁾ and when Strozzi was recalled in disgrace he was replaced by Agostino Dini, a prosperous merchant.

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 113, 116. In 1509 Florence had punished Bibbiena for having received the exiles, Piero and Giuliano de' Medici. The Medici later recompensed the town with many privileges, E.I. The republican regime at Florence now deprived the commune of these privileges, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 395.
 2. G. Spadari, Racconto della Ribellione Aretina del 1529, 250.
 3. Ibid. 252.
 4. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 310-11.
 5. Catani, Ricordi, 225, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 109-111.
 6. Albèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol.5, 409.
 7. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 136.
 8. Ibid. 137.

Although the current ruling faction at Pistoia was supposedly in sympathy with the aims of the republican regime at Florence, they had few real interests in common and it was generally recognised that Pistoia had received far better treatment at the hands of the Medici who had made sustained efforts to restore the prosperity of the contado of Pistoia.⁽¹⁾ Florence certainly anticipated rebellion at Pistoia and at the outbreak of hostilities demanded hostages from both parties to be sent to Florence.⁽²⁾ Whether the city would have rebelled if it had not been abandoned is not certain, but Dini, without permission from Florence, left the city together with all the Florentine troops, thus leaving Pistoia to its own devices. Inevitably this meant a return of the Panciatichi in April 1530 who, having taken control of the city, surrendered it to Clement.⁽³⁾

Volterra also had made a bid for independence. After encouragement from Ruberto Acciaiuoli who had taken over San Gimignano as papal commissioner, Volterra broke away from Florence, despite a garrison of Florentine soldiers who had remained in the citadel, and the city hired its own troops.⁽⁴⁾ Like Arezzo, Volterra was determined to maintain its independence against both parties; it promised the papal captain, Alessandro Vitelli that, if he would desist from attacking, it would surrender to whoever won the war.⁽⁵⁾ Volterra even sent to the pope at Bologna to ask for artillery to use against the citadel, which was still held by the Florentines.⁽⁶⁾ On the other hand when del Guasto and Maramaldo arrived to take the town, they were attacked and forced to retire, not only by Ferruccio, who on 26 April 1530 had forced his way into the citadel and retaken the city but also by the Volterrani. Acciaiuoli and all his supporters were forced to flee Volterra. It was only with considerable difficulty that the imperialists eventually succeeded in taking the city and restoring it to the pope.⁽⁷⁾ In the meantime, however, Empoli, abandoned by Ferruccio was taken by Orange with surprising ease.⁽⁸⁾

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1. E.I.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 189.
 3. Ibid. 189-192, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 235, Albèri, Relazioni, ser. i. vol. 2, 280.
 4. Nardi, Historie, 217-219, Albèri, Relazioni, ser. i. vol. 2, 286.
 5. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 253.
 6. Ibid. 254.
 7. Nardi, Historie, 219-220, Albèri, Relazioni, ser. i. vol. 2, 278, 284, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 254-259.
 8. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, i. 259.

This was to be the final pattern; the extinction of separatism by superior force and the restoration of the Florentine state as a whole. It was clear that, by 1530, further resistance was impossible to the massive imperial army. Nevertheless it was equally clear that this was a settlement imposed by the emperor and not the settlement desired by the local inhabitants. But with their opinions the emperor had no concern; in 1530 he was no more sympathetic to Italian local feeling than he had ever been.

Charles' dealings with Siena make this clear. Here the sack of Rome which depressed the trade of an economy already in acute decline,⁽¹⁾ had sparked off unrest and attempted revolution, although this was at first unsuccessful. An assault by the fuorusciti sponsored by Florence was a total fiasco and the Florentine government was placed in the ignominious position of having to order the restoration of all captured property and the removal of the fuorusciti to between 15 and 20 miles from the border, while Siena retaliated by confiscating the property of all the exiles.⁽²⁾ Nevertheless, the imperialist-sponsored government only survived as a result of direct intervention by the imperial generals. Inside the city the houses of the Monte de'Nove were attacked in July and Piero Borghesi was killed. The Monte de'Nove was deprived of any share in the government and annulled, the old Monte de'Riformatori being revived in its stead. Orange was only able to quell the disturbances in the city by dispatching troops. Subsequently, much against his will, he had to move there himself with 150 cavalry in order to keep the city faithful to the emperor. When Orange left the city a Spanish garrison remained and it was clear that henceforward Siena, which the emperor regarded as the key to Tuscany, would be an imperial satellite. Control at first was exercised indirectly but effectively. In the spring of 1529 Mai intervened from Rome several times in the city's affairs.⁽³⁾ In April a Lutheran with German connexions was expelled from the city at Mai's instance in order to gratify Clement.⁽⁴⁾ The status of Siena as an independent city had been completely and unobtrusively lost as the events of 1552-9 were to show. In 1552 the Siennese attempted to rebel against the imperial control, allying with France and some of the now numerous Florentine/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 265.
 2. Ibid. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 252.
 3. E.g. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 962.
 4. Ibid. 985.

Florentine fuorusciti led by Piero Strozzi. The emperor reacted strongly and in 1554 the famous siege of Siena began which ended only in April 1555. Contrary to the terms of the capitulation, Siena was granted to Philip of Spain who on his accession gave it to Duke Cosimo of Florence in lieu of a repayment of his debts, Spain retaining only five coastal towns, known as the presidi as hostages for Cosimo's good behaviour.

III. Genoa

It is scarcely surprising that the emperor should have succeeded in establishing his authority throughout Tuscany and in setting up the kind of political regime he wished, for this, after all, was no more than what had happened throughout Italy. With the collapse of the French interest in Italy and the failure of the Italians to provide a powerful enough alternative of their own to meet the great imperial war machinery such an outcome was, no doubt, inevitable.

Only Genoa and Venice succeeded in escaping imperial domination and it seems appropriate to discuss in the context of Tuscany the history of Genoa over this period. The cases of Venice and Genoa are not in any way alike. Venice proved too powerful in herself to crush, Genoa, on the other hand, survived hispanization through the mediation of Andrea Doria whose services to the emperor were so indispensable that he was able to dictate his own terms on behalf of his beloved city. Free from overt imperial domination and under the beneficial guidance of Doria, Genoa emerged from these years with greater political stability than she had ever achieved in her previous history.

In the middle ages when Genoa had been divided as even no other Italian state was divided, the city had been dominated by the struggle between her leading families, the Ghibelline (White) Spinola and Doria and the Guelf (Black) Fieschi and Grimaldi, and had also been divided by the struggles between the 'nobili' and the 'popolari'.⁽¹⁾ From 1339 until 1529 the Doria played no direct part in the city's politics. Genoa had gradually fallen under French domination and it was this connexion which made Genoa the object of general attention in the early 16th century, for, despite the loss of her colonial empire in the 15th century, Genoa remained a commercial, banking, ship-building and trading port of the first importance. One of the main objects of the Holy League and, in particular, /

1. For this see J. Heer, Gênes au xv^e siècle, chapter xii.

particular, of Julius II, who had allied with the fuoruscito, Gian Fregosi, ⁽¹⁾ had been to end French influence in the city. After the French defeat of 1512 Genoa, under the Fregosi, returned to an autonomous government, but, with a new French expedition, the Fregosi were once more expelled.

Spain now began to play a more prominent part in Genoese affairs, for it was clear that control of Genoa was vital for any nation permanently wishing to hold the duchy of Milan ⁽²⁾ or, indeed, to control Italy. ⁽³⁾ Also Genoa had developed strong links with Sicily, where by the end of the 15th century Genoa dominated the field of maritime assurance, ⁽⁴⁾ and with Naples, where the entire economy was dominated by foreign merchants and the Genoese were gradually ousting the Florentines from their established position. The export trade in foodstuffs and silk and in grain was based on a group of determined Genoese families who in the absence of a Neapolitan merchant marine tended to monopolise Neapolitan commerce. At Genoa too, were based the emperor's principal ship-builders, the Doria, the Sauli, the Negroni, the Imperiali and the de Mari. ⁽⁵⁾ And if Spain was dependent on Genoa, conversely Genoa was dependent on Spain and increasingly so as the years passed. The fortunes of Genoa were founded on and maintained by the silk trade; by 1531, at a time when there were only 423 wool weavers in the city, there were 2,303 silk weavers. At first most of the raw silk for these manufactories came from the east, but even by the end of the 14th century Genoa was experiencing difficulty in obtaining silk from Asia and was looking elsewhere for supplies. The source of these supplies which was to replace Asia was/

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1. See J. Heer, Gênes au xv^e siècle, chapter xii. 576-7 for the Fregosi.
 2. '.... cui haverà Zenoa haverà etiam el Stado de Milan. Zenoa è la chiave de tutta Lombardia; è quella che da il viver al Stado de Milan, et preso Zenoa, Milan non si potria tenir'. Sanuto, Diarri, xliii. 181-2.
 3. Brantôme, Oeuvres, ii. 46, '.... qui n'est seigneur de Genes et maistre de la mer ne peut guieres bien dominer l'Italie'.
 4. J. Heer, Gênes au xv^e siècle, 334.
 5. Ibid. 284-7 for the ship-building industry in the 15th century, G. Coniglio, Il Regno di Napoli al Tempo di Carlo V, (Naples 1951), 103-129. The Genoese also had important mercantile interests in France, N. Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens sur les Affaires de France au xvi^e siècle (Paris 1838) i. 36.

was Spanish by 1527; by 1460 Genoa was regularly importing silk from Calabria and by the beginning of the 16th century almost all raw silk came to Genoa from Spain or the Spanish dependencies of Sicily and the Regno.⁽¹⁾ And these dependencies also fed Genoa - the principal source of Genoese grain was Sicily, where grain was purchased at Palermo. So vast was the volume of this trade that the Genoese merchant marine was not sufficient to maintain it, and use had to be made of Portuguese and Spanish ships. Without these auxiliary fleets, indeed, Genoa would have starved.⁽²⁾

Thus the community of interest between Spain and Genoa was very great and this explains increasing Genoese tolerance of Spanish interference in the political life of Genoa. After the battle of Novara (1513) it was with Spanish help and approval that Ottaviano Fregosi was appointed doge. Ottaviano, however, was himself under pressure from Gian Fregosi who had gained control of Savona and was threatening Genoa with the Adorni and Fieschi.⁽³⁾ Afraid both of Gian and of the aspirations of Massimiliano Sforza, Ottaviano made a secret agreement with the French, and, after the battle of Marignano, ceded Genoa to Francis I, driving the Adorni into alliance with the emperor.

