

THE THEISM
OF
JAMES MARTINEAU

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PREFACE

This study is an exposition and evaluation of the Theism of James Martineau, showing also the manner in which Martineau influenced and was influenced by the various trends of thought in the nineteenth century. Special attention has been devoted to that phase of his theism which deals with his doctrine of God. The task of presenting a clear picture of Martineau's view has been rendered difficult at some points by his practice of criticizing opposing views without giving a systematic presentation of his own. In such cases it has been found necessary to deal directly with his treatment of the relation between his own position and that to which he is opposed. Although his exposition of these opposing views is not always accurate, no criticism has been attempted of these inaccuracies. It will be seen that such questions are not of major importance for the understanding of Martineau's own position.

In making citations in footnotes the books have been indicated by the author's name, the initials of the title of the book to which reference is made, and the volume and page numbers. For example, a reference to Martineau's Study of Religion, volume one, page thirteen, will appear thus: Martineau, SCR, I, 13. The initials by which each book is designated will be found in the Bibliography along with the other necessary bibliographical data. Direct quotations which are short have been set off by quotation marks in the body of the text, but, where a quotation exceeds four

lines in length, it has been single-spaced and set in a separate paragraph, in which case the quotation marks have been omitted.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	i
Table of Contents	iii
Introduction.	1
Martineau's Definition of Theism	9
General Purpose of this Study	10
Characteristics of Martineau's Thought and Writing	15
Chapter One: The Life and Work of James Martineau	24
Early Education.	27
College Years, 1822-1827	29
First Ministry.	32
Early Liverpool Ministry	36
The Year in Germany	45
Later Liverpool Ministry	48
Teaching and Preaching Ministry in London	52
Literary Activity after Resignation at Eighty Years	59
Chapter Two: Martineau's Theory of Knowledge.	63
The Presuppositions of Knowledge.	64
The Method of Cognition.	70
Intuition.	75
Types of Intuition	79
Causal Intuition	80
Moral Intuition	81
Religious Intuition	86
Chapter Three: God as Cause.	91
The Self-Conscious Ego as Cause	96
The Causal Will	98
The Attributes of God as Cause	112

INTRODUCTION.

The nineteenth century witnessed rapid changes in British philosophical thought, as the various philosophical systems followed each other in quick succession to the centre of the stage in popular interest and acclaim. The problems over which division arose were chiefly epistemological and metaphysical. Such a statement may seem strange when one considers the great number of works on moral philosophy which were published during the century, and the wide variety of opinions to be found in the ethical thought of the various philosophical groups. However, the ethical differences were largely contests concerning the authority of ethics rather than its content, and as such were concerned with the 'metaphysics of ethics.' Professor C. C. J. Webb's statement in regard to the last half of the century could be made to apply to the entire century with almost equal accuracy. He writes:¹

Of the most prominent of the British thinkers of the period which we are now considering there was not one but was profoundly convinced not only of the momentous importance of that distinction (the distinction between right and wrong) but even of the general correctness of the traditional rules of conduct which were prescribed by the Christian Church.

Throughout the century the task of theism was to combat the various opposing philosophies by affirming that God, as the Supreme Spirit,

1. Webb, RTIE, 39.

was the origin and ground of all existence, that a knowledge of Him was possible through the exercise of the human cognitive and moral faculties, and that the moral obligation which man felt had its possibility in man's free will and its authority in the absolute requirements of God.

At the beginning of the century the Utilitarianism of the Benthamites was the generally accepted philosophy. This group of thinkers, in banding themselves together in support of a given set of principles, became what may be called a 'school of thought,' a phenomenon new to English philosophy, though quite common on the continent.¹ The chief philosophical principle of this group of thinkers, following the leadership of Bentham, was one which resulted in a kind of 'ethical hedonism.' The ideal was, 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number.' The test and measure of all virtue was utility, and the obligation paramount to every other was the obligation to minister to general happiness.² Mill's statement of the primary principle of Utilitarianism reads:³

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.

The problem for theism as opposed to Utilitarianism was to maintain the absolute authority of ethical principles, independent of the desires and pleasures of men. For the theist the authority of the moral law lay in the absolute demands made by

1. Sorley, HOEP, 211 f; "The utilitarian group presents an appearance unknown before in English philosophy, -- a simple set of doctrines held in common, with various fields assigned for their application, and a band of zealous workers, labouring for the same end and united in reverence for their master."

2. Ibid., 219 f.

3. Mill, UTIL, 6.

God on the moral beings who are his creatures. No fabrication of the human desires into a law could be invested with the sense of authority which attended the awareness of absolute moral demands. The theist held that God was the source of the authority and the absolute demand of moral principles.

The next philosophical system which received popular acclaim was the scientific materialism of Herbert Spencer. He held that the one ultimate reality was matter which was capable of being in motion and of exerting force. In the closing pages of First Principles, he wrote: "The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols."¹ Professor Tennant gives this excellent statement of the position of materialism in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics:²

According to the doctrine of materialism, extended, impenetrable, eternally self-existent matter, susceptible of motion, is the one fundamental constituent of the universe; mind or consciousness is but a mode or property of such matter, and psychical processes are reducible to physical.

Such a philosophy has no place for spiritual reality, and on this point it was attacked by theism. Theism holds that the one supreme reality is the Infinite Spirit, and that all existence finds its origin and ground in Him. The materialistic philosophy has no adequate answer to the problems of the emergence

1. Spencer, FP, 558.

2. Tennant, "Materialism," ERE, VIII, 488 b.

of living organisms from inanimate matter, and of the appearance of mind as distinct from the non-mental existence of some of the organisms. The theistic doctrine of creation by God, who is the Divine Mind, shows its superiority in this respect at least over the materialism of Spencer's philosophy.

Following close upon the materialist view was the biological evolutionism of Darwin. He sought to determine how, "whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved."¹ According to this evolutionary view the changes and adjustments that man makes are traced to the animal automaton which is operative within him, responding to instincts which have been acquired through countless generations of living organisms developing reactions suitable for the maintenance of life in the struggle for survival.

Theism was willing to grant that the evolutionary principle was one which had value as a guide to scientific research, but was unwilling to admit that it was a satisfactory explanation of all the facts of existence. Theism affirms growth and development towards an end, but denies that this can be the result of blind evolutionism. The theist sees in evolution a teleological, purposeful development, that is, a development toward a given end, directed by a creative, selecting, and determining Mind. Biological evolution is one of the means which God employs for accomplishing his purposes in the organic realm, but it is not a philosophical principle capable of giving an explanation of the whole nature of reality.

1. Darwin, OOS, 6th Ed., last sentence, p.429.

The fourth philosophy with which we are concerned is Agnosticism. This, as it is generally understood, is the view that we can know only phenomena, and that if there were anything behind phenomena we should have no way of knowing about it. The term 'Agnosticism' was invented in 1869 by Huxley to describe the religious and philosophical position of those who hold that real knowledge is limited to phenomena only, and that concerning God, Immortality, and the like we can affirm nothing.¹ It is naturalistic in that it limits the possibility of knowledge to natural phenomena. This position was followed by J.S. Mill who, in keeping with his empiricism, contended that "all we know is phenomena."

In opposition to this view theism held consistently to the possibility of man's knowing ultimate reality. Man is conscious of a transcendental world of reality just as surely as he is conscious of the natural world. If man's cognitive faculties are to be regarded as able to know any reality at all, theism contends, then they must be trusted in what knowledge they give of the transcendental world. The agnostic position is difficult to maintain because an agnostic may inadvertently ask why a certain thing should be so, and he immediately discovers that he has asked a question which is illegitimate in his philosophy. He can trace orders of succession in phenomena, but he cannot ask why they should be so. Martineau says of agnosticism:²

To make it (the case for agnosticism) good, you must . . . abjure the enquiry into causes, and the attempt to trace invisible issues: never lift the veil that bounds experience, and you will need nothing and know nothing of a transcendental world.

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1. Chisholm, "Agnosticism," Ency. Brit., 11 th Ed., I, 378b f.
 2. Martineau, SOR, I, viii.

Against such a view theism strongly affirms the validity of human cognition for the knowledge of ultimate reality. Man can and does know the Supreme Reality, God.

The last of the systems of thought which achieved wide popularity in the nineteenth century was the neo-Hegelianism which resulted in the Absolute Idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet. The influence of the German Idealists came first into English thought through the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. On the idealist view the action of one self-conditioning and self-determining mind was a postulate of all knowledge, our knowledge being simply a reproduction of this activity. The constitutive factor of all experience, whether cognitive or volitional, was an ideal element, the Absolute. In this Absolute lay the ultimate unity of subject and object, and of knowledge and reality.¹ There can be no reality conceived which is external to Eternal Thought, for in this is comprehended the whole series of objective relations.² For Bradley, appearances only achieve reality when they are, through addition and rearrangement, converted into the Absolute. Truth and knowledge are illusory appearances certain to be in error until they lose their existence and give place to the real life of the Absolute.³

There was much value in the idealist movement, in its exposing some of the errors of empiricism, and in its vindication of the spiritual nature of the world and man. In its Absolute form, however, it denied both the personality of God,⁴ and the ultimate reality of any relation. The relation between man and man, and the relation between man and God were thus rendered impossible save

1. Sorley, HOEP, 283-292.

2. Green, PTE, 17f., 80-85.

3. Bradley, AR, 364 ff.

4. Webb, RTIE, 118 ff; 120 n.

as the Absolute contained all within itself. Against this contention theism affirmed the reality of man's personality, and God's personality, and the relationship between them. In order to retain the reality of man's moral obligation, the individuality of each centre of consciousness must be maintained. Theism held to the reality of the finite subjects, and to the free self-determination of man's finite will. Professor Webb comments that one of the strongest statements of the view of God as personal is to be found in the works of James Martineau.¹ He "supplied a basis in experience for a genuine theism which was welcomed by many who were not so completely under the spell of the absolute idealists as to turn a deaf ear to any philosophy that did not speak their language."²

The philosophy of Theism, as an "examination of the ultimate foundations of the religious conception of the universe,"³ sought, throughout a century of changing and conflicting opinions, to retain the full significance of both man and God in the universal system. In so doing it held fast to one of the deepest intuitions of man's nature, the consciousness of a personal relationship between man and God. Professor Mackintosh states the position of theism in the following words:⁴

In Christian theology, much labour has been spent upon vindicating man's freedom against God's intrusion, or upon blotting out human power in order to leave room for the divine. Theism suggests at the very outset that we should rather expect to find a correlation between the two. If there is a God at all, he must be thought of as the guarantee of freedom in man and as the pledge of his immortality.

1. Ibid., 125.

2. Ibid., 127.

3. Fraser, POT, 21.

4. Mackintosh, "Theism," Ency. Brit., 11th Ed., XXVI, 746 b.

Theism as a metaphysical system finds its explanatory principle of existence in the philosophical conception of God as the ultimate ground of all things. Professor Taylor defines theism as "the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (a) intrinsically complete or perfect and (b), as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration and worship."¹ It arose as the attempt of thinking religious men to find an explanation of existence which was compatible with and contained sufficient authority for their religious beliefs. Neither naturalistic empiricism on the one hand nor absolute idealism on the other gave an adequate account of phenomena and reality, combined with a satisfying recognition of the significance of man. The theism of the nineteenth century was able to retain the values of religious life and experience, and to find intellectual satisfaction in a philosophical theory which combined immanence and transcendence. The theistic doctrine which will satisfy man's religious needs must derive from the head and the heart, and must recognise the validity of both the speculative and the practical reason.²

A wide variety of types of theism appeared in the course of the century. Although the central belief in God as Creator, Preserver, and Governor varied little, yet the means of proof were by no means uniform. Caldecott has divided the theists of this period roughly into three groups, namely, those holding to Speculative Theism, to Ethical Theism, and to 'Composite' Theism.

1. Taylor, "Theism," ERE, XII, 262 ab.

2. Pringle-Pattison, THE, 3.

The division is determined by the arguments for the existence of God which occupied the chief place in the thought systems of the various thinkers. As representative of the Speculative Theists he cites J. H. Stirling, Edward Caird, John Caird, and (Lord) A. J. Balfour. As representative of Ethical Theism he names Archbishop Temple, A.C. Fraser, A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, and the Aesthetic Theists. The representatives of 'Composite' Theism are Martineau, Seeley, and R. Travers Smith.¹ While some such scheme may serve as an interesting guide to study, the accuracy of the division is open to serious question. One may quote a passage such as the following from Professor Pringle-Pattison's Theism, the first half of which consigns him to the class of ethical theists, but the last half of which shows that he does not rest entirely on the moral argument. "All moral and religious truth is won by the race for itself, in the sweat of its own moral experience, but not without the indwelling spirit of God."² The characteristic of 'composite' theism, Professor Caldecott says, is that the various arguments are brought together and each given its place in establishing the case for the Divine Source of all existence. Professor Flint's statement that "there are few if any writers on Theism whose works do not belong to what Dr. Caldecott calls a 'composite type,'" ³ is a just refutation of Caldecott's artificial division.

Martineau's Definition of Theism

The definition of Theism which Martineau gives at the beginning of the Study of Religion is very concise. He says: "The central faith in the Supreme Mind is . . . known as Theism."⁴ Such a statement, if taken by itself, is indistinguishable from pure idealism,

1. Caldecott, FOR, 146-195, 338-364.

2. Op. cit., p. 32.

3. Flint, THE, Appendix, note XLI, p. 450 f.

4. Martineau, SOR, I, 2.

but it must be understood in the light of the definition of religion which immediately precedes it. A theistic faith would involve "belief in an Ever-living God, that is, of a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Moral relations with mankind."¹ These two definitions taken together clearly affirm the spiritual nature of reality, and the reality of man and his relations with God. There is no explicit statement of free will included here, but Martineau would have said that without the free determination of the finite will there could be no real moral relations between man and God. There is also another phase of Martineau's theism which is not indicated by this definition. He characterized his theism as founded on two bases, the Causal and the Moral. Hence he developed the Causal and Moral Arguments for the Divine Existence fully in the Study of Religion. In his sermons, and in his devotional writings, and to some extent in his formal studies, however there are traces of a third basis for his theistic belief, drawn from the immediate communion of spirit with Spirit. In the moments of man's deepest insight he loses himself in "union with God." In such experiences man is immediately aware of God as the "Soul of all souls." Martineau's definition of theism is therefore not entirely adequate for his own system of thought. It would need to be amplified to include man's immediate personal communion with God, his Father. A development of this phase of Martineau's thought will be found in Chapter Five of this study.

General Purpose of this Study

The general purpose of this treatise on "The Theism of James Martineau" is to present in reasonably brief compass

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 1.

the evidences and arguments employed by Martineau for the Divine Existence, together with the attributes which he affirmed of the Divine Nature. The pendulum in current theological thought has swung to the side which has traditionally been called 'Revealed Religion.' Much of the discussion on theological matters in recent years has been concerned with the position held by the group of German thinkers who emphasize God's sole revelation of Himself through His Word. None of the 'natural' arguments are permitted to enter into this system of thought because God is said to be above the world of nature, completely transcendent.

Theism, on the other hand, has always maintained its emphasis on God's immanence as well as His transcendence. The theistic position, in the century following the work of the Deists, insisted that God's hand was visible in all his works. Not alone at a single time, but 'at sundry times and in divers manners' does God present to the eyes, the mind, and the spirit of man evidences of His existence and nature. It is therefore with the purpose of bringing the view of one of the greatest theists of the previous century again into the light that this study has been projected.

Martineau's major treatment of the theistic problems appears in the two-volume Study of Religion, which was published in 1888. The view propounded in this work had been, for the most part, the material with which he had dealt during his long period of teaching in Manchester New College. Hardly less important for this study, however, are the Types of Ethical Theory, (1885), and the Seat of Authority in Religion, (1889). Although these works all appeared very late in the author's life, we have an excellent record of the progress of his thought through the reviews, essays, addresses, and sermons, which came from his pen from 1833

to 1899. None of the major theological and philosophical controversies of the century passed without his comment and consideration. Some of his finest writing is to be found in the essays and addresses of an apologetic nature which were drawn from him when he was forced to defend his position as a nonconformist. Martineau's life and teaching, in short, must be looked upon as in no small measure formative for the theological thought of the century.

In Martineau's formal treatment of theism, which appears in the Study of Religion, he has three chapters entitled respectively "God as Cause," "God as Perfection," and "Unity of God as Cause and God as Perfection." The evidences for each of the arguments for the Divine Existence he finds in the nature of man himself. Man's knowledge in respect to the nature of Cause he finds given in the experience of willing. Will is a type of force, immanent in the willing subject, and directed by mind to the accomplishment of selected ends. In thus identifying Will and Cause he is following Maine de Biran. From the intuition of the nature of Cause thus received he develops both the cosmological argument from cause to effect, and the teleological or design argument, whereby purpose and intention in the creation give evidence of an intelligent purposeful Creator. Thus nature's forces and processes are seen to be God's Will in immanent operation.

In the chapter on "God as Perfection" he considers one of the chief attributes of God, i.e., moral perfection. Moral intuitions come to man through his conscience. When two motives are the possible sources of action in a given situation the intuition of conscience tells man which is the higher motive.

In this intuitive choice man feels that he is confronted with an authority which is not of himself. This is man's intuition of God as moral perfection. From this intuition Martineau develops the moral argument for the Divine Existence and gains insight into the Divine Nature. Here Martineau emphasizes man's free will. The decisions of conscience are infallible, and man knows with certainty which of two possible motives is the higher, but he is free to choose either of the two. By doing so he is capable of exerting his will in disobedience to God. The individual consciousness by retaining its freedom of choice stands as a self-determining agent. Martineau says, "It is not enough that you save the Divine Personality, if you sacrifice the Human."¹ The moral perfection of God requires that the freedom of the individual human subject be maintained. "The unconditional mandate of the Right postulates, not the freedom of spontaneity, but the freedom of choice."² In the intuitions of conscience God reveals himself to man. "In the act of conscience, we are immediately introduced to a Higher-than-ourselves that gives us what we feel."³

The chapter on the "Unity of God as Cause and God as Perfection" deals with the natural inseparability of these attributes, but it does not include a development of the concept which might have been expected to follow here, namely, the idea of God as "Soul of all souls." This third phase of Martineau's theism has not been adequately and systematically developed at any point in his formal studies. There are many brief sections where this idea appears, but it was never fully developed. It is of such

1. Martineau, "Nature and God," ERA, III, 169.

2. Martineau, SOR, II, 309.

3. Ibid, 28.

a character where it does appear that it might be described as approaching mysticism. When Martineau speaks of this phase of his thought he describes it as the 'spiritual' stage which is above the 'intellectual' and the 'ethical.' It begins in man with the feeling of 'reverence,' which is the highest of all sentiments, and can only be felt for a person. The highest religion, he feels, is a mode of thought and a mode of feeling, indissolubly united, and in which "you surrender yourself to the awe and love of that infinite presence."¹

This third phase of Martineau's thought has been noticed by some writers, but no one has made a detailed study of it, and presented the results of such a study in composite form. In Chapter Five of this treatise such evidence from Martineau's thought is brought together as is necessary for the understanding of his complete theistic position. Unless we recognise the spiritual element in his thought which is above the intellectual and the moral it is impossible to understand such statements in his writing as this: "The bridge is thus complete between the Divine and human personality; and we can crown the religion of Causation, and the religion of Conscience, by the religion of the Spirit."² Upon no other basis can we make provision for the "spiritual union of man with God."³

Chapter One on the "Life and Work of James Martineau" is not intended to bring anything new in the way of biographical data, but rather to observe the influences which made him the man that he was, and to trace the changes in his philosophical views. In

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 3.

2. Martineau, "Three Stages of Unitarian Theology," ERA, IV, 580.

3. Ibid., 580.

Chapter Two an attempt has been made to present "Martineau's Theory of Knowledge," with its emphasis upon intuition as the source of inerrant certainty in determining the truth and falsity of judgments made concerning supersensible reality. The final chapter outlines the "Influence of Martineau," throughout the last century and the first third of this, as a preacher, a teacher, a thinker, and a man of great personal character.

Characteristics of Martineau's Thought and Writing

Martineau's philosophy, after his departure from the Hartleyan Necessitarianism which he was taught during his college years, was a Dualistic Realism of Cause and Condition. Causality is the Will of God in operation, but causal activity is possible only when Cause stands as one term in a relation. There can be no cause without a condition to which it is related. He considers the possibility of matter being the condition of God's Causality, but rejects this because matter is characterised by resistance, form, and magnitude. To postulate a condition which offers resistance to causality would mean assuming a duality of cause, since a cause can only be resisted by another cause. The only other possibility for a condition, he thinks, is space. By reducing the co-existing datum to space he is left with what he calls a 'pure condition,' one which can fulfil all the requirements of a condition without offering resistance to the one Supreme Cause. Space and time he affirms to be eternal, self-existent, objective realities, which serve as the field of operation for God's causal activity.

A further characteristic of Martineau's thought is his strong ethical interest, and the importance given to ethics in the construction of his religious philosophy. He placed such great emphasis upon the place of ethics in religion that at times he regarded his own position as a Moral Theism.¹ He regarded the 'moral argument' as giving the most convincing and enriching evidence concerning God's existence and nature. In point of priority he placed 'ethics before religion' in the development of his theism. He regarded "the consciousness of duty as an originating condition of religion."² Conscience does not wait for the lessons of the religious instructor, but is the condition on which religious instruction depends for its efficacy.³ "Religion . . . as the bare belief in Divine omnipotence administering universal law, cannot institute a Duty or provide us with a possibility of Morals,"⁴ but Conscience does "reveal a source higher than human nature for the august authority of righteousness."⁵ Martineau would not exclude the ordinarily accepted sources for the faith of mankind. Some may trace their beliefs to the 'idea of the infinite,' or the 'sense of absolute dependence,' but for Martineau it is through the sense of Duty that the greatest authority and the richest religious conceptions arise. At the 'High altar of Moral experience' we become conscious of ourselves as not only Objects, but also Subjects and Agents. He says:⁶

In the moral consciousness therefore there enters a kind of dependence on the universal Cause unfelt before; a

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1. Martineau's description of his theism has been followed by Caldecott and Mackintosh, SLT, 386, where his thought is designated as "Ethical Theism."
 2. Martineau, SOR, I, 16.
 3. Ibid., 21.
 4. Ibid., 20.
 5. Ibid., 21.
 6. Ibid., 18 f.

dependence not for what we have to suffer, or are driven to do, but for what lines of self-determination it is open to us to take; our datum is not a factor already settled for us, but an alternative left to be settled by ourselves: the conditions are given: the solution is to be found. We are thus partners in the transaction; not in servitude, as tools or creatures wielded by another hand, but taken into counsel, with the adoption of sons.

Although ethics have practical existence prior to any explicit religious belief,¹ yet Conscience and Duty are transformed into the life of love by the vision of God which they present.² In this way the bondage of the law becomes the freedom of the gospel. "The law of righteousness spring(s) from its earthly base and embrace(s) the empire of the heavens, the moment it becomes a communion between the heart of man and the life of God."³ This priority of ethics over religion is stated by Martineau to be the reason for his publishing the Types of Ethical Theory before the Study of Religion.

Martineau's ethics were 'idiopsychological.' By that he meant that the only knowledge which man can gain of ethics was through a psychological study of his own self. The same may be said to be characteristic of his epistemology and his theism in general. It is only through a complete understanding of the 'home factor' (by which he meant the self of the thinker) that man knows anything of the nature of reality. The intuitions of cause which come in the experience of willing, the intuitions of moral perfection which come through the conscience with the feeling of absolute obligation, the intuitions of God as the Supreme Personal Spirit which arise from the experience of immediate personal communion of spirit with Spirit, all show the importance of man's preliminary understanding of his own nature. Martineau says that without an adequate understanding

1. Ibid., 22.

2. Ibid., 27.

3. Ibid., 28.

of the moral nature of man, and the basis it furnishes for his religious feelings and experiences, a right understanding of religion would be impossible.¹ The same could be equally affirmed of the intellectual and the spiritual phases of man's nature, and their importance in the development of his theism. By intuition man is led to place his trust directly in the same realities which he will discover if he follows through the 'dizzying circuits' of metaphysics. In the preface to the Study of Religion Martineau writes:²

But for the promise which I have quoted (the promise made in the Types of Ethical Theory to submit the moral postulates to metaphysical tribunals), I would gladly have spared my readers its intricate and technical pleadings; for I am aware of the tediousness of these metaphysical tribunals; especially when the whole process wins at last, through all its dizzying circuits, only the very position which common sense has assumed at first. For this is all, I take it, that metaphysics can pretend to accomplish by their scrutiny of the ultimate factors of human knowledge.

In himself, then, man finds the key to the knowledge of ultimate reality.

Martineau's work is further characterized by a high standard of rationality and a readiness to delve deeply into metaphysical problems. Throughout the long period during which he was writing reviews and criticisms of the various systems of thought which occupied his attention, he showed his willingness and ability to grapple with the most difficult problems of metaphysics and epistemology. Professor Upton gives this estimate of his intellectual ability:³

This address (Ideal Substitutes for God, 1879) deepened the impression of Dr. Martineau's great philosophical powers,

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1. Martineau, SOR, I, viii, xviii.
 2. Ibid., viii f.
 3. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 365. The criticisms of Spencer and Tyndall referred to will be found in Martineau's "Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism," which he wrote in reply to Prof. Tyndall's Belfast Address; and "Modern Materialism, Its Attitude toward Theology," which was a reply to a further article by Tyndall in the Fortnightly Review.

already made, both in literary and religious circles, by his searching criticisms of Spencer and Tyndall; and it was the combined effect of these striking utterances which raised Dr. Martineau to the admitted rank of the foremost philosophical exponent and champion of the great basal principles of Theism and rational Christianity.

Further testimony is given by the Archbishop of York after the dissolution of the Metaphysical Society, wherein were to be found the finest minds of the time. The Archbishop said that "he was more struck with the metaphysical ability of Father Dalgairns and Mr. James Martineau than by that of any other of the disputants."¹

The strength of Martineau's writing is also traceable to the depth of his spiritual insight. In his sermons and prayers, particularly, one encounters passages where he seems to be lifted beyond the reach of the world in the company of a guide who is thoroughly familiar with the spiritual heights through which he is leading. A deep devotional emphasis characterises all Martineau's work, and the expressions and concepts of Christian mysticism are employed from time to time. The concept of immediate communion with God, the presence of the Divine in the human, the basis of his Theism in the 'feeling for God' show how closely his thought was bound to the deepest insights of his own religious experience.

Martineau's work is not only clear in its thought, but it is couched in fine prose. Whether one reads his sermons, his formal studies, or his essays and reviews, one is impressed with the author's mastery of style. His prose is flowing and beautiful, strong in expression, yet lucid and amply illustrated. The chief difficulty which one feels with his writing is his lack of conciseness. He had a tendency to be diffuse in his expression, a trait which is particularly noticeable in the formal studies. This weakness is

1. Quoted from Sir M.E. Grant Duff; Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 371.

perhaps traceable to the fact that these volumes were prepared for the publishers after the author passed his eightieth year. In the sermons which were published during the earlier years this fault is not found. The sermons are carefully wrought essays, with each line carrying its part of the weight of the discourse.

In poetry too, and particularly in hymns, Martineau took an intense interest. During the years when he was engaged in preaching as well as teaching, he edited three hymnals. He found expressed in hymns "the undying trusts and aspirations which make us one spiritual family, and which have nowhere such pure utterance as in the Christian hymn."¹ The importance which he attached to hymns in the life of the individual Christian and in ecclesiastical worship is expressed in a sentence from a letter written to Catherine Winkworth, herself a hymn writer, thanking her for a copy of her Christian Singers of Germany, which reads: "After the Scriptures, the Wesley Hymnbook appears to me the grandest instrument of popular religious culture Christendom has ever produced."² He wrote poetry and hymns only to a very limited extent, but his name is known beyond his own country for this branch of his writing. The short article on his life and thought in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, mentions this branch of his activity thus: "Er ist auch als Dichter geistlicher Lieder (z.B., "A Voice upon the Midnight Air") hervorgetreten."³ Julian's Dictionary of Hymnology also takes account of Martineau's influence upon the development of Christian hymnology.

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 98 f.

2. Ibid., 99.

3. Eoll, "Martineau," DRGG, III, 2031 a.

A further characteristic of Martineau's life and work, and one which is often the first to be mentioned in connexion with his name, is his Unitarianism. This was not the result of an inherent desire for separationism in religion. On the contrary Martineau longed for a truly national church in which the conscience of men should be free in matters of doctrine. He refused to have any part in establishing a Unitarian creed, because he felt that such a move would tend to destroy the possibility of an immediate personal communion between the worshipper and God. Dissent was defensible for Martineau on the ground that the authority of duty to God was greater than that due to the State. "Nothing short of a supreme obligation, directly imposed from the Source of all duty, could release from the secondary authority of society and the Commonwealth, and warrant retreat into exceptional modes of religious life,"¹ he said in an address entitled "Why Dissent?" delivered in 1871. He says further that the dissenting groups long looked upon their position as temporary, and felt that the doors closed to them would soon be opened. Therefore their organizations had been slow in taking form. "And it was only when a generation had passed in disappointed hope, and the Revolution finally gave them 'Toleration,' but refused them re-admission, that they sorrowfully accepted their attitude of isolation, and laid the foundation of integral churches and schools for a separate people."²

He felt that there were two bases for doctrinal differences. The first was the distinction between a sacerdotal and a personal Christianity, "the one relying on the mediation of priest and sacrament; the other, on the immediateness of individual faith."³ The authority of the latter Martineau found in the distinctive message of Jesus to the world, a message which would

1. Martineau, "Why Dissent?" ERA, IV, 147.

2. Ibid., 148.

3. Ibid., 149.

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1. Martineau, "Why Dissent?" ERA, IV, 147.
2. Ibid., 148.
3. Ibid., 149.

sweep away all resort to mediation, and channels of grace, and magically-endowed men, and emphasize the "immediateness of relation between the human spirit and the Divine."¹

The other basis for dissent lies in his theory of religion. He says:²

A worship which begins with the abjectness of man before the terror of God, and is lifted thence only by foreign deliverance, and ends with a borrowed righteousness, fails to reach the springs of conscience, to satisfy the needs of devout affection, or relieve the shadows of life with lights of intelligible trust.

If he had assented to such a view of religion and the relation of man and God, he would have had to do so insincerely, and would thus have become a dead member of a church to which he seemed to belong. Martineau's view of the relation of the human and Divine natures was such that this view of religion was entirely unnecessary. He taught that Christ had come to show that this great difference in natures did not exist, that a veil did not exist between man and God which could only be torn away by a sacrifice of blood. If the nonconformists were dwellers in 'holes and corners' as Matthew Arnold had called them, Martineau replied that they had been driven into holes and corners by legislation, and did not deserve to be maligned for being there. "(Not) until greater justice is done to it (dissent), and freer concessions are made to its sense of veracity and its necessity for an unfettered life, is the time come for its functions to cease and its institutions to die."³

He allied himself with the Unitarian group, on whose behalf he gave the labours of his life. However, if this should be interpreted as meaning that Christ, the Son of God, had a less significant place in his theology than in orthodoxy, then such an

1. Ibid., 153.

2. Ibid., 154.

3. Ibid., 161.

interpretation is in error. He was not a Trinitarian, but his words bear witness to his Christianity. He wrote:¹

We know how he (Christ) fed the secret springs of his gentle and holy life, and sought upon the hills and in the night for the lonliest confidences with the Hearer of Prayer, and with mingling confines of personality, felt himself in the Father and the Father in him and his: and we must own in him the supreme witness to the spiritual union of man with God; -- a union, which, were it constant as in him, might be deemed an Incarnation; but where transient and intermittent, as with our lower fidelity, appears rather as a dispensation of the Spirit.

Thus then the Unitarian protest . . . comes round at last to a reunion of the human and the Divine. And in the cycle which it has run there is a curious recovery, as it were, of the functions of the Trinity without its paradoxes, only with the drama transferred from the individuality of Christ to the life of humanity. We have traversed, and at length united, the relations of creature to the Creator, of Son to Father, of weak and tempted to the all-quickenning Spirit.

This to Martineau was the highest 'stage' of Unitarian theology. He taught and preached among the Unitarians, but he gave his support to every movement throughout his life which sought the establishment of a national church in which freedom of conscience should supersede ecclesiastical dictate in matters of doctrine. He was a bulwark of faith in a century when the foundations of religious belief were attacked from every side.

1. Martineau, "Three Stages of Unitarian Theology," ERA, IV, 580 f.

C H A P T E R O N E .

THE LIFE AND WORK OF JAMES MARTINEAU

James Martineau was born in Norwich, a town whose history goes back to its charter by Henry I in the first quarter of the twelfth century. From a family of French Protestants, fleeing to England for conscience sake, he received his lineage. Is it more than pure romancing to find in these surroundings and inheritance the seeds of the keen appreciative sense, the high ethical standards, and the tenacity for opinions held to be right even if by a minority, which were characteristic of Martineau in later life?

The earliest of the Martineaus in England was the family of Gaston Martineau, a surgeon from Dieppe, who, at the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, in October, 1685, fled to Norwich. With him in the ship among the other refugees was a family of Pierres, from among whom Gaston Martineau selected his bride. To them were born three children, of whom the youngest, David, followed in his father's profession of surgery. The youngest son of David, Thomas Martineau, was born after his father's death. Thomas, who later became a manufacturer of bombazine, and on a greater or lesser scale a merchandizer in wines, was the father of James. In Magdalen Street, in Norwich, on April 21, 1805, James Martineau was born, the seventh child and the fourth son in the family, just three years younger than his sister, Harriet. Another daughter, Ellen, born in 1811, completed the family circle.

James Martineau says of his father, that he was "a man of more tenderness and moral refinement than force of self-assertion."¹ His sister, Harriet, in her Autobiography, writes thus of her father:

In our remembrance of him there is no pain on the ground of anything in his character. Humble, simple, upright, self-denying, affectionate to as many people as possible, and kindly to all, he gave no pain, and did all the good he could. He had not the advantage of an adequate education; but . . . he was not the less, but the more, anxious to give his children the advantages which he had never received; and the whole family have always felt that they owe a boundless debt of gratitude to both their parents for the self-sacrificing efforts they made, through all the vicissitudes of the times, to fit their children in the best possible manner for independent action in life.²

It was to preserve in honour the memory of this father that the entire family laboured to pay off in full the debts incurred by the reverses which he sustained in his business enterprise, which at his death was insolvent.

From a pencil sketch, and the word pictures preserved of the mother of the household, it may be gathered that she was capable and kindly, a good mother to the children who were her chief responsibilities.³ She was Elizabeth Rankin, the daughter of a merchant in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. From the Biographical Memoranda, and subsequent published letters of James Martineau, we draw the following picture of his mother:

(She) was perhaps the most capable member of a family whose standard of ability and character was above the average.

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1. Martineau, Biographical Memoranda, quoted by: Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 3; except for actual quotation or specific reference, the material from which the facts in this chapter are drawn is to be found in three excellent biographies:
 - (a) Drummond and Upton, Life and Letters of James Martineau, (2 vols
 - (b) Carpenter, James Martineau, A Study of His Life and Thought.
 - (c) Jackson, James Martineau, A Biography and Study.
 2. Harriet Martineau, Autobiography, I, 127.
 3. For a reproduction of the pencil sketch, see: Drummond and Upton, LL, I, facing p. 4.

Of great energy and quickness of resource . . . she naturally played the chief part in the government of the household, though always supported by the authority and admiration of her husband. Her children were trained in wholesome habits and clever arts, and stimulated by her sparkling talk.

Her understanding was clear, and her will, with a duty once in sight, not to be diverted; but behind these, and giving them their direction, was an inexhaustible force of affection; and not behind them only, but glowing through them in her expressive features and fervent words. A slight and delicate portrait of her is before me, from the pencil of a young artist friend who had an eye to read her truly; and no one can fail to see that its calm dignity is but the momentary composure of a countenance moulded by emotion, and often tremulous with pity and with love.¹

Such was the picture given of a mother who was much in her children's confidence, and had a large part in the inspiration which sent them on to lives of distinction and service.

The home life was strict but congenial, with much serious thought and discussion, and little levity. Perhaps this is traceable to the uncongeniality of the early champions of non-conformity to those outside their ranks. The religion of the household was of the type derived from the Puritan ancestry. The family attended the Octagon Chapel, in Norwich, which professed no connexion with any sect whatsoever save that its worshippers were Christians, and which imposed no set theological doctrine. The minister at the time of James' childhood was Mr. Madge. He was a Unitarian, and was often in the Martineau home for supper after service on Sunday evening.

1. Martineau, Biographical Memoranda, and Letter, to the "Daily News," Dec. 30, 1884; both are quoted: Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 3f.

One of the practices of the parents, as the children were growing up, was to impress each with the necessity of learning a trade or skill of some sort. Even the girls were given to understand that this was a wise practice, and the principle proved its worth when in later life all set themselves individually to the task of helping to discharge the burden of their father's indebtedness. It was thus in a home of rigid piety, combined with an extremely practical outlook on life, that James Martineau received the impressions which were to form the basis of his later thought and experience.

Early Education.

Of lessons which he must have received at home, Martineau said he remembered nothing.¹ It may well be supposed, and it is supported by Harriet Martineau in her Autobiography, that a certain amount of sound instruction was given to the children in the home, such education as the parents were able to give. The first experience James Martineau had of school was in the Grammar School at Norwich, which he entered at the age of ten. He was a day scholar, and was therefore looked down upon and despised by the boys who were in residence. Since he was of a quiet and sensitive temperament, we may imagine that some of the boyish roughness which he encountered repulsed rather than attracted him. He remained in this school for two years, but they were not happy years in his memory. He was then placed for a time under the tutelage of Mr. Madge, the minister, who discovered that he had little if any imagination, and probably quite wisely replaced Greek and Latin with a course of reading in the Arabian Nights.

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 14.

Harriet, upon returning from a fifteen months' school experience in Bristol, reported that Dr. Lant Carpenter, along with his pastoral services, was taking some pupils in that city. Therefore James was placed, as one of a dozen pupils, under his religious and moral and educational influence for two years. Dr. Carpenter was a Unitarian, an able teacher with a diversity of gifts, and later in life Martineau often spoke of the awakening which had come to him during the two years he spent under his tuition. He wrote thus in a letter to Dr. Carpenter's son, the Rev. R. L. Carpenter:

So forcibly, indeed, did that period act upon me, -- so visibly did it determine the subsequent direction of my mind and lot, that it always stands before me as the commencement of my present life, making me feel like a man without a childhood; and though a multitude of earlier scenes are still in view, they seem to be spread around a different being, and to belong, like the incidents of a dream, to some foreign self that became extinct when the morning light of reality broke upon the sight. I need not dwell on the illusory nature of this feeling. It is obvious enough that in no one's case can there really occur such an abrupt termination of one series of causes, and sudden replacement by another; that the years before I knew your father, prepared me to love and venerate him as I did, and set before him a boy ready to be penetrated and fused into new forms by his extraordinary influence; than which I can give them no higher praise. Still the illusion itself . . . is evidence of a wonderful power, rare even among the best instructors, of commanding the reverence, and reconstituting the wills, of the least manageable class of human beings.¹

At this time Martineau was looking toward the profession of Civil Engineer, and the part which most rejoiced his heart in his studies in Bristol was the greater opportunity afforded him of studying mathematics. Before he left this school he had, he says,

1. Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Lant Carpenter, LL, D., edited by his son, the Rev. R. L. Carpenter; Quoted by: Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 19.

"been put in possession of" Euclid, the Conic Sections, Plane Trigonometry, and something of Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Geology. As a means of training for the engineering profession, he was apprenticed in the summer of 1821 to a Mr. Fox, in Derby. It was during the first year of this apprenticeship, which he was forced to spend almost entirely at the lathe in the model room, that the realization of his future task came to him. He was staying in the home of the Rev. Mr. Higginson, whose daughter later became his wife, but there seemed to him a lack of spiritual depth in the circles in which Mr. Higginson moved, as contrasted with the devotion which was observable in the home of Henry Turner, a young Unitarian minister in Nottingham, in whose home he often visited. The early death of this young friend haunted him with a deep sorrow, and he says later that it was this experience which caused the scales to fall from his eyes, the change of heart that "turned him from an engineer into an Evangelist."¹

College Years, 1822-1827.

Thus it was that he left his apprenticeship, forfeiting the premium which his father had paid there for his training. His father agreed to help him in his training for the ministry, and he was granted admission at Manchester New College, then located at York. At this time there were three instructors, the Rev. Charles Wellbeloved, the Theological Tutor, who was also the directing head of the College, the Rev. William Turner, Tutor in Mathematics, and Natural and Experimental Philosophy, and the Rev. John Kenrick, Tutor in Greek and Latin Languages, History, and Literature. Little could anyone have then suspected the long period of years during which the

1. Martineau, Biographical Memoranda; quoted: Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 24.

lives of this College and James Martineau would be so intimately associated, and would exert such a formative influence over each other.

Martineau was always an outstanding scholar. He sought to develop every phase of his intellect, and persevered at studies which were not to his liking in order that he might gain mental discipline as well as instruction from them. He says, with genuine humility, that it was his fortune to achieve honours in anything wherein there appeared an opportunity for competitive work. From the existing evidence it appears that his college life showed some of the characteristics which he had acquired earlier in life, of not being generally friendly, and because of studiousness and the limitation of friendships, he failed to gain much that college life offered in the way of breadth of interest and a wide and diversified group of close friends. In a speech made at the close of his college career he spoke of feeling that he had spent all his time with one friend to the exclusion of other friendships which would have proved equally rich and valuable.

The training which he received in philosophy and theology during the years in York implanted in his mind a system of thought to which he adhered for some years, but which he later departed from and came to criticize severely. Although Hartley and Priestly had no direct connection with Manchester New College, yet the necessitarian doctrine of the will, and a utilitarian theory of ethics were accepted and taught there. The Rev. Charles Wellbeloved was a pupil of Belsham, and the Rev. William Turner, who taught Philosophy to Martineau, was the grandson of the William Turner who was an ardent disciple of Priestly during his Leeds ministry.

Professor Upton, in writing of the teaching of the Rev. William Turner, says: "The grandson, we learn, embraced, and for many years taught, without qualification, the philosophical views of his grandfather. . . In his lectures he always adhered closely to the Hartleyan philosophy, and ardently followed it into all its application to mind and morals."¹ Furthermore, it is most likely that Belsham's book, The Elements of Mental and Moral Philosophy, in which Priestlyan views were accepted and expounded, was the textbook used in York during Martineau's student days. Martineau accepted this philosophy, not seeing the limitations of the moral and spiritual life which it imposed, but finding it compatible with the principles of natural science in which he had begun his intellectual training. It was not until seven years after he left York that the beginnings of a change of philosophy are noticeable in his writing.

A statement of Martineau's acceptance of this philosophy is given in a record of a walking tour with his sister, Harriet, in Scotland in the summer of 1824. The brother and sister spent three weeks hiking through the countryside and parts of the Highlands, visiting friends, and calling upon eminent people within their own religious circle. The conversations as they walked occasionally came upon the subject of philosophy, and James records that his sister's insight was much quicker than his own. He says that at that time they both adhered to the deterministic philosophy, a position which his sister never abandoned. He says:

I was at that time, and for several years after, an enthusiastic disciple of the determinist philosophy; and was

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 261.

strongly tainted with the positive temper which is its frequent concomitant; yet not without such inward reserves and misgivings as to render welcome my sister's more firm and ready verdict. While she remained faithful throughout life to that early mode of thought, with me those 'reserves and misgivings,' suppressed for a while, recovered from the shock and gained the ascendancy.¹

Two major sorrows came to Martineau during his college years, the deaths of his elder brother and of his Father. These came in the summer of 1824. In 1826, when he became of age, he wrote to Miss Helen Higginson, professing his love to her. In view of his youth it had not been thought proper that he should see her or communicate with her during the four years previous. Each however had proved true to the love they had felt for one another and their marriage took place shortly after the completion of his college work, and the beginning of his ministerial life in Dublin.

First Ministry.

At the close of his college course Martineau naturally faced the problem of making some sort of permanent settlement. There were certain openings towards which he was looking hopefully when word came that Dr. Carpenter in Bristol was unable to carry on the work of his school, and that he was taking some time for rest on the Continent. He was desirous of having Mr. Martineau take over his duties until he should be able to return. Largely because of his regard for Dr. Carpenter, since at this time he felt that his field of service was to be the pulpit rather than the classroom, he accepted the invitation, and went to Bristol to assume his new duties. From August, 1827, until about the same time the following year he successfully carried on the administration of Dr. Carpenter's school, and the work in his pulpit. In the work of instruction as well as preaching he succeeded well, winning the confidence of the boys under

1. Martineau, Biographical Memoranda; quoted: Carpenter, JM, 44.

his supervision. His success with the pupils is witnessed by their parting letter to him, and the presentation of a gift, as well as by the fact that some of them followed him to Dublin in order to remain under his tutelage. In 1828 Dr. Carpenter returned to Bristol, closed his school, and resumed his service in the pulpit, which necessitated Martineau's again looking for a settlement.

Through the recommendation of Dr. Carpenter, in March, 1828, Martineau received an invitation to preach in Eustace Street Presbyterian Meeting House in Dublin. He was elected during the summer, and in September began his services as minister in that church. At first his sister kept house for him and through the financial aid of a friend he was able to secure a house suitable for doing a certain amount of tutoring. Some of the boys from Bristol continued their work with him here, and he had other special students from Trinity College. This addition to his income was a necessary provision for his marriage which was to follow shortly.

His ordination took place on the 26th of October, in full keeping with the principles and practices of the Presbyterians among whom he was to minister. Martineau's reply to the ordination charge was an excellent short address on what he considered to be the duties of his position.¹ It would appear from one paragraph of this address that his views on theological matters, and the place and significance of Christ, were at this time capable of being expressed in more orthodox terminology than he would have employed in later years. There is nothing distinctly and characteristically Unitarian in his utterance.

