

AL-JUWAYNĪ
AND
HIS DOCTRINE OF THE ORIGINATION
OF THE WORLD
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PREFACE

At a certain period in the history of Islamic thought, dogmatic theology (Kalām)^e received the full attention of the most brilliant of Muslim scholars. This happened at a time when purely intellectual sciences had appeared on the Islamic horizon, and opponents of Islām were using these as a weapon against the faith. These factors made Muslim scholars very keen to expound religious truth and support it by rational arguments and proofs, and obliged them to probe into what they called (kalām).

In this way they hoped to repair the breach caused by the followers of other religious and intellectual sciences. Their work was zealous and thorough. They composed many lengthy volumes. Most of these were intended to refute and silence their opponents.

One of these Mutakallimūn was Imām al-Ḥaramayn, whose fame spread far and wide among his contemporaries and successors, and the perplexed have sought in his works the answers to most of their difficulties.

When we examine the works of Imām al-Ḥaramayn, we find him pointing out, with sound logic, the weaknesses of the views held by the various sects which then existed and brilliantly supporting Islamic beliefs against the opinions of those who

were trying to belittle the tenets of the sunnis. This is why I chose Imām al-Ḥaramayn as the subject of my thesis, Imām al-Ḥaramayn who was a guardian of Islamic sciences, zealous in the service of Islām, and encyclopaedic in the range of his interests. I have tried to trace his public and private life and to survey his work in the various religious sciences. I have also tried to study his writings on the origination of the world (Ḥudūth al-‘Ālam) in which he tries to prove that the world has a creator. Further I have added an edition of a work of his, Luma’ al-Adillah fi Qawā’id ‘Aqā’id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-j-Jamā’ah, which is still in manuscript form.

My warm thanks are due to Dr. W. Montgomery Watt for having agreed to supervise my study. I am very grateful for his assistance in finding the correct terminology in many parts of my work. I would also record my gratitude for his encouragement at all times.

I wish to thank also Dr. Pierre Cachia, ~~lecturer~~ Lecturer in Arabic at Edinburgh University, for helping me to express myself in more fluent English than I should ever have been able to write unaided; and Mr. J.R.Walsh, Lecturer in Turkish at Edinburgh University, for kindly reading the manuscript.

I am much indebted to the librarians in the

National Egyptian Library, the Institute of the
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the Arab League, Cairo University Library ~~and~~
Al-Azhar Library, *and Edinburgh University Library*
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in making available to me the works which were
used in the preparation of this thesis.

Fawkia Hussein Mahmoud.

List of Abbreviations

The Qur'ān (Egyptian edition). (When Flügel's numbering of a verse differs, it is put after a stroke.)	<u>Q</u>
Al-Juwaynī: <u>al-'Aqīdah an-Nizāmiyyah</u>	<u>Aqd.</u>
Ibn 'Asākir: <u>Tabyīn Kadhib al Muftarī fi mā waqa'a Li Abī al-Ḥasan al Ash'arī</u>	<u>Ask.</u>
Al-Juwaynī: <u>Al Burhān fi Uṣūl al-Fiqh</u>	<u>Burh.</u>
Al-Bākhārzi: <u>Dumyat al-Qaṣr wa 'Aṣrah Ahl al 'Aṣr.</u>	<u>Dum.</u>
Ibn-al-'Imād: <u>Shadharāt adh-Dhahab</u>	<u>Imd.</u>
al-Juwaynī: <u>al-Irshād Ilā Qawāṭi' al Adillah fi uṣūl al I'tiqād.</u>	<u>Irsh.</u>
Ibn al-Athīr: <u>al Kāmil fi-at-Tārikh.</u>	<u>Kam.</u>
Ibn Kathīr: <u>Al-Bidāyat wa-n-Nihāyat</u>	<u>Kath.</u>
Al-Juwaynī: <u>Luma' al-Adillah fi Qawā'id 'Aqā'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah</u>	<u>Lum.</u>
Al-Maqdisī: <u>Kitāb Ahsan at-Taqāsīm.</u>	<u>Maqs.</u>
Ibn al-Jawzī: <u>al Muntazim fi Tārikh al-Mulūq wa-l-Umam</u>	<u>Munt.</u>
Ibn Taghri Bardī: <u>An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah fi Mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhirah</u>	<u>Nuj.</u>
As-Sam'ānī: <u>Kitāb al-Ansāb</u>	<u>Sam.</u>
Al-Juwaynī: <u>Ash-Shāmil fi Uṣul ad-Dīn</u>	<u>Sham.</u>
Adh-Dhahabī: <u>Siyar A'lām an-Nubalā'</u>	<u>Siy.</u>
As-Subkī: <u>Tabaqāt ash-Shāfi'iyyah al-Kubrā</u>	<u>Subk.</u>
al-Bāqillānī: <u>at-Tarḥīd fi ar-Radd 'Alā al Mulhdah al-Mu'attilah-wa-l-Qarāmiṭah wa-l-Khawārij wa-l-Mu'tazilah.</u>	<u>Tam.</u>
Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umārī: <u>Masālik al-Abṣār fi Mamālik al Amsār</u>	<u>Um.</u>
Al-Baḡhdādī: <u>Kitāb Uṣūl ad-Dīn</u>	<u>Uṣul</u>
Ibn Khallikān: <u>Wafayāt al-A'yān</u>	<u>Waf.</u>
Yāqūt: <u>Mu'jam al-Bulḍān</u>	<u>Yaq.</u>

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PART I
AL-JUWAYNĪ

Introduction: Sources for the Biography

Of the classical writers who write about al-Juwaynī, some were contemporaries, others lived a century or more later. The oldest biography is 'Abd al-Ghāfir's.¹ It is to be found in two books. The first is Tabyīn Kadhibal Muftarī fī mā Nusibā ilā Abī-l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī,² by Ibn 'Asākir ad-Dimishqī [d. 571 A.H., 1175 A.D.] The second is Kitāb Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi'yyah al-Kubrā,³ by as-Subkī [d. 781 A.H., 1379 A.D.]

Ibn 'Asākir ascribes this biographical notice to Abu-l-Ḥasan, but that is the Kunya of 'Abd al-Ghāfir. This material is of great value, because 'Abd al-Ghāfir was one of al-Juwaynī's disciples, and lived with him. Thus he records many details about the circumstances of his life and manners.

As-Subkī says about this notice: "It contains most of the details of al-Juwaynī's life."⁴

1. He is 'Abd al-Ghāfir b. Isma'īl b. 'Abd al-Ghāfir b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Ghāfir al-Ḥāfiḡ Abū al-Ḥasan al-Fārisī an-Naysābūrī, grand-son of the author of Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. Born in 451 A.H., 1059 A.D., he was taught by his grandfather Abu-l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī and others. Many such as Abū-l-ibn 'Asākir, Abū Sa'd, and Abū-l-'Alā' al-Hamadhānī were taught by him. He died in 529 A.H., 1134 A.D. (Subk. vol. IV, p. 255).

2. Ask. pp. 278-285.

3. Subk. vol. III, pp. 253-258.

4. Subk. vol. III, p. 253.

'Abd-al-Ghāfir spoke about al-Juwaynī's birth, the first period of his life, his manners, character and practical achievements, his love of study and power in debate, his life in Naysābūr and elsewhere, his works, and the high regard in which he was held by his people throughout his life and after his death.

Important as this biography is, the scholar must compare it with other biographies; and as it does not contain any details about the political, religious and cultural circumstances of his age, he must refer to historical works and to those which contain details about sects.

Each of the two books in which this biography is to be found has its value, although the author of the first one, Ibn 'Asākir,¹ did not add much to what 'Abd-al-Ghāfir had said. Yet he is a valuable source, being one of the oldest writers. The second, as-Subkī,² mentions many additional incidents of al-Juwaynī's life, and this renders his work important. He begins with the praise of al-Juwaynī by his contemporaries,³ and speaks of the good reputation he had among them; then he gives some details about the first period of his life⁴ and about his teachers, which are not in at-Tabyīn.

1. Ask., pp. 278-285.

2. Subk., vol 3, p253, 258.

3. Ibid., p. 249.

4. Ibid., p. 251.

He also gathered from different sources,¹ many details about al-Juwayni's father; the veneration al-Juwayni had for some of his teachers; his opinion about "al Kalām" at the end of his life; and what some great scholars thought of him. He mentions what adh-Dhahabi² says of al-Juwayni, which is not complimentary. He speaks about the problem of al-Istirsāl,³ and two debates⁴ between him and ash-Shirāzi⁵ which took place when the latter came to Naysābūr, the first on "al-Ijtihād fi 'l-Qiblah," the second on the marriage of the virgin.

There are other biographies detailed hereunder in their chronological order:

Kitāb Dumyat al-Qaṣr wa 'Aṣrat-Ahl-al-'Asr, written by Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'l-Ḥasan al-Bakharzi [d. 549A.H. 1154AD.]

Kitāb al-Muntazim fi Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa 'l-Umam, by 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn al-Jawzi.

[d. 597A.H., 1200 A.D.]

Kitāb Wafayāt al-A'yān, by Ibn Khallikān [681A.H., 1282A.D.]

Kitāb Siyar A'lām al-Nubalā', by Al-Ḥafīz Shams al-Dīn

abū 'Abd. Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn 'Uthmān ibn

Qaymāz al-Turkumāni, of Dimashq, known by the name of

adh-Dhahabi [d. 748 A.H., 1347 A.D.]

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 259.

2. Ibid. p. 261

3. Ibid. p. 264

4. Ibid. p. 275, 278.

5. He is Ibrāhīm b. Alī b. Yūsūf, Abū Ishāq ash-Shirāzi al-Firzābādi. [d. 476 A.H., 1083 A.D.] He wrote: At-Tanbih, al-Muḥadhdhab fi al-Fiḥ, al-Nukat fi al-Khilāf, al-Luma' and its comment, at-Tabṣirah fi Uṣūl al-Fiḥ, al-Mulakhkhaṣ, al-Ma'ūnah fi al-

Jadal, and Tabaqāt al-Fuqahā'. He taught first in a small mosque at Bāb al-Murāqab. Then Niẓām al-Mulk asked him to teach in an-Niẓāmiyyah school in Baghdād.

Kitāb Masālik al-Absār fi Mamālik al-Amsār, by Shihāb
ad-Dīn ibn Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umari
[d. 749 A.H., 1391 A.D.]

Kitāb al Nujūm az Zāhirah fi Mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qahirah, by
Abū 'l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf ibn Taghri Bardī. [d. 874 A.H., 1469 A.D.]

Kitāb Shadharāt adh-Dhahab fi Akhbār man Dhāhab, by
Abū-l-Falaḥ 'Abd al-Ḥayy ibn al-'Ammār al-Ḥanbali
[d. 1089 A.H., 1678 A.D.]

These biographies are of varying importance. In the first one, Kitāb Dumyat al-Qasr¹, the author only mentions the praise of the contemporaries and successors of al-Juwaynī. The second biography² is valuable because it is earlier than as-Subkī's by about 200 years. It also contains some details which are not mentioned in other biographies, such as the date of the arrival concerning which Ibn al-Jawzī says: "al-Juwaynī came to Baghdad of al-Juwaynī at Baghdād/when ^{in the year 500} ~~(he) entered it~~ entered it. In the third one, Wafayāt al-A'yān,³ Ibn Khallikān gives rather a condensed biography, but it contains some details about al-Juwaynī's works and his intellectual life which are not mentioned in other biographies. The fourth, Kitāb Siyar A'lām al-Mubalā',⁴ differs from the other biographies in that it is hostile and indeed abusive in its criticism. The fifth biography, Kitāb Masālik al-Absār,⁵ gives a clear idea of the high place which al-Juwaynī held in the esteem of his contemporaries and successors.

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1. Dum, pp. 196-197.
 2. Munt., vol. 9 pp. 18-29.
 3. Waf., vol. 1, pp. 360, 361.
 4. Siy., vol 11, from folio 255 to 257.
 5. Um. vol 4, sect. 1, from folio 38 to 42.

The sixth one¹ is extremely short. Ibn Taghri Bardī just mentions al-Juwaynī's date of birth and some details about his life and death. The seventh² is interesting mainly because it enables us to ascertain with greater accuracy the names of some of al-Juwaynī's ancestors.

Some of these sources speak mostly of al-Juwaynī's intellectual life, others of his everyday concerns, others yet of his influence on his contemporaries or on posterity. From all together, a rounded and reliable picture of al-Juwaynī's life emerges.

1. Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121
2. Imd. vol. 3, pp.358 - 362.

Chapter 1
Al-Juwayni's Life

Chapter 1.Al-Juwayni's LifeHis Name

All biographers say that he is 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd Allāh¹ ibn Yūsuf. They differ about his further ancestry.

As-Subkī says that he is: 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd Allāh b. Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥayyūyah.² Ibn Khallikān calls him 'Abd al-Malik ibn 'Abd Allāh b. Yūsuf b. 'Abd Allāh ibn Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad b. Ḥayyūyah,³ and so does Ibn al-'Imād⁴ in Shadharāt adh-Dhahab, when writing about al-Juwayni's father.

Ibn Khallikān, as-Subkī and Ibn al-'Imād all mention two patronymics (kunyah) by which 'Abd al-Ḥāh, and the first Yūsuf were known. They give: 'Abd al-Malik b. Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh ibn Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf... ..ibn Ḥayyūyah. Ibn al-'Imād⁵ explicitly tells us how the name Ḥayyūyah is to be spelt and vocalized.

1. Subk. vol.3, p. 249
Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
Imd. vol. 3, p. 358
Munt. vol. 9, p. 18
Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121
Um. vol. 3, sect. 1, folio 38^r
Ask. p. 278
Sam. folio 144^r
Siy. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 255, col. 2.
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 249
3. Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
4. Imd. vol. 3, p. 358
5. Ibid. p. 361.

As-Subkī, Ibn Taghrī, Ibn 'Imād, Ibn 'Asākir, and Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umari, mention that one of the patronymics (kunya) by which al-Juwaynī was known is "Abū al-Ma'ālī". Perhaps he was known by this (kunya) because he dealt all his life with theology, placing it on a higher and more honourable footing among Muslims,¹ and because of the way in which, by his clear and persuasive logic, he raised and dignified Islam.

As to his relative name (Nisbah), biographers all² call him "al-Juwaynī". Only as-Subkī calls him "an-Naysābūri". "Juwayn" or "Kuwayn"³ is one of the districts (Nāhiyah) or regions of Naysābūr. Many people are named after it. Yāqūt, in Mu'jam al Buldān,⁴ mentions the father of 'Abd al-Malik, his uncle⁵ al Ḥasan, and Mūsā b. 'Abbās b. Abū 'Umrān, as of the same

1. See p. p 113 - 115
2. Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121
Imd. vol. 3, p. 358
Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
Munt. vol. 9, p. 18
Ask. p. 278
Um. vol 3, sect. 1, folio 38^r
Sam. folio 144^r
Siy. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 125. 1st. col.
3. It is between Bastām and Naysābūr, bounded by Bayhaq in the east and by Jajirm in the north. (see Yaq. vol 3, Juwayn, p. 181
 See also: Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-Islāmiyyah, vol 7, Juwayn, p. 178, 179.
Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif li-l-Bustānī, vol 6, Juwayn, p. 610
al-Iṣṭakhrī, p. 284.
4. Yaq: vol. 3, Juwayn, p. 182
5. He is also called Shaykh al Hijjāz. (d. 462 A.H., 1069 A.D.). Yāqūt mentions that he was suffi, and knew Hadith. He wrote a book on sūfism entitled aṣ-Ṣalāh.

name. It is known that the names associating people with a particular place are given because these people were born in the place, or because they lived a long time there or because they died there. According to the biographies, al-Juwaynī was not born in Juwayn, nor did he live or die there. So why was he named al-Juwaynī? It is certain that his father¹ was born in Juwayn, where he lived for some time, studying literature, and Islamic law. (fiḥ). Then he left it and went away to other places to gain more knowledge, as was the habit of most of the 'Ulamā' at that time. He was called after the place where he was born and lived for a certain space of time. Therefore he was called al-Juwaynī. When after his death his son 'Abd-al-Malik took his place as a teacher in his school he inherited the name of al-Juwaynī. Al-Juwaynī had the name Al-Naysābūrī because he lived for a long time in Naysābūr,² where he taught in an-Niẓāmiyyah school, as will be shown later. Biographers all mention that he was known by the (laqab) Imām al-Haramayn.³ Ibn al-'Imād, Ibn Khallikān, and Ibn

1. Subk. vol 3, p. 249

Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121

Imd. vol. 3, p. 358

Waf. vol. 1, p. 361

Munt. vol. 9, p. 18

Ask. p. 278

Um. vol. 3, sect. 1, folio 38^r

Sam. folio 144^r

Siy. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 255, 1st col.

2. In Khurasān, separated from ar-Ray by 16 parasangs, (a parasang is a Persian measure of length, usually reckoned as equal to between 3 and 3-and-a-half English miles. See Murray, vol. 7, p. 463) and

from Sarkhas 40 parasangs.

Yaq. vol. 8, Naysābūr p. 356.

3. See footnote No. 1

Faḍl Allah al-'Umari mention that he was also known by another (laqab) Diyā' ad-Din. As to the first one¹, he was known by it, because he lived at Mecca, ^{and Medina} for four years, during which he was serving the Islamic faith by debating, giving decisions in Islamic law, and trying to spread knowledge everywhere. The second laqab was given to him, because he stood as a beacon to the defenders of the faith.

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 251
Um. vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 38
Kath vol. 12, p. 128
Siy. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 38
Imd. vol. 3, p. 358
Waf. vol. 1, p. 361.

Place of birth

'Abd al-Malik was born in the wilāyah of Khurasān.¹
 Brockelman in the Geschichte der Arabischen/ literatur
 mentions that he was born in Bushtingān or Bushtinkān.
 However none of the sources, mentioned by Brockelman,²
 speaks of al-Juwayni's birthplace, but they all agree
 that Bushtingān was the place where he died.

The study of his father's life shows that the
 father left Juwayn for other places to gain more
 knowledge and came to Naysābūr in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D.³
 He lived there and taught till the end of his life.⁴
 If this is true, 'Abd al-Malik, who was born in

1. It is in the north-east of Persia, bounded by
Khabwa in the north, Afghanistān in the east, and
 by Karamān, Lūkhistān, Irāq, and 'Ajami in the
 south, and west. - Yaq. vol. 3, Khurasān p. 408.
 - Dā'irat Ma'ārif al-Bustāni, vol. 7, p. 353.
2. Brockelman says that بشتگان in Asākir 284¹¹ should
 be بشتگان and that al-Juwayni had returned
 to his birthplace.
3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 218
Imd. vol. 3, p. 261
Siy. vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 137
4. See pp. 12, 13.

419 A.H., 1028 A.D., as will be shown below,¹ was born in Naysābūr or in its environs. Bushtingān is one of the pleasant little villages near Naysābūr.² It is separated from it by one parasang³ only, which is about 3 or 3-and-a-half English miles. Therefore it is probable that the father was in Bushtingān, and not in Naysābūr at that period, which was the period of the birth of his son, especially if we take into consideration that Naysābūr's climate was very hot, and the taste of its water was bad, because people had to go to underground⁴ canals to get it. If we also take into consideration that 'Abd al-Malik wanted to be buried in this little village to which he was transferred in his last days, it can be said that Bushtingān is the place of 'Abd-al-Malik's birth.

1. See p. 12

2. Yaw. vol. 8, Naysābūr p. 356

3. See p. 8, footnote no. 2, the word 'parasang'.

4. See p. 8, footnote No. 2 about Naysābūr.

Date of his birth

Biographers differ about the date of his birth. Al-Subki,¹ ibn Khallikan,² ibn 'Asākir,³ ibn Kathīr,⁴ ibn faḡl Allah al-'Umari⁵ and al-Sam'āni⁶ say that he was born on the 18th of Muḡarram 419 A.H., 1028 A.D. Only two, ibn al-Jawzi⁷ and ibn Taghri Bardī,⁸ assert that he was born in 417 A.H.

All biographers agree about 'Abd-al-Malik's death. They say that he died in Bushtinqān on a Wednesday evening on the 25th of Rabi' al-āwal, 478 A.H., 1085 A.D. and that he was 59 years old, which makes his date of birth in the year 419 A.H. Ibn al-Jawzi and ibn Taghri Bardī are wrong, therefore, and so is ibn Kathīr,⁹ when he mentions that 'Abd al-Malik was 57 years old when he died. This leads one to affirm that the date of his birth was the 18th of Muḡarram, 419 A.H. or the 12th¹⁰ of February, 1028.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 251

2. Waf. vol. 1, p. 362

3. Ask. p. 185

4. Kath. vol. 11, p. 118

5. Um. vol. 4, sect. 1, folios 38, 40

6. Sam. folio 144^r

7. Munt. vol. 9, p. 18

8. Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121

9. Kath. vol. 12, p. 128

10. Mikha'il Dībānah: al-Taḡwīm al-'Ām: al-

Hilāl edition, 1898.

His descent

As he was born in wilāyat Khurasān, we tend to conclude that he is of Persian origin. But some biographers mention his father as being "Tā'i, Sunbusi"¹ relating him to Tayyi' and Sunbus. Sunbus was one of the leaders of a clan of Tayyi', and Tayyi' is a well-known Arab tribe, as is said in Taj al-'Arūs.² This would indicate that the father, and therefore also the son, were of Arab blood. Of course a Mawlā could also have his nisbah from the tribe. But, if someone was a Mawla, biographers usually mention it in their works.³ This is not done in the biographies of any of al-Juwayni's relatives. So the presumption must be that al-Juwayni was of Arab descent.

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208
Sam. vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 137 col. 2.
 2. Az-Zubaydī: Tāj al-'Arūs min Jawāhir al-Qāmīs: vol. 4, p. 92, 168.
 3. Abū al Maḥāsīn al-Ḥusaynī ad-Dimishqī: Dhayl Tārīkh al-Huffaẓ Li-'dh-Dhahabī. Damascus edition, p. 65.

His father

His name is 'Abd Allāh b. Yusuf b. 'Abd Allah b. Yusuf b. Muḥammad ibn Ḥayyūṭah,¹ and he was called al-Juwaynī. He was born and brought up in Juwayn.² He was also called Sunbusi³ because he was of the clan of Sunbus.

Biographers mention that when he was in Juwayn he received lessons first of all from his father, Yūsuf⁴, who was a literary man^{of letters} and that he learnt Islamic law⁵ (tafaqqaha) from Abū Ya'qūb al-^{Abīwardī}~~Abjardi~~. When he left Juwayn to gain more knowledge, he went first of all to Naysābūr, where he studied with Abū al-Ṭib al-Su'lūki. Later he went to Marw⁶ to meet al-Qaffāl al-Marwazi,⁷ who taught him the Shāfi'ite doctrine, al-Madhhab and kalām. He returned to Naysābūr in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D., and opened a school where he taught, discussed and defended the Islamic faith until his death.

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1. Siy: vol. 11, sect. 1. folio 137
 2. See p. 7, 7
 3. Ibid.
 4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ibid.

(15)

As-Su'lukī¹ [d. 387 A.H.] ^{997 A.D.] He} was "Shāfi'i". He was a great authority on Ḥadīth, a theologian (Mutakallim) and a cultured man. Al-Qaffal al-Marwazī ^{1026 A.D.]}² [d. 417 A.H.] was also a very important "Shāfi'i". He had a large number of pupils. This leads to the fact that the predominant element in his culture was his thorough knowledge of the prophet's traditions (Ḥadīth), Muslim Jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalām) On these subjects he has many works.³ I have discovered two manuscripts written by him.

The knowledge thus acquired by the father gave a good background to the son, who took a deep interest in Islamic sciences. If we take into consideration that he was well versed in Islamic sciences and was treated with great veneration and respect and that in his school at Naysābūr he was called a "Shaykh", a title bestowed on those who held deep knowledge and were consulted on ex cathedra opinions, then we should recognize that the son began his academic life at the hands of a worthy master.

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1. Al-Dhahabī hesitates about the date of death of aṣ-Ṣu'ūkī. He fixed once in the year 387 A.H. [997 A.D.] and another time in the year 402 A.H. [1011 A.D.]. See Siy. vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 6 - Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umari mentions that he died in 404 A.H. [1013 A.D.]^{1013 A.D.]} See Um. vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 21.
 2. Kath: vol. 12, p. 21. - Um: vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 25
 3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208.

What influenced the son also was his father's love of knowledge. He was always saying in his morning prayers, "O God, put no obstacles or hindrance in my way to knowledge."¹ This quality in the father had its importance in directing the son towards research and inquiry.

Another two characteristics of the father were of great importance. The first was his great anxiety about falling into sin.² His extreme conscientiousness is shown by the fact that he used to give his legal alms not once but twice a year³, to ensure that he did not fall short of his obligations either by forgetfulness or by allowing some of the money to fall into undeserving hands. Similarly it is related that the money he paid for the woman who became the mother of his son - ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ *She was* / a slave whom he bought - was entirely lawful, earned by the work of his hand as a copyist, for he wished her to bring blessing and good fortune upon him. When she conceived and bore him a son, he enjoined upon her that in anything concerning her or the child she should avoid any action of dubious lawfulness. On one occasion while the mother was cooking the child cried, and as a wet-nurse

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208:

اللهم لا تحقني من العلم بعاتي ولا تحقني
عنه بما نفع.

2. Ibid. p. 210

3. Ibid. p. 251.

belonging to the neighbours happened to be in the house she gave suck to him. To this the father objected on the ground that the nurse did not belong to him and had no right so to make free with her milk, so he forced the child to regurgitate it.¹ This shows that he was extremely punctilious in all matters that affected his son. Some biographers, such as as-Subkī,² declare that the son's good temperament (Mizāj) was due to his upbringing, which was devoid of all unlawful acts; and surely this is so, for parental care plays a prominent part in developing the physical, moral, intellectual and spiritual qualities of a child.

The second characteristic of the father which is of great importance emerges from what is related about Kitāb al Muḥit,³ a book which he set out to write. In this book, which deals with Traditions, we are told that al-Juwaynī's father sought to go back to the sources and not to restrict himself to a Shāfi'ī interpretation. Part of the work, however, fell into the hands of al-Bayhaqī, who wrote to the author pointing out its errors, criticising its innovations, and vindicating the position taken by ash-Shāfi'ī. Al-Juwaynī's father thereupon thanked al-Bayhaqī and desisted from completing the work.⁴

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 251

2. Ibid. p. 251

3. Ibid. p. 209

4. Ibid. pp. 210 - 217

The Collection: Majmū'at ar-Rasā'il al Muniriyyah,
vol. 2, pp. 281-290.

What this incident reveals in al-Juwayni's father is both a certain independence of thought and a willingness to accept informed criticism. The same independence of thought was prominent in the son from his childhood, for he was prone to gainsay his father, when his father's views did not appeal to him. This characteristic became stronger and stronger, and is very apparent in his books.

Al-Juwayni's father was in fact the author of many books. He wrote: al Furūq, as-Silsilah, at-Tabṣirah, at-Tadhakkur, Mukhtaṣar al-Mukhtaṣar, a commentary on the Risālah, the summary of a treatise Mawqif al-Imām wa l-Ma'mūn, and a Tafsīr containing ten interpretations of each verse of al-Qur'ān.¹

Only two of these works are mentioned in the catalogues of extant libraries: The first as-Silsilah is attributed in the catalogue of the Institute of ^{revival of} Ancient Manuscripts of the Arab League to the son and not to the father. Because of the Institute's rules I have not so far been able to examine the manuscript, and have not discovered on what grounds this attribution was made.² The second is Kitāb al Furūq, which it

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 209

2. See p. 101

was also impossible for me to see for the same reason. Brockelman mentions that there is a copy of this book in Istanbul in 'Ashir Library Index. I, that another copy is to be found in Tarkhān Library No. 146, and that a third one is a microfilm. This last is to be found in the Arab League's catalogue under no. 171 Uṣūl fiqh.

I have also come across another book of the father's entitled: Risalah fi-l-Istiwā' wa 'l-fawqiyah, fi Tanzih al-Bērī 'azza wa jall 'an al-Ḥaṣr wa 't-Tamthil wa 'l-Fawqiyah. This is the second risalah in V.I. of Majmū'at al Rasā'il al Munfriyyah, printed in the year 1343. Other copies are manuscripts: one is in Berlin collection No. 3903, another in London, in the Landberg collection; a third in al-Mawṣil No. 357 Majmū'at. It is to be noticed that the style of this work is quite different from the style of Imām al-Ḥaramayn's books. That is why I list it among the father's books and not the son's.

This manuscript begins with:

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد

الحمد لله الذى كان ، ولا مكان ، ولا اتسى ولا جابة ، ولا
طائر ولا حيوان . المنفرد بوجدانيته في قد ازليته ، والدايم
في فردانيته في قدس حمدانيته
وفصول الرسالة هي :-

ص ١٧٥ - سبب انشاء الرسالة الدين النصيحة

١٧٧ - عدم تحذير الرسول من الايمان بظواهر الصفات

١٨١ - وصف الله نفسه بهذه الاوصاف

١٨٢ - الفرقية والاستواء والنزول

١٨٣ - ثبوت صفة الوجه

١٨٤ - مسألة الحرف والصوت

١٨٥ - علوه على عرشه تعالى بلا كيف ولا انحصار

١٨٦ - تقريب مسألة الفرقية

١٨٧ - ختام الرسالة

وتنتهي بـ

"..... ومن تقى الله قلبه عرف انه ليس المراد الا معرفة الرب تعالى
بها والتوجه اليه منها ، واثباتها له بحقائقها واعيانها ، كما يليق بجلالته
وعظمته بلا تأويل ، وتعطيل ، وتكييف ، ولا تمثيل ، ولا جمود ، ولا وقوف .
وفي ذلك بلاغ لمن تدبر . وكفاية لمن استبصر ان شاء الله تعالى ،
والحمد لله بوجه صلى الله على من لا نبي بعده وعلى آله وصحبه
وسلم . اعلم . . . " (صفحة ١٨٧ من المجموعة)

Date of the father's death

Biographers differ about the date of his death. Some mention that he died in 434 A.H., 1042 A.D.; others say that it was in 438 A.H., 1046 A.D. One biographer, however, tells us that Al-Juwayni was approximately twenty years old when his father died.¹ This information makes it likely that the later date given for the father's death is the correct one.²

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 251 "وهو دون العشرين أو يزيد"
 2. Klopfer asserts that the father died when the son was nineteen. (See Das Dogma des al-Djuwaini und sein Werk Al-'Aqidat an-Nizāmiya p. 7.)

His time

He lived in the fifth century of the Hijrah, from 1009 A.D. to 1106 A.D. In this, as in other periods of Islamic history, there was a close link between religious and political conditions.

Political conditions in the eastern part of the Muslim Empire were in complete chaos. Since the fourth century, the 'Abbāsid Empire had broken up into small States. Khurasān was a small state that had become independent and had gone on to attack its neighbours, gaining control over them during the reign of Aḥmad al-Būwayhī, approximately in the year 334 A.H.,¹ 945 A.D.. The Būwayhids went further, and made a puppet of the 'Abbāsid Khalifah, who through incompetency, particularly in religious affairs, had led his people to disaster. The advocates of the Shi'a doctrine, who were sent by the Faṭimid caliph, grew in number in the various parts of the 'Abbāsid domains, and called for the dethronement of the caliph. This led to disorder among the people. The Būwayhids supported the 'Abbāsid caliph, and by so doing, maintained their influence over him. Nevertheless, they spared no effort in humbling the sunnite caliph and his adherents. This policy led to many crises between the religious sects, and the reign of the Būwayhids was known as the age of persecution of the sunnites.

1. Kath. vol. 12, p. 39

These met various difficulties and dangers which made many of them observe strict silence or emigrate from their homes, resenting acts which compromised their dignity.

The Buwayhids maintained their influence for over a century until the Saljūqs appeared in Khurasān, approximately in the year 426 A.H., 1034 A.D.¹ The state of things became stable in Khurasān about the year 431 A.H., 1039 A.D.² Their influence then extended to neighbouring countries, and their attention was fixed on 'Iraq. The appearance of the Saljūqs and their growing influence did not prevent religious intrigues in Baghdād or Naysābūr, or in other towns, and in Baghdād religious intrigues resulted in sanguinary incidents.

One of these religious slashes occurred in the year 443 A.H., 1051 A.D.³ as a result of a sentence written in golden characters, by some of the inhabitants of al-Karkh on towers flanking the Fishermen's Gate: "Muhammad and 'Alī are the best of mankind." Some Sunnites said that the inscription added that whoever did not agree with the statement was an unbeliever. The people of Karkh denied this. The caliph sent the heads of the 'Abbāsīd and the

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1. Kath. vol. 12, p. 39.
Zambaur: Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'Histoire de l'Islam: vol. I. Wulat Naysābūr. Translated by Dr. Zaki Muḥammad Ḥasan, and Ḥasan Aḥmad Muḥammad.
Kam vol. 9, p. 175.
 2. Kam vol. 9, pp. 175 - 81
 3. Ibid. . . . p. 214

'Allawiyite families (Naqib) to Karkh to verify this. They found that al-Karkh's people were right. The caliph ordered the fighting which had broken out to stop; but it did not stop. The Hanbalites [⊗] interfered too, and prevented the sunnites from getting their drinking water from the Tigris. But some spople pitied them, and gave them Tigris water mixed with rose water. It happend then that one of the Hashimites was killed, and his people carried him through the city on his bier. This incident made the sunnites angry. They wanted revenge, so they went to the burial-ground of the Buwayhid kings and ministers and desecrated the graves. The state of things became more serious, and the city was in complete disorder.

Another religious clash occurred in the year 444A.H., 1052 A.D.¹ when some sunnite Turkish officers abducted a Shi'f man, and slew him in front of his women. Violence broke out between the Shi'ahs and the Turkish officers. Houses and bazazrs were burnt. The Karkh was extensively damaged. The incident did

1. Kam, vol. 9, p. 221

⊗ The Hanbalites who had a large following among common people, were opposed to all theological speculation.

not last long, and the Turkish officers apologised and went away.

Another religious disagreement took place in Baghdad in the year 447¹ A.H., 1055 A.D. between the Shāfi'ite and Ḥanbalite jurisconsults, when the latter declared it wrong for the name of God the Beneficent and the Merciful to be spoken out loud, or for the profession of faith to be repeated² with a raised voice in the call to prayer or in the supplication addressed to God when standing (qunūt)³ in the course of an act of worship. The Shāfi'ites were very angry. But the Ḥanbalites withdrew their declaration, and ^{the} conflict ceased.

In Naysābūr disorders spread between the year 443 A.H., 1051 A.D. and 447⁴ A.H., 1055 A.D. The cause was a report to King Tughril Beg that al-Ash'ari had uttered opinions incompatible with the Faith. The king ordered that al-Ash'ari should be cursed from

1. Kam: vol. 9, p. 230
2. For "the profession of faith" see Lane's book I, part III, p. 1039; Tahānawī, vol. 1, p. 569; and Qaṣṭalānī, Al-Irshād as-Sāri li-Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. In its margin the text of al Imām Muslim together with the commentary of the Imām an-Nawawī, vol 1, from p.2
3. For (Qunūt) see Lane's book I, part VII, p. 2566. Tahānawī, vol. 2, p. 1175. Qaṣṭalānī, Al-Irshād as-Sāri, vol p. 381.
4. Kath, vol. 12, p. 62
Kam vol. 9, p. 233
al-Qazwīnī: Kitāb 'Āthar al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-'Ibād, p. 317, 318.
Ibn Khallikān, Kitāb al-'Ibar, vol. 3, p. 468.
al-Qaramānī, Akhbar ad-Duwal wa Athār al-Uwal,
 vol. 8, p. 158, in the margin of Kam.

pulpits.

As-Sam'āni¹ gives other details of what happened to the Ash'arites at that time. He says that they were prohibited from preaching in mosques, as well as being cursed from pulpits. Al-Bistāmī, one of the Ash'arites, went to war with the prince of the city. There was much violence before al-Bistāmī was taken, and put in prison by the prince. Some sources² say that this led to the emigration of some Ash'arites from the town, and that among the emigrants was 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī.

When King Alp Arslān sat on the throne and made Nizām al-Mulk his minister, religious intrigues were quelled, conditions became stable, and the emigrants returned home. Yet such calmness did not put an end to religious sectarianism. Al-Maqdisī mentions in his book entitled Aḥsan at-Taqāsīm that in Khurāsān the Shi'at were strong and the Hashimites were a weak minority.³ The wāzīr Niẓām al-Mulk took an interest in the spread of knowledge, and opened many schools, in which sunnite rites were taught.

As-Subkī mentions nine of these schools, one in

1. Sam. al-Bistāmī's life, vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 179.
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 254, 255. *Imd.* vol 3. p. 358.
3. Maqs., p. 323.

Baghdād, another in Balkh, a third in Naysābūr,¹ a fourth in Hurāh,^{Herāt} a fifth in Aṣṣbahān,¹ a sixth in al-Baṣrah, a seventh in Marw, an eighth in Āmil-Ṭabaristān, and a ninth in al-Mawṣil.² A sunnite Imām was appointed to each school to teach, preach and give decisions in Islamic law. As-Subkī mentions two of them: aṣḥ-³Shirāzī at Baghdād, and Imam al-Ḥaramayn in Naysābūr. It may be said that these schools stabilised the practice of the sunnites, and enhanced their prestige. Thus the power of the sunnites grew greater, and they became of great importance after being a weak minority. Bearing in mind that the Saljūq dynasty was sunnite, it can be seen that it was in the interest of Saljūqs to consolidate the sunnite rites for by doing so they themselves gained in strength. Thus when some people intriguing against Niẓām al-Mulk said to Malik Shah that the money he spent on schools could finance a big army which could plant his banner on the walls of

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1. As-Subkī mentions that this school was not the first in Naysābur. There were four schools before it: al-Bayhaqī school, al-Sa'diyyah school built by the prince Naṣr Subuktayn, the brother of as-Sulṭān Maḥmūd, another school built by Abū Sa'id b. 'Alī al-Istrabādhi, and a fourth one, where the great Imām Abū Ishāq al-Asfara'ini was teaching - See Subk. vol. 3, p. 137.
 2. Subk., vol. 3, p. 137.
 3. See footnote 5. p.3

Constantinople, Niẓām al-Mulk could defend himself by saying: "I have created an army called the army of God. When your armies sleep at night (the soldiers of) this army stand in rows before their Lord shedding their tears, exercising their tongues, and stretching out their arms to God in invocation for you and your armies. You and your armies live under their guardianship, devote yourselves to God's service by their invocations, and are given rain and sustenance by their blessings."¹

The wazir Niẓām al-Mulk, by establishing such schools, and by his lavish expenditure thereon, did not intend to spread knowledge only, he was also trying to foster loyalty to the Saljūqs' princes.

Political intrigues had led to religious disorders, but knowledge on the contrary had flourished and spread; in particular, theological, philosophical and sūfi doctrines had developed. The fifth century abounded in great theologians of Mu'tazalite, Ash'arite, Kharijite, Qadirite, Shi'ah, Karmatian, and other leanings who subjected religious beliefs to study and discussion.

In Naysābūr appeared many Imāms, such as Abū Yūsuf al-Qazwīnī² (d. 482 A.H., 1089 A.D.) a Mu'tazalite. He wrote a large Tafsir in about 700 volumes.

1. Zaki Mubārak: Al-Akhlāq P. 16

2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 230

He was fond of collecting books. He was always glorifying Mu'tazilite doctrine, even in front of the wazir Nizām al-Mulk. He presented him with a book entitled "Sharīf al Hadīth" in the hand-writing of Abū 'Amir b. Abī Hayyūyah, in ten volumes, and Nizām al-Mulk kept it in his library. Another Imām Abū Turāb al-Marāghī¹ was Ash'arite. He used to give valuable decisions in the sacred law, and died in the year 492 A.H., 1098 A.D. There were other Ash'arites in the city, such as Abū Muḥammad al-Muḍarī² (d. 486 A.H., 1093 A.D.), 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Wāḥidī (d. 468 A.H., 1075 A.D.)³, Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Bākhārī⁴ (d. 467 A.H., 1074 A.D.), Abu Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 A.H., 1065 A.D.)⁵ and many others. So that al-Yaraqānī⁶, who was one of the most learned men in his epoch advised Abū Ḥamid al-Bayhaqī to go to Naysābūr saying: "There are many scholars there. If you miss any, you will contact others, and thus benefit by your journey." At that time, therefore, there were many theologians in Naysābūr, and Imām al-Ḥaramayn lived at a time when different opinions and beliefs were known.

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1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 219
 2. Ibid. p. 237
 3. Ibid. p. 289
 4. Ibid. p. 298
 5. Ibid. p. 3
 6. Ibid. p. 13

As to philosophy, we find that the fifth century was distinguished at its beginning by a great philosopher, Ibn-Sinā'. None can deny the vast scholarly production of this man. as well as his extensive and diversified research. His influence was great in stimulating his people by his deep philosophical insight. He had many disciples, among whom was Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Ma'sūmī.¹ Ibn Sinā' said: "He stands in the same relationship to me as did Plato to Aristotle." He wrote many books such as Kitāb al Mufāraqāt, Kitāb fi A'dād al 'Uqūl, another title fi al-Aflāk, and Kitāb al-Mubdi'āt. All these are philosophical. Many of his books were in the Nizāmiyyah Library.

Also in Naysābūr, lived 'Umar al-Khayyām.² Ash-Shahrazūri says that he comes next to Ibn-Sinā'. He wrote ar-Rubā'iyāt, a Mukhtasar fi at-Tabi'iyāt, a Risālah fi-l-Wujūd, a Risālah fi-l-Kawn wa-t-Taklif, which contains 'Umar al-Khayyām's answer to al-Imām an-Nasawī's question about "Hikmat al Khāfiq fi Khalq al-'Ālam wa-Kalimat at-Taklif."

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1. Ash-Shahrazūri: Nuzhat al-Arwāh : folio 191, vol.1
Al-Bayhaqi: Tārīkh Hukamā' al-Islām folio 57,
col. 2, Lahore Edition, p. 95-96.
 2. Ash-Shahrazūri: Nuzhat al Arwāh: folio. 195. col.1
Al-Bayhaqi: folio 66, col. 2
It has to be noticed that Ash-Shahrazūri copies
from al-Bayhaqi
For information about al-Khayyām, see the book
written by Ahmid Ḥamid al-Ṣarrāf. Second Edition,
Baghdād, 1949.

It can be seen that there were a great number of philosophical works, especially in Naysābūr, and that al-Juwaynī could have access to the most important philosophical works of his time.¹ But philosophy was disapproved of by different muslim sects at that time, and especially by the Ḥanbalites, who were against philosophers. They attacked his concern with philosophy.²

This century abounded also in eminent sūfis, among whom mention should be made of Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī ad-Daqqāq (d. 415 A.H., 1024 A.D.), Abū 'Abd ar-Raḥmān as-Sulamī, Abū-l-'Abbās al-Qaṣṣār, Abū Sahl al-Khashshāb, and Abū-l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī. During this time, there appeared also quack sūfi, who did much to harm the standing of sūfism. Al-Qushayrī alluded to them in his Risālah called Ar-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah.³

Sūfi sciences conform during this period with al Qur'ān and with sunnite rites⁴ in their original simplicity.⁵

1. See p. p. 45-49

2. See p. p. 115-117

3. Al-Qushayrī: Ar-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah, p. 3,4.

4. Al-Qushayrī, p. 3,4.

5. Ibid. p. 53.

This is a sketch of al-Juwaynī's time in its political, religious and cultural aspects.

The next study is of the different phases of al-Juwaynī's life. The first phase begins with the birth of al-Juwaynī, and ends with the death of his father. The second shows him as a teacher in his father's stead, continuing to acquire knowledge while teaching. The third begins after he left Naysābur and ends with his return. On his return to Naysābur to teach in al-Niḡāmiyyah school, the fourth stage of his life begins, and it ends with his death in the year 478 A.H. 1085 A.D

First phase

As-Subkī gives a clear idea of the early days of al-Juwaynī. He says that his father took great care of him from the time of his birth and even before. That began when he bought the slave who was to bear the child with the money which he earned by copying. It was shown again later when he was careful not to have him fed with something which did not belong to him. It happened that once al-Juwaynī stammered during one of his debates, a thing which had never happened before. The audience wondered and asked Imām al-Ḥaramayn, "How does that happen?" He replied, "I think that is the result of what I sucked in once." "And what is the story behind that?" ¹ they asked. Al-Juwaynī told them how ¹ once, when he was a baby, he was suckled by a slave who belonged to their neighbours, and he told the story which has been mentioned above.²

Al-Juwaynī studied Jurisprudence (Fiqh under his father, and earned his admiration. He also exerted himself in the study of legal rites (al-Madhāhib), especially the Shāfi'ite one, their differences, (al-Khilāf), and theology, (al-Uṣūl). He learnt

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 251
Imd., vol. 3, p. 360
2. See p. 16, 17

the prophet's traditions (al-Ḥadīth) from several shaykhs, such as Abū Ḥasan, Abū Sa'd b. 'Alī, Abū Sa'd al-Naḍrawī, and Mansūr b. Dānis. These three teachers were known especially as traditionists (Muhaddithīn).¹

Al-Juwaynī had a very good command of the Arabic language, as al Fārisī says.² He studied the Qur'ān and was noted for his eloquence. Most of those who met him were astonished at his ability in debate and his vast knowledge, so that, when his father died, he was recognized by them, in spite of his youth, as one of the very wise Imāms. He was known as a discriminating and honest critic. Sometimes he criticised his father, and the father was glad of that.