On 30 May 1522 with the change of fortunes following Bicocca, Genoa was occupied by an army of Spaniards led by Prospero Colonna and Pescara and subjected to a terrible sack. Ottaviano was taken prisoner to Naples, where he died, and was replaced as doge by Antonietto Adorno who ruled under imperial surveillance.

However, the city did not escape the vicissitudes suffered by the rest of Italy after the sack of Rome. Adorno had been considerably weakened by his failure to retake Savona, which was in League hands and which had been refortified by Pedro Navarro.⁽⁴⁾ The vulnerability of his government was well known to Charles V who believed Genoa to be essential to his cause, because of the access it provided to northern Italy, its valuable banking facilities, and its important ship-yards where he hoped to build up a fleet as powerful as that of the League. Accordingly, immediately on receiving the news of the sack of Rome, Charles wrote/

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1. J. Heers, Gênes au xv^e siècle, 236-7.
 2. Ibid. 335.
 3. For the Adorni see ibid. 576-7.
 4. See above p. 46.

wrote to the city, urging the doge and Balia not to seek any novel form of government. With the same post Soria, the emperor's permanent resident in Genoa, received bills of exchange for 20,000 ducats with which to build galleys for the imperial fleet, but the Genoese would only agree to provide six galleys at their expense if the imperialists would agree to build a comparable number, and, as Soria hastened to point out, for this funds were just insufficient.⁽¹⁾ Adorni's government was severely demoralised by the acute food shortage and by the spread of plague in the city and its contado which brought trade to a standstill.⁽²⁾ Although, in normal times, Genoa could be supplied with wheat from Corsica and a convoy was imminently expected from the island, it was doubtful whether this would ever reach the city, since Andrea Doria had been taken into French service and was successfully blockading Genoa.⁽³⁾ The citizens had little will to resist an attempted take-over by the League and on 19 August the city was occupied by Cesare Fregosi with 1,000 of Lautrec's infantry and some picked Venetian troops.⁽⁴⁾ Fregosi chose Teodoro Trivulzio as governor⁽⁵⁾ who nominated a commission of eight reformers who were to seek a stable form of government for the city. Adorni returned to Milan where he remained until his death in 1532. Genoa was constantly open to threats of an imperial return,⁽⁶⁾ there were doubts about the city's loyalty,⁽⁷⁾ and Trivulzio had to rely heavily on the League for protection. His position in the city was difficult for he appeared to represent French control and the material conditions of life were as unsatisfactory as they had been under the previous regime. The Genoese resented the attempts being made by Francis I to set up Savona, traditionally an 'allied' town, as a rival to Genoa. The French had established the Mediterranean salt-market there, provoking bitter and envious feelings in Genoa.⁽⁸⁾

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 257-8.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 159.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 293, Paruta, Istorie, 468.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 293, 341, 346-7.
 5. Ibid. 347, Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 90.
 6. E.g. in April 1528, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 315.
 7. Ibid. 316.
 8. For the importance of salt see J. Heer, Gênes au xv^e siècle, 350-6.

Doria, meanwhile had come to his strange agreement with Charles.⁽¹⁾ The price of his services to the emperor included the provision that if Doria could recover Genoa and its former dominions, especially Savona, without any cost to the emperor, then the city would always be free from any attempt to impose imperial control. Yet, in trade, the Genoese were to be as privileged as if they were imperial subjects.⁽²⁾ On 21 July 1528 Doria wrote to Genoa, preparing the ground for his return to the city, promising that he would never harm Genoa whoever he was to serve.⁽³⁾ On 12 September he entered the port with 500 infantry on board his vessels. His arrival provoked a popular rising and Trivulzio retired to the castello whence he wrote agonised appeals for assistance to the League.⁽⁴⁾ Declaring that he came only to restore Genoese liberty and to complete the union with Savona, Doria who was acclaimed Pater patriae handed over the government of Genoa to twelve reformers.⁽⁵⁾ Immediate measures were taken to raise fresh troops; there were 2,000 already in Genoese pay and another 1,000 were provided by Doria but it was intended to double this number.⁽⁶⁾ On 21 October Doria received Savona once more into the Genoese dominion and the fortifications of that city were dismantled.⁽⁷⁾ On 28 October came agreement with Trivulzio who promised to surrender to the commune of Genoa if no help came from St. Paul within a week. In return he was promised security for his person and goods.⁽⁸⁾ Since no effective help came from St. Paul,⁽⁹⁾ Genoa passed peacefully into Doria's hands, the castello was dismantled⁽¹⁰⁾ and the new constitution was assured. This free and liberal constitution which lasted until 1796 increased the number of those able to play a part in the political life of the city and a serious attempt was made to reduce faction rivalry. Ten new citizens a year might be added to the oligarchy and legislative powers were granted to two councils chosen from/

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1. See above p. 233-4.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 765-6, L. & P. Henry VIII, iv. pt.2, 2009.
 3. Molini, Documenti, ii. 48.
 4. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 502-3, Paruta, Istorie, 511.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 503, Guazzo, Historie, 96-7.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 503.
 7. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 824.
 8. Molini, Documenti, ii. 60-2.
 9. See above p. 237.
 10. Paruta, Istorie, 517.

from the ruling families by lot.⁽¹⁾

The constitution and the city withstood all attempts to reimpose foreign control. In December 1528 St. Paul detached 2,000 infantry and 50 cavalry to attack Genoa. The principal object of the enterprise, the capture of Doria, failed, and the French troops had to retire unsuccessfully to Alessandria.⁽²⁾ All attempts to put economic pressure on Genoa also failed.⁽³⁾ Thus, finally, French control of Genoa came to an end.

But, if Genoa retained her independence, this was uncharacteristic of events in north-western Italy where whole areas were falling under direct imperial control. As a result, even Genoa was circumscribed for it was clear that, with the emperor increasingly powerful in Italy, independent action was unthinkable. Any overtly anti-imperial action must inevitably result in the total loss of even such cherished attributes of 'liberty' as Genoa had managed to retain. Indeed, there is little reason why Genoa should have revolted against mild control from Spain. The connexion with Spain appeared essential; well into the 17th century the Genoese retained their predominant position in the mercantile and banking worlds of Spain, Sicily and the Regno.⁽⁴⁾ The economic links between Genoa and Spain had been forged so fast that political independence was largely irrelevant. It was clear that Doria had made the right choice with his surprising change of allegiance in 1528, which had then seemed a betrayal of Italian independence in favour of imperial domination.

1. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 237.

2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 367.

3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 159.

4. R. Lopez, 'Il predominio economico dei Genovesi nella monarchia spagnola', Giornale storico e letterario della Liguria (1936), 6-8, G. Coniglio, Il Viceregno di Napoli nel sec. xvii. (Rome 1955), 95-104.

CHAPTER XI

The Imperial Victory

'la grandezza dello imperatore è la servitù nostra'

P. Guicciardini, Scritti inediti di F. Guicciardini, 62

For two years the threat to Italian independence, which, after the battle of Pavia, Charles V had so suddenly come to represent, had held the majority of Italian states to a common purpose. For those two years they had been forced to work together in one final effort to rid the peninsula of 'barbarian' power.⁽¹⁾ Now, the sack of Rome had once more divided Italy; there was a general loss of morale, the pope and Venice were in opposing camps, Florence was in open revolt against the Medici, and Sforza was immobilised by fear and bankruptcy. All over Italy the sack of Rome unleashed divisive forces and the resulting disorder led, in the end, to the collapse of Italian independence and the imperial triumph, symbolised in Charles V's coronation at Bologna (24 February 1530).

By Italian observers the significance of the sack of Rome was immediately recognised⁽²⁾ but, in the months following the capture of the city, this significance was lost on the imperialists themselves. Burdened with their own problems, they could not be persuaded of the possibility of their eventual success. The sack of Rome was seen as an incident which was more likely to contribute to a total imperial failure. Without money, a vigorous policy, following logically from the success at Rome, could not be pursued. On 30 September 1527 de Veyre warned Charles: 'Generally speaking, I have found your Majesty's affairs in such confusion and bad order that I can see no help but in peace',⁽³⁾ and on 4 October Andrea del Borgo again urged on the emperor the necessity of a speedy peace.⁽⁴⁾ Da Leyva's report on 18 October was little better; the Venetian army was still encamped before Milan, where the imperial troops were in a state of almost constant mutiny. The Milanese were fleeing from Milan, refusing to support the imperial army any longer, while the contado was completely ruined.⁽⁵⁾ A schism threatened, for eight cardinals had met at Parma, with the tacit support of England, in order to elect a lieutenant to act for the pope during his captivity.⁽⁶⁾ At Naples Lautrec was successfully besieging the city which was/

1. See above p. 23.

2. See below p. 316.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 411.

4. Ibid. 413.

5. No more than one quarter of the agricultural land in the duchy was under cultivation in 1529, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 873, ibid. 570-571.