Shortly after this on December 18, 1828, Mr. Martineau

1. The full text of Martineau's address on this occasion is reproduced in Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 55, ff.

was married in Derby. He and his bride returned immediately to the full round of duties in Dublin. His time was occupied with his pupils, his pastoral work, his preaching, and his study, but he still felt that his congregation wanted an easy time for themselves and for him, since they assembled but once on Sunday. He therefore instituted classes for the instruction of young and old on spiritual matters. Often there was a class of young people for an hour before the morning service, and then a class of fifty or more adults for an additional hour at the close of the service. In 1829 the first child was born to the Martineau household, a daughter, who lived only a short time. The second child was a son, Russel, who was destined in later years to teach in Manchester New College, to which his father's life was so closely attached, and later to occupy the position of Assistant Keeper in the British Museum.¹ Then another child, Isabella, was born, who was to precede her father but six days in death, in 1900.

Certain experiences in Dublin show that already there were developing the strong personal characteristics of Martineau which are observable throughout his life. Chief of these was his acute sense of right and justice in the making of moral judgments, and his determined adherence to a policy of action in accord with these judgments. On one occasion he preached a sermon criticising the Arian doctrine, and one of his leading members left the church. At another time some of his people took exception to his interest in the cause of toleration toward the Roman Catholic Church. In neither case was he willing to retract his statements, or to compromise an opinion which he believed to be right, in order to retain the good favour of the people of his congregation. In fact,

1. Gordon, Russell Martineau, Dictionary of National Biography, Supp. III. 150.

it was this trait in his character which led to the rather abrupt termination of his ministry in Dublin, and to his being barred from further service among the Irish Presbyterians. At the death of his elderly colleague, with whom he had been sharing the work at Eustace Street, it appeared that he was to receive an additional one hundred pounds. This, he discovered, was the Regium Donum, a grant made annually to the Presbyterian Churches of Ireland to strengthen their loyalty to the Crown, and to aid in the support of their ministers. Martineau felt that he could not accept it since there were other bodies in Ireland who seemed to him as deserving of royal patronage as the Presbyterians. Without censuring others whose consciences were not troubled by it, he wrote an open letter to his congregation in which he declined this part of the support offered him, and stated that if they were not minded to join him in the refusal, then his period of service as their minister must cease. The decision was delayed for a time, but when it came to a vote the chairman cast his vote, the deciding one, in favour of the resolution to accept the minister's resignation. The step was not an easy one for Martineau, a young man in his first church settlement, with financial obligations in connexion with the house he had purchased, and with family responsibilities, but his wife was of the same mind with himself and so the step was taken resolutely. After continuing his preaching from the time of the decision in November until the following June, 1832, he left Dublin to continue his ministry, as later events proved, in Liverpool.

In Dublin Martineau had begun his activities in regard to the collection and publication of hymns. The hymn book in the Eustace Street Meeting House was old and inadequate, and it was

replaced by "A Collection of Hymns for Christian Worship," a new book in the publication of which Martineau had been instrumental. It contained two hundred and seventy-three hymns, some of the texts of which had been altered on the grounds of 'theology and taste' to make them suitable. Although this volume was published anonymously, it is significant as the beginning of a work which was to be continued by Martineau in later volumes. There is no trace of the literary labours which were to begin shortly in the form of numerous reviews and essays. His philosophy was essentially the same as that which he had been taught at York, a determinist view of the will, and a utilitarian theory of ethics.¹

Early Liverpool Ministry.

By the autumn of 1832 the family was settled in Liverpool, and Mr. Martineau began his work as associate minister with the Rev. John Grundy at the octagonal nonconformist chapel in Paradise Street. The income was small and this again necessitated the taking of pupils in order to meet the expenses of living. The house in which they lived, however, was small, and day pupils for special tuition were all he could accommodate. It was not long until Martineau's abilities began to be recognised, and he was asked to lecture at the Liverpool Mechanics' Institution, on Experimental Chemistry, and Physical Astronomy. In addition to these duties he began a series of Tuesday night lectures for the people of his congregation on matters

1. The extent of his adherence to the philosophy he had been taught at York is evident in a letter he wrote to Dr. L. Carpenter in 1830. It reads: "Have you thought of reprinting from the Repository Mr. Fox's most beautiful sketch of Mr. Belsham's life and writings? I do not know whether it is quite adapted for separate publication; and yet I wish it were accessible to every Unitarian. I would give up two-thirds at least of Dr. Channing's writings for those papers. I never received so much delight and improvement in so short a space from anything out of the Bible." Quoted: Carpenter, JM, 147.

of moral and religious interest. This round of activities he discovered was sufficient to keep him completely occupied. Such time as he found still at his command he spent in giving special lectures in his own and neighboring cities. Some of these are preserved among the Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, which he collected as the last major publishing project of his life. They include, "The Existing State of Theology as an Intellectual Pursuit, and Religion as a Moral Influence," (1834), "Views from Halley's Comet," (1834), and the "Need of Culture for the Christian Ministry," (1836).

In the early years of Martineau's Liverpool ministry traces of a change in his philosophy began to be apparent. The first important philosophical article which he wrote was a review and appreciative estimate of Priestly's philosophy, in the Monthly Repository, in 1833, wherein he expressed his agreement with Priestly, and spoke highly of the ability and thought of Brown and James Mill. In this article Martineau expressed his agreement with the view which traced ethics to a source in "self-interest transferred to society," a view against which in later years he brought all the force of his critical powers. The spirit of discipleship which is evident in the article on Priestly, however, is not to be found in another of the following year (1834) on Bentham's Deontology. In this article Martineau speaks with disapproval of the scorn with which Bentham regards all systems of ethics **other** than his own, and seems inclined to place emphasis on motives rather than consequences in the making of moral judgments. Such an emphasis alone is enough to indicate the direction in which Martineau's thought is moving, away from the

utilitarian view of ethics and towards what has been called his "ethical individualism," and the sole concern with motives which is found fully developed in the Types of Ethical Theory.

Martineau's departure from the traditional Unitarian position in theology became apparent in the first of his formal publications, The Rationale of Religious Enquiry, in 1836. This book was made up of a series of lectures which he had delivered the previous autumn on the subject of authority in religion. Previously authority had lain with the Scriptures, anything which could be found in the Bible being regarded as unquestionable. In the "Rationale," however, Martineau claimed that revelation must be subject to reason, contending that "no apparent inspiration whatever can establish anything contrary to reason; that reason is the ultimate appeal, the supreme tribunal, to the test of which even scripture must be brought."¹ Most of the points made in regard to authority in this work are repeated at more length in the Seat of Authority in Religion, nearly fifty years later but their beginnings in the earlier work are indicative of the change which was taking place in Martineau's thought.

By 1839 the change in Martineau's philosophy seems to have been almost complete, a fact which is evident from some of his addresses in connection with the Liverpool Controversy. In that year thirteen clergymen of the Church of England set themselves the task of giving a series of lectures for the avowed purpose of exposing the errors of the Unitarians and of bringing them back to the 'true' faith, and so saving those who called themselves Unitarians from the 'brink of hell where they were tottering blindfolded.' All the Unitarians in Liverpool were invited to

1. Martineau, RORE, 64; cf., also note 2, p. 158 f.

attend and see themselves dissected. A counter challenge was promptly given by three Unitarian ministers of Liverpool, the Rev. James Martineau, the Rev. J. H. Thom, and the Rev. Henry Giles. They agreed to urge their people to attend the lectures given by the Church of England clergymen, but the latter, it is said, tried to discourage their people from hearing the answering Unitarian lectures by assuring them that they would defile themselves by entering Unitarian places of worship. For thirteen weeks the controversy was carried on, with alternate lectures by representatives of the Church of England and of the Unitarians. Martineau records that at each of the Church of England lectures the three Unitarian clergymen sat in the 'condemned pew,' and heard their position attacked by scriptural texts, and unsympathetic criticism. Of the answering lectures Martineau delivered five, and the other two Unitarian ministers four apiece. The lectures may be read as they were collected into two volumes, Unitarianism Confuted, and Unitarianism Defended. The net outcome of the controversy was the transfer of two families to the ranks of the Unitarians.

The lecture of Martineau in this controversy which most clearly shows his change of philosophy is the one on "The Christian View of Moral Evil." Here the freedom of the will is clearly affirmed, and Martineau's 'Ethical Individualism' is expressed in the most emphatic terms. Furthermore, Professor Upton states that the two bases of Martineau's theistic philosophy emerge here, "the rational necessity of an adequate spiritual cause for the cosmos, and the ethical experience of a superhuman Presence and Authority in the Conscience."¹ There is also mention of the internal or self-evidence of Christianity. God is not simply the 'Only Cause'

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 270.

but is 'the Holy Watch of virtue.' A short quotation from this lecture will show the extent to which Martineau has emerged from the Hartleyan philosophy.

Let each consider his own life as an individual unit of responsibility, no less complete, no less free, no less invested with solemn and solitary power, than if he dwelt, and always had dwelt, in the universe alone with God. There is confided to him, the sole rule of a vast and immortal world within; whose order can be preserved or violated, whose peace secured or sacrificed, by no foreign influence. We cannot, by ancestral or historic relations, renounce our own free-will, or escape one iota of its awful trusts. No faith which fails to keep this truth distinct and prominent, no faith which shuffles with the sinner's moral identity,¹ contains the requisites of a 'doctrine according to godliness.'

The influences which brought about this change in Martineau's thought are not entirely clear. However there are certain evidences which may be regarded as indicating the direction from which the influences came. Professor Upton states that "In conversation he (Martineau) often referred to the writings of Dr. Channing as having powerfully co-operated with the other influences in bringing him to his final and decisive renunciation of the Hartleyan theory of ethics."² In view of the statement quoted from a letter of 1830 to Dr. Lant Carpenter about the relative worth of Channing's and Belsham's writings, it would appear that further contact with Channing's writings had caused him to see more truth in them than he had at first. It is clear that in the years which followed he regarded Dr. Channing's writings and letters very highly, and felt a marked affinity with him in the matter of belief.

A second influence which may have induced the change was contact with the writings of Reid and Stewart. The works of the

1. Martineau, "The Christian View of Moral Evil," Unitarianism Defended; Quoted by: Carpenter, JM, 182. In a further explicit statement in this address he says, "It appears impossible to defend the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity."
2. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 270.

Scotch philosophers had no place in the instruction which Martineau received at Manchester New College, yet in later years he followed to no small extent the philosophy of these representatives of the Scotch Intuitionalist School.¹ It seems reasonable to believe that in his reading after he left college he would come in contact with the works of these men, and his later approach to their position shows that they were not without influence upon his thought.

A third line of thought which must have exerted some influence over him at this time is to be found in the writings of Maine de Biran, and Victor Cousin. Cousin's lectures were being studied at this time by British Unitarians, and Martineau appealed to the writings of Maine de Biran, Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin in support of the doctrine of cause which he adopted after this change in his thought. As will be seen in the chapter of this study which deals with "God as Cause," Martineau's view of cause was drawn almost directly from this French source. It is not, therefore, too much to suppose that part of the influence producing the change in Martineau's thought came from this source.

A fourth source to which this change is traceable is a general feeling of the inadequacy of the necessitarian philosophy to account for the facts of experience. In the passage from the Biographical Memoranda already quoted which refers to Martineau's conversations with his sister Harriet during the tour of Scotland he mentions that it was not without certain stirrings and misgivings that he accepted the doctrine. It is natural, therefore, that when

1. Martineau, ERA, III, 463 f.

he had the opportunity to think through the problem more completely, coloured as was all his thought by his strong ethical sense, that he should have found this dissatisfaction crystalizing into a genuine disagreement. In a further passage of the Biographical Memoranda he says that it was in the process of expanding and applying the doctrine of necessity that its inadequacy became distinctly apparent. The passage recounts his attempt to trace the steps in the change of his thinking:

I can hardly say now what were the successive steps which removed me more and more from the school of philosophical opinion in which I had been trained. In my fondness for physical science I had accepted its fundamental conceptions and maxims as ultimate, and had been unconscious of the metaphysical problems which lay beyond. In this state of mind it was inevitable that the Necessarian doctrine should appear to have demonstrative certainty, for it is little more than a bare expression of the postulates of natural science, and hardly requires a single remove from its definitions. But in the very process of expounding and applying it I not only became aware of the distortion which it gave to the whole group of moral conceptions, but began to see that in Causation there was something behind the phaenomenal sequence traced by inductive observation; and gradually the scheme which I had taken as a universal formula shrank within limits that did not include the Conscience of man or the Moral Government of God. Along with this discovery of a metaphysical realm, beyond the physical, came a new attitude of mind towards the early Christian modes of conception, especially those of the Apostle Paul, whose writings seemed to be totally transformed and to open up views of thought of which I had previously no glimpse.¹

In metaphysics and in ethics the change was forced upon him by the facts which he encountered in working out the system of his own philosophy.

As soon as the change was accomplished he tells us that he was strengthened by the feeling of relief and the sense of freedom which came to him. Although the change necessitated his rewriting the lectures he had already prepared, yet it was with a consciousness that he had come to a clear insight into the truth

¹. Quoted by: Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 270.

and the nature of ultimate reality that he set about the task. God was no longer simply the Creator, but he was known immediately as the indwelling Father. Martineau felt that man could trust the soul's deepest insight into reality as valid because God was within pointing the way to truth and giving a self-disclosure of Himself to the individual soul. The concepts of sin, repentance, miracle, and revelation all came to have a new and richer connotation in his mind because he saw how each was a part of the experience of God within man.

Shortly after the Liverpool Controversy an opening came which was to give Martineau a new field for the development of his intellectual powers, in the reorganization and expansion of Manchester New College. With the signing of the Royal Grant in 1840, Manchester New College became affiliated with the University of London, and all the departments except the theological were transferred to London. The theological department was permitted to remain in Manchester because it was felt that some provision for free theological education must be made for students from the district surrounding Manchester. Martineau was given the position of Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and Political Economy, in the autumn of 1840. Since only one day a week could be spared for this work, his contact with the students was limited to the reading of his lectures on Wednesday afternoons. On the occasion of his inaugural lecture in this position Martineau received a letter of congratulation from John Stuart Mill, expressing the happiest forebodings for the college as the result of Martineau's connexion with it.

In November of the same year, in Paradise Street Chapel, Mr. Martineau introduced his second volume of collected hymns, "Hymns for the Christian Church and Home." This volume was more

extensive than the first, published in Dublin, and shows more mature powers of choice and editorship. His literary activities at this time also included the publishing of articles in some of the Unitarian magazines, and the first volume of his published sermons, the Endeavours after the Christian Life, which appeared in 1843. In the following year the family moved to a home which they had built in Prince's Park, called 'Park Nook,' from which address Martineau wrote many of his finest letters.

One of the greatest sorrows of Martineau's life came in 1845 with the beginning of the defection of his sister Harriet, to whom he had been so close in their childhood. She had come to a change in her thinking, and she wrote to Mr. Martineau demanding that all her earlier letters be destroyed, threatening not to write again unless her wish were obeyed. Martineau felt that the earlier letters represented his sister more as he wished to remember her, and refused to destroy the earlier letters. He sacrificed the future which promised only differences of opinion to the past which was loving and kind, thus opening the way for the complete alienation between himself and his sister which came a few years later.

In 1845 he assumed further editorial duties as one of three members of the editorial board of the Prospective Review, while contributing articles with some regularity to the Westminster Review. When he undertook the responsibilities of the Prospective Review he was criticized severely by those who adhered to the philosophy of Hartley and Mill, a fact which in itself shows how completely he had broken away from this type of philosophy. The criticism of Whewell's Elements of Morality which Martineau published in 1845 shows that his ethical views were already assuming the form which is expounded in his Types of Ethical Theory, ethical judgments

being regarded as preferential rather than being made in terms of an abstract concept of 'Good,'¹ With the publication of the second edition of the first volume of the Endeavours after the Christian Life in 1847, there appeared also a second volume under the same title. This was, like the first, a collection of miscellaneous sermons, which had been preached since Martineau's coming to Liverpool. The deeply devotional spirit of these sermons, as well as the theory of ethics which is evident in the mind of their author, give additional evidence of the completeness of the change in his philosophy.

The rapid growth of Liverpool, and the natural shifting of the residences of the people required some change in the location of the church. Hope Street was chosen as a more suitable location, and the work was begun for the new building in 1847. In May, 1848, the foundation stone was laid, and the church was dedicated 'to no priestly offices, no individual's teaching, and no fixed creed.' Arrangements were made for Martineau and his family to spend a year in study in Germany during the period of the erection of the new church. On July 16, 1848, the last sermon in Paradise Street was preached, and the family departed for a year of absence.

The Year in Germany

The year in Germany, although it was punctuated with unpleasant experiences, was on the whole a happy one. The Martineaus went first to Dresden, where teachers were engaged so that they might improve their knowledge of the language before proceeding to Berlin. In October, after Martineau and his son and some other English friends had completed a walking tour to Prague and had returned to Dresden,

1. Martineau, "Mhewell's Morality," ERA, III, 349 f.

the family went together to Berlin, in spite of the political disorders there and against the advice of some of their friends.

The stay in Berlin was at times rendered uncomfortable by the activities of the struggle between the Court and the Revolution, but through their friendship with Professor and Mrs. Ranke, Professor Trendlenburg and his family, Dr. and Mrs. Zumpt, and the company of their friend Mr. R. H. Hutton, the winter months in Berlin passed happily and profitably. Word came to them of a longer leave of absence, due to the slow progress on the Hope Street Chapel, so they turned their faces south by way of Nürnberg to München. They spent six weeks in a secularized monastery, St. Zeno, near Reichenhall, and then proceeded by steamer on the Danube to Vienna. They returned by way of southern Germany, the Neckar valley, the Rhine, and Antwerp, arriving at Park Nook in September.

Martineau felt that he had received much that was of value from the year's study, particularly from the parallel study of Hegel and Plato.¹ The latter came to have new meaning when translated into German, and new light came to the difficult passages of Hegel's writings through comparison with Plato. He read Kant's works, and Schleiermacher, with whose views he was not well pleased. Martineau tells that through his German experience he came into the 'same plight' in respect to the cognitive and aesthetic side of life that he had already encountered in regard to the moral. He found it necessary to reconstruct his views of metaphysics and epistemology so that they would be in essential agreement with his ethical thought. Of Professor Trendlenberg's lectures he wrote in a letter to the Rev. J. H. Thom:

His lectures on the History of Philosophy have precisely hit my wants, not imposing a system upon me, and obliging me

1. Martineau, TOET, I, xiii f.

to struggle with the temptations of a disciple or a partisan, but affording faithful guidance to sources of both ancient Greek and modern German systems, and presenting in the best way an occasion for the review and correction of my own opinions.¹

With the state of Moral Philosophy in Germany he was very much disappointed. As a branch of philosophy it did not exist, there not being a single lecture on Ethics in the University of Berlin. The estimate which Professor Upton has given of the value of Martineau's year in Germany seems thoroughly justified. He writes:

What he really gained from his studies in Berlin was such an insight into the history of philosophical thought, and especially into the chief systems of ancient Greece and of modern Germany, that his mind was put into the best possible condition for attaining to a complete and consistent philosophical unification of the several rational, ethical, and religious ideas which were at this time vigorously asserting themselves within his inner life.²

The movement which had been taking place in Martineau's thought through the years immediately preceding his experience in Germany seems to have reached its culmination in a sense of spiritual rebirth from which the authority of his own theism emerged with greater strength. A German encyclopedia, in an article on Martineau, states his position and attributes the formative influence to Professor Trendelenberg.

Von Haus aus rationalistisch gerichtet, wandte sich Martineau doch scharf gegen den Intellectualismus seiner Zeitgenossen und vertrat einen auf die geistige und sittliche Natur des Menschen und sein feeling for God begründeten Theismus. Er ist von Trendelenberg in Berlin beeinflusst, unter dem er eine 'Neue Geistesgeburt' erlebt zu haben bekennt. Sein Gottesglaube ist streng unitarisch: den dogmatischen Formeln gegenüber ist Martineau durchaus indifferent.³

It was from such a year of study and experiences that Martineau returned to his work at Hope Street Chapel, and to his lecturing in Manchester, in the autumn of 1849.

1. Letter quoted by: Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 331 f.

2. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 329.

3. Eoll, "Martineau," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III, 2031.

Later Liverpool Ministry

On October 18 the service of dedication for the new chapel in Hope Street attracted to Liverpool many of the older friends of Dr. Martineau. The Rev. Thomas Madge, the Rev. John Kenrick, the Rev. Charles Licksteed, the Rev. J. H. Thom, and the Rev. J. J. Tayler were among those who had part in the dedication of this new house of worship for those who believed in the freedom of theological opinion.

The usual extensive labours were shortly resumed, and classes of instruction for the old and young were added to the regular program of services. Martineau continued his lecturing at Manchester, as well as the writing of criticisms and reviews. In 1851, in an article in the Westminster Review, entitled "The Battle of the Churches," he entered the field in defence of the Roman Catholic battle for existence in England. The Pope had appointed bishops to English sees, and this was the object of much criticism on the part of the Church of England. Martineau pointed out that the Church of England was denying the right of the Roman Catholic Church in England because of a principle held in common by the two churches, i.e., the supreme authority of the bishop. If authority were complete no two bishops could stand in the same territory, having in their possession all the means of Grace, and the sole right to confer the power of the Spirit. The better path which he proclaimed was one rid of this difficulty, the path taken by nonconformity. This question was the occasion of some rather sharp controversial correspondence between Martineau and the Very Rev. Gilbert Elliot, the Dean of Bristol.

Much of Martineau's review writing at this time shows the

effect of the new metaphysical and psychological interest which had come to him with his year in Germany. Such articles as, "The Unity of Mind in Nature," (1853), which is a critical review of the philosophy of Hans Christian Oersted in his book, Ein Geist in der Natur, "Hamilton's Philosophy," which appeared in the Prospective Review (1853), "John Stuart Mill," (1859), "Nature and God" (1860), and "Science, Nescience, and Faith," (1862), show the phase of philosophical thought which was engaging Martineau interest at this time. He was concerned with the defence of Theism against British Empiricism, as it was seen from Locke to Mill, and against the continental monisms which tried to deduce the universe by thought.

In 1851 Martineau's estrangement from his sister Harriet became complete. The issue was precipitated by her having been one of the editors of a book entitled Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, dealing with the study of mental science through phrenology, the latter being approached through mesmerism. The duty fell upon Martineau to write the review of this book for the Prospective Review. The review, entitled "Mesmeric Atheism," was written in a tone which was extremely critical and derogatory. The strain which had come upon the relationship between Martineau and his sister over the matter of correspondence a few years before was so increased that a rift was opened between them, and there was no contact between them, either spoken or written, for many years afterwards.

In 1846 there had been founded in Manchester another college to which admission was free from theological tests. It had been largely endowed by a generous benefactor, and soon gave evidence that it would be sufficient to provide free religious and arts training for students from the vicinity of Manchester. As there was already some

agitation on foot for the removal of Manchester New College to London, and since the presence of the new college in Manchester had removed the chief reason for Martineau's having opposed the transfer at an earlier date, he gave his support to the proposal for the transfer. It was decided on Dec. 8, 1852, that Manchester New College should be established in London as a Theological Institution in connection with University College. This removal gave Martineau some anxiety, however, as it meant his separation from the College and the cessation of his professorial duties. The difficulty was solved temporarily in February, 1854, by his acceptance of the invitation to travel to London once a fortnight for two days lectures. This arrangement, combined with heavy pastoral duties and no small amount of literary work, continued for two years.

Since he had already served his people in Liverpool for a quarter of a century, and because he sought more leisure for literary work, Martineau decided to resign his place as minister early in 1856. His letter of resignation was handed to the chairman of the Congregational Committee, but urgent pleas from individual members of the congregation, and no small amount of persuasion on the part of the committee, caused him to withdraw his resignation.

In January, 1857, a change was proposed in the affairs of Manchester New College in London. Mr. G. Vance Smith, the Principal of the College, was retiring, and Mr. J. J. Tayler and Mr. Martineau were to submit plans for the redistribution of the work between themselves so that a third professor need not be secured. Mr. Tayler was to take over the duties of the Principal. As the new arrangement offered the opportunity for Martineau to spend his full time in educational and literary work, he promptly resigned his pastorate in Liverpool. Scarcely had his resignation been accepted, however, when it appeared that there was some division of opinion on the

decision at the College, and a protest had been placed on the minutes of a meeting of the Trustees against the proposed plans. Martineau determined that he would not undertake to go further with the plans for work at the College until a vote of the entire body of the trustees should be taken, and a resolution of confidence in Mr. Tayler and himself should be forthcoming. Many of Martineau's friends felt that such a vote would be unwise, and tried to dissuade him from insisting upon it, but he was determined. In April the meeting of the trustees was held, and the vote resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of the committee's arrangement, supporting Mr. Tayler and Mr. Martineau. The plans for the reorganization of the work at the College were therefore carried forward.

Another incident immediately following this caused no small amount of criticism. Mr. Vance Smith, the retiring Principal, had agreed to take the Hebrew classes. This Martineau felt to be unwise, and out of keeping with the dignity which should be accorded to the retiring Principal, so Martineau's son, Russel, was appointed to the position of teacher of Hebrew. A cry of family politics was immediately raised, and again Mr. Martineau called for a meeting in which it should be shown clearly that he had not been instrumental in the appointment. Through the reading of certain documents, especially an unsought testimonial letter from Professor Ewald in commendation of Russel Martineau's ability, it was shown that Mr. Martineau had nothing whatever to do with the appointment of his son.

Thus it was not without some mixture of emotions that Martineau undertook his additional duties at Manchester New College in London, duties which were to increase throughout the years of his active service until his retirement. The incidents related in the



two preceding paragraphs show how strong was the sense of moral right which characterized every phase of Martineau's life, and it is a tribute to the greatness of the man that he determined to forget the hurt that he had received from these two incidents, and to give to the College his undivided loyalty and service. His farewell sermon was preached on August 2, 1857, at Hope Street Chapel, and his twenty-five years of ministry in Liverpool were at an end.

Teaching and Preaching Ministry in London

With the opening of the college year in the autumn the Martineaus were settled comfortably but not elaborately in a house in Gordon Street, not far from University Hall. The lack of Sunday obligations now enabled Martineau to spend more time upon his formal studies and his philosophical lectures, and the days soon fell into a comfortable and routine efficiency, his mornings being spent in his study when his presence was not required at the college. Letters written at this time speak of missing the pulpit work, but he found recompense in the completion of some systematic studies which the lack of time had hitherto rendered impossible.

In 1859 the death of a friend, the Rev. Edward Tagart, minister of the Little Portland Street Chapel, quite unexpectedly placed in Martineau's path the opportunity of resuming his pulpit ministry on a limited scale. Mr. Tayler and Mr. Martineau were invited to divide the pastoral and preaching work between them. This they agreed to do, and Mr. Martineau found himself again dividing his time between ministerial and professorial labours. In the following year Mr. Tayler's health failed so that he was forced to give up his part of the work in Little Portland Street Chapel,

and the entire responsibility came upon Martineau. Later in the same year Martineau and the Rev. Dr. Sadler began work on a book of liturgical services, based on a critical redaction of the Prayer Book of the Church of England, a book which was to be called Common Prayer for Christian Worship.

An event which showed the greatness of Martineau's nature was his rejection for the position of Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic at University College on sectarian grounds. On the vacancy being announced, Martineau put in his application, the other candidate being Mr. Croom Robertson, a young man whose reputation was untried, but who gave evidence of growing powers. According to Mr. Martineau's words there was some opposition to a minister occupying this position, and there was also some feeling against having an unorthodox minister fill it. The first committee of selection came to a deadlock and disbanded without electing anyone to the position. A second list of candidates was to be prepared, but Mr. Martineau was not notified of the plan, the result being that the name of Mr. Robertson was the only one on the list. He was therefore elected to the position. Mr. Martineau's feelings at the loss of the appointment were not as strongly personal as we might reasonably expect, but he was greatly disappointed that the sectarian bias should have been permitted to be a determining factor in the selection of the man. Another noteworthy professor, Professor Augustus De Morgan resigned the Chair of Mathematics as a result of this exposé of the limitations of free thought which might easily be extended to other departments.

The position occupied by Mr. Tayler and Mr. Martineau, and consequently by Manchester New College, in determining the meaning of the term 'Unitarian Christianity' caused some consternation among those who held differing views. The British and Foreign Unitarian

Association was thought by some to be no longer representative of certain of the Unitarian congregations, and the result was the formation, in 1866, of the Free Christian Union. One of the influences leading to the establishment of this Union was Martineau's enumeration of the principles of the ecclesiastical life of the churches. The churches require, he felt: (1) a basis of union as broad as Christianity; (2) an unconditional refusal of special doctrinal names; (3) an openness to progressive change in doctrine, discipline, and worship. The constitution of the Free Christian Union was laid down in 1868, a plea for the acceptance of which Martineau published early in 1869 in the form of a pamphlet, The New Affinities of Faith: A Plea for Free Christian Union. It was Martineau's desire to make possible by this means a union of all the Christian churches, all Unitarian, Trinitarian, and independent communions. The attempt was not successful, however, and the result was the dissolution of the Union in December, 1870.

The Rev. J. J. Tayler, the beloved friend and colleague of Mr. Martineau, and Principal of the College, died on May 28, 1869. This brought very great sorrow to Martineau, for his feeling for this man, he confessed to his daughter, was that of love and reverence. It was considered only natural that Mr. Martineau should be chosen to step into the position of Principal vacated by the death of his friend.

By this time Martineau's reputation was far-reaching and many new friends became interested in his writing and his lectures. The Metaphysical Society was formed in 1869, and this too was bringing him into touch with some of the finest minds of the day. The suggestion for the formation of the Society had come from Tennyson, the purpose being the criticism of the intellectual foundations of

Positivism and Agnosticism. The first plan was not to include men who held to these doctrines, but Mr. Martineau insisted that such representatives of these philosophies as cared to do so should be given the opportunity of joining. Accordingly Professor Huxley and Tyndall became members of the Society. The meetings were held monthly and the discussions, judging from the list of the titles of the papers presented, were extremely interesting and valuable. The membership roll included such men as Gladstone, Tennyson, Lord Selbourne, the Archbishop of York, Henry Sidgwick, and John Ruskin. John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, although they had been invited to join, refused to become members or to participate in the activities of the society. There were also Roman Catholic members, one of whom, Father Dalgairns, Mr. Martineau thought to be one of the most fruitful minds and pleasing personalities in the entire group. It is worthy of note that Mr. Gladstone and others of the group regarded Mr. Martineau as one of the ablest men in the company, and valued highly his comments and contributions from time to time. The society disbanded when the members agreed among themselves that they were fairly well acquainted with each other's positions, and the usefulness of the meetings was gone.

In 1872 Mr. Martineau began to feel that his health was failing, and, in order to lighten the burden of his labours, resigned from his pulpit work in the Little Portland Street Chapel. Here as in Liverpool there were many words of regret and appreciation expressed when he announced his decision. This concluded his regular preaching ministry, the cessation of which enabled him to devote his entire time to writing and to teaching and administrative duties at the College.

In the same year (1872) Martineau received the first of his honorary academic degrees, Harvard University in America granting

him the degree of LL. D. On four previous occasions he had received invitations to travel to America and to give lectures there, one request being that he should deliver a course of twelve weeks' lectures at Harvard University. Each invitation, however, had come at a time when some circumstances prevented his acceptance. A similar honour came to him from the University of Leyden, when in February, 1875, that University conferred on him the degree of S. T. D. The Harvard degree had not been without warning, but the honour from Leyden came to him as a complete surprise. Martineau's eminence and his ability entirely justified his receiving these honours, although the universities of his own country had not yet recognized his greatness.

One of the greatest clouds of Dr. Martineau's life appeared during the year 1877 with the death of Mrs. Martineau. During the summer, only their second in residence at the Polchar in Aviemore, it was seen that Mrs. Martineau's health was failing rapidly. The decline was steady, and, although she withstood the return trip to London well, her days were ended on November 9. The funeral was conducted by the Rev. Charles Wicksteed, one of the oldest friends of the family. Although this was a serious blow to Dr. Martineau, yet with his usual greatness he bore it with calmness and composure.

Martineau's literary activities during this period were extensive and varied. In 1873 he published his third hymn book, Hymns of Praise and Prayer. This volume was longer than either of his earlier collections, containing seven hundred and ninety-seven hymns. Dr. Martineau was always deeply conscious of the value of suitable hymns, and of the necessity of making a hymnal keep pace with growing conceptions regarding the personal relationship between man and God. In the autumn of 1876 another volume of sermons

appeared from his pen, the Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. The reception given to this book caused him no little sadness. It was well received by his friends, but by the representatives of the other group of Unitarians it was given cool and slight notice. This called forth the fear from Dr. Martineau, expressed in a letter to the Rev. Charles Wicksteed, that the Unitarian Christians had departed from the fundamental view of the Personality of God, and had degenerated in their thinking into a sort of Moral Idealism, a fact which he thought would spell ruin for the Unitarian cause in future years. In 1880 there followed a second volume of the Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. This, like the first volume, received a cool reception at the hands of those opposed to Martineau's innovations in Unitarian thought. The Study of Spinoza, from the writing of which Martineau had shrunk for some years after the suggestion was first made to him, was put in the hands of the publishers in 1882. The presentation of Spinoza's thought which this study contains is not generally thought to be as able as the treatment of Spinoza which is included in the Types of Ethical Theory, yet it does indicate the thoroughness with which Martineau made his studies preparatory to the treatment of various thought systems in his formal studies of ethics and religion.

The University of Edinburgh honoured Dr. Martineau with the degree of D. D., on the occasion of its tercentenary in 1884. This honour pleased him very greatly, not because of the honour itself, but because it showed a striking change for the better in matters of tolerance and interchurch relationships when such a University could feel itself able to bestow its Divinity honours upon a man of his ecclesiastical connections.

Early in the year 1885 Dr. Martineau's first great formal and systematic work in philosophy was published, the Types of Ethical

Theory. In this work he devotes much careful consideration and criticism to various systems of ethics of the psychological and unpsychological types. His own theory of ethics, which he develops in the second volume as 'idiopsychological,' he presents only after the background has been laid by the searching criticisms and extensive evaluatory treatments of Platonic, Spinozistic, and Comtean ethics which comprise volume one. Martineau's own ethical theory develops the basis for the self-revelation of God to man through man's moral nature and experience. In the experiences of Conscience man becomes aware of the Divine Authority which asserts the right to control his desires and aims. Through moral experience man becomes aware of his freedom and the possibility and responsibility of sin. This phase of Martineau's thought is more fully developed in the chapter of this study which treats of 'God as Cause.' The Types of Ethical Theory is thought by many to be the finest work which Martineau published. With much in it which is not acceptable, it is nevertheless an exhaustive and adequate treatment of his subject.

At the annual meeting of the Trustees of Manchester New College early in the year 1885 Dr. Martineau's letter of resignation was read. From his advanced age of eighty years he felt that he could draw sufficient reason for release, but he was seeking also time for additional work. Throughout his active years he had been collecting materials on the authority of religion, and these he wanted to have time to set in order for publication before his years of labour were ended. In June, when the trustees met in University Hall, the resolution of thanks was moved and passed which was to convey to Dr. Martineau the feeling of the trustees and all those connected with the College at the termination of his services. The College felt the loss of a great spirit when Martineau's active teaching ministry was at an end.

Literary Activity after Resignation at Eighty Years

After Dr. Martineau's retirement the speaking engagements which had been gradually restricted in the years previous were limited even more carefully. It was not inactivity that he sought, but time to put his house in order and to publish certain remaining studies. He knew that what strength he had must be reserved for these tasks if they were to be brought to successful completion. His connexion with the College was not entirely severed, for he permitted himself to be made the president of the board of trustees. On the occasion of the centenary of the College he was feted in London by a group of representatives from the College, and on this occasion he gave an historical sketch of the origin and growth of that institution, placing emphasis upon the principles for which it had always stood. Shortly after this he became highly concerned with certain proposals for the reform of the requirements for admission to the Church of England, whereby these requirements would be acceptable to all Christians in England, and the Church of England become truly a National Church. In connexion with the proposals Dr. Martineau wrote articles and delivered addresses, for this was a move in a direction towards which he had looked and laboured hopefully throughout his life. A 'National Church Association' was formed to consider proposals and legislation. The Association fell into oblivion, however, after a time for want of adequate support, and the objective for which it was formed has not yet been reached.

Most of the time which has not been otherwise accounted for was undoubtedly spent by Dr. Martineau in the preparation of the manuscript of the Study of Religion. The preface of this work is dated 1887, but the actual publication came in 1888. It is in this two volume work, with which this study will be chiefly concerned,

that the author gives his critical evaluation of the various types of Christian belief, and lays the foundations of his own Theism. The two major arguments which are given in the exposition of his system are the Causal Argument and the Moral Argument. Under these God is viewed as 'Cause' and 'Moral Perfection' respectively. A subsequent chapter deals with the "Union of God as Cause and God as Moral Perfection," wherein the natural inseparability of the two attributes, and their transformation by the awareness of the presence of the living God into an immediate apprehension, is made clear. God cannot be divided and known in parts. His reality only appears when the whole being of man enters into immediate personal communion with the Divine Presence. The closing chapters of the Study of Religion deal with the physiological, metaphysical, and moral aspects of death and immortality.

In 1888 Dr. Martineau was invited to receive the honorary degree of D. C. L. from Oxford. Dr. Martineau was graciously received, and the degree was conferred by Professor Bryce. While he was at Oxford on this occasion Dr. Martineau made inquiries about the advisability of a proposed removal of Manchester New College to Oxford. As a result he recommended such a transfer, and it was voted by the trustees of the College in May, 1889. A further honour came to Dr. Martineau in 1888 which gives some evidence of the breadth of the circle of his friends and admirers. On his eighty third birthday he received a letter to which were attached the signatures of six hundred and fifty people of outstanding reputation and ability throughout Europe, Great Britain, and America. The list of names included those of Tennyson, Browning, Jowett, Zeller, Muller, Renan, Lecky, Lowell, and many other scarcely less familiar names.

The last of Martineau's formal studies was published in

1890, The Seat of Authority in Religion. This is, as the name implies, a study of the various modes of establishing authority in the matter of religious belief, and an attempt to counteract certain misconceptions which have crept into Christianity concerning the nature of that authority. Martineau's conclusion is that not in the Scriptures, nor in the Church, but in the indwelling of the Divine in the human, the 'veil is taken away,' and the true authority of religion is seen to rest.

In 1892 Dr. Martineau took part in the Tercentenary Celebration at Dublin University, and received the honorary degree of LL. D. This was the fifth and last of his academic honours. He was present at the opening of the new building which was to accommodate Manchester College, no longer Manchester New College, at Oxford, in 1893. After this his appearances in public were very few, there being recorded only three or four occasions on which he again attempted to speak to an audience. On his ninetieth birthday he received an embossed and bound address from Manchester College as a token of appreciation for his long service.

His literary labours continued in the form of reviews and criticisms, showing that Martineau, even at this advanced age, kept himself abreast of the latest movements of thought, and in the editing of such of his earlier essays, reviews, and addresses as he thought most worth of preservation. The result was the four volume set edited under the title, Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, in 1891. The last of his published articles was a review of Balfour's Foundations of Belief, 1895, in which Martineau reasserted his view that Christ revealed the co-essentiality of man and God in even stronger terms than he had employed in the Seat of Authority. His last publication in any form was a book of four short sermons on,

Faith and Self-Surrender, in 1896. Two years later a marble bust of Dr. Martineau was unveiled in the Library of Manchester College. The sculptor was Mr. H. R. Hope-Pinker, whose work in this case was regarded as an admirable likeness of Dr. Martineau, and in itself a work of art.

The end of this great philosophical and religious thinker came quietly in the winter month at the opening of 1900. The family was suffering from an attack of influenza, which Dr. Martineau also contracted, and rest came to him on January 11. He had run with patience the race which had been his, and had finished the last of his self-appointed tasks. The spirit of complete devotion and self-surrender which made his greatness possible is expressed in this excerpt from a letter written a few days before his ninetieth birthday:

In the retrospect of ninety years there is a pathetic mixture of gratitude for ample opportunities and humiliation for insignificant performances. The habitual pressure of the latter is the only cloud that overhangs my declining path. My friends - as if they caught sight of the shadow and understood it - try to assure me, as they gather around me at the close of my last decade, that the labour of so many seasons has not been all in vain. If to some few souls the meaning of life has indeed become clearer, its possibilities nobler, its sanctities deeper, its immortality surer through the simple report of my own experience, I thank the Father of Lights for thus joining me in love, -- be it only to two or three brethren in spirit, and children of his.¹

From such souls, great in humility, do great works proceed.

¹ Martineau, Letter to Mr. Charles Fenton; quoted by, Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 198 f.

C H A P T E R T W O .

MARTINEAU'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

The scepticism which declares that mind is incapable of knowing what is ultimately real, and the Absolute Idealism which denies the existence of finite minds capable of free self-determination tend to undermine the foundations of both religion and morality. It is therefore the major problem for the theistic philosopher to discover and vindicate the nature and validity of religious knowledge. For the religious man it is a matter of deep concern that what he believes to be true is actually true, and that his faith in the reality of his ideal is not simply a chimera of the imagination. The starting point for a religious philosophy is the investigation of the ground and the processes of knowledge, and the relation of these to the facts of religious experience. Such a philosophy will then be able to affirm the ability of the human mind to apprehend religious truth, and to show the relation between knowledge and reality.

In Martineau's theism we shall see that he sets such a task for himself. He approaches the problem of knowledge from the psychological end, investigating the facts of cognition. In the experience of cognition he finds given indubitable knowledge of realities, both empirical and transcendental. These realities, when properly understood, fit into a coherent system adequate for the explanation of the data of man's religious experience. Thus

through the circuits of metaphysical investigation man is led back to, "the very position which common sense had assumed at first."¹ Man discovers that his primary faith presents a true picture of reality. In religion, Martineau says, you come to "the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls."² In the exercise of his highest faculties, man is cognizant of the reality of both subject and object in the empirical realm, and of the Supreme transcendent personal Reality which is God.

The Presuppositions of Knowledge

Martineau's epistemology may be said to rest on four postulates. The first is the duality of subject and object. The second is the reality of the object of cognition. The third is the trustworthiness of man's cognitive faculties. Here the validity of knowledge gained through the cognitive experiences is affirmed for both empirical and transcendental reality. And the fourth is the immediacy of the knowledge of objects through intuition. In his theory of knowledge Martineau stands close to the position of Thomas Reid, and the Scottish school of Common Sense Dualism.

"There are," Martineau says, "three possible objects of our cognitive faculties, namely: (1) Ourselves. (2) Nature. (3) God."³ Of man's ability to know the first of these there has been little doubt. Since the mind is ever present with itself it has not been thought impossible for it to know itself. To know nature, however,

1. Martineau, SOR, I, viii.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 13.

3. Martineau, "Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 451 f.

is for mind to apprehend matter. This has presented a persistent problem from the time of the earliest philosophical thinking. Mind and matter have been held to be incommensurable, and the question as to how one could know the other has been the source of much difficulty. To know God is for the finite to apprehend the infinite. For this to be possible a relative act would need to achieve the absolute. Thus, unless some means can be found for the solution of the difficulties involved in the cognition of the last two objects, it would seem that any knowledge of objects beyond itself is impossible for the mind of man. Both qualitatively and quantitatively man seems to be cut off from all that lies beyond himself.¹

The difficulty which lies in the apprehension of matter by mind can be traced to the assumption that 'like can only know like.' Man has been unable to find in mind such qualities as extension, externality, and solidity, which are the characteristic qualities of matter. Since the two are so unlike, direct knowledge has been thought impossible. Martineau overcomes the difficulty, following Sir William Hamilton, by denying the truth of the assumption. He does not reduce the unlikeness, but holds that it is no barrier to knowledge. He did not deny the reality of one or the other of the terms in the subject-object relation. This Berkeley had done by denying the reality of the object, and Fichte by reducing the subject to its perceptions (esse is percipi). He did not seek for some other reality to which both the subject and object would stand in a phenomenal relation, and through which they might communicate, as had Spinoza and Hegel. Nor did he seek for

1. Martineau, "Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 452.

some quality predicable of both, some neutral ground on which they could meet, as the 'idea' of Plato or the 'motion' of Aristotle. He chose rather to affirm that their duality was the possibility of knowledge. The mental self knows the material object by distinction from itself, and knows itself by distinction from the 'otherness' of that object. In commenting on Hamilton's thought, Martineau writes thus: "Flinging away the assumption of the schools, our author reverts to the simplicity of nature; and declares that in perception the mind, with equal immediateness, knows itself as the subject and an outward reality as object."¹ In this Martineau is in full agreement with Hamilton. He says that in the case of a perception there is a self which has it, and a not-self which gives it, both of which are present in the perception and are known as real existences.² Of the occasion of percipiency he writes in another connection: "The fundamental discovery opened upon us in this experience is the dualism of the Self and other than Self."³

Upon this point Martineau takes issue again and again with the Idealism of Kant and his followers. Professor Caird, in his study of Kant, makes this statement: "Knowledge of things must mean that the mind finds itself in them, or that, in some way, the difference between them and the mind is dissolved."⁴ To this Martineau replies:

If I wanted to name the condition which most certainly excluded knowledge, I should be at a loss for better terms than this: the moment you dissolve the difference between the knower and the known, they coalesce like the foci of an ellipse with its eccentricity reduced to zero, and the relation between them which constitutes intelligence vanishes."⁵

1. Ibid., 460.

2. Ibid., 461.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 198.

4. Caird, KANT, 553; It must be borne in mind that Caird's interpretation of Kant is not always reliable. Cf. Kant, CPUR, B275.