After his father's death he used to repeat this sentence, when he discovered one of his father's errors: "This is an error committed by the Shaykh, God save his soul."³

We have al-Juwaynī's own testimony that in his quest for truth he has read extensively in the Islamic sciences and, still unsatisfied, turned aside from

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 258
Siy. vol. 10, sect. 1, folio 113.

2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 254

3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 254

Imd. vol. 3, p. 260

"هذا زلة من الشيخ رحمه الله"

authoritatively transmitted knowledge to works condemned by the [Ahl al-Islām.] Eventually, however, his quest had taken him back to the faith of early Muslims, and it was in that faith that he hoped to die.¹

Some biographers interpret these words as if al-Juwaynī had at one time rejected Islamic sciences. But as-Subkī² held, - correctly, I believe - that all he did was to subject religious problems to a critical, intellectual examination.

Al-Juwaynī was fond of reading, and it is said that he read a hundred books before he began to study theology under al-Isfarā'īni.³

If we now bear in mind that al-Juwaynī's father was fond of knowledge, that he tried at one time to examine things critically, that he always encouraged his son to learn more and that he was glad when his son criticised him, it is clear that it was he who set the pattern for his son's life.

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 260 لقد فرأت خمسين ألفاً في خمسين ألفاً ثم خليت أهل الإسلام من أسلافهم فيها وعلومهم الظاهرة، ودرجيت البحر الحضم، وغنت في الذي بهي أهل الإسلام معناه، وكل ذلك في طلب الحق، وكنت أحرب في سالف الدهر من التقليد والآن قد رجعت عن الكل إلى كلمة الحق، عليكم دين العجائز، فإن لم يدرك الحق بلطف يره فأبوت على دين العجائز، وتخت عاقبة أمرى عند الزجيل على نوحته أهل الحق، وكلمة الأحاديث له آله آله الله، قالوا لا بن الحويين.

2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 260

3. See p. 34, and footnote p. 35

Second Phase

Al-Juwaynī's experiences during the first stage of his life prepared him to become a great man. He was called an Imām when he was only twenty. When his father died he took his place in the school and began to teach. While teaching he continued to acquire knowledge. He went to al-Isfara'īnī, and to al-Bayhaqī's school, and attended the teaching of al-Khabbāzī.¹

Abū 'l-Qāsim 'Abd al Ḥabbār b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Isfarā'īnī was a great man, and a great Imām in law (fiqh) and theology (kalām). He was an Ash'arite. He used to hold debates, he taught Islamic sciences, and he gave decisions on Islamic law. He followed the ascetic practices associated with early Muslims. He died in the year 452 A.H., 1060 A.D.²

Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Bayhaqī al-Khizrūkhārī, was a Shāfi'ite. He studied law (fiqh) under Abū 'l-Faṭḥ Nāṣir ibn Muḥammad al-'Umari al Marwāsi. He was known as a Traditionist. To learn Ḥadīth he travelled to Hijāz

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1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 254
- Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
 2. Subk., vol. 3, p. 210

and al-'Irāq. He studied also under some Shaykhs in Khurasān. He wrote, it is said, about a hundred books. He was the first man who collected the texts of ash-Shāfi'i. Among his books are: Kitāb As-Sunan, al Kabīr, as-Sunan as-Ṣaghīr, Dalā'il an-Nubuwwah as-Sunan wa 'l-Āthār, Shu'ab al Imān, and Manāqib ash-Shāfi'i Ahmad. He followed the practices of the first Muslims (as-Salaf) and was ascetic. He died at Naysābūr in 458 A.H. ^{1065 A.D.} His body was then taken to Baghdād.¹

Al-Khabbāzī was the chief of the reciters of the Qur'ān (Shaykh al-Qurrā'). His name is Abū 'Abd allah ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al Naysābūrī al Khabbāzī.² He taught the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī. He was a good and noble Shaykh. He was well versed in the Qur'ān. Many people went to him for authoritative opinions. He died in 449 A.H., 1057 A.D.

These three teachers of al-Juwaynī were distinguished by being good Muslims, following especially the instructions of the first believers (aṣ-salaf). Their influence on al-Juwaynī appeared when after examining all sciences he came back to early Muslim beliefs, called by him Dīn al 'ajā'iz.³ This point will be discussed later.⁴

1. Um. vol. 3, sect. 2, folio 294, 295

. Kath, vol. 12, p. 34

2. Siy, vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 159, col I

3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 260

4. See p.p 117-120

Al-Juwayni was highly interested in defending¹ the sunnite rites, especially because there were many enemies who attacked and persecuted the sunnite people, as had been shown when surveying al-Juwayni's time.² Some biographers mention that the troubles caused to the sunnites led to the emigration of some of them from Naysābūr, and among these was al-Juwayni. But whether ^{or not} these religious clashes were the reason for his leaving the town ~~or not~~ it can be said that this happened in 445 A.H., 1053 A.D. or 446 A.H., 1054 A.D.³ This incident marks the beginning of the third phase.

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 252

2. See p. p. 26-28

3. See p. 25

Hopfer in his introduction to Kitāb al-'Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah asserts that this happened in the year 445/1053. See Das Dogma des al-Djuwaini, p. 7.

Third Phase

This phase begins with his leaving Naysābūr and ends with his return to it. Historians differ as to the reasons which made him leave Naysābūr. Were religious intrigues the cause, or his desire to gain more knowledge by travelling abroad?

‘Abd al-Ghāfir al Fārisī, as-Subkī and Ibn al-‘Imād¹ mention that al-Juwaynī, al-Qushayrī and some other sunnite Ināms left the city when religious intrigues appeared. Ibn Khallikān² just mentions that al-Juwaynī left Naysābūr to meet some (‘Ulamā’) in Baghdād, and so does ibn al-Jawzī³, and also Ibn Taghri Bardī⁴ who adds that he went also to Mecca, where he stayed four years teaching, preaching and defending Islamic law. But it is rather more likely that religious intrigues made him abandon Naysābūr, as is confirmed by his disciple ‘Abd al-Ghāfir al Fārisī, and by historical events. The places he went to were probably free from such intrigues because it is not mentioned in any of the sources that there was any movement against the Ash‘arites by that time⁵ outside Naysābūr.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 254, 255, 358.

Ask. 280

Ind. vol. 3, p. 358

2. Waf. vol. I, p. 361

3. Munt. p. 18

4. Nrj. vol. 5, p. 121

5. See p. 25

All the same, he gained in knowledge for in every town he lived in, he studied and discussed opinions.

From Naysābūr he went to ^{a camp} (al-⁴Askar), and from there to Baghdād.¹ Ibn al-Jawzī mentions that he arrived at Baghdād as the ^{Turkomans} ² entered it. According to Ibn-al-Āthīr, these came to the city in 447 A.H., 1055 A.D.³ Therefore al-Juwaynī left Naysābūr about 446-447 A.H.⁴ It is said that he met many great Imāms in Baghdād, discussed opinions with them, and became famous in the city.⁵ Biographers do not mention how long he stayed in Baghdād. After leaving Baghdād, al-Juwaynī went to al-Hijāz, and stayed at Mecca for about four years⁶ debating, giving decisions in Islamic law, and trying to spread knowledge everywhere. Therefore, he was called Imām al Ḥaramayn, as already noted.⁷

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 252 and pp. 254, 255.

Waf. vol. i, p. 361

Imd., vol. 3, p. 358

Munt. vol. 9, p. 18

Nuj., vol. 5, p. 121

2. Munt. vol. 9, p. 19

3. Kam. vol. 9, p. 227

4. See p. 37

5. See footnote 1 of this page

6. See footnote 1 of this page

7. See p. 9

During his stay in Mecca, besides defending the sunnite doctrine, al-Juwayni spent his time in pious devotion, between aş-Şafā and al-Marwah, until he had purified his soul.¹ Indeed as-Subki in describing his piety and sensitiveness appears to imply that he was a Sūfi. He says, "When in the course of his assemblies he launched into an account of conditions or "Sūfi states" (ahwal) and waded into the science of Sufism, he used to reduce those present to tears by his own weeping and to make their eyes bleed by his cries, his recitations and his allusions, for he was ablaze within himself and certain of the subtle mysteries that take place."²

Some of al-Juwayni's own words show that he looked for a way other than Kalām, which is based on reasoning, to the reality of God. He says that reason is at a loss to apprehend reality, although it is sure of the existence of an Eternal God.³

"وجاوز بمكة أربع سنين، يدرس ويعتق ويجتهد في العبادة. 1. و نشر العلم، حتى شرف به ذلك النادر، وأشرقت قلوع ذلك الوادي، وأسبلت عليه الكعبة ستورها. وأقلت عليه وهو يطوف بها كالمسود حتى اللبالي بيض ويجوزها وصفت بيته مع الله، فلو كانت الصغار ذات لسان لسان لسانه جهاراً وشكر له المسعى بين الصفا والمرواة، أقبالا وادباراً."

See Subk. vol. 3, p. 252

"وإذا شرع في حكاية الأحوال وخاض في علم الصوفية في فصول. 2. مجالسه بالغدوات أبكى الحاضرين ببيكاته وقطر الدماء من الحفون بزعماته ونعراء أنه وبأشاراته لا حتراقه في نفسه وتحققه بما يجري من دقائق الأسرار."

Subk. vol. 3, p. 257

Imd. vol. 3, p. 360

Waf. vol. 1, p. 361

3. Aqd., p. 16. "العقول حائرة في درك الحقيقة، فاطمعة بالوجود المتزا عن صفات الافتقار."

This means that al-Juwaynī finds that Kalām does not lead to the knowledge of the reality of God. This reality can be known by the heart. It is the heart that leads to knowledge of the Reality. This is Sūfism.

It has to be said that biographers do not give many details about al-Juwaynī's life as a Sūfi, any more than they do about the philosophical element in his knowledge, as will be seen later. This comes from the fact that al-Juwaynī was supposed to be mainly a theologian, for he was at the head of an-Niẓāmiyyah school at Naysābūr, which was built, like the other Niẓāmiyyah schools, to keep the adherents of the sunnite sect loyal and in good spirit.¹

Al-Juwaynī himself seemed to have been careful to keep these two aspects of his life out of the public eye. None of his works known to us is on sūfism, or discusses philosophical problems systematically.² Sūfism was not, at that time, the way recognized by all Muslims to the knowledge of God. It seems even that it was not highly esteemed by most of them. Al-Qushayrī mentions in his Risālah³ that there were at that time some bad Sūfis who were

1. See p. p. 26 - 28

2. See p. 54

3. Ar-Risālat al-Qushayriyyah, p. 34
See p. 31

harmful to Sūfism. This means that al-Qushayri was trying to defend Sūfism and to prove that it was not what these disreputable Sūfis made it out to be. Philosophy was also, as has been shown, attacked by many Muslim sects.¹ This explains why al-Juwayni and his biographers were trying not to give many details about these two aspects of his life.

From Mecca, al-Juwayni returned to Naysābur.²

As-Subkī mentions that this was after religious

intrigues had vanished.³ When Alp-Arslān was on the throne, ~~and Nizām al-Mulk became his vizier.~~ ~~the Ash'arite Imams were recalled. Now Alp Arslān succeeded to the throne in 455/1063⁽⁴⁾ and Nizām al-Mulk became his minister in 456/1064. Al-Juwayni therefore is likely to have returned to Naysābur in 456/1064, or a little later.~~

1. See p. 31

2. Subk., vol. 3, p. 253

Waf., vol. 1, p. 362

Ind., vol. 2, p. 367

3. Subk., vol. 3, p. 255

4. Kam., vol. 9, p. 175

5. Zāmbour: Manuel de Généalogie et de Chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islām, translated by Dr. Zakī Maḥmūd Ḥasan and Ḥasan Aḥmad Maḥmūd., vol. 1 (Wulāt Naysābur). p. 44, 221

5. Ibid. p

Fourth Phase

This begins with al-Juwayni's return to Naysābūr, and his appointment as teacher at an-Niẓāmiyyah school in Naysābūr. He admitted Niẓām al-Mulk's policy.¹ He continued teaching at this school till the end of his life. He became more famous, and many people came to learn from him. Biographers mention that at that period of time, he became the head of the sunnite community, and was responsible for (waqf) affairs.² He was also appointed preacher of al-Munif'i Mosque. His pupils numbered over four hundred. His writings appeared at this stage, and his knowledge became mature. He had a good command of philosophy as well as of Islamic Sciences. This is very clear in his answers to Naturalists (Ṭabā'i'iyun) and other philosophers in ash-Shāmil, which is one of his most important books. This tallies with what as-Subkī says about the philosophical element in his culture.³ He mentions that al-Juwayni debated the problem of the creation of the Qur'ān with a philosopher and refuted all his arguments so convincingly that partisans and opponents alike agreed that he had carried the day. Al-Juwayni's assertion that he had at one time turned to sciences

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 137, 138

2. Ibid. p. 252

3. Ibid. p. 253

other than the traditional ones may be taken to mean that he took to the study of philosophy. Ultimately, however, he came to disapprove of it,¹ as did most of his contemporaries. That is why, when al-Juwayni discusses the opinions of the philosophers, whom he calls "heretics" (al-Mulhidah),² he does not expose them in an organised system. He gives separate answers to separate problems.³

When the Ḥanbalites said that al-Juwayni was an unbeliever because he believed in some of the philosophers' opinions about the knowledge of God, namely that God knows universals and not particulars,⁴ they were alluding in an unfair and abusive way to the fact that al-Juwayni had studied philosophy. Ash-Shahristāni⁵ also mentions that al-Juwayni shared the philosophers' views about the originated power of man (al-Qudrah al-Ḥādithah). This statement, discussed later,⁶ proves that ash-Shahristāni also believed that al-Juwayni had studied philosophy.

As-Subkī and other biographers make slight allusion to this element without giving any details about how, where and when he learnt philosophy. This was through veneration for the Imām, philosophy being a science abhorred by most of the Muslim thinkers.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 260, 25.
2. Irsh. (Luciani): pp. 12, 13, 15 and p.
3. See p. 46 and following
4. See p. 116, 117
5. Ash-Shahristāni: Nihāyat al Iqdām fi 'Ilm al-Kalām, edited by Alfred Guillaume, p. 78.
6. See p. 186

Some biographers state that philosophy was not studied by the doctors of Islām up till the time of al-Juwaynī. Dr. M.A.R. Biṣār, in his thesis entitled "Al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī as theologians", submitted to Edinburgh University in May, 1953, discusses the statement of Ibn Khaldūn, in which the latter says that al-Ghazālī was the first to confuse philosophy and logic with theology. He agrees with him that al-Ghazālī was the first to introduce logic in theology, and disagrees with him when he says that this great Mutakallim was the first to confuse philosophy with theology. He says: "We in fact find that many leading Mu'tazilites had replied to the philosophers and preferred dialectical and polemical arguments against them, and made frequent use in their own theological discussions of this method of disputation. Amongst these is Ibrāhīm an-Nazzām, who put forward arguments against Empedocles and Aristotle and against those who held the view that the movements of the stars were pre-eternal. His demonstration of the falsehood of this proposition is similar to the proof advanced by al-Ghazālī; and it is probable that the views of Ibrāhīm an-Nazzām in this respect formed the basis of al-Ghazālī's views. (See the Book, al-Intisār (victory), by al-Khayyāt, pp. 35, 36, and the book, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, (the incoherence of the incoherence) by Ibn Rushd. Beirut edition, pp. 31, 32.) " ¹

1. See Dr. Biṣār's thesis, pp. 16-19.

It is necessary to discuss here what al-Ghazali says about his predecessors, the doctors of Islam, and philosophy: "So far as I could see, none of the doctors of Islam had devoted thought and attention to philosophy. In their writings, none of the theologians engaged in polemic against the philosophers, apart from obscure and scattered utterances so plainly erroneous and inconsistent that no person of ordinary intelligence would be ^klikely to be deceived, far less one versed in the sciences."¹

By these words al-Ghazali attacked his predecessors. He considers their writings to be of no value. His remarks about his predecessors, the doctors and theologians of Islam are not really true. The fact that none of their writings were a systematic answer to the philosophers is true. The reason was not the incapacity of the Muslim theologians, but the aggressive spirit, which prevailed against philosophy and against those who studied it. The latter were considered unbelievers, and sometimes were put to death. These answers rejected by al-Ghazali as "obscure and scattered utterances" are proofs at any rate that these ^{men} did study philosophy.

As to the value of their writings, it cannot be denied that they are not organised in a coherent system. They are merely answers to some problems

1. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali, p. 29

which the theologian mentions either in isolation or in connection with some others. That is the reason for the incoherence of the answers. The obscurity of these answers is rather external than internal. The importance of this is that if the obscurity is external, it means that it comes from the way they were presenting their answers, and not from the way of understanding the philosophical problems. It is very ^klikely that the Muslim writers deliberately refrained from arranging the opinions they were refuting in any logical order or even formulating them correctly, in case the reader might be convinced by these opinions before he read the refutation. One of the Muslim authorities gave his opinion about this practice. His opinion is mentioned by al-Ghazālī himself, who says: "Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, once criticized al-Ḥarīth al-Muḥāsibī (may God have mercy on them) for his book The Refutation of the Muṭazilah. "It is a duty to refute heresy", al-Ḥarīth replied. "Certainly", said Aḥmad, "but you first give an account of their false doctrines and afterwards a refutation of them. How can you be sure what men will do? A man might read the false doctrines and grasp them with his understanding, without turning afterwards to the refutation, or he might peruse the refutation without understanding its full import."¹

1. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī, pp. 44, 45

This opinion must have been of great influence among the Muslims, because it will be noticed that this was the way they adopted in answering their opponents - the philosophers or the Mu'tazilites.

Al-Juwaynī was one of those who followed this practice. His theological works, especially Ash-Shāmil, are full of such examples.¹ They contain answers to separate problems raised by his opponents. Nobody can say that al-Juwaynī was unable to arrange his opponents' points of view in logical order, for he did this thoroughly with the opinions of the adherents to his doctrine.

If it can now be accepted that the obscurity of the theologians' writings before al-Ghazālī was due to this fragmentary way of exposing their opponents' arguments, it will be seen that al-Ghazālī's words were unfair to his predecessors. If al-Ghazālī succeeded in changing the way of examining the opponents' arguments, this is due first of all to the fact that he placed himself above suspicion by writing The Incoherence of Philosophers and to the evolution of Muslim intellectuality. Slowly but surely al-Ghazālī managed to realise his aim. His words can thus be considered abusive. He was far from giving expression to the facts. He seems to have ignored the aggressive spirit against philosophy which his predecessors had

1. Sham vol. 1, folio 39, 40 and 98, 99.

to reckon with, and he discounted the way in which they presented their opponents' opinions by saying: "Ahmad's observation is justified, but it applies to false doctrine, which is not widely and generally known. Where such doctrine is widely known, it ought to be refuted, and refutation presupposes a statement of the doctrine."¹

Al-Ghazālī was very severe in judging Muslim doctors and theologians. Al-Juwaynī and others may have studied philosophy as thoroughly as Al-Ghazālī himself. The only difference was that the latter had greater opportunity of expressing his opinions openly. Even he was attacked later by a philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd) who said that the doctors of Islam should prevent ordinary Muslims from reading his books.²

1. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī, p. 45

2. Ibn Rushd: Fasl al-Ma'āl, texte arabe, Gauthier, p. 21

Al-Juwaynī left Naysābūr for Iṣbahan¹ for a short time about the year 465 A.H., 1072 A.D.

It is noted of him that at the close of his life he wrote on the Shāfi'ite legal rites, a book entitled Nihāyat al Maṭlab fī Dirāyat al Madhhab, a huge book of about twenty-two volumes.²

It has been mentioned that, when Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Faḍālah ibn 'Alī al-Jāshī'ī,³ the linguist, came to Naysābūr in 469 A.H. al-Juwaynī was humble enough to study grammar (nahw) under him and to examine his book entitled Iksīr al-Ḥayāh fī Sinā'at al Adab.

At that period of time al-Imām aḥ-Shirāzī⁴ came also to Naysābūr in connection with some administrative affairs. Al-Juwaynī was also happy to receive this great Imām.

Al-Juwaynī then fell seriously ill.⁵ He recovered, but a relapse followed. He asked to be transferred to Buḥtingān because of its moderate climate, and shortly afterwards died in this village.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 255
2. See p. p. 97-100
3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Imd. vol. 3, p. 360

Date of death The biographers ¹ say that he died in 478 A.H., 1085 A.D. Some of them specify the day and the time, the 25th of Rabi' ath-Thānī, ² 25th of August, 1085 A.D., ³ in the evening at the age of 59.

He left behind him a son called Abū 'l-Qāsim, who died a few years after his father.

Place of burial The great Imām was buried in his house, in Naysābūr the same evening, ⁴ and it is said that his remains were later removed to the cemetery of al-Imām Ḥusayn. ⁵

My research into other records has brought no confirmation of his having been buried in this cemetery. ⁶ If his mortal remains ever were removed from his house, it is very probable that they were buried in Karbila', ⁷ as this city is closer to the place where he died than Cairo, these two cities being mentioned among the places of burial

(Mashāhid) of al-Ḥusayn.

1. Imd: p. 358
 Nuj. vol. 1, p. 12
 Sam: vol. 1, folio 144
 Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
 Munt. vol. 9, p. 20
 Waf. vol. 1, p. 362
 Um. vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 38, 42
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
 Munt. vol. 9, p. 20
 Waf. vol. 1, p. 362
3. Mikhai'l-Dibbānah: Al-Taqwīm al-'Am, 1898 Hilal edition
4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
5. Ibid.
6. Yaq: Karbila'.
7. Ibn Rushīd: Rihlat: The journey of al-Ḥāfiẓ b. Rushīd.- Egyptian Library, photostat no. 2376
7. A place of pilgrimage, west of the Euphrates about 60 miles S. S. W. of Baghdad, on the edge of the desert (Yaq. v. I p. 249) See also al-Istāḥḡān p. 85 - Maqs. vol. III p. 121. and Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden) p. 359.



'Alī Pāchā Mubārak in his book, Al-Khutāṭ al-Tawfiḳiyyah,¹ says that there is a mosque called al-Juwaynī's Mosque in Cairo in a small district called by al-Juwaynī's name "Darb al-Juwaynī", situated in a bigger district called "ad-Darb al-Aḥmar." Above the door of this mosque a plaque bears the name of Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh al-Juwaynī, who is the father of Imām al-Ḥaramayn. Beside this plaque, another one bears some details of Imām al-Ḥaramayn's life, gathered, so it is said, by the servant of the mosque.

This mosque does not, however, appear to be registered among ancient mosques. Perhaps it is the mosque of an al-Juwaynī² other than the Imām, or it may be a mausoleum raised as an expression of the admiration of the people of Egypt for Imām al-Ḥaramayn.

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1. 'Alī Bāshā Mubārak: Al Khutāṭ al-Tawfiḳiyyah,
vol. 1, p. 100
 2. It is to be noted that 'Alī ibn Yūsūf al-Juwaynī, a ṣūfī who was an uncle of Imām al-Ḥaramayn, visited Egypt. But it is not said that he died there. Subk, vol. 3, p. 215.

Chapter 2
Al-Juwayni's Works

Chapter 2.Al-Juwayni's Works

All the biographers of al-Juwayni are agreed that he was a prolific writer. As-Subki¹ mentions twelve books of his, Yāqūt three² as being the most famous ones, Ibn Khallikān³ twelve, and Ibn al-'Imād⁴ seven. Brockelman⁵ in Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, mentions nineteen, but probably two of these were written by the father. The Index of the Library of the League of Arab States,⁶ mentions Kitāb alKāfiyah fi-l-Jadal and a summary made by al-Juwayni of a book written by al-Bāqillāni. As-Subki mentions two debates between al-Juwayni and ash-Shirāzi. The subject of the first is, the posture in prayer,⁷ and of the second, the marriage of the virgin.⁸

In the theological part of one of al-Juwayni's books, entitled an-Nizāmiyyah fi-l-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah, which was separately edited by al-Shaykh Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawthari in 1367 A.H., 1947 A.D., the Imām mentions another book written by himself. He

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 253
 2. Yaq., vol. 3, Juwayn. p. 282
 3. Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
 4. Imd., p. 359
 5. Brockelman, p. 388, appendix p. 671
 6. The Index of the Library of the League of Arab States, edited in 1954, Tawfiq.
 7. Subk. vol 3, p. 275
 8. Ibid., p. 278

says: "I wrote a book about the soul (an-Nafs), which contains about 1000 pages."¹ The editor ash-Shaykh al-Kawthari commented that in the first place a thousand pages was too much to write about the soul, and in the second place al-Juwayni's biographers do not mention such a work. He concluded that al-Juwayni had never written it.² This book is not mentioned by biographers, and it is not found in library indexes; but as al-Juwayni mentions it himself, surely he wrote it. But as the subject of the book, as it appears, deals with philosophy, which many Muslim thinkers abhorred, they deliberately overlooked it, despite their veneration for al-Juwayni. Al-Juwayni also mentions in ash-Shāmil fi usūl ad-Dīn,³ another book he wrote himself, Kitāb at-Talkhīṣ fi 'l-Uṣul, which may be Kitāb Mukhtaṣar al-Irshād li-'l-Bāqillāni, summarized by al-Juwayni, as mentioned in the Index of the League of Arab States. But that cannot be settled without examination of the microfilm copy of this manuscript, found in the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts

1. Add: p. 59. This work is referred by Dr. Farīd Jabre to al-Ghazālī, which is not true. See La Notion de la Ma'rīfat chez al-Ghazālī, pp. 140, 141, and La Notion de la Certitude

selon chez al-Ghazālī. p. 11

2. Add. p. 59.

3. Sham, vol. 1, folio 4.

4. Tamh, p. 258, 259

of the League of Arab States, which, for administrative reasons, was not available for scrutiny. It may be that the summary is by al-Bāqillānī himself and that al-Juwaynī tried to summarise it again.

Al-Khawansārī in his book, Rawḍat al-Jannāt, also mentions Kitāb Talkhīṣ at-Tagrīb as one of al-Juwaynī's books. Al-Bāqillānī's book, mentioned above, is also called by him, al-Irshād wa 'l-Tagrīb. So Kitāb at-Talkhīṣ fi 'l-uṣul, mentioned by al-Juwaynī in al-Shāmil, may be the summary of one of al-Bāqillānī's books.¹

Two biographers mention works of al-Juwaynī's which are missing in all libraries. The first, as-Subkī,² mentions three books: al-Irshād fi uṣul-al-figh, which may be the summary of al-Bāqillānī's book mentioned above; Diwān Khuṭab, which may be some recommendations to his son; and Mukhtasar an-Nihāyah. The second, Ibn Khallikān, mentions Mukhtasar an-Nihāyah too and says that it was not completed by al-Juwaynī. He tells of another book, Madārik al-Uqūl, and mentions that it also was unfinished, and last of all, Ghunyat al Mustarshidīn, which is not to be found in libraries.

1. Al-Khawansārī · Rawḍat al-Jannāt. Ebraim Edition, p. 463
 2. Subkī, vol. 3, p. 253

Another relevant manuscript has been pointed out to me by Dr. Umberto Rizzitano. It is part of a collection and is entitled Masā'il 'Abd al-Ḥaqq aṣ-Ṣiqillī wa Ajwibatuhā li-Imām al-Ḥaramayn.¹

Thus the number of al-Juwaynī's works is twenty-seven. Hereunder is a list of all the books of al-Juwaynī, arranged in Arabic alphabetical order:

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1. He is 'Abd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥārūn al-Ḥāshimī al Qurashī, called also (al-Muknā) Abū Muḥammad (d. 466 A.H., 1073 A.D.). See p. footnote no. 1
(Dr. Umberto Rizzitano, Lecturer in Rome and Heliopolis Universities, verified the collection, which is in old maghrabi handwriting.)

1. Al-Irshād ilā Qawā'id al-Adillah fi Uṣūl al-I'tiqād.
2. Al-Irshād fi uṣūl al-figh (which may be al-Talkhis).
3. Al-Burhān fi uṣūl al-figh.
4. At-Talkhis fi uṣūl al figh.
5. Ad-Durrah al-Mudiyyah fi mā waqa'a min Khilāf
Bayn ash-Shāfi'iyyah wa 'l-Hanifiyyah.
6. As-Silsilah fi Ma'rifat al-Qawlayn wa 'l-Wajhayn
Alā Madhah ash-Shāfi'i.
7. Ash-Shāmil fi uṣūl ad-Din.
8. Diwān Khutab.
9. Risālah fi-l-Taqlid wa 'l-Ijtihād.
10. Risālah fi-l-figh
11. Risālah fi uṣūl ad-Din
12. Shifā' al-Ghalil fi mā waqa'a fi-t-Tawrāt wa 'l-
Injil min at-Tabdil.
13. Al-'Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah fi-l-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah.
14. Ghiyāth al-Umam fi Iltiyath az-Zulam.
15. Ghuniat al-Mustarshidin fi-l-Khilāf.
16. Qasidah wasāyah Li-Ibnihi.
17. Kitāb al-Kāfiyah fi-'l-Jadal.
18. Kitāb ah-Nafs.
19. Luma' al-Adillah fi Qawa'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa 'l-
Jamā'ah.
20. Al-Mujtahidin (min at-Talkhis fi uṣul-al-figh.)
21. Mukhtasar al-Irshad fi 'Ilm al-Kalām (summarised by
Imām al-Haramayn - which may be at-Talkhis fi
uṣul al-figh).
22. Masā'il 'Abd al-Haq as-Siqilli wa ajwibatuhā Li
Imām al-Haramayn.
23. Mughith al-Khalq fi Ikhtiār al-Abaqq.
24. Munāzarat fi al-Ijtihād fi al-Qiblah.

25. Munāzarat fī Zawāj al-Bikr.
26. Nihāyat al-Maṭlab fī Dirāyat al Madhhab.
27. Al-Waraqāt.

These works are scattered here and there in 'Iraq, India, Syria, Paris, London, Madrid, Berlin, Tubengin, Istanbul and other cities throughout the world. A great number are to be found in Egypt, some in the Egyptian National Library, some in the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts of the League of Arab States, and in al-Azhar. Most of these works are manuscripts. Only five have been published. Three books, al-Waraqāt, al-'Aqīdah an-Nizāmiyyah, and al Irshad ila Qawa'id al-adillah fī usūl al-I'tiqād, and two debates which are to be found in as-Subki's Ṭabaqāt.

The works are classified below according to their subject matter. Chronological order was attempted but, as the works bear an approximate, and not an exact, date, this was not satisfactory.

The number put against each title refers to its position on the list above.¹

1. See p. 57

Classification according to Subject:I. Works in ('Uṣūl al-Fiḡh)

- ✓ 3. Al-Burhān fi Uṣūl al-Fiḡh.
- ✓ 20. Al-Mujtahidīn (Min al-Talkhīs fi uṣūl al-Fiḡh.
- ✓ 27. Al-Waraqāt
- ✓ 23. Kitāb Muḡhith al-Khalq fi Ikhtiyār al-Aḡaqq.
- ✓ 21. Mukhtaṣar al-Irshād Li-l-Bāqillāni.
- ✓ 2. al-Irshād fi uṣūl al-fiḡh.
- ✓ 4. Kitāb al-Talkhīs fi 'l-Uṣūl.

II. Works in (Uṣūl ad-Dīn).

- ✓ 1. Al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭil al-Adillah.
- ✓ 21. Risālat fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn.
- ✓ 7. aḡ-Shāmil fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn.
- ✓ 14. Kitāb Ghiyāth al-Ummān fi-l-Ilṭiyāth aḡ-Zulam.
- ✓ 12. Shifā' al-Ghalīl fi mā waḡa'a fi-l-Tawrat
- ✓ 13. Al-'Aḡidah aḡ-Niḡāmiyyah.
- ✓ 19. Luma' al-Adillah fi qawā'id 'aḡā'id Ahl al-Sunnah wa 'l-Jamā'ah.
- ✓ 22. Masā'il al-Imām 'Abd al-Ḥaḡ aḡ-Siqillī.

III. Works in (al fiḡh)

- ✓ 26. Nihāyat al-Matlab fi Dirāyat al-Madhhab.
- ✓ 24. Munāzarah fi 'l-Ijtihād fi 'l-Qiblah.
- ✓ 25. Munāzarah fi Zawaj al-Bikr.
- ✓ 6. Aḡ-Silsilah fi Ma'rifat al-Qawlayn wa 'l-wajhāyn.
- ✓ 10. Risālah fi 'l-fiḡh.
- ✓ 9. Risālah fi 'l-Taqlid wa 'l-Ijtihād.

IV. Works in (Khilaf)

5. ad-Durrah al-Mudiyyah fi mā Waqa'a Min Khilāf Bayn ash-Shāfi'iyyah wa 'l Hanīfiyyah.

15. Ghūniat al Mustarshidin fi 'l Khilāf.

V. Works in (Jadal)

17. Kitāb al-Kāfiyah fi 'l-Jadal.

VI. Works in other subjects.

16. Qasidah wasiyyah li waladihi.

18. Kitāb al-Nafs.

8. Diwān Khutab.

The description of these works follows in Arabic.

التصنيف بحسب الموضوعات

ان الموضوعات التي يمكن ان نوزع بينها مصنفات امام الحرمين
خمس : اصول فقه ، واصول دين ، وفقه ، وخلاف ، وجدل ، ومصنفات
اخرى .

أ - مصنفات في اصول الفقه

٣ البرهان في اصول الفقه (١)

١ - كتاب البرهان في اصول الفقه لامام الحرمين مصور فوتوغرافيا في
٣١٨ لوحة عن نسخة مخطوطة بالمكتبة البدرية (المدرسة
المدبولية بدمياط) ومسطرة كل لوحة ٢١ سطرا وكل سطر به
١٥ كلمة بخط النسخ المصطد وهو في قسمين ولا تاريخ لكتابه
واوله :

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر يا كريم

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة على خير خلقه محمد وآله قال
الشيخ الامام ابو المعالي امام الحرمين رضی الله عنه : حق
على كل من يحاول الخوض في فن من فنون العلوم ان يحيط
بالمقصود منه وبالمواد التي منها يستمد الفن حقيقته وحدته
ان امكت عبارة سديده على صناعة الحد وان عسر ان يحاول
الدرك بمسلك التقاسيم . والغرض من ذلك ان يكون الاقدام على
تعلمه مع حظ من العلم الجملى بالعلم الذي يحاول الخوض
فيه . فاصول الفقه مستمدة من الكلام والحريية والفقه والكلام
نعني به معرفة العالم واقسامه وحقائقه وحدوده والعلم بمحدثه

1- This work was considered by many Muslims a
difficult work. (see Subk. p. 274)

وما يجب له من الصفات وما يستحيل عليه وما يجوز في حقه
والعلم بالنبوات وتمييزها بالمعجزات عن دعاوى المبطلين واحكام
النبوات والقول فيما يجوز ويمتنع من كليات الشرائع ولا يتسدرج
المطلوب من الكلام تحت حد وهو يستمد من الاحاطة بالميميز
بين العلم وما عداه من الاعتقادات والعلم بالفرق بين البراهين
والشبهات ودرك مسالك النظر . ومن مواد اصول الفقه العربية
فانه يتعلق طرف صالح منه بالكلام على مقتضى الالفاظ . الخ .

(لوحة ٢ من سطر ١ - ١٢)

ثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلى هذه المقدمة ويتخلله
لوحات بها بياض من الاصل وليست له ابواب ولا فصول ظاهرة
يمكن الرجوع اليها اللهم الا النادر القليل لعدم محاولة كاتبها
اظهار الابواب او الفصول بالكتابة حتى انتهينا الولى ٣١٨ ففي
السطر الاول منها في نهايته فصل في الفرق بين النسخ
والتخصيص .

وفي السطر السابع منها يقول :

تم الكتاب وقد نجز بحمد الله وحسن توفيقه الغرض من هذا
المجموع في الاصول ونحن نرسم بعد ذلك مستعينين بالله تعالى
كتابا جامعا في الاجتهاد والفتوى يقع مصنفا براسه وتمة لهذا
الموضوع .

وهنا ينتهي الكتاب بدون ذكر التاريخ او اسم الناسخ وهو
في قسمين مجلدين الاول في ١٨٧ لوحة والثاني من لوحة ١٨٨
الى ٣١٨ وهو محفوظ برقم ٧١٤ اصول الفقه بدار الكتب

المصرية بالقاهرة

ب - ويوجد منه نسخة بالخط النسخ الجيد الحديث في ٢٦٨ ورقة كبيرة مسطحة ٢٣ سطرا ومتوسط كلمات كل سطر ٩ كلمات محفوظة بالمكتبة الازهرية برقم ٩١٣ اصول الفقه وهي تختلف عن النسخة المتبوية في كثير من الجبارات . ونسخة الازهر تمتاز بالتبويب والتقسيم بالمداد الاحمر والخط الثلث الجميل . وآخر نسخة الازهر كسخة المكتبة المتبوية بدمياطه وذكر اسم ناسخها وتاريخ نسخها .

وكان الفراغ من كتابة هذا يوم الجمعة الرابع والعشرين من شهر جمادى الثاني سنة ثلاثمائة وتسع وثلاثين بعد الالف من الهجرة النبوية . وذلك بقلم كاتبه الفقير الى ربه ندى عطيه محمد ابو العينين عطيه غفر الله له ولوالديه ولجميع المسلمين!

وأهم الموضوعات هي :

فصل يجمع التكليف ومعناه ومن يكلف وما يجوز التكليف به ورقة ٦
القول في العلوم ومداركها وادلتها ٨ ظ الى ٢٠ و
القول في البيان - الكلام في هذا الفصل يتعلق بثلاثة فنون ٢٠ و- ٢٢ ظ
القول في اللغات ٢٢ ظ - ٢٣ و
كتاب الاوامر ٢٤ و- ٤٦ ظ
باب القول في النواهي ٤٦ ظ - ٥٥ ظ
كتاب العموم والخصوص ٥٥ ظ - ٩٩ و-
سائل الاستثناء ٧٢ و- ٧٨ و

- القول في المفهوم ٩٠- و٩١ و
القول في افعال الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم ٩٩ و- ١٠٤ ظ
القول في التعلق بشرائع الماضين ١٠٤ ظ- ١٠٦ و
كتاب التأويلات ١٠٦ و- ١٤٨ و
كتاب الاخبار ١٢١ و- ١٤٨ و
القول في الخبر والمتواتر ١٢١ و- ١٢٦ و
كتاب الاجماع ١٤٨ و ١٦٣ و
كتاب القياس ١٦٣ و- ٢٦٩ و
كتاب الترجيحات ٢٦٩ - ٣١٢ و
كتاب النسخ ٣١٢ و- ٣١٨ ظ

ورد في بروكلمن ان نسخة الازهر هي شرح كتاب البرهان
والواقع انها نسخة من كتاب البرهان وليست شرحا له . كما
تبيننا ذلك .

الشروح :

- ١ - يوجد شرح في " فاس " "قرويين" برقم ١٣٩٧ باسم " كفاية
طالب البيان شرح البرهان " ولا يعرف اسم الشرح .
- ٢ - كما توجد نسخة اخرى من هذا الشرح في مكتبة ^{لندن} بيريل بهولندا
بهوتسما برقم ٨٠٧ بالفهرس الجديد .
- ٣ - وذكر السبكي ثلاثة شروح على كتاب البرهان : اولها شرح الامام
ابي عبدالله المازري ولم يتمه وعمل عليه ايضا مشكلات وورد ان
المازري سمى شرحه " ايضاح المحصول من برهان الاصول " ولم

نعثر على هذا الشرح في فهارس المكتبات^(١) والثاني شرح ابي الحسن الامباري من المالكية ، والثالث شرح شخص مغربي اسمه الشريف ابو يحيى جمع بين الشرحين^(٢) ولم نعثر على ذكر هذه الشروح في فهارس المخطوطات .

٢ - "المجتهدين" (من التلخيص في اصول الفقه) .

و هو فيلم في ٢٣ لوحة ومسطرته ٢١ سطرا وكل سطره ٢١ كلمة بخط النسخ المستطد ولا تاريخ لكتابه . واوله "باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ، ربي يسر بعونك كتاب المجتهدين وليس هو من الام انما هو من التلخيص في اصول الفقه تأليف الامام ابي المعالي الجويني رحمه الله . كتاب المجتهدين وذكر القول في تصويب المجتهدين علما ، وقول الله ان ما يحوى فيه كلام العلماء ينقسم الى المسائل القطعية والى المسائل الاجتهادية العارضة عن ادلة القطع فاما العقلية وهي تنصب فيها ادلة القطع على الاستقلال ، ويقضي الى المطلب من غير افتقار الى تقرير الشرع وذلك معظم مسائل العقائد نحو اثبات محدث " (لوحة ١) ثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه . ولا يوجد لوحات بها بياض وليست له ابواب وفصول ظاهرة^(٣) .

(١) انظر هـ ١ من ص ٤٧ من هذا البحث

(٢) السبكي طبقات الشافعية الكبرى ج ٣ ص ٢٦٣

(٣) ورد في فهرس جامعة الدول العربية عن هذا المصنف انه نسخ عام ٥٩٢ هـ

وان عدد اوراقه ٣٠ ورقة وثبت بالبحث ان تاريخ النسخ لم يذكر وان

عدد اللوحات - ٢٣ لوحة كما اثبتنا ذلك في اعلاه

وفي لوحة ٢٣ ظ ينتهي الكتاب بفقرة تبدأ : " قيل عن
عبدالله بن عمر بن العاص . قال الناس على النار رحمان
تحقق ابوابها وذلك بعد ان يلبثون فيها احقابا وقال الشعبي
عن الطبرى عن ابن عباس قال بأمر الله وذكر الزمجرى"
وتنتهي اللوحة بعنوان مصنف آخر من مصنفات امام الحرمين
وهو "العقيدة النظامية في الاركان الاسلامية"

وينتهي الكتاب بدون ذكر التاريخ او اسم الناسخ وهو محفوظ
برقم ١٢٣٧/٢ فيلم ١٠١٢ بمعهد احيا المخطوطات القديمة
بجامعة الدول العربية .

٢٧ - الورقات

هذا المصنف مطبوع طبعت عديدة متداولة وسنصف احدى
النسخ الخطية التي توجد بدار الكتب المصرية برقم ١٥٥م مجاميع .
هذا المصنف يتكون من خمس ورقات حجم كل ورقة ١٢سم x ١٦
سم وبكل ورقة ٢١ سطر وبكل سطر ١٥ كلمة . والورق قديم
ومتآكل ولا يوجد هامش بل تملأ الكتابة الورقة باكملها والخط
نسخ ~~معتد~~ واوله باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على
سيدنا محمد . . .

هذه ورقات تشتمل على معرفة فصول من اصول الفقه ينتفع
بها المهتمدى وغيره وذلك من جزئين :
فالاصل ما بني عليه غيره والفرع ما بني على غيره . والفقه

معرفة الاحكام الشرعية التي طريقها الاجتهاد والاحكام سبعة ٠٠٠
الخ

ويستمر الكلام في الورقات التي تلي هذه المقدمة وليس
بالورقات هوامش او فراغ وفي الورقة الاخيرة ينتهي المصنف بهذه
الكلمات "قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم : من اجتهد واصاب قلبه
اجران ومن اجتهد واخطأ فله اجر واحد . وجه الدليل ان النبي
صلى الله عليه وسلم خطأ المجتهد تارة وصوبه اخرى وصلى الله
على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم ."

ولهذا المصنف نسخ عديدة ، منها نسخة ببرلين برقم ٤٣٥٨ -
٤٣٥٩ واخرى بها مرج برقم ١٢٨ وثالثه بباريس برقم ٦٧٢
الرسالة الخامسة . ويوجد بالمتحف البريطاني نسخة ضمن مجموعة
الرسالة الثالثة برقم ٢٥٢ واخرى ضمن مجموعة ايضا الرسالة
الثالثة برقم ٠٥٥٧ . كما ان هناك نسخة بالجزائر برقم ٢١٣
الرسالة الثالثة ونسخة بالاسكوريال في اسبانيا بالفهرس الجديد
رقم ١٠٢ و ١٠٤ ونسخة بليينج برقم ٨٨٢ ونسخة بأمبروزيانا
برقم فقه ٢٦٩ الكتاب الرابع . ونسخة بالفاتيكان ٧ برقم ١١٥٥
ضمن مجموعة الكتاب الرابع ، واخرى برقم ١٤٥٩ . وتوجد نسخ
عديدة بالقاهرة بالارقام التالية : ١٥٥ مجاميع - ١٠٦٨ نحو -
اصول تيمور ١٧٥ - ١٧٦ . مجاميع تيمور - ٢٦٤ مجاميع تيمور .

شرح كتاب الورقات :

١ - ان شرح هذا المصنف عديدة ولها نسخ كثيرة : فشرح الورقات

لعبدالرحمن بن ابراهيم بن الفرکاح المتوفى عام ٦٨٠ هـ منه نسخ في
برلين برقم ٤٣٦٠ ونسخة بـغوظا برقم ٩٢٢ وثالثة بتونجن برقم ١٠٨
ورابعة بباريس برقم ١٢٦٦ الرسالة الثانية كما ان بالمتحف البريطاني
نسختين : الاولى برقم ٥٤٨ الرسالة الثالثة والثانية برقم ٢٥٦ بالملحق .