6. Ibid. 421-2.

was ravaged by plague, and it looked as though the whole of the Regno would soon fall to the League. Worst of all, despite the sack of Rome and imperial control of so much of the Italian peninsula, the main commercial and banking centres were still unrepentently hostile; Florence, Venice and Genoa openly so, Lucca, actually so, although proclaiming her neutrality. It was as difficult as ever to raise money.⁽¹⁾ The principal communication routes were also in League hands. Until Doria's defection⁽²⁾ the Italian League had complete control of the sea. All couriers passing through French, Florentine, Genoese and Venetian territory were automatically stopped and it was impossible to send dispatches from Italy to England, the Netherlands or Austria without sending them first to Spain.⁽³⁾

The imperial leaders in Italy were still at cross-purposes.⁽⁴⁾ The treasury of Naples was exhausted and the council of Naples was as hostile as ever to the remnants of Bourbon's forces. Its greatest nightmare was that the troops would end up in the Regno itself. The sack of Rome had solved nothing; the vast army had either to be occupied somehow or else disbanded, a task apparently too great for the emperor to solve from Spain. For this reason there were always to be found Neapolitan councillors who, from the first, had urged an attack on Florence or any diversion which would keep the army away from Naples.⁽⁵⁾

What reaction the emperor had anticipated when he agreed to an attack on Rome is not clear, but what is certain is that the sack of the city produced feelings of hostility in the most unexpected quarters. Everywhere the news was greeted with shock and horror; at Urbino men stood in the streets and wept as they listened to the accounts of the sack.⁽⁶⁾ Despite subsequent adulation of the emperor in Italy, resulting from fear, attempts to maintain the fiction that the emperor had been in no way responsible for the sack,⁽⁷⁾ and a glossing over of its worst/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 732.

2. See above p. 233-4, 304.

3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 567, 676, 937.

4. Ed. A. Morel-Fatio, Historiographie de Charles Quint (Paris 1913), 199.

5. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 211.

6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 189.

7. Sadoleto, Letters, 180 'rendomi certo, che queste cose sono contro la volonta e mente dell'Imperatore, ovvero piu fede non e al mondo'.

worst aspects, public opinion throughout Europe was appalled. Few found they could congratulate Charles on this victory. For Francis I it was a golden opportunity which he did not fail to seize; brushing aside Charles V's excuses, he maintained that it was public knowledge that the emperor had ordered the attack on Rome and criticised Charles for his praise of Bourbon. 'Besides' he said, 'it was easy to know who were those who wished for the peace and quietness of Christendom and those who did not. As far as he himself was concerned he aimed not at universal monarchy, knowing very well that it did not belong to him; he only wanted to live in peace within his own kingdom'.⁽¹⁾

In Spain, where the emperor received the news of the sack at Valladolid on a day of public celebration for the birth of his son, Philip, at the beginning of June, it was as unpopular as anywhere. There had always been a large body of influential opinion opposed to a war against the pope, particularly among the ecclesiastics.⁽²⁾ Now the opposition, led by the archbishop of Toledo and the duke of Alva, became embarrassingly outspoken. They were particularly incensed by Bourbon's failure to observe Lannoy's truce, and this was to prove the biggest stumbling block in the emperor's subsequent self-justifications.⁽³⁾ The most important dignitaries in Spain, both lay and ecclesiastical, were opposed to celebrating mass for as long as the pope should remain a captive.⁽⁴⁾ It is clear that the government remained sensitive on the subject of the sack of Rome, judging by the affair of Eugenio Torralba, who was arrested by the Inquisition of Cuenca in 1528 on charges of witchcraft. Torralba had been a medical student at Rome in the early years of the sixteenth century, where he had first adopted his own peculiar spirit, Zequiél, who, he claimed, had the property of transporting him through the air at will. In 1527 Torralba betrayed himself, for Zequiél informed him that Rome was about to be sacked by the imperial troops and he asked the spirit to carry him there to witness the horrifying scene. He left Valladolid at 11 p.m. on the night of 5 May and was back by 3 p.m. the next day to tell his friends what he had witnessed. Whatever the truth of this strange/

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1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 639.
 2. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 143, 145.
 3. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 68.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 235.

strange episode it clearly indicates that the government was disturbed by any loose talk associated with the sack of Rome.⁽¹⁾

Close upon the first news of the sack came adverse criticism from Italy, particularly from the emperor's own advisers. Typical of these was Salazar, who told Gattinara that although a great victory had been achieved, it was not without 'the shade of infamy with which future generations are likely to brand Spain'.⁽²⁾ The only way in which the bad impression created by the imperial army might be obliterated was by ensuring that events would now lead to a reform of the Church.⁽³⁾ Gattinara's own ideas about the sack of Rome were first written down on 7 June. He saw that public opinion would blame the emperor most severely. He advised Charles to justify himself publically, but not to repeat the mistakes made after Pavia, and forgo any of the advantages which the capture of Rome and the imprisonment of the pope might bring to the imperial cause. He suggested that Valdés should draft the emperor's public justification, and draw the moral that henceforth wars in Christendom must be stopped, a general council must be called and the church reformed.⁽⁴⁾ Church reform was in the minds of many, not least in that of Quinones, who arrived from Rome towards the end of July and soundly castigated Charles, 'to whom he said boldly that unless his Majesty did his duty by the Pope he could no longer be styled 'Emperor' but 'Luther's Captain', as the Lutherans, in his name, and under his flag, perpetrated all their atrocities'.⁽⁵⁾

Charles as advised by Gattinara, was inclined to justify himself on religious grounds and to point to the sack of Rome as a divine judgement on the pope for failing to reform the church.⁽⁶⁾ The sack of Rome he declared to be no doing of/

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1. H. Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition (London 1965) 205-6.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 243.
 3. Ibid. 244-5.
 4. Brandi, Charles V, 256.
 5. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 76. There is an MS. copy of this letter to Salviati in B.M. Add. MSS. 28576, f.304.
 6. E.g. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 297, Brandi, Charles V, 259. See also Charles letter to the commune of Rome in Arch. Cap. MS. Arm. xiv. tom. 7, ff. 113-115v.

of his but rather of his soldiers who had been exasperated by Clement's failure to fulfil his promises.⁽¹⁾ There were many who were prepared to share the emperor's view. Lope de Soria declared the sack to be a punitive visitation from God to demonstrate to the world at large the iniquities of those who obstructed the emperor's messianic purposes in Europe. He concluded that 'the Emperor ought now to try and make his peace with the Pope and with the rest of the Christian Princes, who, perceiving their inability to carry out their wicked purposes, and how favourable Fortune shows itself to the Imperial arms, will certainly not refuse his terms. Should the Emperor think that the Church of God is not what it ought to be, and that the Pope's temporal power emboldens him to promote rebellion and incite the Christian Princes to make war on each other it will not be a sin, but on the contrary a meritorious action to reform the Church in such a manner that the Pope's authority may be confined exclusively to his own spiritual duties'.⁽²⁾ The official imperial viewpoint was presented by Valdés in the Dialogue of Mercury and Charon⁽³⁾ and in the Dialogue of Lactantio and the Archdeacon.⁽⁴⁾ These remarkable documents reflect imperial policy and the hope for church reform. They exculpate the sack on somewhat contradictory grounds claiming that, although it had not been ordered by the emperor, it was made inevitable by the intrigues of Clement VII and of Francis I, that it was a manifestation of God's will, designed to punish evil churchmen for religious abuses. Although Valdés is here expressing official opinion he was not the only Spanish humanist to be elated by the sack of Rome. For many the tangible benefits to be gained from the sack were so great that they overrode the horrifying aspects of the sack. To Erasmus who was appalled by the events at Rome since he believed they would only lead to worse conflict between Christian peoples, Vives wrote on 13 June that, on the contrary, this would be the prelude to the long-awaited reform of the church.⁽⁵⁾

On the other hand, among the Italians many shared a fatalistic view of events, particularly in retrospect. They spoke of 'il tempo qual'idio per/

1. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 297.