5. Martineau, SOR, I, 74.

This dualism of the subject and object is fundamental to Martineau's entire system of thought.

Consciousness, so far from revealing only our own existence, and leaving us to gather all other existence by inference from this, cannot give us the percipient self except in simultaneously giving us the perceived other-than-self; and we are as directly cognizant of the one as of the other.¹

In this distinction of the object from the self-conscious subject come two of the most important intuitions. Any act of perception is a self-conscious act on the part of the percipient subject. In this act there is a certain out-going of force which immediately feels the opposition of a counter-act. The opposition thus encountered by the ego from the non-ego brings to the ego the consciousness of an objective force and an objective position. Martineau speaks of these as the dynamic and mathematical antitheses of the ego. They are objective to the self-conscious subject. In this preliminary encounter with resistance and extension the subject receives its first intuitions of Cause and Space. More will be said of these in the section where the subject of Intuition is more fully developed. It is important to note here, however, that on Martineau's view in the act of perception both the self-consciousness of the ego and the reality of the external world are immediately given.

The reality of the external object is strongly emphasized. Martineau maintains that the object and the infinite ground in which that object is encountered are both immediately apprehended as realities. Thus when the self perceives an object, and as we have seen, encounters resistance and extension as qualities of that object, the infinity of space and cause which constitute the ground of that object's existence are immediately perceived as possessing equal

1. Martineau, "Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 460.

reality with the object.¹ The reality of the ground of the object is not reached as an inference from the reality of the object, but both are immediately and simultaneously apprehended as real.

The distinction is also made in the perception between the inner reality which is the Self and the outer realities which are Nature and God. The reality of nature is not to be understood as a material reality, but as Cause, Space and Time. God's Causal Will in operation constitutes the reality of nature, and Space and Time are the pure conditions of Causation. Space and Time are the only self-existent realities apart from God.² In the act of perception the reality of the subject and object is immediately known. It is only on a realistic view of nature and thought that Martineau feels a sound philosophy can be built.³

On the further point of the veracity of knowledge gained through the cognitive faculties we find Martineau very explicit. He points out that unless we trust human reason, that it gives a true picture of both empirical and transcendental reality, we are doomed to a complete scepticism. In the exercise of his highest faculties man is immediately cognizant of reality both within and without himself. In this regard he criticises the position of Hamilton and Mansel, and that of Mill and Comte. "We cannot admit," he says, "the doctrine of the religious incompetency of the human faculties."⁴ He agrees with them in regard to the relative character of human thought, as a psychological fact. All thinking which is carried on by the human mind is relational. In the very act of thinking the self-consciousness discriminates itself from its object. This does

1. Martineau, "Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 482.

2. Cf., Space and Time, p. 218.

3. Martineau, "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought," ERA, III, 136.

4. Martineau, "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought," ERA, III, 134.

not, however, disqualify thought from the apprehension of ontological reality. The self is not barred from escape from itself into the realms of external reality. Martineau writes thus:

Undeterred by the fashion of the day and the influence of authoritative names, we do not hesitate to believe with Cousin, that there is a legitimate 'passage from psychology to ontology,' and to protest against the paradox that human intelligence, in its highest exercise, can only mock us with impossibilities and contradictions.¹

Instead of the relative character of human thought limiting it to the finite realm, it is this very characteristic which enables it to have access to the infinite. By being finite it is able to distinguish itself from that which is infinite. Every phase of man's cognitive experience points clearly to the fact that his faculties are constructed with the capacity for something far beyond phenomenal knowledge. In the causal, moral, and affectional intuitions man is introduced to an infinitude which is God. It is in contrast to his own finitude that man apprehends the infinitude of God.

We have entire faith in the veracity, and in the consistency, of the reports given in by our highest faculties; and think it possible, even within our segment of a life, to trace their convergence towards one Divine and Holy Reality. The causal instinct of the intellect, the solemn suspicions of the conscience, the ideal passion of the imagination, the dependent self-renunciation of the affections, are all, we believe, so many lines of attraction to the same Infinite Object.²

The other of the four major postulates will be made clear in the section where the doctrine of intuition is developed. The judgments which man makes when he goes beyond the possibility of empirical verification are intuitions. The knowledge in such cases is the immediate apprehension of the object, whether it be of an inner or an outer reality. All cognitions which cannot be verified by our own or another person's sensory experience must depend for their verification on the inerrant intuitive judgments concerning

1. Ibid., 134.
2. Ibid., 140.

the object of experience.¹

The Method of Cognition.

In the Preface to the Study of Religion Dr. Martineau quotes a statement from an "eminent English Positivist" in which he says: "You can't make the slightest concession to metaphysics without ending in a theology." This Martineau regards as true, and proceeds to make the concession to metaphysics in order to end in a theology. It is quite the same with his epistemology. His epistemological system is built with the view of supporting his theology. He consciously moves, through his treatment of the problem of knowledge, in the direction of the theistic arguments which are to follow. His theory of knowledge is a theory of knowledge of God, the Divine in the human.

"Knowing," he says, "is . . . an active condition of the mind."² In making such a statement he is repudiating the view which he held at the beginning of his philosophical career when he was under the influence of the empirical school. On the empiricist view the mind is purely passive, constituted only by the aggregate of experience which come upon it. He would not agree with the idealists that the mind was constitutive of its objects, but he felt it necessary to emphasize the active character of cognition.

Knowing is distinguished from feeling in that it possesses an object. Sensations and feelings can be the objects of cognition, but in themselves they have no object. Only the self-conscious subject can have an object. Until there is energy directed upon an

1. Martineau, "Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 470.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 40.

object, there is no real appearance of an object. Only in the dynamic and mathematical antitheses does the mind encounter objectivity. "Sensation . . . as such has no object; and this word acquires its first title to appear, when some point comes into view on which an energy of attention can direct itself."¹ Having sensations is very different from knowing that one has them.

Knowing is further distinguished from will in that knowing lacks the "preference and effort directed upon a future end."² Will, as we shall see later, is force which is consciously directed towards the accomplishment or resistance of certain acts. It is effort which is expended at the instigation of a selective and directing mind. Although knowing is active, it is not effort directed towards the accomplishment of some end.

Not all thinking is knowing. Knowing is the sort of thinking in which the subject has an object distinguishable from itself both dynamically and mathematically.

In order to exercise my thought, I must direct it on something either different in place from myself, as the person, the book, the diagram before me, or different in time, as last night's dream, or the conjecture that occurred to me a moment ago. Without Space and Time, therefore, no objectivity; without objectivity, no thinking; without thinking, no knowing.³

Such a statement seems to demand a question. Cannot the mind think of itself here and now? Must the knowledge of self come only as a distinction from an outer object? If the mind is incapable of thinking of itself as the present object, both here in space and now in time, how can it analyse its own states, feelings, sentiments, passions, and propensions? Much in Martineau's

1. Martineau, "Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 469.

2. Martineau, SOB, I, 43.

3. Ibid., 40; Cf., ERA, III, 470.

system of thought, his ethics, his metaphysics of cause, his knowledge of God, depend upon the mind's being able to analyse itself, and being able also to trace to their source its intuitions.

Martineau seems determined in this position, however, because he affirms that only the thinking in which the subject can state some proposition about the object can be called knowledge. "The rule . . . stands without exception, that no mode of thinking amounts to knowledge but one, viz., the predicative; which, for distinction's sake, we call judging."¹ A further limitation is made for knowledge in denying that all judging is knowing. It may be possible for the mind to make certain judgments which are not true for reality. "Only when the mind's predications reproduce in thought the relations which exist in reality, do they constitute knowledge."² Thus the mind must have access to reality in order to determine the truth or falsity of its judgments, and hence to determine the extent to which it possesses knowledge. The verification will be seen to be two-fold, by experience and by intuition. Let us then investigate his theory of judgments and their agreement with reality.

The mind begins, he says, with the making of simple judgments, i.e., analytical. It is the characteristic of such analytical judgments that they do not state in the predicate anything which is not implicit in the subject, thus conforming to the 'Law of Identity.' He gives the example, "Water is liquid." The predicate is implicit in the subject. Out of his own mind the knowing subject supplies this predicate for the subject of the proposition.

The object of thought and speech is a concept which the speaker has at home in his own mind: to know what it connotes, he has but to consult his self-consciousness, and compel its lazy experience to unpack its contents and spread them out side by side with the specified particulars of the predicate.

1. Martineau, SOR, 1, 43.

2. Ibid., 43.

Of a single analytical proposition the truth or falsehood is thus read immediately at a glance.¹

But what is meant here by "at home in his own mind," and why should the self-consciousness unpack its experience for consultation if the truth can be read at a glance? In the case of water being known to be liquid we can safely affirm that this has been learned by experience. His analysis would have been psychologically much more accurate if he had traced these simpler judgments to empirical origins. The simpler judgments are made spontaneously, but their basis is in the apperceptive mass of the data of experience.

From these simple judgments we move to the more complex, the synthetic judgments. It is the characteristic of the synthetic judgment to introduce into the proposition a third term which gives some additional assertion concerning the subject. Here the self-consciousness is no longer able to determine at a glance the truth of the proposition, and the thinker must go out of himself and experiment with the subject of the proposition to test the truth of the judgment. The synthetic judgments depend upon perception for their verification.² This perception will be empirical if the subject of the proposition is a sensible object, and intuitive if it is a super-sensible object. "This appeal (to perception) is universally taken as ultimate; so that we assume that in perception and self-consciousness we know."³ In this Martineau is close to Kant's view of a combination of the inner and outer sense. The limitation of knowledge to feelings and states of consciousness urged by J. S. Mill, is thus repudiated. Martineau stressed the directness of knowledge of external realities, and criticised strongly the limitation of knowledge to the subject's own states.

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 44.

2. "For any insight into Nature we must go beyond the development of our own concepts." Ibid., 45.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 46.

Martineau does not, however, place implicit faith in the determination of truth by universal agreement of experiencing subjects. He does not commit himself to a thorough-going empiricism. He points out that sensible experience warrants no universal and necessary agreement on the truth of a given proposition, but is always open to correction by ulterior experience.¹ Kant held that only of mathematical judgments was verification possible; they alone afford an undisputed example of absolute demonstration. Space and Time as forms brought to experience are pure intuitions, and mathematical judgments are constructions of the categories and pure forms. The mathematical judgments, since their forms are a priori, are subjectively determined. Martineau rejects this subjective limitation, and holds that we can test the correctness of a synthesis by 'going up to the object,'² and seeing if the predicated property be there. There are, however, super-sensible objects which do not permit of such empirical investigations. For these judgments, which are beyond the scope of sensation, we must trust our intuitions as valid.

At the close of a critical section in which the positions of Kant and Mill are investigated we find such expressions as the following: "What is inevitably thought is in accord with what really is,"³ and "Our only resource therefore is to avail ourselves of the empirical psychology to the limits of its honest analysis of acquired combinations; and beyond these limits, to trust, as valid intuitions, the residual belief(s) inherent in our mental constitution."⁴ Thus in our search for the criterion of truth of judgment, we find ourselves led into one of the most characteristic phases of Martineau's thought,

1. Ibid., 48.
2. Ibid., 54.
3. Ibid., 135.
4. Ibid., 136.

his doctrine of intuition. In the intellectual, moral, and religious realm the final verification of judgments rests with man's intuitions of the immediate objects of reality.

Intuition

When man's judgments are made concerning objects in the sensible world, and deal only with phenomena, they can be verified, as we have seen, by submission to the tribunal of 'universality' in like minds.¹ If we can gain corroboration from the experience of others for our intuitive judgments of phenomena, then 'reality' may be regarded as the equivalent of 'universality.' Although the word 'intuition' has been employed in the description of the apprehension of phenomena, yet it is particularly in the realm of the super-sensible objects that the immediacy of the object to the subject appears. Here Martineau accepts Kant's terminology, calling the super-sensible objects 'noumena,' although he rejects Kant's distinction between Sense and Understanding. In stressing the possibility of knowing super-sensible objects in the inner and outer realms of experience he is rejecting "the idealism which limits our knowledge to the interior line of our consciousness: the principle of the relativity of knowledge, which forbids us to suppose that what is true to us is true beyond us: and the maxim that 'all we know is phenomena.' He says:

When we rise above the ground level and look forth on the wider horizon swept by the Intellectual vision, may we not expect to transcend these limits (limits of phenomenal cognition), and through the purer light and air gain access to super-sensible objects?³

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 55.
2. Ibid., 133.
3. Ibid., 57.

Instead of the knowledge we gain of phenomena being all that we can know, the knowledge we gain of phenomena is less reliable than that which we have of noumena through intuition. Our intuitions of noumena are the most valid of all our cognitions.

The intuitions appear as full and final apprehensions of the truth of judgments. It is not to be thought, however, that they are fully grown in the infant, or that they will appear all at once in any given mind. It is neither necessary nor desirable that a baby in the cradle should possess all the intuitions for its earthly life stored away in its mind. The intuition is adequate for any problem as it arises, and gives its pronouncement of truth or falsity of propositions when their verification is desired.¹

If you would know, (he says,) what provision our nature holds for dealing with its Duty and interpreting its guilt, you must go into the thick of its moral life, and bid it tell you what it sees from the swaying tides of temptation and of victory.² The 'purity' of intuitions is not 'pristine,' but ultimate.

This is indeed a true insight into the nature of the moral intuitions. We cannot sit back from the strife of life and make our judgments. It is only when **the** temptations are thick and the path of duty difficult to follow that judgments suitable to the occasion can be made. The English empirical school has attempted to discount intuitions by tracing their origins to accidents of education and position, by explaining them away into custom, association, prejudice, logical tradition, and the like. The significance of intuitions does not lie in their origins, but in their authority and validity in a given situation.³ We might as well discredit chemistry because

1. Martineau, "Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man," ERA, IV, 594.

2. Ibid., 594 f; Italics not in the original.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 133-135.

of its growth out of the earlier alchemy, or modern medical science by 'tracing origins' to the incantations of the witch doctor. The value of an intuition is not to be denied by tracing its origin.

Intuition is the source of independent insight and ultimate authority.¹ This does not mean that in intuition an individual is in no way concerned with his fellow men. It is not intended to be a mark of isolation, but is rather one of the chief factors whereby a person recognizes the meaning and responsibility of his relation with other individuals. Martineau states explicitly that the moral intuitions would have no meaning if a man were living entirely away from all contact with his fellow men. A lone person in the world could have no moral intuitions. By independent he simply means that a person is not under necessity of consulting his fellows in making an intuitive judgment, but the insight comes directly to him. A man need not rely on any other individual to confirm his intuitive decisions.

In the matter of the authority of intuitions, Martineau rests his case upon idio-psychological grounds, as he does his ethics. The authority of an intuition is determined by a psychological analysis of one's own states. The intuitions which come to man, particularly in the realm of ethics, are themselves a constant characteristic of human nature.² They do not vary with the individual, but may be regarded as universal in human self-consciousness. Here Martineau's entire faith in the veracity and the real validity of knowledge gained through the human faculties is rallied in support of the trustworthiness of the intuitions. He says: "Nothing . . . stands in the way of our trust in the bona fides of our intuitive witnesses to (and of) a world

1. Martineau, "Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man," ERA, IV, 591.

2. Martineau, TOET, II, 93.

beyond the contents of our own consciousness."¹

The intuitions are not, however, purely subjective. They do arise in the self-consciousness and their basis is idio-psychological. Yet their validity and authority are not confined to the self. "The supposition of 'subjective' morals is no less absurd than that of 'subjective' mathematics."² Here Martineau joins issue with Bentham. If ethics were purely subjective, then it would be conceivable that the intuitions of man would be applicable only to himself. Ethics, rightly understood, is concerned with the principles of relationship between individuals in society, and hence the duty which a moral intuition lays upon a man is broader than himself. Since the intuitions are constant characteristics of human nature, they may be regarded as valid for all individuals. Kant's doctrine of the a priori led him to a closely confined subjectivism. William James spoke of certain of our moral judgments as 'brain born.'³ The responsibility for these judgments would seem to rest entirely with the individual. Martineau recognizes the subjective factor in morals, but in the intuitions there is an authority which has its source outside the individual subject. It is the same authority which is within and yet transcends all the other individuals in society. In the matter of their authority our intuitions are independent of our wills and idiosyncrasies.⁴

If the sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something higher than we, having claims on our self, -- therefore no mere part of it; -- hovering over and transcending our personality, though also mingling with our consciousness and manifested through its intimations.⁵

Our intuitions have an existence which is determined not by the fallacies of our minds and wills, nor by our peculiarities of likes

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 79.
2. Martineau, TOET, II, 96.
3. James, WTJ, 187.
4. Martineau, TOET, II, 95.
5. Ibid., 97.

and dislikes, but by a higher authority which enters and abides in the life of each person. This higher-than-we is the Supreme Person, God.

It is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself. Here we encounter an 'objective' authority, without quitting our own centre of consciousness; an authority which at once sweeps into the widest generality without asking a question of our fellow-men; for an excellence and sanctity which He recognizes and reports has its seat in eternal reality, and is not contingent on our accidental apprehension: it holds its quality wherever found, and the revelation of its authority to one mind is valid for all.¹

The real objective authority of man's intuitions is Himself the Supreme Reality. He is within the judging subject as the Divine in the human, thus enabling the ultimate Reality to give itself directly and immediately to the subject.

Types of Intuition

There are, in Martineau's system, three types of intuition. They are (1) the rational, (2) the moral, and (3) the religious, each of which is a source of independent insight and ultimate authority.² The particular intuitions are given through the functioning of man's higher faculties. Reason and Will give to the individual his knowledge of the Divine Causality. The operations of conscience proclaim the dictates of the Divine moral authority. These two intuitions blend together into the third, which is something more than their combination, the spiritual intuition. It is this third intuition which gives to man his belief in and knowledge of the supreme holiness and love of God.³ This makes no pretension of being an exhaustive list of the intuitions, but these Martineau

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 97.

2. Martineau, "Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man," ERA, IV, 591 f.

3. Ibid., 595.

stresses because they are necessary to the understanding of his doctrine of God.

Causal Intuition

The first intuition we shall consider is variously designated as the Rational or the Causal intuition. The later title indicates more clearly the type of knowledge which it presents, so we shall use this designation in this study. Martineau investigates the various theories of causation which have been held. He rejects the ideas of mere sequence, and of 'phenomenon as cause,' in favour of the dynamic view. This view, wherein force is regarded as cause, he selects because of its possessing the necessary dynamic for efficient causation. "Power . . . is postulated by the understanding as the operative condition of any and all change."¹ When the presence of power is postulated, then the antecedents in the causal series stand to their subsequents not simply in the position of prophecy, but of production.

Yet power alone is not sufficient to explain causation, for while it may explain the efficient phases of causation, it cannot account for the teleological factor which appears. Power cannot tell why this ~~phenomenon~~ rather than that occurs. Force must be directed by a mind if it is to operate purposefully. The self, through the exertion of will, i.e., force under the direction of a self-conscious mind, comes to an intuitive apprehension of the meaning of Cause. In the same act it gains immediate understanding of the relation between cause which is internal and Cause which is external to itself. Through exerting the power of origination and cessation of activity the mind receives its intuitions of the nature of the Causal Will.

1. Martineau, *SCR*, I, 177.

Thus man learns what causation is by the exercise of it in willing.

The notion 'Cause' takes its form from the fundamental antithesis and correspondence of the Ego and the non-Ego, revealed in percipience as the constituents of one whole; the key to which is necessarily found in the home-factor. Here we learn what it is to be a Cause. It presupposes, because it controls, immanent Power; to which, by an act of will, it gives a selected direction.¹

It will be noted that this is not an inference but an immediate perception in the act of willing. Thus through the causal intuition we are given our idea of the universal order of causation. This causation, which is seen to be efficient and teleological, we attribute to the Divine Volition, which in its turn implies the Divine Mind. To this Divine Volition are attributed all the phenomena of the universe.

The causal intuition teaches man the real meaning of causation, the essential conditions to all causation, the dependence upon an originating mind, and the exercise of immanent power in the accomplishment of its ends. This is all that is necessary for him to understand the dynamic characteristics of the natural order in which he lives. He immediately apprehends the natural order of reality around him.

Moral Intuition

The moral intuition is an immediate apprehension, taking the form of a dictate of conscience, that there is a higher than ourselves, to whom we owe an obligation to choose to act from the higher of two possible motives. The Higher Person (for only to a person is it possible to owe a moral obligation) to whom we have the duty to choose the higher is God, who is Moral Perfection.

1. Ibid., 211.

The authority of our moral intuitions is God, the Divine in the human. This authority speaks through the voice of conscience to man.

Conscience, for Martineau, is an order of feeling, personal and sympathetic, which the individual finds unfolding within himself. It does not depend, as in Mill's doctrine, upon the approval of others. Such determination of 'right by social vote' could never be finally authoritative. The seat of the conscience is within the Ego, and the reproof of wrong appears within the mind of the offender in the form of an immediate feeling of guilt. Conscience may be identified with the moral consciousness, and is a universal factor in the human Ego.

In all our dealings with one another, nay, in all our self-knowledge in the presence of another, we necessarily assume an invariable constitution of humanity in our separate personalities, and never relinquish this natural ground, except where we are forced from it by positive evidence of speciality.¹

The immediacy of the dictates of conscience is made clear by the fact that it is not dependent upon any previous teaching, religious or moral.

The profound sense of the authority and even sacredness of the moral law is often conspicuous among men whose thoughts apparently never turn to superhuman things, but who are penetrated by a secret worship of honour, truth and right.²

Although all the dictates of conscience are given by the Source of Moral Perfection, its voice may be heard by those who never think of God as such. This independence of the moral dictates reveals most clearly that there is a "source higher than human nature for the august authority of righteousness."³ Thus the Divine immanence in the human is particularly evident in the conscience. The Divine authority is not a 'wholly other,' but a 'uniquely within.'

The personal nature of the authority is responsible for our obligation to obey its demands. The immanent God is a Person,

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 95.
2. Martineau, SOR, I, 21.
3. Ibid., 21.

and when he reveals to man his will man is under personal obligation to discharge his duty. In this respect Martineau's doctrine is more tenable than that of Kant, and certainly rests upon a richer religious conception. Kant emphasized the absolute authority of the moral obligation, but this authority for him rested in a law. Martineau's analysis of obligation as a duty felt to a person is much truer to the facts of our moral experience. It is true that man may stand in awe of a law, but the dynamic of love, which is an emotion involved in the feeling of obligation to a person, is certainly a force for good more powerful and more commonly recognized than respect for, or a sense of duty to, a law.

How then does the moral consciousness achieve its divinely authoritative judgments? It does so by immediately apprehending which of two possible motives is the higher. No moral judgment, in Martineau's view, is ever made upon a single motive. A moral judgment is necessarily a choice between two motives, one higher and the other lower. Error is impossible in the determination of the relative worth of any given pair of motives, because the judgment is divinely given.

In accordance with his doctrine of the universal agreement of all men on moral judgments, Martineau set up a Table of Springs of Action, in which the various motives were arranged in respective order, from the highest to the lowest. Although he felt perfectly certain that there was universal agreement on the relative worth of the various motives, yet none has followed the order of this tabulation without some criticism and readjustment. Professor Sidgwick makes it clear that any such universal agreement as Martineau affirmed is impossible by simply saying: "I shall now go on to state the extent of my disagreement with Martineau." This in

itself is enough to show the impossibility of a fixed order of ethical judgments. The Table of Springs of Action is as follows:

Table of Springs of Action¹

-Lowest-

1. Secondary Passions;--Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions;--Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.
3. Primary Organic Propensions;--Appetites.
4. Primary Animal Propensions;--Spontaneous Activity (unselective)
5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from Appetite).
6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings)
7. Primary Passions;--Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy;--Love of Power, or Ambition; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments;-- Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social;--with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

-Highest-

There is no criterion of the good. The conscience only tells which is the better of two, and hence cannot say that either is good or bad, but only that it is better or worse than its competitor. At least two motives must present themselves before a judgment has moral quality.

When two incompatible springs of action simultaneously urge us, there is an attendant consciousness of superior excellence in one of them; an excellence not in point of pleasure or advantage which it were wise to take; nor in respect to seemliness and beauty which it were tasteless to decline; but in the scale of right, which in carrying our assent, commands our obedience.²

The preferential scale of obligation thus imposed is intelligible to all men if they but push back the veil of external action and view directly the springs from which they rise. The judgments given by the conscience are always instantaneous and unerring.³ When once the judgment has been made, the obligation is inescapable. To choose to

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 246f. For a criticism of the order of motives in this table, cf., Martineau's own defence of the order given in the section in the Types of Ethical Theory where the table appears, and Sidgwick, LCE, 351-374. The problem does not concern this study.

2. Martineau, SCR, II, 3.

3. Ibid., 2.

act from the lower motive is to incur an immediate feeling of guilt. The feeling of approbation or condemnation comes with the choice of motive. "The Moral Law (for such is the 'Canon of Principles' taken as a whole) is imposed by an authority foreign to our personality, and is open, not to be canvassed but only to be obeyed or disobeyed."¹ The casuistic question is never raised, for the morality lies in the choice of motive and not in any way in the act.

The "authority foreign to our personality," by whom these judgments are given to us through the dictates of conscience, is God as Moral Perfection. Our Moral intuitions give us insight into the true nature of morality, and the concept of perfection. "From the indefinite experience, in moral life, of a better and a better, with yet the possibility of a better still, we rise into the assurance of an infinite perfection."² This perfection is possible only to God. Thus conscience sets before us an objective higher mind, "an immediate apprehension or intuition which it is equally impossible to escape and to explain."³ The evidence of God in these intuitions lies in the fact that the higher motive lays claim to our wills with a personal authority which is above us. "The Moral Law first reaches its integral meaning, when seen as impersonated in a Perfect Mind, which communicates it to us, and lends it power over our affections sufficient to draw us into Divine communion."⁴ Thus, "In the act of Conscience, we are immediately introduced to a Higher than ourselves that gives us what we feel."⁵

1. Ibid., 7.
2. Ibid., 35.
3. Ibid., 28.
4. Ibid., 29.
5. Ibid., 28.

Our entire moral nature is dependent upon this presence within ourselves of a nature higher than our own. In its manifestation to us it takes the form of a consciousness of an indwelling personal and Holy Mind, which amounts to an immediate vision of God. God is the type of perfection in morality which, though envisaged by us, is impossible to us. There are, in reality, two visions of God given us by conscience. The first is of the God of our aspirations, and of victory in strife. The second is God as the Moral Governor and Judge, before whom conscience brings man in the case of wrong. "We rest therefore in the conclusion that, both in the aspirations of conscience which lift us upwards, and in its recoil of horror that arrests our fall, we are under the action of an Infinite objective Perfection, that would win us to sympathy with itself."¹

Religious Intuition

The remaining intuition is less clearly described than the other two. The Religious Intuition, sometimes called Spiritual, combines the intuitions of Divine Causality and Divine Moral Perfection into one which transcends them both, the intuition of Eternal Holiness. Neither the Causal nor the Moral intuition is complete in itself. Each requires the other to supplement it, and both are finally completed only in the Religious. It is the distinctly religious intuition which "lifts us at once into divine relations, and connects us with one supreme in the distinguishing glories of personal existence, wisdom, justice, holiness."² In this third intuition man and God meet as spirit with Spirit, in the union of love.

1. Ibid., 41.

2. Martineau, SAR, 70.

The third intuition was never clearly worked out by Martineau. He declared that his theism had two bases, the Causal and the Ethical. However, as one reads through his works, particularly his devotional and occasional writings, one is conscious of a deeply spiritual atmosphere which cannot be accounted for by the cold logic of the causal intuition nor the stern obligation of the moral intuition. There is a third type, that of God's immediate revelation of himself to man. The intuition of God as Soul of All Souls is an important phase of Martineau's doctrine of intuition, which he did not fully develop.

This phase of his thought is somewhat difficult to trace because he called the characteristic intuition by the name of conscience. It is clear, however, that a much richer concept is given by this intuition than can be indicated by the term conscience as used in connexion with the Table of Springs of Action. The mechanical coldness of the Table of Springs of Action does not stand on the same level with the following deeply spiritual passage.

This reflective tendency, this retirement within, is due to the hidden sense rather than the open discovery that here is the true seat of law, -- the place of judgment, whence there is no appeal. And hence it is never in light mood, with noisy and jaunty step, but with hushed breath, and on the tiptoe of silence, that we draw near to look into these inner circles of the soul. Elsewhere, we can go familiarly in and out, and take our notes of what we find, without disturbance to the humour of the hour: but there we know that there is a sanctuary; and ere we reach it, an invisible incense breathes upon our hearts, and subdues us into involuntary worship. While the mere external study of men, the scrutiny of them by intellectual eye-sight, is the constant source of cynical illusion, meditative self-knowledge is the true school of reverence, of sympathy, of hope, of immovable humility; for there we see, side by side, what we are and what we ought to be; -- and of unquenchable aspiration; for there too we meet, spirit to spirit, the almighty Holiness that lifts us unto Himself. ¹

1. Martineau, SAR, 47 f.

Martineau seems to use the word conscience to refer to all three of the intuitions which have been enumerated. He says: "So the alternative apprehensions of conscience are the preferential lights of his moral nature, the first reporting his power, the second his wisdom, the third his righteousness."¹ Only by understanding conscience to be a synonym for intuition, and supplying in our own minds the additional term 'spiritual' can we understand what is meant by the comparison of cold obedience with the life divine in this passage.

When conscience was found to be inseparably blended with the Holy Spirit, and to speak in tones immediately divine, it became the very shrine of worship: its strife, its repentance, its aspirations, passed into the incidents of a living drama, with its crises of alienation and reconciliation; and the cold obedience to a mysterious necessity was exchanged for the allegiance of personal affection. And this is the true emergence from the darkness of ethical law to the tender light of the life divine. The veil falls from the shadowed face of moral authority, and the directing love of the all-Holy God shines forth.²

This is "the precise point of transition from morals to religion."

The intuitive beliefs of the reason in Divine Causality, and of the conscience in Divine Authority, blend together in the immediate knowledge of the Supreme and Holy Mind.³ These beliefs are not the illusions, but the discoveries of man. By following them he comes into immediate consciousness of the transcendent and ultimate realities of the Universe. The religion of Causation and the religion of the Conscience are both transcended in the immediate vision of God's eternal Holiness and Love which comes in the religion of the Spirit.⁴ Here man realizes the community of essence between himself and God.

1. Ibid., 74.

2. Ibid., 75.

3. Martineau, "Mind in Nature," ERA, IV, 595.

4. Martineau, "Three Stages of Unitarian Theology," ERA, IV, 580.

The spiritual intuitions give man an immediate apprehension of God's presence within, and of union with Him in love. The possession of the certainty of a common essence with God is the life with God of which saintly men of all ages have written. It is the ascent to the higher region of the soul.¹ The God who is revealed through the Spiritual Intuition is the One Person of the Universe; He is the Infinite Mind and Perfect Holiness.

In this apprehension, then, of God as the Infinite, including all finite existences, as the Immanent Absolute on whom all Noumena, whether physical or psychical, depend, and who progressively manifests his character in the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness, and Love, we have the inmost essence of Dr. Martineau's religious philosophy.²

Professor Upton, in writing the statement just quoted, has employed some terms for God which Martineau carefully avoided. Martineau was very careful in his use of the word Absolute in respect to God that he should not be understood to agree with the idealists who denied the reality of the finite selves. The phrase which described the view of God presented by the religious or spiritual intuition is one which Professor Craufurd says was frequently on Martineau's lips, "God as Soul of All Souls."³

Thus, to summarize, cognition for Martineau falls into two divisions. The first consists in the making of judgments concerned with the phenomenal realm alone. The truth of these judgments is either self-evident, or is capable of being verified by empirical evidence. Such appeal may be made to the experience of our own or other minds. The second is concerned with judgments which cannot be submitted to the test of experience. In the case of these judgments the individual receives from a 'foreign authority,' (although this

1. Martineau, "Three Stages of Unitarian Theology," ERA, IV, 580.

2. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 479.

3. Craufurd, RJM, 196.

authority has its seat within the order of feeling of the thinker) an unerring testimony to the agreement of the judgment with reality. Through the intuitions God is revealed as standing behind the working order of the universe, the moral nature of man, and the high reaches of the soul which characterize experience which is uniquely religious. In this immediate apprehension of the Unity of Soul between man and God is achieved the highest knowledge, viz., complete realization of God. For Martineau, to know reality is to know God.

C H A P T E R T H R E E

G O D A S C A U S E

In the constructive development of his Theism, Martineau traces first the Causal argument, in its genesis and implications. He begins with this argument because he regards it as necessary to understand at the outset of a religious philosophy the relation of nature and God. The problems of nature are the first which the mind encounters when it awakes to the necessity of finding some explanation of existence and reality. "At bottom the theistic argument is . . . a causal argument."¹ It is the Causal argument which places the Divine Will behind the world, and with this argument theistic construction must begin.

The idea of Causality, whenever it appears, must necessarily be understood to contain two factors. (1) Causality involves a relation between two terms, distinguished as Cause and Effect. (2) It also involves change, for the Effect is always a phenomenon.² This may be clearly seen in a glance at the history of the Causal argument for God. In identifying the Unmoved Mover with God, Aristotle was attempting to make it clear that the source of all causality and all change was the One Eternal God.³ Thomas Aquinas, in proving the proposition that 'God exists' by appeal to the argument from Motion, traced all motion and all change to the

1. Knudson, POP, 275.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 139.

3. Aristotle, PHYS, VIII, x, 266a-267b. META, XII, vii, 1072ab;
"We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good,
so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God;
for this is God."

First Mover, God. He says: "It . . . is evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion. . . Whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another and that by another again. This cannot go on to infinity. . . Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a First Mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."¹

The Divine Agency is further stressed thus: "God is in all things; not, indeed, as a part of their essence nor as an accident; but as an agent is present to that upon which it works."²

To the above two factors of Causality Martineau would add a third. In all causality there must be the dynamical factor, consisting in the command of power necessary for the accomplishment of contemplated ends.³ He felt it necessary to affirm this dynamic character of Cause in reply to those thinkers who, following Hume, had reduced causality to mere sequence. A Cause, he maintained, must be able to exert the power necessary to the production of the change which is the Effect. Without change there is no Cause and no Effect, and without power the Cause is not capable of initiating the change.⁴

The axiom of Causality for Martineau is this: "Every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon; and this Noumenon is Power."⁵ In order to justify his statement of this axiom he examines the alternative possibilities. The first alternative view of Cause which he examines is that which makes 'thing' to be

1. Thomas Aquinas, SUM. THEOL., I, ii, 3.

2. Ibid., I, viii, 1.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 137, 155-177.

4. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" ERA, III, 567f.

5. Ibid., 576.

cause. Such a view had been enunciated by Kant in the Latin essay which he wrote for admission as Privat-docent to the faculty at Königsberg. A 'thing' is that which holds a definite position in space, and hence belongs to the realm of geometrical relations. A thing may be a point, a line, or a surface. The relations with which mathematical truth is concerned, however, have no power of origination within themselves. They could exist in an unchanging universe. Hence, between them no Cause and Effect relationship is necessary. "Between 'Things,' as such, this relation cannot exist."¹ To be is not to do, and in the production of an Effect activity is necessary. Things may be intermediary in the causal sequence, as when one body is put in motion by another moving body, which itself has been put in motion by another. Yet this does not attribute the origination of motion to a thing. "Except as the seat of change, or partner in a change, no 'thing' can ever play the part of Cause."²

The second alternative possibility which is considered is that which finds the Cause for a given phenomenon in another phenomenon. This was the view held by Hume, Brown, the Mills, and Comte. They reduced all causality to a time-succession traceable in the order of phenomena.³ Cause and Effect are thus made two members of the same series, differing only in priority of occurrence. Against this view Martineau holds that only phenomena are caused, and that Cause must be something other than phenomena. "An effect must be a phenomenon, and not homogenous with its cause."⁴ Whatever is a phenomenon obliges is to look beyond it for its origin in something different.

1. Ibid., 567.

2. Martineau, *SOR*, I, 145.

3. Ibid., 145.

4. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" *ERA*, III, 568f.

The idea of temporal succession as causality is untenable because of the very nature of causation. In order to produce the change which is the Effect, the Cause must be present in the change; i.e., the motive must be in the act at the time of its occurrence. If causality is reduced to temporal succession then the possibility of efficient causation is destroyed. The dynamic view of causation which Martineau is defending provides for the immanence of the cause in the act of change.

J. S. Mill held that when the appearance of two phenomena in a given order of antecedence and sequence was invariable or unconditional, then the former could be safely affirmed to be the cause of the latter. That such invariability is observed is said by Martineau to be evidence of invariability and nothing more. Can the high tide, he asks, be supposed to cause the low tide, or similarly the night the day? Such a discovered order is purely descriptive, and has no right to claim to be explanatory. This is simply a discovery of a Law of Nature, and in itself involves no assertion about Cause.¹ Since no causality can be admitted of prior phenomena, "It is evident therefore that something else is necessary than order among phenomena, before the mind sets up the belief of cause and effect."²

In the possibility of Force or Power as Cause Martineau finds a greater appeal, because it introduces dynamical terms; it introduces, that is to say, action which is capable of inducing change. The idea of causality cannot be translated into any other than dynamical language. Here Cause is found to be something other than phenomena. In Force there is the power to produce change. Yet when Cause is viewed as Force we can understand why there is any

1. Martineau, *SOR*, I, 151.
2. *Ibid.*, 153.

phenomenon at all. Force stands not only in the position of 'prophecy' of phenomena, but of their production. They are the effects of which it is the efficient. Those who deny the presence of force in causality try to eliminate the language of force from their discussions, but it is impossible. They employ expressions such as "tendency to motion" and the like, in which the efficient force is but poorly disguised. Power is thus seen to be postulated by the understanding as the operative condition of any and all change.¹ Antedecence can be affirmed within the phenomenal order, but in the causal relation we must go beyond phenomena to something which has power to produce them. Cause is then, since it must be other than phenomena, a noumenon.² This is clear from two considerations. The first is that it is an a priori law of thought brought by us to the interpretation of the world.³ We do not learn this by experience, for it is only through this belief that experience is possible; it is only through the intuitions of Causation that we come in contact with the external world.⁴ The other consideration which establishes Cause as a Noumenon is the indispensableness of dynamical language.⁵ The causal relation cannot be expressed in any other terms. He has thus justified his statement of the axiom of Causality, that "every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon; and this Noumenon is Power!"

There is yet another question which has not been answered in regard to the appearance of phenomena. It is, "Why this particular phenomenon?" Force can account for the appearance of phenomena in general, but the reason for a given phenomenon is not apparent;

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 177.

2. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" ERA, III, 573.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 158.

4. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" ERA, III, 574.

5. Martineau, SOR, I, 162.

"so that the dynamic idea clings to causality throughout, yet does not complete it."¹ The true nature of causality, on Martineau's view, appears when force is seen to be directed and conditioned by the self-conscious activity of a mind. There are two functions in man's nature, the receptive and the active. The first shows himself as the theatre of his feelings, and the second as a spontaneous agent, expending energy and effecting movements. In the former case man simply registers what he observes, and is affected by what happens to him. He has sensations of what goes on around him in the world, but he can do nothing in the way of controlling his environment. He may be conscious of the phenomena about him, yet he is unable to understand or explain them. When he enters the field as agent, however, he encounters certain problems and puts forth energy to the accomplishment of certain desired ends. In this experience, which involves the exercise of living force or will, self-consciousness arises as he encounters limitation and impediment from something other than self.² Only then can he understand the problem of causality and attempt its solution.³ The noumenon of cause can only be understood when the intuitions of the external world bring out clearly the contrast between the Ego and the non-ego. Only when the Ego knows itself as Agent can it come to appreciate the self-conscious activity present in all Causality.

The Self-Conscious Ego as Cause

The knowledge of Cause is only possible when the self-conscious Ego interprets all cause in terms of its own experience of causation in Will. The necessary procedure is therefore to trace

1. Martineau, SCR, I, 177.

2. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" ERA, III, 577.

3. Martineau, SCR, I, 178.

the psychological birth and growth of the notion of causality. Causality is no object of the senses, but a thought, and hence the problem of determining its nature is a purely reflective one.

When a man begins to reflect upon his experience as an Agent, the first idea that immediately strikes him is the Unity of the Self. The tributaries to the feelings are both external and internal, and these feelings are woven together by the sensitive and understanding faculties into a unity which is distinguishable from the external world. It is not the feelings which distinguish the self, but the self which distinguishes the feelings. The unity of the self is not made by the association of a diverse group of components, but, on the contrary, the plurality of the not-self is perceived in contrast to the unity of the self. The activity which distinguishes the self-conscious ego does not happen to the ego, but issues from it.¹ Without such activity there could possibly be feelings, but the self would know nothing of that which it felt. The activity which constitutes the self-consciousness of the ego arises at the same time with its receptivity, and cognition is possible when the activity and receptivity are properly combined.²

Another perception which arises equally immediately with that of the unity of the self is the Dualism of the Self and the Not-Self, or Other than Self.³

If I know myself at all, it is in trying 'with all my might' to do something needed but difficult, to heave away a retarding resistance; nor does anything sooner bring home to one the poise and counterpoise between Self and Nature, than the attempt to shut a door against a furious wind. When thus withstood and resolved to persist rather than desist, I am conscious of exercising a causal Will to institute or sustain efficient movement.⁴

It is immediately discovered that the not-self acts and feels, and

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 194.

2. Ibid., 196.

3. Ibid., 198.

4. Ibid., 199.

the active and passive predicates are affirmed of the not-self as well as the self. By applying to the external world the rule of the causal relation which is learned in one's own activity of Will, the nature of all causality is immediately understood. "Not till we put forth and direct our own causality, whether simply percipient or motory, have we revelation of the causality of the world."¹ In our exercise of Cause then we discover the essential unity of all causality. Causality is of the same order for the non-Ego as for the Ego. This is the immediate intuition given in the experience of Willing.

The Causal Will

If the understanding of Cause is to come through the experience of Willing, we must understand the relationship between Cause and Will. The key to Martineau's doctrine of Will lies in this statement: "There is nothing new in saying that we learn what causality is by our own exercise of it in willing. There is nothing new in saying that willing consists in determining an alternative. But the combination of these two propositions is unusual."² The axiom of causality which we have already noticed, he says, may be reduced to the proposition that "every phenomenon springs from a Will."³

From this it appears that in studying this doctrine of Will we shall trace its application alike to man and God, and find in the Supreme Causal Will the ground of all phenomena.

Although Martineau does not mention the sources from which he derived his doctrine of Will, yet it is clear that it had its roots in Locke, Maine de Biran, and V. Cousin. It is certain that he had

1. Ibid., 201.

2. Ibid., 209 f.

3. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" ERA, III, 578.

studied the works of both these French philosophers, the latter of whom was also strongly influenced by Locke. Professor Drummond, from his study of the Manuscript of Martineau's college lectures which have never come to print, makes this significant statement:

The elaborate discussion of the Idea of Cause, which was one of the chief features of his course of lectures on Mental Philosophy, shows that Dr. Martineau found support for his conclusions in Cousin's lectures on Locke, and still more in the writings of Maine de Biran. Indeed, Dr. Martineau's account of the meaning of the Causal Idea, which plays such a leading part in his arguments for Theism, and the relation of Cause to Will, is almost identical with that of Maine de Biran.¹

In another connexion Professor Drummond writes that Dr. Martineau often appealed to the writings of Maine de Biran, Royer-Collard, Cousin, and Jouffroy, by way of confirmation of his account of Cause, and recommended that his students make a careful study of their work.²

As Martineau said, there was nothing new in his affirming that what we know of Cause is that which we experience of it in Will, for this had been stated by both Berkeley and Locke. Berkeley held that God is immediately present to us in the phenomena of sense, as their efficient and regulating cause.³ In the first paragraph of Locke's famous chapter on Power we find a similar assertion.

The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without; and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also, on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea of what we call power.⁴

Maine de Biran also held that activity was the essence of the

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 279.

2. Ibid. 271.

3. Pringle Pattison, "Martineau's Philosophy," Hibbert Journal, I, 462.

4. Locke, ECHU, II, 21, 1.

consciousness of power.

The concept of causality as immediately given through the opposition of the volitional activity of the self by the not-self is traceable in Maine de Biran. He held that in the will we immediately experience at once our own activity and the resistance of the non-Moi.¹ The reflection of the self upon its own activity is so essential to his philosophy that the ideas of force, substance, cause, unity, freedom, and necessity are all developed from it. The inner experience is the clear and self-evident basis of all mental science, and the self-consciousness of the willing and choosing self is the fundamental principle. There is, however, one fundamental difference between this view and that of Martineau. Maine de Biran found the non-Moi particularly in the body of the subject self. Martineau found the not-self in the external world, and in God. He did not depend therefore on the feelings in the muscles, as had Maine de Biran, for the consciousness of resistance to a volitional act. It is here that Cousin makes a correction of his teacher's view. Cousin holds that the fulfilment of an act through muscular activity is not necessary for the completion of a volition. The self completes its volition even though it finds that it is unable to accomplish the outward act because of a paralysis of the muscles or any other external hindrance.²

In the preface to the first edition of the Fragments Philosophiques there appears this statement:

1. Mindelband, HOP, 636.

2. Cousin, HOMP, 408 f; "I maintain that if the exterior world be taken away, and the muscular and locomotive system also, and if there remained to man, with a purely nervous organization, an intelligence capable of conceiving motives, of deliberating, of preferring, and of choosing, there would remain to him the power of willing, which would still be exercised in special acts, in volitions, in which would be visible the proper causality and freedom of the will, although these effects, these free volitions would not pass beyond the internal world of the will."