٢ - وشرح جلال الدين بن محمد بن احمد العجلي المتوفى عام ٨٦٤ هـ
منه نسخة ببرلين برقم ٤٣٦١ - ٤٣٦٢ ونسخة بـغوظا برقم ٩٦٣ وثالثة
بتونجن برقم ١٠٧ والرسالة الثانية . ونسخة بملحق المتحف البريطاني
٢٥٧ . ونسخة بمجموعة بود ليانا في اكسفورد جزء ١ رقم ١٥٢ ونسخة
بالاسكوريال الفهرس الجديد ١٠٢ الرسالة الاولى واخرى بنفس المكتبة
برقم ٥٢٠ الرسالة السادسة كما يوجد بمكتبة جارالله نسخة برقم ١٧٩٤
وتوجد بمكتبة بلدية الاسكندرية نسخة برقم فنون ١٧٠ الرسالة الاولى
وتحوى مكتبة القاهرة عدة نسخ ذكرت بالجزء الثاني من الفهرس القديم
جزء ٢ صفحة ٢٦٢ و ٢٥٤ و ٤٥٨ وتوجد نسخة بمكتبة مكرم الملحقة
بدار الكتب رقم ٤٥ - ونسخة بفلورنسا رقم ١٤ - ١ ونسخة بباريس برقم
١٢٩٦ ونسخة ببيترسبورج برقم ٠٩٤٦ A.M.K. ونسخة بباتافيا ملحق رقم
٢٦٤ الى ٢٦٦ ونسخة بالاصفية حيدراباد الدكن بالهند من فهرس رقم
١٧٢٤ بالمجموعة ١٤٦١٦ .

٣ - وشرح قره العين لمحمد بن محمد الوعيني الخطاب المالكي برقم
٩٥٣ هـ منه نسخة بـغوظا برقم ٩٢٤ ونسخة بالاسكوريال ج ٢ رقم ١٠٢
الرسالة الخامسة ونسخة برقم ٥٢١ الرسالة السادسة ونسخة بباريس برقم
٨١٣ - ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٩٦٣ - ونسخة بالاسكندرية برقم ١٧ اصول
- ونسخة بالرباط برقم ٥٢١ - ٥٢٣ - ٥٢٤ - ونسخة بكمبرج برقم
١٤٩٨ - ٦ - ونسخة بالقاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج ١ ص ١٠٠ و ٦٦

٤ - شرح محمد بن محمد بن عبدالرحمن بن امام الكاملية المتوفي عام ٨٧٤ هـ . توجد منه نسخة ببرلين برقم ٤٣٦٨ - ونسخة بباريس برقم ٦٢٤ الرسالة الثانية ونسخة بالاسكندرية اصول رقم ١٢-١٨ ونسخة اخرى بنفس المكتبة : فنون رقم ١٧٦ الرسالة الثانية - ونسخة بالقاهرة الفهرس القديم جزء ٢ رقم ٢٦١ ونسخة بليدزج برقم ٨٥٢ - ونسخة بالموصل برقم ١١٣ - ١٥٩ الرسالة الثانية .

٥ - وشرح احمد بن محمد الدمياطي الشافعي طبع القاهرة علم ١٣٠٣ هـ

٦ - وشرح احمد بن محمد بن القاسم العبادي القاهر المتوفي عام ٩٩٤ هـ . توجد منه نسخة باسم الشرح الكبير ببرلين برقم ٤٣٦٣ ، ٦٣٦٤ ونسخة بالهند الجزء الثاني من الفهرس القديم صفحة ٤٥ رقم ٢٦٢٨ الرسالة الاولى ونسخة باسم الحاشية الكبيرة بمكتبة دمشق عمومية رقم ٤٠/٥٨ - ونسخة بتونس الزيتونية ج ٤ ص ٢٩ برقم ٢/١٨٢١ - ونسخة اخرى بنفس المكتبة برقم ٢٩ - ١٨٢٣ - وتوجد نسخة باسم شرح صغير ببرلين برقم ٤٣٦٥ - ونسخة بالاسكندرية اصول ص ١٨ - ونسخة لاحمد بن احمد السنباطي المتوفي عام ٩٩٥ هـ ببرلين برقم ٤٣٦٦ - ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٢١٨ الرسالة الثانية - ونسخة في قليجي علي باشا رقم ٣١٠ استامبول وهناك لاحمد بن سلامة القليوبي المتوفي عام ١٠٦٩ هـ ببرلين نسخة رقم ٤٣٦٧ ونسخة بالاسكندرية اصول برقم ١٨

٧ - وشرح الشوكاني ارشاد الفحول طبع عام ١٣٤٦ هـ ويوجد شرح ارشاد الفحول لسعد الدين التفتازاني متوفي عام ٧٩١ هـ منه نسخة بباريس برقم ٥٣١١ ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٥٦٩ الرسالة

الرابعة .

٨ - وشرح غاية المأمول لشرف الدين ابو العباس احمد بن احمد الرطبي المتوفي عام ٩٥٧ هـ توجد منه نسخة بباريس برقم ٥٠٤٩

٩ - وشرح عمرو بن عبدالرحمن بن الصلاح المتوفي عام ٦٤٣ هـ وتوجد منه نسخة باستامبول سليم اغا برقم ٢٦٩ ونسخة برانفور بالهند ج ١ ص ٢٧٥ برقم ٧٩

١٠ - وشرح باسم غاية العرام بشرح مقدمة الامام لاحمد بن محمد بن زكري توجد منه نسخة بالقاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج ١ ص ٢٩

١١ - وشرح لطائف الاشارات الى تسهيل الطرقات لنظم الورقات في الاصول الفقهية لعبدالحميد بن محمد العهرطي (١) طبع سنة ١٣٣٠ هـ وهو نظم .

١٢ - نظم لشرح اقدس النفوس محمد مصطفى ماء العينين طبع على حجر في فاس عام ١٣٢١ هـ .

١٣ - كلمات في اصول الفقه مع شرح في الامبرزيانا برقم ٥٤ C. وقد كتبت على هذه النسخة مقالة في مجلة B.S.O. (٢) المجلد السابع ص ٦٢٤ ولماسينيون مقالة عنه في مجلة اسلاميكا سنة ١٩٤٥م المجلد الثالث ص ٤٠٥ .

(١) الارجح ان يكون العهرطي

(٢) Rivista Degli Studi Orientali المجلد السابع صفحة ٦٢٤

- ١٤ - وشرح باسم الدرر المصريات في نصم الورقات لمحمد بن محمد بن الشريف توجد منه نسخة بالقاهرة الفهرس الجديد جزء ١ صفحة ٢٨٥
- ١٥ - وشرح باسم الشامل بحقائق الادلة العقلية واصول المسائل الدينية وتوجد منه نسخة بالقاهرة الفهرس الجديد جزء ١ وبالملحق ص ٢٢ تحت عنوات الشامل في اصول الدين .

٢٣ - كتاب مغيث الخلق في اختيار^(١) الاحق .

تأليف حجة الاسلام وجبر الانام وحر التحقيق الحافظ الامام الكبير ناصر دين الله الامام ابي المعالي عبدالملك بن الامام العلامة ابي محمد عبدالله بن يوسف الجويني الشافعي قدس الله تعالى ارواحهم عما اظهره في ترجيح مذهب الامام الاعظم القائد لزمام الحق في الشرع المكم ابي عبدالله محمد بن ادريس الشافعي رض الله تعالى عنه وارضاه بمحمد وآله آمين .

مخطوطه في ورق حديث بخط نسخ وحجم الورق متوسط ومسطرته ١٩ سطرا وكل سطر ٨ كلمات وهو من وقف مكتبة السيد احمد الحسيني في شهر سبتمبر ١٩٢١م وعدد اوراقه ٢٣ ورقة ومسطرته ١٩ سطرا .

واوله : ورقة اظ

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وهلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وسلم قال ، الامام الكبير فخر الاسلام سلطان العلماء " جبر الامة ودحر

(١) قال الجويني في لوحة ٢ من هذا المصنف سميته "مغيث الخلق" في اختيار الاحق وهي التسمية التي اثبتها لهذا المصنف

الشرعية امام الحرمين ابو المعالي عبدالملك بن الامام ابي محمد عبدالله بن يوسف الجويني قدس الله ارواحهم :-

الحمد لله الذى خص من شاء من الانام باعلام الادلة والاعلام ووقفهم لمعرفة قواعد الاحكام وسهل لهم سبيل الادلة على تفاصيل الحلال والحرام ليبتدى في المشكلات مثالهم . .

وبعد ذلك مقدمه يليها اسئلة واجوبتها في فصول معينة بالمداد الاحمر ويستمر الكتاب على ذلك حتى ظهر ورقة ٣٣ . ففيها يقول في آخر سطر من وجهها :

واوردت في هذا الكتاب الموجز من العجب العجاب ولباب الالباب ما تحار فيه العقول السليمة والاذهان المستقيمة مع مراعاة الانصاف ومجانبة الاعتساف والله اعلم بوجه الصواب واحمد لله اولا وآخرا والصلاة على خير خلقه محمد ظاهرا وباطنا اللهم اغفر للمسلمين والمسلمات واغفر لي ولوالدي ولجميع المؤمنين والمؤمنات .

ولا يوجد تاريخ لكتابتها ولا اسم ناسخها وهي مخطوطة برقم ٤٥٨ اصول الفقه بدار الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة .

ولهذا المخطوط نسخ عديدة فتوجد في برلين نسخة برقم ٤٨٥٣ وباريس نسخة اخرى برقم ٥٨٩٦ كما ان ملحق فهرس المتحف البريطاني يشير الى نسخة ثالثة برقم ١٢٢١ وهي الرسالة الاولى - ومكتبة الاسكندرية توجد نسخة برقم اصول ٢٠ - اما دار الكتب المصرية فعدا للنسخة رقم ٤٥٨ اصول الفقه التي وصفناها فان بها ثلاث نسخ اخرى الاولى برقم ٤٠ اصول الفقه والثانية ٢٢٢ م مجاميع والثالثة ٥٦ تيمور .

وقد كتب المرحوم الشيخ محمد زاهر الكوشى عن هذا المصنف في

كتابه : " احقاق الحق بابطال الباطل في مغيث الخلق " . القاهرة
سنة ١٩٤٠ .

٢١ - مختصر الارشاد للباقلاني اختصره امام الحرمين

ذكر هذا المصنف في فهرس جامعة الدول العربية برقم ٢١١
علم كلام . وقد حاولت مرارا وتكرارا ان اصل الى هذا المصنف لاطلع
عليه ولكن كانت هناك اسباب خاصة بالمعهد حالت دون ذلك . ويلاحظ
ان للباقلاني كتاب عنوانه " الارشاد في اصول الفقه " وهو كبير اختصره
الباقلاني نفسه ^(١) ويجوز ان امام الحرمين قد اختصره ايضا وخصوصا
وان الخوانساري يذكر في روضات الجنات من مؤلفات امام الحرمين
تلخيص التقريب وفي اعتقادنا انه هو والكتاب المسمى " التلخيص في
الاصول " كتاب واحد لان الباقلاني يسمي كتابه في اصول الفقه الارشاد
والتقريب .

٤ - كتاب التلخيص في الاصول

٢ - الارشاد في اصول الفقه (وربما يكون هذا الكتاب هو كتاب
التلخيص ومختصر الارشاد المذكوران آنفا)

(١) انظر هامش (٣) من صفحة ٥٥ من هذا البحث

ب - مصنفات في اصول الدين

١ - الارشاد الى قواطع الادلة في اصول الاعتقاد

هذا المصنف مطبوع حقه وعلق عليه وقدم له وفهرسه الدكتور محمد يوسف موسى والسيد علي عبدالمنعم عبدالحميد . ومن قبلهم Luciani مع ترجمة فرنسية سنة ١٩٣٨ في باريس .
ولهذا المصنف مخطوطات عديدة توجد نسخة بلندن برقم ١٩٨٣ ونسخة بالمتحف البريطاني برقم ١٦٢٨ ونسخة ثالثة بالجزائر برقم ٦١٦ كما تحتوى مكتبة الاسكوريال على نسخة برقم ١٥٥٠ ونسخة بفاس القرويين برقم ١٥٢٠ ويوجد بالقاهرة بالفهرس الجديد جزء واحد ، وهناك نسخة برقم ٨١٩ علم كالم واخرى برقم ٩٢٩ علم كالم و ٩٥٢ علم كالم ونسخة بالاحمدية بحلب برقم ٧٦٤ كما توجد نسختان اخرتان باستامبول بفهرس المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية في ٦١ لوحة ٥٠٣ .
شرح الارشاد الى قواطع الادلة في اصول الاعتقاد .

١ - يوجد شرح ابراهيم بن يوسف بن محمد بن المرأة المتوفي علم ٦١٦ هـ بالقاهرة الفهرس القديم ج ٢ ص ٥٨ والفهرس الجديد جزء ١ صفحة ١٨٨

وقد عثرنا اثناء البحث على مخطوطة قديمة لم تضاف الى رصيد دار الكتب المصرية بعد وتبيننا انها جزء من شرح ابن المرأة على الارشاد ووصف هذه المخطوطة هو :

مخطوطة قديمة مخرومة البداية والنهاية والاوراق لا تحمل ترقيما .

لرب تعالى عن قول المبطلين وزعم ان المعلومات اذا تجددت
احدث البارئ تعالى علوما متجددة بها يعلم المعلومات
الحادثة .

- ورقة ١٢٦ ظ : " فصل في حقيقة الكلام وحده ومعناه
ورقة ١٤٨ و : " ثم قال (رح) شبهة للمخالفين
ورقة ١٧٩ ظ : فصل وقوله (رح) العقل علوم ضرورية الى آخر الفصل
ورقة ١٨٣ ظ : باب القول في حدث العالم .
ورقة ٢٠٥ ظ : باب اثبات حدوث الاعراض وهو الاصل الثاني من حدث العالم
ورقة ٢١٤ و : باب بيان استحالة تعرى الجواهر عن الاعراض والاصل
الثالث من حدث العالم

انتهى المخطوط

وقد ظهر بالبحث كما اثبتنا ذلك ان هذه المخطوطة هي اوراق
من شرح ابن المرأة على كتاب الارشاد لامام الحرمين . فقد قارنت بسين
فصول شرح ابن المرأة وهو شرح ابراهيم بن يوسف بن محمد بن المرأة
المتوفي عام ٦١٦ هـ وهي مخطوطة قديمة برقم ٦ علم كلام بدار الكتب
المصرية وهي من خمسة مجلدات، وبين فصول هذا المخطوط فوجدت
تطابقا بينهما في كثير من المواضع نذكر على سبيل المثال تطابق النصين
في :

" فصل وقوله (رح) العقل علم ضرورية " وذلك في ل ٧٣ و من المجلد
الاول من شرح ابن المرأة للارشاد المشار اليه آنفا والذي يحمل رقم ٦
علم كلام بدار الكتب المصرية، ول ١٧٩ ظ من المخطوط الذي نحن بصدده
بحثه . ويستمر تطابق الكلام بين النسختين .

والامر بالمثل في :

- "باب القول في حدث العالم" وذلك في (ل ٨٠ و من المجلد
الاول من شرح ابن المرأة للارشاد رقم ٦ علم كلام و ل ١٨٠ ظ من
المخطوطة القديمة وتكون هذه المخطوطة بنا على ما تقدم جزء من شرح
بن المرأة للارشاد .
- ٢ - وشرح آخر باسم "المقترح" لعزبن المظفرين علي الشافعي
بالجزائر برقم ٦١٧
- ٣ - وله مختصر في الجزائر ايضا برقم ٦١٨
- ٤ - وشرح "الاسعاد على الارشاد" والمؤلف غير معروف وتوجد بفاس
قرويين برقم ١٥٧٤
- ٥ - ويذكر صاحب كشف الظنون ان هناك شرح لتلميذ امام الحرمين
ابي القاسم سلمان ابن ناصر الانصاري المتوفي عام ٥١٢ هـ
- ٦ - كما ورد بفهرس جامعة الدول العربية طبعة ١٩٥٤ ص ١٣٠
شرح الارشاد لامام الحرمين تأليف ابي بكر بن ميمون وهي نسخة
كتبت في سنة ٧٨٢ بخط نسخ واضح فيلم رقم ١٤٣ - صور عن
نسخة في مكتبة احمد الثالث
- ٧ - وشرح بعنوان "نكت الارشاد في الاعتقاد" تأليف ابي اسحق
ابراهيم بن يوسف بن محمد بن دهاق الاوسي المالكي المتوفي
عام ٦١٦ هـ الجزء الاول من نسخة كتبت في ٧٣٩ هـ نقلا عن
نسخة المؤلف رقم الفيلم ٢٣٩ - وتوجد منه نسخة بدار الكتب
المصرية ٦ علم كلام - ٢٢٣ ف

١١ - رسالة في اصول الدين

لم يتيسر لي الاطلاع عليها . توجد منها نسخة بباريس برقم ٦٧٢
الرسالة الخامسة ضمن مجموعة

٧ - الشامل في اصول الدين

مصور فتوغرافيا في ٥٢٧ لوحة مفردة عن نسخة خطية قديمة
بالاستانه وكل لوحة بحجم ٢٣ سم x ١٧ سم ويكل منها ٢٠ سطرا وطول
السطر ١٣ سم والخط نسخ ~~عربي~~ وتاريخ النسخ عام ٦١٠ هـ واوله ناقص
بمقدار كراسلة^(١) ويتدئ الكلام فيه بقول امام الحرمين
" . . . ولا بد منهما ، وانما المبتدئ المعاني دون العبارات فان
قيل فلم يشترط عدم العلم في صحة النظر ينبي " عن انتفاء اضداده
فكانه شرط في ثبوت النظر عدم ضده والعدم انتفاء محض ، بالانتفاء لا
يكون شرطا . . . الخ " .

(١) تبين بمقابلة هذا المصنف بالنسخة الخطية لكتاب "الكامل في اختصار
الشامل" لابن الامير وهو مختصر لكتاب الشامل فيلم رقم ١٨٨ بجامعة
الدول العربية "انظر صفحة ٨٩ من هذا الفصل" ان الجزء الساقط من
بداية مصنف امام الحرمين لا يتعدى بضع صفحات او كراسة كما قلنا ان
ان ابن الامير يقول في ل آو حيث يبدأ اختصاره للشامل . "النظر في
اللغة بمعنى الروية وبمعنى الانتظار وبمعنى الرقة والرحمة . . . " الى ان
يقول في لوحة ٣ "فصل اذا تم النظر ولم يحصل فيه آفة تضاد
للعلم كان متضمنا للعلم . . . " وهذا الفصل يوجد في ص ٣ من كتاب
الشامل لامام الحرمين نسخة رقم ٢٤٢٢٣ بدار الكتب المصرية

ثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه الفقرة ويتخللها
 لوحات بها بياض وله ابواب وفصول ظاهرة حوالي ١٦٣ فيما بين ابواب
 ومساءل واجوبة وفصول . وينتهي الكلام بالجملة الآتية
 " وقد بقى من توابع العلل بابان احدهما في ذكر الصفات
 التابعة للحدوث والثاني في ذكر الحقائق والحدود والله الموفق للصواب"
 كمل الجزء الاول من الشامل لثلاث خلون من شوال سنة
 (١١٠ هـ) عشر وستمائة كبه العبد الفقير الى الله تعالى ربيع بسن
 محمود بن موسى بن محمود بن محمد بن علي الانصارى الخزرجي يتلوه
 في الثاني .

ويلاحظ ان الجزء الثاني هذا مفقود

والمصور محفوظ برقم ١٢٩٠ علم كلام بدار الكتب المصرية
 وهناك نسخة منقولة عن المصور الفترافني السابق الذكر المصور عن نسخة
 الآستانة نقلت بخط حديث في مجلدين . وينتهي المجلد الاول الذي
 يحوى ٤٦٢ صفحة ببداية الفصل الثالث
 "ويشتمل على نصب الدلالة على نفي القديم القادر وينطوى على
 مصدر تعلق القدرة القديمة بما لا يتناهى من المقدورات" يلي ذلك
 ختم دار الكتب المصرية .

اما المجلد الثاني من كتاب الشامل فانه يبدأ بالفصل الثالث
 بالفقرة التي انتهى عندها المجلد الاول وينتهي في صفحة ٥٢٣ بالفقرة
 التالية :

" ثم نسخ كتاب الشامل للجويني وقد نقله بخط من النسخة
 المصورة الموجودة بدار الكتب المصرية الفقير لله حسين فهمي بن
 الخطاب . وكان الفراغ منه في يوم الثلاثاء ١٩ ذى الحجة سنة ١٢٦٨ هـ

الموافق ١١ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٩ م .

والحمد لله رب العالمين

وفي ظهر هذه الصفحة الأخرى من النسخة المصورة أي بصفحة
من المجلد الثاني من النسخة المنسوخة حديثاً
٥٢٤/كتب الآتي :

" وهذا نص ما وجد بشهية الكتاب . "

والعبارة مكتوبة داخل مستطيل يشير إلى المكتبة بالاستانة ثم
ختم دار الكتب المصرية . وهذه النسخة المنقولة رقمها ٤٢٢٣ ب
وقد أوردنا فهرساً لفحوى كتاب الشامل وأرقام الصفحات التي في
مقابلة الأبواب والفصول والمسائل والأسئلة والأجوبة هي أرقام صفحات
النسخة المنقولة عن مخطوطة الاستانة أي النسخة التي تحمل رقم
٢٤٢٢٣ ب دار الكتب المصرية .

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٢٦ فصل : ما الدليل على وجوب من جهة الشرع

1- It is to be noticed that the numbering of the pages in His Index of ash-Shāmil is of the copy written in the 11th of October 1949. This copy became unavailable later. It was in the hands of another scholar.

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- ٦٩ فصل : اتفق الاسلاميون على ان الاجسام تتاهى في تجزئتها
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- فصل : الجواب عما قالوه من اوجه اولها بالتقديم ان
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- ٤٦٦ فصل : هل يجوز ان يثبت حكم العلة بعلة اخرى
- ٤٦٨ الجواب :
- ٤٧٣ القول فيما يعلل وما لا يعلل
- ٤٧٣ فصل فيما لا يعلل
- ٤٨٥ فصل في تعليل وقوع الفعل
- ٤٨٩ فصل في استحالة تعليل اوصاف الاجناس
- ٤٩٧ فصل القول في الاحكام المعللة
- ٤٩٨ فصل الواجب من الاحكام لا يمتنع تعليله لوجوده به
- ٥١٠ فصل في الشرط والمصحح وما يتعلق بهما
- ٥١٥ فصل في المحل شرط في وجود الاعراض
- ٥١٨ فصل الشرط ليس علة في المشروط

ويوجد مختصر لكتاب الشامل في اصول الدين عنوانه :

"الكامل في اختصار الشامل" لابن الامير . وهي مخطوطة كتبت في القرن الثامن بخط نسخ واضح وتوجد بمكتبة احمد الثالث (رقم ١٣٢٢ - ٢٧٤ ف) وقد اطلعت على الفيلم المصغر الذي اخذ لهذه المخطوطة ويوجد بقسم المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية برقم ١٨٨ من الفهرسوس طبعة ١٩٥٤ ص ١٣٥

ويبدأ المخطوط في ل آظ يقول ابن الامير :

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر يا كريم والحمد لله الذي سبق الحوادث وجوده وهم المخلوقات كرمه وجوده . فهو الذي يبدأ الخلق ثم يعيده " ويستمر الكلام على هذا النحو حتى نهاية ل آظ . وفي ل آظ يشرح حالة وبداية احتكاكه بالعلم وتقديره وتحظييمه له . ثم ياتي "ذكر كتاب الشامل" فيقول ابن الامير "وكت وقت علسى الكتاب المسعى بالشامل في اصول الدين من مصنفات الامام العالم جامع الفضائل . . . ولا يبدأ في اختصار الشامل الا في نهاية ل آظ فيقول : النظر في اللغة بمعنى الروية ومعنى الانتظار . . . الى ان يقول في ل ٣ حيث يرد :

"فصل اذا تم النظر ولم تحصل فيه آفة تضاد العلم كان متضمنا له . . . وتتوالى لوحات المخطوطة دون ظهور بياض حتى ينتهي المخطوط بقوله : " هذا آخر ما وجد من كلام امام الحرمين في كتابه المعروف بالشامل وقد اختصرته بقدر ما فهمته ! دون اشارة الى تاريخ تصنيفه وكتابته . . . والخط نسخ جميل وفي مكتبة الازهر مختصر

الكامل في مسائل الشامل في ١١٦ ورقة للباسطي المتوفي عام ٨٤٢
والمخطوط مع ذلك من القرن الثامن (١)

١٤ - كتاب غياث الامم في التباك الظلم

الشيخ

تصنيف الشيخ الامام فخر الاسلام ركن الدين امام الحرمين ابي

المعالي عبدالملك بن يوسف الجويني رضي الله عنه المتوفي سنة ٤٧٨ هـ
مخطوط قديم ورقا وكتابة . بخط نسخ به ١٢ كلمة وصفحاته ٢٧٤ صفحة والعناوين مسطحة
وكل سطر ٢١
- واوله : ص ٢ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم .

قال الشيخ الاجل الامام فخر الاسلام امام الحرمين ابوالمعالي

ابن عبدالله الجويني رضي الله عنه :

"الحمد لله القيم الحي بارادته كل رشد وهي ومشيئته كل

نشروطي كل بيان في وصف جلاله عصره في ١٠٠٠ الخ

الى ان يقول آخر صفحة ٨

٠٠٠ ضاق هذا الترتيب الى تسمية الكتاب التلقيب وقد تحقق

للعالمين ان صور الانام وموئل الايام ومن هو حقا معول الاسلام يدعى

باسما تبر عليها معانيه ويفوق (صفحة ٩) فحوالها معاليه فهو غياث

الدولة وهذا اذا تم غياك الام في التياك الظم فليشتهر بالغياي (٢)
 كما شهر الاول بالنظامي والله ولي التأييد والتوفيق وهو باسعاف راجيه
 حقيق .

فاركان الكتاب ثلاثة :

احدها - القول في الامامه وما يليق بها من الابواب

والركن الثاني - في تقدير خلو الزمان عن الائمة ولاه الامه

١٥٦ - ٢٠٣

والركن الثالث - في تقدير انقراض حملة الشريعة ٢٠٣ - ٢٢٩ .

فلتقع البدائة بالامامة :

وهي ثمانية ابواب :-

الباب الاول - في (معنى الامامة) ووجوب نصب الائمة وقادة

١ - ٣٠

الامه

(١) ورد في الجزء الخاص بالعقيدة في "النظامية في الاركان الاسلامية" الذي سماه المرجوم الشيخ الكوشى "العقيدة النظامية" نص يفيد ان الامام كان يرغب في كتابة فصول في الامامه يضمنها مصنفه "النظامية في الاركان الاسلامية" ولكنه فضل ان يكون الكتاب منفصلا لطول القول في هذا الموضوع فوجد بكتاب قال عنه "نسميه بالامامه الكبرى وهي مصدره بالامامة مختتمه بالاحكام السلطانية وقد عقب الشيخ الكوشى على هذا القول بانه هو الكتاب المعروف بالغياي نسبة الى غياك الدولة نظام الملك اما غياك الام له في الامامة . فهو كتاب آخر لابن الجويني . وهذا غير صحيح بنا" على ما صرح به الامام نفسه فغياك الام والغياي كتاب واحد .

	الباب الثاني - في صفات اهل الحل والعقد واعتبار
٣٠ - ٣٨	عدد فيم اليه العهد
	الباب الثالث - في الجهات التي تعين الامامة وتوجب
٣٨ - ٤٧	النزامة
١٢٦ - ١٥٦	الباب الرابع - في صفات الامامة القدام على اهل الاسلام
٤٧	الباب الخامس - في الطوارئ التي توجب الخلع والانخلاع
٧٩ - ٨٣	الباب السادس - في امامة المفضول
٨٣ - ٨٧	الباب السابع - في نصب امامين
	الباب الثامن - في تفضل ما يلي الائمة والولاة
	وجاءه بآخره :

نجز الكتاب بحمد الله ومنه وحسن توفيقه وذلك في ثالث عشرة شهر ربيع الاول سنة ٧٤٨ هـ ثمان واربعين وسبعمائة والحمد لله وحده وصلواته على سيدنا محمد وآله رحمه الله لمن دعا لكتابه وقارئه ومن قال آمين آمين . ووجد بخط آخر ما يلي :

تمت مع مراجعة الاصل فصح بحمد الله ومنه كتبه خليل عبد العلائي الشافعي وفرغ منه في تاسع عشر شهر جمادى الاولى ثمان واربعين وسبعمائة ببيت المقدس حماه الله تعالى . ويوجد بدار الكتب المصرية برقم ٨ اجتماع تيمور .

والملاحظ انه يوجد اضطراب في ترتيب ابواب الكتاب يخالف ما ذكره في تصديره وقد وضعنا الارقام المكتوبة امام الابواب حسب وضعها داخل الكتاب غير اننا وجدناها مضطربة كما ذكرنا وتوجد ارشادات عند كل باب لبعض القارئین الذين سبق لهم الاطلاع عليها .

وتوجد نسخ اخرى لهذا المخطوط احداها بمكتبة بلدية الاسكندرية رقم (تاريخ ٩٢) والثانية في بنك بورخدا بخش القهرس العاشر ص ١١ .

١٢ - شفا الخليل في بيان ما وقع في التوراة والانجيل من التبديل :

هذا الكتاب مصور في ٢٧ لوحة في فيلم برقم ١٥٩ في قسم المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية . وكل لوحة بها اثنتي عشرة سطرا . وكل سطر به ثمان كلمات والخط نسخ واوله : : (ل ا و)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله الذي صرف شيطان الجهالة عن قلوب اوليائه وصرف بصائرهم الى معرفة حكمه الصادرة على لسان انبيائه الهادين والكفر قد استفحل ومرد شيطان غواية صلواته على خير خلقه محمد النبي فمهي بحججه فحول البيان وفرسان بلغائه . وبعد فقد نطق بالخبر اليقين وصرح القرآن مبينا ان نصوص التوراة والانجيل اشتملت على ذكر سيد المرسلين صلوات الله عليه .

ثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه المقدمة ولا يتخلله لوحات بها بياض وينتهي ب (ل ٢٦ و) ففي نهاية ل ٢٥ ظ ورد :

..... وانما اعرضت عن الاكار من ذلك حين ذكرت منهما ما يلزم به الحجة على الخصوم لان سيد المرسلين (وهنا تبدأ ل ٢٦ و) صلوات الله عليه رأى عمر ينظر في التوراة غضب منه وقال لو كان موسى حيا لما وسعه الا اتباعي . فلماذا السبب لم اكر من النظر فيها . "

وهنا ينتهي النص ثم ورد بنفس اللوحة :

"وهذا آخر هذا المختصر المسمى بشفا الغليل في بيان وقوع
التبديل فالله يجعله خالصا لوجهه الكريم ويجعل جزاءه الفوز من
عذابه الاليم والخلود في جنات نعيمها دائم مقيم " ثم بلوحة ٢٦ ظ .
"العبد الفقير لله الراجي عند الله محمد بن عيسى بن
عبدالقادر الشافعي عفا الله عنه وذلك في العشرين من ذى القعدة
سنة اثنتين وسبعين وثمانمائة وذلك بالقاهرة المغربية وحسبنا لله ونعم
الوكيل

وتوجد بهذا المخطوط نسختان بأيا صوفيا الاولى برقم ٢٢٤٦

والثانية برقم ٢٢٤٧

١٣ - العقيدة النظامية

وهذا المصنف مطبوع وصححه وعلق عليه صاحب الفضيلة المرحوم
الشيخ محمد زاهد الكوثري سنة ١٢٦٧ هـ سنة ١٩٤٨ م . وقد نشر
هذا المصنف بعد ترجمته الى اللغة الالمانية الدكتور هلموت كلوبفر^(١)
بعد ان قدم له بمقدمة تحدث فيها عن آراء امام الحرمين العقيدية
وذلك بمطابع شركة الاعلانات الشرقية بمصر
والعقيدة النظامية قسم من اقسام مصنف كبير اسماه العقيدة
النظامية في الاركان الاسلامية^(٢) وهذا القسم خاص بالعقيدة وقد صرح

(١) Von Helmut Klopfer: Das Dogma des Imam al-Haramain
al-Djuwaini und sein werk: Al-Aqidat un-Nizariya.
(٢) الجويني العقيدة النظامية ص ٨

مجاميع ونسخة فتوغرافية لنسخة دار الكتب بمكتبة احمد الثالث بجامعة الدول العربية وتوجد نسخة اخرى ببرلين برقم ٢٠٧٣ وقد حصلت على صورة فتوغرافية لهذا المخطوط وقد ظهر لنا ان محتويات مكتبة برلين قد نقلت الى تونجيين .

شرح لمع الادلة

شرح لعلي بن محمد التلمساني سنة ٦٥٨ هـ ٠ نسخة برلين بنفس رقم المخطوط اى ب ٢٠٧٤ ونسخة القاهرة بالفهرس القديم ج ٢ ص ٣ ونسخة بحلب برقم ١٧ ونسخة الاسكوريال برقم ١٦٠٦ (١)

٢٢ - مسائل الامام عبدالحق واجوتها للامام ابي المعالي :

وهي مخطوطة ظهر انها لامام الحرمين وورد بها بعض اجوبة لمسائل عرضت على الامام وتلك الاجوبة منقولة عن نسخة خطية مغربية بآخر كتاب شرح المنهج المنتخب الى اصول المذهب وليه شرح بستان فكر المنهج ذيلا وتكميلا لتالي المنهج والبستان للشيخ محمد مباره . عن النسخة المحفوظة بدار الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة برقم ١١ ش فقه مالك وعنوان تلك الاجوبة (مسائل الامام عبدالحق الصقلي واجوتها للامام ابي المعالي الجويني وتبدأ هذه المخطوطة في اول ورقة ١٧٣ او بالاتي :-

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

" صلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليما .

(١) اتخذت من شرح التلمساني غير نسخة ثالثة لتحقيق لمع الادلة .

كتب الشيخ ابو محمد عبدالحق بن محمد بن هارون الصقلي (١)
الى الامام ابي المعالي عبد الملك عبد الله بن يوسف الجويني النيسابوري
في مسائل والجواب مشتمل على السؤال فلا معنى للتطويل بايراده وذلك
بمكة حرسها الله عام خمسين واربعمائة .

ثم عرض المسائل وهي تسع اجوبة .

- ١ - في حدوث العالم
- ٢ - زهول بعض العوام عن وجه الدلالة على صدق الانبياء
- ٣ - في كلام القاضي
- ٤ - في المثليين
- ٥ - في الاعراض
- ٦ - الكلام على المنجمين
- ٧ - المعجزات
- ٨ - في جهل صفة من الصفات
- ٩ - في معنى تمثل جبريل

وتنتهي هذه الاجوبة بنهاية المسألة التاسعة وهي الاخيرة حيث
يقول "٠٠٠" ثم الاخرى التي يعرف زوالها من شخصه فيجوز ان الله
يعدمها ويفنيها ثم يعيدها كما يعدم اجزاء من جسد الميت فينحسل

(١) هو عبد الحق بن محمد بن هارون الهاشمي القرشي المكنى ابو محمد
توفي عام ٤٦٦ هـ وقد درس على ابن يونس وتلاميذه خلف بن ابراهيم وسليمان
بن قرطبة بمكة (الديباج المذهب لابن فرحون ص ١٧٤ في ترتيب المدارك
للقاضي عياض وتقريب المسالك لمعرفة اعلام مذهب مالك لابي الفضل عياض
بن موسى اليحصبي)

وينحف ويجوز ان يزيلها ولا يعدمها بل تبقى غير متصفة بصفات الملائكة
ثم يوليها الله ويجمعها والله القادر على كل ممكن جازز والحمد لله
رب العالمين .

والمخطوطة متأكلة بعض الشيء* وحجم الصفحة ٢٧×٣٠سم وطول
السطر ١٥سم وعدد الكلمات في السطر حوالي ٢٠ كلمة والخط مغربي .
اما تاريخ النسخ ، فلا يوجد تاريخ لكتابة هذه المسائل
واجوبتها ، كما انه لا يوجد تاريخ شرح الضهج ولكن جاء في آخر كتاب
البيستان ان ابراهيم بن محمد بن ابراهيم الشهير بالحاج البرنسي كتبه
لشيخه ابي عبدالله سيدى محمد عبدالرحمن الصيني في العاشر من شهر
الله المحرم فاتح سنة تسع بعد المائة والالف سنة ١١٠٩ ميلادية اى
حوالي عام ٥١٨ هجرية (١)

ج - مصنفات في الفقه

٢٦ - نهاية المطلب في دراية المذهب

هذا المصنف ضخم من عدة اجزاء وله نسخ عديدة كما سنثبت
ذلك فيما بعد ولم يتيسر لي الاطلاع الى على مجلد يحوى الاجزاء :

(١) ١١ ش فقه مالك - وقد تم نسخ مسائل الامام عبدالحق الصقلي
واجوبتها للامام ابي المعالي الجويني برسم حضرة الدكتور امبرتو
ريزيتانو الاستاذ بجامعة روما بايطاليا وعين شمس بمصر وذلك في يوم
السبت آخر شوال سنة ١٣٧٢ هـ ١١ يوليو عام ١٩٥٣ م بيد الشيخ
حسين زيدان نساخ دار الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة .

العاشر والحادي عشر والثاني عشر وهو مصور فوتوغرافي في ٧٢٧ لوحة وحجم اللوحة ٢٧×٣٠سم ويكل منها ٢٥ سطرا وكل سطر يحوي حوالي ١٥ كلمة والخط نسخ ~~مصحح~~ وهذا المجلد هو الجزء الرابع من مجموعة برقم ٢١٢٠٩ وهذه المجموعة تحوي اجزاء اخرى اشترت اليها فسي مواضعها بعد .

واول هذا المجلد :

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر ولا تعسر فرغ اذا كان الثوب يساوي عشرة وكان الصبغ يساوي عشرة والثوب والمصبوغ يساوي ثلثين وقد ذكرنا انهما اذا رضيا ببيع الثوب فالثمن مقسوم بينهما نصفين فلو كان الصبغ ممكن ازالته فان اراد الغاصب فصله فله ذلك ولكن ان بقي الثوب بعد فصله يساوي خمسة عشر وان نقص الثوب عن خمسة عشر فعلى الغاصب ضمان النقصان (ل ٢ يمين)

ويستمر الكلام ولا يوجد بياض بالنسخة والابواب والفصول ظاهرة

وينتهي :

٠٠٠٠٠ بباب في المعايير ومسائل الامتحان (لوحة ٧٢٧ يسار)

وقد وردت عبارة بعد ذلك تفيد انه يتلوه كتاب الوصايا .

ونسخ هذا المصنف عديدة منها نسخة بالاسكندرية برقم ٤٤ فقه

شافعي - واخرى بأيا صوفيا برقم ١٥٠٠ - وثالثة بالمكتبة الظاهرية

بدمشق برقم ٤٨ - كما انه يوجد بدار الكتب نسخ متعددة برقم ٥٣٠٠

٣٠١ ٥ ٣٧٨ ٥ ٢١٢٠٩ ب والاجزاء التي توجد منها هي (١ - ٢ -

٣ - ٤ - ٧ - ١٠ - ١١ - ١٢) ويوجد بمكتبة احمد الثالث نسخة برقم

١١٣٠ (ز) ورقم الفيلم في قسم المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية هو:

ف ٩٨٩ من ١٢٤٨ ومجموعات برقم ١١٣٠ - وكل مجموعة من هذه المجموعات تحتوى على اجزاء مختلفة فهناك مجموعة تحتوى على (جزء ١ ٢٦ ٢٥ ٢٤ ٥٤) ومجموعة اخرى تحوى (ج ٢ ٣ ٤ ٥ ٦ ٧ ٨ ٩ ١٠ ١٢) ومجموعة ثالثة تحتوى على (ج ٧ - ٨ - ١٠ - ١٣ - ١٥ - ١٦ - ١٩ - ٢٠) ومجموعة رابعة تحتوى على (ج ١٩ - ٢٠ - ٢١) ثم مجموعة اخيرة تحتوى على (ج ٢٥ - ٢٦ - ٢٧)

ويوجد بمعهد احيا المخطوطات القديمة بجامعة الدول العربية نسخ مصورة عن المكتبة الاحمدية بحلب وبها جزآن (١٦ و ٢٢ برقم ٦٦٦) واخيرا توجد نسخة بمكتبة سوهاج ورقم الفيلم بها ١١٧

شرح نهاية العظم في دراية المذهب

الغاية في اختصار النهاية لعبدالعزیز بن عبدالسلام السلى غوطا رقم ٩٤٩ - القاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج ٣ صفحة ٢٤٥ القاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج ١ ص ٥٢٦ مباتنا صفوة المذهب جز ١ صفحة ١٠٤ رقم ١٠٦٦ - جارالله استامبول " الكفاية في نظم بيت الغاية لمحمد نجل فتى الظاهر ١٧٨٣ - بريل هولندا هوتسا ٤٢٨ الفهرس القديم و ٨٠٨ الفهرس الجديد

٢٤ - مناظره في الاجتهاد في القبلة

هذه المناظرة في سؤال وجه لمام الحرمين من الشيخ ابي اسحق الشيرازى عن اجتهاد في القبلة صلى ثم تبين الخطأ فاستدل منها بانه تعين له الخطأ في شرط من شروط الصلاة فلزمه الاعادة

كما لو تيقن الخطأ في الوقت (١)

٢٥ - مناظره في زواج البكر

هذه المناظرة في إكبار البكر البالغة على الزواج بغير إذنها (٢)

٦ - السلسلة في معرفة القولين والوجهين على مذهب الشافعي

ورد بفهرس جامعة الدول العربية ان هذا المصنف لامام الحرمين ولم يتيسر لي الاطلاع عليه لاسباب فنية وهي نسخة كتبت عام ٦٤٢ هـ احمد الثالث ١٢٠٦ ورقم الفيلم بجامعة الدول العربية هو ١٨٤ فقه شافعي وقد سبق ان ذكرت اثناء حديثي عن مصنفات والد الامام ان هذا الكتاب ربما يكون من تصنيف الوالد لان بعض المترجمين كالسبكي قد ذكروا انه لوالد الامام وليس للامام نفسه (٣)

١٠ - رسالة في الفقه

لم يتيسر لي الاطلاع على هذه الرسالة ويوجد منها نسخة خطية بالموصل بمدرسة الحجبات رقم ٣٨ الرسالة السابعة وهي ضمن مجموعة

(١) السبكي طبقات الشافعية الكبرى جزء ٣ صفحة ٢٧٥

(٢) السبكي طبقات الشافعية الكبرى جزء ٣ صفحة ٢٧٨

(٣) انظر ص ١٨ من هذا البحث

٩ - رسالة في التقليد والاجتهاد

وهذه الرسالة ايضا لم يتيسر لي الاضطلاع عليها والنسخ الخطية الموجودة لهذا المصنف نسختان احدها بالمكتبة الآصفية بحيدرآباد الدكن برقم ١٢٢٠ الرسالة الاولى او الحادية عشر من مجموعة بها ثمان عشر رسالة - والاخرى بمكتبة باتنا برقم ٢٩١٦ (١)

د . مصنفات في الخلاف

٥ - الدرة المضية فيما وقع من خلاف بين الشافعية والحنيفية

هذه المخطوطة من المصنفات التي لم يتيسر لي الاطلاع عليها . وقد ورد في بروكلمن انه توجد نسخة واحدة فقط من هذا المصنف بالمتحف البريطاني بالقسم الشرقي برقم ٧٥٢٤

١٥ - غنية المسترشدين في الخلاف

وهو احد المصنفات الثلاثة التي ذكرها ابن الخلكان في ترجمته لامام الحرمين ولم نعر على ذكره في فهارس المكتبات (٢)

(١) لقد صورت الجامعة العربية محتويات المكتبة الآصفية بحيدرآباد الدكن غير انه قد ظهر بالبحث انه حدث لاسباب فنية خاصة بظروف التصوير انه لم يصور من المجموعة التي تحوى رسالة في التقليد والاجتهاد الا كتاب الرد على ابن عقيل .

(٢) انظر صفحة ٥٥ من هذا الفصل .