2. Ibid. 210.

3. Alfonso de Valdés, Dialogo de Mercurio y Caron, ed. Jose F. Montesinos (Madrid 1929).

4. John E. Longhurst, Alfonso de Valdés and the Sack of Rome (Albuquerque 1952).

5. A. Renaudet, Erasme et l'Italie (Geneva 1954), 191.

per iusto giuditio suo voleva gastigar il popolo Romano per li suoi peccati'.⁽¹⁾ This was a view of events most vigorously contested by Castiglione, hitherto one of the emperor's consistent supporters, a man who had invariably regarded Charles V's actions in the most favourable light.⁽²⁾ Publically replying to Valdés famous Dialogues⁽³⁾ and to that humanist's subsequent justificatory letters, Castiglione argued that the sack of Rome owed nothing to divine intervention, 'E certo la permission di Dio non è stata in questo caso altro che non proibire e lasciare il suo libero arbitrio a quello esercito'.⁽⁴⁾ Valdés, Castiglione argued, would have adopted a better position had he argued that God permitted the sack of Rome in order that Clement and the cardinals might have a greater reward in heaven, and Valdés suggestion that the sack was a punishment because the pope had sold church property and cardinal's hats must surely be ironic, given that the money thus raised had been used to pay the imperial army.⁽⁵⁾

Although the Sienese, who had suffered nothing by the sack of Rome, continued obstinately to regard the emperor as the saviour of Italy,⁽⁶⁾ in general the sack of Rome brought about within Italy one great change in public opinion, an increase in the popularity of the French, even among those who had previously held Francis I in derision. The outrages of the imperial army 'inimica de Dio et della Chiesa sua',⁽⁷⁾ finally killed in all save the most credulous the belief in Charles V and the Spanish as vindicators of Italian liberty against French oppression. This change in public opinion was carefully fostered by Francis I who took the occasion to emphasise his own virtues at the expense of the emperor. There were many Italians now who would believe Francis; Alberini for instance speaks in glowing terms of the French king and swore never to forgive Charles or his army.⁽⁸⁾ France and Venice were praised, were supplicated/

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1. MS. Vat. Lat. 7933 f.56, F. Berni, Orlando Innamorato di Matteo M. Bojardo (Milan 1806), i. 273.
 2. See above p. 66.
 3. See above p. 310.
 4. Castiglione, Lettere, ii. 187.
 5. Ibid. 187-193.
 6. La Guerra di Camollia, 43.
 7. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 225.
 8. Ibid. 327, 'hebbi in casa mia quattro di quelli insatiabili devoratori tutto quel tempo continuo a mia spesa, et Iddio che il sa che fastidii e difficoltà, no lo perdoni mai a Carlo nè alli suoi'.

supplanted as potential deliverers of the pope and of Rome.⁽¹⁾ Some took the opportunity to advocate a united Italy or a revival of the glories of Italy's Roman past, using the sack of Rome to reinforce all the old arguments.⁽²⁾

Alberini's views on the sack of Rome were bitter, understandably so, for he had suffered considerably in the sack.⁽³⁾ What outraged him most, however, was not his own difficulties but that it was Rome against which the imperial army had been unleashed, 'patria comune de ogniuno, che ancora non abborisce ricever nel seno et amorosamente abbracciar di quelle genti, che già la ferno captiva, la rubborno, la flagellero, l'arsero et la destrussero'.⁽⁴⁾ An intense love of his city where even the plants, the trees and the animals had been destroyed made every Roman suffer doubly, once for himself and once on behalf of Rome⁽⁵⁾ and instils into eye-witness accounts of the sack a peculiar bitterness that it was impossible to hide.⁽⁶⁾ But the suffering of the individual alone would have been sufficient to bear. The most neutral, indifferent or hostile observer in Rome could still be frankly appalled; Francesco Gonzaga, for instance, could speak only of the intense compassion to which he had been moved by the fate of the city, 'parmi mutato il mondo in tutto'.⁽⁷⁾

Immediately, people observing the disaster wrought at Rome began to ask how such a thing had come about. It was easy enough to survey the whole series of events which led up to the sack of Rome, easy to point to single errors and mistakes - the failure to prosecute the attack on Milan, the death of Giovanni de' Medici were favourites. For the Venetians it was very simple, the blame must lie with Clement VII who had been so credulous in his dealings with the/

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1. La Presa e Lamento di Roma in Curiosità Letterarie (Bologna 1890) vol. 236, 365, Lamento d'Italia in *ibid.* 405-414, written by Guicciardini. For his authorship see A. de Ruboli, 'Francesco Guicciardini e la Censura Toscana' in La Bibliofilia, li. 86-91.
 2. Lamento di Roma in Curiosità Letterarie (Bologna 1890) vol. 236, 397, G. Guidiccioni, Rime, ed. E. Chiorboli (Bari 1912), 5-8.
 3. See above p. 188, 196.
 4. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 195.
 5. E.g. Sadoletto, Letters, 209.
 6. E.g. the account of P. Corsi printed in Mélanges d'Archeologie et d'Histoire (1896) 421-432.
 7. Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. 503-4, D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 116.

the viceroy; 'Nostro Signore ha sempre creduto al Vicerè, et prestata tanta fede, come si egli fosse stato un Dio, et questo è stato la ruina di tutta questa impresa et di Roma'.⁽¹⁾ But this was only a short-term view. It was explored and was rejected as it was seen that so great a tragedy ought to have great causes and as time passed the sack was universally moralised over. Among the most common of interpretations was that which regarded the sack as a punishment by God, although it was difficult to explain why a pope so notably virtuous as Clement⁽²⁾ should have been singled out for so drastic a punishment. Some attempted to get round this stumbling block by regarding the sack as a punishment for the corruption of the papal court or of Rome, in which the pope, albeit innocent had been caught up.⁽³⁾ Even Aretino was shaken by the disaster to which he subsequently referred with some frequency and which he considered a just punishment by God, which seemed to justify all that he had already written against Rome. Although he wrote to the emperor urging him to release the pope and to spare Rome, he also wrote sharply to Clement, 'chi cade, come Vostra Santità, rivolgasi a Giesú con in preghi, e non a la sorte con le querele. Era di necessitá che il vicario di Cristo, col patir le miserie dei casi, scontasse i debiti dei falli d'altri, né appariva chiara a tutto il mondo la giustizia con cui il cielo corregge gli errori, se il carcere vostro non era testimonio'.⁽⁴⁾

Eustachio Celebrino, author of the poem La Presa e Lamento di Roma⁽⁵⁾ attributed the sack to the internal divisions of Rome, between the Orsini and the Colonna, and between Guelph and Ghibelline, which had betrayed the traditions of classical Rome;

'O popul mio, voi n'avete gran torto
Far fra voi guerra come lupi e cani'.⁽⁶⁾

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 418.
 2. Vettori, Sommario, 381.
 3. Ibid. 380-1, Sadoleto, Letters, 178, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 127.
 4. P. Aretino, Il Primo Libro delle Lettere (Bari 1913) i. 13-16.
 5. In Curiosità Letterarie (Bologna 1890) vol. 236, 356-369. See also Romae Lamentatio in ibid. 369-383.
 6. Ibid. 359.

Others concentrated on the picture of Rome reduced from the summits of prosperity to the depths of human misery, regarding it as an excellent object lesson in the mutability of fortune, 'e della fragilità delle cose humane'.⁽¹⁾ This was the standpoint adopted by Guicciardini,⁽²⁾ who pointed out how peculiarly vulnerable to Fortune's caprices men were in war. Choosing to place the sack in its proper context he reviewed all the events which had led up to such 'infinite calamità universale'⁽³⁾ and concluded that the disastrous outcome did not prove that the pope was wrong to enter the war in the first place. On the contrary, Guicciardini concluded that all the dictates of reason had demanded that the pope should attempt to check Charles V.⁽⁴⁾ In his consideration of Vettori and Guicciardini, Felix Gilbert emphasises the importance of the years 1525-30, and, in particular, the traumatic effect of the sack of Rome which represented the triumph of Fortuna over reason. The experiences of these years had revealed to the Florentines the limitations of human reason, of human planning and of human power, had demonstrated the uncertainty of what man could achieve in politics. It was clear that the Italians could not control their own destiny, for what had happened in Italy was largely the result of what had happened elsewhere in Europe. It was for this reason that Vettori and Guicciardini began to investigate the power of fortuna in history, with the result that, 'The strongest, most permanent impression which the History of Italy imparts is that of the helplessness and impotence of man in the face of fate'.⁽⁵⁾

Inevitably comparisons were drawn with the previous sack of the city by the/

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1. Paruta, Istorie, 449-451, Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 133, Romae Lamentatio in Curiosita Letterarie (Bologna 1890) vol. 236, 371, Lamento di Roma in ibid. 383.
 2. In 'Giustificazione della politica di Clement VII' printed in F. Guicciardini, Scritti Politici e Ricordi, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari 1933), 198-211.
 3. Ibid. 198.
 4. Ibid. 200-206.
 5. F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 253-301, R. Ramat, Il Guicciardini e la Tragedia d'Italia (Florence 1953), especially pp. 94-117. This was a point of view shared by many contemporaries, e.g. the comment of the Doge in March 1527 that 'la fortuna vol ruinar il Pontefice'. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 356. See also ibid. xlvii. 130-133 for an elegant inquiry into the role played by Fortuna in the events leading to the sack of Rome.

the Goths, the general consensus of opinion being that the Goths had behaved rather better than the army of Charles V.⁽¹⁾ Equally inevitable were the comparisons made with the sacks of Carthage, Jerusalem, Constantinople, Rhodes or such sacks as Italy had witnessed in recent years. It was generally agreed that the sack was worse than that of Genoa⁽²⁾ or even of Prato. Later on Brantôme compared the sack of Rome and the sack of Antwerp and decided that that of Rome was worse.⁽³⁾

In the end the Italians came to terms with the sack of Rome by maintaining the fiction so convincingly put forward by Charles V, that he had nothing to do with the sack of Rome. All could then be blamed on the emperor's evil servants, on Bourbon, or on Bourbon's mutinous army which was held to have coerced him into the march on Rome. Thus the decimation of the imperial armies in Naples by plague was considered a divine punishment for the sack⁽⁴⁾ and thus Bourbon, despite the official imperial view of his quasi-sanctity,⁽⁵⁾ came to personify, in Italian terms, all that was bad, as did Moncada, Lamoy and to some extent, Colonna,⁽⁶⁾ who were all held to have acted without the emperor's knowledge. Giovio describes the popular theory that Sessa had been poisoned by Moncada and the Colonna because he refused to sanction an attack on the pope and Rome.⁽⁷⁾ Even Clement, in his own mind, seems to have shifted responsibility from the emperor to Bourbon and the duke of Ferrara,⁽⁸⁾ whilst some, particularly the Florentines, held that Clement himself must bear the entire responsibility.⁽⁹⁾ Yet another favoured means of excusing the emperor among the Italians was to argue/