It is a fact, that in the midst of the movements which exterior agents determine in us, in spite of us, we have the power of taking the first step of a different movement, first of conceiving it, then of deliberating whether we will execute it, finally that of resolving and passing to the execution of it, of commencing this execution, of continuing or suspending it, of accomplishing or arresting it, and always of being master of it. The fact is certain, and what is not less certain is, that the movement executed on these conditions takes in our eyes a new character; we impute it to ourselves, we refer it as an effect to ourselves, considering ourselves then as the cause of it. This is for us the origin of the notion of cause, not of an abstract cause, but of a personal cause, of ourselves. The proper character of the me is causality or will, since we refer to ourselves, and impute only to ourselves, that which we cause, and that we cause only what we will.¹

Apart from the emphasis upon the external manifestation of the causal act, Martineau would accept this statement as his own position. He says:

It is in this determining act, of initiating or modifying, at will, a given quantity of energy, that the causality of the Ego consists. This act is of all things most intimately known to us, and nothing else is known to us that can decide an alternative.²

There is perfect identity of meaning in the words Cause and Will, the former depending for its understanding upon the immediate consciousness of the latter.

The notion 'Cause' takes its form from the fundamental antithesis and correspondence of the Ego and the non-Ego, revealed in percipients as the constituents of one whole; the key to which is necessarily found in the home-factor. Here we learn what it is to be a Cause. It presupposes, because it controls, immanent Power; to which, by an act of will, it gives a selected direction.³

The otherness which is encountered in the volitional experience, our opposite in the Causal polarity into which the universe falls,⁴ is the One Objective Will. In this way we are confronted by God.

1. Maine de Biran, *Op. Cit.*, preface; quoted by Cousin, *HOMP*, 409 n.
2. Martineau, *SOR*, I, 212.
3. *Ibid.*, 211.
4. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" *ERA*, III, 577.

All which happens in nature has One kind of Cause, and that cause a Will like ours; and that the universe of originated things is the product of a supreme Mind. And precisely thus, by no less immediate a step, are we carried, by the causal intuition, to the first truth of Religion.¹

The theistic faith therefore assumes that the sole power in the phenomenal universe is the Divine Intellect and Will. Natural force is one of the modes that it assumes in the course of its eternal transmutation of itself into the cosmic order. Nature is one of God's modes of manifestation as he pursues his ends of beauty and good.² As God employs his Causal Will in the world, the world responds to his touch and speaks forth the power, reflects the beauty, and spreads abroad the majesty of the Supreme Cause.³ The proposition that, "every phenomenon springs from a Will" is thus established. God is the Cause which lies behind all phenomena.

The relation which stands between God and man in this view is one of great personal richness. God is not a Being about whom man knows nothing but what he can glimpse from the traces of his activity in a historical creation. Neither is He an Absolute Spirit who envelops in Himself all being so that the freedom of the finite selves is destroyed. Man retains the power of self-determination and at the same time is conscious that he is exerting a power which corresponds to that of God. "Whether, in the movements of reason, he descends to us, or we ascend to him, it is by the path of law which stretches across the spaces of the world, and which is in one direction the wayfarer's track, and in the other the highway for our God."⁴ In this kinship of the Divine and the human lies the basis of real communion.

That Nature does exhibit One Cause throughout, Martineau

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 230.

2. Martineau, SAR, 27.

3. Ibid., 36.

4. Ibid., 8.

establishes by an appeal to teleology. He traces through nature a thorough-going intentionality, to be seen in the selection, combination, and gradation of beings working to a common end. In nature we have the continual putting forth of the Divine Causality according to certain laws laid down by God for Himself in the accomplishment of certain ends. In establishing the fact that nature exhibits intellectual purpose in all her workings, Martineau develops three lines of evidence. The first is selection. There is proof of selection in the wide range of variation in the skeleton structure of the anterior limbs of vertebrate animals. That there should be such a wide variety here, and yet that each type should be suited to the mode of life of the animal in which it is found, cannot be the result of blind chance. Similarly the modifications of the organs of sense are suited to the conditions in which their functions are to be exercised. Likewise also the modifications of the specific gravity and comparative solidity of the various forms of life show that each is suited to its own conditions of life. In each of these instances the limitation of erratic possibilities to definitely chosen lines exhibits the presence of selection in nature. The second line of evidence which he traces is that of combination. In each type of organized being there is a correlation of organs performing various functions for the maintenance of the whole. The fact that the ears and the vocal organs and the eyes are formed within the dark silence of the mother's body, in complete absence of the elements to which each is suited, shows that all the processes of life combine to serve a single end. Also the instincts which serve the animals in their problems of direction and seasonal change of mode and place of life show forth the intellectual combinations of the world of nature. Teleology is further seen in the gradation of beings, all serving a

common end. In the physiological realm there are numerous examples of an organism's feeding on the surrounding elements and turning them to its own account. Vegetation thus makes use of air, and light, and rain. In the animal kingdom the lower orders of life serve as food for the higher. That unconscious life should be used up in the service of conscious existence is certainly a legitimate adjustment of means to ends. In man who is the highest order of conscious life there is indisputable evidence that he is constituted for the achievement of ends. In the whole range of life the lower serves the higher, and each higher stage in the hierarchy of beings possesses more of the character of an end and less that of a mere means. It is impossible to examine the whole range of nature, but that which we have seen is sufficient to show that throughout the range of natural history intellectual purpose, intentionality, is in evidence. Force, wherever it is encountered, is thus seen to be under the direction of intending thought.¹ "Causality, dynamically interpreted and identified with Will, . . . gives us our natural Theism."²

There are, however, blemishes exhibited in nature which are difficult to reconcile with such a sweeping affirmation of purpose and control. There are also logical objections to the inference of an infinite causality from evidence which is only finite. We shall examine, therefore, Martineau's consideration of the various objections to the argument from design.

The first objection is one which Martineau quotes from Kant thus: "No Cause which operates within Nature in conformity with its general laws, can also be the principle which gives origin to Nature."³ In this way all intelligent activity is prevented from extending beyond the world to transcendental reality. Since man can force nature,

1. The full development of the teleological view of nature may be found in the Study of Religion, I, 270-320.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 257.

3. Ibid., 322.

by the use of some of her laws, and by the successful opposition of others, to accomplish his purposes through the exercise of his intelligent guidance upon her, this is thought to be sufficient reason for refusing to trace nature to an intelligent Cause. If Art and Reason come from Nature, then Nature cannot come from Art and Reason. To this Martineau makes answer that the proposition quoted from Kant is not self-evident. On the contrary, the opposite is just as easy to believe, and has in fact been believed by a large majority of philosophic thinkers. Empedocles' statement, "That like is known by like, and that things exist by their first elements," would seem to indicate that intelligence in the finite realm can know transcendental intelligence. Furthermore, if intentionality in man is the product of nature, so too are all the processes in the natural life of plants and animals. All speculation regarding the origin of nature is thus swept away. Such a statement as Kant's is a declaration of a general agnosticism. The criticism not only falls upon Theism but upon the tracing of causality in the whole sphere of natural phenomena. It would seem unlikely that Divine Intelligence, by creating Reason, would render itself unintelligible. Reason can hardly be looked upon as the obstacle to our coming to a knowledge of the existence and nature of the uncreated Mind.

The next objection is one which has been urged against the design argument by Hume, Kant, and J. S. Mill. It is said that if God is only the Former and Collocator of Nature, he becomes simply an architect, rather than a creator. God might be very great, but he would be only a very skilled architect, and no God at all. Martineau evades this objection by affirming that it is stating more than Theism has claimed. Theism, he says, has never claimed to be able to prove an infinite intelligence. It has simply insisted on having an

intelligence capable of producing at least the purpose and intentionality which nature exhibits. Theism has attempted to establish only an 'Architect of Nature,' and has never sought an 'Absolute and Necessary Being.'

A second implication of the same objection deals with the problem of matter. If God is only a Former of nature, then matter must have been preexistent. If, however, He is the Creator, why should he not have called into existence perfect being instead of creating matter to serve as the field for his operations and to offer its own problems? It would seem that He had incurred wasteful and unnecessary problem-solving by the creation of matter. Professor Caird states Kant's question thus:

How can the Divine Being be conceived as creating a nature which has no reference to his purposes, in order that afterwards he may, by skilful arrangements, subject it to his purposes?¹

The answer which Martineau gives to this objection may well be quoted verbatim. "To this question it is sufficient for our present purpose to answer, that the proposal to abolish means, and order up at a flash whatever was wanted, is a proposal to do by sheer will what now is wrought out by intellect; and if it took effect, no trace would remain of thought or plan in nature; what is now a scheme of unity and relation would be nothing but an arbitrary volley of dynamic discharges. It means the repeal of all law and reduction of all phenomena to incoherent surprises."² The choice of means is not a weakness, nor does it detract from the perfection of the Infinite Cause that it has chosen to create and form such an order. The universe is an exhibition of constructive skill, perfect beauty, and great beneficence, the field for the discipline of righteousness. If the whole is regarded as a sublime work of art, then there is no indignity placed

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 329.
2. Ibid., 329 f.

upon the Artist. The limitations which God has incurred by his choice of materials are only the conditions of all activity. Causality without conditions and agency, i.e., with nothing to act upon, is an impossible conception.

It is regarded as a further limitation of God that he is intelligible to our intellects. To this Martineau answers that we are not limiting God, but simply affirming that our intellects are valid as far as they go, though there is much which they do not fully comprehend. This objection is urged against theism as an indictment of anthropomorphism. To look upon the Universal Cause as Mind or Intelligence, or a related order with our intelligence, is to limit God to the cast of man's abilities and weaknesses. This charge was made against theism by Matthew Arnold and Professor Tyndall. Dr. Martineau argues that man is the point of departure for all systems of explanation, whether they be mental, biological, or material. "The necessity may be disguised, but can never be escaped, of interpreting the universe by man."¹ All explanatory conceptions arise within the mind of the thinker, and must necessarily take the form possible to that mind. Out of the Infinitude and Absolutism of God, one thing must be saved, namely, the individuality of the Ego as a thinking subject. Within its own limitations this thinking subject contemplates that which is other than itself. In terms comprehensible to itself the Ego has a right to think of God. Nevertheless, it would seem that Kant's insistence upon the inadequacy of finite categories for the explanation of the infinite is a just rebuke to Martineau's making man the measure of all things.

A further objection assumes that if the Cause be regarded as the Designer, and the creation a vast Design, this leaves the

1. Martineau, "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?" ERA, III, 579.

Designer outside. This would make God's relation to the world purely external. In answer to this Martineau asserts that the Designer can just as well be inside as outside the Design. It is one of the fundamental tenets of theism that God is immanent in His creation. Science is progressively showing that the order which is traceable in matter is the necessary condition of its being what it is. Matter consists in the orderly arrangement of its components. Martineau quotes the statement of Aristotle, "(if you) plant the ship-builder's skill within the timber itself, you have the mode in which Nature produces,"¹ as an illustration of what is meant by the immanence of the designer in the design. The presence of design in matter which man finds exhibited in the order of nature, is a type of God's immanence in the world.

The most serious objection to the teleological view of nature, and the design argument, however, arises from the blemishes in nature. The teleologist picks his cases and points to what they indicate of order and harmony, but other cases can be chosen in which the presence or goodness of an intending Mind is questionable. There are some arrangements in the world which are useless and unmeaning, and it is difficult to understand why the Mind which directs so extremely well in some parts of nature should be so conspicuously absent in other parts. The polar and equatorial wastes, the destruction by earthquakes, volcanoes, and hurricanes, the presence in the organic realm of certain organs which have no use to the health of the bodily mechanism,-- all these are examples of the apparently useless and meaningless phenomena in nature. The lack of adjustment of certain organs to their functions, the law of birth which seems to be out of proportion with the needs of existence, and the ruthlessness

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 349.

of the law of death are further examples of 'blemishes in nature.'

The answer which Martineau gives to these objections may be summarized in six points. (1) The marks of intention and purpose which have been observed are not to be cancelled by the blemishes discovered. These blemishes constitute a problem of their own, and have no right to dispose of the marks of order already noted. (2) The fact that a thing may appear to us as unmeaning cannot be taken as proof that it has no meaning. It may appear to defeat purposes which we recognise, and still have an intention and a meaning which we with our limited understanding cannot fathom. To assert the existence of blemishes in the terrestrial order is a great assumption on the part of man, who cannot possibly know the eternal purpose of the terrestrial movements in the universe. (3) In order to make charges of incompetence to a given end for any physical organ such as the eye we must make certain assumptions as to the purpose of the eye. It is not required of us that we count the stars in the Milky Way with the naked eye, or classify the most minute forms of biological existence. The eye gives knowledge of physical danger and enables man to seek the food which his body requires. It reveals to him beauty, and aids him in making the necessary adjustments of himself to the conditions of life on the earth. Is it a valid charge of incompetency that he needs the aid of a microscope to observe minute organisms, or that he requires the telescope to gain accurate knowledge of the nature and characteristics of the heavenly bodies? That science has been able, by the use of special devices, to discover things not normally visible to the eye can scarcely be regarded as proof of the eye's incompetence. "Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in

all . . . alike."¹ This statement of Aristotle in regard to political science reminds us that perhaps we are expecting more in some cases than we have a right to expect. (4) In regard to the superabundance of births it is pointed out that Nature has no occasion for parsimony. Only in our finite economy is a careful reckoning of resources required. Many beings which are born do not reach their internal end, but this is not sufficient reason to deny that some external purpose is served by their failure. Perhaps a greater usefulness is achieved by the conditions of that frustration. "Every grain of wheat is a seed, capable of raising a new plant; but who would be offended at the miscarriage by which it finds its way into a loaf of bread?"² The same law is applicable to that order of nature wherein one beast of prey lives by taking the life of another. Is it really a blemish in the system of nature that some one species must live off the surplus of another more prolific species? That the cutting short of a life in the human species should give us pause is simply due to our preconception that each man should live a full round of three score years and ten. The total end of life is not defeated by simply cutting short the physical existence of certain members of the group. (5) It is said that the species which, according to the Darwinian hypothesis, come to birth and pass to extinction between the first imperfect attempt at an adjustment and its final achievement are wasted. If they have succeeded in accomplishing through their birth and death the necessary adjustment, have they not gloriously succeeded rather than ingloriously failed? They are the means that have conducted progress to its end. (6) Death should not be regarded as a blemish. "Death is in itself simply the application to organized beings of a universal rule, that whatever takes a beginning must reach an ending too. It is the

1. Aristotle, NIC. ETH. I, iii, 1.
2. Martineau, SOR, I, 370.

necessary correlative of birth."¹ The fear of death has been placed in man so that it may serve as an aid in self-protection. There is planted within all living organisms a similar fear to serve as the motive for their activities and stratagems of protection. The forces of destruction are so numerous, and the need for caution so constant, that this dread of death assumes a right of its own in our thinking, to which perhaps we attach too great significance. We have an interest in the individual life which nature does not possess. Her concern is with types of being, rather than the single life. Even in the case of man endless earthly existence is not desirable. Progress would be seriously arrested if the patriarchs and tyrants were to live forever, and stubbornly refuse to accept a change of order. There is little justification for the plea for endless life in man, even if it were possible to support the resulting surplus of population.

So that Death may be but the provision for taking us abroad, ere we have stopped too long at home, and unsealing the closed inlets of wisdom, affection, and reverence, by the surprise of new light. In this aspect, Death, instead of frustrating the ends of life, becomes the great arrester of ills,-- the liberator of souls, for both the visible and invisible worlds.²

In spite of all these difficulties, real as they are, it is possible for faith to retain its belief in the One Supreme Will energising throughout the universe, from which arise all phenomena. "Causality, dynamically interpreted and identified with Will, . . . gives us our natural Theism."³ From our experience of Cause in Will we take the key for the interpretation of all Causality. The intuition which teaches us the identity of the Supreme Cause with God is the source of our first knowledge of religious truth. When our eyes are opened to see God as Cause, then all nature shows forth the Will of

1. Ibid., 381.
2. Ibid., 398.
3. Ibid., 257.

God pursuing the ends of beauty and of goodness. The Will of God is the Cause of all phenomena, and through them we trace our intuitions to the Cause from which they rise.

The Attributes of God as Cause

Having traced the concept of God as the One Supreme Causal Will from its psychological source and through its manifestation in the phenomenal world, we shall now look within the concept which we have established, in order to discover its contents. We must ask what are the attributes which such a God possesses. Since the approach has been through nature, the attributes which we deduce from the present concept may be designated as 'natural attributes.' Our consideration has been so far only of the sphere of nature, and we shall not expect to find here the full richness of the complete theistic concept of God.

The first of the natural attributes of God is power. "To identify Causality with God is to ascribe to Him all Power."¹ Power is a necessary factor in causality, and to affirm that God is powerful connotes that He is all-powerful. This Martineau regards as a self-evident assertion, but all we can legitimately infer is that he is powerful enough to have produced all phenomena. John Stuart Mill has ascribed power to God, but he asserts simply that God wields all the power in the universe. Such a statement is not entirely satisfying, for this makes God limited in His power. This Mill saw clearly, for according to his view God is a well-meaning deity, but He is baffled by the problem which His task presents. To escape this difficulty we must affirm that God possesses power beyond the limits of the universe which we know. "In its (the cosmos's) Author is vested therefore not only all operative power, but all that is conceivably or inconceivably alternative and has been left out of operation."²

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 399.
2. Ibid., 400.

Since all causality is selective, and functions by the determination of alternative choice, we must attribute to God sufficient transcendent power to have chosen another course for the world's realization than the one we see, and to have invested it with power.

Martineau admits the truth of Kant's contention that we cannot legitimately infer the infinite from the finite. The nature from which we have drawn the evidence for this argument is finite, and to affirm dogmatically an infinite power from it would be to strain the legitimacy of logic. Hence the use of the traditional word Omnipotence is avoided. Martineau does not assume that God is powerful enough to do all things, for to do so would be to assume that He could do a thing which in itself involved a contradiction. As someone has commented, it would be stupidity to assert that God could create a square circle, or a stick with only one end. We can affirm, however, that He could do anything which was not in itself internally contradictory. He must possess more power than is expressed in the phenomenal world, for that is implied in the choice of alternative possibilities by which his causality operates. God is Almighty, in the sense that He possesses and controls all the might there is.¹ This is all that man need affirm in order to have a perfectly satisfying concept of God's power. "It (God's power) is sufficient for the production of the cosmical system of phenomena,"² and this is all that can logically be affirmed from the evidence.

The final appeal in this regard is a conceptual one. Whatever stops a power in its operation or works against it must be a force which is directed, and this is causality. By definition we have stated that all the Causality there is lies with God. Hence any opposing force is seen to be taken up into the nature of the one

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 400.
2. Ibid., 399.

original Causality, and God's power stands vindicated as 'all the might there is.'

The second attribute of God as Cause is Unity. The question that invariably arises is that of plurality in the causal order. Upon what basis can we affirm that Causality is one, and not vested in a plurality of causes? The appeal which Martineau makes for Unity involves the repetition of certain of the evidences of Causality. In the first place, "the psychological or intuitive principle which leads us to read a causal Power behind phenomena makes that power the external counterpart of our own."¹ Since it is the essence of self-consciousness to know itself as one and the same through all its experiences, this becomes part of the intuition of the Divine Will. The individuality which we affirm of ourselves is likewise assumed for the 'other' self-consciousness, God.² Secondly, Martineau appeals to the logical law of parsimony, whereby no more causes are admitted than are needed for the explanation of the effect. The multiplication of causes does not furnish any more adequate explanation than a single cause, but only serves to aggravate the problem. Hence we are justified in affirming the singularity of the all-sufficient Divine Will. Thirdly, he appeals to the evidence to be found in nature. "The Physical Unity of Nature . . . plainly bespeaks the Oneness of its Cause."³ That we should speak of the natural order as a universe bears witness to the fact that we believe in the Unity of nature in a single system, and justifies our tracing it to One Divine Will. A prism will refract the light from one of the heavenly bodies into the same colours to be found in a light which man can create. The laws which are valid for man's thought here are

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 401.

2. "Cause without differs from cause within only in the adverb of place."
Ibid., 401f.

3. Ibid., 403.

seen to be applicable to the relations of heavenly bodies to each other. All nature exhibits a unity of order, and a Unity of Cause.

When the assertion is made of an all-embracing unity there is the danger that this will be mistaken to mean an "Unconditioned" or an "Absolute," and this Martineau will not allow. He affirms a self-existence which is not in itself a cause, standing outside this unity.¹ In this self-existence is found the condition which is necessary before Causality can operate. Divine Cause, to be operative must constitute one term of a relation. There are two possibilities for such a condition, either matter or space. If we affirm that matter has self-existence, it means that in itself it possesses resistance, form, and magnitude. Such qualities are seen to invest matter with a force which would resist the Divine Causality. By the use of the conceptual argument employed on behalf of God's power, matter is traced to the seat of all force, the One Divine Causality. Hence it cannot be regarded as the self-existent condition. With empty Space, however, the problem of resistance does not arise. Causality can stand in the necessary relatedness to Space without having its power resisted, and without being dependent upon the 'other' self-existence. "(Space is) pure condition which has no pretensions to a dynamic character."² The whole volume of force is left with the Divine Causality, and Space stands as the receiving ground for the activities which the Divine Causality initiates. In this view of Space Martineau is following Boscovitch's hypothesis.³ By affirming

1. "A self-existence which is not a cause is by no means excluded. . . . by a self-existence which is a cause: nay, is even required for the exercise of its causality." Martineau, SOR, I, 405.
2. Ibid., 406.
3. "The thorough-going hypothesis of Boscovitch declines the first step upon this uncertain and beguiling track (the partitioning of force between matter and causality); and assuming only Space which can do nothing, and Mind which can do everything, excludes all controversy between two self-existences, and leaves the total causality with God." Ibid., 407.

this pure condition he escapes the necessity of regarding the One Divine Cause as the Absolute, and yet by making space purely inert he avoids a Causal Dualism, and leaves the Unity of God as Cause unimpaired.¹

The third attribute of God as Cause is Intellect. The greatest witness to the Intellect of God is the intentionality pervading the cosmos. This teleology is the immanent working of Intellect. "The preconception of ends, and the realization of them by the apparatus of appropriate means, are the characteristics of rational existence."² All the Science and Art which man produces depend for their value and appeal upon their correspondence with the order which is observable in the world. This correspondence determines their truth. This does not mean, however, that the intellect of man is exactly the same as the Intellect of God. Intellect in man is dependent upon what he has learned from the things in this world, which presents to him the data for his intellection. God's intellect is not dependent upon His having learned from facts present to His experience, for it is from the intellect of God that the order of things has come. "The Divine thought, instead of learning, goes before the objects that are known."³ It was upon this basis that Spinoza denied intellect to God. He felt that intellect was the result of learning from the things that are presented to the mind, and thus he felt that such a predicate could not be made of God who was the source of all things. God was high above all attributes, and hence neither intellect nor any other 'anthropomorphic' attribute was predicable of God. Martineau affirms

1. Cf., p. 223 of this study.

2. Ibid., 408.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 409; Cf., The a posteriori method of our cognition has been familiar to contemplative religious writers such as Eckhart and Tauler, and other devotional writers. Instead of its furnishing a difficulty for the doctrine of God, however, it has been used for the humbling of man, and the uplifting of his piety through the completeness of his self-abnegation. Ibid., 414.

that God's Intellect is the source of the order which is perceived in phenomena by our intellects, and although there is a difference in order between the Divine and human intellects, there is intelligence in both man and God.¹

Spinoza's other contention was that for intellect there must be something 'other.' There must be a not-self if intellect is to be affirmed of the self. This necessity Martineau supplies by making the world of created minds the 'not-Self' for God. God is not Absolute in the sense that all existence disappears in His existence.

There are natures individually sentient, rational, moral, whose phenomena, felt by themselves, are unfelt by Him . . . Here, therefore, we alight in the universe on something which is not included in his personal being; something which must be treated as objective to him; something which, as universal power, he causes; which, as omniscient intellect, he knows; but which, as infinite perfection, he cannot feel.²

That this otherness to God which is supplied by man constitutes the field of His operation is brought out in this additional statement:

We thereby claim something objective to him, on to which his thought, his purpose, his power, may pass; for it is the characteristic of will to stand **face** to face with an end in view: to distinguish itself from what is other than self, and look forth on things and persons around as the scene given for its activity.³

This is Martineau's escape from the barren Absolute of Pantheism such as he feels one is committed to in Spinoza's system. He 'guards himself against drowning the objective field in the overwhelming of the Divine.'

The temporal limitations of our intellects disappear for God. He can think the past, present, and future together. In such fashion he can stand as the originator as well as the knower of all history. The lack of the limitations which rest upon the human mind does not mean that the essential nature of intellect is different in man and God.

1. Ibid., 413.

2. Martineau, SAR, 30 f.

3. Ibid., 31.

The mind of God has intellectual apprehension not different in nature from the intellectual apprehension of man.¹

From these qualitative attributes of God as Cause, we shall turn to the quantitative. What can be said of the spatial and temporal attributes of God? From a consideration of space we affirm that God is Infinite. The cosmos as it was known to the Greek philosophers was not as vast as it is today, and there was little question that One Will could have been responsible for it. Now, however, when the telescope and modern mathematical calculations from these telescopic observations have done their work, the universe is seen to be vastly greater. The inverted pierced cup of the night sky has been expanded so far that we know there is light hurtling towards us which will not reach the eye of an earthly observer for thousands of years to come. Such facts do not serve to destroy but rather to confirm our belief in the infinite extent of reason. It is not as if the vast expanses introduced us to an outlying chaos. On the contrary they present us with an infinite extension of the same rational precision observable closer at hand.

The same simple but sublime physical geometry which interprets the path of the projectile, the phases of Venus, and the sweep of the comet which has no return, is still available in the most distant heavens to which the telescope can pierce. . . . There is not one truth here and another there.²

Reason makes its way to the outermost reaches of the universe, and finds there evidences of the God of Causality of whom man has intuitions within his own consciousness.

God, thinking out his eternal thoughts on lines that descend to us, from cause to law, from law to fact, from fact to sense; and we, counting our way back . . . from what is to what must be, till we meet him in the eternal fields, where all minds live on the same aliment of the ever true and ever good.³

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 414.

2. Martineau, SAR, 7.

3. Ibid., 8.

We cannot infer the infinite from the finite, but Space, which has been previously regarded as the necessary field of causality, the 'pure condition' in which Causality operates, we can affirm to be infinite.¹ Causality can operate in all parts of its condition unless certain parts are preoccupied. These parts could only be occupied by something capable of restricting or resisting causality if they are occupied by causality already in operation. Causality has already been seen to be a Unity in the One Supreme Will, and hence wherever space is occupied by causality, that causality must be a part or phase of the causality of God. It is impossible to maintain a disparity of scope between Causality and its Condition.² Thus, although infinity cannot logically be inferred of Causality itself, we can eliminate all possibility of its limitation. "We are not lost, then, in our modern immensity of space; but may still rest, with the wise of every age, in the faith that a realm of intellectual order and purest purpose environs us."³ God has an unlimited scene of existence and operation. The One Supreme Will, God as Cause, is Infinite.

Finally, God as Cause is Eternal. Here again the discoveries of science have brought questions to the older beliefs, for we no longer rest in the short time-span of a universe only six thousand years old. To the faith of those whose religious beliefs included the instantaneous creation of the world at a given moment in time, and the day of wrath in which all is to end at the last trumpet, this extension of time to the measure of geologic ages has been a severe blow. Yet there is no real reason here for the loss of majesty

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 415.

2. "They (Causality and its Condition) share the same dimensions; and though we cannot directly infer the infinitude of God from a limited creation, indirectly we may exclude every other position by resort to its unlimited scene of existence." Ibid., 416.

3. Martineau, SAR, 9.

in the conception of God. The growth of a world throughout infinitely extended time speaks no less volubly of a controlling mind than one which springs into being by fiat in a single moment. The orderly working of a logical mind is more accurately and sympathetically shown in this purposefully directed process of growth than in an instantaneous act. The creation which in the older cosmology was concentrated, is now diffused, but mental causation does not lose its dignity because it is diluted with duration.¹ The reasons for regarding the Infinite Mind as the Supreme Cause are not done away by a change in our view of the age or importance of the world.

The argument which Martineau adduces to establish the eternity of God is speculative. He says, if there was ever a time when God did not exist, then He must have come into being. If this were true then He would be a phenomenon or an effect requiring a cause. A cause and an effect cannot be the same, and since we have established God as Cause, He cannot be an effect. Cause is always other than phenomena, its self-existence being the essential feature of its being cause of phenomena at all.² God as Cause could not have had a beginning. The same reasoning logically excludes the possibility of His coming to an end. If God is Cause He must be without beginning and without end. The One Supreme Causal Will must be Eternal.³

From our study of the Causal Will and its relation to nature, we conclude that "there is One universal Cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all power, an omniscient Mind, ordering all things for ends selected with perfect wisdom."⁴ Further than this it is impossible to affirm anything about the nature of the relations which

1. Ibid., 14. Cf., pp. 227 f., of this study for a criticism of Martineau's view of eternity as endless duration.
2. Martineau, SOR, I, 416 f.
3. Ibid., 416.
4. Ibid., 417.

God bears to His creation, purely on the basis of the Causal principles which we have been considering. The power, the beauty, the majesty of the Cause we can discover, but any of the higher attributes we cannot determine from a study of nature. The moral and spiritual attributes of God cannot be affirmed until suitable studies have been made of man's moral and spiritual endowments, and the implications for reality drawn from each in its turn.

C H A P T E R F O U R

G O D A S P E R F E C T I O N

The second pillar of Martineau's theism is the Moral Argument for the Divine Existence. In this connexion he deals with the 'higher' attributes of God, such as benevolence toward sentient beings, justice toward moral beings, amity toward like minds, and righteousness. This last attribute shows God to be the supreme moral ideal of society, and society itself to be a theocracy. The order of inference in this argument is the same as in the Causal argument, i.e., from self knowledge to divine knowledge.¹ The difference lies in the fact that a different part of the self, namely, man's moral nature serves for observation and construction. He begins with the basic ethical fact that judgments of approval and disapproval are made by the thinking self. From this starting-point he argues by carefully reasoned steps to the belief in God as given by the moral intuitions. The relations between man and God are herein given much greater range and intimacy than in the Causal relation.

Before tracing the steps of Martineau's inference from man's moral intuitions to belief in God as moral Perfection, let us look briefly at the genesis of the Moral Argument. This argument is comparatively new in the field of theological speculation for it was first given a place in philosophic theism by Kant. This is not to say, however, that the idea of worth had had no place in the

1. Martineau, *SOR*, II, 1.

minds of thinkers previous to Kant. Among the earlier philosophers worth had been regarded as implicit in existence.¹ For Plato the highest Idea or universal was the Good. In Aristotle's thinking, the Prime Mover was regarded as the Perfect Being. And Plotinus had come even closer to what may be thought of as the modern view of the Moral Perfection of the source of existence, when he held that the hierarchies of existence and value must ultimately correspond. In Kant we find for the first time a sharp distinction drawn between existence and value. Kant destroyed the speculative arguments for the divine existence, but found the ideas of God, freedom and immortality, to be necessary postulates of the practical reason. The practical reason, according to Kant, does not afford us knowledge of the objects of these postulates, but enables us to assert their reality.² Man's whole moral nature would fall into contradiction if there were not a God who administered all things righteously. The categorical imperative possesses an a priori character, and its postulates are valid for ultimate reality. The Summum Bonum, as the complete and perfect Good, for Kant, was a combination of virtue and happiness. For a rational, finite being there is only an infinite progression from lower to higher grades of perfection.³ Hence only for the Infinite Being, for whom the time condition does not exist, is the true end of man's moral striving conceivable. We know that it is our duty to pursue the Highest Good, and therefore, if our moral nature is not to fall into complete contradiction, it must be possible that this Highest Good can be realised. We are thus under the necessity of postulating "the existence of a Being who is quite distinct from nature, and

1. Knudson, POP, 308 ff.

2. Caird, CPK, II, 298.

3. Caird, CPK, II, 294.

at the same time the cause of it, and who contains in himself the ground of this realisation, i.e., of the realisation of the combination of happiness with goodness."¹

Hence, the supreme cause of nature, so far as it must be presupposed with a view to the highest Good, is a being who, through his intelligence and his will, is cause or author of nature, i.e., God . . . We are not merely permitted but compelled by a necessity which is bound up as a requirement with the idea of duty, to presuppose the possibility of the highest Good, which can be secured only under condition of the existence of God; i.e., it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.²

We are thus authorised a priori to postulate the Divine existence. This Kantian expression of the argument has been elaborated by later theists such as Lotze, Bowne, Pringle-Pattison, and Sorley. Wherever this moral argument appears it builds upon this assumption, that worth is the key to reality.

Martineau's statement of the argument does not begin with the statement of an antinomy to be solved, but with an analysis of man's moral nature. He finds what he designates as a 'fundamental ethical fact,' and develops his argument by inference from this fact. Neither does he elicit any concept of the Good. The conscience, through which man is given all his knowledge in the moral realm, never reveals the concept of Good as such. Goodness may be regarded as implicit in righteousness and perfection, attributes of God which the conscience does reveal, but the moral judgments determine only that which is the better of two or the best of three conflicting motives. Conscience functions only to reveal to us relative moral worth.

1. Kant, Cr. Pr. Reason; Quoted by Caird, CPK, II, 295.

2. Ibid., 295f.

Martineau finds the justification for the appeal to the moral argument in the added richness which accrues to men's theistic beliefs when their moral basis and implications are recognized. The intellectual and the moral aspects of our natures furnish us with two coordinate sources for these beliefs. The intellectual brings us to a transcendent Cause, and the moral to a transcendent Righteousness. Religion arises only by these two channels. Religion without metaphysics, he says, offers us but a painted dream, but Religion that is mere metaphysics offers us but a pale and icy reality.¹ One of the outstanding characteristics of Martineau's writing is that he often turns to the language of pictures when he reaches the crucial point in an argument. Just when we desire an explicit statement, we are confronted with an example or a finely wrought figure of speech. Such a practice often makes it difficult to determine exactly what he means, since figures of speech are frequently capable of double interpretation. However, we shall attempt to trace with accuracy the steps in his argument from man's moral nature to God as Perfection.

Two things must be borne in mind at the outset. The first is the importance of the 'home factor', as Martineau frequently defines the self. His ethics was 'Idio-psychological.' That is, he began by an introspective investigation of himself. Man must always begin his knowledge with knowing himself, and proceed to a knowledge of the 'other-than-self' in the case of the Causal intuitions, and of the 'higher-than-self' in the case of the Moral intuitions. The other characteristic of his thought which must not be forgotten is his doctrine of intuition, which we traced in our study of his theory of knowledge. The intuition is an immediate apprehension of

1. Martineau, "Ideal Substitutes for God." ERA, IV, 289.

objectivity. In the Causal realm, we have an intuition of objective causality, and in moral experience we have immediate knowledge of objective authority.¹ We shall see how he attempts to establish the objectivity of moral authority as the proof progresses. It will, however, be well to have both these things in mind in order that we may see clearly the significance of the fundamental ethical fact, to which we now turn.

The Seat of the Moral Judgments

The fundamental ethical fact, the first discovery which a person makes as he begins to consider the moral nature of man, is the tendency to approve and disapprove of human beings and affairs in the external world.² This is a tendency which cannot be deduced, but is found as a fact inherent in man's nature as a moral being. This in itself distinguishes man as a moral being from all other creatures which act from some of the same motives. The beasts are motivated by some of the same springs of action as are operative in man, but it is only in man that the fact of approval and disapproval appears. If one brings together Martineau's statements in this regard it is seen that he makes an assertion which does not agree exactly with the rest of his system. In one connexion he says: The fundamental ethical fact is "the consciousness of a better and a worse in human beings and affairs."³ In the opening pages of volume two of TOET he says: "The broad fact, . . . of which we have to find the interpretation, is this: that, distinctively as men, we have an irresistible tendency to approve and disapprove, to pass judgments of right and wrong."⁴ To say that

1. Martineau, SOP, II, 2.

2. Martineau, TOET, I, 1; II, 17.

3. Ibid., I, 1.

4. Ibid., II, 17.

we recognise 'better and worse' and to say that we pass judgments of 'right and wrong' are not one and the same thing. Throughout the later construction of the system we shall see that Martineau finds no single intuition of right or wrong, but only the better or worse of two possible motives. Right, for Martineau, is only predicable of the choice which we make of two possible motives, or springs of action. Since these springs of action are known only in the 'home factor', he would have been more consistent if he had stated the fundamental ethical fact only in terms of better and worse.

Another difficulty which presents itself at the outset is the fact that this approval and disapproval is said to concern itself with human beings and affairs. Since in Martineau's system the only moral judgments we pass are upon the motives competing within ourselves, it would seem to be unjustified to begin by passing judgments on other human beings. All we can know of their moral life is the behaviour which we can observe. We cannot know the motives from which this behaviour springs. Hence it would appear to be impossible for us to begin by making judgments of the moral conduct of others.

However, if we are to trace Martineau's argument we must accept this as his declared starting point. The next step is the assertion that it is only of persons and not of things that we make moral judgments. Either a person or a thing may affect us agreeably or disagreeably. We may feel a like or a dislike for the effect upon us of a given thing, but the judgment we make of it is not a moral judgment. No matter how great the annoyance or agreeableness of our relation with a thing, it awakens in us no distinctly moral approval or disapproval. If this distinction be carried further it

will be seen that it is the person doing whom we judge, and not the thing done by that person.¹ Thus in our judgments it is the agent, not the act, who is regarded as mean or noble.

If then it is not the act which we judge, but the person acting, where do we direct our judgment? We go behind the act into the character of the agent and see that the first term in the succession from which that character derives its nature is the spring of action or motive upon which the agent acts. All action has its dynamic source in the mind. Hence it is upon the source or spring of action upon which the mind has chosen to act that we pass our judgments. "What we judge is always the inner spring of action."² Here we encounter one of the most characteristic phases of Martineau's thought, his table of the springs of action. In a moral judgment there is never a solitary spring of action, for if there were, the mind would have no choice and could make no moral judgments at all. This is one of the points of distinction between man and the beasts. The animals may act from many of the same springs of action as human beings, but their actions are instinctive. When they act from instinct there is only one motive urging them. The instincts come in a successive series for them, but seldom if ever conflict. In man the action which issues from the mind arises from one motive, but the mind has chosen to act upon that motive rather than another which at the moment of decision was present and offered another course of action. The consequent freedom of choice is a necessary postulate of man's moral nature.³ No man is ever

1. Martineau, SAR, 41; TOET, II, 20.

2. Martineau, TOET, II, 22 ff.

3. "The whole system of moral conceptions, feelings and language, rests upon the belief in Free Will, and deals with man as (within its particular range) the real cause of what he is and does." "The Relation between Ethics and Religion," ERA, IV, 300.

base who has not had the opportunity of being honorable, nor is there any honour for a man if he did not have the opportunity of choosing to act from a lower spring of action than the one selected. Thus when a man chooses a good act and his fellow-men approve, they are conscious of the conflict out of which this choice of motive was made and the subsequent action issued.

Let us look briefly at this table of springs of actions which plays so large a part in Martineau's ethical theory. As we saw in a previous section, conscience operates to judge which is lower and which is higher of two possible motives. After a series of such decisions man begins to discover that the judgments always agree, and that they may be arranged in a fixed order of preference. Thus the various appetites, propensions, and affections are seen to stand in an unchangeable relation to one another. Upon this basis Martineau has built his elaborate Table of Springs of Action which he regards as valid for all consciences for all time.¹

"Conscience, then, is the critical perception we have of the relative authority of our several principles of action."² "The whole ground of ethical procedure consists in this: that we are sensible of a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles, quite distinct from the order of their intensity, and irrespective of the range of their external effects."³ In the Types of Ethical Theory he justifies, both from the psychological and ethical points of view, the arrangement which he has made of these motives.

We shall not endeavour to criticise the internal

1. For Table of Springs of Action, cf., p. 84 of this study.

2. Martineau, TOET, II, 50.

3. Ibid., 45.

arrangement of the motives in the table of springs of action, but there are two criticisms which must be made of the doctrine, in regard to its construction and its universality. The first is concerned with the assertion that the conscience always tells the same 'story' in any number of parallel cases in the same individual, or in similar cases for a number of individuals.¹ This has been criticized by Sidgwick in his Lectures on Ethics. The 'stories' which the consciences of a number of individuals tell in regard to a given case of conflict are not always the same. Sidgwick says: "To make this clear I will begin by stating the amount of my own agreement (and disagreement) with Martineau."² The fact that he disagreed is in itself witness to the fact that among ethicists there is not universal agreement, and certainly not among people in general in regard to the relative worth of two competing motives.

The universality may further be questioned in the light of the fact that often the social situation into which the resulting action will issue affects the choice of motive. In the choice of a motive for action we cannot be entirely oblivious of the possible results of that action. This Martineau would deny, because he feels that it is only the motive and in no way the act that is judged. In general such a position is defensible, but it is not universally so. The decision cannot be entirely internally dictated. Since the act is chargeable to the motive, the choice of the motive must in some measure be determined by the result. Martineau supports his position by such statements as this:

The holy purpose, broken off by paralysis of limb, or interrupted by sudden death, kindles our reverence as much as the highest triumphs of successful will; and those whose

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 5f.
2. Sidgwick, LOE, 322.

designs of love are blotted out in the darkness of some Calvary, are none the less venerated as saviours by the world.¹

This is true, yet to make our moral decisions purely internally, totally oblivious of the outer scene, is to throw ourselves open to all sorts of error. The fact that a person 'meant well' is not enough to absolve him of the guilt resultant from an action that has been morally detrimental to society. This view is well put in the proverb, "the path to hell is paved with good intentions."

Martineau himself contends that a lone man in the world could have no moral experience. Morality is fundamentally a social concept. There must be, therefore, some moral significance attachable to an action when it makes its appearance in the world of moral beings.

But let us carry Martineau's argument further. It is at this point that the full force of his Idio-psychological ethical system appears. If a moral judgment is to be passed only on the springs of action, in the choice of the higher we first judge ourselves. We can only know the motives of one whose consciousness and conscience we fully know. Hence we can know only our own springs of action. All our moral principles arise within our own selves. Thus, to use Martineau's phrase, we begin by visiting the moral consciousness in its own home, looking it full in the face, and taking notes on what it tells of itself. No matter how long or earnestly we look at other men we can see only their actions and cannot view the choice between motives within them. Only when these motives issue in action are they visible, and the rejected motive gives no evidence of what might have been, had a different choice been made.

It is on the home enclosure, within the private plot of our own consciousness, that we make acquaintance with the

1. Martineau, SAR, 43.

springs of action, and are forced to see them as they are; and if here it is that we discern the sacredness and the sin, our primary school of morals lies within ourselves.¹

Thus by the steps so far traced Martineau has located the seat of the ethical judgments within the self. The source and the authority of these judgments is a 'higher-than-self' and not the self as such; this 'higher-than-self' which is immanent in the human self, is God.

It is in placing the seat of the moral judgments and the moral principles within the self that Martineau comes into sharp disagreement with certain of the other ethical systems of his day. The opposing system with which he chiefly deals is that which was represented by the Mills and Bain. It was their contention that the demands upon a moral being were made by an aggregate self-interest of the society of his fellow-men. Society has found what is best for itself through a long process of experience, and what it has learned it has formulated into certain principles which society as a whole impresses upon the individual. It is part of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" doctrine of Bentham. His own opposition to this view Martineau presents in the section of the Study of Religion entitled "Right by Social Vote."² He makes two general criticisms of such a position. The first is that society is made up of individuals, and if there were not certain moral principles within them, no amount of multiplication of individuals could generate such principles. Each of these individuals either has or has not a moral sense. Thus morality goes behind its social to its individual reference. In the second place, he points out that ethics rests on a sense of Duty.

1. Martineau, SAR, 45; cf., TOET, II, 29.
2. Martineau, SOR, II, 7-28.

Man feels that he is morally bound to choose one or the other of two motives. Morality thus rests upon a feeling of ought. Society could create a Must for the individual, but it could never invest this necessity with an Ought.¹ In other words society can dictate the necessity of a certain type of action for the individual, but it can never dictate his feelings. As we have seen, for Martineau morality is determined not with the act, but with the motive which produces the act. The motive can never be forced upon the individual by society.

In treating the doctrine of "right by social vote" in greater detail Martineau reduces it to three propositions. They are: "(1) Self love, or the idea of pleasure to one's self, is the sole spring of action. (2) Joint or collective self-interest sets up a public demand for actions not pleasant to the agent; and this public demand is moral sentiment. (3) An ideal adoption, by the individual agent of this public demand, is Conscience."² Against the first proposition he urges two points. (a) In his own system he has already shown that there are many more springs of action than the one of self-love. This is one of them, but it is not the only one. (b) Any observation of animal or human life will show that action of the sort dictated by one's own inner being springs from motives other than self-love. "If there be a Parental, a Social, a Compassionate affection, just as much given in our nature as the self-seeking desire, there are more elements to go into the ethical organism of thought than James Mill has allowed."³ Even for the behaviour of animals the motive of self-love cannot furnish an adequate explanation. Against the second he affirms that it is

1. Ibid., 9.

2. Ibid., 12.

3. Ibid., 13.

impossible that the self-love of the individual will flow into a moral sentiment which seeks the good of all, because the latter is the direct opposite of the former. Observe, he says, the case of two men, one to be the benefactor and the other the beneficiary. The crowd which is watching the transaction, if feeling only self-love, can hardly approve the sacrifice of the benefactor. Acting purely from self-love the spectators would hardly erect the beneficial act into a rule for society, since to do this would demand a similar sacrifice on their own part in a later identical case in which they as individuals might be involved. In answer to the third proposition Martineau says that what Mill has evolved is not conscience at all. Conscience cannot be regarded as derivative, since it is entirely different in nature from that which is supposed to be its source in the Utilitarian view. It has a language of its own, and deals with an entirely unique set of facts. Martineau says: "The springs of action are not differenced merely by men's interested preferences among them; but have an order of claim which is sealed in the constitution of things, and belongs to them wherever they appear on the theatre of a voluntary nature."¹ There is some objective power which authorises the demands of conscience, but the self-interest of Society as such is not that power. Moral principles are not imposed on us from our fellow beings, but arise within each individual being. Right, for Martineau, can not be determined by social vote.