هـ • مصنفات في الجدل

١٧ - كتاب الكافية في الجدل

نسخة خطية بخزانة الازهر الشريف برقم (٨٤) ١٠٦٢٣ ادب
 بحث ٩٥ ق وكل لوحة بها عشرون سطرا وكل سطر به ١٦ كلمة ~~فيها~~
 وقد اطلعت على الفيلم الموجود بقسم المخطوطات بجامعة الدول
 العربية وهو فيلم رقم ١٨٧ والورقة الاولى منه عليها " فيشة جامعة
 الدول العربية " واول ورقة من المخطوط وهي ل ~~لو~~ بها اشارة الى
 المالكين واسماء قبائلهم ورقم المخطوطة في مكتبة الازهر الشريف - وفي
 لوحة اظ يوجد سطران في الركن الاعلى على يمين الصفحة وفي الجزء
 الخالي الباقي منها فيشة جامعة الدول العربية وفي لوحة ~~أور~~ عنوان
 الكتاب كتب بخط كبير (هذا الكتاب لإلام الفقيه • وكلمات السطر بعد
 ذلك محووة • وبلي هذا السطر ستة اسطر تذكرة ودعوات للخلق •

ول ٢ ظ خالية وبها فيشة جامعة الدول العربية للمرة الثالثة •

ل ٣ و : كتب عليها بخط كبير كتاب الكافية في الجدل تصنيف عبد الملك
 بن عبد الله بن يوسف الجويني امام الحرمين ثم اسما المالكين وختم
 الخزانة الازهرية •

ويبدأ الكلام في لوحة ٣ حيث قال : (وهذه اللوحة مكررة في الفيلم) :

" بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على محمد وآله الطيبين الطاهرين
 وسلم تسليما الحمد لله العلى في اسماءه وصفاته على خير البرية محمد
 وآله وسألت وفقك الله لطلب الجنات واعانك على سبيل الخيرات ان اجمع
 طرقا للكلام في النظر لا يستغني عنه في مناظره اهل الزمان طمعا

في جزيل ثواب الله سبحانه ، مستعينا به خير موفق لكل خير اعلم انه لا يتم تحقيق النظر لمن لا يكون مستوفيا لمعاني ما يجري من اهل النظر في معاني العبارات وحقائقها على التفصيل والتخصيص معرفة على التحقيق فتكون البداية اذن بذكرها احق واصوب فاول ما يجب البداية به بيان الحد ومعناه لتتحقق خواص حقائق العبارات وحدودها ، فالحد والحقيقة والمعنى على عرف علماء الاصول واستعمالهم واحد . وان كان لكل واحد من هذه الالفاظ مزية الاختصاص في لسان العرب واولاها بالاستعمال عند اهل الاصول لفظ الحد ، ثم لفظ المعنى ، فان لفظ الحد لا تجرى مستحسنة في الكشف عن بيان كل شيء ، وصفاته فانه لا يحسن ان يقال ما حد الاله ، ما حد علمه وقدرته ولكن يقال ما حقيقة الاله وصفاته وكذلك يحسن ان يقال ما معنى الاله وقدرته وعظمته لان الحد في اللغة ينبي عن الغاية والنهاية ، وذلك محال في الاله وصفاته واصح العبارات في معنى الحد والحقيقة هو اختصاص المحدود بوصف يخلص له وقد قيل فيه انه الجامع المانع وقيل هو اللفظ الوجيز"

وينتهي الكتاب في ل ١٥ ظ حيث قال الامام :

" فهذه ضروب من الامثال نستعين بها على وضع الخصم فيما يتعين وضعه برسم النظر اولا ثقصد بالمناظرة طلب الحق وابتغا الرشد او يقصد به التلهي والمباهاة"

" تم الكتاب بحمد الله ومنه وتوفيقه ولطفه فله الحمد وكان الفراغ من كتابته في شهر رجب لثمان خلت منه من شهر ستة خمسين وستماية وصلى الله على محمد وآله وصحبه اجمعين ."

٠٠٠٠ قد نقل الكتاب عن النسخة الواردة من العراق وقد تمت المقابلة في ذى القعدة من سنة اربعين وستماية بحمد الله وتوفيقه ومنه .
 ويوجد بنهاية المخطوط اربع لوحات بخط مختلف غير واضح النبرات وقد ورد في فهرس جامعة الدول العربية بصفحة ١٣٥ انه يوجد بأخر كتاب الكافية في الجدل رسالة في الحدود المستعملة في اصول الفقه . فرما تكون هذه اللوحات الاربع هي رسالة في الحدود

و - مصنفات في مواد اخرى

١٦ - قصيدة من نظم امام الحرمين وهي وصية لولده

ومطلع هذه القصيدة :

الى كم تعاد في غرور وفلة ٠٠٠ وكم هكذا النوم الى غير يقظة (١)
 وتوجد نسخة من هذه القصيدة ببرلين برقم الرسالة الثالثة بقلم اسماعيل بن ابي بكر المقرئ اليمني المتوفي عام ٨٣٧

١٨ - كتاب النفس

وهو المصنف الذي ذكره امام الحرمين في سياق اقواله في كتاب العقيدة النظامية (٢)

٨ - ديوان الخطب

وهو المصنف الذي ذكره السبكي اثناء ترجمته لامام الحرمين (٣)
 هذه هي مصنفات امام الحرمين مصنفة بحسب الموضوعات .

(١) ويلاحظ ان البيت مكسور هكذا (٢) انظر صفحة ٥٤ من هذا البحث
 (٣) انظر صفحة ٥٥ من هذا البحث

Chronological classification:

It is quite difficult to classify chronologically al-Juwayni's works. The reason is that one work only has an exact date, thirteen have an approximate date, and the others cannot be dated.

22. The only work which bears an exact date is Masā'il al-Imām 'Abd al-Ḥaqq as-Ṣiqillī wa Ajwibatuhā li-l-Imām Abi-l-Ma'ālī al-Juwayni. It is mentioned at the beginning of this work that it was written at Mecca in the year 450 A.H., 1058 A.D.¹

The works which bear an approximate date are:

13. Al-'Aqīdah an-Niẓāmiyyah. This work, as mentioned in Cairo edition, is ^{transmitted} submitted by al-Ghazālī.² This leads to the fact that it was written quite late, after the arrival of al-Ghazālī in Naysābūr. This might be about the year 471 A.H., 1078 A.D., when al-Ghazālī was learning in an-Niẓāmiyyah school. This tallies with what was said by two biographers, that al-Juwayni spent his last days in writing in al-Madhhab. This work, apart from the part published under the name of al-'Aqīdah,

1. باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليمًا. كتب الشيخ أبو محمد بن هارون الصفطي إلى الإمام أبي المعالي عبد الملك بن عبد الله ابن يوسف المويني النيسابوري في مسائل والجواب مشتمل على السؤال فلا معنى للتطويل بإيراد ذلك بمكة حرصها الله عام خمسين وأربعين.

See

al-Juwayni: Masā'il 'Abd al-Ḥaqq wa Ajwibatuhā, folio 173^v manuscript no. 11 Sh figh Mālikī.

2. Aqd. with the title رواية أبي بكر بن عزي عن الغزالي عن المؤلف.

is in Fig. 1. Its original title is an-Nizāmiyyah
fi-l-Arkān al-Islamiyyah.¹

19. Risālat Juma' al-Adillah fi Qawa'id 'Aqā'id Ahl
al-Sunnah wa'l Jamā'ah:² There are differences
between the two MSS available in the chapter entitled
"Imāmat-al-Muslimīn"³, which helped in finding the
approximate date of each. It is said in MS Q⁴ that the
prophet did not appoint anyone to be his successor. In
MS B, it is said that the prophet did not indicate
'Ali to be his successor.⁵ This means that version
Q, where the name of 'Ali is not mentioned, was
composed under the Shi'ah, or Buwayhid's government,
and that the other copy, in which 'Ali is mentioned
by name as not having been appointed to succeed the
prophet, was composed under the sunnite or Saljūq
government. The first version is the earlier⁶,
and was composed before the Saljūq came, probably when
al-Juwaynī was teaching in his father's school;
therefore it was composed between 438 A.H., 1046 A.D.
and 447 A.H., 1055 A.D.

1. See p. p 94, 95

2. See p. p 95, 96

3. See p. VI. VII of the introduction (part III)

4. See p. xix قول الإمام: ما نرى النبي عليه السلام على إمامة أحد بعده وتوليته من بعده
من الله

5. See p. xix قول الإمام: ما نرى رسول الله عليه وسلم على إمامة أحد بعده وتوليته من بعده

6. See pp VII from the introduction to the manuscript. (part III)

7. Kitāb ash-Shāmil fī Usūl ad-Dīn: This was written by al-Juwaynī to defend the orthodox Muslim faith. It seems likely that this was during his first years at an-Nizāmiyyah school, where he was engaged in the teaching of the sunnite rights. Therefore this book might be written between the years 456 A.H., 1060 A.D. and 459 A.H., 1063 A.D.

1. Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭi' al-Adillah fī Usūl al I'tiqād: This is a summary of ash-Shāmil as Ibn Khaldūn says¹ in his book. This book was therefore written after ash-Shāmil.

14. Kitāb Ghiyāth al-Umam fī-l-Ilṭiyāth az-Zulam: This was written after al 'Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah, because it is said in the preface that the book would be known as al-Ghiyathi, even as the other book was known as an-Nizāmi²; therefore it was written in the year 473 A.H., 1080 A.D. or a little later.

4. Kitāb at-Talkhīs fī Usūl was mentioned by al-Imām in Ash-Shāmil. This means that it was written before ash-Shāmil, but not necessarily immediately before. Probably it was written when al-Juwaynī was learning Kalām, because it might be a summary of one of

1. Ibn Khaldūn - al-Muqaddimah. p. 555

2. تأله الامام: فروعيات الدولة وهذا اذا تم غيات الامم في التثايت النظام فليشتهر بالغيثي كما شهى الاول بالنظامي، والله ولي التأييد.
al-Juwaynī: Ghiyāth al-Umam fī 'l-Tiyāth

az Zulam, p. 9, under no. 8 Ijtimā' Taymūr.

al-Baqillāni's books, which al-Juwayni studied when he was learning theology. Therefore this book was written early in the second phase of his life, probably about the year 440 A.H., 1048 A.D.

21. Mukhtaṣar al-Irshad fi-l-Uṣul, which may be Kitāb at-Talkhīṣ fi-l-Uṣūl.

18. Kitāb an-Nafs, which is mentioned by al-Juwayni in al-ʿAqīdah an-Niẓāmiyyah.¹ The likelihood is that he wrote it before he was named at an-Niẓāmiyyah school. This is because, during this period of his life, he was undertaking the full responsibilities of a sunnite Imām. This should prevent him from writing a book dealing rather with philosophical ideas, as has been stated above, than pure theological subjects. This book was written in the second phase of his life. It seemed likely that during the first years of this phase he was engaged in the writing of Kitāb at-Talkhīṣ, and Lumaʿ al-Adillah.

The likelihood therefore is that Kitāb an-Nafs was written about the year 444 A.H., 1052 A.D.

24,25. The two debates mentioned in as-Subki's book, between al-Juwayni and ash-Shirāzi. They were composed when the latter visited Naysābūr.

This was before the year 465 A.H., 1072 A.D.

26. Kitāb Nihāyat al-Matlab fi Dirāyat al Madhhab was written after 465 A.H., 1072 A.D., because two biographers² mention that al-Juwayni spent the last

1. See p.p 54, 105

2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 256

Imd. vol. 5, p. 395

years of his life writing this book.

3. Kitāb al-Burhān fi Uṣūl al fiqh was probably written when al-Juwaynī was teaching in Naysābūr, because the book proves that it was written when the author was really mature. It might be after ash-Shāmil, about the year 460 A.H., 1067 A.D.

20. Al-Mujtahidīn was written after al-Burhān,⁽¹⁾ because, as Brockelmann says, it is the summary of it.

Thus the chronological order of such of al-Juwaynī's works as can be dated is:

<u>Mukhtasār al-Irshād li-l-Bāqillanī.</u>	about 438
<u>At-Talkhīṣ fi-l-Uṣūl</u> (which may be <u>Mukhtasār al-Irshād</u>)	about 438
<u>Luma' al-Adillah fi Qawā'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah.</u>	between 438 and 447
<u>Kitāb an-Nafs</u>	about 444
<u>Masā'il 'Abd al-Haqq as-Siqillī</u>	in 450
<u>Ash-Shāmil fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn</u>	between 456 and 459
<u>al-Irshād ilā Qawā'id al-Adillah fi Uṣūl al-I'tiqād</u>	after 459
<u>Al-Burhān fi Uṣūl al-fiqh</u>	about 460
<u>al-Mujtahidīn</u>	after 460
<u>Munāzarah fi-l-Qiblah</u>	before 465
<u>Munāzarah fi-l-Zawaj al-Bikr</u>	before 465
<u>al-'Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah</u>	about 471
<u>Ghiyath al Umam fi-l-Iltiyāth az-Zulam</u>	about 471
<u>Nihāyat al-Maṭlab fi Dirāyat al-Maḥhab.</u>	after 471

1- al-Juwaynī says at the end of his book al-Burhān:
 "و نحن نرسم بعد ذلك مسامعنا بالله تعالى كتاباً جاسماً في الإفتاء
 و الفتوى يقع منسباً برأسه و تتمه لهذا الموضوع" (See p. 62)
 This sentence might confirm Brockelmann's statement (See Brockelmann p. 377 appendix p. 641)
 if the title "al-Mujtahidīn" is considered as a derivation
 from the word al-Ijtihād.

The works of which the date cannot be fixed are:

Ad-Durrah al-Muḍiyyah fī mā waqa'a min Khilāf
Bayn 'aḥ-Shāfi'iyyah wa-'l-Hanifiyyah, Risālah fī
't-Taqlīd wa 'l-Ijtihād, Risālah fī 'l-Fiqh,
Risālah fī uṣūl ad-Dīn, Qaṣidah li-ibnihi, Muḥith
al-Khalq fī Ikhtiār al-Aḥaqq, al-Waracāt, Shifā' al-
Ghalīl fī ma waqa'a fī 't-Tawrāt wa 'l-Injīl min
al-Tabdīl, Kitāb al-Kāfiyah fī 'l-Jadal, aḥ Silsilah
fī ma'rifat al-Qawlayn wa 'l-Wajhayn 'alā Maḥḥab
aḥ-Shāfi'i, which may be written by the father,
Kitāb al-Irshād fī Uṣūl al-fiqh, which may be Kitāb
al-Talkhiṣ fī Uṣūl al-fiqh, or Kitāb Talkhiṣ at
Tagrīb, Kitāb Ghuniat al-Mustarshidin fī 'l-Khilāf,
 which is not to be found in library indexes, and
Diwān Khuṭab which was not finished by al-Juwayni.

These books must be left out of any chronological list until new information is found.

Comment Muslim commentators took a deep interest in al-Juwayni's works, and in their notes helped to clarify obscurities in his works, so that now ordinary readers are able to understand the aims of al-Juwayni. In other words, these commentators completed the work which the Imām had begun in his childhood for the spread of truth and the exaltation of the faith. Thus his contemporaries and succeeding generations benefited by his knowledge.

The commentaries written on the works of al-Imām also reflect the culture of different epochs. In interpreting him they committed many errors; but despite these, their efforts point to the great trust they placed in al-Juwayni.

Four European scholars were interested in al-Juwayni's works: Luciani, who edited al-Irshād; Rev. Louis Gardet and M. M. Anawati, who speak about some of al-Juwayni's works, specially al-Irshād and ash-Shamīl; and Klopfer, who edited al-'Aqīdah an Nizāmiyyah. in German.

Conclusion to Part I

Conclusion to Part I.

From the study of Al-Juwaynī's biographies, it can be concluded that he was a man of sound judgement and keen intelligence, who spared no effort in serving the Muslim faith. His father had instilled into al-Juwaynī as a boy his love of the Muslim faith; and in manhood his sincerity and knowledge impressed his contemporaries. His deep love of the faith made him defend his religious standpoint with all his power, and thus he earned the veneration of his fellow-men.

Abū Ishāq ash-Shirāzī,¹ Imām and director of an-Nizāmiyyah school of Baghdād, says of al-Juwaynī: "How fortunate you people of Naysābūr are, with such an Imām."² On another occasion the Imām of Baghdād says to al-Juwaynī, "The people of the East and the people of the West have greatly benefited by your knowledge."³ He also hailed al-Juwaynī as "Greatest of Imāms."⁴ Yet this man in his own right was also a great leader of his people; therefore such a tribute paid by such a man served to show to contemporary thinkers al-Juwaynī's true worth.

1. See p. 3, footnote 5.

2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 253.
Waf. vol. I, p. 361

3. Subk.
Vol. 3, p. 253
Imd. vol. 5, p. 360

4. Ibid.

قال عن إمام الحرمين تمتعوا بهذا الإمام فإنه
ترجمه هذا الزمان

وقال له: يا مفيد أهل المشرق والمغرب لقد استفاد من علمك
الدولوت والأرضون

وفي مناسبة قاله وصفه بأنه إمام الأمة .

Another great Imām, Abū 'Uthmān Ismā'il ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān aṣ-Ṣābūnī,¹ heard al-Juwaynī speaking and exclaimed: "O God, spare al-Juwaynī all adversity. He is today the comfort of Islam, and by his eloquence its defender."²

By such declarations, these two great Imāms acknowledged that al-Juwaynī had made extensive contributions to the understanding of the faith.

A third great Imām, Al-Jurjānī,³ also placed al-Juwaynī on a high and honourable footing. He said about him: "He is the Imām of his time, sui generis, the prodigy of his age without parallel in knowledge and prestige and eloquence."⁴ People from Khurasān, 'Irāq, and Hijjās go to him to acquire knowledge."⁵

Al-Qushayrī maintained of al-Juwaynī that his power of convincing people placed him in such a position that "if Imām al-Ḥaramayn were today to claim to be a prophet, his words would take the place of a miracle,"⁶ which meant that al-Juwaynī's words had the same effect on souls as the prophet's miracles had on their bodies. This also serves to show how well he understood the psychology of his people.

1. His name is Ismā'il inn 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Ahmad ibn Ismā'il ibn Ibrāhīm ibn 'Amir ibn 'Ā'idh, Shaykh al-Islām, Abū 'Uthmān aṣ-Ṣābūnī. He was a jurisconsult and a man of Hadīth.

(d. 449 A.H., 1057 A.D.)

2. قال الصائوني: صرف الله المكاراة عن هذا الامام فهو اليوم قرّة عين الاسلام والذاب عنه بحسن الكلام. Subk. vol. 3, p. 253

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. قال المرجاني: هو امام عصره ونبي ووجه نادرة دهره عليم المش وحفظه وثنائه ولسانه.

5. Ibid. كما قال فيه: و اليه الرحلة من خراسان والعراق والحجاز.

6. Ibid. قال القشيري في الامام: لو ادعى امام المرين النبوة لاستغن بكلامه هذا عن المعجزات.

Many succeeding generations honoured Imām al-Ḥaramayn. Aṣ-Subkī is one of them. Some of his words are very significant. "His answer is ever on the tip of his tongue; It is as if it (i.e. his argument) were a hail of iron." "His contender approaches with the dignity of a scrutiniser; and departs acknowledging the abasement of a culprit." ¹

Aṣ-Subkī thought so highly of al-Juwaynī that he considers al-Juwaynī's treatises better than any of either al-Qaffāl's or Abū Hāmid's, ² who were two great Imāms of Islam. According to aṣ-Ṣubkī, nobody is to be compared to al-Juwaynī.

There are biographies which censure him, and his foremost opponents are adh-Dhahabī ³ and the Ḥanbalites. Aṣ-Ṣubkī mentions this ⁴ in At-Ṭabaqāt. There is also reference to this in adh-Dhahabī's books, ⁵ which make four accusations: ⁶ the first is that al-Juwaynī was ignorant about Ḥadīth; the second that he held that God knows universals and not particulars; the third, that he was once unable to give the meaning of a particular verse of the Qur'ān "al-Raḥmān 'Alā al-'Arsh istawā."; the fourth that he gave up the study of theology.

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 250 قال السيوطي: ابراهيم بن الحسن بن جزيه: فلما هبى و فقهه من حور و
يتعبر منها جاهد بعرضه ما في ا. د. روح معقول فابذلها بديق
 2. See p. 15
 3. His name is Al-Imām al-Ḥāfiẓ Shams ad-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allah Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn 'Uthmān ibn Qaymāz al-Turkumānī, known by the name of Adh-Dhahabī (d. 748 A.H., 1347 A.D.)
 4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 261
 5. The first volume of Tārīkh al-Islam wa Ṭabaqāt al-Mashāhir wa 'l-'Ulamā', which contains the names of people who died between 437 A.H. and 1045 A.D. and 500 A.H., 1106 A.D. is missing from the Egyptian National Lib., Cairo. Syr. contains the accusations. (Index Tārīkh Egyptian Nat. Lib. vol. V, p. 171)
 6. Syr. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 255, col. 1.

On consideration of the first accusation, how could al-Imām use Ḥadīth in debate and give decisions in Muslim law, without some deep knowledge of the prophet's traditions?

If adh-Dhahabi had discovered that al-Juwayni was really wrong, why did he not give examples to prove it? This point does not stand up to examination. Adh-Dhahabi did not study al-Juwayni's works before decrying them. He may have heard this accusation from some ignorant Hanbalites and reproduced it in his book. He may, in fact, have been quoting al-Māziri,¹ who wrote a commentary on al-Burhān; but as-Subki says² that both adh-Dhahabi and al-Māziri were ignorant of Kalām and affirms that al-Juwayni's view of God's knowledge is very clear in his book Ash-Shāmil. He gives examples of al-Juwayni's own words.³

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1. His name is Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Alī ibn 'Umar at-Tamīmī al-Māziri called (Yuknā) Abū 'Abd Allāh, and known as an Imām. He lived in Māzir, in Sicily. He wrote a commentary on al-Juwayni's book, al-Burhān, entitled Idāh al-Maḥṣūl min Burhān al-Uṣūl. (d. 536 A.H., 1141 A.D.) He was about 80 years old when he died. See Jalā' al-'Aynayn fi Hikmat al-Aḥmadayn, written by Nu'mān Khayr ad-Dīn ibn Muḥammad al-Aḥṣī, Cairo, p. 97. See also Ibn Khallikān, Cairo, 1299, vol. 2, p. 287.
 2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 261
 3. Ibid. p. 265

If we try to ascertain from al-Juwayni's own writings in another of his works what his view was¹ of God's knowledge, we find that al-Juwayni linked God's will with His knowledge.²

Now al-Juwayni asserts that God wills all that is to be. The world, according to him and the Ash'arites, is in permanent creation (Khalq Mustamir)³. As His will is concerned with the particulars of creation, it follows that knowledge also must comprehend the particulars and not be restricted to generalities.⁴

The third accusation⁵ deals with al-Juwayni's hesitation when asked the meaning of "Al-Rahmān 'Alā al-'Arsh Istawa," and why a person looks up to pray. The accuser felt that such a great Imām should have known where God, but he, the accuser, failed to understand that al-Juwayni knew that God is everywhere.

The last accusation is that he gave up the study of Kalām. Defending the Imām, as-Subki comments on a statement attributed to al-Juwayni. "Do not study Kalām, because if I had realised where that knowledge was to lead me, I would never have concerned myself with it."⁶ As-Subki denies that such words could have been said by such a great Imām, but adds that even if al-Juwayni said them they would give no ground for criticism.⁷

1. Aqd. p. 17

2. Ibid. p. 14

3. See p. 176

4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 261

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. p. 260

7. Ibid. p. 261

As-Subki's words mean that if al-Juwayni deserted the study of Kalām, this does not mean that he rejected Kalām. That is why he says that there is no ground for criticism.

Taking into account al-Juwayni's environment, his works, and his spiritual and mental qualities, it can be understood why he studied Kalām and why he deserted it.

The great influence of his family in guiding him to the study of Islamic sciences has already been pointed out. Political intrigues led to disorder in religious affairs to such an extent that people were at a loss which doctrine to follow. Thus it was that one so well versed in Islamic doctrines was a most suitable person to help people to acknowledge the existence of God. Al-Juwayni seems to have realised deeply the role he had to play in appeasing souls. That is what he declares in his introduction to his work al-Irshād.¹ He says that theological proofs are the means of conviction and methods of corroboration. When he perused exhaustive treatises containing conclusive demonstrations and convincing proofs which the people of his age were incapable of conceiving, and when he found that beliefs were unsupported by convincing proofs, he was disposed to pursue a course that

1. Irsh. (Luciani) P. 1,2. هذا وما رأينا أدلة التوجيه عصاها للتشديد
 ودنيا لها لا سبب التأييد، والفننا المكتت المبسوطة المحترمة على القواطع الساطحة
 والبراهين المأدعة لا تنهض لردك أهل هذا الزمان ومبادئنا المعتققات عريضة عن
 قواطع البرهان، رأينا أن سلك سلكنا ليشتمل على الأدلة (من) القطعية والقضايا
 العقلية متعلبا عن رب المعتققات بخطأ عن جلة المصنفات، والله وفي
 الإعانة والتوفيق وهو بالصبر حقيق.

would contain conclusive proofs and propositions based on reason. He even considers the study of theology as a revealed command. (Wajib bi-ash-Shar').¹ His work, an-Nizāmiyyah fi-l-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah,² which was composed late in his life, has an introduction in Kalām, which was called later, when separately published, al-'Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah. This proves that if he has deserted Kalām, this must be quite late, after he had written Al-'Aqidāh, this theological introduction to an-Nizāmiyyah fi al-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah. In this work he gives his true opinion about Kalām. He declares that Kalām is a good way to prove the existence of God, but not to knowledge of God Himself.³ This may be the reason for which some of his contemporaries and successors thought that he rejected Kalām. This opinion of al-Juwaynī gives a great importance to Kalām, because he considers it as a science leading to the knowledge of the existence of God. Later on, if he deserted Kalām the reason must be that he felt the groundwork was done. He may also have come to the realisation that though Kalām could be a way to appease other people's souls, it could not satisfy him any more. He wanted his faith to be strong and solid, and he may have found that the way

1. Irah. p.

2. See p. 106

3. Aqd. p. 16

to it is through the heart (al-Qalb) and not the intellect (al-'Aql). That is why he says that Kalām does not lead to the knowledge of God Himself. Therefore he did not reject Kalām, but just deserted it. Kalām was for him simply a means of consolidating beliefs. The fact that he deserted Kalām lies in words of his, already referred to, to the effect that he had ultimately returned to the faith of early Muslims.¹ As-Subki says that this means that al-Juwaynī abandoned (at-Ta'wīl) "controversial interpretation of scriptures" and came back to (at-Ta'wīd) "reliance on the obvious meaning of revealed texts". He may have been a theologian in doctrine, and a sūfi in his own devotional life.

It may be that although al-Juwaynī studied philosophy and perhaps wrote on the subject, as mentioned above; although he occupied himself with theology and found that it confirmed his religious beliefs; yet his thirst for the true knowledge of God was still not quenched, so he found satisfaction in sūfism.

It is very likely that his disciple, al-Ghazālī, who went through these three stages, was influenced by his master, and it can be said that the renaissance of Islamic sciences brought about by al-Ghazālī is really due to al-Juwaynī.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 263

PART II
AL-JUWAYNĪ'S DOCTRINE OF THE
ORINATION
OF THE WORLD

PART IIAL-JUWAYNI'S DOCTRINE OF THE
ORINATION
OF THE WORLDIntroduction

Before examining the doctrine of al-Juwayni on the origination of the world, the general and specialised meanings of the two words "al-Hudūth" and "al-'Ālam" should be understood, to ascertain the attitude of al-Juwayni with regard to these two meanings.

The general meaning¹ of the verb "Hadatha" is "happened" or "was found". It means also "came into existence, began to be, had a beginning, began or originated, existed newly for the first time, not having been before." The infinitive nāun is "Hudūth". "Hadath" is a term applied by Sibawayh² to the infinitive noun. "al-Hādith" is an event, an accident, which is likely to happen from nothingness.

The opposite of the verb "Hadatha" is "Qaduma". The opposite of "al-Hudūth" is "al-Qudmah" or "al-Qidam", and of "al-Hādith" is "Qadīm".

The specialised³ meaning of Hudūth is threefold.

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1. Lisān al-'Arab, Cairo, 1305 A.H., vol. II, pp. 436, 437.
 2. Muhit al-Muhit vol. I, p. 355, 336.
Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, Bk. I, p. 2, 527, col 3.
Wright: Arabic Grammar, Vol. I, p. 110, Vol. II, p. 54
 2. Lisān al-'Arab, vol. II, p. 437
Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, Bk. I, p. 2, 528, col. 3
 3. Abū-Ab-Baqā': Kulliyāt, p. 166.
Ash-Shahristāni: al Milal wa-l-Nihal in the margin of

Continuation of Footnote 3 on P. 121

al-Fiṣal by Ibn Ḥazm, Cairo, 1317 A.H., vol. 2, from p. 70 to p. 160.

Ibn Ḥazm - Al-Fiṣal fi l-Milal wa-l-Nihāl, Cairo, 1317 A.H., vol. I, p. 9, 23, 24, 35.

Lalande - Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, Tome I, supp. p. 131.

Frank. Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques, p. 308, from p. 1141 to 1181.

Sweetman - Islam and Christian Theology, 3 vols.

1. One represents the opinions of philosophers, most of whom looked upon the world as being eternal. Existents do not spring from nothing; matter and time preceded them. Philosophers believe that there is an eternal matter which existed with God. It has no form, and bears within itself the potentiality of being. There are causes which lie in the world itself. They determined its existence at the moment it was created, for otherwise it would have remained in the state of pure potentiality in which it was before. But if there was something determining its existence, this determinant must have been determined by another determinant and so on. There is a series of causes. But there cannot be an infinite series of causes. There is a Prime Agent, a Prime Mover, which is God. According to Aristotle, the efficient cause lies in the souls of the stars. God is not an Ultimate Agent. God is the Ultimate Aim of desire which inspires the Heavens to action.

2. The second represents the opinion of theologians, who believe that existence sprang from nothingness. The Mutakallimīn divided the existent (al-Mawjūd) into substance (al-Jawhar) and accident (al-ʿArāḍ), which are according to them created by God from nothing, and do not spring from a pre-existent matter.

They then state four basic principles: The first one is the existence of the accident (Thubūt al-‘Arād); the second the originated character of accidents (Hudūth al-‘Arād); the third the impossibility of substances being without accidents (Istihālat Ta‘arri al-Jawahir ‘an-al-A‘rād); and the fourth, which is the impossibility of events without a beginning (Istihālat Hawādith lā Awwala-Lahā) or a chain of events without a first link.¹

According to them, origination is one of God's acts. This is in general their method of proving that the world is originated. But there are some differences between two of the most important sects of Mutakallimīn, the Mu‘tazilites and Ash‘arites, in what concerns the existent, the non-existent, substance, and accident. These differences are mentioned, not by the Mu‘tazilites but by their opponents, the Ash‘arites. Most of the Mu‘tazilites' books are lost, except a few such as Kitāb al-Intiṣār by al-Khayyāt.²

The existent, according to Ash‘arites, is the thing,³ (ashshay‘) as will be explained later, the thing existing in the external world, which is the

1. Tam. Cairo, 1360, p. 44

2. Al-Khayyāt: Al-Intiṣār.

3. Al-Bāqillāni: At-Tamhīd, Cairo, p. 40.

3. Tam. Cairo p. 40.

creation of God, the result of His will. The Ash'arites hold that this is different from the Mu'tazilites' point of view. According to the latter, the thing is not what exists, but what is known (al-Ma'lûm). This leads to the view that the existent and the non-existent are both things, because what is known may be existent or non-existent. If the thing is a thing both in non-existence and existence, there would not be anything for God to do. His power will have no effect because existence is already one characteristic of the non-existent thing. In this way the thing has existence without the interference of God's will.¹ And this is contrary to the sunnites' principles.

The Ash'arites mention also that the substance, according to the Mu'tazilites, is a combination of accidents (A'râd Mujtami'ah). Therefore, if accidents perish, the substance perishes too. The Ash'arites find that the Mu'tazilites have confused two species (Jins); the substance must be of a quite different species from the accident. This is one of the most important principles of the doctrine of the origination of the world.

1. Sham. Vol. I, folio 24 - 25.

As the copy of ash Shamil written in the 11th of October 1949. was not available. I referred in the following pages to the photos of the photostat copy. (See p. 80)

But Ibn al-Amir,¹ who was a sunnite, understands the Mu'tazilites' point of view about substance in a different way. He says, as a commentary upon the Ash'arites' explanation of the Mu'tazilites' opinion on substance, that if the Mu'tazilites say that substance perishes when the accidents perish, they do not mean that substances are not different from accidents; they simply mean that it is impossible to separate substances from accidents. Thus their opinion is not contrary to that of the Ash'arites.²

This leads to the fact that the Mu'tazilites' rivals may have misunderstood them, and what is said about the Mu'tazilites in their opponents' books may give a wrong idea about their doctrines. So it can be asserted that the Mu'tazilites' doctrines are still unknown to us.

The Ash'arites have another way of proving the origination of the universe. It is given by al-Ash'ari. He said: "The proof of that is that the completely mature man was originally semen, then a clot, then a small lump, then flesh and bone and blood. Now we know very well that he did not translate himself from state to state. For we see that at the peak of his physical and mental maturity he is unable to produce hearing and sight for himself,

1. See p. 89

2. Ibn al-Amir says: نظر (يقصد قول أهل الحق) نظر لأن الحضم قال إذا أنتجت الأعراض كلها، أنتهي الجوهر وقولنا إذا أنتج بعضها خلفه غيره، ليس منافياً لما قاله والحق في الجواب أن الجوهر إنما ينتهي عند انتفاء الأعراض لا متباعد بقائه بدونها لأنه عين الأعراض، كما يلزم من عدم الظل عند المساء ولا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون الجسم خوصو عين ظله.

or to create a bodily member for himself. That proves that he is even more incapable of doing that when he is weak and imperfect. For if he can do a thing, when he is imperfect, a fortiori he can do it when he is mature; and if he cannot do a thing when he is mature, a fortiori he is incapable of it when he is imperfect." ¹

Al-Ash'ari then gives examples which prove the existence of God. He says: "From seeing him a baby, then a youth, then a man in the prime of life, then an old man, we know very well that he does not translate himself from youth to old age and decrepitude. For even though a man strain to rid himself of old age and decrepitude, and to restore himself to his youthful condition, he cannot do it. So what we have said proves that he has a translator who translates him from state to state and governs his every condition; for his translation from state to state without a translator and governor is impossible." ²

He mentions another example; he says that "cotton cannot change into spun thread and woven cloth, without weaver or craftsman or supervisor." ³

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1. Al Ash'ari: Al-Luma' fi ar-Radd 'alā Ahl az-Zigh wa-l-Bida': p. 6,7, translated by R. J. McCarthy, Beyrouth, 1953.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

This method differs from the other in that the existence of God is proved without dividing the originated world into substances and accidents. It proves the existence of God by pointing out the fact that creatures are unable to create themselves, which leads to another fact: that there must be a Creator.

3. The third represents the opinion of the Sūfis, who believe in the creation of things. They think that there is a relation between the knowledge of God and the appearance of the universe. To them, the world is eternal according to God's knowledge, and originated in its concrete existence. The universe is neither eternal nor originated, and there is a relation between God and mankind which represents the need of the created for the creator. If this relation did not exist, then the universe must exist by itself. According to the sūfis, this relation is the basis for the proof that the world is originated.¹

The word "al-Ālam" in its ordinary sense, means "all the creatures" or "what the cavity of the celestial sphere comprises"² and according to theologians, it means "everything that exists besides God". This is the early Muslims' definition (aṣ-Salaf).³ The

1. Ash-Sha'rānī: Al Yawāqit wa-l-Jawāhir fī Bayān
'Aqā'id al-Akābir: vol. I, p.

2. Al Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ: Fourth edition 1354 A.H., vol. IV
p. 155, Faṣl al-ayn, bāb al-Jīm.
Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon Book V, p. 214, col. 1

3. Irsh . p. 17 and (Luciani) p. 10.
Lum. p. 2 x "العالم بكل ما حوالا بطن الغلاك"
"العالم بكل ما حوالا بطن الغلاك" أو "ما حوالا بطن الغلاك"
"العالم بكل ما حوالا بطن الغلاك" أو "ما حوالا بطن الغلاك"

later Muslims' definition (al-Ḥalaf) is: "The universe is substances and accidents."^(*)

These two definitions are not contrary: everything that exists besides God is what implies a prior non-existence. It has a beginning. It is originated. Substances and accidents imply also a prior non-existence and are originated. Al-Juwaynī mentions them in his books as indicating the same originated existent.

According to the Mu'tazilites (as their views are represented to us by the Ash'arites), these two definitions would be contrary, because they defined the thing as being the comprehensible and not the existent.

Al-Juwaynī in his books uses the word "Ḥudūth" in its ordinary meaning. Sometimes he uses "Ḥadath" as a cognate noun. He says, for example: "Bāb al Qawl fī Ḥadath al-ʿĀlam,"¹ and "al-aṣl al-Thānī: Ithbāt Ḥadath al-ʿĀlam,"² and "Wa Gharadunā fī Rawm Ithbāt Ḥadath al-ʿĀlam Yattadīhu bi Thubūt al-Akwān!"³ At other times he uses the word "Ḥudūth". He says:

1. Shām. Vol. I, folio

Irsh. p. 17 (Luciani) p. 10

باب القول في حدث العالم

2. Irsh. p. 19 (Luciani) p. 12

الأصل الثاني إثبات حدث العرضي

3. Ibid. p. 24

(*) Irsh. p. 14 (Luciani) p. 10.

Lum. p. 2x

"العالم جواهر وأعراض"

"fa idhā thabatatt bi ma Dhakarnā al A'rād wa

Hudūthihā" ¹ and "Thumma Lam Yuthbitāhā Qabla al-Hudūth

Bal Athbatūhā lāzimataa Ba'da al-Hudūth." ²

Al-Juwaynī uses the word 'Ālam³ and Hudūth in its ordinary meaning, which is "what the cavity of the celestial sphere comprises".

Technically al-Juwaynī uses the words Hudūth and 'Ālam⁴ according to the Mutakallimīn point of view, as will be demonstrated later. He usually mentions the definitions of the world given by the early and later sunnites.⁵

1. Irsh. p. 27
(Luciani) p. 16
2. Shām. vol. I, folio 30
ثم يثبتها قبل الحوادث ثم اثبتوها
لازمة بعد الحوادث
3. See p. 124
4. Irsh. p. 17
فما يستعملونه وهو منطوق به لغة وشرعا العالم
وهو كل موجود سوى الله تعالى ومبغى ذاته في العالم
and (Luciani) p. 10.
جواهر وأعراض
5. Lum. p. 2 x

Al-Juwaynī's works which contain his opinions on the origination of the world are four: Luma' al-Adillah fī Qawā'id 'Aqā'id Ahl al-Sunnah wa -l-Jamā'ah, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawā'id al-Adillah fī Usūl al-I'tiqād, Kitāb ash-Shāmil fī Usūl ad-Dīn, and Kitāb al-'Aqidah an-Nizāniyyah.

In the first three books, al-Juwaynī studies the opinions of Ahl-al-Haqq on the origination of the universe. He analyses these opinions, criticises them, and links them with intellectual proofs and arguments. It appears that he tries to analyse and criticise these opinions in order to make a doctrine of his own, according to the opinions of Ahl-al-Haqq, on the origination of the world. He chooses the best definitions.¹ He also tries to introduce new definitions,² and to examine the different problems in a more orderly way.³ He says: "It is logical to begin with the study of the originated existents, because the Eternal Existent is not known necessarily, but by reflection. Reflection

1. Shām. vol. I, folio 37. "والقول الحق عنى... مثال ذلك قوله"

2. Ibid. folio 38 "أو قوله: "وأحسن الحدود هو..."

3. See .p.p. 200 - 229

is based on necessary or immediate knowledge. Thus it is necessary to start by it." Then he continues: "You have to know that the originated existents are essentially divided into two divisions...etc." ¹

These words prove that al-Juwaynī has his own opinion about the treatment of theological problems. He is trying to apply his doctrine of knowledge (al-‘Ilm). One of his most important principles is that necessary knowledge is known immediately without the mediacy of reflection. Reflective knowledge comes after. ²

Al-Juwaynī has another doctrine on the origination of the universe. It is to be found in the fourth book, mentioned previously, Al-‘Aqidah an Nizāmiyyah. He declares that he is the first to expound this doctrine.

Thus al-Juwaynī has two doctrines. The study of his opinions on Hudūth includes the study of these two doctrines. The first chapter of this second part will be on al-Juwaynī's doctrine of knowledge and its links with his doctrine of the origination of the world. The second chapter

1. Sham, folio. 36. "ثم ما يقتضيه الترتيب أن نستدعي الكلام عن الحوادث، إذ القديم سبحانه وتعالى لا يعلم اضطراراً وإنما يتوصل إلى معرفته نظراً واستدلالاً، وسبيل الاستدلال لا يتضح إلا بالأحاطة بالحوادث، فاقضى ذلك البداية بالكلام عليها، فاعلموا أن الحوادث تنقسم أيضاً انقساماً ضرورياً..."

2. See p. 135 and following.

will have for subject matter the doctrine of al-Juwaynī on the origination of the universe according to Ahl-al-Haqq. His other doctrine, which is entitled "al-Juwaynī's doctrine on the origination of the world according to his own opinion" will be the subject of the third chapter. Then in the conclusion a comparison will be made between al-Juwaynī and two of his predecessors, al-Bāqillānī and al-Baḡhdādī.

Chapter 1

Al-Juwayni's Doctrine of Knowledge

Chapter 1.Al-Juwayni's Doctrine of Knowledge

Al-Juwayni believes that those who want to acquire knowledge should have and follow a doctrine of knowledge.¹ Opinions on knowledge are given in some of his books, although, as he himself said, they do not constitute a complete doctrine of knowledge; he has just given the principles he need to acquire theological knowledge.²

The Imām talks of the sources of knowledge, its degrees, subjects, the method used for each subject, and the aim he seeks from knowledge in all its forms. All this shows how he studies the world, and how he considers its problems. He distinguishes between studying the world according to theology and studying it to know its different phenomena.

The sources are reason (al-'Aql), the senses (al-Hawās), and the self (an-Nafs).

1. Reason: Al-Juwayni speaks about immediate knowledge (al-Badihiyyāt) which he defines as a faculty of the mind, either to reject or accept some considerations, ^{looking} He looks upon ^{some} ~~rejected considerations~~

1. Burh. folio 11

2. Ibid. folio 19

”و نحن نرى تعرض الأقدام العقلية تحتاج إليه في الأصول.”

upon others.

as impossibilities, and ~~accepted~~ considerations as possibilities.¹ Man conceives impossibilities naturally. Al-Juwayni calls that "knowledge of the impossibility of combining contraries"² or immediate knowledge.³ This primary knowledge is not extraneous, but is innate in man's mind, and man cannot acquire it. The reason is of a kind that is called by al-Juwayni "necessary knowledge".⁴

2. The Senses. Sounds, colours, smell, tastes, heat and cold;⁵ all these are considered by al-Juwayni as sources of knowledge. They also cannot be acquired.

3. The Self. Feelings of pleasure, of pain, and all other feelings are considered by al-Juwayni as non-acquired knowledge, and thus they are also another kind of immediate knowledge. One of the examples

1. Shām. Vol. 1, folio 63.

"ذلك التصحيح الذهني لرفض بعض الاعتبارات وقبول غيرها
واعتماد الأولى المستحيلات والثانية الممكنات.

2. Irsh. p. 14. and (Luciani) p. 8

"العلم باستحالة اجتماع
المتضادات.

3. Shām. vol. 1, folio 68

"العلم بالبرهان"

4. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 9

"العقل يحسن من العلوم الضرورية"

5. Irsh. p. 12, 13 and (Luciani) p. 8.

"وليس كالم"

he gives to explain this is: "When a man changes his direction, he knows that he is able to do so, immediately."¹

These three sources give necessary knowledge, but (Badhiyyāt) differs from what is known by the senses and the self by the fact that it is not affected by physical deficiencies (Darar) or bodily needs (Hājah).²

All that has been written of the origination of the world by al-Juwaynī can be based on these three sources: reason, the senses, and the self. The difference in sources leads to different doctrines.

As to the degrees ^{or steps.} of knowledge, al-Juwaynī believes that man's mind can understand some facts immediately and easily, but not others; the former are understood naturally, without reasoning, but the latter, to be understood by the mind, require time. He calls the first "necessary knowledge" (al 'ulūm al-Darūriyyah)³ and the second "reflective knowledge", (al 'ulūm an-Nazariyyah).⁴ The reflective knowledge is called al-ʿilm by al-Juwaynī "the acquired knowledge" (al-ʿilm al-ʿāqib) ^{and ash-Shāmil} in his book al-Irshād.⁵ This reflective

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1. Burh. folio 17 "إذا قدر الواحد على التقلد في الجهات فاعلم من نفسه حال القادرين بياحة ووضوح ذلك يعني عن الاعتراف فيه."
 2. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 8 "والبيهي كالضروري إلا أنه لا يقترن بضرر أو حاجة."
 3. See p. 134
 4. Burh. folio 19
 5. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 8
فصل: العلوم النظرية. (See also p. 80).
تقع مكتسبة للعبارة.

knowledge is so called by al-Juwaynī as it is the result of the originated power of man (al-Qudrah al-Hādithah).

He explains what he means by necessary and reflective knowledge as follows: "Some geometrical facts are conceived immediately, such as: the part is less than the whole, and the whole is more than the part, and the straight lines from the centre of the circle to the circumference are equal. These are called axioms. If on these premises the mathematician builds a geometric form, he makes an hypothesis, and proves it, according to the facts. He may find it quickly or he may spend some time searching for it. It depends upon his intelligence.¹

This means that immediate knowledge is innate. It is not in the power of man to acquire it. It is called by him, as has been previously said, "necessary knowledge". Acquired knowledge is based on it. The mental operation which has to be accomplished to realise the acquired knowledge is reasoning

1. Burh., folio 20 "فإن المقدمات الهندسية ما تنجم العقول عليها من غير احتياج إلى فكر كالعلم بأن الجزء أقل من الكل والكل أكثر من الجزء، والخطوط المستقيمة الخارجة من مراكز الدائرة إلى محيطها متساوية، إلى غير ذلك من الأمثلة التي تسمى مصادرات، فإذا بنى المهندس على هذه المقدمات شكلاً بنى عليها دعاوى، وبرهنها بما يستند إلى تلك المقدمات، فقد يحتاج في ترتيب الاستنتاج إلى فكر يقصر أو يطول تبعاً لمحددة القرائح."

by questioning. He expresses this as being a transition from affirmation to negation. To explain this he says that a man studies an immobile body; if this body moves, a new thing happens. This is conceived immediately, without reasoning. Then if his mind considers the incident, he will wonder if it is logically possible. He will suppose two things: affirmation or negation: and according to the state of his mental alertness, will come the result. He will discover through this mental operation that to affirm the necessity of the movement is logically absurd. Therefore he knows that it is possible. This is accomplished by the acceptance or determination of one of the two supposed divisions. This is wandering among necessities.¹

Reason, during this mental operation, does not adopt a special method,² such as (Qiyās)³ or argument

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 68. See below.