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1. Pastor, Papacy, ix. App. 507, Paruta, Istorie, 450, Nardi, Historie, 195, Sadoleto, Letters, 244-5, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 23, La Presa e Lamento di Roma in Curiosità Letterarie (Bologna 1890) vol. 236, 364, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 136.
 2. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 219, 237, L. Guicciardini, Sacco di Roma, 23.
 3. Brantôme, Oeuvres, 322. 'Ce sac fut tel, que, de nos peres et de nous, en quelque lieu qui ait esté forcé, on n'en a veu de pareil'.
 4. Ibid. 320.
 5. Alfonso de Valdés, Dialogo de Mercurio y Carón (Madrid 1929), 77, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 639.
 6. Sanuto, Diarii, xlv. 418 and see above p. 1 for Bourbon's posthumous reputation.
 7. P. Giovio, La vita del Gran Capitano, (Bari 1931), 7.
 8. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 267.
 9. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 429.

argue that the sack of Rome had increased European unity against the Turk. The sack of Rome had shown what quarrelling within the Christian community could lead to. It was an object lesson to all Europe, a lesson which Erasmus had been trying to teach for many years. And the emperor, it was argued, had learnt that lesson. The monument to the imperial coronation in Bologna, emphasized the fact that, after his coronation, Charles went off to Germany to fight the Turk.⁽¹⁾

One thing was clear to all Italian observers. The sack of Rome had created a vacuum in Italian politics which served the emperor well. To all intents and purposes the only effective power in central Italy was now the imperial army. The sack of Rome seemed such an act of finality that it appeared the imperialists must have everything their own way. But Charles' advisers considered that if that way was to be constructive rather than destructive the emperor must come at once to Italy and make known his wishes in person. Immediately after the sack Gattinara warned, 'senza la venuta di Vostra Maesta, tutta Italia sara distrutta, massime che questo exercito non penso ad altro che a saccheggiare e distruggere ogni cosa',⁽²⁾ and Perez also advised the emperor to come to Italy as soon as possible to 'hold a council, and therein ordain what is best for God's and the imperial service'.⁽³⁾

But the emperor's arrival in Italy and the final peace were still many months away, and peace resulted as much from war-weariness after long years of profitless conflict, as from the sack of Rome. Exhaustion of all the parties concerned, none of whom had proved to have the resources necessary to carry on such a prolonged war, was gradually bringing the wars in Italy to a close, with the imperialists predominant but hardly triumphant. Even the long-awaited arrival of the emperor no longer aroused much enthusiasm among his supporters. In May 1529 Pompeo Colonna warned Charles that if he landed in Naples he would produce famine throughout the Regno and would drive the army in Italy to mutiny.⁽⁴⁾

Among the allies suspicions were rife as it was clear that, despite the/

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1. Monument on the Palazzo del Commune, Bologna.
 2. Gattinara in Milanese, Sacco, 528.
 3. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 203.
 4. Molini, Documenti, ii. 200.

the terms of the League of Cognac,⁽¹⁾ the French and English were negotiating separately with the emperor. In July 1527 Navagero reported that in Spain both countries were carrying on separate talks and he warned Venice that it seemed likely Francis would desert Sforza if he could thereby recover his sons.⁽²⁾ Discussions, based on the Treaty of Madrid, which was argued over clause by clause, had progressed some way by September. Agreement had almost been reached on a ransom for the French princes but things were not progressing entirely in the emperor's favour, for it was clear that in order to achieve a lasting peace in Italy he would have to abandon that most cherished of his dreams, the recovery of the Burgundian inheritance. Encouraged by Lautrec's successes in Italy the French were also standing firm over Milan, as was the pope in his separate negotiations, much to Charles V's chagrin, as he was still anxious to retain the duchy in his own hands.⁽³⁾

By June 1529 the Venetians were suspecting an imminent peace between France and the emperor⁽⁴⁾ and at the end of June heard that Francis had left Paris for Cambrai, where his mother had been in charge of the negotiations.⁽⁵⁾ Both Venice and Florence hastened to beg the French king to include them in his talks which Francis, anxious not to be left alone if peace talks broke down, readily promised to do.⁽⁶⁾

At Cambrai the discussions were protracted. To the anxious Venetians and Florentines it seemed likely that Francis would agree to any terms in exchange for the young princes⁽⁷⁾ and suspicion deepened that the French would abandon Italy entirely. On 10 July the Italian ambassadors were assured that there would be no peace without the allies but the Venetians and Milanese were not convinced and their perturbation increased when they could get nothing but/

1. See above p. 34-5.

2. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 79-80.

3. Ibid. 92-4.

4. Molini, Documenti, ii. 204-8.

5. Ibid. 214.

6. Canestrini et Désjardins, Négociations, ii. 1071, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 3.

7. Canestrini et Désjardins, Négociations, ii. 1076.

but evasive replies to their questions about the progress of the negotiations.⁽¹⁾ On the following day the Venetians and Milanese were joined at Cambrai by Calvacanti, hurriedly dispatched from Florence, where it had been learnt that Francis had been annoyed by Alamanni's mission to Spain.⁽²⁾ His fellow-Italians had little reassurance for him, since it was now clear that the only remaining obstacle in the agreements between Francis and Charles was the French king's wish to include the other League members.⁽³⁾ But this the emperor would not accept, as the intractable attitude of Venice both over Milan and over projects for a joint expedition against the Turk, was irreconcilable with the French willingness to agree over both matters.⁽⁴⁾ Nevertheless, as late as 3 August, Francis again said that he would never agree to a peace which did not include the confederates.⁽⁵⁾ Only two days later, to the consternation of all the ambassadors, despite the fact that agreement meant that at least Italy would no longer be the battlefield of Europe, the peace was published without any mention of the allies. With the exception of Milan, which was partially protected by the papal-imperial agreement at Barcelona,⁽⁶⁾ the Italians were abandoned in a state of war with Charles V.⁽⁷⁾ The Peace of Cambrai⁽⁸⁾ or Paix des Dames left Italy to the discretion of Charles V, to whom Francis surrendered all his rights in Naples, Milan, Genoa and Asti,⁽⁹⁾ and agreed that Venice must/

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1. Canestrini et Désjardins, Négociations, ii. 1081-1083.
 2. Ibid. 1087-1090.
 3. Ibid. 1090.
 4. Ibid. 1099.
 5. Ibid.
 6. See above p. 253.
 7. Canestrini et Désjardins, Négociations, ii. 1102.
 8. Among other provisions a ransom of 2 million gold ducats was agreed to for the French princes, Francis promised not to interfere in Germany, abandoned Tournai and Arras, agreed to join in a naval expedition against Turkey and to restore the property of Orange and that of Bourbon to his heirs. There is a summary of the Treaty in ed. Ch. Weiss, Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle (Paris 1841) i. 464-470.
 9. Asti in 1447 had been recovered by Charles d'Orleans from the Visconti. Charles left it to his son, Louis XII. Asti therefore became the forward point for French expansion into Italy, and between 1494 and 1557 suffered the vicissitudes of the duchy of Milan. On the death of Francesco Sforza, Asti was granted to Lannoy, on whose death it was conferred on Beatrice II of Portugal the wife of Charles II of Savoy. In 1538 it passed to Emmanuele Filiberto of Piedmont, but after 1529 it was continuously garrisoned by Charles V.

must be forced to give up the territories she still held in the Regno.⁽¹⁾

On 12 August 1529 Charles V, with a military escort of 14,000 troops, landed at Genoa where he was welcomed by shouts of 'Long Live the Ruler of the World'.⁽²⁾ As it seemed likely that Charles would use these fresh troops to subdue Venice and Sforza, it was natural that Venice's reaction to the news of the emperor's arrival should have been one of panic, 'trovandosi loro con pochissima fanteria, vietatogli il modo di far fanterie sopra le terre della Chiesa et pensando non volere stare alla campagna, ma ritirarsi nelle terre lor forte, non harebbono havuto il modo di fornirle tutte, come erano necessitati, havendo un Marchese di Mantova già dichiarato Imperiale, qual dava il campo in mezzo di tutte le sue città per il sito di Mantova'.⁽³⁾ In the meantime, while making herself conspicuous by being the only Italian state not to send ambassadors to the emperor on his arrival, Venice began to raise fresh troops; Sigismondo Malatesta was given a condotta of 1,000 infantry and 200 cavalry and Giovanni Contarini and Cesare Fregosi were sent to provide for the defence of Verona.⁽⁴⁾ With the courage of the damned Sforza declared that he would rather be cut to pieces in front of the castello of Cremona than surrender to the emperor.⁽⁵⁾

But, in the end, the emperor was not to have everything his own way in Italy, since, though ultimately at the expense of Florence, Venice succeeded in checking the more flamboyant of the emperor's designs. She retained one major bargaining counter in Naples where she still held Trani, Barletta and Monopoli. Charles had hoped that French pressure on Venice would lead to their restoration and in September the French duly asked Venice to restore this property to the emperor, 'per la liberation de li Sereniss. Figlioli Regii'. When the French ambassador suggested that Venice was bound to such an agreement by the terms of the League of Cognac Venice caustically replied that the terms of the League of Cognac had equally bound the Most Christian King not to make peace without including Venice 'imperoche la restitution de essi suoi carissimi figlioli è/

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1. Molini, Documenti, ii. 241, 243, 247.
 2. Pastor, Papacy, x. 68, Sanuto, Diarri, li. 368.
 3. Molini, Documenti, ii. 241.
 4. Paruta, Istorie, 560-1.
 5. Molini, Documenti, ii. 243.