Another view opposed to Martineau's doctrine is that of the naturalistic evolutionary ethicists represented by Spencer and Stephen. On this view the ethical principles have evolved,

1. Ibid., 27.

purely on an organic basis, out of certain instincts of the physical organism. Just as the sensations come from the skin into the 'centre', and this conscious centre makes the necessary adjustments for the good of the organism, so, as the complexity of these stimuli increases, certain of the adjustments take on the character of moral (habitual) principles.¹ The moral principles according to this view have no origin apart from a certain habitual and satisfying history in the experience of the organism.

Martineau's answer is to affirm the essential difference between moral and organic reactions. The organic reactions are instinctive, while the moral reactions are determined by a self-consciousness capable of selective thought. He says:

Moral existence is not constituted by organism, simple or complex, or by instincts lodged in it to do its work; but by the presence of a self-conscious, free, and reflecting subject, to whom both organism and instincts are objective facts; and as no such presence can be alleged in concomitance with the prior animal forms, the evolution misses all contact with the essential prerequisite of morals.²

Still a different view of origins, although it is close to the Utilitarian view already considered, is that of the sociological evolutionists such as Adam Smith and later James Ward. Adam Smith says, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, "Our first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people." Ward's position, in his Realm of Ends, is close to this. "(An individual) acquires the knowledge of himself through social intercourse."³ The growth of the moral consciousness is traced further as follows. The selfishness which naturally comes with our growing self-consciousness becomes apparent to others and is disapproved. Although we are still unconscious of

1. Spencer, POP, I, 401, 403.

2. Martineau, TOET, I, xiv.

3. p. 366.

our own wrong-doing, we become conscious of the wrong-doing of others. Finally the judgment is transferred to ourselves, and is combined with our own self-consciousness. W.K. Clifford traces the moral demands upon the individual to "the voice of the tribal self."¹ Martineau's answer to this position would be much the same as that which he gives to the Utilitarian ethicists. Unless the individuals of that society in which man finds himself have within themselves as individuals a moral sense, then no amount of multiplication of morally barren individuals will be able to produce moral principles. Furthermore, the obligation which we feel in connexion with our moral principles is an Ought and not a Must. This sense of Oughtness could never be generated within an individual simply by hearing or feeling the Must imposed upon him by society. The phenomena observable in the operations of conscience will not fit into such a pattern. No projection of the interests of society into the individual can account for the facts of the moral life, according to Martineau's view. Things look mean and vulgar not because of their consequences either to the self or to society, but in their own right. Martineau would, in large measure, agree with Professor William James, that our moral perceptions are 'brain-born.'²

The Form of the Moral Judgments

Having seen that in Martineau's thought the seat of the Moral judgments is in the individual self, and that on the basis of one's own moral intuitions a person approves or disapproves his fellow human beings and himself, we shall now trace briefly

1. Lectures and Essays, 290-293; cited by Ward, ROE, 368.

2. James, WTB, 187.

the form in which these moral principles arise. When the Moral Intuition appears within the mind, it assumes the form of a dictate of conscience. This dictate introduces an order of preference throughout the countless possible combinations of our motives. If moral choice is to retain its voluntary character this factor of preference must be emphasised. Morality can never become spontaneous, because a spontaneous act arises from a single impulse. That an act should be voluntary requires that it should be the result of a choice between two motives. We think only by differentiating. Hence comparison is essential to purpose. The comparison and choice are thus seen to be the operations of conscience. It is the form which the moral intuitions assume.¹ The basis of judgment between the two possible motives is not self-interest, nor desire, but rests solely in their moral worth. Two quotations from Martineau's formal studies of religion bring out clearly the preferential nature of the moral intuitions, showing that the choice takes the form of a dictate of conscience which can never fall into error.

As the instinctive impulses turn up within us, one after another, and two or more come into presence of each other, they report to us their relative worth; and we intuitively know the better from the worse . . . And the consciousness we have of the relative excellence of the several instincts and affections which compete for our will - a consciousness inseparable from the experience of each as it comes into comparison with another, but incomplete till we have rung the changes on them all - is neither more nor less than conscience.²

The independent nature of the decision is brought out clearly in another summary which Martineau gives of his doctrine of the moral intuition.

Whenever two incompatible springs of action simultaneously urge us, there is an attendant consciousness of superior excellence in one of them; an excellence, not in point of

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 35.

2. Martineau, SAR, 46.

pleasure or advantage which it were wise to take; not in respect to seemliness and beauty which it were tasteless to decline; but in the scale of right, which, in carrying our assent, commands our obedience.¹

This preferential nature of the moral intuition, and the fixed table of springs of action, constitute the particular points of divergence from the ethical doctrines of Butler and Kant, to whom Martineau stands, on the whole, very close. Furthermore, it may be observed that these two points are most difficult to maintain. It is doubtful if Martineau has enlisted many more followers for this doctrine of preference than for the Table of Springs of Action. If the moral intuition is as authoritative and as faultless as Martineau claims it to be, and since its decisions are given in terms of a 'rule of right', there seems to be no reason for holding it to be incapable of giving its decision in terms of a single motive. From my own moral experience it appears that the question decided by conscience is more often 'to be or not to be,' in the case of a single possibility, than 'to be this or be that,' as a choice between two positive possibilities. Kant seems to be nearer to the truth in concerning himself with the motive behind an act and determining its agreement or disagreement with the moral law.

Let us now briefly see how closely Martineau's doctrine of conscience stands to that of Kant and Butler. The point on which the three most fully agree is the assertion of the universality of conscience. In Butler this universality is emphasized by showing that conscience is constitutive of man as man. He says: "We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures

1. Martineau, *SOR*, II, 3.

as to reflect upon our own natures."¹ Instead of finding the fact of conscience in man, as had Hobbes and Shaftesbury, Butler held that in this reflexion on his own nature which is the operation of conscience man discovers himself to be man. The possession of conscience is thus the constitutive fact of human nature. This principle of reflexion or conscience is found in every man.² In Kant's Metaphysics of Ethics conscience is an original disposition of man's nature. Conscience is present in every man as a human being, for "conscience is man's practical reason."³ In another section of the same work he plainly asserts that "every man has conscience."⁴ Martineau's position is clear on this point. By asserting that conscience is the making of judgments of better or worse within the individual, and by denying that moral principles can be traced to a source outside the individual, he makes it plain that the faculty of conscience is present within every human being.⁵ It is a factor in the constitution of the ego.

There is less agreement, however, on the matter of its being an order of knowledge or feeling. For Butler it is clearly cognitive. He speaks of it repeatedly as a 'principle of reflection,' and as 'knowledge.' It deals with propensions, aversions, passions, and affections, but these pass in review before it for judgment. They are not the objects of knowledge. He says: "Conscience is fundamentally knowledge. The object of this knowledge is the Good, or the Will of God."⁶ In Kant's

1. Butler, SERMONS, I, iii, p.68.

2. *Ibid.*, II, iii, p.94.

3. Kant, MOE, 217.

4. *Ibid.*, 254.

5. Martineau, SOR, II, 5.

6. Butler, SERMONS, I, n. 19, p.70.

identification of conscience with the practical reason the cognitive nature of conscience is emphasized. It operates to command man to do his duty, as that duty is revealed to him in the form of the categorical imperative. This is present to his mind a priori. One of the distinguishing characteristics between the doctrine of the a priori imperative and the doctrine of intuition is that the former is concerned with ideas and cognitive states, and the latter more purely with feelings.¹ If this be accepted as a true distinction, then it would seem that conscience for Kant is cognitive rather than affectional. On this point Martineau is seen to differ strongly. Dedicated as he is to his doctrine of intuition, he consistently holds that conscience is an order of feeling, personal and sympathetic.² In the entirely uninstructed man it takes the form of a secret worship of honour, truth and right, but it is universally present. It does not wait for any lessons from religion or from external nature, but feels the validity and authority of its judgments.

On the question of the possibility of error, Butler wavers more than Kant and Martineau. Butler never calls into question the inerrancy of conscience, but he equivocates by asserting that the faculty of conscience presents a correct decision "by almost any fair man, in almost any circumstances." Kant is much more emphatic. In objective judgment man may go wrong, but subjectively in interpreting the practical reason there is no possibility of mistake.³ "An erring conscience," he says,

1. Starbuck, Intuitionism, E.R.E., VII, 397 b; "Intuitionism differs from apriorism in emphasizing usually the importance of affections rather than, or in preference to, cognition as being itself a direct source of knowledge. The unlikeness of the two is represented, e.g., by the fondness of apriorism for the doctrine of innate ideas."

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 21.

3. Kant, MOE, 217.

"is a chimera." For Martineau too conscience carries with it no possibility of error. The man who truly obeys the dictates of his conscience tries to play no part in making the judgments but simply obeys what is given to him through his conscience from an authority above himself. Since the comparative worth of the springs of action is fixed, and since his conscience gives him intuitional certainty of this scale, there is no point at which error can creep in. Man's moral judgments are given to him by an authority above himself, an authority not to be questioned but obeyed. In the divine source of man's moral intuitions lies the guarantee of the impossibility of error.

The mode of operation of conscience is another point on which Kant and Martineau stand close together against Butler. On Butler's view, conscience is concerned with an act. It arises as a judgment of an act, and all its operations take place as it disapproves or approves of an act. This view is open to many casuistic questions which are avoided by Kant and Martineau. We may quote Butler thus: "The occasion upon which this knowledge (which is conscience) awakes is some action which we perform."¹ The approval which comes is concerned with the agent as well as the act, but we have seen that the first appearance of conscience is with an act. He says further, "There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve, and disapprove their own actions."² There is, he says,

A superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man; which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust.³

1. Butler, SERMONS, I, n. 19, p.70.

2. Ibid., I, iii, pp. 67-68.

3. Ibid., II, iii, p. 94.

The act for Kant is not made the object of concern for conscience. The only good for Kant is the good will. The conscience operates as an inward censor which keeps man in awe by the picture it presents of the sternness and inescapableness of the moral law. The form which the operation of conscience takes is that of dividing the person into his real and his ideal self, the latter of which serves as judge to the former. Conscience always represents to a person someone other than his real self as his judge. Such an ideal person, he says, must be enough of myself to be able really to search the motives of my heart, but he must be enough of an other to possess an all-obligatory power over me.¹ It is the motives of the heart which are judged and not the act which the motive chosen produces. The function of conscience, for Kant, is thus not concerned with consequences, external relations, or conditions.² It is concerned solely with the will. The inward censor cries incessantly, 'Do thy duty.' We have seen what was the mode of operation of conscience in Martineau, namely, the approval or disapproval of possible springs of action. The conscience discloses unerringly which is the higher of two springs of action, and in giving this decision impresses man with his obligation to choose the higher. There is no question of the morality of an act.

One additional comparison will be made in regard to the nature of authority. For Butler the authority of the dictates of conscience rests in the fact that it is our own human nature which is speaking. It is a condition of our being that we should obey. He divides human nature into three parts, the passions, self-love,

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1. Kant, MOE, 255f. M's answer to such a view is that "the splitting of 'ourselves' into two agents susceptible of reciprocal obligations," is an impossibility; ERA, IV, 308; cf., TOET, II, 4.
 2. Hyslop, Conscience, ERE, IV, 32 a.

and conscience. In the moral life the two former are subordinated to the latter. The authority arises from the fact of human nature being what it is, most fully realized when passion and self-love yield to conscience in the determination of action.

It is by this faculty natural to man that he is a moral agent, that he is a law unto himself: by this faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart which is to have some influence as well as others; but considered as a faculty, in kind and in nature, supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority of being so.¹

In Kant the authority rests with the moral apriori, the categorical imperative. The authority of Duty is the most fundamental of the postulates of Kant's ethical system. He does not attempt to trace the authority behind itself, for that is the basic apriori idea. The moral law is its own authority. Professor Royce has caught the spirit of Kant's sense of the authority of the moral law in this passage:

Conscience . . . shows you the moral law, -- shows it as something overwhelmingly rational, absolute, universal, indifferent to your private wishes, independent of your present happiness, sublime as the heavens are, but as directly known to you as is the very existence of your will and of your reason. Conscience shows you this absolute law, and says sternly, unwaveringly, uncompromisingly, 'Do thy duty.'²

For Martineau the authority of the dictates of conscience lies in their divine source. These dictates are given to man not to be canvassed but to be obeyed. God is speaking to man and revealing his will through the conscience, and these dictates thus rest upon an authority foreign to our personality.³ The word of conscience, says Martineau, is the voice of God. The authority of conscience is Divine. In the next section, The Authority of the Moral

1. Butler, SERMONS, II, iii, p.95; cf. SERMON III, p.115.

"Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide, the guide assigned us by the author of our own nature. It therefore belongs to our condition of being."

2. Royce, SOMP, 112.

3. Martineau, SOR, II, 7.

Judgments, this phase of Martineau's thought will be more fully developed. We shall trace the order of inference from conscience to God, from the form to the authority of moral judgments.

The Authority of the Moral Judgments.

As we have seen, Conscience, in Martineau's doctrine, operates by making a judgment of the relative worth of competing springs of action. These judgments are said to be attested by universal agreement among moral beings, and to be incapable of error. We must then go on to inquire into the nature of the authority of these universally infallible judgments. Martineau opens his discussion of authority by criticising rival views, a method which he frequently employs to clarify his own position. The first view which he criticises is that which invests authority in the persuasive power of superior pleasure or exemption from pain. He quotes Bentham as saying:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.¹

He further quotes a statement from J.S. Mill. "Happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct."² This position Martineau counters by stating that pain and pleasure are the fruit and not the germ of the moral life. Utilitarianism has explained the moral facts away into something else, and retains only the authority with which they are vested. Utilitarianism endeavors

1. Martineau, SAR, 58; cf., Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, I, i, 1.

2. Mill, UTIL, 2nd Edition, 58.

to deal only with the external action, and in doing so is missing the essential seat of the moral life. Conscience, on Martineau's view, can never be made to deal with these external acts. Even if some compulsion is granted, yet it can never achieve the inner sense of obligation which is characteristic of conscience. "It (Utilitarianism) fails to take possession of Morals at their source."¹ To deduce the authority of duty, and the disclosures of conscience from the 'consolidated experiences of utility', fails to take account of the most important fact of moral experience, i.e., its inner-ness. Authority, says Martineau, must be traced further back than the external appearance of an action.

The prudence of the Utilitarians is only slightly more refined in the other-wordly prudence of Paley. In Paley's doctrine the distinction between prudential and moral action is similarly done away, and the fear of other men of Bentham's doctrine becomes the fear of hell, a more 'theological' conception. The assurance of rewards and punishments in the hereafter becomes the authority in Paley's doctrine. This Martineau criticises because it does away with the essence of the moral experience in the case of wrong, i.e., the sense of guilt, and retains only the appendages. The dangling before men's eyes of two pictures, one of paradise and the other of torture, cannot constitute the authority of the moral judgments.

The next position which he inspects is that wherein one part of the self is said to possess authority over another part. This doctrine we saw in Kant's view of authority wherein the self

1. Martineau, SAR, 100.

was viewed as divided into the real self and the ideal self, the latter possessing the power of judging the former. This view Martineau attacks upon two points. The first is that the voluntary nature of man embraces his whole self as a unity; it cannot be severed; we cannot conceive this subject-object division within the confines of the subject. The other point of criticism is that such a view would make the moral experience something of a purely subjective nature. If it arose purely within the realm of one's subjective nature, then it would have power over that nature only, and could have no significance for, nor be able to make any judgments in regard to, the society which is objective to that individual. Any judgments which might be made would be valid for that one self alone. The moral judgments are, however, seen to be valid for all human beings. They come from beyond our nature, and are valid for all men. "The authority which claims us, whatever it be, is something far beyond the personal nature, wide as the compass of humanity, embracing us all in one moral organism,-- a universal righteousness which reaches through time, and suffers no individual to escape."¹

Martineau then turns to the treatment of his own view of authority. Not by society, nor by one part of myself over another part, nor by the hope of reward are my moral judgments authorized, but by God through whom the moral law is ordained and revealed. The authority of the moral judgments of man is a divine authority. Just as the not-self of man's causal intuitions was God as Cause, so the not-self of the moral intuitions is God, an authority foreign to man's personality, its external counterpart. "It is . . .

1. Martineau, SAR, 65. Cf., TOET, II, 4. "Nothing can be binding to us that is not higher than we; and to speak of one part of self imposing obligation on another part,--of one impulse or affection playing, as it were, the God to another, --is to trifle with the real significance of the sentiments that speak within us.

necessary that our psychology should be dualistic in its results recognising, as in its doctrine of perception, so in its doctrine of conscience, both a Self and an other-than-Self. In perception it is Self and Nature: in morals, it is Self and God, that stand face to face."¹ Further, he says "the Moral Law . . . is imposed by an authority foreign to our personality, and is open, not to be canvassed, but only to be obeyed or disobeyed."²

That this 'other-than-self' of the moral intuitions is a person Martineau contends on the basis of the nature of Duty or Obligation, and also on the basis of the place which personality occupies in the order of existence. It is, he says, the sense of Duty which both constitutes and discloses the relation in which man stands to an 'other' in the moral relation. Duty cannot belong to a soul in vacuo.³ Furthermore, it is only to a person that duty can be felt. Man has, for Martineau, no duty to ideals as such, but only to the person who is the embodiment of those ideals. Upon this basis he regards "the consciousness of duty as an originating condition of religion,"⁴ because God is the personal embodiment of the ideals which we possess and it is to Him that we feel the sense of duty. Upon the other consideration, the place of personality in the scale of existence, he bases his contention that the object of man's duty is personal. There is no thing higher than person, and since it is to a 'higher-than-ourselves' that the duty is felt by a finite person, the sense of Duty points to a Higher Person. He says:

If the sense of authority means anything, it means the

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 5.
 2. Martineau, SOR, II, 7.
 3. Ibid., 29.
 4. Martineau, SOR, I, 16.

discernment of something higher than we, having claims on our self,-- therefore no mere part of it; . . . the predicate 'higher than I' takes me yet a step beyond; for what am I: A person: 'higher' than whom no mere 'thing' assuredly, -- no mere phenomenon, - can be; but only another Person, greater and higher and of deeper insight . . . Over a free and living person nothing short of a free and living person can have higher authority.¹

The next step, the identification of this Higher Person with God, is one of the most significant in Martineau's moral argument. He says that it makes no difference whether this step be regarded as an inference, or as an immediate vision. The truth, he says, is that the objective authority of the experiences of conscience is God.² It is at this point that an illustrative example which is widely viewed as characteristic of Martineau's thought is interposed in both his formal religious studies. Suppose, he says, a lone man in an atheistic universe. There would be no moral intuitions or sense of authority in his experience. Any such feelings, if they came to him, would be pure illusion. But we cannot suspect our primary faculties of illusion. Hence we must accept the fact as valid that "the moral intuition exists." When we accept that proposition the atheistic universe

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 97; cf., Martineau, "The Relation between Ethics and Religion," ERA, IV, 307.

"The moment the experiences of Conscience are recognised as a personal relation, the whole body of Morals starts up as in life from the dead, and becomes transfigured with light flashing from the contact of two worlds. . . . The Authority of Duty becomes transcendent and Divine; and we understand how it is that it always gazed at us with so awful and quickening an eye as if to fix our look, and still to pursue us though we turned away. This is intelligible, if it be the meeting of Spirit with spirit, the living touch of infinite holiness on finite temptation. But no absent power, no code of the past, no heaven or hell of the future, could draw from us such secret homage; where and when the worship is, there and then is God. If previously it was the tendency of moral conviction to harden our independence of will and impart a Stoical rigour, this temper, which belongs only to our standing before men or Fate, must now give way, and be replaced by pure reverence and self-surrender, not to resistless Force, but to Highest Righteousness."

2. Martineau, SOR, II, 30.

vanishes from possibility, and we discover ourselves to have relations with One Supreme existence, justice, wisdom, and holiness.¹ The objective authority of the experiences of conscience is God as Moral Perfection. This example is typical of a device which Martineau often employs in his writing. He sets forth two possibilities, carefully eliminating all other possibilities, and then makes his choice. He completely ignores the fact that it is only upon the existence of the moral intuition according to his own definition that the atheistic universe vanishes. Some of those thinkers who would deny the inference from the moral intuition to God would assert just as strongly as would Martineau the validity of the moral consciousness. By unduly limiting the alternative Martineau is attempting to gain his point quickly and easily.

We have seen that the identification of the authority of conscience with God may come either as an immediate vision of God, or as an inference drawn from the data supplied by the experiences of conscience.² The former can rest only upon such bare assertions as "the word of conscience is the voice of God,"³ which Martineau says, rather questionably, is a point agreed upon by the wise and good of every age. Of the latter view we can trace the order of inference, the way in which he steps from the sense of authority to God. This may be done in two ways. The first argues from the 'gradation of character,'⁴ or a sort of moral teleology, and the second from a doctrine of merit and demerit, to the necessity of a Moral Governor and Judge. In all his moral experiences man has a sense of differences among moral

1. Martineau, SAR, 69-70.

2. Martineau, SOR, II, 30.

3. Martineau, SAR, 71.

4. This expression appears in Martineau, SAR, 105.

beings. A given individual will feel this most strongly when he finds himself standing in the presence of a nature much nobler, and simpler, and purer than his own. The personal consciousness of these differences must have some verification in reality. The 'pull' which the higher nature exerts upon the lower cannot be explained purely on the basis of 'the force of example.' It is closely allied with the highest of the springs of action, that of 'reverence.' The lower nature stands reverently and in awe before the higher nature. The power which the higher nature exerts over the lower must be found to have a basis for verification in reality. This verification comes when the comparisons are carried further, and it is seen that there is a complete hierarchy of moral beings, at the head of which must stand a perfect goodness. As in the cognition of space we arrive at a belief in the infinity of its extension, so in the moral realm we come to feel that there must be an infinite moral goodness, i.e., Perfection. Man's moral faculties seem to exist for the achievement of right action and right character, carrying him along the way toward the Perfection which he believes to exist. The moral ideas, and the data of conscience do not exist on their own account, but for the sake of what may be achieved by them. On this Martineau bases his teleological principle of judgment.¹ Thus through the hierarchy of moral ranks, and through the purposefulness implied in man's moral endowments, "we are led up to a Supreme Objective Perfection."²

The second inference is drawn from the fact that "we are conscious of good or ill desert."³ From this fact Martineau

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 37.

2. Ibid., 34.

3. Ibid., 37.

infers a God who is a Moral Governor and a Judge. In this respect he is not far from Kant's view of God, wherein He is regarded as a necessary postulate if the good which we do is to receive its just reward, and the evil which we do to receive its just punishment. Martineau maintains that throughout man's moral experience man is conscious of deserving reward or at least approving recognition for merit, and of deserving pain and displeasure as a retribution for demerit. Thus, as strongly in his failures as in his successes, man finds the moral nature of reality revealed to him. The retribution which man feels himself to deserve, both good and bad, cannot be administered by an unmoral physical nature. These rewards and punishments must be meted out by some supernal being in whose hand rests all power, and who owns himself to be guided by the same rules of righteousness as man himself. Not the rewards and punishments, but the consciousness of guilt and the assurance of righteousness which become present to the moral consciousness of man reveal this Moral Governor.¹ Man feels a sense of guilt entirely distinct from the sting of the 'rod' by which the penal power executes its justice. This sense of guilt for sin carries with it a feeling of separation for the sinning soul from the fountainhead of all righteousness. Thus,

Whoever gives full credence to the consciousness of guilt finds himself estranged, not only from the just sympathy of men, but from an ever living Righteousness that searches their hearts and his. This is exactly what we should expect, if our life were under the Divine Moral Government, and our nature framed for responsive communion with an Infinite Perfection.²

The being who administers this Divine Moral Government is God as Moral Governor and Judge.³

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1. It is the idea of Justice and Moral Perfection in God which elevates into 'authority' the administrations of rewards and punishments which might otherwise operate only as a bribe. Martineau, TOET, II, 111-116.
 2. Martineau, SOR, II, 40.
 3. Ibid.. 37.

The alternative which Martineau recognizes to the acceptance of his entire doctrine of Objective Divine Authority is the pronouncement of the entire sense of responsibility to be a mere illusion. If we would retain the concept of Duty and clothe it with any meaning, it must find its authority in God as Perfection. Again it seems he is stating the alternative in somewhat too limited a fashion, for there have been thinkers who made other provision for the explanation of the sense of Duty. There is another alternative which Sidgwick supports, and which he feels that Martineau inadvertently admits, namely, the vesting of authority in the 'Rule of Right' itself rather than in God, who is also under this 'Rule'. Martineau does not identify the 'Rule of Right' with the 'Will of God', "but, in knowing our inward springs as better and worse, we know His will."¹ There is, he thinks, "an inward rule of Right which directs the action of His (God's) power." To this 'Rule of Right' Sidgwick assigns independent existence, and authority. It is possible that the dictates of conscience could be authoritative without emanating from another Person or God. This rule of right can give authority to our moral decisions. Martineau affirms the existence of the rule but refuses to grant it authority until it is seen to be directed by a Person. Sidgwick admits that for a Christian Theist conscience does speak forth Divine Commands. However, he does not grant the truth of Martineau's assertion that without the Divine Objective Authority the sense of duty of obligation has no meaning. For one who is not a Christian Theist, Sidgwick says, authority for

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 218.

moral decisions is available from the 'Rule of Right.'¹ The criticism is well directed, and Sidgwick has found the grounds for his own case within Martineau's admission of the existence of a rule of right which directs the action of God's power. Martineau has grasped a real truth, however, in affirming the superiority of strength in Duty felt towards a person over Duty which rests upon an abstract law or rule.

Another criticism of Martineau's view that conscience brings an immediate vision of God comes from a Christian Theist whose position is in some respects not vastly different from his own. Professor Flint states his doubt as to the ability of conscience to give testimony of God. He says, "I more than question if we have a right even to ascribe to conscience an immediate intuition of God."² Conscience, for Flint, is that by which we gain knowledge of good and evil, and to ask that a faculty suited to knowing good and evil should bring to us knowledge of God is like asking a man to taste a colour.

What we immediately apprehend through conscience is the right or wrong in actions, and therefore not God. Morality is the direct object of conscience; God can therefore only be the presupposition or postulate of conscience, ³- can only be given in conscience as implied in morality.³

Faith in God does help to faith in duty, and faith in duty does help to faith in God, but the two must be held together if we are to grasp the whole truth.⁴

This is one of the points at which Martineau's system is open to serious question. It is true, as Professor Sidgwick points out, that for a Christian Theist there is something about

1. Sidgwick, LOE, 324.

2. Flint, THE, 216.

3. Ibid., 216f.

4. Ibid., 263.

the facts of the moral consciousness which drives him to seek behind these facts a certain principle of explanation, the Rule of Right, or the Moral Law, or whatever one may choose to call it, which is adequately understood only when it is found to be the expression of the will of God. For the Theist the identification of this reality with God is possible as an act of faith. However, Martineau's position is not as easily defended as this. He states that the moral consciousness qua moral consciousness gives an immediate vision of God. An alternative position which he attempts to establish, as we have seen, is that logical inference can be made from the facts of moral experience to God. He does not wholly succeed in justifying either of these views. The outstanding feature of his argument is the significance which he attaches to Reverence. It is a primary sentiment which stands as the highest of all the springs of action in the table which he has constructed. Only when a man is filled with the sentiment of reverence for goodness can he come to have the immediate vision of God, and it is from the facts of the experience of Reverence that the logical inference can be made to God. This is the crucial point in his argument, and it seems to me that here the argument is most open to question.

The first point of difficulty lies in making reverence a purely moral sentiment. Martineau, by listing it as the highest of the motives of the moral consciousness, is certainly limiting it to the moral sphere. He says explicitly in another connexion that "it (reverence) never quits the presence, and never escapes the restrictions of conscience."¹ It applies

1. Martineau, TOET, II, 208.

itself only to approval and disapproval of the character and disposition of persons, and can never be said to apply to their whole personalities. This limitation of the term reverence cannot be fully justified. Man reveres sacred places, memories, and whole personalities. Reverence for ideas such as justice and beauty cannot be limited entirely to the moral sphere without leaving certain of the depths of these ideas unfathomed. Nor is it possible to understand reverence without viewing it as involving more of the personality of the person who feels the reverence than merely his moral nature. Human nature is not so clearly divisible as this. When reverence is truly felt it involves an inclination of the will, the feelings, the intellect, -- in short, the whole personality. Martineau seems to sense this pervasiveness of reverence, for he says it pervades the complete set of springs of action, while being itself higher than the rest. He states that it is identified with devotion to God.¹ This makes it clear that the sentiment of reverence is more than merely moral. To the artist who feels an all-consuming reverence for the beauty which he is giving his life to create, it would be unthinkable that his feeling is purely moral. It is an inclination of his whole being. To the devout Christian who feels a deep reverence for the place of worship where he finds communion with God most complete, that feeling stirs his entire nature. When a man feels truly reverential he seems inclined to fall to his knees, and bow his head, and yield his will. Thus reverence affects the moral nature of the feeling subject, but to limit it to the restrictions of conscience is not possible.

Thus understood, reverence, when felt for the Divine,

1. Ibid., 206.

can be identified with devotion to God. On Martineau's definition it is impossible to see how simple reverence for character can be thus identified. When he is presenting his view of a limited type of reverence which man feels for other persons, it is permissible for him to limit the approval and disapproval of them to an approval and disapproval of their characters, and hence to present the feeling of approval as a type of reverence for goodness.¹ When he goes further and applies this same type of conscience-limited reverence to God, identifying, as he does, reverence for character and devotion to God without changing the meaning of reverence, the reader feels that the writer has begun to deal with a new concept, but is unwilling to recognise it. Martineau perceives this difference between the simply moral approbation and the feeling of Reverence,² but he refuses to recognize that there is any inconsistency in his use of the term reverence for both.³

Since Reverence cannot be limited entirely to a moral sentiment, and since it is the sentiment of reverence which in Martineau's moral system gives the immediate vision of God, it is clearly seen that the ethical system, thus robbed of its seeing member, becomes powerless to gain a vision of God within itself. Since it was from the facts of the experience of Reverence that the inference to God was made, this inference is also rendered invalid. The moral consciousness does play a very important part in the whole reaction of a man. A response of his whole being must include a response by his moral nature. In this respect morality can be said to lead man to seek the reality

1. Ibid., 206.

2. Ibid., 210.

3. Ibid., 211.

behind the facts of experience. However, it is by an act of faith that this reality is identified with God. Conscience, as such, cannot supply the basis for an inference to God. God as Moral Judge and Governor does enter into relation with man's moral nature, but the force of such consideration is not purely logical. The approach to God is made through faith, a prostration of the whole being. The fuller truth is seen by Professor Flint when he asserts that duty cannot lead to God, but the two are held in faith to be true.¹ Conscience cannot give an immediate vision of God, or furnish an adequate basis for a purely logical inference of him.

Another criticism which must be made of Martineau's position from a purely ethical point of view is that he dwells too exclusively upon the individuality of morality. His reaction against what he calls 'right by social vote' carries him to the extreme of limiting too severely the significance of the social factor in ethics. The ethical nature of man is conditioned by the inheritance which he receives from the generations of men who have gone before. The institutions and customs of the past play a large part in the determination of the ethical standards of the individual. Martineau, in stressing the idio-psychological genesis of ethics, has made the individual too isolated and self-sufficient. He denies, to be sure, the existence of obligation and ethics for a lone man in an atheistic universe, but man as we find him is neither completely alone nor dwelling in an atheistic universe. Society is the field of operation of man's moral activities, and it does play a significant part in the shaping of the ethical standards.

1. Flint, THE, 263.

Pringle-Pattison criticizes Martineau on the basis of never having entirely escaped his deistical background. In an article in the Hibbert Journal shortly after Martineau's death, in which he was treating Martineau's philosophy, he calls attention to a trace of this deism in Martineau's doctrine of obligation. By making the obligation in man to be an obligation to 'another Person,' Pringle-Pattison feels that Martineau has made his theism take on the cast of an 'ethical Deism.'¹ This criticism, I think, can hardly be substantiated. If Martineau had made that 'other Person' distinct from the finite person and away from it, perhaps the criticism would be valid. But Martineau is careful to affirm that this 'other Person' is immanent in the ethical agent, a presence which is felt to be 'uniquely within.' It would seem to me that a more reasonable criticism would be that the 'other Person' is so entirely within the ethical agent that the decision which is made between two contending motives is made by the 'Presence' rather than the agent himself. This would be much nearer to a denial of the freedom of the agent, and hence to the danger of pantheism, than to the separation of agent and God chargeable to deism. An affinity to deism is traceable in certain phases of Martineau's thought, but this is not an instance of it.

Problem of Evil and Sin

Martineau recognizes that the presence of natural and moral evil in the universe presents serious problems to the theist. The facts of the apparent unfriendliness of the natural forces to

1. Pringle-Pattison, Martineau's Philosophy, Hibbert Journal, I, 455.

man and of man's sinfulness would seem to conflict with a view of the world as under the direction and power of a God who is loving, righteous, and holy. "It cannot be denied that in various ways the phenomena of life are disappointing to our ideal of a moral administration of its affairs."¹ However, it must be remembered that morality is not essentially hedonism. The question is one of the righteousness of the Author of the universe, rather than his ability or willingness to give uninterrupted pleasure to his creatures. A moral system is one which provides for the 'formation,' the 'exercise,' and the 'discipline' of character. For this purpose the order of the universe can be shown to be suitable.

To make character possible there must be opportunity given for right choice. This is impossible without the alternative possibility of wrong choice. Free-will is indispensable to a system in which moral character is to be developed, providing as it does the freedom of alternative choice.

The establishment of this risk, so far from contradicting the holiness of God, is its immediate and indispensable expression; and only shows that He does not necessitate a good, of which the very essence flies at the touch of necessity.²

This does not make provision, however, for the presence of natural evil. What can be said of the sufferings of animals and human beings as a result of the natural circumstances into which they are born, or the nature with which each is equipped? There is the suffering which is caused by such natural cataclysms as earthquake and volcanic eruption, and the pain which certain orders of life suffer because of the predacious method of life of other organisms. There are the pains which are felt by the

1. Martineau, *SOR*, II, 57.

2. *Ibid.*, 57.

various organisms in the form of wants for the satisfaction of which the organism must often face danger and destruction. Other pains felt by the organism are the result of decline of the organism into the period when exertion for the relief of these pains is no longer possible. For the human being there are the pains and suffering which come as the result of sin. That sin should have been permitted to enter into the created order, and bring with it its attendant measure of suffering, is difficult to harmonise with the Moral Perfection of God.¹ Lastly, suffering in human life is much greater than that of the animals because of memory and the other intellectual endowments of man. Because of these special powers man suffers when the actual stimulus of pain is not present. What is the answer to these problems on the basis of a theism which stresses the Righteousness of God?

There is certainly no gain in approaching the problem only to deny its existence, as has been done by some theists. These thinkers have denied that pain is evil, by affirming that anything found in the world comes from God, and that which has its origin in God cannot be regarded as evil. God is wise and good, they say, and since all phenomena are aspects of His creation, no charge of evil can be brought. This gives no solution of the problem at all, and if we are not to deny the validity of human reason we cannot in one breath enumerate problems and in the next deny them. We must seek for some more adequate answer. Martineau attempts to answer the problem point by point, but some of his answers are more adequate than others.

(1) The pains resultant from the physical elements such as

1. Ibid., 105-138.

earthquakes and volcanoes are exempted from the moral order by emphasizing the parallelism of the moral and physical orders. The great process of planet building in nature is always going on, and the disturbances which occur cannot be charged against the moral order as such. Destruction comes to only a negligible part of the great system of life and fertility through events which are an inescapable part of a system which is preponderantly good and profitable. On the basis of Martineau's main contention that nature administers justice for the moral order this answer is one which we should not expect. He says: "That external nature is not foreign to the system of moral laws is further evident from the fact that, to a considerable extent, it administers their retribution and enforces their discipline."¹ If there is a parallelism between the physical and moral orders, and the former administers its acts in harmony with the latter, then the fact that there is a preponderance of good does not account for the existence and apparently irrational appearance of the evil. The fact that a million people receive just treatment does not account for the one person who receives undeserved suffering.

(2) The next problem to be considered is the suffering of animals. The denial of feelings to animals by those who follow Descartes, e.g., Malebranche, and the reduction of animals to the level of automata cannot be accepted. Animals are automata if by that is meant that they conduct themselves by instinct rather than rational thought, but this is not a denial of feelings to them.² They have suffered even before the sin of

1. Ibid., 55.

2. The denial of sentient feelings to animals was made by those who felt this to be the only escape from the difficulties involved in the problem of souls in animals. In Pascal's writing the idea of animals as automata is used to relieve the Divine Goodness of the responsibility for animal suffering. Ibid., 62-78.

man, to which is traced, by some thinkers, the presence of evil in the world. The geological record of the ages shows that animals have suffered and died long before the beginning of the moral probation of man in the physical existence of this world. Martineau admits that animals suffer, but contends that when the balance sheet of good and evil is completed, there is a preponderance of good. The question then becomes one of method. It is more consistent, he thinks, with a view of the Divine benevolence that the gifts should be granted as a mixture of evil with the predominating good, than that the good should come in a limited but uninterrupted flow. "Are you then prepared," he asks, "to contend that, of the two modes of bestowing a given portion of happiness, viz., to deal it out with uniformity, and to pour it forth in waves of elation and depression beyond the average level, the former alone can be the object of benevolent Will?"¹ It is by no means certain that the answer which Martineau gives is the only one that is satisfactory in regard to the choice of method. The method for which he contends seems comparable to inflicting pain in order that the sufferer may enjoy the absence of pain when it ceases. It is by no means certain that this method is more in harmony with the Divine benevolence than the uninterrupted flow of a limited measure of good, and the absence of the extremes of suffering and pleasure.

(3) The pains which come from wants in the organism, which the organism has the power of satisfying through its own

1. Ibid., 78.

exertion, are regarded as purposeful. These pains have a distinct usefulness in that they serve as incentives to directed action. As such they exert a disciplinary influence in the building of character. "This class of pains is strictly self-corrective, and reacts into the corresponding pleasures."¹ It is by no means certain that any living power would be exerted to the accomplishment of ends unless there were some disturbance to the equilibrium of comfort and content.

(4) The pains attendant upon decline of the organism, pains which the organism can no longer exert itself to alleviate, must be regarded as undesigned imperfections. The Divine Will works by order and law rather than by pure caprice, and there are involved in the system which has been chosen certain imperfections of this sort which cannot be eliminated. They are due to the fact that in pursuing larger and inclusive ends there are some partial evils which God cannot avoid at certain stages of incompleteness.

If he (God) lives out of his boundless freedom and, from moment to moment, acts unpledged, conducting all things by the miscellany of incalculable miracles, there is nothing to hinder his Will from entering 'where it listeth,' and all things will be 'possible to him.' But, if once he commits his Will to any determinate method, and for the realization of his ends selects and institutes a scheme of instrumental rules, he thereby shuts the door on a thousand things that might have been before; he has defined his cosmical equation, and only those results can be worked out₂ from it which are compatible with the values of its roots.

Such a doctrine dispenses with the need of seeking a given justification for each single item of suffering. If it can be shown that the system is working toward a good end in an orderly fashion, then much of the evil which is observable no longer presents a serious problem.

(5) That one form of life should live by the destruction

1. Ibid., 81.

2. Ibid., 85.

of other forms of life under the 'Law of Prey' must also be looked upon as a necessary part of a great system which is mostly good. It cannot be reckoned as entirely an evil that the surplus of a lower form of life should go to sustain the life of a higher order. Little would be gained if those orders of life which now slay for their food were obliged by their nature to stand around and wait until their prospective meal died in the course of nature. There have been experiences in famine where the longing eyes of one creature followed with satisfaction the declining strength of another because of the possibility of a meal. It can hardly be contended that this would more nearly agree with the demands for a morally justifiable universal plan. Furthermore, the nourishing of one form of life by the death of another is evidently nature's plan for sanitation and the disposal of organisms before they decay. This planet would soon be rendered unfit for life if there were not those organisms which feasted upon the flesh of others, both dead and alive.

(6) The problem presented by the existence of Sin in the world is answered by stressing the necessity of free-will. Unless the freedom of the individual moral agent is inviolable, then no moral decisions can be demanded of any creature, and morality itself entirely disappears. God provides the possibility of moral evil in that he has placed free-will in man, but without having created moral agents God's plan could not have been moral and righteous. To have forced right action upon man by making the motives to the higher act stronger than those to the lower would have meant the destruction of freedom of choice. Man is tempted just because the relative moral worth of a motive is not proportionate to its strength. The conflict of impulses, and the

possibility of wrong choice are necessary phases of God's righteousness in creation. The suffering which results from man's choice of the lower rather than the higher motive comes as retribution for lack of character. No other system could have been instituted which would have been in harmony with God's moral perfection if man were to be endowed with the power of free choice.¹

(7) The suffering of human beings is rendered more acute and of longer duration by the fact that through memory and intellectual endowments men are caused to suffer even when the cause of pain is not present as a stimulus. Would any man be willing to give up his memories and his intellectual gifts in order to decrease his suffering? Without forfeiting all intellectual superiority to the other forms of life we cannot escape this phase of the problem of suffering. Furthermore, the suffering which comes through thought and memory is a necessary part of man's moral nature. The remorse which is felt as a result of sin, the struggle with the passions and the subsequent choice of right -- these are phases of the discipline both before and after the moral decision which are necessary to moral existence. The sufferings which man is called upon to bear have in them the possibility of refining his nature into something much finer than an unsullied quietude upon the surface of his moral waters. Suffering makes man strong in his convictions and beliefs, and yet gentle in his personality. It cannot therefore be entirely evil.

(8) The last problem which Martineau faces is the apparent triumph of brute force in history. How can God permit the brute force of one nation to triumph over the ideals of another? This he answers by tracing certain movements in history which have

1. Ibid., 105-116.

apparently shown the success of force, but in reality have resulted in a triumph of what was best in the life of both the victor and the vanquished. The rise of Rome brought eastern culture to the western world. The fall of Rome at the hands of the barbarians spread Roman culture into the lives of the conquering hordes. Man's conscience is often educated by the shocks which it receives from observing horrors wrought by force. "History, thus interpreted, is no record of the triumph of rude strength; but, on the contrary, attests the ever advancing superiority of the higher terms in the hierarchy of powers."¹

In this way Martineau attempts to show that although there are facts which must be regarded as evil in the universal order, yet they may be traced to the necessities of God's working according to plan in the discipline and development of a moral order. The facts of evil, sin, and suffering are not denied, but are justified on the basis of the predominance of good in the system which is the creative expression of the Goodness of the Divine Will. At some points the answers have been reached by faith rather than by discursive reason, but this is not a charge of inadequacy. Martineau's primary interest throughout his writing was in developing the ground of a theistic faith. When faith sees deeper into the real meaning of life than the answers reached by logic, then man has the right to follow the path of faith.

The Attributes of God as Perfection.

Let us now turn to a consideration of the attributes of God as determined through the moral consciousness. These are reached by a careful analysis of what is implied in the term

1. Ibid., 133.

Perfection. Martineau says that the term Perfection, when rightly understood, justifies these additional predicates of character to the idea of God. He makes a primary division of the attributes in terms of the meaning of Perfection for the individual and for society. The former are the predicates which are to be made of God as the Highest individual in the graduated scale of beings. The latter are the predicates which can be affirmed of God as the Supreme Moral Ideal for Society. Both alike are Moral Perfection, but they are distinguished as viewed by the individual and by society.

As the Highest for the individual moral consciousness, God is the "supreme term in the hierarchy of spiritual natures."¹ He is the reality which is objective to all our moral idealism. In Him are to be found the ulterior ends which are served by all the physical and moral laws. Conscience is thus the faculty by which man apprehends the nature and being of ultimate reality. Although the picture of reality which is thus achieved may be in conflict with the outward facts of the world, the error lies with our apprehension of the outward facts of the world. The 'story' which conscience tells is the correct story of reality.

The first of the attributes of 'Our Highest' as Moral Perfection is "benevolence towards sentient beings."² The indications for this, he says, are unmistakable in the order and relative authority of the springs of action. The higher we proceed in the order of springs of action the more we see that selfishness, and the limiting of our actions to the individual organism, are of a low ethical quality. The propensions which we

1. Ibid., 42.

2. Ibid., 43.

share with the beasts are not entirely selfish, but the affections by which the behaviour of the human organism is so largely determined are almost entirely directed in the service of others. The devotion of the mother to her infant, and the vigils in sick room -- ministries of this sort which are made possible by self-denial and self-forgetful affection speak in the strongest terms of the moral loftiness of benevolence towards sentient beings. The human being feels that he is achieving the greatest heights morally when he is giving himself on behalf of his fellow beings. In the same way he feels that he has degraded himself and suffers under the stinging lash of self-reproach if, with a view to self-protection, he refuses to help a person in need. From this constitution in the nature of humanity, from these fundamental laws of behaviour, Martineau draws his inference about the Author and the Lawgiver. He thinks it impossible to account for these factors in human nature if they are not also characteristic of the Author of our human nature. Is pity, he asks, to be regarded as being implanted in us by the pityless? In placing within us compassion and love, God has shown himself to be compassionate and loving. He who is the author of our wills, is benevolent towards sentient beings.