2. Burh. folio 17 20 "فليس في العقل قياس، وبناء الغائب، وجمع بالعلة لا أصل له أيضا، إذ لا علة ولا معلول عندنا، ولا استدلال بالمتفق على المختلف لا أصل له، ولا أثر للخطوف والوقف، وأما السبر والتقسيم فحظ ما يستعمل فيه باطل طالما أنه لا يتصرف في نفي أو إثبات."

3. In general, the verb (Qāsa) means "He measured the thing by another thing like it," both in the proper sense and mentally often meaning "He compared the thing with another thing" [Lane's Book I, Part VII, p. 2577. (Al-Qiyās) means the act of measuring.]

In grammar (Qiyās) means a law deduced from the (Continued on p. 137A)

يقول المتكلم والجسد الساكن إذا تحرك فقد تجرد أمره، وهذا يلحقه عليه من غير نظر، ثم إن استدلاله في جهة إثبات الأجزاء يقول هذا التجرد شأنه لا، فيفرض التقسيم بين النفس والأجزاء ثم يفكر فيطير فكره أو يقصده على المتفاوت في جهة الفرح وكلها لها فعل من غير وسيلة ما ينسب ذلك أن الحكم بوجود التحرك محال، فيعلم الجوان ثم يعين له تفسير آخر في أن ما علمه جواز، فنت لنفسه لا يفكر فيه كما تقدم في تعيين له أحد القسمين تعيينا ضروريا فهذا هو التردد في أنحاء الضروريات.

Continuation of Footnote 3 on P. 137:

way of using words (al-Qiyās fī-l-lughah). The specialised sense of the word (al-Qiyās) includes five kinds: (Al-Qiyās as-Sufusta'i or al-Mughāliṭi, al-Qiyās al-Khatābi, al-Qiyās al-Jadali, al-Qiyās al-Mantiqi, and al-Qiyās Ash-Shar'i), which is called by logicians and theologians, (at-Tamthil). (Dictionary of technical terms by at-Tahānawī, Calcutta, 1854, vol. II, pp. 1189-1195). Ibn Rushd mentions four kinds of (Qiyās): Al-Burhāni, al-Jadali, al-Khatābi, and al-Mughāliṭi (Faṣl al-Mawāl fī ma Bayna Ash-Shar'i'ah wa-l-Hikmah Ma'n al-Ittisāl, p. 2.) Ibn Rushd, in his book, does not explain what he means by each of these, but at-Tahānawī does. He says that the three first kinds which are al-Sufusta'i, al-Khatābi, and al-Jadali, are not based on real or true premises (Muqaddimāt Ṣādiqat.) (Tahānawī, vol. II, p. 1190). The fourth (see Qazwīnī, Risālat Shamsiyyah, appendix to Tahānawī) is used by logicians, and he seems to say that it is also used by theologians. The fifth is only used in jurisprudence and is completely different from the (Qiyās) used by logicians. It is based on four points (al-Aṣl, al-Far', Hukma-l-Aṣl, and al-Waṣf aḷ-Jāmi', or al-'illah). (Tahānawī, vol. II, p. 1193).

Al-Juwaynī really does not accept any other mental operation than what he calls: transition between affirmation and negation. So it is better to keep the word (Qiyās) in this context and understand by it any kind of Qiyās known by the Arabs.

from present things to absent; ¹ or the unification of things by ('Illah)² or the demonstration of the different compared with the identical. All these methods are rejected by al-Juwaynī during the mental operation. As to the method called (as-Sabre wa-t-Taqsīm),³ al-Juwaynī⁴ finds that most of it is false; only the transition between affirmation and negation is accepted by him. It is to be noticed that these proofs are rejected by reason only during a purely mental operation; they are adopted when reason relies upon revelation, in what al-Juwaynī calls "What is known by reason and hearing" (Sam'ī). To acquire this kind of knowledge, one must use these proofs, the (Qiyās), the argument from present to absent, the unification of things by ('Illah), etc. These proofs are used by al-Juwaynī in the study of the attributes of God,⁵ because the study of this subject ^{relies on revelation, that} belongs to what is known by reason and hearing. Therefore al-Juwaynī is not contradicting himself in using these proofs in Irshād and refuting them in al-Burhān. Al-Juwaynī distinguishes between the methods used to acquire "what is known by reason alone" and "what is known by reason and 'hearing'". (Sam'ī).

1. Ash-Shahrastānī mentions that al-Juwaynī rejects the argument from present to absent.
(Continued on p. 138A)

Continuation of Footnotes for P. 138:

1. (Contd.) (Nihāyat al-Iqdām, edited by Alfred Guillaume, Arabec texte, p. 174.
2. In its specialised sense, the word ('Illah) means ('illah Ḥaqīqiyyah, wa Shar'īyyah, wa wasfāa, wa 'Illah Ismaa, wa ma'naa, wa Hukmaa). (Tahānawī, Vol. II, p. 1036). See also Ibn Hazm, al-IḤKAM fī Uṣūl al-Ahkām, vol. 8, pp. 99-101.) It is said that (al-'Ilāl, ash-Shar'īyyah) have no influence on things, like (al-'Ilāl al-'adliyyah) which bring things into existence. According to logicians the latter might be (Sūriyyah or Mādiyyah or Ghā'īyyah) (Ibid.) ~~Al-Juwaynī rejects~~ (al-'Ilāl al-'adliyyah).
3. In general, سبر الجرح means "he probed the wound, measured its depth with the مسبار, with an iron or other instrument, tried, or examined, or endeavoured to learn its depth; examined its extent . He determined, or computed by conjecture or by the eye, its measure, quality, size or bulk. He tried, proved, or tested it; proved it by experiment or experience; He elicited its true, or real, condition. سبرت القوم I observed the people attentively, with investigation, one after another, that I might know their number. سبر and سبر means the source, or origin أصل . It also means رآيته سبي السبر form, appearance, figure, condition . It means also a characteristic or likeness. (See Lane's Book, part IV, p. 1293, col. 2,3.) In its specialised sense, the word (As-Sabre) or (As-Sibre) means (at-Taqsīm) which is to limit (ḥaṣr) the characteristics (Awṣāf) the source or origin (al-Aṣl). (Tahānawī, vol. I, p. 661). At-Tahānawī mentions that this is the explanation of al-Jurjani.).
4. The word (Taqsīm) means: division (al-Qismah) or (Tarkīb al-Qiyās) or according to theologians, the transition between two things, one is prohibited, the other must be accepted. Sometimes the word is used by them for (as-Sabre). (Tahānawī, vol. II, p. 1222). Al-Juwaynī rejects (at-Taqsīm) during the mental operations in its first two meanings and accepts it as being the transition between what he calls affirmation and negation.
5. Irsh. p. 38, 44, 48, 49.

According to al-Juwayni, there is only one mental proof which points out the truth.¹

Al-Juwayni found how difficult the transition between affirmation and negation could be. He showed that man has to deal with the subject of his study directly.

It can happen during this operation that he has to believe in something which is not right, and he falls into error, or as time elapses, into doubt. Al-Juwayni calls these two cases (al 'uqūd)², that is, wrong beliefs. The right thing or the truth is to be found in man's mind. Thus acquired knowledge is innate in men's minds as well as necessary knowledge or immediate knowledge, but it takes time to appear. That is why he calls it necessary as the immediate knowledge.³

It is to be noticed that al-Juwayni means by the word (Darūri) at the beginning "What is innate and immediately known without reasoning."⁴ He means by it at this place, "What is innate" only. This is a wider meaning because it includes both the immediate and reflective knowledge. Therefore if al-Juwayni calls the reflective knowledge once acquired (kasbi)⁴ and another time necessary (Darūri)⁵ he does not contradict himself, because

1. Irsh. p. 8. and (huwini) p. 5.

2. Burh. folio 13, 14. "عقود تتعلق بغيره على خلاف ما هو به"
(continued on p. 189 A)

3. Irsh. (Revised) 24
4. Irsh. 25-26

Continuation of footnotes on p. 139:

- 3 - Al-Baydāwī in interpreting the word (Hidāyah) in the Qur'ān finds that it has many meanings. These meanings can be classified in four categories.
- God gives (Ifādat) to the person the faculties by which he can manage in life such as: the intellect, the senses, and internal feelings.
 - He gives also the proofs which differentiate between the truth (al-Haqq) and wrong (al-Bātil), the goodness (as-Salḥ) and badness (ash-Sharr).
 - God guides also by sending the prophets and the Holy Books.
 - God guides His people also by making their hearts cognizant with fine subtilities, by revelation, inspiration or true dreams. This is what happens to prophets and the (awliyā').
- That is what Tahānawī says of al-Baydāwī's interpretation of the word (Hidāyat) in the Qur'ān (Tahānawī, vol II p.p. 1540-1541.)
- One might see easily how these four categories can be the different sources of knowledge mentioned by al-Juwaynī- the reason, the senses and the self. All that the person learns is due to these three sources, given by God. That is why al-Juwaynī calls the reflective knowledge necessary. It is innate as well as the immediate knowledge, because God gives it. The person does not bring anything more than what God gave him. When he acquires knowledge, he feels that he brings something new, but in reality he is just discovering by the faculties given by God something which God wanted him to know. This tallies well with al-Juwaynī's view about the originated power of man. Man acts freely within the limit of what God wills for him (See part III p. XII) (See Tahānawī, vol. 2, pp. 1540-1541.)

- 4 - Fish (Luciani), p. 8
- 5 - Burh: folio 15, 16.

he asserts what he means by the word (Darūri)
 each time.¹ The reflective knowledge is acquired,
 because it is the result of the originated power of
 man, as has been stated above. As acquired, it
 relies upon the immediate knowledge (Badihiyyat),
 which is known by the senses, and which is known by
 the self. This reflective knowledge is necessary,
 as it is innate and emerges from the reason ('Aql).
 The word ('Aql) here has another meaning than the
 one al-Juwayni bestows on it at the beginning of his
 doctrine and at some places in Irshad,² when he
 represents it as a source of knowledge. At this
 place it means more than an immediate knowledge.
 It seems to be the faculty which includes all kinds
 of knowledge. According to al-Juwayni, the word
'Aql might have different meanings.³

Al-Juwayni thinks that what is to be done, when
 somebody wants to acquire knowledge, is to go through
 a sort of contemplation, but he has to be very
 careful not to believe in the wrong thing, or to
 fall into doubt. Experience is necessary to make
 such discrimination between what is right and
 what is wrong.⁴ Al-Juwayni says "Knowledge never
 comes about without experience."⁵

1. He does not seem to make the sense clear later,
 when it means "self-evident." (see p. 141), but
 one can deduce this meaning from what he says.
 2. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 9
 3. Ibid. وليسنا ننكر كون العقل من الالفاظ المشتركة
المنقسمة إلى معان
 4. Ibid. folio 20
 5. Ibid. folio 16 العلم لا يحصل إلا بحالة من غير تقدير فرض
خبر فيه أولن يبلغ المرء مبلغ التحقيق في ذلك حتى يعرف
مذهبها في حقيقة النظر."

The Imām gives a criterion for recognizing the truth. It is when the problem has given the person interested in it a feeling of appeasement and confidence.¹ Then he will have no doubt. But if this never happens, it means that somebody has tried to make him doubt, and he feels that he is unable to defend his point of view. This is not doubting, it is only inattention (Dhuhūl), because the feeling of appeasement and confidence is never wrong. When this feeling is present, wrong beliefs disappear. This leads to the fact that, according to al-Juwaynī, knowledge is self-evident.

This tallies with what he asserts about reflective knowledge, which he calls necessary knowledge as has been stated above. As the reflective knowledge is necessary, which means innate,² it is self-evident as the immediate knowledge. This is what the (Darūri)³ might also mean.

This is extremely important. Al-Juwaynī wants the results of his demonstration in proving the origination of the world to be absolutely true.

1. Irsh. folio 111 ان الذي على علم حقيق يشجر في نفسه بالارتياح والشك والثقة
2. This idea of reason as necessary knowledge might be taken by al-Juwaynī from the Qur'ān
3. See p. 140, footnote 1.
4. ~~_____ (_____)~~
(_____)

There are three subjects of knowledge:

1. What is conceived by the reason alone (bi-l-
'Aql Wahdahu) such as the reality of things, the impossibility of the impossible, the possibility of the possible and the necessity of what is necessary.
2. What is conceived by "hearing" (or receiving information) (bi-as-Sam') is the happening of possible things, and their disappearance. The possibilities which are created by God, if declared by a truthful person, can be believed.
3. What is conceived by reason and "hearing" simultaneously, comes from "hearing" and does not appeal to the reason, and the reason has to ascertain its validity.¹ Theological opinions, according to al-Juwayni, come in this category. He says: 'The existence of God, His life, that He has true speech, are affirmed by hearing. But if somebody who knows this by "hearing" then reflects about the possibility of seeing God, about the creation of acts, the rules of the Power, or any other question which belongs to theology, he tries to conceive them by reason and "hearing".'²

1. Burh. folio 18,19.
2. Ibid. folio 19

Each subject has its own method. Al-Juwayni tells us that what is known by hearing happens through the director (al-Murshid), and proofs,¹ (al-Adillah as-Sam'iyyah). The director speaks truth, and his ways of appealing to mankind to accept his speech are miracles. The mind does not intervene. The Qur'ān and the prophets' traditions are proofs based on "hearing". To accept religious "hearings" man must believe that the director, who pronounces God's words, has learned such words through the speech of his soul.

As to miracles, man must believe in those through whom they have been performed.² Miracles are ^{not}unnatural, and the prophet who performs the ^{not}unnatural makes one feel deeply that he has a power within him which is not found in others, and that he has acted under the guidance of a higher power. People believe in him. Al-Juwayni says that this deep feeling, which is felt directly after the performance of miracles resembles immediate knowledge. It is a sort of intuition.³

As to what is known by reason alone, the Imām says of it that he would not enter into details as he believes it is unnecessary in his book⁴ on theology. Nevertheless his method in this kind of knowledge ~~can~~ be indicated.

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1. Burh. folio 19
 2. Ibid. folio 22
 3. Ibid. folio 23

ان وجه دلالة المعجز لا يقرب من امتحان
قرائن الاحوال بالعلوم البيهية

Al-Juwaynī distinguishes between the study of the world as a natural scientist and its study as a theological problem. Speaking about the first study, he declares that the knowledge of things is acquired by induction (al-Istiqrā'), that is, by observing nature, and by determining rules which are compatible with reality. Al-Juwaynī also points out that what cannot be conceived by the mind now, such as the nature of magnetic attraction, will be known hereafter, and that such problems require a certain aptitude of mind.

The Imām means by such declaration that there is a certain dealing between reason and nature which prepares the intelligence to go deeply into the facts of nature.¹ The only proof used by al-Juwaynī in that kind of knowledge is the transition between affirmation and negation, as has been previously stated.

The method of acquiring knowledge by reason and "hearing" is deductive. This is supported by his saying: "Everyone who attempts to grapple with a subject should know its definitions."² To acquire knowledge by reason and "hearing" (Sam'), the transition between affirmation and negation, the (Qiyās), the argument from present to absent, the unification of things by ('Illah) etc. are used.³

1. Burh. folio 21

2. Ibid. folio 2. "أن يحيط بالمقصود منه، بالمواد التي يستمد منها الفن بحقيقته وحواله، إن أمكنت عبارته سديرة على صناعة الفن، وإن عسر أن يجادل الدرر بالسير والمعتم والعرض من ذلك أن يكون الإقدام على تحليه مع قسط من العلم الخليلي."

3. See p. 138

We should bear in mind that the results obtained through the deductive¹ method should not be dependent upon facts, but should be dependent upon first principles. Al-Juwayni in the study of the origination of the world gives definitions, before beginning his studies.

If the subjects of knowledge differ in their methods, likewise they are different in their aims.

Belief in things learned by "hearing" comes from the heart and not from reason. The aim of theology is to consolidate faith in the heart. Al-Juwayni thinks that what is known by hearing, even if it is said by the truthful man, is yet open to doubt. This may lead to an uncertain knowledge. Yet it does not mean that he suspects hearsay, but his aim is to render it as what is known by the mind.² The mind, according to al-Juwayni, has its value with regard to theology. It endows this science with a degree of certainty which appeases the soul.³

1. Dr. Zaki Najib Maḥmūd: Positive Logic. Dr. Zaki calls it: al-Istinbāṭi

2. Acđ. Bāb al Sam'iyāt. p. 57

3. Ibid.

Yet *Al-Imām*'s confidence in reason with regard to theology is not absolute;¹ for he believes that the reason alone is sometimes unable to urge man to think of God, and his bounties and mercy. That must come from a religious command, for man is not always attentive.² According to the *Mu'tazilites*, there are ideas in man's head, and there is inclination more to one idea than the other. One idea, for example, is that there is a Creator who gave him life. If he knows God, and thanks Him, he deserves no punishment, and will receive his reward; but if he does not know and thank Him, he will receive punishment. Man will prefer the first idea, to escape suffering, and, if we observe what happens in his "self", we find that this happens, when he is in a state of attention. If he forgets to pay attention to these problems, he will never discover that he has to prove the existence of God by reasoning, which is a religious command. Thus *al-Juwaynī* does not deny that reason is able to find religious truth. He just points out that those who say that it is necessary to study religious beliefs forget that the thinker is not always paying attention to such problems, and that souls need an external stimulus. This stimulus

1. *Shām.* vol. 1, folio 16

2. *Irsh. fī Uṣūl al-I'tiqād.* p. 8 (*Luṭ'īnī*) p. 5.

is the religious command. Therefore the power of reason is limited, when it deals with religion.

That is why the study of religious problems, according to al-Juwayni, is always based on revelation (al-Shar').

The aim of knowledge by reason alone is to study the facts of the outer world. Al-Juwayni is very clear about that when he says that the phenomena which cannot be known now can be known later, when the proper methods will be discovered. ¹

Therefore, the world, according to al-Juwayni, is either to be studied as a subject of theology, and the method followed should be deductive, and the aim ^{is} to prove its origination, to consolidate religious beliefs; or it is to be studied for knowing the world itself.

Al-Juwayni as a theologian applying the deductive method ^{is} free to make suppositions before studying. Thus he holds more than one doctrine in proving the origination of the world. At one time he adopts the technicalities of the sunnite predecessors, called (Ahl-al-Haqq); at another he lays down other suppositions and ~~found~~ another doctrine.

The results of his suppositions are self-evident, because, according to him, knowledge is self-evident. Thus, all his sayings about the origination of the world are self-evident. This leads to prove the existence of God.

As to the fact that he was applying the deductive method, and was conscious of its value, it can be said that he did not hold some ideas at the beginning of his life from which he turned back fully later, as stated by Klopfer,¹ but he had a method, and, according to this method, he could lay down the definitions he likes, and build the systems he wishes. This leads to the fact that he might have wished to expound, ~~from~~ from the beginning of his career as a theologian, his own doctrine of the origination of the world, but his contemporaries' need of a right way to follow decided him to examine, criticise, and organise first (Ahl-al-Haqq's) opinions.²

1. See Agd. (German translation) introduction p. 25
2. See pp. 26, 27, 28.

Chapter 2

**The Origination of the World
according to Ahl-al-Haqq
as expounded by al-Juwayni**

Chapter 2The Origination of the World
according to (Ahl-al-Haqq)
as expounded by al-Juwayni

It has been stated above that al-Juwayni held two doctrines.

a) In the first he examines his predecessors' opinions, accepts what seems to him right, and rejects the others. This is the doctrine of al-Juwayni on the origination of the world according to (Ahl-al-Haqq).

b) In the second he proves the origination of the world following a new method. Therefore it can be called: The doctrine of al-Juwayni according to his own way of thinking.

Al-Juwayni, together with (Ahl-al-Haqq), bases the first doctrine on definitions. He declares this when he says: "You have to know that the study of the origination of the universe is based on first principles, technical words, and sentences, which should be explained clearly. The aim of such study cannot be comprehended, unless its method is understood." ¹

(Ahl-al-Haqq) give two definitions of the universe. The first, which is: "The world is everything that exists, except God" is given by the early Muslims (as-Salaf). The second, which

1. Lum. p. 2 x
Irsh. (Luciani) (Paris) p. 10

2. Shām. vol. 1, folio 23 "أعلموا قولي الله إرشادكم أن القول في حدوث العالم ينبغي على تقديم أمور وشرح فصول وإيضاح عبارات وإصطلاحات بين المتكلمين ولا يتوصل إلى اعتراضهم إلا بعد الوقوف على طرفتهم ومعاني كلامهم..."

is: "The world is substances and accidents."¹ is given by the later Muslims (al-Khalaf). (Ahl-al-Haqq) define also the thing (ash-Shay'), the substance (al-Jawhar), and the accident (al-'Araq).

The two definitions of the world are both accepted by al-Juwayni. He shows, as has been previously asserted,² that there is no conflict between them, for he divides existents into two parts: "Him, who has no beginning", that is, God; and those who have a beginning, and an end, the originated (al-Hādith).

This originated existent (al-Mawjūd-al-Hādith) is divided necessarily into substance and accident. The existents, which have a beginning and an end, are called by the early Muslims: "Every thing that exists, except God," and by later "substances and accidents". Al-Juwayni asserts that the world, in the eyes of both early and later Muslims, is created from nothingness. It can be said that the difference between the two definitions is due to the evolution of Islamic culture. The method of the early Muslims is the contemplation of the universe, according to what is said in the Qur'ān. The method of the later Muslim is the division of the real and concrete existent (al-Mawjūd al-'ayni) into two abstract entities: substance and accident.

1. Lum. p. 2 x

Irsh. (Luciani) p. 10 "العالم كل موجود سوى الله تعالى"
"العالم جواهر و أعراض"

2. See p. 128

Al-Juwaynī says that this division is to facilitate the realisation of the Mutakallimīn's aim. This aim is to prove the origination of the universe, as has been previously said, when his views on knowledge were mentioned. The division of real existents into substances and accidents is just a supposition, which leads to what the Mutakallimīn wanted to prove.

Al-Juwaynī speaks about each of the three terms: the thing, the substance, and the accident.

The thing, according to al-Juwaynī's definition, is "what exists".¹ He says: "Everything is an existent, and every existent is a thing; what cannot be a thing, cannot be in existence, and what cannot be in existence, cannot be a thing."² This is one of the definitions of (Ahl-al-Haqq), as al-Juwaynī himself declares.

1. Shām. folio 23. "كل شيء موجود، وكل موجود شيء، وما لا يوصف بكونه شيئاً، لا يوصف بالوجود، وما لا يوصف بالوجود لا يوصف بكونه شيئاً."

2. Ibid.

One of (Ahl-al-Haqq), al-Bāqillānī, gives, in his book, at-Tamhid,¹ the same definition, "Every **existent** is a thing, and every thing is an existent."

Al-Juwaynī shows that this definition means that only the existent is a thing, and not the non-existent, because non-existence in his doctrine means absolute nothingness. A thing exists after it has been nothing, that is, from nothingness.

Thus al-Juwaynī proves the power of God, who creates things from nothingness. According to al-Juwaynī, God is powerful. His power is not hidden.² It appears in the act of creating things from nothingness. If things were things in nothingness - he means if they were existent in nothingness - what would the effect of God's power be? Things should be defined only as existents, to show and prove the power of God in all His magnificence; because if the thing is defined as "the comprehensible"/^{or object of knowledge.} (al-Ma'lūm), then, since the comprehensible can be non-existent, so the thing can be in nothingness. Thus the effect of the power of God will be just to bring the existents from one state to another, and not to create the things from nothingness.

1. Tam. p. 40, Cairo. ~~and~~
 2. Shāh. vol. 1, folio 24, 25.

In other words, if the thing, according to the definition of the Mu'tazalites, is the "comprehensible", it will not prove the existence of God's power of creation, for the comprehensible may exist or not exist, and thus the thing becomes existent or non-existent. If the thing is non-existent, where is the tangible proof of the creative power of God?

Al-Juwayni gives some contrary ideas resulting from the definition of the thing as the "comprehensible". He mentions two examples:¹

The first one is: "God has no partner," and the second is: "Contraries are never combined."

If the thing is the comprehensible, the first statement, "God has no partner" will be not an immutable truth but a contingent thing, which is blasphemy. The second statement, "Contraries are never combined", will also be a thing, which is nonsense.

Some thinkers, commenting on these two statements, say that this kind of knowledge might be considered as having no (Ma'lūm). Al-Juwayni rejects such nonsense, because according to him, if there is a knowledge without something known (Ma'lūm), there will be a Will and a Power, without result, which is not acceptable. Thus knowledge

1. Shām. vol. I, folio 25, 26.

must entail something known.

It should be noticed that al-Juwayni means by a thing, the originated existent; created, and not the Creator; because if not, he would also fall into non-sense, and God would mean a thing.

Thus, according to al-Juwayni¹ and all the Ash'arites, a thing exists after it has been nothing. Its existence is in the concrete. They differ completely in this point from the philosophers who speak about an eternal matter, previous to existence. According to them, the world is eternal. The Ash'arites differ also from the Mu'tazilites, as has been said.²

Al-Juwayni gives some linguistic arguments in answer to the Mu'tazilites. He says names are given after an intellectual effort (Ta'aqqul al-Maqsūd), or by taking them from others, who have already given a sense to them (Naql). Names are determined by agreement (Istilah), or by ^{establishing} arbitrary ^{a correspondance} choice (Tawfiq), if the word has already a sense.³

The author has only to combine the different meanings derived from diverse uses of the word. Naming may be either literal or metaphorical. If it is literal (Tasmiyah Haqiqiyyah), one has to prove

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 25, 26.

2. See p.p. 123-125

3. Shām. vol. 1, folio 32.

not to indicate a kind of thing, or a thing which does not now exist but will exist,¹ but to name a ^{existent} ~~existent~~ thing. Al-Juwayni refutes his opponents' opinions about (Ash-Shay') by discussing two verses from the Qur'ān. The first one is cited by the Mu'tazilites, to prove that they were right in calling the non-existent a thing, the word (Ash-Shay') being applicable in the Qur'ānic verse they give, to the earthquake, which has not yet happened. "Verily the Quake ^{of the} Hour is a mighty thing."²

Al-Juwayni replies that the word "thing" in this verse is applied to the movement which is noticed in the act of quaking or trembling, and not to things which will exist one day. If the world, for the Mu'tazilites, were only movement, and not composed of real existents, the Quranic verse cited by them would be the right one to prove what they are trying to assert. But, according to their doctrine, the world is not equal to movement,³ but is composed of things having an external existence. Therefore, they are wrong in attempting to support their view by this Quranic verse. Al-Juwayni then cites another verse: "I have created thee formerly, when thou wert nothing."⁴ to prove that, in the Qur'ān, the word

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 33

2. Sūrat 22, from Syat. 1

Q. XXii / 1

"ان زلزلة الساعة لشئ عظيم"

3. Shām. vol. 1, folio 33

4. Sūrat 19, Syat. 9 (or 10, Be 11)

Q. XIX / 9/10 (Fligil) "وقد خلقناك من قبل ولم تكن شيئا"

(Shay') is only applied to what exists. If the existent is not created yet, it is used in the negative case, as it is in this verse. So al-Juwayni with (Ahl-al-Haqq), uses the word in its ordinary meaning.

Al-Juwayni and the Ash'arites consider that the non-existent² is known, because they know that it does not exist. This means that the non-existent is only an idea. Al-Juwayni explains the non-existent in relation to the existent. In this he seems to agree with Ibn Sinā', when he says: "Existence is more known than non-existence, because the existent is known by itself, and the non-existent is known by some aspect of the existent."²

Al-Juwayni gives some examples to explain what he means by knowing the non-existent. He says that if somebody knows that he has no dress (Thawb), his knowledge is sure. What is in his mind could not be an idea of having a dress, but the idea of having no dress.³ Al-Juwayni also says to his opponents: "Do you believe that God knew eternally that the universe is going to be? If you say no, you are pagans; if not, then you recognize that God knew the existence of the universe, before it came into being.

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 34.

2. Ibn Sinā': Ash-Shifā': Maqālat I, Ch. V, p. 298

3. Shām. vol. I, folio 35. إذا علم الفرد أنه ليس معه ثوب، فعملية ثابتة لا تستلزم إلى إنكاره، ثم لا بد للعالم من معلوم، ولا يستحيل أن يكون معلوم علم الفرد ثبوت الثوب، فهو يوضح بين علمه بكون الثوب معه وبين علمه بأنه ليس معه.

He knew it in its possibility when it was a non-existent." ¹

Here al-Juwayni and (Ahl-al-Haqq), in disagreement with the Sūfis, do not believe in any ^{causal.} relation between the eternal knowledge of God that the universe is going to be existent, and the existence of the concrete universe. He says that the possibility of existence is not existence, ² and that the object of knowledge is non-existent.

Substance was defined by several men of (Ahl-al-Haqq). Al-Juwayni discusses three of their definitions.

The first: "Substance is that which accepts the accident." ³ Al-Juwayni refutes this, because it defines substance by one of its characteristics. ⁴

The second: "Substance is everything that occupies space, or has location." ⁵ Al-Juwayni does not refute this. He just replies to those who thought that occupying a place (at-Tabayyuz) is unintelligible.

According to him, it is intelligible. ⁶ The third definition: "Substance is every (Jirm) ⁷ is accepted by al-Juwayni as being the best. It does not differ from the second definition, but it is clearer. In Irshād, he just states that "the substance is what has a location (Mutabayyiz).

1. Shām. "أنتقولون أن الرب تعالى علم في أزله أن العالم سيجرد أم ثابتون ذلك؟ فإن أئولا كلهموا، ولا يابوندها وآجا اعترفوا به، قبل تجاوز الوجود ليس بوجود، فقد اثبت المعلوم غير موجود."
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. vol. I, folio 37 "الجوهرا ما يقبل العرض".
In Lum, he just gives the different definitions of the substance without discussing any of them. (Lum. p. 2 x and footnote no. 1,1.
(Footnotes continued on p. 157A)

Continuation of Footnotes on p. 157:4. Shām. vol. I, folio 38.5. Ibid.Irsh. p. 10

"ما يشعل الخيز أو المتخيز"

6. Shām.7. Ibid.Irsh. p. 10

"الجواهر كالجرم"

In general, (Jirm) means body (See Lane's Book, Part II, p. 413.) But al-Juwayni does not really mean by it "body". According to him, the substance is different from the body (al-Jirm), the latter being defined by him as "the combined" (al-Mu'talif). The term (Jirm) used by al-Juwayni in this definition is equivalent to "every thing that occupies space or has location" which is something mental, as will be shown later. Therefore it cannot be a "body". Yet al-Juwayni does not use the term (Jirm) in a new and completely different way from its meaning in language. Lane mentions a meaning for this term, which is: "It has no colour" "لا جرم لها". (See Lane's Book I, Part II, p. 413.) This meaning is very near the one intended by al-Juwayni in his definition of the substance. "What has no colour" cannot be seen, therefore it is mental.

Al-Juwayni mentions eight qualities of substance. He divides these qualities into "essential, or individual qualities" (As-Sifāt-an-Nafsiyyah), and "abstract or relational qualities" (As-Sifāt al-Ma'nawiyah).

By "essential qualities", al-Juwayni means those without which substance cannot be conceived. He defines them as being necessary to the substance for its existence. They have no cause ('illah) to be in the substance. They constitute its self.¹

The "relational qualities" differ from the "essential" ones. They do not constitute the self of the substance. They are in it by cause ('illah), which is a (Ma'nā).²

The "essential qualities" are: "The occupation of space" and "the acceptance of accidents."³

As these two qualities are essential, they are necessary. Al-Juwayni believes that anything that occupies space is a substance, and the occupation of the space is the space itself. To understand this, it should be borne in mind what he means by

1. Irsh. p. 30 and (Lu'atī) p. 17 "كل صفة إثبات لازمة ما بقيت النفس غير معلة يعقل قائمة بالموصوف"

2. It is to be noticed that some Mutakallimin call (as-Sifāt al-Nafsiyyah) (as-Sifāt ath-Thubūtiyyah). This is to distinguish them from (as-sifat as-Salbiyyah). Al-Ījī defined these qualities as being those which point out the essence (تدل على الذات) without additional meanings, and the (صفات مضموية) as being those which point out an additional meaning to the essence. See al-Ījī-al Mawāqif, Cairo, 1907, vol. 5, al Mawqif ath-thālith - the introduction.

(Footnote continued on p- 158A)

Continuation of Footnote 2 on p. 158:

It is to be noticed also that al-Ījī considers (Aṣ-Ṣifāt al-Ma'nawīyah) as being the location (محل). This is contrary to al-Juwaynī's principles. See al-Ījī, the same book, p. 2. Some Ash'arites define the (الصفات النفسية) as being what cannot be separated from the essence, and (المحرفية) as being its contrary. Al-Jurjānī says that the latter divided the (Ṣifāt Ma'nawīyah) into "caused" (معللة) such as (العلمية والفكرية) and "non-caused", such as the knowledge (العلم) and the power (القدرة). Then he says those who deny the (أحوال) deny (الصفات المعللة). He finds that being powerful means having the power. Al-Ījī mentions that according to Mu'tazilites (الصفة النفسية) is divided into four divisions (الصفة الذاتية الموروثة) (الصفة الحاصلة بالتأخر) (الصفة الحاصلة بالتأخر) (الصفة الحاصلة بالتأخر).

3. It is to be noticed that these two kinds of qualities, (aṣ-Ṣifāt an-Naṣiqiyah) and (aṣ-Ṣifāt al-Ma'nawīyah) are what is also called by al-Juwaynī (al-Aḥwāl). According to him (al-Aḥwāl) are of two kinds: those which have a ('Illah) and those which have no ('Illah) (See: Jush. (Luciani) p. 44). He asserts that the theologian must accept the idea of (Aḥwāl). He says:

"ولا يستغنى خائض في هذا الفن (بغير الكلام) عن
التعرض للأحوال إما بتسويتها أحوالاً أو وجوهاً
أو صفات نفس (See Jush. (Luciani) p. 48)"

"essential qualities". Relying on this meaning, space cannot be conceived without that which occupies space, and that which occupies space cannot possibly be conceived without space.

The acceptance of accidents, which is the second essential quality, means that substance cannot be conceived without accidents. This leads to the question: Is it possible for the substance and the accident to exist alone, or not?

It is really difficult to answer this question, since al-Juwayni has mentioned the acceptance of accidents as an essential quality of substance.

But there are two kinds of existence: real existence, in external reality, and mental existence.

Which kind of existence does al-Juwayni bestow on substance and accident, when they are separated, and which kind, when linked together?

To answer this question, the remaining qualities of substance, mentioned by al-Juwayni, must be studied. These qualities are not "essential". They are what he calls "relational" (Sifāt Ma'nawiyah.).

1. One of these qualities is "substance is different from accident." This quality is conceived by the mind, after the division of the existent,

by al-Juwayni, into substance and accident. According to him, only the substance occupies a place, and never the accident. That is why he refutes one of the Mu'tazilites' definitions, which is: "Substance is a collection of accidents" because, if substance is the result of a group of accidents, and nothing else, this means that every accident occupies a place, which is contrary to his principles.

Al-Juwayni tries always to remind his opponents of the definitions given by them as the basis of their doctrines, the method applied being the deductive method.¹

To show how substance is different from the accident, he says that, if life comes to the substance, the substance becomes alive and feels pain, joy, and other feelings. These accidents, which were not in the substance, did not require a place in the substance.² Thus they do not occupy a place, and are different from the substance.

2. The second is that substance is indivisible (al-Jawhar fard). That is the atom. These atoms have no beginning, no middle, and no end.³ According to mathematicians, this is the geometric point.⁴

1. See p. p. 143-145
 2. Shām, vol. 1, folio 43
 3. Ibid. folio 38
 4. Ibid.

Philosophers and some theologians who followed philosophers such as an-Naẓẓām, denied the existence of atoms.

To confirm this quality al-Juwayni gives an example in which he makes an insect, "the ant", move from one place to another. If the space in which it moves is divided into infinitesimal parts, it cannot go further.¹ He thinks, like those who preceded him, and who believed in the existence of atoms, that, if the ant is advancing on its way, the space must be divided into a finite number of parts. Al-Juwayni asserts that the ant's movement implies the finite division of space because whatever is not finite cannot be conceived as being completed.²

Al-Juwayni denies the infinite division of bodies into atoms. He finds that completion is a natural phenomenon, which occurs and is a natural characteristic of existents. All thing existing come to completion, and none of them can be conceived as divisible into an infinite number of atoms. For him, it is absolutely impossible for infinite bodies to be completed.³ Thus, he concludes that bodies

1. Shām. folio 39 قال: "إذا نظر الناظر إلى جسر بسيط وعلماً أحد طرفيه، ثم صور نحوه فبتبع الدبيب من أحد طرفي الجسر ولا تزال كذلك حتى تنتهي إلى الطرف الآخر، فبتدأ نستيقنا أنها قطعت الجسر وخلقت أجزاء البسيط، فلو كانت أجزاء غير متناهية لما تصور الفراغ من قطعه وتخلقه..."

2. Shām. vol. 1, folio 39 "ما استحال عليه وصف الانتهاء، لم يعقل فيه الا انقضاء."

3. Ibid. "إن ما لا يتناهى يستحيل عليه الانقضاء من كل وجه، وليس لا انقضاء وجه في الجواز، ووجه في الاستحالة..."

must be divided into a finite number of atoms.

Al-Juwaynī asserts the necessity of a contact (at-Tamās) or parallelism (al-Muhādḥah), between the mover and the space. He also asserts that all this must be completed during a certain lapse of time. Accordingly, he rejects the idea of leaping (aṭ-Tafrah),¹ which is suggested by An-Naẓẓām.

To refute the (Tafrah), al-Juwaynī asks: "What is accomplished by leaping; is it finite or infinite?"

If it is finite, that is what he wants to prove, i.e. that it is not infinitely divisible. If it is infinite, and if the mover traverses the distance by leaping, that leads to the same conclusion, namely, the completion of the traversing of what is infinite. According to al-Juwaynī, this completion shows that there is no infinite divisibility.

He then explains by some examples the idea that a relation is necessary between the mover and space. He says: "Supposing, that the mover just leaps in its path."² As it goes from one end to another, so there is always a sort of relation between the ant and its path, and there is no real hiatus or gap. This is what al-Juwaynī wants to prove.³

1. Shām, vol. 1, folio 39.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. folio 40

"بعضها في سيره"

He rejects the idea of leaping from the point of view of space. He also rejects it from the point of view of time. He says: Suppose that there is a deep well,¹ and there is a wooden plank across it, with two ropes, one of which goes to the bottom, through the water which is only half-way up, and the other goes half-way down the well, to the water's surface. There is a bucket at the end of the long one, and ^{a hook} ~~hook~~ at the end of the short one. If both ropes are pulled up, the bucket and the ^{hook} ~~hook~~ might arrive at the same time at the top of the well. This could mean that the end with the bucket has leaped, but that is not so, it only means that it has been quicker than the other. Therefore, according to al-Juwaynī, movements should always happen in space and time, and (al-Indiā') means that there is no completion without finitude, i.e. a limit to divisibility.

Al-Juwaynī gives another example; the one of the mill-stone (ar-Rahā)² which turns. The points near the centre turn more slowly than those on the circumference. The latter must be faster, because

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 40.
2. Ibid. folio 41.

they have to traverse, in the same lapse of time, a bigger circle than the ones near the centre. They only move faster and never leap.¹

After refuting the idea of "leaping", al-Juwaynī tries to affirm the existence of atoms by examples taken from practical life. He says that the difference between two bodies in size is not due to the difference of size of particles but to their number. If two unequal bodies are divided into equal parts (which cannot, in this example, be atoms, because atoms are not found in the natural world but are geometric points),² the difference between the unequal bodies is due to the number of parts and not to their size.

As has been previously stated, al-Juwaynī, in drawing examples from practical life, does not believe that the atom is actually found in the real world. The examples he gives are to simplify the understanding of his doctrine.

1. Shān. vol. 1, folio 41

2. Ibid. folio 53

It is important to notice that, according to al-Juwaynī, atoms are in the mind, and not in external reality. Most of the Mutakallimīn divide the ~~body~~ (al-Jism) into a finite number of real particles. An-Nazzām speaks of the infinite division which ends in real particles. Philosophers assert an infinite division which ends in unreal particles. Al-Juwaynī agrees with Ash-Shahristānī that the particles do not exist as real objects, but they are finite in number.¹

3. Another quality of substance is that all substances are of the same genus (aj-Jawāhir, Mutajānisah), or are similar.

According to him (Tajāmus) means similarity (Tamāthul). He explains what he means by similarity. He says that it is possible for two similars to be different from one another in one quality and for two dissimilars to have a common quality, provided it is not an "essential quality" in both cases.²

In this way similarity lies in the resemblance in essential qualities.³ In the case of substances the similarity, as has been previously said, lies in two essential qualities,⁴ location in space (Tahayyuz)

1. al-Ījī: al-Mawāqif. Cairo, 1907. al-Mawqif ar-Rābi', al-Maqṣid al-Thalīth, "the body".

2. Irshād (Luciani), p. 21

3. Ibid. p. 36 (Luciani) p. 2.

4. See p. 158

and the acceptance of accidents (Qubūl-‘Arād).

Some theologians ¹ who do not accept the similarity, as an essential quality, of substances notice that the Ash‘arites and most of the Mu‘tazilites who assert that all substances are similar have to introduce accidents in the structure of things to explain the differences between things. In other words, they say that they have to assert the acceptance of accidents as an essential quality of substance, and to affirm the impossibility of separating of substance from accident. Accident makes the differences noticed in existents, for only accident and not substances are visible.

4. A further quality, is that the substance has no form or shape (Shakl).

Al-Juwaynī criticises the views of those who are inherently contradictory in ^{first} saying that substance has no shape, and then considering it as similar to a quadrilateral or circle or any such form. Al-Juwaynī says that "If it has been stated that substance has no form, it is nonsense to consider it as being like a form; what resembles a form is a form. That is the reality of likeness."² He thinks that this is possibly rather

1. al-Ijī: al-Mawaqil: vol. 5.

2. Shām, vol. 1, folio 51.

Irsn. (Luciani) pp. 20, 21. ^{يبيّن تعليل التماثل في}
الصفات بالاشتراك في الأخص.

difficult for ignorant people who try to conceive (Taşawwur), the essence of substance. Only material forms can be conceived.¹ Therefore it can now be asserted that substance, having such characteristics, cannot be found in external actuality.

5. Another quality given by al-Juwayni is that substance undergoes no change,² (al-Jawhar Bāqir Ghayru Mutamadid).

From this quality, al-Juwayni wants to show that there is something unchangeable in individuals. This quality of being unchangeable or invariable does not mean a material invariability, but something conceived by the mind. Al-Juwayni wants to make substance stable and accidents unstable. This quality brings to mind what is said by the modern philosophers about the "Ego"; namely, that each person has the same attributes as others, yet differs from others, because he is not the result of these attributes. There is the "him", the individual man, the "I" felt by the everybody.

Al-Juwayni and the Ash'arites mean by the "ego" the affirmation of a religious aim, which is the existence of individuals in the Day of Judgment, to receive reward or punishment.

1. Shām, vol. 1, folio 337 إنما صحب هذا السؤال على الجملة من حيث حاولوا تصوير الجوهر الفرد في صيغتهم، ورتبوا على تصورات لا تصوير الاتصال به، وليس يتصور في جوهر النفس أو فكر القلوب إلا الأجسام وكيف يطمع في تصوير فرع ليس يتصور أصله.

2. Ibid. folio 51. 52.

The problem of the stability of the substance or atom is very important in Islām. The Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites discuss it. Ibn-Sinā' speaks about it with his disciple Bahmani¹. Ibn Maymūn mentions it in Dalālat al-Hā'irin.² Nuṣir ad-Dīn at-Ṭusi and Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Diwānī³ studied it too.

6. The last quality al-Juwāynī mentions is that substances cannot penetrate one another.⁴ (Al-Jawāhir Lā Tatadākhal), although they can be beside one another.

If substances were interpenetrable, they would enter into a small space. In this way, the world would emerge from a small space, without God's interference, interpenetrability being a quality of substances. According to al-Juwāynī, as will be stated later, every existent, every event in the world, every change is due to God's will.⁵

Further, the interpenetrability of substances leads to the interpenetrability of accidents, with the result that one accident is to be found in more than one substance. This is contrary to the qualities of accidents.⁶

1. Kitāb al-Mahrajān adh-Dhahabī Li Ibn Sinā', Dr. Maḥmūd al-Khuḍrī's article, p. 55. See also: Dr. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī: Aristū 'Inda al-'Arab, p. 153.
2. Ibn Maymūn, Dalālat al-Hā'irin, Munk's tr., v. I, pp. 419-440.
3. Nuṣir ad-Dīn at-Ṭusi: Sharḥ 'alā Tajrīd al-Kalām Tibriza, 1501 A.H., p. 68 with original notes by Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Diwānī.
4. Shām, vol. 1, folio 52. الجواهر لا تتداخل.
5. See p. 186.
6. Shām, vol. I, folio 52.

Al-Juwayni asks: If the substances are penetrable, which one will penetrate, and which one will be penetrated, substances being spaces? How will they be one into another? How will the accidents, which are contrary, be together, like black and white, for example? Thus al-Juwayni rejects the idea of interpenetrability of substances.

These are the qualities of the substance as given by al-Juwayni. It can be concluded that substance has not real existence. Thus it is a thought, of which it can be said that it is the occupation of space, or space itself. But al-Juwayni, by the second essential quality, which is the substances' acceptance of the accidents, gives to substance a real existence. It is not strange that substance seems to have two existences, an intellectual, unreal one, and a real one according to its state, separated from the accident or linked to it. But according to al-Juwayni's doctrine, it is only a supposition, an idea, it can never exist in reality by itself.