è stata da noi summamente desiderata, per il qual effecto habiamo eseso da poi sono in Spagna 4 milioni et più di oro tra li exerciti terrestri et armata maritime'.⁽¹⁾

If France had deserted Venice there was still one ally to whom the republic could turn and to whom she was demonstrating remarkable fidelity. Even as Charles advanced in triumph towards Bologna there were reports from his brother of a Turkish advance in Hungary and on 25 August the Venetian Senate instructed its ambassador in Constantinople to stir up this threat.⁽²⁾ It was clear that while the emperor now had a free hand to dispose of Milan, were he to give it to the Archduke Ferdinand, Venice would be driven into open alliance with the Turk.⁽³⁾ Steadfastly, throughout the negotiations, the Venetians refused to take part in a crusade against the Turk, for they were well aware of the importance of the Turkish trade to the maintenance of the financial stability of Venice on which the war effort had been based.⁽⁴⁾

The difficulties experienced in dealing with Venice were not without their side-effects, for, as a result, the emperor was driven into closer dependence on Clement VII whose co-operation could only be purchased by an agreement to attack Florence.⁽⁵⁾

The Peace of Cambrai had been officially published in Rome on 19 September and on 7 October Clement left the city accompanied by Accolti, de Cessis, Cesarini and Ridolfi, advancing through Civita Castellana, Orte, Terni, Spoleto and Foligno to Sigillo where they were met by an imperial embassy. Charles now had certain news that the Turks were advancing on Vienna and was consequently more than anxious, in the face of the hardening attitude of Venice, that papal-imperial relations should not be jeopardised.⁽⁶⁾ He accordingly declared his willingness to surrender all imperial claims to Parma⁽⁷⁾ and to listen to the pope's advice/

1. Molini, Documenti, ii. 246-7.

2. Pastor, Papacy, x. 69, Paruta, Istorie, 581, see also Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 657.

3. Brandi, Charles V, 256.

4. Paruta, Istorie, 581.

5. See above p. 253.

6. Pastor, Papacy, x. 75-7.

7. See above p. 146.

advice over Milan.⁽¹⁾

Passing through Cesana and Forlì Clement made his solemn entry into Bologna on 24 October 1529.⁽²⁾ On the following day, Clement was visited by Contarini, the Venetian ambassador who, under instruction from the Venetian Senate, had the ungrateful task of raising the subject of Ravenna and Cervia offering, on behalf of Venice, an annual tribute for the two towns. Although, it was obviously of the greatest importance that Clement should work closely with Venice over the question of Milan, the pope's bitterness of the subject of Ravenna and Cervia had by no means evaporated. Cardinal Cybo attacked Contarini in public on the subject⁽³⁾ and Clement reminded Contarini that, 'La Signoria ha tolte queste città in tempo che io era in lega seco e che io era prigionero in Castel Sant'Angelo; e ci fu promesso di restituirle, usciti che fossimo dalle mani dei nemici'.⁽⁴⁾ Contarini had been instructed by the Venetian Senate to refer to the long years during which Ravenna and Cervia had been held by Venice, 'onde pare alla nostra Repubblica di avere ragione di conservarle, e di non si lasciar spogliare di esse come di cosa che le è state lasciata dalli nostri padri e maggiori'. Here he drew a comparison between Venice in relation to Ravenna and Cervia and the Medici in relation to Florence, but Clement refused to be diverted from the main topic, and explained that, albeit the Venetians had obtained Ravenna and Cervia from the Polenta family and had held them for over a hundred years, the Polenta themselves had taken the two cities from the Holy See. In despair Contarini was driven to remark that 'se le cose degli stati si dovessero risolvere nel lor principio, ora non si troverebbe chi fosse vero possessore di alcuno'⁽⁵⁾ a remark which could well have been applied to all the points under discussion at Bologna. Clement firmly concluded his interview on a practical note by reaffirming that he was determined to recover the two cities whatever might happen.⁽⁶⁾

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1. Pastor, Papacy, x. 77.
 2. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 154.
 3. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-1533, 235.
 4. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 154-5.
 5. Ibid. 155.
 6. Ibid. 156.

On the following day, Contarini had a second audience with the pope, but found no change in his attitude, and subsequently the Venetian cardinals, Grimani and Pisano, assured the Venetian ambassador that Clement really was determined to have Ravenna and Cervia and would have the backing of the emperor.⁽¹⁾ Although it must have been clear at Venice where a majority of the Senate now favoured peace⁽²⁾ that it would not be possible to drive a wedge between pope and emperor, that Clement would aim for the entire reintegration of his states, and that the emperor would always seek to oblige him, Venice still hoped that the Turkish threat would have some effect. Certainly it was a question which continued to preoccupy the emperor; on 8 November the Senate heard from Contarini that he had been assured by Mercurio Gattinara that the emperor was anxious to make peace with the republic, 'si per acquietare la povera e rovinata Italia, come per poter soccorrere Ferdinando suo fratello contro i Turchi'.⁽³⁾

Encouraged by these remarks, Contarini proceeded to warn the pope that his stubbornness over Ravenna and Cervia, which was certainly delaying a peace settlement in Italy, might well prove disastrous. Although the Turks had withdrawn from Vienna, it was common knowledge that Naples and Sicily were considerably weakened and in no state to resist should the Turks invade by sea.⁽⁴⁾ The pope remained unmoved. On the following day the new datary, Girolamo Schio, informed Contarini that the pope was as firm as ever in his determination to have Ravenna and Cervia restored.⁽⁵⁾ Venice was at last forced to give in. On 10 November the Venetian government instructed Contarini to agree to restore the two cities on the conclusion of a peace, the pope promising that no reprisals would be taken on the inhabitants of Ravenna and Cervia for having supported Venice and that Venetian citizens should enjoy any property they still held in the two towns. Clement also had to agree to the right of the duke of Urbino to the possession of his estates.⁽⁶⁾ At the same time the Venetian government/

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1. Albèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 156.
 2. Paruta, Istorie, 571.
 3. Albèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 160-1.
 4. Ibid. 161.
 5. Ibid. 165.
 6. Ibid. 166-171, Paruta, Istorie, 577.

government declared itself ready to evacuate Apulia, although it was not until 26 November that Venice would agree to entering a defensive Italian League.⁽¹⁾

The only outstanding problem was Sforza who had the total and unflinching support both of Venice and of Clement VII.⁽²⁾ Negotiations between pope and emperor on the subject of Milan had been begun in September when the imperial envoys had suggested that the duchy be given to Alessandro de' Medici who, it was presumed, with the backing of Florence, would be powerful enough to resist any eventual French invasion, but to this Clement would not agree.⁽³⁾ Others worked towards securing Milan for Federigo Gonzaga, while Antonio da Leyva, who was opposed to the restoration of the effeminate Sforza to Milan⁽⁴⁾ and the Ghibelline members of the Milanese aristocracy canvassed the candidature of Francesco Sforza's brother, Massimiliano, who, being still a prisoner in France and likely to remain so, would be no impediment to effective power remaining in imperial hands.⁽⁵⁾ Meanwhile Charles had summoned Sforza to Bologna and had his first interview with him on 23 November.⁽⁶⁾

On 14 December Contarini spoke to Charles on the subject of Milan. The emperor was not in the most conciliatory of moods. While remarking that nothing could be further from his desires than the monarchia d'Italia he suggested that the same could not be said of Venice. He seemed set against the restoration of Sforza and again referred to the possibility of Alessandro de' Medici being given Milan but Contarini assured the emperor that to replace Sforza in the duchy would inevitably lead to another general Italian conflict.⁽⁷⁾ Agreement was finally reached on a financial basis; Sforza was to pay 800,000 scudi for the investiture of Milan and as a security for this sum was to surrender the castelli of Como/

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1. Pastor, Papacy, x. 87.
 2. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 177.
 3. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 205, Pastor, Papacy, x. 86.
 4. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, ii. 175.
 5. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 183.
 6. Pastor, Papacy, x. 86, Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, v. 284-5.
 7. Alèri, Relazioni, ser. ii. vol. 3, 178, 205.