The second attribute of God as Our Highest is superior to the first. Man has not reached the greatest heights of which he is capable when he has achieved the social affections. Higher than these is justice. Hence, as Moral Perfection, God is characterized by "Justice towards Moral Beings."¹ There is in man a consciousness of good and ill desert. The truth of the ethical judgments of right and wrong, and the approval or

1. Ibid., 44.

disapproval which follows is given to man infallibly by his conscience. The other individuals about us we judge by a transference of the judgments we make of ourselves. Thus a man will look upon the crime of another man as implying guilt in his consciousness, just as if it were an experience of himself, the observer. These feelings of good or ill deserts cannot be placed in man by a cause which is morally neutral. If the author of our natures were unsusceptible of moral polarity, there would be no way to account for the intense attractions and repulsions which so largely determine the course of men's actions. He says, "as surely therefore as moral effects must flow from a moral source, may we read in our own ethical discriminations the reflections of an Eternal Justice."¹ Thus justice is an attribute of God as Moral Governor and Lawgiver.

The third attribute affirmed of God in this connexion is much more difficult to understand. It is "amity towards like minds,"² or "amity towards beings that have attained a moral harmony."³ The idea which Martineau seems to be trying to convey is that between minds which have achieved a relatively equal degree of victory over the demands of the lower springs of action, and who therefore feel themselves called upon to choose between two relatively high motives, there is a certain friendliness and communion which is comparable to the communion between God and the saints. In other words, we are drawn to those who achieve victory in the struggles of conscience. When we see another person win a moral battle, we feel the inclination to cry, 'Well done,' and to show certain deference to that person. The result is that we are

1. Ibid., 47.

2. Ibid., 47.

3. Ibid., 49.

drawn very close to that person. "Sanctity of character is in itself harmony with God . . . and carries in it the communion by which, among minds that live together, like understands like, and the perfections of one meet and quicken the aspirations of the other."¹ This is the witness, which has been borne by saints of all ages, that they have been conscious of a Divine communion, sustaining and kindling them with a strength and a fire not their own. There is a communion between God and the souls who depend entirely upon Him. Jesus went apart to commune with God on very important occasions in his earthly experience. But to say that such amity between those who have achieved moral harmony in this world is of the highest moral order seems questionable. This would seem to be equivalent to saying that those individuals who are never troubled with pain are most healthy when they are sitting about complimenting each other upon their good health. The greatest souls in Christian history have been those who spent themselves among those individuals less fortunate than they to whom their own strength could serve as an inspiration. Jesus felt that the physician's ministry was needed by those who were sick, not those who were well. If this 'amity towards like minds' had been the watchword of Jesus' life, we can imagine that he would have chosen out a few of the most religious people of his day, perhaps a clique of the Pharisees, and spent his time among them. If conscience is, as Martineau affirms, the voice of God, then God is speaking just as surely to the individual who is struggling with decisions at the bottom of the scale of springs of action as he is to those who have ascended the scale to the 'higher' conflicts. God's voice may be more clearly heard by those who are

1. Ibid., 48.

more accustomed to listening to it, but it is difficult to think that God is more friendly to those whose struggles have become less grave and are less likely to terminate in destruction. 'Communion with like minds' would be predicable of God, but 'amity towards like minds' seems to me to do violence to the Divine Perfection.

A further predicate which Martineau might have made of God in this connexion would have been to affirm his personality. He does point out that only to a 'person' can man feel obligation. He speaks of God as 'another person,' but in stating the attributes of God he never affirms that God is Personal. It would seem that the place to make this affirmation would be in the realm of individual perfection. God was intensely personal for Martineau, but perhaps he felt that personality was a complex attribute, not to be given in the list of analytical predicates. His omission of this attribute could not have been due to a fear of anthropomorphism, because he defends himself fearlessly against such a charge in other connexions.¹

When Martineau turns from the individual to the social view of God as perfection, he finds the humanity of man not as an individualizing force, but as a bond of fellowship between man and man. The secret communion between each heart and God is discovered to be repeated in all human hearts. The revelation of the all-Perfect is discovered to be not a confidential whisper to each ear, but one tone which vibrates through the universal medium of spiritual existence.² This discovery that God stands in one

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1. Martineau never feared the charge of anthropomorphism in regard to his thinking. He felt that men needed to be more anthropomorphic in their view of God. Henry Jones makes this assertion in a memorial address on Martineau delivered at Manchester College, Oxford. "The essential message of Christianity is that a perfect humanity is the most perfect revelation of God; or that the humanity of God and the divinity of man are two aspects of the same truth." Jones, *POH*, 15n. To such a statement it is likely that Martineau would have agreed.
 2. Martineau, *SOR*, II, 49.

relation to all men contains within it two significant truths. The first is the unity of all spiritual natures. There is an underlying oneness among all spiritual beings, a principle of union which penetrates all social attachments. The second is that God, as the All-Righteous, is the Source and Head of this great spiritual union. Thus we find ourselves face to face with the Kingdom of God. The life in which all spirituality finds its oneness is the life of the Kingdom. "The unity of Conscience in all wakes the prophecy of One acknowledged realm of Divine Law, harmoniously working towards a human perfection analogous to that of the higher world."¹ The theocratic conception of society rests upon certain principles in the spiritual nature of man. Martineau does not say that the Kingdom of God is an inference from man's moral nature, but such a conclusion is implied in this section. Humanity, as a moral organism whose Author is God, is the Kingdom of God. As the supreme moral ideal for society this is admissible, but to make the Kingdom consist of humanity as a moral organism is to make it more comprehensive than the teaching of Jesus would permit. The Kingdom of God is something more than moral perfection. It is a concept which Martineau would undoubtedly have developed in the third or spiritual phase of his theism, if he had developed that phase of his thought systematically.

1. Ibid., 51.

C H A P T E R F I V E

G O D A S S O U L O F A L L S O U L S

Although Dr. Martineau declared in his formal studies that his Theism rested upon two bases, the intellectual and the moral, one cannot read his treatises on ethics and religion without feeling that there is a spirit breathing through his lines which is not traceable to these two alone. This spirit is more strikingly felt when one reads his sermons and the addresses which were delivered outside the coldly logical atmosphere of the classroom. It would seem that a third phase of his Theism, which may be described as mystical, is definitely traceable. In the pages of his writing where this mystical phase of his thought makes its appearance we find him referring to God as 'Soul of All Souls,' 'Soul of Our Souls,' and 'Soul of Souls.'

If one could find another word to describe this phase of Martineau's thought besides the much used and much misunderstood term 'mysticism,' much difficulty and misunderstanding could be avoided by its use in this chapter. However, any other term which might be chosen, such as 'immediate personal awareness,' or 'psychical immediacy,' would be equally subject to misunderstanding and criticism. We shall endeavour, therefore, to make clear what is meant by the term 'mysticism' in this connexion, and continue to use it. As Dean Inge has pointed out, not all mysticism completely divorces thought and will from faith, forcing that faith to rest on feeling alone. In some mysticism the place of thought is recognised, and the mystical

experience manifests itself in a kind of transcendent clarity of thought. Professor Baillie shows that the emphasis on thought as well as feeling is central in the mystical conception of religion.

He says:

The central contention for which mysticism stands is certainly that of the direct and intimate nature of God's presence to our souls, but . . . it is not to our senses that He is thus present, but to our thoughts. That in our thoughts we can get closer to God than we can get to the things of sense by seeing, touching, and tasting them.¹

On the basis of this definition, Martineau's view of the immediate presence of God to the souls of men can be termed 'mysticism.'

In several of the articles concerning Martineau which appeared in the various periodicals at the time of his death, some mention was made of the deeply devotional aspect of his personal life, and his emphasis on the immediacy of God's presence in man. Pringle-Pattison has termed this emphasis in Martineau's thought 'speculative,' but he does not make clear his use of the term in this connexion. It may be that the use of the term 'speculative' was intended to designate this third or 'mystical' phase of Martineau's thought as Hellenistic, to distinguish it from the characteristically Hebraic mode of knowing God, which sees Him simply as 'another higher Person,'² Martineau, however, would have called the intellectual phase of his thought, which we have considered in the chapter on 'God as Cause,' the Hellenistic phase. The recognition of the importance of feeling which distinguishes this 'mystical' phase shows Germanic roots.³ Professor Craufurd, in his small monograph, "Recollections of James Martineau," writes at some length of this mysticism. Its emphasis upon thought as well as the senses is implied in the statement that Martineau's mysticism was of the higher type which was not unfriendly to philosophy,

1. Baillie, IOR, 227.

2. Pringle-Pattison, Martineau's Philosophy, Hibbert Journal, I, 458f.

3. Cf. the emphasis upon feeling in religion as found in the German mystics. Martineau, SAR, 123-125.

not seeking to replace philosophy but to transcend it.¹ In the same monograph Professor Craufurd mentions the frequency with which Martineau was accustomed to speak of God as "Soul of All Souls." The great interest which Martineau took in devotional literature, both prose and poetry, has already been mentioned in connexion with his editorship of the 'Book of Worship' for his own congregation, and of the three hymnals. Professor Fairbairn gives a further insight into Martineau's personal devotional practice when he writes:

He (Martineau) told us more than once that when he sought religious inspiration it was not to the thinkers of his own school or the teachers of his own faith that he went, but to the great mystics and saints of other communions.²

Martineau placed great emphasis upon the importance of thought and will in the growth of religion, but he also recognised that there were factors in the experience of religious awareness which were distinctly and uniquely religious. In the awareness of God there is a feeling of objectivity and certainty of which it can only be said that it accompanies the awareness of God. Intellect and conscience alone cannot account for the depth and richness of the communion of the soul with God. Principal Dickie, in the recent Gunning Lectures, while speaking of this uniquely spiritual phase of Martineau's thought, made a statement with which Martineau would certainly have been in full agreement. Principal Dickie says:

I am convinced that while religion in its higher form always takes up into itself and makes its own all the truth that the human mind has reached in all spheres of its activity, it has something peculiarly its own, so that it can never be fully expressed in terms of the non-religious, however acute and exhaustive may be our psychological or epistemological analysis.³

It is to give account of this uniquely religious element in man's nature that Martineau writes of the Religion of the Spirit, which

1. Craufurd, RJM, 23-25.

2. Fairbairn, James Martineau, Contemporary Review, 83:7.

3. Dickie, FYBT, 36.

gathers up into itself and yet transcends the Religion of Causation and the Religion of Conscience.¹ The direct, intimate, personal, immediate knowledge of God recognises inferential knowledge without resting upon it. Through immediate personal communion man is immediately known as well as immediately knowing; it is the presence of Spirit with spirit.

Professor Farmer, in The World and God, writes of the uniqueness of man's apprehension of God as "a living awareness of God as personal." His position is not vastly different from Martineau's. In the experiences of will man encounters a value-resistance in which he is aware of the authority and obligation of 'unconditional value.' Value possesses this 'unconditional' nature because it is authorized by the ultimate Will of God. Will means person, he says, for, "in and through the resistance of values the dimension of the personal is immediately known."² Yet, in the actual encounter with the 'Person,' there is a characteristic experience which is entirely unique, and incapable of being described in terms other than "a personal awareness of God." Of man's awareness of God he writes:

There always accompanies this awareness a reverberation of feeling concerning which we can only say that it is that peculiar feeling-tone which accompanies the awareness of God A situation in which God is livingly apprehended is like no other, and the feeling which attends it is like no other It is itself--- the peculiar reverberation of the soul of man to ultimate₃ being apprehended as meeting him in holy demand and final succour.³

The particular feeling to which this sense of awareness is most clearly traceable, in Professor Farmer's view, is 'awe.' In Martineau's thought the particular feeling by which God is immediately apprehended is 'reverence.' Both Professor Farmer and Dr. Martineau affirm that the response which man makes to this awareness is a response of the

1. Martineau, ERA, IV, 580.
2. Farmer, JAG, 24.
3. Ibid., 27.

whole personality, and yet both recognize that it can be described in no other terms than those in which it appears. Man has an immediate awareness or apprehension of God, and the experience in which this apprehension comes has its own feeling-tone which is indescribable. Man's direct communion with God is entirely unique.

There have been various attempts to explain why this spiritual or 'mystical' phase of Martineau's thought did not receive greater recognition and fuller development in his formal studies. Professor Pringle-Pattison, in the article on "Martineau's Philosophy" already referred to, states that it was probably due to a life-long fear of Pantheism and the danger that this mystical speculation might lead in that direction.¹ Such a statement cannot be supported from Martineau's practice as a thinker and writer. It was not his habit to keep away from a subject because he disagreed with its tenets or its conclusions. He made a careful study of the systems of thought which were opposed to his own, and wrote on them extensively in critical reviews and in his formal publications. Nor was he afraid to change his position when he saw the error of a mode of thought which he had previously followed. He had been reared in the Necessitarian tradition, and began his teaching while he held these views. Yet when he saw the extent of his disagreement with this system of thought, he left it and followed lines of thought which were more satisfying to him.

Another suggestion is that this lack of development of the spiritual phase of his thought was due to an imperfect escape from his Deistic background. Martineau's training had been in the cold intellectual atmosphere of a Deistic Unitarianism, and it is conceivable that he might never have freed himself fully from the influence of this tradition. The Deistic spirit which finds its later expression

1. Hibbert Journal, I, 458.

in what Principal Dickie calls "Humanistic Christianity,"¹ is allied with the belief that we come to the possession of religious truth by the exercise of our minds. Martineau emphasized the necessity of the use of mind in religion, but there are certain truths about God which the intellect as such cannot acquire. For Martineau, to know God was infinitely more important than to know about him. Thought has an important place in the apprehension of religious truth, but religion does not need to wait upon thought for its entrance into the human soul. Martineau writes at the outset of the Study of Religion:

In the soul of Religion, the apprehension of truth and the enthusiasm of devotion inseparably blend: and in proportion as either is deserted by the other, the conditions of right judgment fail . . . If it (religion) arises without conscious elaboration of thought, and is assigned to immediate communication from the Divine Spirit to the human, it is called 'Supernatural Religion.'²

The analytic method, by which we break into its parts for the purpose of study the experience which brings the apprehension of God, leaves us with a very imperfect picture of that experience. In reality the experience is not separated into its moral, intellectual, and spiritual elements, but is a synthesis of all three in which the full richness of the awareness of God is to be found.

We would suggest, rather, that the lack of development of the 'mystical' phase of Martineau's thought is traceable to a reason which lies in the nature of all religious experience. Many times in his sermons he makes mention of the fact that in the pulpit he is free from the chill, logical confines of the lecture room, and can present religious truth with greater warmth and greater accuracy. He felt that deep religious truth was a self-revelation of God to the individual which it was presumption to try to 'teach' in the lecture room. In the Seat of Authority in Religion, he writes: "Second-hand

1. Dickie, FYBT, 40.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 1 f.

belief, assented to at the dictation of an initiated expert, without personal response of thought and reverence in myself, has no more tincture of religion in it than any other lesson learned by rote.¹ There is no lack of the 'mystical' element in his sermons and addresses, from which fact it seems evident that the truth which it contained must be experienced through the communion of the worshipper and God rather than introduced to the mind through carefully reasoned argument. If, as Professor Pringle-Pattison suggests, he were afraid of the effect of this type of thought upon himself and his students, he was not afraid of its having a 'harmful' influence upon the people who worshipped in his congregations. We must trace the lack of the development of this 'mystical' phase of his thought in his formal studies to the utter impossibility of trying to teach what must be experienced.²

Although this spiritual phase of Martineau's thought has been mentioned frequently, yet no systematic study of this branch of his writing has come to print. Caldecott, in the Philosophy of Religion in England and America, seems to have been the first to point out that Martineau's thought contained this mystical element which was not accounted for by the two bases which he had developed for his Theism, the intellectual and the moral. We have noticed the testimony borne by personal acquaintances such as Professor Craufurd and Professor Fairbairn to the presence of this element in Martineau's personal life and experience. Professor Upton, in the second volume

1. Op. cit., vi.

2. There is some development of this 'mystical' phase in the Seat of Authority in Religion, the last and least scholastic of the formal studies. There it is emphasized that revealed religion must precede natural religion. Only in so far as God has revealed himself to man will man begin to look about him and trace the natural arguments for the Divine existence. The immediate self-revelation of God to man is the necessary condition to man's beginning to be aware of God's presence in the world. SAR, 300-313.

of the Life and Letters of James Martineau, which appeared in 1902, devotes a few pages to tracing the facts already brought to light by Caldecott, and to bringing additional evidence from Martineau's correspondence. Pringle-Pattison's article, some of the conclusions of which we have had occasion to question, was based upon the treatment of Martineau's philosophy by Professor Upton. In 1905 there appeared a small study by Henry Jones entitled The Philosophy of Martineau in Relation to the Idealism of the Present Day, in which this 'mystical' element was mentioned as showing Martineau's groping after the truths of idealism from his own realistic position. A subsequent treatment of the 'mystical' element is presented in Professor Webb's Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850, which was the Claus Petri Lectures at Upsala in 1932. The most recent allusion to the problem is in Principal Dickie's Gunning Lectures in Edinburgh, Fifty Years of British Theology, published in 1937. It is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter to bring together the fragmentary comments in the above works, and certain further evidences from Martineau's own writings, and to present systematically a study of the "Religion of the Spirit," and of God as Soul of All Souls.

The Religious Sense

As we have already noted in the Chapter on "God as Moral Perfection," there is some ambiguity in the use of the term 'Reverence' in Martineau's system of thought. It is in the significance of 'Reverence' that Caldecott finds the basis of the third phase, i.e., the 'mystical' phase, of Martineau's philosophy.¹ At the same point Professor Webb calls attention to the fact that Martineau has made a transition in his thought from the purely ethical sphere to the

1. Caldecott, POR, 348.

strictly religious.¹ To Webb's statement Martineau would agree, for he says that when man feels reverence toward the Infinite, the Ultimately Real, morality is swallowed up in and transformed into religion. Martineau says: "But with the opening of the heavens, a great redemption comes, and by presenting an infinite object of personal affection, converts the life of Duty into the life of Love."²

The transformation of the 'religion of conscience' into the 'religion of the spirit' comes as a result of the immediate apprehension of God through 'Reverence,' which is "a religious sense."³ The intuitions of Will and of Conscience are immediate apprehensions of reality, but it is only in the 'religious sense' that man is aware of the personal, intimate nature of reality. Only by 'reverence' which is the 'religious sense' does man apprehend God as the 'Soul of All Souls.' Reverence, in Martineau's system, is a primary sentiment, capable of being classed with the other propensions and affections in the Table of Springs of Action, but it is unique in that it occupies the supreme place above all the other motives.⁴ In reverence all the other motives are transformed and find their highest significance. Through the 'religious sense' man has "an immediate divine knowledge, strictly personal and individual."⁵ God so enters our minds as to be immediately known.⁶ Reason and intellect are not deprecated, because it is as though that this realization of God comes. Feeling is not denied its rightful importance, because in so far as the religious sense is a 'sense' it is in the order of feeling. Yet the realization which comes of the immediate personal Presence is above thought and feeling. It is entirely unique, describable only in terms of its self,

1. Webb, RTIE, 126f.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 27.

3. Martineau, TOET, II, 151.

4. Ibid., 206ff.

5. Martineau, SAR, 307.

6. Ibid., 305.

a direct personal awareness of transcendent Reality. God makes the immediate self-disclosure to the person who truly humbles himself in reverence before Him. Under no other conditions can God speak directly to the whole nature of man.

Where the Agent is Divine, and the recipient human, there can be nothing for the mind to do but to let the light flow in, and by the lustre of its presence turn each common thought to sanctity: the disclosure must be self-disclosure; the evidence, self-evidence; the apprehension, as we say, intuitive; something given and not found.¹

Here we must note a fact which is fundamental to the understanding of Martineau's religious philosophy as a whole. "The intuitive and personal character of revealed religion necessarily places it first in the order of thought."² It has sometimes been said of Martineau that he reached the higher spiritual levels only through a series of steps upward through intellectually and morally grounded theistic speculation. Such an assertion was made by the Reverend Stopford A. Brooke, in a Memorial Address to Dr. Martineau in 1900, as follows: "I believe that Dr. Martineau arrived at the close-fibred convictions he had concerning the predominance of the things of the spirit by first passing through the things of the intellect and the conscience in their relation to God."³ This misstatement, as I believe it to be, must have come from Brooke's acceptance of Dr. Martineau's assertion that his formulated philosophy was founded on intellect and conscience. However, the section on 'Natural and Revealed Religion,' in the Seat of Authority in Religion, and the statement in the introduction to the Study of Religion, that through all our intellectual metaphysical speculation on the logical questions in religion we come again only to the point where we started,

1. Ibid., 305.

2. Ibid., 313.

3. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 472.

i.e., the faith in the Reality of the Divine Being, make it clear that 'revealed religion' occupies the prior place. 'Natural Religion' is necessarily mediated through physical phenomena and the senses, and unless the individual has had the previous immediate revelation of God, these phenomena can in no way mediate God.¹ The vision of God must stand at the beginning rather than at the end of all speculation. It is not through the ethical, intellectual, or aesthetic intuitions that the original vision of God comes, but exclusively to the 'religious sense.'

The 'reverence' which arises within the soul towards divine things, the sense of the personal relation between the single soul and the Spirit of God, Martineau regards as characteristic of Germanic piety.

The mystic devotion of Eckart, of Tauler, of the *Theologia Germanica*, finding its way at last into Luther's doctrine of 'justification by faith,' expresses that self-abandonment of the soul, that merging of it in the life of God, which though breathing the most passionate humility, can spring only from the sense of essential and ultimate affinity with him.²

Martineau makes no attempt to limit the appearance of this attitude entirely to the Germanic races, because it has made its appearance from time to time throughout Christendom; but it is Germanic piety which has shown most clearly the marks of inwardness and spiritual depth which are characteristic of mysticism. The cord of Christian thought has three main strands, the Greek, the Jewish, and the German. The intellect, the moral will, and the affections combine to draw man up to a 'life in God.'³

We suffer, we think, we will; what we feel is the pressure of his laws; what we know is the order of his reality; what we choose is from his possibilities; and how can there fail to be a path to him from the sensitive, the intellectual, and the moral

1. Martineau, SAR, 309.

2. Ibid., 123.

3. Ibid., 124.

passages of our history?¹

The intellectual phase of Martineau's theism, he regards as Hellenistic, the moral is Hebraic, and the affectional is grounded on the writings of the German mystics.

The affectional relation of man and God is expressed by Martineau in three different ways: the first is 'immediate personal communion,' the second, 'loss of individuality,' and the third, 'union with God.' These terms indicate the forms which the immediate apprehension of God by the 'religious sense' may assume, and they may be regarded as marking the steps of the mystical ascent of the soul into the embrace of the Soul of Souls.

Immediate Personal Communion

The immediate personal communion of the individual soul with the 'Soul of All Souls' comes as "an immediate divine knowledge, strictly personal and individual."² There can be no condition intervening between the Self-Revealer and the recipient soul. In such an experience God is apprehended by man in direct personal awareness which is "the personal presence and real communion of the supremely Holy."³ The true language of devotion declares the living contact between the Divine and the human, a contact in which the Divine reveals its Reality. At this point in the experience the individuality of the recipient is never overshadowed. The worshipper is an individual, and holds individual, personal, immediate communion with the source of all Being, "the infinite object of personal affection."⁴ God is not apprehended as the universal Cause, nor as the Authority of Moral Obligation, but He is the Living God, the Loving Father. Unless the

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 17.

2. Martineau, SAR, 307.

3. Ibid., 308.

4. Martineau, SOR, I, 27.

individual is able to begin at the point of his individuality he can never rise to the heights where that individuality disappears in the union which is the life in God. "Our own spirit is the vestibule which we must enter, as threshold to the temple of the Eternal, and wherein alone we can catch any whisper from the Holy of Holies. A man who had never found his soul, could assuredly never see his God."¹

Loss of Individuality

The next stage in the mystical experience stresses the importance of true community of spirit between the souls of men and the 'Soul of Souls' by emphasizing the necessity of man's complete self-abandonment and loss of individuality. "There is no way to the peace of God but by absolute self-abandonment to his will that whispers within us, without reservation of happiness or self."² In two ways, through worship, and through meditation, man can abandon himself to such an extent that he can enter into complete communion with God. The immediacy of the communion between God and the worshipper is thus described in a sermon of Martineau's on "The Communion of the Saints": "That sublime ascent of the soul, that common flight of love, in which all individuality is lost, all personal regards absorbed, and the vision of Heaven and God melts the many minds and many voices of the church in one."³ Each worshipper, as he confesses his humility and casts himself upon God, hears his fellowman at his side speaking the same prayers, and realizes that to all men who bow in true devotion God speaks in the same tones of love. The arms of God's embrace are open to those who, through community of worship with their fellows, seek to lose themselves in His immensity.

1. Martineau, EAEL, 315.

2. Ibid., 22.

3. Ibid., 140.

Meditation, an act of mind by which the personal and the particular merges into the universal and the immense, is the other means by which man loses his identity in the boundlessness of God. The senses and the perceptions fall away, and the soul realizes its oneness with the immensity with which it is surrounded. In a sermon on "Silence and Meditation" Martineau writes:

It (meditation) brings, not an intense self-consciousness and spiritual egotism, but almost a renunciation of individuality, a mingling with the universe, a lapse of our little drop of existence into the boundless ocean of being. It does not find for₁ us our place in the known world, but loses it for us in the unknown.

There is no possibility of demonstration or argument, for man has immediate perception of the Divine, spirit to Spirit with God. "The isolation of his (man's) separate spirit passes away; and with the countless multitude of souls akin to God, he is but as a wave of His unbounded deep. He is at one with Heaven, and hath found the secret place of the Almighty."² It is not necessary to give any further elaboration of this point in Martineau's 'mysticism.' The soul which bends down in reverent meditation before God finds that God's infinite presence is so real and so immediate to him that his own individuality vanishes in the Infinite Spirit. Man's soul disappears in the embrace of the 'Soul of Souls.'

Complete self-abandonment and loss of individuality is one of the most widely recognized marks of mystical experience.³ When the

1. Ibid., 186.

2. Ibid., 188.

3. There is some question if the 'loss of individuality' is characteristic of the highest type of mysticism. By some writers it is thought that the mystical experience is an experience of a relation. If relatedness is retained throughout the experience, then it is clear that there must be no disappearance or complete absorption of one of the terms in the relation. 'Absorption' is a metaphor which does not necessarily imply the complete loss of the self. Professor De Burgh writes in this connection: "The mystic, the lover, and the poet alike bear witness that the revelation is no alien imposition, but inseparable in essence from the expression of their creative personality. Their being as individuals is not absorbed, but heightened and enlarged by the sense of contact." Furthermore, it would seem that Martineau's emphasis upon the loss of individuality in this phase of his thought is incompatible with his view of the significance of the distinctness of the self throughout the rest of his philosophy. De Burgh, TARP, 8; Cf., Pringle-Pattison and Underhill, "Mysticism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Fourteenth Edition, vol. 16, pp. 51 ff.

sense of direct and immediate relationship with God comes to the individual, he feels himself to be lost in the entirety which he apprehends. Professor Galloway writes: "The tendency of Mysticism is . . . to treat individuality as a vanishing quantity."¹ The same thought is given expression by Professor Leuba in the statement that one of the essential aspects of mystical experience is the 'merging of the individual and the universal.'² This experience is not altogether limited to religion, for when one contemplates majestic beauty, or grandeur, in art or in nature there is a tendency toward the complete negation of the consciousness of self, and the increasing sense of 'loss' in the contemplation. The distinctively religious experience, however, affords a greater sense of reality than the other similar experiences. God is immediately known as the Ultimately Real, and the 'loss' of self is a merging into boundless Reality.

Union with God

The culmination of the 'mystical ascent'³ is union with God. In the famous chapter on 'Mysticism' in the Varieties of Religious Experience, Professor James writes:

This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime or creed.⁴

C. C. J. Webb also mentions that this is the most characteristic feature of the experience of those to whom the term 'mystic' would be applied, the passionate aspiration after union with the ultimate reality.⁵

1. Galloway, POR, 161; Cf., also Siebeck: Religionsphilosophie; and Delacroix: Etudes d' Histoire et de Psychologie de Mysticisme.

2. Leuba, PRM, i.

3. Martineau, EAOL, 140; Here the 'mystical ascent' is referred to explicitly as the 'ascent of soul.' Cf., also Martineau, ERA, IV, 580.

4. Op.cit., 419.

5. Webb, PPOR, 34.

For Martineau, union with God is the crowning phase of the mystical experience, and as such it is the highest possible realization in religion. "Religion," he says, "is after all beyond the range of mere tuition. It is not a didactic thing that words can give, and silence can withhold. It is a spirit; a life; an aspiration; a contagious glory from soul to soul; a spontaneous union with God."¹ In the address which Martineau delivered on "The Three Stages of Unitarian Theology," he gives the clearest expression of this third or 'mystical' phase of his thought. In that address he explicitly stated that the 'Religion of the Spirit,' which is the third phase of his Theism, was the highest and culminating stage of Christian thought and experience. He wrote: "The life with God of which saintly men in every age have testified, is no illusion of enthusiasm, but an ascent, through simple surrender, to the higher region of the soul, the very watch tower whence there is the clearest and largest view."² In the experience of Jesus this consciousness of union with God reached its greatest heights.

We must own in him (Jesus) the supreme witness to the spiritual union of man with God;-- a union, which, were it constant as in him, might be deemed an Incarnation; but, where transient and intermittent, as with our lower fidelity, appears rather as a dispensation of the Spirit.³

In the immediate apprehension of God, possible to every man who bows his soul in silent, reverent meditation before the 'Soul of all Souls,' there is achieved the real and complete union with God, which is "the divine and the human, mingled in ineffable combination."⁴

In writing of the union with God in Christian experience, Martineau deals chiefly with the life of Jesus. In Jesus' experience the immediate self-disclosure of God to the human spirit⁵ was most

1. Martineau, EAEL, 425.

2. Martineau, ERA, IV. 580.

3. Ibid., 580 f.

4. Martineau, EAEL, 438.

5. Martineau, SAR, 311.

fully achieved. In Jesus we see an example of the perfect 'life in God,' which is the type of union possible to every soul.

In Jesus they (severest purity and gentlest forbearance) found their union in the one deep spring of all his life, his relation of devout love to the Father in heaven, as the infinitely perfect. Where this pervades the entire consciousness, and the touch is never lost between the human spirit and the Divine, all morals resolve themselves into a personal attitude of affection towards the supremely Holy, a private interchange of secret sympathy, of mutual understanding, of open trust . . . It is the singleness of this Life in God that gave its uniqueness to the personality of Jesus; referring back all his experiences to the infinitely Perfect, all his sorrows to the eternal blessedness, all his disappointments to the living Fountain of Hope.¹

Jesus showed to men how their intellects, consciences, and affections could be transformed into a religion of personal union between themselves and God, a communion between two invisibles, the soul of man and the Infinite Spirit.²

If Martineau were a trinitarian writer, then whatever he would say of the uniqueness of Jesus would not necessarily be applicable to the experience of ordinary humanity, but as a unitarian it must be remembered that he is writing of a type of experience possible to all men. In the section entitled "Theories of Union with God," in the Seat of Authority in Religion, he deals extensively with the fact that Jesus was trying to bring men to union with God, the Life in God, both here and hereafter. The difficulty which men have encountered has arisen from their rendering Jesus' acts and teaching sacerdotal, and have thereby made them simply instruments of institutionalized piety. In Martineau's own terminology, we could say that Jesus tried to take away the veil between man and God, and to render the life in God possible to all men both in this world and in eternity. The doctrines of the church, however, have taken the veil from between Jesus and God and placed it between man and Jesus. To render the Life in God

1. Ibid., 609, 611.

2. Ibid., 614 ff.

accessible to men we must try to do what Jesus did, namely, recognize the non-existence of this veil. If we recognize the presence of the Divine in the human, this will be accomplished.

The emphasis upon "the common essence of man and God,"¹ with Jesus as the means of revealing this community of nature, is one of the most characteristic marks of the 'mystical' phase of Martineau's thought. "The true language of devotion," he says, "declares the living contact of the Divine Spirit with the human, the mystic implication of his nature with ours, and ours with his."² This conception is expressed in the latest of all Martineau's writings, the review which he wrote in his ninetieth year on Balfour's Foundations of Belief, where we find these lines:

In opening to us this co-essentiality with God through His (Jesus') own personality, did He show us what is true of His individuality alone? On the contrary, He stands, in virtue of it, as the spiritual head of mankind, and what you predicate of Him in actuality is predicable of all in possibility.³

In the light of such explicit statements as those which have been quoted in this chapter, it is extremely difficult to account for a statement made by Hastings Rashdall. He says that among theistic people an immediate knowledge of God is claimed by very few, and that it is explicitly disclaimed by some strongly religious minds, such as Newman and Martineau.⁴ It would be impossible to read through a single one of the major works of Martineau without encountering an affirmation of the immediacy of man's apprehension of God, either explicit or implied. This fact certainly disproves the accuracy of Rashdall's statement. The statement that Martineau thought like a Socinian and prayed like a pietist, made by Dr. Forsyth in the London Quarterly Review soon after Martineau's death, and quoted in the

1. Martineau, ERA, IV, 580.

2. Martineau, EAEL, 14.

3. Quoted in Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 481.

4. Rashdall, PAR, 108.

Drummond and Upton Life and Letters, is more defensible.¹ Dr. Forsyth was evidently trying to show that the deep 'mystical' strain, present in Martineau's thought and life, was not taken into account in the rationalistic portion of his Theism. Dr. Forsyth's figure of speech implies, however, that Martineau had one mind when he was in his study and another when he was in his closet on his knees. This implies a division of life of which there is little evidence in the life of Martineau, "a Saint of Theism."²

To attempt to develop the 'mystical' phase of Martineau's thought further than he himself developed it would be to do violence to his Theism. That he never developed it fully himself is evidence that this was a realm of thought in which he could not see his way clearly to the end. He was constantly in search of truth, and at times it must have seemed to him that the highest truth was to be apprehended in the 'mystical ascent.' Particularly in his sermons it is evident that from time to time he perceived that there was a realm of truth in the direction of immediate experience of God which could not be ignored. He held consistently that immediately revealed knowledge was prior to inferential knowledge, both in order of achievement and in importance. The religious sense, by which through reverence man immediately apprehends the reality of God, is employed by man in his highest possible 'role,' as a child of God.

There is no attempt in Martineau's writing to deprecate reason, or to base religion on feeling alone. This, as Dean Inge points out,³ has been the desire of some who have called themselves mystics. Such individuals seem to desire that the Faith-feeling should remain a vague, mysterious apprehension of the infinite, an immediate intuition of the ineffable. This is not representative of

1. Op. Cit., II, 471.

2. Watson, James Martineau, Hibbert Journal, I, 253.

3. Inge, FIF, 55.

Christian mysticism at its best, for, says Dean Inge, "Christian mysticism appears in history largely as an intellectual movement, a foster child of Platonic idealism."¹ Martineau was a life-long student of Plato, but in his own thinking never departed from a natural realism. His 'mysticism' was not a pure order of feeling, for it was always with the mind that the vision of God was apprehended. "Religion," he said, "is a mode of thought and a mode of feeling."² In a sermon, "The Witness of God with our Spirit," in the Hours of Thought on Sacred Things, we find this statement:

A pure, faithful, devout and tender mind, borne down by no weight of stifled nobleness, and lifted above selfish fear and care, has the best key to the mysteries of humanity, and an insight into the counsels of the Infinite, clearer than acuteness and philosophy can give.³

In the clarified realm of immediate communion, God speaks to the mind of man.

Martineau's 'mysticism' has no affinity with the pre-Reformation type of mysticism wherein the eye of sense for the world was closed in order that the spiritual eye might see more clearly. His 'mysticism' was never an escape from the world, or a despising of the world, but, following the later mystics⁴ of the Germanic type, he brought the natural and the spiritual worlds together. He believed that through nature, as well as directly, God can speak to men, and that the natural and spiritual faculties work together to give man a sense of the immediacy of God's presence to him. The nature of man is such that God can speak to him immediately. "In the very constitution of the human soul there is provision for an immediate apprehension of God."⁵ Man is not only a creature of God, which characteristic he shares with the animals and the natural world, but

1. Inge, CM, 22.
2. Martineau, SAR, I, 3.
3. Op. cit., I, 54.
4. Inge, CM, 299.
5. Martineau, SAR, 651.

he is a son of God.¹ Therefore the communion between man and God is a mutual communion. This in itself bears witness to man's supreme place in nature. Martineau says: "I would be understood to speak of a direct and mutual communion of spirit with spirit, between ourselves and God, in which he receives our affection and gives a responsive breathing of his inspiration."²

The significance of the life and work of Jesus and the mutuality between man and God lead naturally to a further word in regard to Martineau's view of the unity of spiritual nature. The traditional conception had been that a great disparity existed between the Divine and the human. That which was human was natural, and innately evil and corrupt. God was Divine, and perfectly Holy, and hence was widely separated from anything natural. Martineau points out that in the trinitarian view the vast distance between man and God has been bridged by Christ. Through Christ's sacrifice man was redeemed from the sinfulness and evil of his natural state, and the spiritual nature which came to man as a result of his accepting Christ by faith was as vastly different from his previous state as the holiness of God is from the evil of nature. Only through Christ were men given a nature which could know God. Martineau, however, emphasizes the unity of spiritual nature. He contends that man, in so far as he is created a son of God, has a spirituality which is one with the spirituality of God. "There is one and the same righteousness for the whole hierarchy of spiritual natures."³ Man is not simply the creature of God, but bears His image. The unity of spiritual nature, and the image of God, were most clearly revealed in Jesus' life. When the life of man is dedicated and sacrificed fully to the

1. Martineau, *HIST*, I, 191 f; "The 'son' is the partaker of his essence.
2. *Ibid.*, II, 224.
3. Martineau, *ERA*, IV, 576.

Divine Will, then the imagine of the Divine is completed in that man. If the communion between a man and God were constant and complete, as it was between Jesus and God, then the life of that man could be called an incarnation. However, when the communion is fragmentary and intermittent, then it must be regarded as only a partial dispensation of the spirit. The unity of humanity and divinity, seen in Christ, Martineau taught to be possible to all mankind. Professor Upton writes of the significance of this view of Jesus:

This interpretation of His (Jesus') life on earth carries the Divine essence claimed for Him into our nature as His brethren. In Him as our representative, we learn our summons and receive our adoption as children of God. The 'Incarnation,' thus extended from the person of Christ to the nature of man, may fitly be called 'the central mystery of revealed religion.'¹

Obviously Martineau did not mean that there was no difference between Christ and man as we usually find him. There is no comparison great enough to express the disparity between Christ's righteousness and man's filthy rags. He says: "The interval between our lowest possible sin and our highest possible holiness is infinite, and can be expressed by no physical contrast of hell and heaven; and that interval measures the range of our power and the solemnity of our trust."² But man's 'highest possible holiness' Martineau equated with Christ's righteousness. The difference between man and Christ lay not in capability or possibility, but in actual achievement. In one of his sermons, while attempting to answer the question as to whether Christ differed in degree or in kind from other men, Martineau declared that he who always hits the mark, when all other men invariably miss it, is unique, yet not differing from other men in kind. The antithesis of degree and kind, which is borrowed from

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 481 n.
2. Martineau, ERA, IV, 576.

natural history, is absolutely empty and meaningless when it is transferred to the sphere of moral life.¹ In showing men the possibilities of their natures, Christ has revealed the essential unity of all spiritual nature. Man, created in the image of God, is capable of achieving the Incarnation of God even as Christ did. In Christ the veil between man and God was torn away. Or, to speak more accurately, Christ disclosed the non-existence of such a veil. The drama of reconciliation was transferred from the individuality of Christ to the life of humanity. The culmination of all personal endeavour, Divine and human, is spiritual unity.

The Living God

The task of determining the nature of God as revealed through direct communion of spirit with Spirit is difficult because the revelation attests the fact rather than the nature of the Presence. The mystical experience bears witness to His presence, it hears and remembers His demands, it carries a certainty of the reality of the experience, but it does not provide a 'picture' of the Spirit. Professor Brunner, in treating of mysticism as subjectivism, says that pietism or the medieval and later mysticism standing between rationalism and orthodoxy, has not attempted and cannot attempt the construction of a theology.² We can, however, deduce something of the nature of God who is apprehended in the experience of Him as 'Soul of All Souls.'

The God with whom man holds immediate communion is Living. He is a vital soul who is concerned with the affairs of our souls. His significance does not lie in the fact that at one time He lived and created, but that He is alive now, speaking to those who, through

1. Martineau, HTST, II, 218.
2. Brunner, POR, 41.

meditation and silence and prayer, open their souls to Him.

It is no outward change, no shifting in time or place, but only the loving meditation of the pure in heart, that can re-awaken the Eternal from the sleep within our souls; that can render him a reality again, and vindicate for him once more his ancient Name of 'The Living God.'¹

The one other attribute which is clearly deducible from the immediate awareness of God is His Personal Fatherhood. "The term 'Father' is appropriated to God in his absolute Unity."² The knowledge of Him which comes in the 'mystical' experience is personal and individual.³ In the Holy of Holies which man finds within himself, the voice which speaks to him is that of the Father. Christ said, "Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, and they also one in us." In Martineau's thought that which is predicable of Jesus' life is predicable of man's in possibility; hence this mutual indwelling of

1. Martineau, EACL, 353; Cf., Martineau, SIC, 194 ff., xxxi: Here the 'Living God' is contrasted with the God of intellect and Power. "Him that rules in heaven we can in no wise believe to be less perfect than that which is most divine on earth; of anything more perfect than the meek yet majestic Jesus no heart can ever dream. And, accordingly, ever since he visited our earth with blessing, the soul of Christendom has worshipped a God resembling him, -- a God of whom he was the image and the impersonation: -- and, therefore, not the God of which philosophy dreams, -- a mere infinite physical force, without spirituality, without love, chiefly engaged in whirling the flywheel of nature, and sustaining the material order of the heavens, and weaving in the secret workshop of creation new textures of life and beauty; not the God of which natural theology speaks, the mere chief of ingenious mechanics more optical, and dynamical, and architectural than our most skilful engineers, -- a cold intellectual Being, in the severe immensity and immutability of whose mind all warm emotions are absorbed and dissolved; not the God of Calvinism, creating with certain foresight of the eternal damnation of the many, and against the few refusing to relax his frown except at the spectacle of blood; --- but the Infinite Spirit, so holy, so affectionate so pitiful, whom Jesus felt to be in him as his inspirer; who passes by no wounds of sin or sorrow; who stills the winds and waves of terror, to the perishing that call on him in faith; who stops the procession of our grief, and bids bereaved affection weep no more; but wait upon the voice that even the dead obey; who scathes the hypocrite with the lightning of conviction, and permits the penitent to wash his feet with tears; who reckons most his own the gentlest follower, that rests the head and turns up trustful eye on him; and bends that look of piercing love upon the guilty which best rebukes the guilt. An infinite Being contemplated under this type is neither a fateful nor a logical principle, but a Living God."

2. Martineau, SAR, 408.

3. Ibid., 307.

the son and the Father in each other is the type of man's immediate awareness of God as a Personal Father.¹ There is something uniquely alive, rich, and immediate about the relationship which is personal. It cannot be described in terms apart from the language of personal awareness. God is 'other-than-self' to man, and man is 'other-than-self' to God. In man's immediate awareness of the 'other-than-self' his own self-consciousness arises. Thus God is as immediately known to man as his own self, through direct personal communion. Uniquely above all other creatures, man stands as the son of God, capable of immediate awareness of God as his Father.

Professor Upton has given a summary of the view of God in this 'mystical' phase of Martineau's thought in the following statement.

In this apprehension, then, of God as the Infinite, including all finite existences, as the immanent Absolute on whom all Noumena, whether physical or psychical, depend, and who progressively manifests his character in the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness, and Love, we have the inmost essence of Dr. Martineau's religious philosophy; and this fundamental conception of God as Soul of souls not only gives the rationale of all mystical experiences, but it also inspires and justifies that belief in consubstantiality and solidarity of the human race, which is the vital principle not only of Christianity but of all true sociological science.²

These attributes, as well as those of God as Living and Personal Father, can all be deduced from Martineau's thought, but I think Martineau himself would have been more inclined to agree with Brunner that it is impossible for this branch of thought to develop a theology. The immediate personal awareness is rather able to provide the richness and certainty which are lacking in the more coldly logical branches of a theology.

The affectional nature of God's presence more than anything else distinguishes the 'Religion of the Spirit' from the 'Religion of

1. Martineau, EACL, 311 f.

2. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 479.

the Conscience,' and the 'Religion of Causation.' God is the Divine, the Supreme Person, the Soul of All Souls, "who breathes the eternal poem of the universe and attunes our minds to hear it . . . When in the higher moments . . . you catch some faint tones of a voice diviner than your own, know that you are not alone, and who it is that is with you."¹ Thought or Will or Feeling alone is powerless to bring knowledge of God, but the three-fold cord of a religion of intellect, conscience, and the spirit, binds man in a close personal relationship to God his Father.

You do not so much as touch the threshold of religion, so long as you are detained by the phantoms of your thought: the very gate of entrance to it, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush of a fancied angel's wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls.²

In his highest moments, when he has direct personal communion with God, the 'Soul of all souls,' man finds the beginning and end of all true religion, the immediate awareness of God in his own soul.

1. Martineau, HPST, I, 57.

2. Martineau, SOR, I, 13.

C H A P T E R S I X

SOME FURTHER THEISTIC PROBLEMS

Free Will

In Martineau's doctrine of Free Will we are face to face with one of the most important points in his entire system of thought. Upon no other point hinges such a large proportion of his systematised thinking. It is, as he says, his answer to the ultimate problem of all philosophy and religion, "How are we to conceive aright the origin and first principle of things?" His answer involves directly his view of the self, his doctrine of freedom, and his explanation of the problem of causality.