The accident (al 'Arād) is defined by al-Juwayni. First of all, he gives the ordinary

definitions as being variable.¹ He mentions two verses from the Qur'ān to confirm the definitions of accident as being the variable.

The first is "Ye intend the chance gains of this world"² (Turidūn 'Araḍ ad-Dunyā). The second is: "They said: this is a cloud ('Ariḍ) which is going to give us rain."³

In the first verse "the chance gains are accidents ('Araḍ ad-Dunyā). In the second, the word ('Ariḍ) means the cloud, which has passed off the light of the sun.

For the specialised sense of the word, al-Juwaynī gives some of the Mutakallimīn's definitions, such as "The accident is that which is not stable."⁴ This definition is near to the ordinary one, and has the same meaning mentioned in the Qur'ān. The Ash'arites also say that the accident is that which does not stay more than one instant of time. Other Mutakallimīn define it as being "that which subsists in other than itself."⁵

Al-Juwaynī says that this is the definition of the philosophers. He prefers the one he gives, which is:

1. Shām, vol. 1, folio 52 ما يعرض ولا يدوم مكثداً
 2. Surat 8 - Ayat 67 Q.VIII/67/68 "تريدون عرض الدنيا"
 3. Surat 46 - Ayat 24 Q.XLVI/24/23 "قالوا: هذا عارض ممطرنا"
 4. Shām, vol. 1, folio 57 "بالا يبقى وجوداً"
 5. Ibid. "الذي يقوم بغيره."
- In Sum. some other definitions of the accident are mentioned without any discussion. See p. 3 x and footnote 1, 1

"The accident is a happening which has no position and is to be found in the space of a substance." ¹ This definition affirms clearly the difference between substance and accident."

In his book Al-Irshād, he just defines the accident as being "What is relational in the substance." ² This definition does not differ from the other one given by him. It just seems to summarize what has been detailed in the first: the (Ma'nā) mentioned in the short definition is "the happening which has no space" (al-Ḥādith alladhī Lā Hayyiza Lahu) and (al-Qā'im bi-l-Jawhar) is equal to (Wa Ṣawjad bi Dhāt Mutahayizah.)

It is to be noticed that al-Ījī in his book, Al-Mawāqif, ³ preferred the definition of al-Juwaynī. He says: "It is the best, because there is no negation, no annulment in it." He means that the definition of accident as "What is a quality of another thing" is not good, because some qualities are negative, and some others are of God. It is not good also, because it does not define the accident as one of the two divisions of the real existent. Al-Ījī also agrees with al-Juwaynī about the opinions of the Mu'tazilites on the accident, which is, according to them, to be found in nothingness.⁴ This

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1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 72
"هو الحادث الذي لا حيز له، ويوجد بحيز ذات متخيزة"
 2. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 10 "العرض حمول المعنى القائم بالجوهر"
 3. al-Ījī: al-Mawāqif. vol. 2, al-Mawqif al-awwal- fī al-'Arād p. 6.
 4. Ibid. p. 7.

is completely contrary to the Ash'arites' doctrine.

I. Al-Juwaynī attempts to prove the existence of the accident in three ways: the first based on intellectual principles, the second on the power of the senses, and the third on internal feelings. In each way, he tries to point out what is changeable in existents.

a) As to the first one, al-Juwaynī asserts that substance can be conceived in other directions (Jihāt) than it is. So he asserts the possibility of the substance to be anywhere. He then asks: "What is the reason for such a change?" He calls the reason (al-Muqtadī) or (al-Wājib) which produces such change to the substance.¹ Is it the substance itself, he means its essence, which produces that, or some abstract property (ma'nā) over and above the essence?

Al-Juwaynī rejects the first supposition, because it is impossible for substance itself to produce such change, according to its qualities. Thus the (Muqtadī) should be other than the substance. It is the accident.

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 61, 62.
Irsh. (Luciani) pp. 10, 11.
Lum. p. 4 x and footnote 2,2,

b) The second way to prove the existence of the accident is based on sense perception.

Al-Juwaynī asserts that many accidents are perceived by the senses.¹ This knowledge is necessary. It does not need any arguments. Al-Juwaynī has already stated that knowledge supplied by sense perception is necessary or immediate knowledge, which comes without any need for reflection.²

This knowledge is such as colours, tastes and other feelings of sense.³ These sense perceptions are not stable. Therefore they are different from substance which is stable. Thus accidents exist.

Al-Juwaynī proves also the existence of accidents by internal feelings⁴ as a sort of personal experience. He speaks of the internal feelings of pleasure, followed by a feeling of pain. The succession of such feelings proves the existence of something other than the "I" which is substance. Thus the accidents exist.

Al-Juwaynī, by the study of substance, then of accident, introduces us into his principles, by which he proves the origination of the universe.

1. See p. 134

2. Shām. vol. 1, folio 67.

من أهم ما يتعلق الإحاطة به أن يحل أن ضروريا من الاعراض
تثبت ذواتها إما نظرا ومحاولة الإدلة على إثباتها جرد عن التحقيق

3. Ibid, folio 18

4. Ibid.

It has already been pointed out that he first divides real existents into substances and accidents, defines substance, and studies it. Then he defines the accident and proves its existence.

Proving the existence of the accident is the first principle (al-Aṣl-al-Awwal) in the doctrine on the origination of the world.

Some accidents are called by al-Juwaynī "external relations" or states (akwān).¹ They assign a special position to the substance.² These accidents are: Movement (Ḥarakah), rest (Sukūn), assembly (Ijtimāʿ), separation (Iftirāq), and touch (mumāssah).³

Al-Juwaynī explains that the external relation (al-Kawn), is verbal noun of (kān) (Yakūn) which means "to be". He says that the Arabs used to say: (Zayd Kān) was in the house,⁴ to affirm that he was in that place. When he says "He was (kān) with him" this is to affirm that

1. The problem of "external relations" (Akwān) with the problem of "colours" (alwān) are of great importance too, for the theologians preceding al-Juwaynī (See McCarthy, Theology of al-Ashʿarī, pp. xxix, 120.

Taftāzānī. tp. Elder, 33; Baqillānī, Tamhīd (ed. McCarthy), 9¹⁶.

2. فألا يكون هو ما أوجب تخصصه الموحى بمكان أو تقدير مكان

Shām. vol. 1, folio 280

Irsh. (Luciani) p. 10

In Lum. he does not mention any definition for (al-kawn) see p. 3 x

3. Shām. vol. 1, folio 281

Irsh. (Luciani) p. 10

4. Shām. vol. 1, folio 281

he was in the place indicated. If they say that he was not, this means that they deny that he was there, but do not deny his existence.¹

Al-Juwaynī , by this linguistic argument, justifies the term (Kawn) which was used by the Arabs to assign a place to somebody. He uses it in its ordinary meaning, his technical definition of "external relation" being "What assigns a special position to substance."

Al-Juwaynī agrees with some of the Mutakallimīn² about the qualities of accidents. They cannot be located. They are always found in substances, and do not remain for more than one instant of time. They are always changing, and one accident cannot be in two substances. Opposite accidents are not to be found in one space, that is, one substance. Accidents occupy times, as has been mentioned in discussing substance. It is impossible that two accidents exist at the same time. This means that each action has its time. Al-Juwaynī explains this by supposing a substance moving from one direction to another. It moves continuously, without stopping. According to al-Juwaynī, it cannot be accepted that the substance traverses a distance without touching every part of it, or being parallel to it. The accomplishment of the movement cannot happen in no time. It is

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 281

2. al-Ijī: al-Mawāqif. vol. 5, Maqāsid 5,6,7,8.

impossible also that two movements happen in one instant of time. If this can happen, the substance can jump from east to west in nontime. This leads to the idea of leaping rejected by al-Juwaynī.¹

Al-Juwaynī considers that the existence of the accident is the first basis ^(al-Asl. l-awwal) for the doctrine of the origination of the world.

II. The second basis ^(al-Asl. al-thānī.) is the origination of accidents. To confirm this, al-Juwaynī, with (Ahl-al-Haqq)² depends on three points.

a) The impossibility of the non-existence of the ^(al-Qadīm) eternal, because if it did not exist, it would not have been eternal.

b) The impossibility of the existence of the accident by itself.

c) The impossibility of the existence of an accident through another accident.³

Al-Juwaynī gives an example. He says "If it is possible to conceive a substance at rest, then to conceive it in movement, this movement is new (Tār'ah) and the rest has disappeared." Thus rest

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 287

2. See p. 123

3. Shām. vol. 1, folio 71
Irsh. p. 20 (Luciani) p. 12.
Lum. p. 5x see footnote 1,1.

is not eternal. Before going further, he answers those who explain the succession from movement to rest by affirming the idea of latency (kumūn). They assert that accidents are not new (Fari'ah). They were latent. The movement, for example, was latent in the substance. Then it appears, and the rest becomes latent.

According to al-Juwaynī, this is impossible, because the rest, and the movement are two contrary accidents. They cannot be at the same time in one substance. If rest and movement were in the substance and then appeared, this means that movement has an accident, which is appearance, and this is contrary to the qualities of accidents.

a) As to the three points on which the second principle is based, al-Juwaynī, commenting on the first point, says that the eternal never disappears, and that this is immediate knowledge. Supposing that the Eternal was nothingness, who can then bring Him into existence?

Nothingness is absolute non-existence.¹ It is also immediately known, that the Eternal can take away nothingness.²

1. Shām. vol. 1, folio 24
Irsh.p. 21 (Luciani) 12
2. Shām. vol. 1, folio 25
Irsh.p. 22, (Luciani) pp. 12, 13.

If the eternal disappears, this means that one of the conditions (Shurūṭ) of its existence has disappeared, and this leads to nothingness, which is absolute non-existence, and for which there can be no Creator. Thus it is impossible for the Eternal to be in nothingness.

b) As to the second point, which is the impossibility of the existence of the accident by itself, al-Juwaynī says that the accident needs a place, because it does not exist by itself, but exists in another existent. It produces in ~~this~~ existent the change noticed in it. It never stays more than one instant in the substance. It is not transferred from one substance to another. It is the movement itself, because if it is said that it is transferred, it will need another accident to move it, and it becomes a place for the new accident, which is not acceptable, each place being substance. Thus the accident is never a place. It can never exist by itself.

c) The third point¹ is the impossibility of the existence of an accident through another accident. Al-Juwaynī already mentions that if an accident

1. Irsh. p. 22 (Luciani) p. 13
Shām. vol. 1, folio 87
Lum. p. 5 x

exists in another accident, the latter becomes a substance, because the acceptance of accidents is an essential quality of the substance (Ṣifah Nafsiyyah).

Now if these three points are affirmed, this helps to determine that what is not eternal is originated.

III. The third basis or principle (al-Aṣl-ath - Thālith) of al-Juwaynī's doctrine of the origination of the world is the impossibility of separating substance and accident from one another.¹

This principle is to be deduced from the essential quality given by al-Juwaynī to substance, which is its acceptance of the accidents. It has been previously stated that this quality gives a real and concrete existence to substance. It is impossible for substance, without this quality, to be found in the external world, in other words, to be perceived. The third principle affirms this quality. Accidents are in substance. Each of them does not exist more than one moment and never exists with its contrary.

IV. The fourth principle (al-Aṣl-ar-Rābi') is the impossibility of a chain of events without a beginning,² because the existents have a beginning.

1. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 13,14.
Lum. p. 5 x see footnote 2,2.
2. Irsh. p. 23 (Luciani) 14,15.
Shām. vol. 1, folio 97
Lum. p. 6 x see footnote 1,1.

Al-Juwaynī says that, if anyone believes that there are events without a beginning, as being in continuous creation, since eternity, such as the movements in the firmament, each of these movements has a completion. So each has an end. If each has an end, the next must have a beginning. Thus there are no events without a beginning.

Al-Juwaynī, by dividing the real existent into substance and accident, and by giving the four principles or bases to his doctrine on the origination of the universe, presents to us two parts of the real existent; one is stable, ~~and permanent~~; the other does not last more than one moment. But as the separation of these two parts is impossible, if one part is originated, the other should also be so, and existents or things are not eternal. They are originated.¹

In this way, al-Juwaynī proves the origination of the world according to the opinions of (Ahl-al-Haqq).

1. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 15
Lum. p. 4 x

Chapter 3

The Origination of the World

according to

al-Juwaynī's own view

Chapter 3.

The Origination of the World
according to
Al-Juwaynī's own view

In this doctrine, al-Juwaynī defines the universe (al-'ālam) as being "everything that exists besides God."¹ This definition has been given by early Muslims (as-Salāf) as already mentioned.

It is known that according to al-Juwaynī existents are of two sorts: God and the universe. In this doctrine he does not divide the existent into substances and accidents. According to his views in this second doctrine, the universe is composed of finite bodies, with various forms, having accidents which are distinguishing characteristics, such as colours, shape and other qualities.²

This is a realistic definition contrary³ to

1. Agd. p. 13 "هو كل موجود سوى الله تعالى"

This definition is given also by al-Juwaynī in his other works:

Shām. vol. 1, folio

Irsh. p.

Lum. p.

Of the early Muslim (as-Salāf) see p.

2. Agd. p. 14

العالم أحسام مجردة متناهية المنقطعات وأعراس
 قائمة بها كالوانها وهيئتها في تركيباتها وسماتها
 صفاتها.

3. If al-Juwaynī gives views in his work Agd. which are different from the ones given by him in his other works, this does not mean that he denies the latter or turns fully on many questions, as has been stated by Klopfer. (See Agd. German translation), p. 25. See also ~~German translation~~ instruction, p.p. 117-120

that given by him and (Ahl-al-Haqq) in the first¹ doctrine, which has been entitled "The origination of the world according to (Ahl-al-Haqq) as expounded by al-Juwayni."

The word accident used by him in this second doctrine does not have a special technical sense, as in the first one. He uses it here in its ordinary meaning of what is conceived by the senses. Knowledge acquired by the senses is necessary,² as has been previously explained.

Al-Juwayni then tries to ascertain their variability, and from this deduces the meaning of the possibility of things. He finds that things have unstable characteristics, these characteristics being perceptible by the senses or conceivable by the mind. One can perceive the sequence of the (A'raq) and can assert that things might always be of another shape (Shakl) than they are. Thus all existents are unstable. This leads to the conclusion that they are possible. Al-Juwayni says: "It can be conceived by the reason that what is at rest (Sukūn) might be in movement, and what is in movement might be at rest. What by chance

1. The first here does not mean the first given by al-Juwayni, but the first expounded in the thesis, (see p. 195).

2. See p. p. 134, 135

is located in the highest position of the atmosphere can possibly be in the lowest, and what turns in a certain orbit can turn out of it." ¹

He concludes by such reasoning that things are possible. If things are possible, they are not necessary, and if they are not necessary, they are not eternal. For him the universe, with the existents it contains, is possible, and can assume another shape and order than it has. Thus if the universe is necessarily possible, it is impossible for it to be eternal.² Al-Juwayni says that if existents are possible, so they need a Maker, for variability and instability of things cannot occur by themselves. They are originated.

These are the two doctrines of al-Juwayni on the origination of the universe. The first³ is his doctrine according to (Ahl-al-Haqq); the second his doctrine according to his own way of thinking. Al-Juwayni then speaks about the relationship between the Maker and his creatures, and the made of creation.

1. ما سكن منها لم يحل الحقل بمركبه، وما تحرك لم يحل بسكونه، وما صورت مرتفعها إلى منتهى سبك من الجو، لم يجد تقديرها تخفاضه، وما استدار على النطاق لم يجد فرض تداء ولا تائبا عن غير الـ"

Agd. p. 11

2. Ibid. والعالم عاذه من موجودات يجوز غير صنع تقديره على خوفها هو عليه فإذا لزم العالم خصم الخوار استقال قدمه.

3. See footnote 1, p. 182

According to al-Imām, God, as the Creator of the World, has known of the existence of the world since eternity. This knowledge is eternal, like his other attributes. Al-Juwaynī shows that the Maker is eternal, because if He was originated, He would need a Maker, so He would not be necessary and this is contrary to what He is. He is necessary and is the Maker and Creator of all the originated existents.

God brings about in the world His will and His choice, because according to al-Juwaynī God is (Murīd, Mukhtār). If God could not exercise His will, and his power of choice, He would not have been able to create the universe in this particular place in the void of space, and in that time.¹ He says that the determinable principle (al-MUjīb) which cannot choose cannot determine one thing rather than another. This idea is explained by the following example: "If there is a medicine, having the characteristic of attracting bile, it will always attract bile and all of it. It will never attract some of it, and leave some, because this medicine does not act capriciously, but according to its fixed properties."²

1. "لأن الموجب الذي لا يؤثر يستحيل أن يعتصم شيئاً دون مماثل"

Aqd. p. 12

2. Ibid.

As to the world, all spaces are similar, and all the instants of time are similar. The Creator created it in a special space and time. This proves His will; because if God was like the medicine, which acts according to a fixed property, without any choice, He would never be able to create the world in this place rather than another, and to determine it in this point of time rather than another. Al-Juwayni shows that the determination of the world in a special space and time leads to the fact that the Determinative Principle (al-Mu'jib al Mukhassis) has a will and acts according to His power of choice. Thus the eternal Creator, God, created the universe, according to His own will, at the point of time He wanted, and in the way and shape he desired.

According to al-Juwayni, God always knew the existence of the Universe. This means that God knew the universe was going to exist. It has already been said that al-Juwayni, along with the Ash'arites, thinks there is no causal relation between God's eternal knowledge of the existence of the universe and the universe's originated existence. According to them, there is no

relation of necessity between the universe and God before its creation.¹ The universe, according to them, comes from absolute nothingness. Nothing was there before the creation, absolutely nothing. If the universe is eternal, it is only eternal as known by God.

Once the Universe exists, there is a relationship between it and God. The creation, according to them, is continuous. In other words, after the creation of the universe, God does not leave His creatures. All changes happen according to His will. Man's power has its effects, according to God's will. Al-Juwayni calls it "the originated power." (al-Qudrah al-Hādithah).² All creatures are the result of God's will. They are the proofs of His existence. It is very important for al-Juwayni and (Ahl-al-Haqq) to assert that God's power has a result (Magdūr li Qudrat Allah). It has been previously stated that their definition of the "thing" (ash-Shay') "What is existent" goes to prove the existence of the power of God; because if the things were not existents, in other words, if they had no real existence in the external world,

1. See p.p. 122, 123, 124

2. Irsh. (Luciani) p.8

what would be the result of God's power and will?¹

Ash-Shahrastānī mentions that al-Juwaynī's opinion about the originated power of man is similar to the philosophers' opinions. He thinks that al-Juwaynī states the result of this power of man as being the existence (al Wujūd) and that there is a chain of causes up to God.² Ash-Shahrastānī does not give any of al-Juwaynī's quotations to prove what he says of him. Al-Juwaynī says that there are results from man's power, but that result is not existence. Existence is the result of God's power.³

If al-Juwaynī speaks about the relation between the Creator and the created, he also speaks about this relation between God and the two mental existents, substance and accident. According to him, accident is originated. Therefore it is created. Substance, which can never be separated from accident, is originated too. Al-Juwaynī says that the first accident, which is

1. See p. 151

2. Ash-Shahrastānī: Nihāyat al-Iqdam, p. 78

3. See p. 186

to be found in substance is rest (suḵān). But as accidents never remain more than one instant of time, so other accidents follow on in the substance, and real things exist.

The sequence of accidents happens by the will of God, which is continuous.¹

These are the two doctrines of al-Juwaynī on the origination of the universe. Both lead to prove the existence of an Eternal Maker of the Universe, who acts according to His own will. Before the creation, there is no relation between Him and the universe. After the creation, He governs the universe, and is the author of each of its changes.

These two doctrines are completely different, as has been previously stated. The difference between them is fundamental. The first doctrine is based on the division of the existent into substance and accident, the second is based on the idea of the possibility of existents, which is immediately known without the division into substance and accident.

Al-Juwaynī follows the deductive method. His doctrines must be examined to see whether he says anything contrary to what he has already laid down as definitions and principles.

1. See p. 176

In the first doctrine, he defines the universe as being of "substances and accidents". He defines substance, saying that it is "every jirm" (Kullu Jirm). The accident according to him is "a happening which has no position and is to be found in the space of a substance."; and the thing is "what is existent."

He first studies the thing, which is, according to him, a real existent, and asserts the power of God,¹ from the fact that He creates things from nothingness. He then divides this real existent into two other existents, which are intellectual or mental. One of these mental existents represents what is unstable in the real existent. This is the accident ('Arāḍ). The other represents what is stable. This is the substance (al-Jawhar). But he says that these two mental existents cannot be separated from one another. Thus, if one, the ('Arāḍ), is continuously unstable, it is possible, and the other mental existent (al-Jawhar), which is inseparable from the ('Arāḍ) must be unstable or possible too. What is possible is originated.

1. See p. 151

The first objection to make to al-Juwayni is: was it really necessary to divide the real existent into two mental ones to prove that the universe is originated?

It can be asserted that the qualities al-Juwayni gives to the substance and accident seem to be coherent, and realise the aim of his research, which is to prove the origination of the world.

(He described substance as being space. It differs from accident. It is indivisible. It has no shape (Shikl). All substances are similar (mutajānisah). They are at rest, and impenetrable by each other.

Being space, and having no shape, it can be asserted that substance is extension (al-Imtidād). These two qualities are stated by al-Juwayni to give the idea that substance is an abstract. Then its indivisibility is said by al-Juwayni to prove the existence of the power of God; because if the existent is infinitely divided, it is impossible to start the creation of existents while the division of the particles of the existents is infinite. This quality of substance leads directly to the aim of al-Juwayni, which is to prove the origination of the world. The similarity of substances also proves this because the indivisible parts are similar. The

difference between things is caused by accidents, which do not last more than one instant. The change is due to God's will and power. Impenetrability is also a quality which proves the power of God; because if the indivisible parts were penetrable, the whole world could emerge from one atom, which is contrary to the power of God.

Rest is a quality which, according to al-Juwayni, distinguishes the substance from the unstable accident, and he supposes it to be the stable, intellectual existent.

All these qualities combine with each other to give a clear and detailed idea of substance. Having no place, not staying more than one instant, never existing in two substances - all these qualities make the accident quite unstable. This affirms the idea of the origination of accidents.

Therefore, it can be asserted that the different qualities given by al-Juwayni to both substance and accident are not contrary. They all assist in leading to the demonstration of the origination of the universe.)

But al-Juwayni is to be blamed for putting the definition of the thing beside the two definitions of substance and accident, as the basis of his first doctrine.

The demonstration of the origination of the universe by dividing the real existent into two intellectual ones - substance and accident - is sufficient in itself and does not require the definition of the thing, to prove the possibility of the universe. In this doctrine, the possibility of the universe is plainly proved by the qualities of the accident, the substance, and the four principles given by (Ahl-al-Haqg) and al-Juwayni. The idea of the thing in the system of this doctrine really has no place. It is extraneous. The definition of the thing as given by (Ahl-al-Haqg) leads to the proof of the power of God. God is powerful when He creates things. Thus the creation of things or existents is proved and the world is originated.

This leads to the conclusion that al-Juwayni with (Ahl-al-Haqg) had put two different systems one beside the other. Each proves the origination of existence, without the help of the other.

It can always be said that there is no contradiction between the definition of the thing on one hand, and the definition of substance and accidents on the other; for the thing, being the existent, is accepted as created by God. Thus it is originated, and the origination is His attribute, and as the attribute is an accident, therefore there is no contradiction between the definitions given by the authors of this doctrine. But this does not rule out what had been said previously, that there is no real relationship, or a sort of necessity, between the definition of the thing and those of substance and accident, in the system built by al-Juwaynī with (Ahl-al-Hagg).

If there is any reason for putting them together, perhaps al-Juwaynī with (Ahl-al-Hagg) wanted to lay down a real and concrete basis, before giving an intellectual basis to the doctrine. It should also be borne in mind that, if al-Juwaynī, with (Ahl-al-Hagg), had to build their doctrine on these three definitions, it was because these meanings always had been in the people's mind, even before the Mu'tazilites and sunnites had to do with them. They were trying by such means to take away every doubt about this doctrine.

The other doctrine of al-Juwaynī does not contain any contradiction, and is not complicated.¹ He

1. Dr. Hemut Klopfer in his introduction to al-'Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah. (German edition) mentions that this work of al-Juwaynī's is really coherent. (See Das Dogma Des Imām al-Haramayn al-Djuwainī, und sein werk al-'Aqidat an-Nizāmiyyah, p. 25.

goes easily from one point to another. (He conceives first the possibility of existents by direct perception. Then he asserts that continuous change in existents needs a supervisor or a governor. Thus there is a Creator, who is God.)

This second doctrine is easier than the first one, and contains, as well as the first, a philosophical thought, which is the distinction between (necessity and possibility in existence.)

This philosophical idea is to be found in al-Farābī's books. He says: "There are two kinds of existents. One of them, if its essence is considered, is not necessary, and is called the possible. The second, if its essence is considered also, is necessary and is called the Necessary Existent. If the possible is supposed non-existent, this is not logically absurd. But it needs a cause. If it happens, it happens as a result of something. Possibilities should never have an infinite chain of causes. They should never happen regularly (Bi-d-Dawr). They should always need a necessary Existent, which is the First Existent.

As to the Necessary Existent, it is absolutely absurd to suppose that it is non-existent. It has no cause. It never happens as a result of something other than itself. It is the first cause of all things. Its existence should be previous to all

other existents. It is the most perfect of all existents, and above causes."¹

Ibn-Sinā' also defines the ^{ce}Necessary and the possible. He says that the necessary does not need a cause; the possible needs a cause.²

The idea of necessary and possible existents is in both doctrines of al-Juwayni, as has been mentioned. It is important to notice that, if the idea of necessary and possible is in both doctrines and if the definition of the world used in the second doctrine is put by al-Juwayni beside the one which divides the concrete existent into substance and accidents, and which is used in his doctrine according to the views of (Ahl-al-Haqq)³, it can be ^{asserted now:} said that he got the idea of his own doctrine expounded in al-Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah since the beginning of his career as a theologian. His study of (Ahl-al-Haqq)'s views was firstly done by him because, as has been previously shown,⁴ many people were perplexed. He had to show them first which way to follow, his main task being the appeasement of souls.

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1. al-Fārābi: 'Uyūm-al-Masā'il: Layben, 1895, p. 57.
 2. Ibn-Sinā': Ash-Shifā': Tahrān edition: al-Maqālah al-Ulā-al-Faṣl al-Khāmis: fī ad-dalālah 'Alā al-Mawjūd wa-ash-Shay' wa Aqsāmihimā, p. 291 and ff. See Chapter VI, p. 299.
Kitāb an-Najāt, Cairo, first edition 1331 A.H., p.366.
It is to be noticed that al-Fārābi's words are mentioned in this page and p. 383 and ff.
 3. Shām, vol. 1, folio 20
Irsh. p. 14 (Luciani) p.10
Lum. p. 2x - see also p. 124.
 4. See p.p. 26, 24, 27

An interesting explanation of the universe can be deduced from al-Juwayni's views about substance.

Al-Juwayni himself does not seem, as a theologian, to be interested in giving an explanation of the universe in itself. His views about substance and accident are aimed only at supplying a coherent and clear system of proof for the origination of the universe. But some of his words reveal that he has the idea of what his views could lead to: it is when he gives an example to explain the changeable existents, saying that they can change one into another. The explanation which can be deduced from his views is the following:

The division of the real existent, made by him, into substance and accident is mental. It can never be realised in the concrete, because of the impossibility of separating substance from accident. Thus substance and accident are two mental elements of the real existent. As the substance is space, its reality is extension. This extension is not real extension, but an intellectual one, like geometrical extension.

Another idea springs from the impenetrability of substances; that is, there is no void (Khalā') in the universe, because substances are one beside the other. The world is compact (Malā'). Al-Juwayni

says: "Every space can be thought of as being occupied by a substance."¹; and "There is not other meaning for the contiguity of two substances than that it is impossible to place a third substance between them."² If there is no void (Khalā'), space is continuous extension, which cannot be smaller than it is, because of the impenetrability of substances. But as substances are the indivisible parts, thus the continuous extension is to be considered as being formed of atoms, these intellectual parts, without form, impenetrable, similar and different from accidents.

If al-Juwayni does not consider the separation of substance from accident as impossible, the explanation of the universe could be metaphysical. But as he returns quickly from the intellectual field to concrete existence, it can be said that the mental extension, which is the reality of substance, when it is separated from accident, is also the reality of substance linked with accident. In other words, it is the reality of things, which al-Juwayni presents as concrete bodies, with defined and different forms, always changing. The atoms get more real existence. As they are similar, the existents are similar in essence. The differentiation

1. Shām, vol. 1, folio 336

2. Ibid. "ما من حين الا ويجوز تقدير اشتغاله بجوهر"
 "... ولا معنى لتكوتى الجوهرين واحتما عليها الا انهما شتا"
 "سويا في حين لا يقدر بينهما حين لجوهر ثالث"

of creatures is due to accidents. Al-Juwayni gives an example to explain this idea. He says that air is not different from fire in substance. The difference between them is due to accidents.¹ Air can have the attributes of fire. It can be heated so that it becomes as hot as fire. It can also have the colour of fire.² Every existent can change into another existent, if it happens that it gets the same accidents. Stones can be transformed into liquids.³

This explanation of the universe is really interesting. It resembles the modern scientific idea of the universe.

The second doctrine of al-Juwayni on the origin - ation of the universe does not contain any explanation of existents. In this doctrine he considers the existents in the external world without giving any mental basis to the doctrine.

But al-Juwayni does not really intend to give an explanation of the universe. Yet he gives a method for it, to realise the study of the world's phenomena. The method to be followed is the induction (al-Istiqrā'), as has been previously stated.

1. Shām, vol. 1, folio 47 "إنما يقع التمايز في الاعراض"
2. Ibid. لا يبعد أن يبدع الله سبحانه وتعالى في الهواء لون النار إذ ما يقبل لونا يقبل كل لون، وكذلك لهيب النار واضطرابها مما لا يبعد تصورها في الهواء.
3. Ibid. folio 48. فاختلاف الصور عن الماء منك راجع إلى
"... مخالفة اعراض المتجسّدات لاعراض الملائحات"

According to al-Juwayni, man can study the universe as a theologian and follow the deductive method. That is what al-Juwayni has really done. Man can also study the universe as a scientist and have another method. In the inductive method, he gives the main place to experience (at-Tajribah). Definitions are not the basic principle of this method. He affirms to those who study the universe in this way, that if they meet a difficulty this does not mean that this difficulty will always stand there, without any solution. What cannot be known now, will be discovered later, when man finds the proper method to apply. There is also a sort of internal preparation in the man himself (Tahayyu' an-Nafs) to know better the secrets of nature. Al-Juwayni believes that man's mind, and his "self" play a great role in the study of nature.

This idea resembles the outlook of modern scientists, who base their researches both on external observation and personal experience.

Conclusion to Part II

**Comparison between al-Juwayni
and two of his predecessors,
al-Bāqillāni and al-Baghdādi**

Conclusion to Part IIComparison between al-Juwaynī and two of his predecessors, al-Bāqillānī and al-Baḡhdādī

After expounding al-Juwaynī's views about knowledge and the origination of the world, a comparison will be made of these views with those of two of his predecessors: firstly, al-Imām Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib ibn al-Bāqillānī (d. 402 A.H., 1011 A.D.); and secondly, al-Imām Abū Maṣṣūr 'Abd al-Qādir ibn Ṭāhir at-Tamīmī al-Baḡhdādī (d. 429 A.H., 1037 A.D.) The comparison is to show how far al-Juwaynī was successful in presenting Ahl-al-Ḥaqq's opinions in a better and a neater way. The comparison will be based on what is contained in Kitāb at-Tamhīd fī ar-Radd 'Alā al-Mulḥidah al-Mu'attilah wa-l-Qarāmiṭah, wa-l-Khawāriḡ, wa-l-Mu'tazilah, by al-Bāqillānī about knowledge and the origination of the world, on what was said about these two problems in al-Baḡhdādī's book entitled Uṣul ad-Dīn, and on the result of the studies concerning the doctrines of al-Juwaynī of knowledge and origination.

It is to be noticed that these three sources are not equal, because two of them are based on one book of each of the authors al-Bāqillānī and al-Baḡhdādī, the third on the result of the most important books of al-Juwaynī. So the fact that the

books of al-Bāqillānī and al-Baghdādī might not express their views clearly enough should always be kept in mind.

In at-Tamhīd, al-Bāqillānī expounds his views about knowledge and origination in a few short sections (Abwāb). He speaks about (al-'Ilm) and its reality, the divisions of the sciences, the sources of knowledge and argumentation (Istidlāl). What is known (al Ma'lūm) is studied with regard to the existent (al-Mawjūd). That is how he introduces the study of the origination of the world, which he treats in a few other sections.

In these sections he treats some of the main points of these two problems and leaves the others.

He defines first of all (al-'Ilm) which is "the knowledge of what is known (al-Ma'lūm), as it is."¹ He shows the importance of this definition, saying that it includes the existent and the non-existent, because according to him the non-existent (al-Ma'cūm) is known as well as the existent.

This is asserted clearly by al-Juwaynī too, and is the basis of one of his criticisms of the Mu'tazilites.

As to the sources of knowledge, al-Bāqillānī

1. Tam. p. 9

"هو معرفة المعلوم على ما هو به"

mentions six sources.¹ Five of these are the five senses, the sixth is the source of all other kinds of knowledge produced in the self,² such as:

- a) The knowledge which man has of his own existence, his feeling of health, pleasure, pain, sadness, happiness, power and impotence, etc.
- b) The knowledge of what the man wants to do, and to whom he wants to speak.
- c) The knowledge that bodies, when they are existent, must be either gathered together (Mujtami'ah), in contact, or separated from each other.
- d) The knowledge of the fact that information received is true or not true, and other facts, which must be in accordance with one of the two divisions, affirmation and negation.
- e) The knowledge of the shyness of the shy, the fear of the frightened.
- f) The knowledge produced by (al-Khabar al Mutawātar).

The last two kinds of knowledge differ from the others³ by the fact that they ^{presuppose} ~~rely on~~ the existence of the senses. The others, according to him, do not rely on the senses.

1. Tam. p. 9

2. Ibid. p. 10

3. Ibid. p. 11

Al-Bāqillāni, by this classification of the sources of knowledge, gives great importance to the senses. Nevertheless, his arguments given later about the origination of accidents are based mainly on mental necessary knowledge, rather than the knowledge coming from the senses.¹

It should also be noted that by putting all the kinds of knowledge, other than those coming from the senses, in one category, or division, he proves that he does not distinguish between what comes from the self (an-Nafs), and what has for source the mind (al-'Aql), such as the knowledge of affirmation and negation.

This confusion between the different kinds of sources is also noticed when he asserts that the last two divisions have the senses for source as well as the self. He should have put these two in a special category. The happening of (al-Khabar al-Mutawātar) by an unusual act of God is another important reason for putting this kind of knowledge in a special category.

Al-Juwayni, in giving three clear sources of knowledge - the mind, the senses, and the self - distinguishes better than al-Bāqillāni between the different sources of knowledge. He is more sure of what he says about (al-khabar al-Mutawātar). Yet it can be said that the idea of affirmation and negation expressed in this book of al-Bāqillāni

1. Tam. p.p. 18, 19, 20.

might have inspired al-Juwayni in his argument about mental knowledge, the transition between affirmation and negation.

As to the degrees of originated knowledge, (al-'Ilm al-Muhdath) al-Bāqillāni mentions two necessary ('Ilm Darūrah) and reflective, which he calls ('Ilm Istidlāl wa Nazar).¹ At this point al-Bāqillāni's inconsistent way of expressing himself must be stressed. After mentioning two degrees or two divisions of knowledge, he speaks in the same paragraph about three kinds of knowledge, the second being introduced by him as the knowledge which comes from speculation and argumentation.² A little further on he considers this same knowledge as one kind of knowledge, saying (al-Dirb-al-Akbar).³ His views about the meaning of necessary knowledge⁴ give a clear idea of it, which is in perfect accordance with what al-Juwayni says about this degree of knowledge. It can even be said that what al-Bāqillāni says about it is simpler to understand than al-Juwayni's assertions.

Al-Bāqillāni's views on reflective knowledge are too summary. He just mentions that it comes after necessary knowledge and requires contemplation or speculation. He calls it later acquired knowledge (kasbi), as being the result of the originated power of man (al-Qudrah al-Hādithah). This

1. Tam. p. 7

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p. 8

4. Ibid. p. 7

is also what al-Juwayni means by (kasbī).¹

Al-Bāqillānī does not explain how speculation, the difficulties of speculation, and the criteria of true knowledge happen.

All these points are discussed in detail by al-Juwayni, as has been shown.² But if al-Bāqillānī neglects these points, or is unable to discover their importance, he speaks about the arguments used in acquiring speculative knowledge. There are six:

- a) The argument based on the idea of affirmation and negation.³
- b) The argument based on the idea that what the thing which is present (fi ash-Shāhid) has because of a ('Illah), the thing which is absent (fi-l-Ghā'ib) must have also, if the same ('Illah) is present.⁴
- c) The argument based on the idea of similarity: if a thing is right, its similar must be right too.⁵
- d) The argument based on the meaning of words:⁶ the fire always gives the idea of heat.
- e) The argument based on the belief in miracles.⁷

1. Tam. p. 9

2. See Part II, Chapter 2.

3. Tam. pp. 11, 12.

4. Ibid. p. 12

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. pp. 12, 13.

7. Ibid. p. 13.

f) The argument based on what is known by "hearing" (as-Sam⁶) such as: the Qur'[']ān, the Sunnah, the consensus and the (Qiyās Shar'[']i), based on the principles given by Revelation.¹

These are the arguments of al-Bāqillānī. He does not distinguish between a mental argument (Dalil 'Aqlī) and a traditional (Sam'[']i) argument as al-Juwaynī does. The first of these six arguments is the only one accepted by al-Juwaynī as mental argument. The two last are mentioned by al-Juwaynī as one, which he calls (Dalil Sam'[']i). It is based on the belief in miracles. The other arguments of al-Bāqillānī are rejected by al-Juwaynī, as what happens in the mind during speculation is, according to al-Juwaynī, a transition between affirmation and negation.

Al-Bāqillānī gives a definition of argument: "It is the guide (al-Murshid) to the knowledge of what is absent, from the senses, and to what is not known necessarily."²

This definition places the senses in a different category from what is necessary knowledge, and is contrary to what al-Bāqillānī asserts before.

Again al-Bāqillānī does not seem to realise the

1. Tam. p. 13

2. Ibid.

importance and the value of his divisions. Al-Juwaynī gives a clearer and more valuable definition of argument, which includes his two kinds of argument, the mental and the traditional (al-'Aqlī wa-s-Sam'ī).

Al-Bāqillānī does not speak about the subjects of knowledge as there is only one subject for him, which is the study of the world from the theologian's viewpoint. He does not mention the possibility of studying the world as a man of science, as al-Baghdādī and al-Juwaynī do. This comes from his narrow outlook on knowledge in this book. Also he does not speak about the aim of knowledge in theology. As to the evidence of knowledge, he does not speak about it, but one can deduce it from his definition of knowledge, by which he affirms the validity of what is known .

As has been previously stated, Al-Bāqillānī does not treat the origination of the world as a separate problem. What he says about "what is known" (al-Ma'lūm) and its two divisions, the existent and the non-existent, is an introduction to the study of the originated existent. The existent is, according to him, eternal or originated.¹ This is the thing.² The originated existents are, according to what he affirms in this book, classified into three divisions: the combined body (jism Mu'allaf), substance and accident.³ Al-Juwaynī follows the same way

1. Tam. p. 16

2. Ibid. p. 15

3. Ibid. p. 17

of thinking in speaking first of all about (al-Ma'lūm) in his doctrine of knowledge, but he gives the problem of origination more importance, as he studies it in a special part in all his works. He also states that there are two kinds of (Ma'lūm): an existent and a non-existent. He speaks of the kinds of existents: the eternal and originated. Al-Juwaynī differs from al-Bāqillānī in putting the originated existent into two divisions: substance and accident. This has its importance, because al-Juwaynī, in putting aside the combined body, gives a clear idea of the two divisions of the existent, each of them being just an idea, a supposition, when separated from each other.

For the seeker of ~~the~~ theological knowledge, al-Bāqillānī does not explain clearly enough whether he means a real division or a mental division of the originated existent. As he presents this idea, it is the originated existents (in the plural) which are divided into three categories - the combined body, the substance and the accident. This presentation gives the impression that substance and accident, being divisions of existents as bodies are, are of the same value, or on the same

level as bodies. They would be all different kinds rather than different divisions or categories of existents, which is not in accordance with the definition of substance and accident given by him, as will be shown later.

Here again al-Bāqillāni seems to be confused about what all these divisions can mean. But he seems to have realised that substance and accident are mental. He does not speak in this book about the qualities of each, but their definitions show it. The definition of substance is "that which accepts one accident from each genus of accidents."¹ This means that substance cannot be perceived without accident; in other words, it cannot exist in the external world by itself. Therefore it is mental. The definition of accident, which is, "what does not last",² shows that it is a mental existent also, which is the reason why he uses the word "division" rather than "kind", and why also he puts the body, which has a real and concrete existence, beside these two mental ones, to be in accordance with what all his predecessors did. Al-Juwayni does the same, but in a more clear and precise way, when he puts the definition of the thing, which has a real existence, beside the definition of accident and substance as basis of the doctrine of the origination

1. Tam. p. 17

"والجوهر هو الذي يقبل من كل جنس من أجناس الاعراض عرضا واحدا."

2. Ibid. p. 18

"والاعراض هي التي لا يصح بتأؤها"

of the world. This is not really very successful, because the definition of the thing has really no place in the system built by al-Juwaynī, as has been shown. The same can be said of the definition of the body in al-Bāqillānī's doctrine, which has now two defects, namely that body is considered as a division of the originated existents, and that it is put beside the mental existents, as the basis of the doctrine.

Al-Bāqillānī speaks about the thing (ash-Shay')¹ as one of the two divisions of the (Ma'lūm) without showing its role in the doctrine of origination at all. He does not mention that it is a real and concrete existent, beside the two mental ones, substance and accident. He also forgets that the "thing", by its definition, and what this definition includes, is an originated existent, and is sufficient by itself to prove the origination of the world. All this has been previously stated in discussing al-Juwaynī's views about the thing.²

Al-Bāqillānī does not expound four principles in his demonstration of the origination of the world as al-Juwaynī does. He just speaks about the accident and its instability,³ which he proves by two verses of the Qur'ān, mentioned also by al-Juwaynī. "Ye intend the chance gains of this world."⁴ and "They said: This is a cloud which is going to give us rain."⁵ But

1. Tam. p. 175

2. See p. p. 191, 192.

3. Tam. p. 18

4. Q. Surat. 8, verse 67 - in Bell, verse 68

5. Q. XLVI/24/23

he gives mental proofs relying on the mind and the self as sources rather than the senses,¹ as has been mentioned previously, to prove the origination of accidents (Ithbāt Hudūth al-A'rad). He does not mention the impossibility of substance and accident being separated from each other. He does not speak about the impossibility of a chain of events without a beginning. All that he asserts to prove that the existents are originated is that bodies do not come before what is originated - the originated being the accident. Thus bodies are originated. His proof that the bodies do not exist before the originated existent, which is the accident,² is that it is known by immediate knowledge that the bodies cannot exist without being gathered together, separated, or in contact with each other. He mentions this at the beginning of his doctrine of knowledge, as a kind of knowledge produced in the self. It can be said that he has not enough order in his ideas, and he does not realise the importance of some of his assertions, such as: these accidents, which he does not call (Akwān), and the importance of which he does not show. Yet these three accidents are the basis of his demonstration of the origination of the world.

1. Tam. pp. 18-20.

2. Ibid. p. 22

Al-Baghdādi expounds his views in his book, Uṣūl ad-Dīn, with more detail than al-Bāqillāni. But he also treats some points and leaves others.

His definition of knowledge is "an attribute by which the alive becomes the knower".¹ This definition is not appreciated by al-Juwayni, who follows the definition of al-Bāqillāni, as has been stated. Al-Baghdādi does not show the importance of this definition, as al-Bāqillāni does. He just presents it with others of his predecessors, without any comment. He affirms later that it is the one he prefers, when he speaks about what is known by mind, and what is known by revelation.²

As sources for knowledge, he mentions two (al-Badīhah) and the senses (al-Hiss).³ According to him, (Badīhah) is divided into two divisions: affirmative immediate knowledge ('Ilm Badīhi fi-l-Itḥbāt) and negative immediate knowledge ('Ilm Badīhi fi-l-Nafy).⁴ The first is such as the knowledge which man has of his own existence, the feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, the feeling of heat, cold, sadness, happiness, etc.⁵ The second is our knowledge of the impossibility of the absurd.⁶

1. Uṣūl. p. 5
 2. Ibid. p. 25
 3. Ibid. p. 8
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

Al-Juwaynī asserts three sources, as has been mentioned: the mind, the senses, and the self. Two of these sources, the mind and the self, are included, as can be noticed, in what al-Baghdādī calls (Badīhah) because the knowledge of our existence, and all these feelings of pleasure, pain, heat and cold, etc. have, according to al-Juwaynī, the self for source. The impossibility of the absurd comes, according to al-Juwaynī, from what he calls the mind (Badīhiyyāt). Therefore (Badīhī) has not the same meaning for the two Imāms. Al-Juwaynī gives it a limited and precise meaning; al-Baghdādī assigns to it more than one kind of knowledge. A curious thing is that al-Bāqillānī does not mention the mind as a source of knowledge, and al-Baghdādī does not realise that the self can be a source of knowledge. They do not clearly distinguish between the different sources of knowledge, as al-Juwaynī does. It can be said that al-Juwaynī, in doing that, proves that he has a very fine sense of differentiation and understanding. But if al-Baghdādī does not distinguish between what is known by the self and what is known by the mind, he is more sure of what he says than al-Bāqillānī about the sources of knowledge. He distinguishes sharply between what he has to include in the affirmative immediate

knowledge and the negative immediate knowledge. Al-Bāqillāni in his book gives all kinds of feelings and conceptions in one division without any order.¹ Another advantage in what al-Baghḍādī says about sources of knowledge can be found in his clear division between affirmative and negative, which can be considered as being the source of the idea of "transition between affirmation and negation" presented by al-Juwaynī as his only process of mental knowledge.