Como and Milan. On 23 December 1529, Charles signed his agreement with Venice and with Sforza and Venice and Milan entered into a mutual obligation of defence. Peace was also signed with the pope, the Archduke Ferdinand, Mantua, Savoy, Montferrat, Urbino, Siena and Lucca.⁽¹⁾ Venice restored to the emperor the towns she still held in the Regno, promised a pardon to all Venetian subjects who had supported the imperialists since the time of Maximilian, and the restoration of their property, agreed to pay to Charles the 25,000 ducats still owing on the 1523 agreement within two months and to assist in the defence of Naples.⁽²⁾

In letters to his brother and to Margaret of Austria Charles subsequently recorded that the last thing he had desired had been the restoration of Sforza and that only the implacable hostility of Venice to any other solution had persuaded him to it, and in June Giovanni Maria Fregosi had spoken feelingly of Venice's contribution in preserving such Italian independence as was left; 'La sublimità vostra ha sostenuta una de li più dure guerre de la memoria nostra, cum immortal laude è stata assertrice de la libertà de tutta Italia'.⁽³⁾ But this was to be the last decisive political victory of Venice. Exhausted by the economic drain of the war between 1525 and 1529, estimated to have cost between four and five million ducats,⁽⁴⁾ which she had embarked on before recovering from the crisis of 1509-1516, Venice was unable to prevent Charles from retaining the duchy of Milan when Sforza died six years later.⁽⁵⁾ The republic no longer had the economic resilience to support virtually constant expenditure on defence since 1509: the building of complicated new fortresses and the cost of their maintenance;⁽⁶⁾ the casting of new artillery; the payment of heavy tribute/

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1. Paruta, Istorie, 577-579, Molini, Documenti, ii. 263, 265, A. Bardi, 'Carlo V e l'Assedio di Firenze' A.S.I. (1893), 39, Pastor, Papacy, x. 88. The peace was ratified on 6 January 1530.
 2. Paruta, Istorie, 577-8.
 3. F. Chabod, 'Venezia nella politica Italiana ed. Europea del Cinquecento', in La Civiltà del Rinascimento (Venice 1957), 42, A. Bardi, 'Carlo V e l'Assedio di Firenze', A.S.I. (1893), 33, Sanuto, Diarii, i. 473.
 4. Paruta, Istorie, 524, Molini, Documenti, ii. 246-7.
 5. Sforza's death without an heir was a disaster. It led to another Franco-Spanish war, the occupation of Savoy and Piedmont by Spanish and French troops for almost twenty years and the investiture of Philip II with the duchy of Milan.
 6. The normal garrison of Bergamo, for example, was 6,000 infantry Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 77-8.

tribute to Constantinople after 1517; the cost of the grain shortage after 1525; had absorbed the entire wealth of the state for ten years.⁽¹⁾ She had found it increasingly difficult to fulfil her military engagements and had had to cast further and further afield when raising new troops, even as far as Constantinople.⁽²⁾ From 1508 onwards Venice had been one of the countries most exposed to troop movements and, under these conditions, the normal flow of merchandise arriving from Alessandria, Syria, Flanders and England through the Veneto could not be maintained. A depression in the Venetian spice trade coincided with these events and lasted until, at least, 1531.⁽³⁾ For several years Venice had been forced to resort to punitively heavy extraordinary taxation.⁽⁴⁾ Within Italy, as the influence of the emperor increased so that of Venice declined; this decline had been perceptible immediately after the sack of Rome when she had been unable to influence the duke of Ferrara against attacking Modena.⁽⁵⁾

As far as Este was concerned, if there were to be any lasting peace in Italy he would have to be included in the peace talks, and, at the request of the emperor, he had come to Bologna under a safe-conduct. The success of the emperor in bringing about agreement which was finally reached on 21 March 1530 contrasts with the inability of the Italian powers to reach agreement previously.⁽⁶⁾ Matters in dispute between Este and the pope were to be referred to the emperor to whom Este agreed to surrender Modena and its contado. Charles was to adjudicate on the matter of the ownership of Modena and Reggio and Rubiera within the following six months, and if, after this lapse of time, he had not done so the towns were to revert to Este.⁽⁷⁾

Already, on 24 February, the emperor had been crowned in the great church/

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1. F. Braudel, 'La Vita Economica de Venezia nel secolo xvi' in La Civiltà Veneziana del Rinascimento (Venice 1957), 88. Venice was always most vulnerable at times of shortage of grain.
 2. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 695.
 3. Ed. B. Pullan, Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London 1968), 4.
 4. E.g. Mai's comment in Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-9, 961, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 77-8, Cal. S.P. Spanish 1527-1529, 657.
 5. See above p. 243.
 6. See above chapter iv.
 7. Cal. S.P. Venetian 1527-33, 240, Pastor, Papacy, x. 97. For his loyalty to the imperialists Federigo Gonzaga was created duke of Mantua.

church of San Petronio in Bologna, and together the emperor and the pope had visited and prayed at the shrine of St. Dominic.⁽¹⁾ It appeared that Charles had made good the imperial pretensions which had, for so long, dominated Italian politics, culture and thought. Charles V's domination of Italy was complete; the monument to the coronation in Bologna was erected by the anti-imperial Cybo;⁽²⁾ although Clement and his successors were, at intervals, to attempt an independent policy, the papacy was now the emperor's client; in 1535 the Florentine fuorusciti, anxious to rid their city of Alessandro de' Medici, realised that this could only be done through the emperor, and placed themselves entirely in his hands. The final agreement imposed on Alessandro and the fuorusciti gave the emperor considerable powers of intervention in Florence - judgements in disputes over property of the fuorusciti were to be made by the imperial ambassador, Alessandro was only permitted to take action against them with imperial approval and promised not to alter the constitution of Florence without the emperor's consent.

It was soon clear that it was not only the political world which would be controlled by the emperor. The victory of Charles V had an immediate effect on the intellectual life of Italy. According to Venetian sources, as early as April 1528, a commission of cardinals appointed to look into the Henry VIII and Katherine of Aragon annulment, decided against the king, not on grounds of canon law, but 'per non displacer a l'Imperador'.⁽³⁾ But canon law had often been subject to the needs and whims of princes; the novel situation in 1528 was that this was a period of church reform. That it was to be only a catholic reform movement, with all the consequences this was to have for Europe, can largely be explained by the predominance of imperial Spain in Italy and by the emperor's victory over the pope. Henceforward the Italian princes were too tied to imperial policy to permit offensive unorthodoxy in their countries. From the beginning the Italian reformers had seen this connexion which explains the very considerable interest taken in politics by the Italian reformers who knew that/

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1. Memorial in the cloister of S. Domenico at Bologna.
 2. The monument is preserved on the wall of the courtyard of the Palazzo del Comune in Bologna.
 3. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 354. For the views of another scholar who agrees that there was a change in the intellectual life of Europe at this date and that the change is clearly reflected in the way the Katherine of Aragon case was dealt with, see H. Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition (London 1965) 82.

that the continued survival of their ideas depended on the 'liberty of Italy'.⁽¹⁾ In the sense that it did end the reform movement which had grown alongside and out of the Renaissance, the sack of Rome was indeed, 'the death-blow of Renaissance Italy'.⁽²⁾ And even more was it the death-blow of Renaissance Rome. Though the gracious area of the Borghi now became a slum area, new palaces did rise from the ruins of Rome. But the city had changed - its intellectual life was more sombre, the counter-reformation was gaining ground.⁽³⁾ Certainly Rome was no longer the home of art, of beauty and of free speculation; and in some cases even the spiritual life of Rome had suffered; the Theatines, for instance, had abandoned Rome after escaping from the sack and had moved to Venice, which to many Italians now seemed the only home of liberty, both political and intellectual.⁽⁴⁾

Powerful as he was, Charles V was the last emperor to be crowned in Italy. Although it had been an international army which had sacked Rome and although the Italians customarily thought of Charles as emperor and not as king of Spain, it was under Spanish domination that Italy had fallen. As Naples, Sicily and Sardinia had for so long been under Spanish influence and, latterly, direct control, so now would be all Italy. When Charles V abdicated, his imperial rights in Italy passed to Philip II and to Spain, by the creation of a perpetual imperial vicariate. In his own person, therefore, Charles had been able to effect a significant change in the course of Italian history.⁽⁵⁾ The period of imperial interference had ended at Rome and Bologna, the long period of Spanish/

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1. M.D. Cantimori, 'L'influence du manifeste de Charles-Quint contre Clément VII (1526) et de quelques documents similaires de la littérature philo-protestant et anticuriale d'Italie', in Charles-Quint et son temps (Paris 1959), 133-4, G.R. Elton, Reformation Europe 1517-1559 (London and Glasgow 1963), 83.
 2. E.M. Jamison, C.M. Ady, K.D. Vernon, C. Sanford Terry, Italy Medieval and Modern, (Oxford 1919), 237.
 3. For an interesting comparison of types of prostitution in Rome before and after the sack see P. Pecchi, Roma nel Cinquecento, 297-301.
 4. G.R. Elton, Reformation Europe 1517-1559, (London and Glasgow 1963), 184. Though it should be noted that, even in Venice, censorship of books had been introduced in 1527, G. Sforza, 'Riflessi della Controriforma nella Repubblica di Venezia' in A.S.I. (1935) vol. i. 7.
 5. The Peace of Cateau-Cambresis confirmed Philip's authority in Italy. France surrendered all her rights in Milan and Naples.

Spanish control was only just beginning. This, in itself, permanently solved the problem of Venice for Venice was, traditionally, the enemy of the Hapsburgs in Austria and not of Spain. It had been imperial preponderance in Italy which she had feared, not Spanish, and against Austria that she hoped to use the Turk. Now Venice, like every other Italian power, had to reorientate her foreign policy. When Charles V abdicated he automatically divided the Italian powers and made the creation of another league like the League of Cognac unlikely.