At the outset he rejects the idea of force as the ultimate principle of all things on the grounds that it fails to explain the data, and that it leads to atheism. In this connexion he traces the position which was occupied by Mill back to Hobbes, and quotes the latter thus:

When we seek after the Cause of any propounded effect, we must in the first place get into our mind an exact notion or idea of that which we call Cause, viz., that a cause is the sum or aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agent and the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect propounded; all which existing together, it cannot be understood but that the effect existed with them; or that it can possibly exist if any one of them be absent.¹

This, Martineau comments, might be regarded as a satisfactory definition for the purposes of natural science, but it does not

1. Hobbes, Elem. Phil., P. I, Ch. vi., Sec. 10; Quoted: Martineau, ERA, III, 572.

account for the question as to why this phenomenon appeared rather than that, or why any at all appeared rather than none. There is no way, according to the doctrine of blind force as causality, to explain the appearance of the knowing intellect. The lower cannot be thought to have created the higher. It is inconceivable that out of the unconscious should have come the thinking being. This doctrine goes hand in hand with the creed of atheism.

It is no better, Martineau thinks, when we turn to the other extreme and try to deduce causality from pure mind or intellect. To him it is unthinkable that the story of creation could be rewritten stating that, 'In the beginning was Thought.' Under such a doctrine he thinks it is impossible to account for the force necessary to the production of objective effects. "How metamorphose a passage of dialectic into the power of gravitation, and a silent corollary into a flash of lightning?"¹ This doctrine, while appealing to the mathematical and metaphysical scientific mind, is not adequate to the explanation of phenomena.

The other criticism which Martineau makes of this view of causality is that it eventuates in Pantheism. If it allows the word 'God' at all, it makes Him only a Thinking Thing, and not a Living Person. To place all things within the interior of God takes from Him the possibility of any field of objective operation. Personal existence is more than mere thinking. The phenomena of the universe could not be referred to a God who was merely a thinking Being.

The solution which Martineau advances is not a choice of either of these extremes, but a middle ground which includes and yet transcends both. He says:

Quitting the two poles of extreme philosophy, confessedly

1. Martineau, "Unity of Mind in Nature," ERA, III, p. 113.

incompetent in their separation, we submit that Will presents the middle point which takes up into itself thought on the one hand and force on the other; and which yet, so far from appearing to us as a compound arising out of them as an effect, is more easily conceiyed than either as the originating prefix of all phenomena.¹

In this way he makes provision for the presence of both intellect and activity in the sphere of causality so conceived. He thus neither attempts to pass from pure force to thought, nor does he attempt to make thought supply any force.

The activity of will is not, like that of the intellect, a subjective transit of regimental ideas, but an objective power going out for the production of effects: nay, it is free power; exercising preference among data furnished by internal or external conditions present in its field; and it thus constitutes proper causality, which always implies control over an alternative.²

By making the Infinite Being through whom this causality is expressed to be the Living God, Martineau places his moral theism as the balance point between the atheism of force, and the pantheism of all-consuming thought. This same view is brought out clearly in the essay, already referred to, entitled "Is There Any Axiom of Causality?", in which it is emphasized that the cause of phenomena must be something other than phenomena, hence a Noumenon. The tracing of a sequence of phenomena is not sufficient to explain causality. In the Noumenal Self, with which Martineau invests causality, are combined intellect and power in such a way as to constitute agency. This agency is Will in operation.

But let us ask the further question, how this will, is to be regarded as free. It is free, he says, in the sense of making a choice, that is, in determining an alternative. This Will is capable of exercising a real preference between two alternative possibilities. It possesses the power of accepting or rejecting either. He says: "The casting vote and verdict upon the offered motives is with him

1. Martineau, "Unity of Mind in Nature," ERA, III, 115.

2. Ibid., 115.

(the active self) and not with themselves; he is 'free' to say 'Yes' or 'No' to any of their suggestions: they are the conditions of the act; he is its Agent."¹

It is not against the Determinists as such that Martineau here brings his critical power to bear. They make it clear where they stand, in their denial of the power of the self to determine alternatives. The phenomena of existence, one of which is the self, are for the Determinist determined in their origination and their destiny. By showing, as he has done, that causality cannot rest with phenomena but must go behind these to a noumenon, Martineau has established his case against the atheistic thinkers who look upon blind force as causality. Against those who stand theologically upon a doctrine of predestination by God against the free will of man, he reiterates his doctrine that what we know of will we see to be free, and in this small finite experience of causality we see a picture of the infinite causality of the Infinite Being, God. In regard to this he says:

The free element in the human soul is not less surely a valid type of the free sentiments of God and the free powers of all spirits, than are its law-bound elements of the legislation regulating the conditions of all thought. As in the latter we have a clue to the whole realm.²

He admits that if man had the power of predicting accurately the particular voluntary actions of himself or other men, the proof of their determinate origin would be unimpeachable.³ As it is, however, only those acts which are habitual or which arise from single motives can be predicted, and these are both cases in which there is a notable absence of will.⁴ He denies determination in any of these forms but it is those who claim to hold to freedom and yet

1. Martineau, *SCR*, II 229.

2. Martineau, "Unity of Mind in Nature," *ERA*, III, 100.

3. Martineau, *SCR*, II 280.

4. *Ibid.*, 259.

limit it in such a way that it loses its truly free character that he particularly criticises.

One type of so-called freedom against which he contends is that which is seen in the writings of Kant. Here freedom is asserted, but it is defined as a negative type of freedom. It is simply the absence of hindrance to spontaneous action in a given direction. Freedom for Kant is the property of causality in virtue of which it acts independently of foreign determining causes. Freedom is thus the power of an act of causality to go its own way unimpeded from outside itself. In this Kant is followed by Schopenhauer who applies the term to the liberty of a stream to flow unimpeded within its banks, or the sweep of the wind. This Martineau will not grant to be real freedom, because it lacks that which is distinctive of freedom, namely, the power of deciding an alternative. Necessity, according to Martineau's view here, is not only the absence of foreign restrictions, but the limitation to one possibility as well. The spontaneity within the confines of this one possibility, which Kant holds to be true freedom, Martineau bluntly calls necessity. He attacks Bain also on the same point. Bain identifies self-determination with spontaneity by affirming that any act which arises from within in contrast with one imposed from without is a free action. Martineau, as we have already seen, holds that an action which arises from one motive only may come from within, but there is no action of the will in the spontaneous response to a single motive. The distinction which he draws is this: "Spontaneity denotes action from within in the absence of any counter forces or irrespective of them: self determination, in their known presence and in spite of them."¹ In such an act, therefore, arising from a single motive, there is no

1. Martineau, SCR, II, 237.

volition and certainly no freedom.

The other type of pseudo-freedom which Martineau attacks is that which calls a voluntary act one which arises solely from the character of the agent. He quotes Mr. Shadworth Hodgson in this regard as saying: "The agent gives rise to the act of choice, not the act to the agent: the act flows from, presupposes, and is evidence of, the character of the agent." And again he says: "The whole validity of moral responsibility depends upon the necessary connection between the character of the agent and the character of his act."¹ Such a position would seem to imply that the self has no power of discrimination or determination apart from the aggregate of previous experience, that the self, in fact, has no existence apart from the character which through past experiences has been established. This doctrine of the self is not compatible with Martineau's view. He holds that the self has an existence and a power of agency apart from the character which forms the content of the self concept. He holds that there is a 'present self' which has an existence apart from its motives or from its formed habits, which make up its 'past self.'

Martineau says:

Is there not a Causal self, over and above the caused self, or rather the caused state and contents of the self left as a deposit from previous behaviour? Is there not a judging self, that knows and weighs the competing motives, over and above the agitated self that feels them? The impulses are but phenomena of your experience; the formed habits are but a condition and attitude of your consciousness, in virtue of which you feel this more and that less; both are predicates of yourself as subject, but are not yourself, and cannot be identified with your personal agency.²

Martineau is seriously criticized for this phase of his thought by Professor Pringle-Pattison in an article on "Martineau's Philosophy," in the first volume of the Hibbert Journal. Professor

1. Hodgson, Spectator, Jan. 25, 1879; Quoted, Martineau, SOR, II, 237-8.
2. Martineau, SOR, II, 227.

Pringle-Pattison says that the distinction between the character and the self which has the character is meaningless. "A characterless self is an abstraction of which it is impossible to predicate agency." "A self over and above the concrete self of character is no more a reality than a thing apart from all its qualities. . . . It is the abstraction of form without matter and can do no work in the real world."¹ Martineau's answer to such a criticism would be that there is no real agency apart from the free action of the will, for which he is contending by this very argument. To make a person entirely determined by his past ties him hopelessly in the fetters of his motives and his habitual responses; such a person is no free agent. Martineau would not deny the power of the past over the self in shaping decisions. A man's character is certainly one of the forces which help to determine his responses, but his decision is not bound to be in accord with the past. Martineau's answer seems to be in these words: "The 'character' thus reported to us (through a volitional act) includes the will; and so, while determining the act, leaves room for self-determination."² It would seem, as one reads further in Professor Pringle-Pattison's article, that he too recognises the power of the agent to choose other than that which he has habitually chosen. Otherwise how could he speak of 'breaking the yoke of the past'? He says: "The absolute claim of the moral ideal, and its infinitely regenerative power in breaking the yoke of the past, seems to me the real fact to which the moral consciousness testifies."³ The moral ideal can have this power only in so far as it operates through moral beings, and unless these beings as free agents can choose in contradiction to their past habits and character, then the regeneration which lies in the breaking of the yoke of the past is impossible. Martineau would seem to be right in holding that the

1. P. 461.

2. Martineau, *SCR*, II, 239.

3. Pringle-Pattison, *Op. Cit.*, p. 461.

self has a power of self-determination apart from and even possibly in direct contradiction to its past character as the determining agent. There is a present self which is a free agent for volition.

Martineau's starting point in establishing his own doctrine of freedom of the will is to trace the steps in the psychology of volition as ascertainable through a study of our own present self-consciousness. He feels that this method is likely to bring us to more valid conclusions than is Bain's attempt to reconstruct a psychology from memories of infantile experiences. Bain had contended that the baby begins to act **at** random and eventually comes upon certain primary pleasures. This process Martineau inverts. He contends that from the first the baby begins to act, of course to some extent at random, in an endeavour to find the satisfaction to felt needs. He says:

The first movements, called spontaneous, are not random, but on lines prescribed by certain organic wants or tendencies; and the first pleasures are simply the satisfaction of these wants. Life is not a mere wriggling into contact with something nice, which thenceforth becomes its master; but contains within itself its own directing forces, which select what it is to do, and crown the doing by satiety.¹

It is, for Martineau, some want or need that spurs the action and in some measure directs it. The satisfaction of that want becomes pleasure, and the disappointment pain. Thereafter these pleasurable or painful experiences do play a part in determining the actions originated within the organism. He cannot agree with Bain and Mill that the pleasures and pains are mere chance.

As the individual develops the extent to which the self becomes the determining subject for all phenomena increases.² The identity and continuity which constitute the permanence of the self enable it to employ its previous experiences in the making of a

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 215.
2. Ibid., 236-239.

determination, and yet to be something other than the mere sum of these experiences. The true nature of the self, says Martineau, emerges when the consciousness of the self as an identical and continuous personality is seen to include the consciousness of the power to control impulses and to modify acquired character.¹ This implies also the selective or preferential function of the will. Until this ability of selection, and the power of self-determination become a part of the self-consciousness, the full nature of the self is not realized.² It is thus, for Martineau, in volition that the self emerges. Without admitting the freedom of the will we can gain no true picture of the self. "You yourself, as a personal centre of intelligence and causality, are at the head of the transaction, and determine how it shall go."³ The last test to which Martineau submits the doctrine of necessity as compared with the doctrine of freedom of the will is the ability to account for the facts of the moral life. He admits that statements made by both sides have been rendered questionable by exaggeration, but his decision is that the necessitarian theory is incompatible with veracity in God and with Duty in man. If God placed within man the belief in his own Freedom as only a chimera of the imagination to which there is no corresponding objective truth, then His place as holy, and man's Duty which arises out of his ability to determine an alternative, are both false. Upon God's truth and holiness, and man's duty to choose the higher of two possible courses of action, Martineau rests his faith. The self stands above its motives and its acquired character, conscious of its power and its duty in the selection and determination of its acts. The Noumenal self is the intelligent, controlling subject of all its phenomena.

1. Martineau, *SOR*, II, 229.

2. "Will does not come into play till the attempt to control the spontaneity, and make it do this and not that, i.e., till there is some selection. Ibid., 222.

3. Ibid., 229.

Immortality

In Martineau's statement of his faith in Personal Immortality there is little, if anything, that is unique or original. The value which it has lies in the strength with which he presents the basis for our faith in 'life in death,' and in his criticism of the obstacles which are usually encountered by one who tries to think through the problem. Professor Upton's comment on the value of Martineau's presentation of the case for a religious faith in immortality is this:

Dr. Martineau has done excellent service to Religion, both by weakening through the force of his philosophical and scientific arguments those physiological and metaphysical obstacles which for many persons, in the present day, bar the way to faith, and also by voicing in most forcible and eloquent words that prophecy of Immortality which is implicit in the inexhaustible potentialities and yearnings alike of the Intellect, the Conscience, and the Heart.¹

The evidences which Martineau presents are to be viewed as Prophecy rather than Proof. He designates them simply as prophecies or demands, and points out that proof is impossible. The truths of immortality are the premisses of a faith which goes before proof. In a letter written to the Rev. C. J. Sweet, Dr. Martineau, in his ninety second year, expresses as follows the impossibility of proving immortality:

It is only secondary truths that admit of what is called proof; the premisses of which are given in a little group of the primary, which we have to take on trust and believe on the blended witness of our thinking and affectional nature. If the scientific intellect, reasoning on the data of sense, cannot follow man further than the grave, Love and Conscience cannot bury him and have done with him there, but will follow him into the Invisible, which completes the justification of his whole nature. Faith is thus presupposed in proof, and also supplements and transcends it.²

Ulterior life, in Dr. Martineau's thinking, was transcendental, like God, but was none the less an object of thought. In being beyond

1. LL, II, 443 f.

2. Martineau, Letters; Quoted: Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 237.

experience as such, it was withdrawn from the field of vision, but it participated in the eternal ground of both experience and 'vision.' From the point of view of such a faith he surveyed the physiological, the metaphysical, and the moral aspects of the problem.

In the consideration which he gives of the physiological and metaphysical evidences, he aims at little more than warding off certain unfavourable assumptions which have been urged against the possibility of immortality. The value of his arguments is thus chiefly negative. In dealing with the physiological aspect of death he first approaches it from the point of view of the naturalist. The organs of a body are intended to perform certain functions. In so far as we concern ourselves only with the lower functions, such as nutrition and respiration and the like, it is clear that with the cessation of the life of the physical organs the functions will also cease. When, however, we pass beyond these lower activities of the organism to the conscious and voluntary activities of the human being, it becomes immediately apparent that we do not know the nature of the organic activity upon which this part of life depends, and we cannot affirm that this activity is cut off with death. We neither know its organic basis, nor can affirm its end. In so far, then, as the mental and organic phenomena lie apart, we cannot affirm that the destruction of the organism is the end of the mental life.

If the structure, when seen through and through to its minutest changes, brings us no nearer to consciousness, the cessation of these changes takes us no further from it. It is a mistake therefore to imagine that the mere organic history covers the whole field of this problem, and by its termination demonstrates consciousness to be extinct: we are not entitled to say more than that the signs and evidences of consciousness have vanished.¹

Further, "they (the mental concomitants) are exempt from the law of conservation which pervades the physical sphere: they belong to

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 332.

another universe: and Mind emerges as something independent of Matter."¹

This, as Martineau sees, is rather more inclusive than is useful. The same which has been said of human mental activity here may also with equal validity be affirmed of animal consciousness. The distinction is to be made, however, between animal consciousness and human consciousness, that whereas in the animal the organs are governed by purely zoological springs of action such as responses to the needs of food, shelter, reproduction, and caring for the young, in man the springs of action include the secondary, or self-conscious list. In man there is a complete inversion of the relation between the bodily organism and the animating intelligence. His capacities and affections are not measured by the needs of his bodily structure, but they transcend these needs of the body and "claim the right to . . . use the whole animal outfit in the service of their own higher ends."² The reference here is to such sentiments and attitudes of the self-consciousness as Wonder, the sense of Beauty, Compassion, Sympathy, and Attachment.³

When he turns from the physiological to the metaphysical aspects of the problem, Dr. Martineau brings out clearly what is meant by the self-consciousness, "the permanent principle of personality,"⁴ which distinguishes human life from the life of the lower organisms. This self is an entity which is successively conscious of phenomena as its own, but the fact that it ceases to be concerned with phenomena does not necessarily deprive it of the possibility of continuing as a subject of phenomena. In this he is saying that a self-conscious being is not dependent upon its attributes. In this lies the real

1. Ibid., 335.

2. Martineau, Letters; Quoted: Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 448.

3. Martineau, SCR, II, 343 f.

4. Ibid., 351.

distinction between a physical object and a person, i.e., self-conscious being. A physical object is known by the sum of its perceptible characteristics. In knowing it we are dependent upon a perception of its phenomena. This is not true of a self-conscious being. The identity of the self-consciousness consists in its being the abiding subject of changing phenomena. He says:

A personal being . . . may remain the same under a total change of all perceptible attributes: the identity consisting, not in partial similitude at different times, not in a reserve of stereotyped phenomena, but in the Unity of the Ego or Self to which all the attributes and phenomena belong, -- a unity undisturbed by the greatest contrasts of experience and revolutions of character. This durable selfdom attaches to us, not as conscious, but as personal (i.e., self-conscious) beings.¹

The self is thus clearly discriminated from the physical which it animates. It is therefore clear that no destruction of the physical body of man necessarily involves the cessation of the self-conscious life.

The next concern is with the two metaphysical contentions of pantheism against individual immortality, that (1) the relation (of the Ego to the Universal Mind) has begun, and therefore it must cease, and (2) that the egoistic personality is finite and cannot hold its ground amid the infinite. In answer to the first Dr. Martineau feels that the opposite contention is equally valid. "If . . . the Supreme Mind set up at a given centre a personal subject of thought and will like his own, with adequate assignment of causality, what is to prevent this from being a freehold in perpetuity? . . . Why may not the communicated Divine nature endure as long as the uncommunicated Source on which it lives?"¹ The second principle, that personality is a finite phenomenon and must sink back into its infinite ground, Martineau rejects on the ground that it does not

1. Ibid., 350.
2. Ibid., 355.

recognize the true nature of the self. The self, having its own self-conscious will and causality, need not be thought of as in contradiction to the Infinite will and causality. He draws an analogy from mental life, and points out that because a lesser mind knows a portion of what is knowable in a certain field, this is not to restrict a great mind from knowing that same portion even as it knows vastly more. Martineau's most astute answer to this pantheistic position is made in harmony with his view of the continuous self-identity of the personality after death. He says: "If it be metaphysically impossible for a finite subject to coexist in antithesis to the infinite, it is not an impossibility that begins with death."¹ If the pantheist grants any degree of self-existence now, he must not take away the possibility of this at death. Martineau then says further that the pantheist insists that after death comes the highest life.² How can this be the highest life, he asks, if thought and love and reverence and will and such like are absent? These are certainly the highest phases of human self-consciousness. The self-conscious identity of the personality, he contends, is not lost in the Infinite at death, but continues as the remembering, loving, conscience-guided, willing, permanent monad which God has called into existence.

At the close of the metaphysical section we find Martineau encountering a problem which he forces upon himself by the realistic view of space and time which he retained in his thinking. One of the difficulties which he finds in immortality is in the matter of location in space. The subjective Ego is always here as opposed to all else which is there. Now with the passing of the bodily locus for

1. Ibid., 362 f.

2. The reference here is to Schleiermacher's doctrine of the loss of the individual and the temporal in the boundless eternal at death.

the there of others, the only space position to be known by the self is its own here. He says: "But when this (the visible form of the other's locus) has vanished in death, we have no help towards that Space-condition, which yet is no less indispensable than before; and we have to cast about for some possibility of fixing the soul in a definite seat of existence."¹ The solution which he presents for this difficulty is very weak. He says: "If Boscovich and Faraday ask for only points of space in which to lodge and from which to direct the attractions and repulsions that constitute the cosmos, no more is needed for the concentration of consciousness and will."² His entire position would have been much stronger here if his view regarded space as relational rather than real. It is difficult to see how in his own thinking Martineau could harmonize this realism of space and time with his concept of the self.

To these negative considerations of the problem Martineau adds the positive demands for immortality which he finds in the moral aspects of death. His contention here is that "the divine ends manifestly invrought in our human nature and life are continuous and of large reach; and being here only partially or even incipiently attained, indicate that the present term of years is but a fragment and a prelude."³ The postulate upon which he builds his case is this: "Some sort of proportion we expect, and never fail to find, between the endowment of a nature and the persistency and range of its achievement."⁴ He finds in the intellect of man greater powers than are required for his life in this world of limitation. Man, he says, is conscious of a larger capacity and more ulterior ends than this present scene of humanity offers. Here again we encounter the

1. Martineau, **SOR**, II, 366.
2. *Ibid.*, 366.
3. *Ibid.*, 367 f.
4. *Ibid.*, 368.

realism of time and space. Rather amusingly he points out that man studies the heavens and is at a loss to know why he is so endowed with sight and yet not permitted to travel to the objects of his wisdom and interest, Man's study of the heavens is like a traveller before a journey consulting a chart of the country in which he is to travel.¹ It would almost seem that Martineau was toying with the possibility of visiting after death the constellations on which he had lectured in the course on Astronomy which he gave at the Liverpool Mechanics' Institution during his first years in that city. Through all the vaticinations of the intellect, in the cognitive, the reasoning, and the creative faculties, he sees the demand for a greater life. The same he finds in the affections. Love he sees to be greater than the limits of this life on earth. The love which is so real here cannot be thought to cease when one of the parties is disembodied. In love man touches depths and intensity far beyond the exigencies of this present life. From all these considerations Martineau is led to argue for the indispensability of immortality.

In the voice and demands of conscience, however, the felt demand for personal immortality speaks forth most clearly. The conditions of a responsible existence are such that there must be a probationary period and a retributory period. If this is true, then the experience in the world cannot be regarded as furnishing full retribution. There is a demand for a longer period in which full retribution of reward and punishment may be made. It is true that many of our decisions bring their own immediate retribution, but not, however, a full and complete retribution.

It is impossible to admit that our Moral nature runs through its own cycle, and fulfils its own idea, in our experience here. It announces a righteous rule which again and again it brings to mind and will not suffer to be

1. Ibid., 372.

forgotten, but of which it does not secure the execution. It is a prophecy, carrying its own credentials in an incipient foretaste of the end, but holding its realization in reserve.¹

The two possible ways through which retribution might be wrought here in this world are (1) through the hand of Nature, and (2) from the sentiments of men. From these two sources there can, however, be expected no final justice. Nature is seen to visit with ill-health those whose lives are temperate and well-governed as well as those who are reprobate. There are also certain limitations which make it impossible for men to administer by the bestowal or withholding of their favour anything approximating ultimate justice. Men are neither faultless in their moral judgments, nor can they see all the acts which constitute the character of any given individual. Furthermore, the danger in depending upon the approval or disapproval of men for moral reward or punishment is heightened by the fact that a given individual who was far above his fellowmen would be hindered from rising too high, just as surely as another man would be prevented from sinking too low.

These considerations are summed up by Martineau in the following two inferences,

(1) that everywhere, -- in our conscience, in our physical nature, in the sentiments of associated men, -- there are indelible marks of a morally constituted world, moving towards righteous ends, and (2) that nowhere, within us or out of us, do we find the fulfilment of this idea, but only the incipient and often baffled tentatives for realizing it by partial approximation.²

The conclusion is, therefore, that this is an unfinished system, a prelude and a prophecy of a justifying and perfect sequel. Immortality is therefore an absolute requirement for moral existence.

One further word must be added about the nature of this immortality. It is, according to Martineau's view, to be a growth

1. Martineau, *SOR*, II, 388.

2. *Ibid.*, 393.

and continuance of the personal, i.e., self-conscious, existence, which has been begun here. This is clearly brought out, not only in the section just referred to in which the criticism of Schleiermacher's view is given, but also in some striking passages from his correspondence. The distinctive characteristics of man, upon which so much rests in Martineau's view, are summed up in the fact that he is a self-conscious being. When the Divine Being exercises causality, and a human being comes into existence, it is not merely an existence that is begun, but a thinking, ordering, selecting, creative existence. It is a self which has a separate although dependent existence. It possesses a self-identity which distinguishes it from the supreme source of all existence. At death this self is disembodied, but this does not mean that it loses its identity and is swallowed up in the Infinite. On the contrary, it continues in its distinct self-identity just as surely as when it possessed a locus in space discernible as its body. "The end pursued by the will of the Creator is . . . to set up what is other than himself and yet akin, to mark off new centres of self-consciousness and causality, that shall have their separate history and build up a free personality like his own."¹ There is no impossibility in such a separate existence which may be regarded as beginning at death. Martineau holds that there is just as surely an object for the love of a widow in the continuing self of her deceased husband as if he were alive. The object of her love had been, and continued to be, not the physical body but the personality of her husband which was his self. If man is to have love for God and knowledge of Him after death, then there must be a continuance of that self-identity which loves and knows. There is no real immortality unless there is a

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 364.

continuance of that personal self-consciousness which now is. In one of Martineau's letters we have a passage in which he shows clearly the incompatibility between Schleiermacher's doctrine and his own. He says:

In his (Schleiermacher's) construction of a theology he started from a principle-- the consciousness of dependence-- and worked upon a method-- of analysis of feeling-- from which he could gain, and did gain, no faith in either a Personal God or the Immortality of the individual soul; and to me a religion which is destitute of these beliefs has no moral or spiritual worth.¹

The finest expression of Martineau's own position is to be found in a letter which he wrote to a friend about the time when the Study of Religion was brought to publication. It reads:

I keep fast to my early belief of 'life in death'; nor have I the least apprehension that the individuality of any soul is either suspended or lost in the transition to a higher stage of being. I can conceive of an ulterior life only as the promotion of the same personalities to a more advanced term of spiritual education; nor do I doubt that they who have left us are simply on their way before us, and wait to help us on ours when the moment shall strike for us to join them.²

We could ask for no more explicit statement of a faith in Personal Immortality.

1. Martineau, Letters; quoted: Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 100.
2. Martineau, Letters; quoted: Ibid., 95.

Space and Time

The last of the theistic problems encountered by Martineau with which we shall deal is his view of Space and Time. Here we find him occupying a rather curious position. He holds partially to the subjective and idealist view of both these concepts, but, refusing to accept this view in toto, he proceeds to identify himself with a realistic, objective view, rejecting emphatically the idealist position. Since most of the material which is now available in regard to his own position consists in his criticisms of other systems, it is difficult to reconstruct a clear picture of his view. The class lectures, which were available to Professor Upton at the time of the writing of the Life and Letters, must have contained a more adequate expression of Dr. Martineau's own position than is now to be found. However, we can gain a fairly clear representation of his position from his criticisms and statements in the Study of Religion, and the Essays, Reviews, and Addresses.

As we have seen in his theory of knowledge, Martineau held that in the experience of cognition the knowing self was simultaneously and equally conscious of its self and an other-than-self. He goes further and says that in the same experience the self differentiates its own here from the there of the object of cognition, and every other there. Likewise it distinguishes its own now from the then of a remembered object or experience. The concepts of space and time which are gained are just as immediately known as are the self and its other-than-self. It is in this particular that Martineau attacks Sir William Hamilton's contention that a remembered experience is not immediately known. Sir William Hamilton had said that man could not have an immediate knowledge of a past experience,

because immediacy was excluded by a thereness and a thenness to some extent removed from the here and now of the remembering mind. Martineau, on the other hand, holds that in any act of perception there is the same thereness and thenness. If a man smells an orange the orange does not enter into and occupy a position of here and now in the mind. The sensations are mediated through the intervening space by the air and the sense organ and the nerves, but the idea is immediate to the mind. He contends, therefore, that when the smell is remembered the idea can be as immediately present to the mind as it was on the occasion of the original experience.¹ At this point Martineau asserts that the ideas of space and time are not forced upon the mind by something external to it, but arise from within it in the act of perception or cognition. In this regard he follows Kant in holding that the ideas of space and time are apriori, making their appearance in the mind on the first occasion when the self encounters an experience in which it perceives some object as there and then in respect to its own here and now.² In this sense the concepts of space and time are subjective, arising within the mind for the explanation of its external relations. It is against J. S. Mill's empirical doctrine of space and time that Martineau is contending when he thus urges the apriori rather than the aposteriori view. Mill's empirical doctrine derived the concepts of space and time from experienced phenomena. The concepts are learned, like any other observed property of things, by analysis of experience.³ Kant's view was that space and time were conditions presupposed in experience, and belonging to the experiencing self. For Kant space

1. Martineau defends here the position of Reid which Hamilton is attacking, namely, that "memory is an immediate knowledge of the past." Martineau says: "Nor does its possible remoteness in time or place disqualify it for the name, 'immediate object.'" ERA, III, 470.
2. Martineau, SOR, I, 79. Cf., Ibid., p. 68.
3. Ibid., 61.

and time were 'principles of arrangement,' which the mind brings to the 'manifold of sense.' In this way the mind gives to the data of sense a certain law as its mode of handling them.¹ These principles of arrangement belong to the mind in its analysis of experience, and in so far as they are concerned with spatial and temporal relations, Space and Time are regarded as the forms of experience, and hence are ideal. Martineau, rejecting the a posteriori view of Mill, followed Kant because he felt the latter's view to be adequate to account for our belief in the external world.

Martineau does not, however, carry through to the end with Kant in this subjective view. He refuses to grant that the concepts of Space and Time are only man's subjective way of perceiving and thinking, having no real existence beyond this. Diverging from Kant's view, Martineau turns to an emphasis upon the objective reality of space and time. By objectivity he means that it does not come and go as do pain and pleasure with the presence or absence of sentient animals, but that it remains as the irremovable and ever-ready condition of causal activity.² It is not objective in the way that a sensation such as that of redness is objective, but it is a constant objective form of relations. Man's consciousness, Martineau thinks, apprehends these ideas of space and time as objective, and we must trust as valid the witness which our intuitions bring of the world beyond the contents of our own consciousness.

In this objective-subjective view of space Martineau is following closely the position of Plato as interpreted by Cousin. This, according to Professor Stokes, is the interpretation of Plato's view of time and space which was held by Aristotle, and may be accepted as being as accurate an interpretation as we can achieve.

1. Martineau, SOR, I, 50.
2. Ibid., 79.

Space, for Plato in the Timaeus, is the 'receptacle' of all becoming. The idea of it is unchanging, begotten, and imperishable. Space is everlasting, admitting no destruction, but affording place for all things that come into being, itself apprehensible without sensation.¹ With this, as we have seen, Martineau would agree in holding that space and time were objective in so far as they were the forms of the relation of beings, unchanging with the fluctuations of the subject.

The ideas of Space and Time, in Martineau's view, hold good for all reality and for all thought, both **Divine** and human. He holds them to be the conditions of all causality, and as such they are self-existent realities with the Divine Will. Professor Upton writes of the place of these concepts in Martineau's thought: "Time and Space possess in his philosophy the same real character which they do in the spontaneous judgments of mankind."² Of time and space no limits can be thought. They are both divisible, but this is because we can think of the beginning and end of existence in time, and of the measure of finite objects in space. The concepts themselves, however, are infinite.³ Hamilton had said that the distinguishing characteristic of space and time was indefinite possibility of which we know no end. Martineau went further and affirmed that they were not indefinite but infinite, holding that they are infinite realities of which we know there is no end.⁴ His point of departure from the Kantian and post-Kantian critical philosophy was identical with that of Trendelenberg, namely, that the subjectivity of space and time do not prejudice their claim to objectivity, and that space and time were both empirically and

1. Stokes, "Space," E.R.E., XI, 759.

2. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 284.

3. Martineau, SOR, I, 415. Martineau asserts that space and time are co-extensive and co-eternal with God. This is Aristotelian and not Christian, for Christianity asserts that space and time are created by God.

4. Martineau, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 482.

transcendentally real.¹

The natural realism which appears throughout Martineau's philosophy is very clearly expressed here. He says that unless we place a firm trust in the beliefs and feelings involved in the exercise of the natural faculties we make all knowledge impossible, and open the way for boundless error. He is ready to affirm the objective reality of these ideas of space and time, which intuition tells him are real, until positive proof is presented to him of his error. The ideas do have a subjective origin, but they present a trustworthy picture of objective reality. He says:

In spite, therefore, of its relative, its negative, its subjective character, we are disposed to vindicate the real, positive, objective validity of that infinitude which we ascribe to extension and duration. The same remarks apply to other entities of thought, as substance and cause, soul and God. These notions are all vehicles of indestructible belief in certain ideal objects as real.²

The veracity of these ideas cannot be doubted without doubting the consciousness in which they make their appearance and out of which they arise. The clearest statement of Martineau's position here is one which Professor Upton quotes from the manuscript of his class lectures:

We solve no mystery, therefore, by plunging into the idealism, to which, as Jacobi has conclusively shown, Kant's doctrine of the pure subjectivity of space and time inevitably leads; hence, while we admit that they are objects of a priori knowledge, given us through the subjective action of our own perceptive faculty, we must retain them as objects of real and not imaginary knowledge, -- the infinite, uncreated, eternal data which constitute the negative conditions of all being and all phaenomena.³

The use which Martineau makes of his conclusions in the working out of his theology is very interesting. When he comes to his doctrine of God he employs the concept of Space in building the inference for two of God's attributes, namely, Unity and Infinity.

1. Martineau, SCR, I, 77.

2. Martineau, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," ERA, III, 483.

3. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 284.

In establishing his doctrine of the Unity of God he is faced with the problem of avoiding the view of God as the 'unconditioned Absolute.' If God embraces all causality and the source of all existence in Himself, then does He not become the 'unconditioned Absolute' which Spencer affirms to be completely unknowable? This Martineau answers by stating that a Cause needs something else than itself in order to be operative, some condition present with it. A cause, he says, is a cause only when it stands as one term of a relation. The condition, then, must be self-existent with the Divine Cause.¹ Martineau finds two possibilities for the fulfilment of this condition, either matter or space. The former would be capable of being moulded to the Divine purpose, and the latter would be capable of having forces or beings thrown into it at any of its points. If, however, all power and all causality are to be reserved for God, matter cannot be the self-existent condition, for matter possesses resistance, form, and magnitude, and as such would be capable of exerting a negative force. "Thus power, instead of being all given to the causality of God, is assigned to a double seat, being partly in Him, and partly in matter."² This view Martineau rejects in favour of the other which makes space the pure condition of causality. "When, on the other hand, you cut down the co-existing datum to Space alone, you leave a pure condition which has no pretensions to a dynamic character; and the whole volume of Force has to ask for its genesis, and finds it singly in the Divine causality."³ This view of the relation of the 'pure' condition and causality, he says, recommends itself to his mind because of its metaphysical neatness and its effectual discharge of the problem of

1. Martineau, *SOR*, I, 406.
2. *Ibid.*, 406.
3. *Ibid.*, 406.

Dualism. The attitude which he has taken here towards space and against matter bears witness to the ever-present influence of Plato on his thought. It will be remembered that for Plato the 'other' for cause was space, viewed as the 'receptacle' into which all being was projected, the limitless and indestructible field of receptivity. The doctrine which Martineau rejects is that of the prima materia of Aristotle.

The other use which Martineau makes of his view of space in his doctrine of God is in establishing His Infinity. If we only reason from phenomena, he says, we should have to stop short with affirming that God is indefinitely great. However, since space, which we can affirm to be infinite, is the self-existent condition of causality, we must hold that the Supreme Will is capable of operating in any point in its condition. The potential causality must be at least co-extensive with its condition. Since it is impossible to maintain a disparity of scope between the Cause and Condition of all things, then we may conclude that they share the same dimensions, and that the Cause is Infinite. By the same sort of reasoning Martineau establishes the eternity of God from the infinity predicable of time. There could not be anything a parte ante nor a parte post in existence without postulating a superior Cause. Since God is the Supreme Cause, then He must be Eternal.¹

There are certain difficulties in the view of Space and Time which Martineau held which cannot be overlooked. Chief among these is his attempt to establish the absolute self-existent reality of the two concepts. We can agree with him that they are empirically real, i.e., that they are real for experience and for appearance, but transcendental reality is more difficult to establish. As subjects

1. Martineau, *SOR*, I, 414-417.

we experience the spatial and temporal relations of objects as real. A man can affirm that a tree at which he is looking is occupying a different position in space from himself. He knows also that the fruit which he sees ripening on the tree is different in time from the blossoms which he observed on the tree a few months before. The spatial and temporal relations are real for the experiencing subject; but for the objects themselves the relationship possesses no such real character. Time and space cannot be affirmed of objects as things in themselves apart from a knowing subject. At least, Martineau does not establish this important step in his case for the ultimate reality of the concepts.

A further difficulty is encountered when an attempt is made to conceive space and time apart from the objects with which they are filled. If they were truly self-existent realities, co-eternal and co-extensive with God, then before God's creation of phenomenal objects which fill both time and space, they must have been empty. Such unfilled space and time are pure abstractions to which we can ascribe no meaning. Professor Pringle-Pattison rightly says of empty time what might also be affirmed of space: "Empty time -- a time in which nothing happens -- is a conceptual abstraction which has no place in real experience. Form without matter nowhere exists."¹ Alexander attempts to create in his mind the concept of empty space by thinking of a material object occupying a given amount of space and then abstracting from his mental picture all the qualities of the object so that the space concept alone remains.² This type of self-hypnosis whereby one induces oneself to visualize a non-existent cube, let us say, is a very clever mental gymnastic, but it must be remembered that when all the qualities are abstracted, including the

1. Pringle-Pattison, *IOG*, 351 f.
2. Alexander, *STD*, I, 39.

form of 'cubeness,' the concept of a given size and shape of space which the cube occupied before its abstraction, and which was intended to be left empty, has disappeared also. The qualities of location and extension and duration do not belong to the thing in itself, but are supplied by the thinking subject. Space and time may be empirically real, but they cannot be established as transcendental realities, as Kant has shown.¹ Martineau is right in affirming that a remembered object may be just as immediately thought as one which is present at the given moment to the senses, but this does not prove the absolute reality of space and time. It only serves to confirm that the spatial and temporal qualities of the object exist in relation to the subject. The practice of fixing dates further shows the dependence of time upon a subject. We say that a certain event took place in 1900. This is simply fixing upon a given moment, in this case the birth of Christ, from which certain subjectively determined units of the time-flow may be counted. For the things of sense time has a certain divisibility and succession which we can deal with as real, and, upon this basis, we may deceive ourselves into thinking that the spatial and temporal relations which we assign to an object are inherent in that object itself. These relations, however, are supplied by the subject; they are real, to be sure, for the relation of subject to object, but not for any two objects in themselves. As Buber has pointed out, the 'I-It' relation is set in a context of space and time, but the completely subjective relation of 'I-Thou' is non-temporal and non-spatial. Only when the 'Thou' has passed into an 'It' does it enter the context of either space or time.² Professor Lamont, in making the 'Object Moment' to be the 'just past,' is placing emphasis upon the fact that time is

1. Kant, CPUR, B 52; Cf., Translation by Kemp Smith, p. 73.
2. Buber, IAT, 33.

a quality of the subject-object relation.¹ In the realm of the subject-subject or object-object relationships the reality of time and space cannot be established. Thus the only time that is real is filled time, and the only space that is real is filled space, filled, that is, with a subject and an object which stand in relation to one another. We can only think of space and time as relational qualities.

Martineau designates our knowledge of time as a knowledge of before and after, rather than of past, present, and future. This would seem to be a verbal device to avoid the necessity of accounting for the significance of the present moment. He would prefer to regard the present moment as a mathematical point. However, it must be recognized that there can be no before and after without their being before and after something, and that something is the present moment of a given subject.² B.C. and A.D. indicate a before and after for the subject Christ, and the point which is the present moment must still be subjectively determined. As Kant, Bergson, Pringle-Pattison, and James have shown, the present moment, the "duree reelle," is empirically real, having a certain comprehension within itself which is more than the mathematical point, but that it is transcendently real cannot be proved. The only escape for Martineau would seem to be in making time real for God, a Spinozistic device which he has rejected in other connexions.

All that we designate as time may be in the specious present for God for whom the reality is eternity. Just as the hour, which is to man only a small unit of clock time, is to some of the lower organisms a complete life span, so the centuries of man are to God as a moment when it is past. Martineau would seem to identify

1. Lamont, *CWT*, 84.

2. On the significance of the present moment, cf., Hocking, *IGHE*, 430.

eternity with infinite time. This we cannot accept, for time is movement and alteration and constant change,¹ while eternity is the same yesterday, today, and forever. A more satisfactory view is that of Professor Pringle-Pattison, in which eternity is seen in some way to contain the time flux, and yet to be above it and independent of it. All the ages of the time of man may be in eternity only a sort of 'saddle back,' as James suggests the present moment is to us, possessing a fore and aft and some width between, but occupying no magnitude determinable in terms of eternity. Eternity cannot be identified with an infinite extension of time.

A further difficulty in Martineau's view is the making of space to be the self-existent condition of Divine Causality. As we have seen, he made space a 'pure condition,' possessed of no magnitude, form, or resistance, and hence he believes that he escapes a Dualism. He does, perhaps, escape a Causal Dualism by defining Divine Causality as possessing all the force there is, but if he affirms the reality of time and space he does not escape a dualism in reality. If all existence comes from God, then no account is given of their genesis; or, if they do not, and are really self-existent, then the dualism remains. He might have done better to have called them self-subsistent non-entities, as Kant suggests,² if he were really seeking to avoid an existential dualism. As it is he has succeeded in escaping a dualism of causality only to leave himself with a dualism of ultimate existence.

The difficulty which Martineau sees in placing souls in space after death is the result of this naive realism. If spiritual beings must be assigned to a place or location in real space, we might

1. Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 352.

2. Kant, CPuR, B 57. Translation by Kemp-Smith, p. 81.

aggravate an already ludicrous problem by asking such a question as 'Where is God?'. Martineau seems in fact to have faced this question in affirming that although we cannot say that God is Infinite, yet we can say that space is infinite, and God must be as extensive as His condition. Martineau's views of space and time represent some of the weakest points in his metaphysical system.

C H A P T E R S E V E N

THE INFLUENCE OF MARTINEAU

In bringing this study to its final chapter it is fitting that some account should be given of the influence which Dr. Martineau exerted upon his contemporaries and upon the third of a century which has passed since his death. An appreciative and accurate estimate is given by Professor E. C. Moore, of Harvard University, in the closing pages of his book, the History of Christian Thought since Kant. This evaluation is interesting also because it comes from America, where Martineau's greatness was felt even before his influence reached its height in his own country. Professor Moore says:

We can think of no man whose life more nearly spanned the (nineteenth) century, or whose work touched more fruitfully almost every aspect of Christian thoughtfulness than did that of James Martineau. We can think of no man who gathered into himself more fully the significant theological tendencies of the age, or whose utterance entitles him to be listened to more reverently as seer and saint.¹

We cannot read the great number of articles written in sincere appreciation of Martineau's life and work, which appeared in the various periodicals and magazines at the time of his death, and remain unmoved. Praises came from men of various communions. Tribute was paid to Martineau's genius and spiritual greatness by Roman Catholic writers, leaders in the Church of England, and representatives of the nonconformist bodies. The philosophical and religious journals in America were likewise laudatory.

1. Moore, CTSK, 234.

It is true, as Merz has pointed out in his History of European Thought, that Martineau had little or no influence on continental thought. Only one of his essays was translated into German, and although some of his works were well received in France, there was no translation of his work into French. Only in Holland did he receive any significant recognition, where he was granted the honorary degree of S.T.D., by the University of Leyden in 1874. The fact that this honour, and the honorary degree from Harvard University in 1872, came several years before he received any academic honours in Great Britain, shows how proximity may veil a man's greatness from his fellows. Honorary degrees came to him in subsequent years from Edinburgh, Oxford, and Dublin, but only after certain prejudices due to his nonconformist loyalties had been lost sight of in his eminence.

The tremendous influence which Martineau exerted was the combined result of several factors. Along with gifts of genius in mental equipment he possessed the capacity for unstinting labour. His interest and his activities spread to many fields. From the time of his graduation from Manchester New College until the weakening of his health in the last years of his principalship of that institution, he carried the double burden of teaching and preaching. His teaching career at the College extended from his first appointment to the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy in 1840 to his retirement from the principalship in 1885. As a critic and reviewer his period of activity extended from the appearance of a discussion of Priestly in the Monthly Repository, in 1833, until his critique of Balfour's Foundations of Belief, in the Nineteenth Century, in 1895. As has already been noted, the five volumes of his formal studies of ethics and religion came from the press after he had passed his eightieth year. To these must be added mention of his influence as a man. To

all who came in contact with him he gave the impression of essential greatness and gentleness of character. His correspondence to intimate friends, and to other friends whom he never met, shows the extent to which he gave of himself in true Christian love to those who came to him. In his ninety-second year he published a little book of four sermons on faith. Not one of his talents was left unmultiplied, for he used the years and the gifts which were granted to him with exemplary faithfulness and fruitfulness.