As to the degrees of knowledge, al-Baghḍādī gives two: necessary knowledge ('Ilm Dardri) and acquired knowledge ('Ilm Muktasab).² He asserts that the difference between these two degrees is caused by the power of the knower in getting his acquired knowledge and his power in argumentation.³ He then asserts that necessary knowledge happens without argumentation or reflection, and it is not in the power of the knower to produce it.⁴ The acquired or reflective knowledge includes two kinds of knowledge: mental ('Aqli) and revelative (Shar'i). Both happen by speculation or reflection. Some of this acquired knowledge can be clearer ('Ajlā) than others.⁵ He also declares that

1. Tam. pp. 10,11.

2. Usūl. p. 8

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid. p. 9

speculative or reflective knowledge might be necessary by God's will and could happen as an unusual thing. So it is possible.¹ He does not give any explanation about the operation of speculation, the difficulties which the knower can meet during this operation, the arguments used, the evidence of this speculative knowledge, and the criteria for its truth. That is why one can have doubts about his meaning of "clearer" (Ajlā), if he means that some kinds of speculative knowledge are easier to acquire than others, or that speculative knowledge acquired is not always in the same degree of clearness in the mind. This leads to a doubt about the evidence of acquired knowledge, and whether acquired knowledge, once it has occurred, is necessary, like immediate knowledge, as has been asserted by al-Juwaynī.

This point really needed more attention from al-Baghdādī. It can be said that he means by (Ajlā) that the speculative process is clearer: he is not referring to the certainty of the result. This comes first of all from the fact that, as a theologian, the evidence of knowledge is really important for his results, which must be self-evident. Secondly, his statement that speculative knowledge can, in an unusual case, be necessary²

1. Uṣūl. p. 15. وكل علم نظري يجوز عندنا أن يحمل الله ضروريًا فيما على قلبه. العادة كما نطق في آدم عليه السلام علمها ضرورية عرف بها الأسماء من غير اشتداد منه عليها ولا قرادة منه لها في كتاب، كذلك القول في مسائل العلوم النظرية عندنا.

2. Ibid.

gives the impression that he has the idea of the necessity of this knowledge. Thirdly, a close examination of his views can be helpful in clarifying this statement. When he divides originated knowledge into necessary and acquired knowledge, he says that the difference between them is in the power of the knower in having them. This means that what makes the difference is the power of man. This does not deny that acquired knowledge happens in the mind and by the mind. Therefore it can be necessary like immediate knowledge. This is what can be said about al-Baghdādi's views concerning the degrees of knowledge, but his meanings here are uncertain.

Al-Juwayni's views are much clearer and more detailed. They do not rely on any unnatural or unusual act of God. They rely more on reasoning and usual facts. This makes al-Juwayni more intellectual. But still it can be said that he got many of his ideas from his predecessors, one of whom was al-Baghdādi.

Another point about which al-Baghdādi appears perplexed is in what he calls (al-Khabar al-Mutawātar). He considers it as a source of knowledge.¹ He asserts that what is known by this source is as necessary as what is known by the senses.² This makes his sources three, and he only mentions two.

1. Usūl. p. 12

2. Ibid.

He adds that the proof of its necessity ¹ is that nobody can doubt it.

What is to be said to al-Baghdādī is: this proof of which he speaks, is it mental or traditional, "by hearing" (Sam'ī)? Or does he want to say that this knowledge is just self-evident? If it is self-evident and is like the immediate knowledge of the senses, why do some people doubt it?

The answer ^w is that, if the knowledge which comes by the (Khabar al-Mutawātar) seems to be necessary, it is because people believe in it. Its evidence comes from the heart, not from the mind. That is what al-Juwaynī asserts when he puts as a basic principle to all that is known by hearing (as-Sam') the belief in the director (al-Murshid).² This belief resembles a sort of intuition. What is known by hearing becomes a proof for him (ad-Dalīl as-Sam'ī), because it becomes self-evident. It is a proof beside his mental proof. These two proofs are the ones used by al-Juwaynī in "What is known by hearing and mind together." Al-Juwaynī was very wise to put this sort of knowledge based on (as-Sam'īyyāt) in a special division, apart from what is known by mind alone, or hearing alone.

In a way, this idea came to him from al-Baghdādī, the latter having said, when he was speaking about

1. Uṣūl. p. 12

2. See p. 143

the subjects of knowledge, that he rather adds (ash-Sharʿ) to speculative knowledge, because (Sharʿ) is based on the evidence of prophecy, and the evidence of prophecy comes by speculation.¹

Here again al-Baghḍādī seems to be unsure about what he asserts; at one time (ash-Sharʿ) is necessary; another time it is speculative.

As to the subjects of knowledge, he mentions four: what is known by speculation; what is known by experience and custom; what is known by Revelation; and what is known by inspiration.²

The first division includes: the origination of the world, the eternity of its Maker, His one-ness, His attributes, His justice, His wisdom, the evidence of the prophecy of His missionary by miracles.³ These points are the subject of what is known by the mind. He does not include in this division any speculative knowledge other than the religious kind. What is known by experience is like medical sciences and the different crafts. What is known by (ash-Sharʿ), as mentioned by him in that place, is the sinful act (Harām), the virtuous act (Halāl), the unbecoming act (Makrūh), and the morally indifferent act (Mandūb). Then he adds, as has been mentioned, the (Sharʿ) to what is known by speculation. That is what al-Juwaynī calls "What is known by mind and hearing". What is known

1. Uṣūl. pp. 14, .5.

2. Ibid. p. 14

3. Ibid.

by inspiration is, for example, poetry. The ability to write poetry is an uncommon attribute, and is a special gift from God. This is not mentioned by al-Juwaynī, but it must have for source the self.

As to the method followed by al-Baghdādī in these four subjects, nothing is said about it. The method differs, according to the subjects, but nothing is mentioned by him about this point. Yet it can be deduced from his way of treating the problem of the origination of the world that in what is known by speculation, he follows the deductive method. None of the mental proofs are mentioned by him. But he mentions the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, the consensus, and the Qiyās, as proofs, which are traditional proofs.

For what is known by experience, nothing is said by him about its method. He makes some superficial observations¹ about animals, insects, etc., which are now considered absolutely wrong. That is a thing which is not found in al-Juwaynī's views of the world's phenomena. On the contrary, al-Juwaynī got the right idea about research, when he declared that what cannot be known now can be known later when the proper way to find it will be discovered.² Another of his ideas, reflected in modern research, is when he asserts that there is

1. Uṣūl. pp. 38, 39.

2. See p. 199

a sort of relationship between man and nature, which interferes with the result of the researches.

Al-Baghdādī says about inspiration that this sort of knowledge is not acquired, therefore there is no method for it. And here again al-Baghdādī does not seem to be methodical in the exposition of his ideas.

As to the aim of each of these subjects, al-Baghdādī speaks about only one, which is the aim of what is called by him speculative knowledge. This aim is that the right speculative knowledge leads to the consolidation of religions.¹ The aim of what is known by experience can be deduced from what he says about the creatures. It is the knowledge of nature in itself. But he does not assert it.

His doctrine of the origination of the world is based on definitions. He first defines the world (al-‘Ālam) as "Everything other than God".² Then he mentions that the world is of two kinds (al-‘Ālam Naw‘ān). He does not say two divisions. This fact has its importance in al-Baghdādī's doctrine, as will be shown. It makes clear from the beginning the fact that al-Baghdādī does not want to divide the real existent into two other existents. The main question now is: What does

1. Uṣūl. p. 11

2. Ibid. p. 33

he say about these two kinds? Are they in perfect accordance with the basic idea of his doctrine, which is not to divide the real existent into two other existents? An examination of the definition of each of these two kinds, the qualities of each, and the principle of the origination of the world will show whether or not al-Baghdādi maintained consistency with his basic idea, and whether this basic idea was the right one to have for his doctrine or not.

The two kinds mentioned by him are: substances and accidents. He does not speak about things (ash-Shay') as al-Juwayni and al-Bāqillāni do. This comes from the fact that al-Juwayni and al-Bāqillāni divide the real existent into two existents. Al-Baghdādi does not. For him substances and accidents are only two kinds.

It has been previously said that one of the facts which might be a reason for al-Juwayni to put the thing beside the substance and accident was the need to have a real and concrete basis to his doctrine after dividing the real existent into two mental existents. Al-Baghdādi does not need this

basis, "the thing", because he does not divide the real existent, but sees in it two kinds. He defines substance as "every thing having a colour,"¹ and accidents as "the qualities which are in substances."²

His definition of substance presents the substance as a real existent, because it includes an accident, which is colour. He chooses colour as the kind of accident to be mentioned in the definition of substance, because he asserts that sight is the most important sense (al-Afdal). The deduction is that colour is the most attractive of that which is seen (al-Mar'iyat).^{*}

Al-Juwayni defines substance as being "space or what occupies space." Space is an essential quality of substance. Al-Juwayni's definition presents substance as quite different from accident, but both are mental. The basic idea of al-Juwayni's doctrine is different from al-Baghdādi's.

Al-Baghdādi does not want to divide the real existent; hence his definition of substance.

The definition of accident presents it as a meaning. It is "a quality", he says. This is in accordance with what he wants to ascertain, which is the real existence of the substance.

1. Uṣūl. p. 33

2. Ibid.

والجواهر كل ذي لون

والاعراض هي الصفات القاعة بالجواهر

At this point it can be said that what al-Juwaynī tries to do finally in developing the qualities of substance and accident, is to restore a real existence to the supposed mental substance. Al-Baghdādī has done this since the beginning. If al-Baghdādī's way of thinking is helpful in putting aside the definition of the "thing", it is at a disadvantage in keeping the idea of a mental existent, which is the accident, right to the end of the development of his ideas. There is one mental existent and one concrete existent at the beginning and we still have one mental and one real at the end.

With al-Juwaynī, there are two mental existents at the beginning, which disappear completely into one real existent after he has developed his ideas.

Al-Baghdādī does not study the qualities of substance and accident in a special chapter, as does al-Juwaynī, but he speaks about these qualities here and there, through the development of the fifteen questions (Mas'alah) of his second (Asl) in which he treats the problem of the origination of the world.

For him substance is the indivisible part. He does not call it atom, and he does not present it as similar to the geometrical point. He just says that it is the indivisible part. It might

be a real and not an unreal indivisible part.

He proves its existence by saying that, if the division was infinite, it would never be possible to say that the mountain is bigger than a grain of corn, because what is infinite is never bigger than another infinite.¹

Another quality is that substances are similar or of the same genus.² He also describes bodies as being similar.³ This comes from the basic idea of his doctrine. Accidents cause all the differences between bodies.

Al-Juwaynī also asserts that accidents cause all the differences between existents, that is why he gives accidents an equal place with substance. Both are, when thought of in separation, of mental existence. Linked together, they form a real existent, which is one, without division.

The idea of the similarity of substance or bodies gives al-Baghdādī the idea of how existents can change one into another; the solid becomes liquid, and liquid becomes vapour.⁴ Al-Juwaynī, who asserts the same idea, must have got it from him. But in al-Juwaynī's doctrine it has a better place in the explanation of the universe, al-Juwaynī having stated that the world can be conceived in another way than that of a theologian.

Another quality of substances is that they do not penetrate into one another,⁵ but are beside one

1. Uṣūl. p. 36

2. Ibid. p. 35

3. Ibid. p. 54

4. Ibid. p. 55

5. Ibid. p. 46

another. This quality is also mentioned by al-Juwaynī. He might have got it from al-Baghdādī. It asserts that there is no void in the world. Substances can also be combined.¹

These are the qualities of substance, as stated by al-Baghdādī. They do not differentiate substance from bodies; accidents, on the other hand are in a different category from substances.

Accidents, according to al-Baghdādī, are not divided.² Each is a unit. It needs a place.³ Accidents are not similar,⁴ (Jins Maḥḥuṣ). Some of them include several accidents, for example, the accident "colour" includes the accidents "red", "blue", etc. Accidents cannot be combined (Tarkīb) or be in contact with each other (Mumāssah) or be transferred from one place to another (Intiqāl)⁵ or last (lā Tabqā)⁶ or be repeated,⁷ which means that they cannot last more than one instant of time.⁸

These qualities are also mentioned by al-Juwaynī. Al-Baghdādī speaks in detail about the divisions or categories of accidents. He mentions thirty categories. The first and important one is

1. Uṣūl . p. 38
2. Ibid. p. 35
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. pp. 38-56
6. Ibid. p. 42
7. Ibid. p. 45
8. Ibid.

the accident called (Kawn). The second is colour. He does not give a definition of "external relations" (Kawn) but one can see that external relations for him are what gives the substance a place, and that they have the same meaning and importance as in al-Juwaynī's doctrine.

Al-Baghdādī does not expound the demonstration of the origination of the world in four principles as al-Juwaynī does in his works where he treats this problem according to Ahl-al-Haqq's views. Yet three of these principles - the first three mentioned by al-Juwaynī - are treated by him in separate questions, but not presented as principles. He then states the origination of the world, then speaks about the finitude of the world.

One can ask why he treats such a point after the assertion of the origination of the world. Is it to complete his views about the origination of the world or just to treat some questions put by the seeker after truth? It might have, in his mind, a relation with the problem of the origination of the world. But he does not know how to show it clearly.

Those are the views of al-Bāqillānī and al-Baghdādī about the two problems of knowledge and origination, as expounded each in his book mentioned above, in comparison with al-Juwaynī's views, as presented in his most important books about theology.

It has been stated at the beginning of this

comparison that the sources on which it is based are unequal. It can be asserted now that this fact was always taken into consideration, and that the results of this comparison might be of some value.

The first thing to assert after this comparison is that the three Imāms differ as to the degree of precision and capacity of comprehension of the meaning of substance, accident and thing.

Al-Bāqillānī deals with "the thing" to which he does not give as much importance as it should have. He deals with substance and accidents, conceiving them as mental existents. That can be deduced from their definition, but he does not make his conception quite clear, when he puts them on the same level with bodies as divisions of the originated existents. His conception of origination is based mainly on the origination of accidents, which he develops clearly enough. He does not seem to have realised the importance of the other principles of the proof of origination. These principles link together again the two divisions of the existent and prove that they have a beginning in time. This is because he does not realise the importance of accident and substance, or the importance of the role they play in proving

the origination of the world. His views about knowledge are more mature although they are incomplete.

Al-Baghdādī neglects some points in treating the problem of knowledge. But he seems to have realised the importance of all its questions as al-Bāqillānī does, because his doctrine of knowledge does not contain any contradictory assertions. His doctrine of the origination of the world is in a way original, being based only on two definitions - of accident and of substance. The thing, which is one of the important definitions used by Muslim theologians, as al-Juwaynī asserts, is put aside by him. He may have realised that its presence is unnecessary, and he was right. But he did not show it. Three of the four principles of the demonstration are well conceived by him. The fourth is put aside, as if it is not important.

Al-Juwaynī, on the contrary, presents a developed doctrine of knowledge. His views about origination prove that he understands perfectly the importance of each definition of his predecessors. He could give to each meaning used by them its own value. What was not in accordance with the right way he conceives, was refuted and rejected by him.

What was not represented in a right way was re-organized by him, such as the sources of knowledge, which were not well conceived either by al-Bāqillānī or by al-Baḡhdādī. The conception of substance and accident is perfectly developed by al-Juwaynī, as well as his conception of the thing. The four principles, which can be considered as the most complete of all that has been said, are clearly expounded. Al-Juwaynī was not really successful in putting the thing beside substance and accident in one system, as has been said. But it can be said that he realised this fact because his views about the thing do not interfere at all in this system of demonstration of the origination of the world. It has been rather stated by him, as has been said, to be a concrete basis to his assertions about the two mental existents.

PART III

Edition of

LUMA' AL-ADILLAH FI QAWA'ID

'AQA'ID AHL AS-SUNNAH

WA-L-JAMA'AH

PART III

Introduction

Risālat: Luma' al-Adillah fi Qawa'id 'Aqā'id
Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah is one of Al-Juwayni's
 works. This manuscript has been chosen, edited,
 and an introduction is written to it, ^{because} It contains
 most of al-Juwayni's theological opinions. It
 naturally deals with his doctrine on the origination
 of the world, which is the subject of this thesis.

Two copies of this manuscript have been used,
 and a commentary. As to the two copies:

(a) The first is a manuscript in the Egyptian National
 Library, in a collection No. 618, Majma'. This
 collection contains twelve manuscripts ¹ in 178 folios.
 Risālat Luma' al-Adillah... begins at folio 117^r, up
 till half of the folio 122^v (25 x 20 cm). Each folio
 has 31 lines. Each line has 12 words. The hand-
 writing is (Naskh).

It is quite possible that this collection had
 all been written by the same man, because the hand-
 writing is the same. The name of the writer is:

1. The twelve manuscripts are: 1) Ma'ālim fi Uḡūl
ad-Dīn, Lil-Imām Fakhr ad-Dīn, ar-Rāzi. It is
 missing. Only its title is there. 2) Al-Ashkāl
al-Arba'ah fi al-Manṭiq. 3) Qawā'id al-J'rab.
 4) Al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah. 5) Malḥamat al-J'rab.
 6) Sharḥ al-Malḥama. 7) Unmūdhaj az-Zamakhshari.
 8) Al-Luma'-li Imām al-Haramayn. 9) Al-Hudūd.
 10) Ajnās al-Mawjūdāt. 11) Manāzil al-Qamar and
 12) Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyyah. The collection
 contains many additional notes. It seems to be
 that its writer wanted to fill the empty places.
 The handwriting of these additional notes is not ^{that}
 of the original writer of the collection. Some
 titles are written by another writer different
 from the original, as in the case of al-Luma'.

(ii)

Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn Yūsuf ash-Shāfi'ī. The Luma' in this collection has no date. It ends by the name of the writer only.¹ But other two Risālahs in the Majmū'ah are dated: the first is Al-'Aqīdah an-Nasafiyyah, the second its commentary.

The first, which is the fourth Risālat in the Collection, ends at the beginning of folio 26^r with the name of the writer, who is the same as the writer of al-Luma', and the date, which is the 17th of Rajab, 508 A.H.

The commentary on the 'Aqā'id an-Nasafiyyah, which is the last Risālah in the collection, ends by the date which is the 11th of Dhū-l-Ḥijjah, 509 A.H. Risālat Luma' al-Adillah is between these two Risālahs. Thus it is more likely that it had been written between these two dates, 508 A.H., 1114 A.D. and 509 A.H., 1115 A.D.

b) The second is a photostat of a copy which is actually in Tübingen Library, ^{the depot for the manuscripts formerly in the Preussischen Staatsbibliothek.} It was in Berlin Library before the war. Its number in this last library is 2073 (Ahlwardt's Berlin Catalogue, Vol. II, p. 441). With the assistance of the General Library of Cairo University, this photostat copy was made, the library number in Cairo being 26393. This copy (Majmū'ah) certain folios of which are bound out of order. is in a collection, X It starts at folio 49^v and ends at 63^r, ^{lacuna found between ff. 61^r and 62^v} The ~~folios of this collection are~~ ^{being completed by ff. 12^v and 11^r, 10^r and 11^v.} ~~unorganised.~~

1. See p. 46 x

The handwriting is (Nasḥ). It is dated. The writer ended it on the 23rd of Rabi' al-Awwal, 547 A.H., 1152 A.D.¹ The name of the writer is Ibn al-Faraj al-Ghuzzi.²

c) The third copy is in the commentary, written by Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh Sharaf ad-Dīn ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Qāhiri, known as at-Tilmisāni. It is entitled: Sharḥ Iuma' al-Adillah fi at-Tawḥid.

There are two copies of this commentary:

1) The first was written in 804 A.H., 1402 A.D. It is to be found in Aḥmad ath Thālith Library ^{in Istanbul} under No. 9869. A photostat of this copy is in the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts of the States of the Arab League, under the number 1240 f.

2) The second, a microfilm copy, which is to be found in the Escurial Library, in Spain, under no. 1606. The microfilm used belongs to Dr. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥādī abū Ridāh. This copy is better than the other, because the text of the Iuma' is generally clearly presented in red ink. Some places are not clear, such as: from folio 2, col. I, till half of folio 3, col. II, the folio 5, col. I, when the author is speaking about the accident (al-'Arād) and its itness (Huwiyyah), and in folio 45, col. II, in ch. "God

1. See p. 45 x

2. See p. 1 x

is superior to the acceptance of accidents." All these points are pointed out in the edition. This copy contains 132 folios, each with two columns. The writing is (Naskh.)

These are the three copies used in establishing the text of Risālat al-Luna^f. As the first copy belongs to the Egyptian National Library in Cairo, the letter Q is used as the abbreviation. The second copy got B, because it is in Berlin Library. The third got the letter Sh as it is a (Sharh).

The style in Q differs completely in some places from the style in B and Sh, in which differences are only in words or some short sentences. The complete ^{difference} ~~change~~ in Q is especially noticed ^{able} in the texts dealing with the origination of the world.¹ This is not in the opinions, but in al-Juwaynī's way of expressing himself. Thus it can be said that, in some places, there are two styles - Q style and B and Sh. style, which are exposed both, one beside the other, in the edited copy, and all additional words in brackets.

The comparison between B and Q (the copy Sh, as it is a commentary, is put aside for a ^{the moment} ~~while~~) leads to the fact that the handwriting in B is better than in Q. This last copy also contains many spelling errors, which have been corrected, sometimes with no reference in the footnotes.

Some grammatical mistakes are also to be found in Q. Nevertheless, in spite of all these imperfections, Q is to be preferred to B, because

1. See pp. 3 x - 6 x

it is the earliest, being written, as has been mentioned, between the two years 508 A.H., 1114 A.D. and 509 A.H., 1115 A.D., and B in the year 547 A.H., 1152 A.D.

It is very important to point out that differences are in the style, as has been mentioned before. Occasionally these differences have been expounded in more than one footnote, referring to one passage in accordance with the ideas, which are the same in both styles, but expressed in different ways. Only one sentence contains a different idea or statement. It is when al-Juwaynī speaks about the prophet's successors. In Q the sentence is: "The Prophet did not mention his successor." ¹ In B it is: "The Prophet did not mention 'Alī as his successor." ²

This is very important. It is to be explained as follows: The copy B containing the name of 'Alī, as not being the successor of the Prophet, has been produced after the Shī'at were away from the government, when the sunnites got the upper hand, under the

1. See p. 42 x
2. See p. 42 x r

reign of Alp-Arslān. The other copy, Q, was earlier produced under the Buwayhides. This fact explains the difference of style between the two copies, as each of them had been written in a different period of time during al-Juwaynī's life. It is very likely that Q had been written during the second phase of his life, when he was teaching in his father's school before he left Naysābūr. At that time he was just starting his career as a teacher. That is why the style in Q is more pedantic. The spelling and grammatical errors are probably due to the Shāfi'ite ^{copied} ^{presumably} writer, who was one of al-Juwaynī's pupils. The second had been written in the fourth phase of his life, after he came back to Naysābūr, to teach in an-Niẓāmiyyah school. At that time he was more mature, and had got more knowledge about most of the sciences he was interested in, Islamic and non-Islamic sciences. That is why his style in B is nearer to his style in his other theological books produced at that period of his life.¹

As the Risālah contains some Qur'ānic verses, they have been mentioned with their Sūrat in the footnotes, without Flügel's numbering.

1. See p.p. 3x-6x
See also Irsh and Sham.

Analysis

"Luma' fi Qawa'id 'Aqā'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah"
or "Luma' men al-Adillah fi Qawā'id 'Aqā'id Ahl
as-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah"¹ or "Luma' al-Adillah fi
at-Tawḥīd" are titles for this work of al-Juwaynī,
in which he attempted to explain the Ash'arites'
beliefs.

The first title is to be found in Q,² the second
in B,³ and the third in Sh.⁴ These titles express
the subject of the Risālah well. The Risālah con-
tains the summary of Ahl-as-Sunnah, wa-l-Jamā'ah's
beliefs, proved by ^{rational} ~~intellectual~~ arguments. The
summary did not alter the aim of the work, which
is to ~~invalidate~~ the sunnite beliefs. Thus, what
this work contains is really quite clear and strong.
It is the salient features of the sunnite beliefs.

Al-Juwaynī mentions that he wrote this work,
because some of his contemporaries asked him to do it.⁵

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1. This title is mentioned by al-Juwaynī in the introduction. The writer of the manuscript gives: Kitāb Al-Luma' men Taṣānif Imām al-Haramayn.
(See footnote 7 p. 1X)
 2. Egyptian National Library, manuscript No. 618 Majāmi'.
 3. A photostat under No. 16393, Cairo University.
 4. Microfilm No. 1606
 5. See p. 1X from line 7up til 10

For clearer understanding, the Luma' has been divided into seven parts (Abwāb).

The first: The world and its origination.

The second: God and His attributes.

The third: The will of God and the will of Man.

The fourth: The visibility of God.

The fifth: God and the creation.

The sixth: The prophet's mission and miracles.

The seventh: The Imāmate.

It is easy to see, according to these divisions, that al-Juwayni has studied theological problems, which seemed to him to be more important than others, and which were strongly discussed by his contemporaries. He started by discussing the origination of the world, which was the basis for the discussion of God's attributes. Then he discussed the prophet's mission, the miracles, and the Imāmate. It is to be noticed that he did not discuss the reckoning day (al-Ma'ad) and people's states in the other world. Some of these parts contain only one chapter.

1. Part one contains al-Juwayni's opinions about the origination of the world. He begins with the definitions of the world, the substance and the accident. He then speaks about the meaning of the Eternity and origination. The arguments of the origination of the world are produced in four chapters (Faṣl). This word is not used by al-Juwayni himself. He uses two other words: (Aṣl) in B

and (Mas'alat) in Q. In these chapters he studies first the ('Arad), then its origination, the impossibility of the separation of the substance and accident from one another, then the impossibility of the infinity of originated existents. He concludes that the substance, which is never separated from the accident, is originated because what is not previous to the originated is originated. According to al-Juwayni, the origination of the world means the possibility of the world. Thus the world needs a Maker, which al-Juwayni calls the differentiating Principle. This principle is not similar to the nature (Tabi'ah) or cause ('Illah) because, according to him, the Maker is powerful, and determinates without the motive being known. He determinates according to His will.

2. In the second part, al-Juwayni studies the attributes of God. He speaks about the necessary attributes of God, saying that God is Necessary Existent. His knowledge is eternal. His power and His life are eternal too. Al-Juwayni refutes his opponents' opinions. They affirm that the power of God is originated. Al-Juwayni's argument is based on the fact that, if His power is originated, it would need another power to create it, and this leads to an infinity of powers, which is absurd. Thus His power is eternal. God is above mankind's

attributes, because these attributes are imperfect. To prove the Unity of God, he speaks about the contradiction between the wills of gods, if they were more than one. He also speaks about the attributes with which God cannot be qualified, such as to be placed, and to have determined form like the bodies, and other qualities.

He then explains the verse "God seated Himself on the throne."¹ telling that (al-Istiyā') means here superiority of God, who cannot be subject to the characteristics of temporal production. God, according to al-Juwayni, is above change, because if He could change, He would be originated. Those who pretend that there is change in God disagree with the consensus of Muslim opinion. They are called Kappanites.

3. Part three deals with God's will and Man's will. What is originated, the good and the harmful, happens by the will of God. God is the Creator of every event. This means that He wanted what He created. God's will is never imperfect. This means that God always does what He wants, He is never unable to do it, and nothing happens without His will. The Mu'tazilites find that the necessary and commendable acts are always wanted by God, whether they happen

In Saḥīḥ al-Bayḥaqī
1. Q. xx/5.

or not. The unbecoming acts are accomplished in spite of God's will. The morally indifferent acts happen, and God does not care if they happen or not. Al-Juwayni believes that creatures are not forced to obey God. God wills them to obey, by their own will, to be free and not determined.

Every adherent to Islām believes in these words: "What God willed was, what He did not will, was not." God willed man to feel free in his acts, and he feels free. Thus his acts happen according to God's will. God's will is above all wills.

The Qur'ān is full of verses expressing this meaning. Al-Juwayni mentions some of them, such as: "But if Allah had so willed, He would have gathered them to the guidance."¹ and "If Allah will to guide anyone, He enlargeth his breast for Islām, but if He will to send him astray, He maketh his breast narrow and contracted."² The verse: "He does not approve of unthankfulness in His servants"³ means that God meant by the word ('Ibād) those who already obeyed Him. The verse "If Allah had so willed, we should not have associated neither we, nor our fathers, nor should we have made anything forbidden .. until they tasted our violence"⁴

1. Q. vi / 35

2. Q. vi / 125

3. Q. xxxix / 7 / 9

4. Q. vi / 148 / 149

God just wanted to answer the pagans. The proof is what He said at the end of the verse: "Say: Have ye any (revealed) knowledge? Bring it forth for us then; ye follow nothing but opinion, and ye are only conjecturing. Say: To Allah belongs the convincing arguments. If He had so willed, He would have guided you all in a body." ¹

4. Part four deals with the visibility of God. Al-Juwayni, with Ahl-al-Haqq, believes that God is visible to men. The intellectual proof they give for the possibility of the visibility of God is that God is existent, and every existent is visible. The proof of the visibility of God in Paradise is the verse: "Faces that day shall be beaming." ² The visibility is by eye and not by mind. The verse: "Sight reaches not to Him" ³ does not mean that He is invisible, because conceiving is not seeing. Conceiving means that God is determined and God is not determined. The verse: "Thou wilt not see me" ⁴ proves that there is a visibility of God, because the verb to see is used. It is used in the negative form because of the circumstances in which the verse was said. Al-Juwayni believes that if a prophet affirms an attribute to God, it is absurd to think that he is ignorant about it. The prophet can ignore the future, which is unknown to mankind, but never a detail concerning the beliefs, such as the attributes of God.

1. Q. vi / 148, 149 / 149, 150.

2. Q. LXXV / 22, 23.

3. Q. vi / 103

4. Q. vii / 143 / 139

Thus the verse of Mūsā contains the idea of the visibility of God.

5. In part five, al-Juwaynī studies the relation between the Creator and the creatures. He affirms that God is the Creator and is quite different from the created. Many verses from the Qur'ān affirm the same idea such as: "To Allah do obeisance, all who are in the heavens, and the earth willingly or of constraint, their shadows too in morning and in the evenings."¹

Al-Juwaynī gives some arguments. He says that acts are proofs of the knowledge of the actor. Most of the people act without knowing what they are doing and why they are doing it. If they were the creator of their acts, they would have known what they were doing. Al-Juwaynī affirms that men still are not determined in their acts. They are free to do what they want to do - they feel it. Thus acts are not necessary. Man should always accomplish the commands of God, which are necessary. Those who accomplish the necessary commands should not be recompensed, because it is a duty to do it.

6. Part six deals with the apostleship, the prophethood and the miracles. Al-Juwaynī believes that God sends the prophets. In answer to those who deny the prophecy, al-Juwaynī says that the

1. Q. XIII/15/16

commands should be external to the "self" because man is usually inattentive. Sometimes he is unable to see what he has to do. And prophecy is not absurd; it is possible. Thus the reason can accept the idea of prophecy.

Miracles, which are unnatural acts, are proofs of the truth of the prophets. Al-Juwaynī explains this by an example: "If a king presents a missionary to the people, he expects the people to believe the missionary. In order to establish proof of his power, the missionary commands the king to get up. If the king gets up, people will believe the missionary, and will obey him as a representative of the king."

The prophet Muḥammad has miracles. The Qur'ān is one of them.

The Qur'ān is a miracle because of its style, which is unique. Al-Juwaynī asserts that the Qur'ān is a miracle also because it contains the history of every early people. The prophet was not cultured; in fact, he was an illiterate man. It is also a miracle because it contains some prophecies about the future, which, in fact, did happen later. Other miracles are also recorded.

7. The seventh part deals with the Imamate. Al-Juwaynī speaks about the Khulafā'-ar-Rāshidūn, that the prophet did not mention anyone to be his successor, and that the Imam was elected according to the consensus of Muslims. Al-Juwaynī mentions the conditions of the Imamate.

THE TEXT

لمع الأدلة
في قواعد عقائد اهل السنة والجماعة
لامام الحرمين

(١) لمع في قواعد اهل السنة والجماعة لامام الحرمين (١)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

(٢) وبه ثقتي وهو حسبي وكفى (٢)

الحمد لله العليم القاهر الحكيم الذي وجب

له القدم واستحال في تعاليه (٣) تجويز العدم

(٤) والصلاة على النبي (٤) مبيد الباطل وموضح الحق بواضحات الدلائل

هذا وقد استدعيتم ارشدكم (٥) الله (عز وجل) (٦) ذكر لمع

(من الادلة) (٧) في قواعد عقائد اهل السنة والجماعة

فاستخرت الله تعالى في اسعافكم بمنام والله

المستعان وعليه التكلان .

١٥١ - ب : " بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر عن يا كريم . كتاب

اللمع من تصانيف الامام الكبير امام الحرمين ابي المعالي قدس

الله روحه العزيز . للعبد المذنب ابي زين اسماعيل بن

ابراهيم بن الفرج الغنوي اللهم فقهه في الدين برحمتك يا

عزيز يا غفور برحمتك يا ارحم الراحمين "

٢٥٢ - ساقط من : ب .

٣ - ~~ساقط من : ب .~~

٤٥٤ - ساقط من : ب .

٥ - ق : " اشدكم " وهو تحريف والتصحيح من : ب ٥ ش .

٧٥٦ - زيادة من : ب .

١ - العالم وحدوثه

(١) الاصل في حدوث العالم ووجود الصانع (١)
اعلموا - وفقكم الله (٢) - ان الاولى تقديم (٣) عبارات
اصطلاح الموحدون عليها ابتغاء (٤) منهم لجمع المعاني الكثيرة
في الالفاظ الوجيزة (٥)

فما اطلقوه (٦) العالم

فان قيل : ما العالم ولم سمي العالم : عالما ؟

قلنا : العالم - عند سلف الامة : عبارة عن (٦) كل
موجود سوى الله تعالى (٧)

(٨) وعند خلف الامة : عبارة عن الجواهر والاعراض (٨)

(٩) فاما قوله : " لهم سمي العالم : عالما ؟ "

فاما : " العلم " : فمشتق من العلم ، والعلامة .

وانما سمي " العلم " : علما ، لانه اشارة منصوبة على وجود صاحب
العلم فكذلك " العالم " بجواهره واعراضه واجزائه وابعاضه -
دلالة دالة على وجود الرب سبحانه وتعالى (٩)

١٥١ - ب : " مسألة القول في حدث العالم " وفي ش : " القول في حدث
العالم " .

٢٥٢ - ساقط من : ش ، وبدله في : ب : " ثم " .

٣٥٣ - ش : " الاولى بالتقديم تفسير " .

٤ - ب ، ش : " روما " .

٥ - ش : (الفاظ وجيزة)

٦٥٦ - ب : " في العالم هوانه " وفي ش : " وهو " .

٧ - ساقط من ب " تعالى " .

٨٥٨ - ب : " ثم العالم ينقسم الى الجواهر والاعراض " .

٢٠٤

في ش: "ثم العالم ينقسم الى جواهر واعراض"
١٥١ - ب و ش: ساط

فان قيل : ما حد الجوهر وما حقيقة العرض ؟
قلنا : قد ذكرت له حدوداً شتى - غير انا نقصر
على ثلاثة منها - فنقول :

الجوهر (١) : المتحيز

وقيل : الجوهر - ماله حجم

وقيل : الجوهر - ما يقبل العرض

فاما العرض فقد قيل : ما يقوم بالجوهر (١)

وقيل (٢) : ما يطرأ على الجواهر (٢) : كالالوان والطعموم
والروائح والعلوم والقدر - والارادات الحادثة وازدادها والحياة
والموت (٣)

(٤) وقيل : العرض : ما يستحيل عليه البقاء .

ثم اعلم ان الموجود : ينقسم الى قديم وحادث .

فالقديم : هو الموجود الذي لا اول لوجوده

والحادث : هو (الموجود) الذي له اول (٤)

(٥) فان قيل : ما الدليل على حدوث العالم ؟

قلنا : الدليل عليه - ان اجرام العالم واجسامها

١٤١ - ب : ذكرت مع تقديم وتأخير وشي من انتصرف اللفظي مما لا يخل

بالمعنى ش : " فالجوهر كل ماله حجم - وقيل هو المتميز -

وقيل هو المستغني عن المحل - وقيل هو القابل للاعراض -

وقيل ما له حظ من المساحة

٢٤٢ - ب : ساقط

٣٤٣ - زيادة من : ب .

٤٤٤ - ساقط من ب وفي ش : مخلوط بالشرح

٥٤٥ - ب : " ثم حدث الجواهر ينبني على اصول " ش : " ثم حدث

الجواهر ينبني على اصول " .

لا تخلوعن الاعراض الحادثة وما لا يخلوعن الحادث حادث
السؤال على هذا الكلام من اربعة اوجه : (٥)

(١) الاول - لا نسلم بثبوت الاعراض

ولئن سلمنا ثبوت الاعراض فلا نسلم حدوثها

ولئن سلمنا حدوثها فلا نسلم استحالة خلو الجوهر عن هذه
الاعراض الحادثة

والرابع - لم قلت : ان ما لا يخلوعن الحادث حادث (١) ؟

(٢) ما السؤال الاول : انكار ثبوت الاعراض

الدليل على ثبوت الاعراض - ان العاقل اذا رأى جوهرًا

سلكناه ثم رآه متحركًا فقد ادرك التفرقة الضرورية (١٨ او)

بين هاتين الحالتين .

وتلك التفرقة لا تخلو :

اما ان ترجع الى ذات الجوهر

او الى معنى زائد على الجوهر ؟

واستحال ان يقال : ترجع التفرقة الى ذات الجوهر ،

(١٥ -) - ب و ش : " . . . منها - اثبات الاعراض . ومنها اثبات

حدث الاعراض - ومنها اثبات استحالة تعرى الجواهر عن

الاعراض ومنها استحالة حوادث لا اول لها ومنها - ان ما

لا يسبق الحوادث حادث . "

وفي ش : " منها اثبات الاعراض ومنها اثبات حدث الاعراض

ومنها اثبات استحالة تعرى الجواهر عن الاعراض . ومنها -

استحالة حوادث لا اول لها . فاذا ثبت هذا فنقول ما لا يخلو

عن الحوادث لا يسبقها وما لا يسبق الحوادث فهو حادث "

(٢٤٢) - ب : " فاما الاصل الاول - (في اثبات وجود الاعراض) فقد انكرت طائفة من الملحدة : الاعراض ، وزعموا ان لا موجود الا الجوهر . والدليل على اثبات الاعراض : انا رأينا الجوهر ساكنا ثم نراه متحركا فنندرك (فانا ندرك (في ش)) تفرقة ضرورة (ساقط من ش) بين الحالتين - ولا يقع الافتراق الا بين ذاتيين ، اذ الشيء لا يخالف نفسه . فوضح بذلك ان التفرقة آيلة الى الاعراض الزائدة (ش : زائدة) على الجوهر - ثم معظم الاعراض مدركة على الضرورة - فان العاقل اذا طرأت عليه الالام واعتزته الاسقام (اسقام) او نالته لذات ، او ارهقته شهوات او ادرك علوما - فانه يستيقن طرؤ هذه المعاني على البدئية . - يلاحظ ان الفروقات بين ب و ش طفيفة وقد اثبتها .

لان الجوهر (في الحالتين) متحد ، والشيء لا يخالف نفسه ،
فلا يقع الافتراق ، الا بين ذاتين ، فصح ووضح بذلك ان التفرقة
راجعة الى معنى زائد على الجوهر ، وذلك هو العرض الذي
ادعيناه

(١) والسؤال الثاني : منع حدوث الاعراض .

والدليل على حدوث الاعراض — انا نرى الاعراض المتضادة
تتعاقب على محالها ، فنستيقن حدوث الطارئ منها ، من حيث
وجدت ، ونعلم حدوث السابق منها ، من حيث عدمت

اذ لو كانت قديمة لاستحال عدمها ، لان القدم ينافي العدم

وان كل : وانما . تح .

وان (*) ما ثبت له القدم ، استحال عليه العدم (١)

(٢) والدليل على استحالة تعري الجواهر عن الاعراض :
ان الجواهر شاذة للاحياز ، والجواهر الشاذة للاحياز لا تعمل
مجتمعة ولا مفترقة بحال .

بل باضطرار يعلم انها لا تخلو عن كونها مجتمعة او

مفترقة ؟ وذلك يقضى باستحالة خلوها عن الاجتماع والافتراق .

١٥١ — ب و ش : " واما الاصل الثاني — وحدث الاعراض .

والدليل عليه : انا نرى الاعراض المتضادة متعاقبة على
محالها وتستيقن حدوث الطارئ منها . ونعلم ايضا حدوث
السوابق من حيث عدمت ، اذ لو ثبت قدمها لاستحال عدمها "

٢٥٢ — ب و ش : " واما الاصل الثالث فهو تبين استحالة تعري

الجواهر عن الاعراض . والدليل عليه : ان الجواهر الشاذة
للاحياز لا تعمل الا مجتمعة ، ولا مفترقة ، بل بالاضطرار نعلم
(نعلم بالاضطرار) انها لا تخلو من كونها مجتمعة او مفترقة ،

وذلك يقضي باستحالة خلوها من الاجتماع والافتراق وكذلك
نعلم ببديهية العقول استحالة تعرى الاجرام عن الاتصاف
بالتحرك والسكون • والتأثير (ش: واللبث) في الحال والنزول
والانتقال • وكل ذلك يوضح استحالة تعريها عن الاعراض •
— يلاحظ ان الفروقات بين ب ه ش طفيفة وقد اثبتتها •

(*) و إن ما : و إنما : ق

وكذلك نعلم ببديهية العقول : استحالة تعرى الاجرام عن الاتصاف بالتحرك والسكون ، واللبث في المحال ، والنزوال والانتقال .
وكل ذلك يوضح استحالة تعرى الجواهر عن الاعراض .^(٢)

(١) والدليل على استحالة حوادث لا اول لها :

ان حقيقة الحادث : ماله اول . واذا كان حقيقة كل حادث ان يكون له اول ، فان كثرة الحوادث لا تخرج عن حقيقتها ، فيكون للكل اول

وهذا كالجوهر - فان حقيقة الجوهر كونه متحيزا ، فالكرة لا تخرج عن حقيقته ، ويكون الكل متحيزا ، فكذلك ههنا .
اذا ثبت الاعراض ، وثبت حدوثها ، وثبت تعرى الجواهر عنها ، وبطل قول الدهري : بان الحوادث لا اول لها ، فيترتب على ذلك ان الجواهر لا تسبق الاعراض الحادثة وما لا يسبق الحادث حادث على الاضطرار ، من غير حاجة الى نظر وافتكار (١)

(٢) والدليل على ان العالم له صانع (٢) :

١٥١ - ب هـ ش : " واما الاصل الرابع - وهو ايضاح استحالة حوادث لا اول لها . والدليل عليه (على ذلك) : ان دورات الافلاك تتعاقب (وتتوالى) وتقع كل دورة (منها) على اثر انقضاء السبق قبلها . فلو انقضت (كانت) قبل الدورة التي قبلها (نحن فيها) دورات لا نهاية لاعدادها ، ولا غاية لاحادها لكان ذلك مؤديا لما لا نهاية له (لما كان مؤدنا بتناهيها) ان ملا يحصره عدد ولا يضبطه امد ولا يتقرر في العقول انقضاؤه م لا يتحقق انتهاؤه - فلما انقضت الدورات قبل الدورة

الناجزة (التأخرة) دل ذلك على نهاية اعدادها واذا
تاهت انتهت الى اول . ونفرض هذا الدليل ، ونقرر هذا
السييل في جملة متعاقبات ، كالأولاد والوالدين والبذر
والزرع ونحوها .

واذا ثبتت هذه المقدمات ، ثبتت عليها (ترتب) استحالة
خلو الجواهر عن الحوادث المسندة الى اول ، وما لا يخلو
عن الحوادث ، حادث على الاضطرار - من غير حاجة الى
نظر واعتبار " .

تلاحظ الفروق بين ب ه ش كما نلاحظ التشابه بين هذا
الكلام وبين ما يقوله : امام الحرمين في كتاب الارشاد ص ٢٥
(طبعة القاهرة)
كانت في الاصل هكذا " — ٠٠٠ — ٠٠٠ " .

٢٦٢ - ب ه ش : " فصل في اثبات العلم بالصانع " ~~ص ٢٦٢~~ .