What had united Italy had been the nature and extent of the rule of Charles V. When that personal union ended Italy was divided, the south caught up in the Spanish complex, the north, Venice in particular, threatened by Austria and Turkey. Without a common enemy Italy was unable to unite and, without unity, the Italians were weak. All their experience in diplomacy, their intelligence, their still considerable wealth, their courage - for the years 1525-1530 saw many acts of bravery both by Italian governments and by individuals, were nothing, face to face with the great powers of Europe. Although the Italians were only just coming to acknowledge it, even the barbaric country of England was more powerful in Europe than any single Italian state.⁽¹⁾

The Italians knew their own weakness; some of the most impassioned pleas for Italian unity were made in these years, though always the underlying assumption, except for a few visionaries or eccentrics like Machiavelli,⁽²⁾ was that a united Italy would remain a free association of sovereign states living without foreign interference. The Italians knew that disunity had undone them; disagreements between states, disagreements within states, disagreements between families had all played their part. In his plea to continue League co-operation made on 14 April 1428 the Florentine ambassador rehearsed to the Venetian senate this familiar theme;

'non pensi alcuno che si abbiamo più volte vista la Italia preda delli ultramontani, che questo sia nato per altra potentia che de italiani medesimi che si sono volti l'uno contra l'altro si può/

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1. This cannot be proved by chapter and verse, but clearly Francis I and Charles V listened more readily to English diplomats than even Venetian ones.
 2. For a description of Machiavelli's views in this context see V. Ilardi 'Italianita' among some Italian intellectuals in the sixteenth century' in *Traditio*, xii. 364. Even Machiavelli was not always consistent. Certainly he would have wanted the destruction of Venice first. See F. Chadbod, 'Y-a-t-il un Etat de la Renaissance?' in *Actes du Colloque sur la Renaissance*, iii. 59.

può fermare che la discordia deli populi de Italia è stata quella che l'ha depressa, l'ha debilitata, e finalmente a buona parte di esta importo el giogo della barbara servitù'.⁽¹⁾

But the idea of Italy was too weak, particular interests too strong. In 1526 and 1527 Italy approached closer to unity in action than is generally recognised,⁽²⁾ but the sack of Rome, symbolic of Charles V's ascendancy in Italy, was the last event in which all the Italian states could feel a common sympathy and a common interest. The emperor's dominion spelt the death of the city-states and the independent republics, which had for so long preached, if they had not practised, the virtues of independence preserved by a united Italy. By the mid-16th century the republic of Venice alone maintained the ancient traditions. To this conclusion Alberini was inexorably drawn as he reconsidered the sack of Rome, 'Hoggi di non ci esser altra patria che Venetia, la quale mantendosi i gradi et la reputatione de republica, conserva anco l'honore d'Italia'.⁽³⁾

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1. Sanuto, Diarri, xlvi. 228-232.
 2. F. Chadbod, 'Y-a-t-il un État de la Renaissance?' in Actes du Colloque sur la Renaissance, iii. 59 argued that after the battle of Pavia, in particular, a national Italian sentiment with a political aim can be seen, and see above p. 23.
 3. D. Orano, Sacco di Roma, 193.

Appendix

Plague in Italy 1525-1530

Among the direct consequences of the exhausting and devastating military campaigns of 1525-30 was a plague epidemic, the result of famine and malnutrition, caused by the depredations of large armies and by a series of remarkably bad harvests. As severe an outbreak of plague as this had been unknown in Italy for a generation.⁽¹⁾ This epidemic began in Lombardy and, by the spring of 1524, was so widespread throughout Milan that Pescara was unable to risk keeping his army in the city.⁽²⁾ Rome, which unlike other major Italian cities had no isolation hospital, fell an early victim; from February until July 1524 a severe epidemic raged,⁽³⁾ broke out again from September 1525 until January 1526⁽⁴⁾ and returned with peculiar virulence after the sack of Rome.⁽⁵⁾ From Rome the sickness was spread to the Campagna, the March and southern Romagna. At Perugia where it lasted from June 1526 until May 1527 a conservative estimate recorded between 8,000 and 10,000 dead in the city and its contado.⁽⁶⁾ Throughout 1527 Mantua was ravaged by plague.⁽⁷⁾

At Naples plague was manifest in the spring of 1527 and Carraciolo believed it to be one of Lannoy's reasons for making a truce with Clement VII. The plague lingered on and broke out with new virulence during Lautrec's siege of the city. The number of deaths from plague seriously reduced the population which did not recover until the middle of the century.⁽⁸⁾ The armies of both sides suffered terribly, in particular the imperialists involved in the sack of Rome, and in 1528 both Lautrec's and Brunswick's armies were decimated by plague.⁽⁹⁾ Soldiers were the worst carriers of the disease.

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1. The last plague epidemic in Florence was in 1498, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 368.
 2. Burigozzo, 'Cronaca', 441, Pastor, Papacy, ix. 263.
 3. Pastor, Papacy, ix. 258, P. Pecchai, Roma nel Cinquecento, 25.
 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 311. Some of the papal household were among the victims, MS. Arm. xiv. tom.7 f.1.
 5. See above p. 196.
 6. 'Memorie Perugine di Teseo Alfani', A.S.I. xvi. pt.2, 311.
 7. Sansovino, Famiglie d'Italia, 360.
 8. E.I. under Naples.
 9. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 312.

Florence had suffered early. Plague was first brought in 1522 by a traveller from Rome⁽¹⁾ and there was virtually no relief until 1528. It returned in July 1530⁽²⁾ and in the spring of 1531.⁽³⁾ At the height of the epidemic there were more than fifty deaths a day,⁽⁴⁾ and at least a quarter of the Florentine population died. Among its distinguished victims was Antonio Alemanni.⁽⁵⁾ The manufactures of the city suffered a severe decline and Florence never really recovered⁽⁶⁾ although immediate measures had been taken to combat the plague. Those who could afford to left Florence although the infection later spread to the contado and Volterra was virtually depopulated by the epidemic.⁽⁷⁾ The rich retired to their villas while others moved to the subject towns and in particular to Prato which was crowded out with refugees. Shops closed down and domestic animals were destroyed.⁽⁸⁾ At the height of the epidemic none of the magistracies could function properly for they had insufficient members to form a quorum and the total number necessary for a consiglio maggiore was halved during the outbreak.⁽⁹⁾ A special magistracy was created to alleviate the sufferings of the sick and to endeavour to check the spread of the epidemic. Travellers from a plague centre were forbidden entrance to Florence.⁽¹⁰⁾ In 1530 a fresh outbreak of plague occurred in the imperial camp beseiging Florence. Although one of the most sought-after delicacies in Florence was now donkey-meat, the Florentines feared plague more than they feared hunger and refused entrance to the city to anyone even if he brought supplies.⁽¹¹⁾

Apart from Florence and Tuscany, a list of infected regions compiled in Venice in 1528, included Chioggia, Murano, Bovelenta, Sirmione and Vicenza/

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1. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 368.
 2. Ibid. ii. 319.
 3. Ibid. 355.
 4. B.N.MS. Italien 15 f.661.
 5. D.B.I.
 6. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 75.
 7. Segni, Storie Fiorentine, 321.
 8. Ibid. 42, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 368-9.
 9. Nardi, Historie, 201-2, Segni, Storie Fiorentine, 43.
 10. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 75, Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 370-1.
 11. Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, i. 243, 275.

Vicenza within the Veneto.⁽¹⁾ The Church State was particularly affected; Rome, Rimini, Ravenna, Forlì, which was so badly weakened by the plague that it was though unlikely it could resist an attack by the fuorusciti, Faenza, where a quarter of the population died in 1528, Cesana and Bologna are mentioned.⁽²⁾ For Genoa,⁽³⁾ also, 1528 was a terrible year; the city was virtually depopulated from fear of the plague and other diseases which, since 1525, had literally decimated the city. By the end of September there had been 100,000 deaths of plague in Genoese territory, 10,000 from the city itself, including substantial losses from the mercantile class, although the plague by then did seem to be abating.⁽⁴⁾

Simultaneously the plague gained ground in the Veneto where it had reached serious proportions by March 1528.⁽⁵⁾ At the beginning of April between 200 and 300 deaths a day were reported from Brescia.⁽⁶⁾ In September it was bad in Crema and probably at its worst in Venice where there were between 15 and 20 deaths a day.⁽⁷⁾ Venice reacted swiftly to the plague, isolating both the diseased and their contacts and preventing travel between Venice and other infected cities. Three health officials were created but by the end of October the existing isolation hospitals were crowded out and new premises had to be found.⁽⁸⁾ Despite all these measures the plague continued to rage until 1529, and even, in some regions, until 1530.

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1. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 35, 147-148.
 2. G.C. Tonduzzi, Historie di Faenza (Faenza 1675), 625, Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 35, xlvi. 279, Salvatore Muzzi, Annali della città di Bologna (Bologna 1844) vi. 223.
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 4. Cal. S.P. Spanish 1525-6, 310, ibid. 1527-9, 748, Sanuto, Diarii, xlix. 121, Paruta, Istorie, 511.
 5. Sanuto, Diarii, xlvi. 8, 35, 147, 252, ibid. xlviii. 191 and passim.
 6. Ibid. xlviii. 198.
 7. Ibid. 530, 531, xlix. 7, 9.
 8. Ibid. xlvi. 252, xlviii. 11, 115.

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This is not an attempt at an exhaustive bibliography. I have restricted myself to listing those sources and secondary works to which reference is made in the text or which I have found indispensable. Such a selection must be arbitrary but I hope that nothing of real importance has been omitted. In the notes to the text frequent use has been made of short-titles. As these may require elucidation they are also listed here.

I. Sources

As source material I have included not only correspondence and accounts which are strictly contemporary, but also a number of later histories and records. Many of the authors of these must have known people who were eyewitnesses of the sack of Rome and the events which led up to it. They had access to an oral and, in some cases, a written tradition which is now lost. Since, for reasons which I give in my first chapter, there is a distinction between material written before and after the imperial coronation I have preserved the distinction here. This list of sources is divided into three parts; a list of manuscripts consulted, a list of printed sources compiled or written before the imperial coronation, and a list of printed works, written between 1530 and 1600. Where material in the last two categories overlaps I have invariably included it in the first.

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