His Progressive Influence on the Century

There is no better way to gain an impression of the impact of this great life upon his times than to trace in some detail the progressive influence which was his in various spheres. The first which we shall note is that in which his name is likely to live the longest, that is, the field of preaching. To men who could not agree with him in the philosophy of religion, doctrine, or biblical criticism he was an inspiration through his published pulpit utterances. The first volume of the Endeavours After the Christian Life was published in 1843. The sermons which this volume contained were not doctrinal, but deeply spiritual and highly inspirational. They were intended for the spiritual nurture of the worshippers rather than as an apology for Unitarianism. Martineau was engaged, during the time when some of these sermons were being preached, at the Paradise Street Church in Liverpool, in the Liverpool Controversy, wherein all his apologetic powers were expended in defending the Unitarian position against attack by thirteen Church of England clergymen.¹ Nevertheless nothing of the spirit of this

1. Martineau's discourses in the Liverpool Controversy may be found in the volume entitled Unitarianism Defended, which contains the full text of the thirteen speeches delivered by the three Unitarian ministers.

controversy obtrudes itself into his sermons. His pulpit utterances were discourses of great spiritual power and philosophical insight. It is a significant tribute to the power and the depth of these sermons that they inspired the religious sympathy and admiration of such a preacher as F. W. Robertson of Brighton.¹

Neither the sermons which he preached nor the manner of their delivery, however, was such as would place Martineau in the front rank of popular preachers. His sermons were carefully wrought in style and form, and contained philosophical matter of such weight that a full appreciation of their artistry and insight would be impossible on one hearing. They are filled with dignified and colourful metaphor, but they are more suited for reading than hearing. It has been stated by some who heard Martineau regularly that a certain amount of training was necessary before one could follow his sermons from beginning to end. It was necessary for the listener to bring to the discourse a serious concentration of mind if he were not to become lost before the end. However, after one had become accustomed to this rigorous practice, the sermons of ordinary ministers seemed empty and shallow by comparison. Martineau's preaching undoubtedly set high standards of philosophical insight and grandeur of style. A difficulty which some of his hearers found was the tendency to let the mind wander in admiration of his literary artistry. When some particularly beautiful passage was delivered the thought of the hearers tended to linger for a moment to contemplate the beauty and the picturesqueness of the style. Such a practice was unfortunate, however, because any moment lost could not be regained. The movement of thought was constant, and to lose the thread of the discussion was to find difficulty in regaining it.²

1. Academy, Vol. 51, p. 455.

2. These impressions are recorded by E. P. Cobbe in the Contemporary Review, Vol. 77, pp. 174 ff.

It has been said that this type of preaching would not make the preacher popular, and yet, while not making a popular appeal, Martineau did attract large numbers to his church, and through his sermons wielded a powerful influence over the people who heard him, and over his contemporaries in other pulpits. An interesting incident, indicative of the strength of Martineau's preaching, is related in the article on Martineau in the Dictionary of National Biography. "An indication of his local influence is afforded by the circumstance that in 1837 the Wesleyan Conference was urged to make special appointments at Liverpool, a reason assigned being the presence of 'the brilliant Martineau.'"¹

The second volume of the Endeavours after the Christian Life appeared in 1847. Subsequently the two were brought together and published as a single volume of forty-three sermons, this being the fourth edition in 1866. The demand for this group of sermons continued unabated, and by 1885 they had reached the eighth edition. In 1876 Martineau published the first volume of the second collection of his sermons, the Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. He had some misgivings about bringing this volume to press because he felt that some of the ideas which it contained would not meet with widespread approval, and to a certain extent this proved to be true. The Hours of Thought were not as universally acclaimed as had been the Endeavours, but there was no lack of deep appreciation for them on the part of those who held the theistic position. The second volume of the Hours of Thought appeared three years later in 1879. The relation of this second collection of sermons to the Endeavours is well expressed by Professor Drummond, in a statement largely drawn from the preface which Martineau affixed to the Hours of Thought.²

1. Gordon, "Martineau," Dictionary of National Biography, Supp. III, p. 147 b; Cf., Gregory, Side Lights on the Conflicts of Methodism.
2. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 32.

The volume represented a considerably later stage of feeling and experience than the "Endeavours after the Christian Life," and bore traces of the more recent aspects of religious speculation; but it retained essentially the same view of life, the same conception of the order of the world, and the same interpretation of the Christian mind. The new lights of historical criticism had certainly changed, in no slight degree, our picture of the origin and growth of the Christian religion; but every larger comprehension of the universe only invested the principles of that religion with sublimer truth; and every added refinement of conscience the more attested their spiritual worth.

These were sermons which had been preached at the Little Portland Street Church in Liverpool during the period in which Martineau was also engaged in teaching in London.

Another group of sermons was collected and published in the last of the four volumes of Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, in 1891. These were sermons preached on special occasions, the titles of some of them being their own explanation. "Views of the World from Halley's Comet" was an imaginative sketch of what might be seen of progress and change on the earth on the occasions of the periodic approach of the comet. "Need of Culture for the Christian Ministry" was preached at the fiftieth anniversary of Manchester New College. "Ireland and Her Famine" was delivered following the taking of a collection for the relief of famine sufferers in Ireland in 1847. In this group also appears "The Three Stages of Unitarian Theology," preached at the Anniversary of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association in May, 1869. In it are to be found some of the finest expressions of the 'mystical' or spiritual phase of Martineau's theism.

The last book which came from the pen of the nonegenarian 'Saint of Theism' was a volume of four short sermons on Faith and Self Surrender which appeared in 1897. These are not the most powerful of his sermons, but the fact of their publication at such

an advanced age bears striking witness to the author's undying love for preaching, and his own dedication of himself to the ministry of the preached word.

A much-quoted description of Martineau entering the pulpit in Paradise Street Church, Liverpool, written by the Rev. Charles Wickstead, shows him with countenance full in repose of thought and yet animated with intelligence and enthusiasm as he ascended the circular staircase. When he began to speak, with a voice clear, strong, and musical, without being in any sense loud, "he completed the conquest of his hearers."¹

An excerpt from Martineau's letter of resignation from the Little Portland Street Chapel in 1872 is a striking expression of his devotion and humility. He says:

To the congregation which I have tried to serve I bid farewell, with deep gratitude for much earnest help and cooperation,-- for patience under my shortcomings and encouragement under my despondencies,-- for many precious friendships with the living and the dead,-- and for catholic sympathy, often in spite of intellectual divergence, with a ministry chiefly devoted to the building up of the Christian life. May a higher inspiration and a more effective wisdom take possession of the place which I resign.²

Thus at the age of sixty-seven he resigned the pulpit, not in order to gain leisure, but in order to devote his full time to the duties of teaching and the principalship of Manchester New College, in which he continued for an additional thirteen years. It is difficult to estimate the extent of the influence of a preacher whose first volume of sermons went through four editions after he retired from the pulpit. Within his own communion, and far beyond its borders, he exerted a powerful influence upon the preaching of the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Another factor of his influence as a minister, which was

1. National Portrait Gallery, Pt. 78, p. 139; cf., Drummond and Upton, LL, I, 72 f.

2. Quoted: Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 13.

not directly connected with the pulpit, was his championing of the nonconformist position. Martineau never gave his assent to calling Unitarianism a denomination. He was desirous of having a national church in which freedom of theological and doctrinal beliefs was permitted. As long, however, as this was not possible, he felt that he must stand firmly for the independence of thought among Christian believers in the way that was open. In the volume, Unitarianism Defended, and in an address entitled "Why Dissent?", delivered at the opening session of Manchester New College in October, 1871, Martineau stood forth fearlessly in defence of nonconformity. He placed no undue importance on sectarian lines, but he felt that the demands of conscience must be obeyed, even if it meant dissent from the national church which was his ideal. He spoke frequently in favour of a comprehensive national church system wherein freedom of conscience would be tolerated. His most extensive apology for doctrinal independence is to be found in the introduction which he wrote for the later editions of J. J. Tayler's Retrospect of Religious Life in England. In this introduction he traces the rise of nonconformity, and shows the value to be derived from freedom of opinion as opposed to a church-imposed system of doctrine. By his own eminence and exemplary life he gained a hearing for the case for nonconformity which would have been otherwise impossible.

The second major sphere of Martineau's influence which we shall notice is his teaching. To his teaching he gave more years of his life than to any other part of his work, with the possible exception of review writing. He began to teach immediately after his graduation from College, when he was called back to Bristol to take charge temporarily of the school of Dr. Lant Carpenter. This work was of short duration, however, because Dr. Carpenter decided

to disband his school. The result was that when Dr. Martineau went to Dublin to enter upon his duties at the Eustace Street Presbyterian Meeting House some of the pupils from Bristol followed him there in order to remain under his tuition. The practice of having private pupils he carried on throughout his years in Dublin until the incident of the Regium Donum. When he removed to Liverpool he continued to have a few private scholars, and in addition he delivered some lectures at the Liverpool Mechanics' Institution on Experimental Chemistry and Physical Astronomy. It was also during the period of his first Liverpool ministry that he began lecturing at Manchester New College as Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy. From this appointment in 1840 until his removal to London Martineau continued his weekly trips to Manchester to deliver his lectures. Apart from the year which he spent in Germany his period of service in teaching was unbroken.

In 1857 Manchester New College moved to London, and Martineau gave up his work in Liverpool to take up more extensive duties with the college. He continued as Professor until 1869, when, at the death of Mr. Tayler, he was appointed to the principalship. He retained the position of Principal until he retired in 1885. His teaching duties were gradually lessened as the increasing administrative requirements of his position and his own advancing age demanded. As Principal not only his intellectual but also his personal endowments were placed at the disposal of the students. From the reports given by the young men in the college, it is evident that a more intimate relationship between Martineau and his students arose at the time of his advancement to the principalship.

The attendance was never large at any of Martineau's classes. One of his students, who later occupied a teaching position

as his colleague in the College, states that at the height of Martineau's reputation one would be likely to find no more than half a dozen in any given class. This fact is largely traceable to the small number of students in the College which was his field of labour, but this in no way limited the exercise of his powers. It may be safely assumed that it was not the eminence but the freedom of his position which was attractive to him. The principle upon which the College was founded was one of "freely imparting theological knowledge without insisting on the adoption of particular theological doctrines." Such spiritual freedom was necessary for one who adhered as Martineau did to his own maxim that "there is no life but in perpetual growth." One could not imagine him giving up the freedom of his position in order to enhance his own reputation. He remained open-minded to new light on any of his doctrines, and in any other atmosphere he could not have been happy in his work.

A noteworthy characteristic of his teaching was that he reserved for his students the freedom of thought which he demanded for himself. He did not endeavour to lead them in well-worn paths for the sake of safety, but encouraged them to exercise their own minds in the construction of their theological beliefs. A man who had been one of his students gives the following record of his attitude.

The freedom which Dr. Martineau welcomed for himself he accorded in full measure to his pupils. No man knew better that we may err in giving intellectual form to our imperfect vision of the infinite God, and that our descendants may climb to heights which our feet have never trodden; and accordingly he never repressed by the weight of his authority the immature thought of the learner, but rather stimulated him to greater exertion, and taught him to love the truth above all earthly gains, and to toil, though it should be with weary and lonely steps, towards that resplendant summit where she reveals herself transfigured in the cloudless light of heaven. . . It was not his aim, therefore, to awaken incessant doubt, but to aid his students in forming strong and manly convictions founded on their own personal thought, and on the witness of their own spirits, to help them on their way by leading them to the sources of the necessary knowledge, and by enriching the

partiality of their opinions by large and catholic judgments.¹

It is difficult to imagine a finer tribute from a student to a professor.

Professor Mellone, of Dublin, records that the students who attended Martineau's classes were not all drawn from the Unitarian group. Men of various denominations in religion and philosophy were drawn to him, and acknowledged their indebtedness to him in the spiritual conflicts of the day.² It is possible that a larger number of students would have been drawn to Dr. Martineau's lecture room if his formal studies had been published earlier. As it was, his influence as a teacher was entirely independent of his writings. Thus his importance as a teacher lay more in the length and strength of his teaching career, than in the numbers who heard him.

The phase of Martineau's work which brought him into greatest eminence, and through which he exerted his longest influence, was his criticisms and reviews. It has been commented that his formal studies came nearly a third of a century after their greatest usefulness. He compensated for this lack of timeliness, however, by the reviews which he contributed to some of the leading philosophical, ethical, and religious journals throughout a period of sixty years. Through his articles he combatted the rising materialism and agnosticism of his day. His article in "Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism," which was written in answer to Tyndall's Belfast address, is one of the strongest apologies which came from his pen. Likewise, towards the end of the century it was through his articles that he contested against the extreme idealism of the British Hegelians. This has been overlooked by some of those who criticise

1. Quoted: Mellone, "James Martineau as an Ethical Teacher," International Journal of Ethics, vol. 10, pp. 381.

2. Ibid., 382.

him for not having dealt with the idealist movement in his Study of Religion.

Some impression may be gained of the extent of this part of his work when one realizes that from the first of his published reviews, a discussion of Priestly in the Monthly Repository, in 1833, until his critique of Balfour's Foundations of Belief, in the Nineteenth Century, in 1895, his pen was never inactive for many months at a time. Such names as Arnold, Channing, Parker, Coleridge, Newman, Schleiermacher, Lessing, Comte, Mill, Bain, Spencer, Hamilton, Strauss, and Renan came before his critical eye in the reviews. This list in itself shows the scope of the problems which he set for himself. He commented in a letter to one of his friends that his work of reviewing, while it was extremely strenuous, was a most profitable way to expend his leisure time and to keep himself abreast of the movements of thought as they appeared.

It is interesting to note that through his championing of orthodoxy in its struggle against materialism and agnosticism he came to be regarded as a bulwark of religious faith, even by those who feared and despised his doctrinal position. From Europe and America alike came letters and comments of praise for his unstinting and fearless labour as a religious teacher and inspirer, and as a defender of the faith.¹

His criticisms and reviews were never entirely favourable, nor altogether unfavourable. As one writer has commented, they were never entirely 'anathema' nor 'amen.'² He was able to evaluate the contents of a work which was before him, and separate the good from the bad. In this way he incurred the trust of men of various communions, because they realized that his criticisms were carefully

1. Everett, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 86, p. 324.

2. (Unsigned) Academy, Vol. 51, p. 455.

and considerably given. It is not without significance that W. G. Ward, the famous Roman Catholic Theologian, sent the proofs of his work on the philosophy of religion to Martineau for correction. A list of the periodicals to which he contributed includes the following: Monthly Repository, 1833; Christian Reformer, 1835; London Review, 1835; London and Westminster Review, 1836-1851; Christian Teacher, 1838; Prospective Review, 1845-1854; National Review, 1855-1864; Theological Review; Contemporary Review, 1875-1876; Mind, 1885-1886; and the Nineteenth Century, 1895. This is not a complete list, but it gives some insight into the extent of the labours with which Martineau employed his 'leisure' time.

The following statement in regard to Martineau's influence was made by the editor of the Academy at the time of his death:

"(He was) a Christian Theist whose bracing intellect and warm transcendental sympathies have so powerfully affected the religious thought of the age."¹ Through his magazine articles he laid a formative hand upon the religious thought of the century. He was truly a bulwark of theism in a changing and difficult period. As Professor C. C. J. Webb has commented, Martineau's insight into moral experience "supplied a basis in experience for a genuine theism which was welcomed by many who were not so completely under the spell of the absolute idealists as to turn a deaf ear to any philosophy that did not speak their language. His contribution to religious thought was indeed of the highest importance."²

It is difficult to give an accurate estimate of Martineau's power and influence as a thinker. His greatest strength did not lie in the originality of his thought system. On this point we may agree with Professor Sorley when he says that Martineau did not make any

1. Academy, Vol. 51, p. 455.
2. Webb, RPIE, 127.

important advance in speculative construction.¹ He employed his powers rather in strengthening and consolidating the position of theism in a century of transition. Professor Tulloch calls Martineau the most conspicuous and distinguished of the theistic thinkers of the century.² Gladstone said, "There is no doubt that Dr. Martineau is the greatest of living thinkers."³ He was a powerful thinker, but his ability was not in the direction of developing an independent and original system of thought. His great contribution as a thinker seems to have been the advance which he made in the formulation and justification of a spiritual philosophy.

Martineau's position in British thought has been interestingly compared by Merz in his History of European Thought to the position of Lotze in Germany. Neither of these men was as original as some of his fellow countrymen in the system of thought which he evolved, but both gave largely of great powers in defence of a spiritual philosophy.

The existence of a Personal Deity and a spiritual centre was a settled conviction, not to say a postulate, and their philosophy consisted to a great extent in defining and defending the Christian doctrine by arguments drawn from two independent sources, the one metaphysical, the other ethical.⁴

Although these two men never met and never corresponded, yet their positions are strikingly similar.

Martineau says that when he first came to the problems of thought he brought with him only scientific conceptions which he had gained from the study of mathematics, mechanics, and chemistry, in his training for a career in engineering. Thus he had only the postulates of physical knowledge for the attack upon logical and ethical problems. He then came strongly into the necessitarian and

1. Sorley, HOEP, 266 f.

2. Tulloch, MRT, 329.

3. Quoted; Cobbe, "Recollections of James Martineau," Contemporary Review, Vol. 77, p. 177.

4. Merz, HOET, IV, 377 n.

empirical mode of thought, He says further that he served terms of willing captivity successively to Locke and Hartley, to Collins, Edwards, Priestly, to Bentham, and the Mills. It was his strong moral consciousness, however, which compelled him to recognize that physical postulates were inadequate to the understanding of moral experience. He thus found himself forced to concede the autonomy of the self-conscious mind in willing as a function distinct from all the changes willed. His year in Germany under Trendelenberg consolidated for him his beliefs in regard to the same autonomy of the self-conscious mind in knowing.

In his philosophy Martineau combined a natural dualism with a common-sense view akin to that of Hamilton. "In perception the mind, with equal immediateness, knows itself as subject and an outward reality as object, and in knowing this, knows their relation to be one, not of analogy, but of antithesis."¹ It is thus that we know Cause. In willing man feels an opposition to his own will which he perceives to be of a similar order. As we have noted previously, Martineau holds that in conscious experience we are introduced to an other-than-self, and in moral experience a higher-than-self. We are directly cognizant of the self and the not-self in a given experience. Martineau's philosophy never wanders far from his theology, for this other-than-self, and this higher-than-self, this immediately perceived presence, is the Living God. "His philosophy . . . was essentially religious philosophy; individual freedom, and the being and presence of God were his fundamental certainties, and these he defended in many writings during his long life."² In this sentence Professor Sorley accurately expresses the chief characteristic of Martineau's philosophy.

1. Balfour, "Philosophy of James Martineau," Monthly Review, Vol. 11, p. 139.
2. Sorley, HOEP, 266.

Martineau's reputation as a thinker began with the publication of his first book, the Rationale of Religious Inquiry, in 1836, through which he became known as a writer of exceptional power. The impression of the force and originality of his thought was strengthened by his part in the Liverpool Controversy. Channing wrote of Martineau's lectures on that occasion that they were "among the noblest efforts of our times."¹ The Unitarians of America then came to realize his importance, with the result that the next two of his books, Studies in Christianity, 1858, and Essays Philosophical and Theological, 1866-67, were compiled and published in the United States. By the time the Types of Ethical Theory, and the Study of Religion appeared, however, the author had earned his position as a thinker, and the books were published in Great Britain. The first of these is the more original, but the second must be regarded as his classic apology for a theistic faith. In this work the doctrine of God as the object of knowledge and experience is fully stated. The philosophical principles of his theism as expressed in this work are well summarized by Professor Foster of the University of Southern California as follows:

(Martineau's) strength consists in his clear perception of the claims of objective reality. No world of idealism satisfies either the instincts of the common mind or the final demands of the philosophic. The instinctive belief in freedom must have a basis in the objective power of alternate choice. The knowing spirit must be in contact with objective existence known. The imperative law of conscience emanates from a Being² whose will is holy and who rightly governs by this implanted law.

These principles he supports by proofs so wrought that they bear indubitable testimony to the greatness of the author's intellectual powers. Mr. R. H. Hutton, the editor of the Spectator, and a friend of Dr. Martineau, is quoted as saying, "Dr. Martineau is the greatest philosopher of religion that uses the English language today."³

1. Dictionary of National Biography, Supp. III, 147 b.
2. Foster, "James Martineau," The Presbyterian and Reformed Review, Vol. 12, p. 604.
3. Quoted: Jackson, "James Martineau," North American Review, Vol. 171, p. 557.

Whether this be true or not is open to question, but it is certain that Martineau was one of the most striking and influential figures in nineteenth century theism.

The question may be asked as to why Dr. Martineau was not more influential, and why his formal studies were not more widely acclaimed, and why academic honours were so long in coming to him from the leading universities of Great Britain. It will be remembered that it was sixteen years after he had received an honorary degree from Harvard University and fourteen years after he had received a similar honour from the University of Leyden that Oxford University honoured him with the degree of D. C. L. One reason for the restricted influence of his formal studies has already been mentioned. The material which is presented in these volumes was assembled from his class lectures. These had been written at a time when the materialistic and agnostic philosophies were in the forefront of the opposition to theism. By the time the Types of Ethical Theory, the Study of Religion, and the Seat of Authority appeared materialism and agnosticism had passed from the position of chief interest, having been replaced by the idealism of the British Hegelians.¹ It was therefore natural that the discussions of problems which had largely disappeared ten to thirty years before would have a chiefly historical interest.

A much more important consideration in restricting Martineau's hearing, however, was his adherence to the nonconformist position. Although the cause of nonconformity was gaining impetus and prestige through the century, yet one who was outside the circle of orthodoxy was looked upon with disfavour. His teaching and writing were stigmatized as being opposed to the accepted religious view, both in Scotland and England. In philosophy too he received

1. Merz, HOET, IV, 374-376.

only a small hearing, because a religious philosopher was not whole-heartedly accepted by those who studied philosophy for its own sake. Hence neither in philosophy nor theology did he have the advantage of an orthodox following. Martineau realized the stigma which was upon him as a Unitarian and sought to protect others from suffering unnecessarily as a result of it. When Keshub Chunder Sen, the leader of the Brahma Somaj, of India, came to England in 1870, Martineau was very much interested in him, but he was careful that the public reception of this man should not be injured by his too close association with Unitarians.¹ Martineau had had the significance of this fact made painfully clear to him only four years before on the occasion of a vacancy in the professorship of Philosophy of Mind and Logic at the University College of London. Martineau made application and sought support for his candidacy from F. W. Newman, J. S. Mill, and Dr. Thomson, the Archbishop of York, whom he knew to have some knowledge of his powers through their familiarity with his reviews and through private correspondence. His application was rejected, but the loss of the appointment was not as great a distress to him as the attitude of two of the men to whom he wrote for reference. The following account is quoted from Martineau's Biographical Memoranda:

Mr. Newman's answer was immediate, cordial, and exact. Mr. Mill was even more appreciative, and said what could hardly fail to be decisive, if produced in evidence; but he added that, as he could not miss the opportunity of planting, if possible, a disciple of his own school in a place of influence, he must throw his weight into the scale of Mr. Croom Robertson's candidature, of whose competency he was well satisfied. His attestation, therefore, privately so generous to me, must be withheld from use. The Archbishop of York sent me a reply, twelve months after the affair was over, apologizing for his silence, and candidly explaining it as the result of a theological scruple; for if he had said that he thought true of my personal qualifications for the vacant office, he would have been helping to a place of influence one who did not

1. Drummond and Upton, LL, II, 2.

believe in the doctrine of the Trinity.¹

It is characteristic of Martineau's equanimity of temperament that he added only the following sentence by way of comment: "In this spectacle, of Mr. Mill and the Archbishop moving hand in hand, under the common guidance of a sectarian motive, there is a curious irony."

Before the time of his death, however, as we have noted in the biographical section, honours did come to him, bearing tribute to his life and work from some of the ablest minds in Europe, America, and Great Britain. Martineau's comment on the occasion of his honorary degree from the University of Edinburgh was not one of self-satisfaction but of delight that such a university should have overcome its sectarian restrictions so far as to honour such an one as himself.

Martineau's Influence Today

In an article in the first volume of the Hibbert Journal on "Martineau's Philosophy," Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison predicted that the influence which Martineau would exert in the future would lie largely outside the sphere of his formulated philosophical theism.² It is already evident that this prediction was accurately made. No school of thought has arisen which has taken the theistic system as erected by Martineau for its rallying point. His name comes before the eye of the present day student, minister, or layman rather because of his ethical studies, his criticisms and reviews, and his sermons and other works of a devotional nature.

In the field of ethics, Martineau's most able work, the Types of Ethical Theory, still retains its eminence. Few if any

1. Quoted: Ibid., I, 409.
2. Op. Cit., pp. 444-445.

have accepted the system of idiopsychological ethics which he developed. There were elements in it which did not commend it to a wide circle of moral philosophers in his own day. Most notable of these defects was its failure to give adequate account of the influence of society and environment on the formation of man's moral principles, and the hard and fast arrangement in order of relative worth of the motives in the Table of Springs of Action. His ethics were too individualistic and mechanistic to attract a large following. However, a large part of this work, and many of Martineau's magazine articles, consisted in studies, criticisms, and comparisons of other ethical systems. The strength of these has commended them to a place of importance in the realm of ethical study. His Study of Spinoza, and the section which is concerned with Spinoza's ethics in the Types of Ethical Theory, stand in a unique position among works on Spinoza. Professor A. E. Taylor states that these works, particularly the latter, have the value of being among the few commentaries on Spinoza which show a real understanding and comprehension of the problems involved which do not come from the pen of a prejudiced disciple.¹ The sections on Plato, Malebranche, and Comte are widely studied and appreciatively received. Martineau's importance in ethics, therefore, seems largely to consist in the use of his works as guides to historical study.

The one particular phase of Martineau's ethical system which commands attention for itself is his emphasis on intuition. In few writers can one find such a clear statement of the intuitionary view wherein the autonomy of moral principles is stressed. His doctrine of conscience as giving objectively valid ethical intuitions is studied with interest by theistic thinkers of today.

1. Taylor, Class Lectures, Spinoza, Autumn Term, 1936.

Much more widespread than Martineau's ethical influence, however, is the influence of his devotional writings. There are many preachers and laymen who value among their treasured possessions the volumes of sermons entitled Endeavours after the Christian Life, and the Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. No one who has read one of these volumes is likely to forget the power and the beauty of the sermons which they contain. The sermons, it is true, are not such as an ordinary minister would choose to preach in his pulpit today, nor such as an ordinary layman would desire to hear. They are too ponderous in their thought to be suitable for hearing, but when one reads them they give the impression of carefully wrought devotional essays. Although they would hardly serve as sermon models, yet there is an inspiration in them which commends them as 'meat for strong men' to those who are prepared to think deeply. The strain of deep piety which runs through them, combined with an absence of theologically controversial material, makes them suitable to be read by men in the various communions of the Christian faith. As one reads them one finds oneself becoming more and more willing to agree with Watson when he called Dr. Martineau the 'Saint of Theism.' The sermons and prayers which came from Dr. Martineau's pen do not suffer by comparison with the finest devotional literature of the entire Christian Church. His own devotion was so complete and unreserved that through his pen and his pulpit he was able to impart it to those about him; and to those who read his lines today, the inspiration is no less real.

The philosophy of religion in the period since the Great War has shown an increasing emphasis upon the 'revelational' basis for religious belief. The natural and moral arguments for God's existence have been set aside by an influential group of thinkers

who have placed particular stress upon God's self-disclosure to man through Christ alone. The result of this has been the divergence of interest from the philosophical theism of which Martineau is one of the most representative figures. It is not strange, therefore, that where this current revelational interest is at its height the name of Martineau should come very rarely into consideration.

There are, however, many philosophers of religion who still retain their interest in a theism which recognizes the importance of the witness which man's cognitive and moral nature bears of God's existence. To these, who with some qualification may be designated as personalistic theists, Martineau's writings and his formulated theism are still of vital interest and importance. Among the theists of Great Britain and America, Martineau's influence is still felt. The stigma which was attached to his work because of his Unitarian associations has largely passed away, and the true greatness of the man and his message can now stand forth unobscured by the shadow of sectarian bigotry.

It may be that the traditional distinction between natural and revealed knowledge is passing away. If this is true then there will be less difficulty in the future in recognising that God speaks to the whole man. To such as hold this position it will be evident that Martineau was working in this direction. He saw **that** God speaks to man through nature, through his intellect, through his conscience, and through the communion of spirit with spirit. Between these modes of communication he had difficulty in distinguishing, because it is, he thought, the same God who speaks to man in various ways; man's consciousness of obligation to a 'higher-than-himself' is the witness of the living God. In coming to know himself, man becomes aware of the Divine in the human.

C O N C L U S I O N

In conclusion, let us restate briefly the major criticisms which have been noted in connexion with Martineau's position, and his defence of the middle ground between extreme immanence and extreme transcendence on the basis of a purposive, righteous, and loving Personal God.

By beginning all his speculation with a critical study of man, and from man's experience of cause in will inferring a transcendental Cause, or from man's experience of conscience inferring a supreme Righteousness, Martineau has laid himself open to the criticism made by Kant of the speculative proofs of God's existence, that a principle applicable to the sensible world has no meaning whatever outside that world. The principles of finite experience are not applicable to transcendental reality. That man can trace a series of causes in the sensible world which he realizes cannot be an infinite series is not sufficient justification for the inference to a first Cause. Martineau repeats this error throughout his thought system. From his survey of the nature of man he discovers certain principles which he makes applicable to infinite reality. He criticizes the empiricists for acknowledging nothing beyond the experience of man, but himself makes empirical principles the premisses for judgments concerning the transcendental world. In so doing he commits the error of making man the measure of all things. Such a procedure is open to the criticism of Heine, that God made man in his own image, and

man hastened to return the compliment. Martineau's approach to all the problems of reality through a study of the self of man had certain value, but he went too far in affirming that the nature of transcendental reality can be inferred from principles drawn from man's finite experience.

The further criticism that Martineau's ethics were too individualistic and too mechanistic is entirely justified. One writer comments that Martineau's ethics is simply his individualism writ large. In attempting to establish the absolute authority of ethical principles as against the social determined morality of the Utilitarians he permitted himself to be drawn into an ethical individualism. The voice of conscience which speaks to every man individually is the word of God. In basing his ethics upon the intuitions of conscience he failed to take account of the tremendously important factor of society in the determination and application of ethical principles. He felt that if all men thought deeply into ethical problems they would all be guided by the same principles, when as a matter of fact any given set of ethical principles is not universally accepted even by the most profound ethical thinkers. Universal agreement in matters of ethics, which is a necessary conclusion from his ethical doctrine, is not found in experience. Furthermore, his ethical system was developed into a purely mechanical scheme, a Table of Springs of Action which could be referred to as impartially as a table of logarithms. Nowhere in the moral experience of man are the facts found to be capable of such tabular reduction. In moral experience man does have a sense of absolute obligation, but no given set of moral precepts is universally accepted. Of this Martineau should have been conscious by reason of his own change from Hartleyan

necessitarianism to the position of his own maturer thought.

He is also open to criticism on the basis of certain weaknesses in his metaphysical system resulting from his natural realism. He affirmed the dual reality of nature and God, and yet never worked out clearly the position of matter in his system. He held to an eternal creationism, with no possibility of a beginning or end of nature as the living expression of God's causal Will. Yet in his discussion of space and time he held that these were the only eternal self-existent realities. Space was regarded as the 'pure condition' of all Causality. At one time he affirms that the 'other' for God's Will consists in the free-wills of his created moral beings, man. In another connexion the 'other' for God's Will is Space. He says that it is inconceivable that Mind could create matter, but he holds that matter is God's Will energizing and creating at whatever points in Space He chooses to have occupied. He does not explain how his natural realism is to be harmonized with his declaration that all reality is spiritual. Many of the difficulties and inconsistencies in his metaphysics would have been overcome if he had been able to accept certain phases of the idealism which was coming into prominence in British thought during the last third of his life. As it is, a complete unification of his metaphysical tenets is impossible.

On the other hand Martineau deserves much appreciative commendation for his system of thought. He contended for the spiritual nature of reality in a century when materialism was popular in philosophy, even though he found it extremely difficult to harmonize with some of his beliefs. In opposition to the

naturalistic atheism of Spencer,¹ Martineau regarded nature as the expression of a purposive will in operation, created and sustained by a righteous, loving, Personal God. According to Spencer a man could deny all order and intention in the world, could look upon the universe as 'a mere aggregate of co-existing and successive phenomena,' could deny the presence and agency of a Mind in the universe, could trace all order in phenomena to the Laws of Nature with nothing behind them, and still be said to hold to Theistic religion. Spencer retains the word God, but looks upon it only as a synonym for Nature.² Martineau regards the laws of nature as the laws of God, but he will not grant that "nature is the complete and only manifestation of God." His case for the spiritual ground of nature, the spiritual nature of ultimate reality, is well expressed in the following statement:

Nothing can be more misleading than to say that 'God is merely a synonym for nature.' The attributes of nature are birth, growth and death; God can never begin nor cease to be: nature is an aggregate of effects; God is the universal cause: nature is an assemblage of objects; God is the infinite Subject of which they are the expression: nature is the organism of intelligibles; God is the eternal intellect itself. Cut these pairs asunder; take away the unchangeable, the causality, the manifesting Subject, the originating Thought; and what is then left is indeed 'Nature,' but, thus bereft and alone, is the negation and not the 'synonym' for God.³

For a thorough-going materialism even less can be said, for in matter there is no power save as it is invested with energy by the Divine Will. There is no such thing as matter save as the Causal

1. Spencer had not regarded himself as an atheist. He contended that the mere tracing of successions of phenomena would serve as the basis for theism. Martineau denies the use of the term Theism to apply to such a view, and shows that only when intelligent purpose and agency are predicated of a spiritual being who is God can the term Theism be accurately employed. Martineau, 3OR, I, 4 ff.

2. Spencer, IR, 45; cited by Martineau, 3OR, I, 5.

3. Martineau, 3OR, I, 8.

Will calls it into being. Phenomena can never be explained save in terms of something other and higher than phenomena. Martineau never relaxed his struggle for the spiritual nature of reality.

Another point on which Martineau insisted was God's relation to nature and the world. In his thinking God could not be God unless he stood in such a relation, because Causality itself is a relation. There can be no causality without the Cause standing as one term in a relation. Since God has been and will be eternally creating, he is seen to be eternally related to his creation. This is extremely valuable as a counteraction to the view which affirms God's absoluteness, and denies the possibility of any relation with him or any predications concerning him on the basis that such relations and predications would limit the Absolute. For Martineau God stands eternally in a Causal relation to nature, and in a moral relation with the moral beings whom he has created. The Absolute must be unlimited from without itself, and unopposed, but it is not unrelated. Relation is not necessarily limitation.

In opposition to agnosticism, Martineau strongly affirmed the possibility of knowledge of ultimate reality. In the presence of the Divine in the human, God's self-revelation of himself to man, the finite mind of man has immediate knowledge of the Infinite. The inferential mode of achieving this knowledge is open to question, but the immediate self-disclosure of God to the mind of man can be safely affirmed.

A further result of this immediate personal communion between man and God is the disclosure of the essential unity of spiritual nature. The spirit of man is only a spark, but it is a spark of the Divine Fire which is God's Spirit. In so far as the

spirit of God dwells in man, the spirit which is in him is co-essential with God. This to Martineau is the meaning of the Incarnation. Christ showed to men that they could be so completely filled with the spirit of God that their wills, their minds, their very lives would be completely identical with God's. If this filling of the spirit of God were complete in us, Martineau says, as it was in Christ, then it would be deemed an Incarnation. As it is, it can be called no more than a dispensation of the Spirit. In the spirit of man is vested the possibility of immediate knowledge of and personal communion with the Infinite Spirit. In Martineau's thought the ground of such possibility lay in the essential unity of spirit with Spirit.

Martineau's view of the authority of moral obligations reveals a profound insight into the nature of Duty. He was not content to let the authority of obligation rest with some law or postulate, whether it be from an a priori or a posteriori source. He saw that absolute obligation could only be felt by man towards a person, and was something more alive and inspiring than a law or a policy. In conscience, when the voice of God speaks, man knows that his obligation is to a 'Higher-than-himself' and there can be nothing higher than a person except another and more complete person. When, in moral experience, man feels the immediate presence of a higher person, he recognises the absolute nature of his obligation. In this respect Martineau's view of Duty is superior to that of Kant, from whom he drew so largely.

Finally, let us see how Martineau avoids the extremes of complete immanence on the one hand and complete transcendence on the other, by incorporating in his Theism the valuable points

of both. The doctrine of God's complete immanence in his creation is held with certain distinctive variations by adherents of Pantheism, and of the Absolute Idealism prevalent in Britain in the last years of Martineau's life. He described the position thus: "The universe is lifted out of its limits and its transiency, and is identified with his Will in its energy and his Thought in its excellence: so that it is the simple externalization of his being, and He is wholly Immanent in it."¹ Martineau's Theism holds that God is immanent in his creation, but it does not limit God's existence to His immanent agency. The conflict comes when the immanentist denies that beyond the natural order of things and prior to it there can be any divine life or agency. The Absolute Idealists refuse to predicate anything of God for fear of limiting Him by so doing, and yet they are willing to limit the divine existence to the measure of the creation. Without being external to nature the divine cause operates through it. Kant's "innere Zweckmässigkeit" as developed by the later Hegelians left no place for intending mind in the direction of natural processes, but simply found the end expressed and achieved by the Idee of the species.² Martineau would not rest in any such denial of a supramundane cause. In his Theism a certain degree of transcendence is not regarded as incompatible with God's immanence in His world. God must be, he says, "somewhere more than the contents of nature, and overpass them in his being, action, and perfection."³ As opposed to the immanence of the aim in the means, with intention having no existence apart from the means themselves, he holds that there is a Mind which has the idea of an end, and that Mind is distinct from the object in which the aim, intention, or idea is operative. This Mind is capable of pursuing its ends throughout

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 149.

2. Ibid., 158.

3. Ibid., 150 f.

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1. Martineau, SOR, II, 149.

2. Ibid., 158.

3. Ibid., 150 f.

the infinity of space, but it must have existence apart from its formative influence upon a given object or operation.

Another point upon which Martineau joins issue with extreme immanentist views is the individuality of the self. To a certain extent in Absolute Idealism, and to a greater degree in Pantheism, individuality is lost. In Malebranche's view the individual will entirely disappears. The Divine Agency is substituted for man's ordinary volitional activity. Man is simply a puppet of the Divine Will working through him to the accomplishment of its own actions and ends. Martineau, on the other hand, held the individuality of the self to be of primary importance. All man's Causal and Moral experience shows him the opposition between himself and the other-than-himself which is God. There is no surrendering of the autonomy of man's self-conscious will. In the encounters from moment to moment with its 'other' it comes to know its own individuality. The only loss of individuality which Martineau recognises is the experience of communal worship when the individual ceases to be conscious of his individuality in the higher consciousness of oneness with his fellow Christians and God in the unity of the Kingdom of God. Thus the maintenance of the individuality of self for Martineau virtually amounts to affirming a dualism of self and God. Of the dualism of self and not-self in causal experience, he says: "Were not our personal power known to us as one, the cosmical power would not be guaranteed to us as the other. Here, therefore, at the boundary of the proper Ego, the absorbing claim of the supreme will arrests itself, and recognises a ground on which it does not mean to step."¹ That which is claimed in the other spheres of man's existence. "If it is not

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 176.

another decides, neither is it another that deliberates, that is tempted, that strives, and prays."¹ The causation which man employs for his own ends is a secondary cause, but it is none the less real causal activity. Causally and morally man is free.

Some thinkers have objected to the use of the term personal in regard to God, because they feel that personality involves a self-conscious distinction of the self from an 'other.' Since God is said to comprehend all being in himself, there can be no 'other,' and hence personality is an impossible predication concerning God. Martineau holds that God is Personal, and that he has provided for this necessity of distinction by providing an 'other' which is not definitely antagonistic to himself. By creating man in his own image, a moral being, invested with self-consciousness and freedom of the will, God has provided the 'other' for his personality. This is supplied by "the aggregate of rational and moral beings, represented in our world by Man."² The word 'personal' Martineau accepts as a suitable symbol for the distinction of individual spiritual beings. He says:

Some symbol we must have of that Divine freedom in the exercise of Will, the acknowledgement of which makes the difference between Theism and Pantheism, and gives religion its entrance into the conscience and affections of men . . . Here it is that the God, immanent through the universe besides, and operating by determinate methods alone, passes into transcendent existence still unpledged, and establishes moral relations with beings whom he has endowed with a certain scope of similar volitional causality.³

God is immanent in his world, but he also retains his 'otherness' to nature and to his created spiritual beings.

Martineau's Theism also stands strongly opposed to all views of the extreme transcendence of God, whether they be of the

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 178.

2. Ibid., 192.

3. Ibid., 194.

deistic sort which regarded God as having set the world in motion and left it to continue its course, or the sort which sees him only occasionally intervening by some special ingression into the created world. In general such views regard God as having created the world by an act of will, set in operation the laws of nature, and delegated all subsequent activity to secondary causes within that creation. Professor Pringle-Pattison characterizes the Deistic view in the following paragraph:

Deism lays so much stress on the difference, or, as it is here technically called, the transcendence of the divine existence, that it removes God out of the world altogether, and sets him at a distance alike from the play of nature's laws and the thoughts and actions of mankind, -- a spirit beyond the stars, a being who created the world once upon a time, who may interfere at times with the machinery, but who contents himself on the whole with 'seeing it go.'¹

The cosmic watchmaker, once having created and wound the mechanism, leaves the regulating of its operation to the escapement and balance wheels set within it.

The first phase of this system of thought with which Martineau deals is the doctrine of creation in time. God felt a desire to create this world after having existed from eternity without it, and after the creation passes away he will continue to live without it. Martineau answers on the basis of his Theism that he can find no place for such a beginning. He rests his faith on the belief that God has always done what he is doing now, creating and sustaining all existence. If anything looks to our limited vision as if it were new, it is but the expression of the eternal purpose of God working through perpetual creation.

Martineau says: "We pass over to the idea of perpetual creation, and let the Divine presence no longer come in visits to the world,

1. (Seth) Pringle-Pattison, THE, 2.

but rest in it forever."¹ If God is constantly creating in the universe then he must be immanent in it. He is present in his purposes and his creative agency.

Secondly, the Creator set up the world and deposited within it materials and properties which would continue to execute his purposes spontaneously. The 'second Causes' carry on the necessary activity, whether God is present or not. Such a view destroys immediately the living will of God. All acts are now initiated in the world by deputies. Martineau comments that such a view makes God hardly less 'out of the way' than the divinities of Epicurus who were little better than dead in their relation to the world. His answer is the direct ascription of all causality to God; the activities of his will in the world disclose his eternal and constant presence to his creatures. Man's will is a partaking of the immanent Will of God. Martineau thinks "there is nothing whatever to warrant, in relation to God, the idea of deputed cosmical action, through 'second causes' set up as tools, separate from his will and qualified to work of themselves."² He will not permit the partition of causes, but invests the responsibility for all that happens directly in the one Supreme Will. He writes:

To an Eternal Being, far above these limits (the limits of finite minds and secondary causes), Eternal Life, i.e., Eternal action, must be an essential element of perfection: all cosmic power is Will; and all cosmic Will is His . . . He is the One Cause in Nature, acting in various modes; and to all else among physical things that has borrowed the name we may give a free discharge.³

It is thus made a necessary factor in God's perfection that his causal activity be never absent from nature.

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 146.

2. Ibid., 172.

3. Ibid., 147.

A third tenet of the transcendent view is that the creation is finite while its Maker is infinite. He exists in external relation to it, and beyond its limits his presence boundlessly extends. To this Martineau answers that although each individual thing may be limited, yet there is an infinite extent to the succession of created things. He can discover no line of demarcation in Time and Space beyond which it is possible to assert that there and then were none of the dependent existents which we witness here and now. There is no reason, he thinks, for questioning that the creation and its author are co-extensive, that the scope of the universe corresponds with the infinitude of God.¹

It is true that the universe of nature is imperfect, but this does not necessarily mean that God is imperfect or that the creation has been neglected. If man could see clearly the purposes behind every step in the natural processes, it is likely that he would discover all to be parts of an eternal process of perfection. Of Nature he speaks thus:

It is a transient and partial expression of him; but it expresses nothing else: whatever it shows is an aspect of his thought: whatever it tells, it tells of him: and since nothing can issue from perfection but that which is akin to it, and an element of it, the constitution of things can attain only functions of the best; and its seeming shadows² are but visual illusions in the presence of partial lights.

The answer of Faith is the reply which man must give to the problems of imperfection in nature.

Martineau's view of the constant presence of the "Divine in the human" is his defence against the view of the occasional intervention of God in the processes of nature. There is no

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 148.

2. Ibid., 148.

moment when God is not near to the needy soul. In every act of will, in every whisper of conscience, in moments of deep meditation and worship, man is immediately aware of the Divine presence with him. The doctrine of extreme transcendence is incapable of satisfying the human mind for long. Man, when he looks to God, feels himself alone if God is simply Eternal, Infinite Creator, the remote source of all things. Man feels the need of a God who will be close to him, the constant presence of whose power and direction never depart from him. Here pure transcendence fails in one of the most fundamental requisites of religion. It fails to furnish a living, loving, present God to whom the worshipper in difficulty or devotion may lift his arms and find Him near.¹ No external co-existence of Matter and God, the former conflicting with the latter, nor a supernal being ruled only by caprice calling the natural world into being as a whimsical and ephemeral expression of a passing fancy, but a God of whose very nature we are partakers, the Giver of every good and perfect gift, in whom our souls live and move and have their being -- this is the God of Martineau's Theism. God is known to man as the "Divine in the human." In the communion of spirit with Spirit man is immediately aware of the strength and guidance and love of a Living, Personal God. This is the God whom man encounters in all the causal, moral, and spiritual experiences of life.

1. Martineau, SOR, II, 172.

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