(١) انه قد صح حدوث العالم بالدلالة التي ذكرناها (١)
 (٢) والحادث جائز الوجود (٢) ، اذ يجوز تقدير وجوده (٣) بدلا (٤)
 عن عدمه (٤) ، ويجوز تقدير (استمرار) (٦) عدمه بدلا (٨) عن
 وجوده (٨) (٩) فلما اختص (٩) بالوجود الممكن (١٠) بدلا عن
 العدم الجائز (١٠) ، افتقر (١١) الى مخصص (١٢) وهو الصانع
 تعالى (١٢) .

(١٣) ويستحيل ان يكون (١٤) مخصص العالم (١٤) طبيعة : كما
 صارت اليه الطبائعيون .

(١٥) ويستحيل ان يكون علة موجبة - كما صارت اليه الاوائل
 لان تلك الطبيعة لا تخلو : اما ان تكون قديمة ، او حادثة؟ (١٥)

(١٦) فان كانت قديمة ، ولم قدم آثارها ، فان الطبيعة عند
 مثبتها لا اختيار لها ، وهي موجبة آثارها - عند ارتفاع
 العوانع (وانقطاع الدوافع) وقد صح حدوثها (١٦)

وان كانت الطبيعة (١٧) حادثة ، افتقرت الى طبيعة (١٨)
 اخرى (١٨) ثم الكلام (١٩) في تلك الطبيعة ، كاللحم في تلك
 الطبيعة ، كاللحم في هذه الطبيعة (١٩) .

(٢٠) وينساق هذا القول (٢٠) الى اثبات حوادث لا اول لها ،
 وقد تبين بطلان ذلك .

(٢١) فوضح بذلك (٢١) ان مخصص العالم : صانع ، مختاره
 موصوف بالاعتدال والاختيار .

-
- ٢٥٢ - ب و ش " وهي جائزة الوجود "
- ٣ - ب و ش : " وجودها " .
- ٤٤٤ - ساقط من ب و ش .
- ٥ - ساقط من ش
- ٦ - زيادة من ب و ش
- ٧ - ب و ش : العدم
- ٨٥٨ - ب و ش : " من الوجود "
- ٩٥٩ - ب : " فاذا اختصت " .
- ١٠٥١٠ - ساقط من ب و ق
- ١١ - ب و ش : " افتقرت "
- ١٤١٢ - ساقط من ب و ش .
- ١٣ - في ب : ساقط
- ١٤٥١٤ - ب : " المخصص " و ش ايضا .
- ١٥٥١٥ - من ب ساقط
- ١٦٥١٦ - ذكر في ب و ش مع تقديم وتأخير " فان الطبيعة عند مثبتها لا اختيار لها وهو آثارها عند ارتفاع الموانع وانقضاء الدوافع ، فان كانت الطبيعة قديمة لنم قدم آثارها وقد وضع حدث العالم " كانت في (ق) زيادة من (ب)
- ١٧ - ساقط من ب
- ١٨٥١٨ - " ب محدث " —
- ١٩٥١٩ - ب " كاللحم فيها "
- ٢٠٥٢٠ - في ب : يودى القول .
- ٢١٥٢١ - ب " ووضح "

٢ - الله وصفاته

- صانع العالم : ازلي الوجود ، قديم الذات ، لا (١) مفتتح لوجوده ، ولا مبتدأ لثبوته (١) .
- والدليل عليه (٢) : انه تعالى (٣) لو كان حادثا لشارك الحوادث في الافتقار الى محدث .
- ثم (٤) الكلام في محدثه ينزل منزلة الكلام فيه (٤) (ويتسلسل القول) (٥) ويؤدي (٦) ذلك (٧) الى اثبات (٨) حوادث لا اول لها .
- وقد سبق (٩) بطلان ذلك (٩)

- ١٥١ - ب : وردت هذه العبارة بتقديم الجملة الاولى على الثانية واستبدال لفظ لثبوته بلفظ لازليته = وفي ش : وردت العبارة كما هي مع استبدال لفظ "مفتتح" بلفظ "مبتدأ" ولفظ "مبتدأ" بلفظ "مفتتح" .
- ٢ - ساقط من ش
- ٣ - ساقط من ب و ش
- ٤٤٤ - ب و ش "ثم يلزم في محدثه ما يلزم فيه"
- ٥ - زيادة من ب
- ٦ - ب و ش "ويفضى"
- ٧ - ساقط من ب و ش
- ٨ - ساقط من ب
- ١٥٩ - ب : "وقد سبق القول والدليل على استحالة ذلك" وفي ش : استحالة ذلك .

فصل

(١) صانع العالم (١) : حى ، عالم بجميع المعلومات ، قادر على جميع القدرات

فانا ببداهة العقول - نعلم استحالة صدور الافعال من (٢) العاجز عنها .

وكذلك يستيقن كل لبيب : ان الافعال المحكمة (٣) المتقنة (٤) الواقعة على احسن ترتيب ونظام (واتقان واحكام) (٥) لا تصدر الا من (٦) عالم بها ،

ومن جوز صدور (٧) خط منظوم على ترتيب معلوم - من غير عالم بالخط : كان من (٨) المعقول (٩) خارجا ، وفي تيه الجهل والجأ

واذا ثبت (١٠) كون صانع العالم : (١١) عالما ، قادرا (١١) فبالاضطرار يعلم كونه حيا ، اذ يستحيل ان يتصف بالعلم ، والقدرة : ميتا ، او جمادا (١٢) وتجويز ذلك : مراغمة ، وهناد .

١٥١ -	ب :	" البارى تعالى "
٢ -	ب :	" عن "
٣ -	ساقط من ب :	
٤ -	ش :	" المتقنة المعنى "
٥ -	زيادة من ب ، ش :	
٦ -	ب :	" عن "
٧ -	ش :	" ترتيب "
٨ -	ق ، هـ :	" هن "
٩ -	ش :	" سنن العقول "
١٠ -	ب و ش :	" استبان "

۹ x ۱

۱۱۶۱۱ - ب و ش: "قادرا، عالما"

۱۲ - ب "فتجوینز"

فصل

صانع العالم : مرید (١) على الحقيقة (١) — عند اهل الحق (٢)

وانكر الكعبى : كونه مریدا على الحقيقة — وزعم (٣) : انه تعالى (عن قوله) (٤) لو (٥) و (٦) صف بكونه مریدا لانفعال نفسه ، فالمراد بذلك : انه خالقها ، ومنشئها .

ولو وصف بكونه مریدا لبعض اعمال العباد فالمراد بذلك انه امر بها (٦) .

وزعم : ان كون الاله عالما بوقوع الحوادث في اوقاتها على خصائص صفاتها — يفتى (٧) عن تعلق الارادة (٨) بها .

وهذا باطل — ان لو اغنى كونه عالما ، عن كونه مریداً ، لاغنى كونه عالماً (٩) ، عن كونه قادراً — (١٠) وليس كذلك (١٠) .

وايضا (١١) : قد وافقونا (١٢) على افتقار افعال المحدثين الى ارادتهم . (١٣)

١٥١	—	ساقط من ب
٢	—	ساقط من ش
٣	—	ب : " فزعم "
٤	—	زيادة من ب
٥	—	ب و ش : " اذا "
٦٥٦	—	وردت هذه العبارة في ب و ش : مع تقديم وتأخير واستبدلت (بذلك) بقوله " به " وسقطت " بعض " من ب و ش
٧	—	ش : " معنى "
٨	—	ب " الارادات "
٩٥٩	—	ساقط من ش

۱۰ × ۱۰

-
- ۱۰۵۱۰ - ساقط من ب و ش
۱۱۵۱۱ - ساقط من ش
۱۲۵۱۲ - ب : " وقد وافقنا " وفي ش : " وقد اتفقنا "
۱۳ - ب : ارادتها .

فصل (١)

- ذهب^(٢) محتلة البصرة الى ان البارى تعالى مرید بارادة^(٣) حادثة (ثابتة)^(٤) لا في محل .
والذى قالوه باطل : لان^(٥) الحوادث انما^(٦) افتقرت الى ارادة لحدوثها^(٧) .
ولو^(٨) كانت^(٩) الارادة حادثة لافتقرت ايضا الى ارادة اخرى لحدوثها^(٩) .
ثم يؤدى اثبات^(١٠) ذلك الى اثبات ارادات لا نهاية لها .
فاذا بطلت هذه المذاهب: لم يبق^(١١) — بعد ذلك^(١١) الا القطع بما صار اليه اهل الحق ومن وصف البارى^(١٢) سبحانه وتعالى^(١٢) بكونه مریدا بارادة قديمة ازلية .

- ١ — هذا الفصل جا" في ب بعد قوله : "فصل صانع العالم مرید عند اهل الحق واحد الذى جا" ذكره في ق في صفحة ١٥ من نسختنا هذه . وهذا راجع الى عدم الترتيب الذى رجحت عليه أوراق المجموعة التى بها هذه النسخة رقد سبق أن أشرت الى ذلك فى موضعه من المقدمة (انظر صفحة (ii) عند التعويض لوصف "ب"
- ٢ — ب : "ذهبت"
٣ — ب : "بارادات"
٤ — زيادة من ب و ش
٥ — ب "فان"
٦ — ب : "اذا"
٧ — ساقط من ب وبدلها في ش . "اخرى"
٨ — ساقط من ب
٩ ٥ ٩ — وردت في ب هكذا : — "كانت الارادة حادثة فهي ايضا مفتقرة لحدوثها الى ارادة . وفي ش : "ثم تلك الارادة الى ارادة"
٥

خ ۱۱

-
- ۱۰ - زیادة من ب و ق
۱۱۶۱۱ - ب ه ش: "بعدها"
۱۲۶۱۲ - ب: "عز وجل" - ساقط من ش •

فصل

صانع العالم : سمیع و (١) بصیر متکلم

اذ قد ثبت كونه حيا • والحي لا يخلو عن الانصاف

بالسمع والبصر والكلام وازدادها (٢)

وازداد هذه الصفات نقائص •

والرب - (٣) سبحانه وتعالى (٣) - يتقدس عن سمات النقص

١ - "و" ساقط من ب

٢ - ساقط من ش

٣٥٣ - ب : "عز وجل"

فصل

- الرب - (١) سبحانه وتعالى (١) - باق واجب الوجود
- ان قد ثبت - بما قدمناه - قدمه
- والقديم يستحيل عدمه - بل اتفاق من العقلاء ، وذلك
- تصرح بكونه باقيا (١١٩ او) مستمر الوجود

١٥١ - ب : عز وجل

٢ - ب "قدمناه" وفي ش : "وتقدم"

٣ - ث : "يُصرح"

فصل (١)

صانع العالم: (٢) واحد - عند اهل الحق (٢)

(٣) والواحد الحقيقي: هو الشيء الذي لا ينقسم (٣)

والدليل على وحدانية الآله: انا لو قدرنا الهين اثنين (٤)

وفرضنا (٥) عرضين ضدين (٦) وقدرنا ارادة احدهما لاحد

الضدين (٦) و (٧) و ارادة الثاني للثاني (٧) - (٨) فلا يخلو من

امور ثلاثة:

اما ان تنفذ ارادتهما

او لا تنفذ ارادتهما

او تنفذ ارادة احدهما دون الاخر (٨)

(٩) واستحال ان ينفذ ارادتهما ولاستحالة اجتماع الضدين .

واستحال ايضا الا تنفذ ارادتهما ولتعارض الاليهين وخلو

الحل عن كلا الضدين (٩) .

(١٠) فاذا ابطال القسمان تعين الثالث (١٠):

(١١) وهو ان تنفذ ارادة احدهما دون الاخر:

فالذى لا تنفذ ارادته فهو المغلوب المقهور المستكروه .

والذى نفذت ارادته فهو الآله القادر على تحصيل ما يشاء .

١ - تقدم ذكر هذا الفصل في ب: قبل "فصل: ذهبت معتزلة

البصرة... وفي ش: فصل في الوجدانية .

٢٥ ٢ - ب: "عند اهل الحق واحد ."

٢٥ ٣ - ب وش: "وحقيقة الواحد الذي لا ينقسم"

٤ - ساقط من ب و ش

٥ - ب: "وقدرنا"

١٤ X

-
- ٦٥٦ - ب و ش: " فان جوزنا ارادة احدهما لاحد الضدين " .
٧٥٧ - ساقط من ش
٨٥٨ - ساقط من ب و ش

فان قيل :

لم لا يجوز ان يتوافقا ابدا ، ولا يختلفا قط ؟

قلنا :

ان لم نجوز اختلافهما في الارادة كان محالا (١) :

ان (مع) (١) وجود احدهما ، ووجود صفاته ، يستحيل ان يمنع الثاني من ان يريد ما يصح ارادته (٢) عند تقدير الانفراد والعاجز منحط (٣) عن رتبة الربوبية (٤) وذلك مضمون قوله تعالى (٤) " لو كان فيهما آلهة الا الله لفسدتا (٥) " .
اي (٦) : لتناقض احكامهما عند تقدير القادرين على الكمال .

٩٤٩ - ب و ش : " استحال نفوذ ارادتهما واستحال ان لا تنفذ ارادتهما جميعا ، لامتناع وجود ضدتين والخلو عنهما " .

١٠٤١ - ساقط من ب و ش

١١٤١١ - ب و ش : " وان نفذت ارادة احدهما كان الثاني مغلوبا مستكرها ، وان لم نجوز اختلافهما في الارادة كان محالا " .

١ - زيادة من ب

٢ - كانت في ق : " اردته " .

٣ - ب و ش : والعاجز عن رتبة الالهية منحط

٤ - ب : " عزولا " .

٥ - (آية ٢٢ سورة ٢١ -)

٦ - ب : " معناه " .

فصل

(١) القديم (البارى سبحانه و) (٢) تعالى :

عالم بعلم قديم ، قادر بقدره قديمة ، حي بحياة قديمة .
 وذهب (٣) المعتزلة الى ان (٤) البارى (٥) تعالى عن قولهم : (٥)
 حي (٦) عالم قادر (٦) بنفسه (٧) . وليس له قدرة ولا علم ولا
 حياة (٨) .

(٩) دليلنا في المسألة ان نقول (٩) :

قد تقرر (١٠) في العقول - ان ما يعلم به المعلوم علم
 فلو علم البارى تعالى (١١) المعلوم بنفسه ، لكان نفسه
 علماً ، اذ كل (١٢) متعلق بمعلوم تعلق احاطة به (١٣) علم
 ثم (١٤) قد تحكمت المعتزلة في صفات البارى (١٥) تعالى -
 فزعمت (١٦) : انه (١٧) عالم حي (١٧) قادر بنفسه (١٨) ، مرید
 بارادة حادثة

(١٩) فلو عكس عاكس ما قالوه ، وزعم : انه عالم بعلم حادته
 مرید بنفسه (٢٠) - لم يجدوا بين ما اعتقدوه (٢٠) وبين ما
 الزمواهم (٢٢) .

فصل

فان قالوا :

لو كان البارى تعالى (٢٣) مریداً بنفسه (٢٤) ، لكان مریداً لكل مراد

-
- ١ - ش " البارى "
 ٢ - ب و ش : " سبحانه "

٣	- ب : " وذهبت "
٤	- ساقط في ش
٥٥٥	- ساقط في ب
٦٦٦	- ورد في ب بتقديم وتأخير " قادره عالم حي "
٧	- ش : " لنفسه "
٨٦٨	- ش : " حياة وعلم وقدره "
٩٦٩	- ب و ش : " و "
١٠	- ش : " تحقق "
١١	- ب و ش : " سبحانه "
١٢	- ش : " و "
١٣	- ب : في ب وردت بعد " علم "
١٤	- كانت في ق : " و "
١٥١٥	- ب : " الرب "
١٦	- ش : " وزعمت "
١٧١٧	- ب : " حي عالم "
١٨	- ش : (لنفسه)
١٩	- ش : " ولو "
٢٠	- ب و ش : " لنفسه "
٢١	- ش : " سبحانه " " قدره "
٢٢	- ب و ش : " الزمونه "
٢٣	- ش : " سبحانه "
٢٤	- ب و ش : " لنفسه "

كما انه تعالى (١) لما كان عالما بنفسه (٢) ، كان عالما بكل (٣) معلوم (٤) (والمعلومات كلها معلومة له) (٥)

قلنا :

(٦) هو باطل ، على فساد مذهبكم ومعتقدكم يكون البارى تعالى قادرا (٦) ، فان ذلك من صفات النفس (عندكم) (٧) .
ثم يختص كون الاله قادرا - عندكم (٨) - ببعض القدرات .
ولا يتصف الرب (عز وجل) (٩) بالاعتدال على مقدرات العباد (١٠) .
وقد صرح نصوص من كتاب الله تعالى باثبات (١١) الصفات ،
منها : (١٢) قوله (سبحانه و) (١٣) تعالى : " وما تحمل من
اشئ ولا تضع الا بعلمه " (١٤)

(١٥) وقال عز من قائل (١٥) : " انزله بعلمه " (١٦) .
وقال سبحانه (١٧) متمدحا (١٨) مثنيا على نفسه :
" ان الله هو الرزاق ذو القوة المتين " (١٩)

(٢٠) اثبت لنفسه القوة (٢٠) ، وهي القدرة ، باتفاق المفسرين

-
- ١ - ساقط من ش .
٢ - ب و ش : " لنفسه " .
٣ - ب " بكل " .
٤ - ش : " المعلومات " .
٥ - زيادة من ب .
٦ ٦ - كان في ق : " هذا ما باطل على فاسد . معتقدكم يكون
الاله قادرا
٧ - زيادة من ب .
٨ - ب و ش : " على زعمكم " .

-
- ٩ - زيادة من ب . وفي ش " تعالی "
- ١٠ - زيادة من ب ه ش
- ١١ - ب : " على اثبات . "
- ١٢ - ب و ش : " فمئها "
- ١٣ - زيادة من ب
- ١٤ - سورة ٣٥ (فاطر) : ١١
- ١٥٦١٥ - ب : " وقال تعالی " وهذه العبارة ساقط في ش
- ١٦ - (٤/١٦٦ - النساء)
- ١٧ - ش : " تعالی "
- ١٨ - ب : " ممتدحا "
- ١٩ - (٥٨/٥١ الذاريات)
- ٢٠٦٢٠ - ساقط من ب - وفي ش : " فأثبت لنفسه القوة . "

فصل

وقد ذكرنا : ان البارى تعالى : متكلم
 فاعلم (الان) (١) ان كلامه (٢) : قديم ، ازلي (٢) (لا مبتدأ
 لوجوده) (٣)
 وذهب (٤) المعتزلة ، والنجارية ، والزيدية ، والامامية ، والخوارج
 الى (٥) ان كلام الله (٦) تعالى : حادث .
 (١١٩ ظ) وامتنعت (٧) طوائف - من هؤلاء - من (٨) اطلاق
 القول بكونه مخلوقا ، (٩) تسموه : حادثا (و) محدثا .
 واطلق المتأخرون - من المعتزلة - قولهم بكونه مخلوقا (٩)
 والدليل على قدم كلام الله تعالى (الاتفاق على انه متكلم بكلام) (١٠)
 انه لو كان (كلامه) (١١) حادثا : لم يخل من امور (ثلاثة) (١٢) :
 اما (ان) (١٣) يقوم بذات البارى تعالى
 او يقوم (١٤) بجسم من الاجسام .
 او يقوم (١٥) لا بمحل .
 بطل (١٦) قيامة به ، (١٧) ان يستحيل قيام الحوادث بذات
 البارى (١٧) تعالى ، (١٨) فان الحوادث لا تقوم الا بحادث (١٨)

-
- ١ - زائدة من ب
 ٢٥٢ - ب "كلامه : ازلي ، قديم" وفي ش: "كلام الله تعالى : قديم
 ازلي ."
 ٣ - زيادة من ب
 ٤ - ب . " وذهبت"
 ٥ - ساقط من ب
 ٦ - ب : "البارى" وفي ش: "الله سبحانه وتعالى ."

-
- ٧ - ش : " امتنع "
- ٨ - ب : " عن "
- ٩٤٩ - ساقط من ش
- زيادة من ب : " و "
- ~~زيادة من ب~~ : " و "
- ب : " بأنه "
- ١٠ - زيادة من ب
- ١١٤١١ - ب : " فلو كان كلامه حادثاً . "
- ١٢ - زيادة من ش
- ١٣ - زيادة من ب
- ١٤ - ساقط من ب و ش
- ١٥ - ساقط من ش
- ١٦ - ب ء ش : " باطل "
- ١٧٤١٧ - ب : " ان يستحيل قيام الحوادث بذاته " . وفي ش :
- " فان الحوادث يستحيل قيامها بذاته سبحانه "
- ١٨٤١٨ - ب : " ولا تقوم الحوادث الا بحادث " وفي ش : " فانه
لا تقوم الحوادث الا بحادث . "

(١) ويطل قيام كلامه بجسم ، اذ يلزم ان يكون المتكلم ذلك
الجسم (١)

ويطل قيام (٢) الكلام بلا محل ، (٣) فان الكلام الحادث (٣)
عرض من الاعراض ، ويستحيل قيام الاعراض بانفسها ، اذ لو جاز
ذلك في ضرب منها ، لزم (٤) في سائرهما .

١٥١ - ب : " ولو قام كلامه لكان المتكلم المتكلم به "

وفي ش : " لو قام بجسم ، لكان المتكلم به "

٢ - ش : " وجود "

٣٥٣ - ب ، ش : " لانه "

٤ - ب : " لجاز ذلك . "

فصل

الكلام الحقيقي ، شاهداً (١) ، حديث النفس (٢) ،
 وهو الذي تدل عليه العبارات المتواضع عليها .
 وقد تدل عليه : الخطوط والرموز والاشارات .
 وكل ذلك امارات على الكلام القائم بالنفس ، ولذلك قال الاخطل (٣)
 ان الكلام لفي الفؤاد وانما جعل اللسان على الفؤاد (٤)
 دليلاً .

ومن الشواهد على ذلك (٥) :
 كتاب الله (٦) عز وجل (٦) في الاخبار عن المنافقين (٧) قوله تعالى :
 " اذا جاءك المنافقون (٧) قالوا: نشهد : انك لرسول الله (٨)
 الآية (٨) ونحن نعلم ان الله تعالى لم (٩) يكذبهم في اقرارهم ،
 وانما يكذبهم فيما تجنه سرائرهم (و) تنكته ضمائرهم (٩) .
 (وقوله سبحانه : "ويقولون في انفسهم " الآية .) (١٠)
 واذا ثبت ان القائم بالنفس : كلام ، وليس هو حروفاً (١١)
 منتظمة ولا (١٢) اصواتاً مقطعة (١٢) من مخارج الحروف ،
 فليستبقن (١٣) الماقل : ان (١٤) الكلام القديم (١٤) : ليس
 بحروف ، ولا (١٥) اصوات ،

١ - ش : " شاهداً هو . "

٢ - ش : " للنفس " .

٣ - هو غياث بن غوث بن الصلت احد بني جسم بن بكرثم احد بني
 تغلب وكنيته ابو مالك . ولد حوال سنة ٦٤١ هـ وهو شاعر عظيم
 من شعراء الدولة الاموية وكان نصرانياً (عن شرح شذور الذهب لابن
 هشام سنة ٧٦١ هـ بتحقيق الشيخ محمد محيي الدين عبدالحميد -
 الطبعة الخامسة سنة ١٣٧١ هـ ١٩٥١ م بصفحة ٢٨ منه)

٣ م - قال الاخطل : - لا يعجبنيك من خطيب خطبة ه حتى يكون
مع الكلام اصيلا ان الكلام لفي الفواد وانما ه جعل اللسان على
الفواد دليلا

(انظر شعر الاخطل ص ٥٠٨ بيرون)

٤ - ب : " الكلام "

٥ - ش : " من كتاب الله . "

٦٤٦ - ش : " تعالى قوله (

٧٤٧ - ش : ساقط من ش

- ب : " بقوله "

٨ - ب : (٦٣/١ المنافقون)

٨ م - ب : سقط : (قالوا نشهد انك لرسول الله . "

ش : " والله يعلم انك لرسوله والله يشهد ان المنافقون لكاذبون "

٩٤٩ - ب ه ش : " لم يكذب المنافقين في الفاظهم ه بل كذبهم في ما

تجن ضمائرهم . "

١٠ - زيادة من ب و ش .

والاية هي : (٤٨/١١ الفتح) و (المجادلة ٥٨/٨)

١١ - ش : " بحروف "

١٢٤١٢ - ب و ش : " فاذا ثبت ان القائم بنفسه هو الكلام . وليس

هو بحروف منتظمة ولا اصوات متقطعة . "

١٣٤١٣ - ب ه ش : " فستبقن "

١٤٤١٤ - ش : " كلام البارى سبحانه وتعالى قديم "

١٥ - ساقط من ب

ولا الحان ولا نغمات (١) ،
فان الحروف (٢) تتوالى وتترتب (٣) ، ويقع (٤) بعضها
مسبوفا ببعض (٥) - وكل مسبوقة حادث .

-
- ١ - ساقط من ب
 - ٢ - ش : " الحروف تتعاقب وتتوالى "
 - ٣ - ساقط من ش
 - ٤ - ب : " ويقال "
 - ٥ - ب : " لبعض "

فصل

كلام (١) الله تعالى (١) مقروء بالسنة القراء ، محفوظ بحفظ (٢)
الحفظ ، مكتوب (٣) في المصاحف (على الحقيقة) (٤)

والقراءة :

• اصوات القارئ ونغماتهم .

وهي من (٥) الانفعال (٦) التي يؤمر بها ، وينهي عنها ، ويشاب

المكلف عليها ، وقد يعاقب على تركها .

وكلام الله تعالى - : هو المعلوم المفهوم منها

والحفظ : صفة الحافظ

والمخفوظ : كلام الله (٧) عز وجل (٧)

والكتابة : احرف منظومة ، واشكال مرفوعة ،

وهي : حوادث .

والمفهوم منها (٨) : كلام الله تعالى .

(وهذا) (٩) كما ان الله تعالى (١٠) : مكتوب ، معلوم ،

مذكور (١٠) ، وهو غير ذكر الذاكرين ولم العاطلين ، وكتابة (١١)

الكاتبين .

١ ٤ ١ - ب : " البارى عز وجل "

٢ - ب و ش : " في صدور "

٣ - ب : " مكتب "

٤ - زيادة من ب ، ش

٥ - مساقط من ش .

٦ - ب : " الاعمال "

٧ ٤ ٧ - ش : " تعالى "

٢٢٥

-
- ق : والمخط
- ٨ - ساقط من ب
- ٩ - زيادة من ب
- ١٠٦١٠ - ورد في ب ش بتقديم وتأخير "مذكور، معلوم، مكتوب" وفي ش
"مذكور" فقط
- ١١ - ب : "وكتاب"

يستحيل

(١) (ذكر ما يستحيل في اوصاف البارى تعالى)

(٢) يشتمل على فصول (٢)

(٣)

وجملة القول فيه :

ان كل ما يدل على الحدوث ، وعلى سمة (٤) النفس (٥) ،
فالرب (٦) (٧) يتعالى ويتقدس عنه (٧)

وهذه الجملة (١٢٠) تتبين بفصول تشتمل على تفصيلات (٨)
منها (٩) :

(١٠) ان الرب (١٠) - تعالى - متقدس (١٠) عن الاختصاص
بالجهات والاتصاف بالمحاذاة (١١) ، لا (١٢) تحيط به
الاقطار (١٢) ، ولا يكتنفه الاقدار (١٣) ، ويجل عن قبول الحد
والمقدار .

والدليل على ذلك :

ان كل مختص بجهة (١٤) شاغل لها : (وهو) (١٥) متحيز .
وكل متحيز (١٦) قابل لملاقاة الجواهر ومفارقتها .
وكل ما يقبل الاجتماع والافتراق لا (١٧) يخلو عنها
وما لا يخلو (١٨) عن الاجتماع والافتراق (١٨) : حادث ،
كالجواهر (١٩) . (٢٠) فاذا ثبت تقديس البارى عن التحيز ،
والاختصاص بالجهات ، فيترتب على ذلك تعاليه عن الاختصاص
بمكان ، وملاقاة اجرام ، واجسام (٢٠)

-
- ٢ — ساقط من ب
٣ — ساقط من ب
٤ — ساقط من ب
٥ — ش: "نقص"
٦ — ش: "فالرب سبحانه و"
٧ ٥ ٧ — "مقدس" وفي ش "وتقدس على ذلك"
٨ — ب: "وتفصيلها"
٩ — ساقط من ش
١٠ ١٠ — ب: "انه"
١١ — ب "بالحادثات"
١٢ ١٢ — ب: "لا تحده الاقطار" وفي ش: "لا تحده الافكار ولا
تحوية الاقطار"
١٣ — ق: "الاقتار"
١٤ ١٤ — ب: (متشاكل بها ٠)
١٥ — زيادة من ب، وفي ش "وهو شجرة" ساقطة.
١٦ ١٦ — ساقط من ب
١٧ — ب: "فلا"
١٨ ١٨ — ب: "وما لا يخلو عنها"
١٩ — ساقط من ب
— ب "واذا"
٢٠ ٢٠ — ساقط من ش.
— ب "فترتب"

فان سئلنا عن قوله تعالى : الرحمن على العرش استوى (١)

قلنا :

المراد بـ " الاستوا " القهره والغلبة ، والعلو (٢)

(و) (٣) منه قول العرب : (٤)

استوى فلان على المملكة - (اى) (٥) استعلى عليها (٦)

واطردت له .

ومنه قول الشاعر :

قد استوى بشر على العراق . . . من غير سيف ودم مہراق

١ - (٢٠ / ٥ ط قرآن)

٢ - ساقط من ش

٣ - زيادة من ب

٤ - ش : " القليل "

٥ - اى : اذا ب

٦ - ش : استوى .

فصل

- الرب - (١) سبحانه وتعالى (١) - يتقدس (٢) عن قبول الحوادث .
 واتفق (٣) على ذلك : اهل الملل والنحل (٣) .
 وخالف اجماع الامسة : طائفة نبغوا فن سجمتان بلقبوا بـ " الكرامية " .
 (٤) فزعموا : ان الحوادث تطرأ على ذات الباري - تعالى (٥)
 عن قولهم (٥) - وهذا (٦) نص (٧) مذهب المجوس
 والدليل على استحالة قيام الحوادث بذات الباري تعالى (٨) :
 انها (٩) لو قامت به - لم (١٠) يخل عنها . وما لم يخل عن
 الحوادث : حادث .

-
- ١٦١ - ب " عزل وجل "
 ٢ - ش : " تقدس "
 ٣٥٣ - وردت في ب بتقديم وتأخير " اهل الملل والنحل ! على ذلك "
 ٤ - ب : " و "
 ٥٥٥ - ساقط من ب وفي ش : الشرح مخلوط .
 ٦ - ب " وهو "
 ٧ - ش : " نظير "
 ٨ - ساقط من ب . وفي ش : " الباري سبحانه وتعالى "
 ٩ - ب " انه "
 ١٠ - ب : " لم "

الحوادث (كلها) (١) تقع مرادة لله تعالى - (٢) نفعها ،
وضرها ، (٣) خيرها ، وشرها .

وزهدت المعتزلة ومن تبعهم من أهل الأهواء :

إلى أن الواجبات والمندوبات - من الطاعات ، مرادة لله تعالى ،
وقعت أو لم تقع .

والمعاصي والفواحش - تقع - والله تعالى (٣) كارهٌ لها (٤)
غير مرید لوقوعها (٥) - و (٦) هي تقع على كره (٦) .

والمباحات ، وما لا يدخل تحت التكليف - من أفعال البهائم ،
والمجانين - تقع (٧) - وهو (٨) لا يريد لها ولا يكرهها .

وإذا دللنا على أن الرب - (٩) سبحانه وتعالى - خالق لجميع
الحوادث . فيترتب (١٠) على ذلك (١٠) أنه مرید لما خلقه ،
قاصد إلى إبداع ما اخترع .

ثم نقول :

قد قضت العقول بأن قصور الإرادة ، وعدم نفوذ المشيئة من
إصديق الأمانة (١١) على سمات النقص والاتصاف (١٢) بالعجزه
والقصور (١٢) .

١	- زيادة من ب
٢ ٤ ٢	- ساقط في ش .
٣	- ساقط من ب
٤	- ب : " لوقوعها "
٥	- ب : " لها "
٦ ٤ ٦	- ساقط في ش

-
- ٧ - ساقط في ب
٨ - ب : "فهو"
٩ - ساقط في ب هـ ش
١٠ - ب هـ ش : "عليه"
١١ - ب : "الامارات" وفي ش : "الامارات الدالة"
١٢ - ورد في ب هـ وفي ش بتقديم وتأخير "بالقصور والمعجز".

(١) ومن ترشح^(٢) للملك ثم^(٣) كان لا ينفذ مراده في اهل مملكته - عدَّ ضعيف المنه^(٤) ومضاع الفرصة^(٤) .
 فاذا كان ذلك يزرى على من ترشح^(٥) للملك^(٦) ، فكيف^(٧) يجوز ذلك في صفة ملك الملوك ، ورب الارباب .

فان قالوا :

الرب - سبحانه^(٨) وتعالى - قادر على ان يرد الخلائق^(٩) الى طاعته قهرا وقسرا ، ويظهر^(٩) آية تظل رقاب الجبابرة لها^(١٠) خاضعة ؟^(١٠)

قلنا :

من فاسد اصلكم : انه لا يجوز^(١١) في حكمه^(١٢) اجبار الخلائق^(١٣) على الطاعات ، واضطرارهم الى الخيرات . ولا يريد منهم^(١٤) الايمان اجبارا ، وانما يريد منهم اختيارا . فما يريد لا يقدر عليه ، وما لا يقدر عليه لا يريد^(١٤) . وقد اجمع سلف الامة وخلفها على كلمة لا يجدها معتر الى الاسلام ، وهي^(١٥) قولهم :

" ما شاء الله كان ، وما لم يشأ لم يكن " .

١ - ب : " فمن "

٢ - ب : " ترشح " وفي ش " ترسم "

٣ - ب : " و "

٤ ، ٤ - ب : " مضيا للفرصة " وفي ش : " ومضيا للفرصة "

٥ - ب : " بترشيح "

٦ - ب : " كيف "

٧ - ساقطة في ب ، ش ولكن ذكرت في ب بعد " رب الارباب "

٨ - ساقط من ب ، ش

-
- ١٥٩ - ب : " العباد الى الطاعة تسرا " وفي ش : " الخلائق الى الطاعة قهرا . "
- ١٥١٠ - كانت في ق : " ولها خاصة " - كانت في ب " بها "
- ١١ - ساقطة من ب
- ١٢ - ب : " الحكم " وفي ش " حكم الله "
- ١٣ - ش : الخلق
- ١٤٥١٤ - ب " ذلك وانما يريد منهم الايمان على الاختيار . وما يريد لا يقدر عليه . وما يقدر عليه لا يريد . "
- وفي ش : - " ذلك وانما يريد منهم الاختيار . "
- ١٥ - ساقطة في ب .

والايات الشاهدة (١) لاهل الحق لا تحصى كثرة .
ومنها : (٢)

قوله تعالى : " ولو شاء الله لجمعهم على الهدى " (٣)
(١٢٠ ظ) (٤) ومنها قوله تعالى :

" فمن يرد الله ان يهديه يشرح صدره للاسلام ، ومن يرد
ان يضلّه يجعل صدره ضيقا حرجا " .
ومنها قوله تعالى : (٤)

" ولو اننا نزلنا اليهم الملائكة (٥) . . . الى آخر الاية .
فان احتجوا بقوله تعالى : " ولا يرضى لعباده الكفر " (٦) .
(٧) فالجواب - ان نقول (٧) :

(٨) اراد الله تعالى بـ"العباد" : الموفقين لطاعته المخلصين
لعبادته (٨) ، وهو (مثل) (٩) قوله تعالى :
" عينا يشرب بها عباد الله " (١٠)

(وانما) (١١) اراد الاولياء الاتقياء من العباد ، الذين لم يرد (١٢)
لم الرب الكفر - لم يكفروا

١ - ب : "شاهدة"

٢ - "و" ساقط في ب - وفي ش : "ومنها"

٣ - (١٦/٣٥ الانعام)

٤ ، ٤ - ساقطة في ب وهي آية (١٦/١٢٥ الانعام)

٥ - (٥/١١١ المائدة)

٦ - (٣٩/٧ الزمر)

٧ ، ٧ - ب ، ش : "قلنا"

٨ ، ٨ - ب : "اراد ان الله تعالى لا يرضى لعباده الموفقين لطاعته
المخلصين لعبادته - الكفر . . . وفي ش : "اراد الله بعباده
المؤمنين المخلصين العبادة . . ."

٢٨ x

-
- ٩ - زيادة من ب
١٠ - (٦/٧٦٠ الانسان)
١١ - زيادة من ب
١٢ - ب : "يرض"

وربما يحتجون بقوله تعالى :
 "سيقول الذين اشركوا : لو (١) شاء الله اشركنا ، ولا آبارونا -
 ولا حرمننا من شي* - الى قوله - حتى ذاقوا بأسنا " (١)
 (٢) ووجه الدليل (٢) من الاية : ان الله (٣) رد على الكفار
 قولهم :

(٤) " لو شاء الله ما اشركنا " (٤)

(٥) فالجواب - ان نقول :

الله تعالى (٥) انما رد عليهم (٦) ، لانهم قالوا ما قالوه (٧)
 مستهزئين بمارة (٨) في الحق ، (٩) وردا لحجة الله (٩) (وتعالى) (١٠)
 والدليل (١١) على ذلك - قوله تعالى (١١) في آخر الاية :
 " قل : هل عندكم مع علم (١٢) فتخرجوه لنا ، ان تتبعون الا
 الظن ، وان انتم الا تخرصون .
 قل : فله الحجة البالغة ، فلو شاء لهداكم اجمعين (١٢)

-
- ١٦١ - ساقط في ب : وهي الاية (١٦/١٤٨ . الانعام)
 ٢٦٢ - ب : " ودليلهم "
 ٣ - ب : " الرب تعالى "
 ٤٦٤ - وردت في ب : " ولو شاء الله ما اشركوا " وقد اثبتنا في
 ق لمطابقتها لنص القرآن الكريم .
 ٥٦٥ - ش : " والجواب ان الله تعالى . "
 ٦ - ش : " قولهم "
 ٧ - ب : " قالوا " وفي ش : " لانه قالوه استهزا " .
 ٨ - ش : " للحق "
 ٩٦٩ - ش : " وردوا الحجة لله "
 ١٠٦١٠ - زيادة من ب .

٢٩ x

١١٥١١ - ب ه ش : " عليه "
١٢٥١٢ - ب : " الاية " : وهما آيتي (١٤٨ / ١٤٩ / ٦ الانعام)
وفي ش : " عليه قوله تعالى . "

فصل

مذهب اهل الحق - ان البارى (١) تعالى : (٢) مرئي (٣) و
 يجوز ان يراه الرايون بالابصار .
 ومذهب (٤) المعتزلة (٥) الى انه سبحانه وتعالى : يستحيل ان
 يرى . وصار الاكثرون منهم الى ان البارى تعالى (٥) : لا
 يرى نفسه (٦) . والدليل على جواز (٧) الرؤية عقلا : ان الرب (٨)
 سبحانه وتعالى (٩) موجود (١٠) وكل موجود (١٠) : مرئي (١١)
 وبيان ذلك (١١) :

(١٢) انا نرى الجواهره والالوان (شاهدا) (١٣)
 فان رئي (١٤) الجواهره لكونه جوهرًا (فيلزم الا يرى اللون ، وان
 رؤى اللون لكونه لونا) (١٥) لزم (١٦) الا يرى الجواهر .
 وان رؤيا لوجودهما : لزم ان يرى كل موجود .
 (١٧) والبارى - سبحانه وتعالى : موجود ، فصح ان يرى (١٧) .

فان قالوا :

انما يرى ما يرى (١٨) : لحدوثه - والرب تعالى (١٩) :
 ازلي (٢٠) قديم (٢٠) (الذات) (٢١) فلا يرى (٢٢) ؟

-
- ١ - ب و ش : " الله " .
 - ٢ - ساقط في ش
 - ٣ - زيادة من ب
 - ٤ - ب : " وذهبت "

-
- ٥ - ب : " الى انه يستحيل ان يرى " صار الاكثرون منهم الى انه
لا يرى نفسه "
وساقط في ش .
- ٦ - ش : " لا يرى نفسه ولا يراه غيره "
- ٧ - ش : " رؤية الله تعالى . "
- ٨ - ساقط في ش .
- ٩٤٩ - ب : " انه "
- ١٠٥١٠ - ساقط في ب
- ١١٥١١ - ساقط في شين - وفي ب : " بيان ذلك " ساقط .
- ١٢٥١٢ - ش : " فانا "
- ١٣ - زيادة من ب
- ١٤ - كانت في ق : " رويني "
- ١٥ - زيادة من ب - وفي ش : " النزم " بدل " فيلزم "
- ١٦ - ش : " وجب "
- ١٧٥١٧ - ساقط في ب ، ش .
- ١٨ - ب : " عزل وجل "
- ١٩ - ش : " الجوهر "
- ٢٠٥٢٠ - وردت في ب بتقديم وتأخير " قليم ازلي "
- ٢١ - زيادة من ب
- ٢٢ - ساقط من ب .

(١) فالجواب - من وجهين :

احدهما - ان تقول :

كلامكم هذا نقص عليكم (١) ، لجواز رؤية (٢) لطعوم ، والروائح ،
والعلوم ، ونحوها (٣) ، فانها حوادث ،
وعندكم يستحيل ان ترى (٣)

(٤) ثم الجواب الحقيقي - ان نقول (٤) :

(ثم) (٥) الحدوث (٦) ينبيء عن موجود (٦) مسبق بعدمه (٧)
والعدم السابق لا (٨) يصح (٩) الرؤية ، فانحصر التصحيح في
الوجود (٩) .

فدل (١٠) : (على) ان كل موجود : صح ان يرى . (١٠)

(١١) ويستدل على جواز الرؤية (١١) ، وانها (١٢) ستكون
في (١٣) الجنان (١٣) : وهذا من الله صدقا ، وقولا منه (١٤)
حقا (١٥) بقوله تعالى (١٥) :

" وجوه يومئذ ناظرة الى ربها ناظرة " (١٦)

والنظر اذا عدى بـ (١٧) " الى " اقتضى (١٨) رؤية البصر (١٨) .

فان عارضونا بقوله تعالى : " لا تدركه الابصار " (١٩)

قلنا :

(مخ من) (٢٠) اصحابنا (٢١) من قال :

(٢٢) الرب - تعالى (٢٢) - برى ، ولا يدرك ، فان (٢٣)

الادراك ينبيء

١ ٥ ١ - ب : " قيل " . وش " قلنا : هذا نقص عليكم " .

٢ - ب : " الرؤية "

- ٣ ٤ - ب : وهي حوادث غير مرئية ، وفي ش : " وهي حادثة غير مرئية عندكم "
- ٤ ٤ - ساقط في ب ، ش
- ٥ - زيادة من ب
- ٦ ٦ - ب ، ش : " الحوادث تنبئ " عن وجود "
- ٧ - ساقط في ش
- ٨ - ساقط في ش
- ٩ ٩ - ب : " يصح عليه الرؤية فما يحصل التصحيح على الموجود " وفي ش : (ولا يصح رؤية الحاضر فانحصر المصحح في الوجود :
- ١٠ ١٠ - ب : " دل " على ش : " فاذا كل موجود يصح ان يرى " "
- ١١ ١١ - ش : " ويدل على وجوب الرؤية " .
- ١٢ - ساقط في ب ، ش
- ١٣ ١٣ - ساقط في ب ، ش
- ١٤ - ساقط في ب ، ش
- ١٥ ١٥ - ساقط في ب - وفي ش - " قوله " .
- ١٦ - (٢٢ - ٢٣ / ٢٥) القيامة
- ١٧ - ش : " بحرف "
- ١٨ ١٨ - ب " الرؤية نصا " وفي ش : " رؤية نصا لا يحتمل غير ذلك " .
- ١٩ - (١١٣ / ١٦) الانعام .
- ٢٠ - كانت فرق و ش : " فمن اصحابنا "
- ٢١ - ش : " فان عارضونا بقوله : (لا تتدركه الابصار وهو يدرك الابصار)
- سورة ٦ آية ١٠٣ -
- ٢٢ ٢٢ - ساقط في ش
- ٢٣ - : " وان "

ينبىء عن (١) الاحاطة ، ودرك الغاية ، والرب (تعالى) (٢)
 مقدس (٣) عن الغاية والنهاية .
 فان عارضونا بقوله تعالى في جواب موسى عليه السلام :
 " لن ترانى " (٤) ؟

فزعموا (٥) : ان (لن) يقتضي النفي على التأييد ؟
 قلنا :

هذه الاية (٦) من اوضح الادلة على جواز الرؤية ، فانها لسو
 كانت مستحيلة ، لكان (٧) معتقد جوازها ضالاً ، او (٨) كافراً .
 وكيف (٩) يعتقد (١٠) ما لا يجوز على الله تعالى - من
 اصطفاه الله تعالى (١٠) لرسالته (١١) ، واجتباه لنبوته ،
 وخصه (١٢) بتكريمه ، وشرفه بتكليمه (١٢) ، وجعله افضل اهل
 زمانه ، وأيده بمرهانه .

(١٣) ويجوز على الانبياء الرب في امر يتعلق بعلم الغيب (١٤)
 اماما يتعلق بوصف البارى عزه لا يجوز الرب عليهم (١٤) .
 فيجب حمل الاية على ان ما (١٥) اعتقد موسى عليه السلام
 جوازه (١٥) جائز ، لكن (١٦) ظن ان ما اعتقد جوازه (يجيبه
 اليه) (١٧) ناجز (١٨) فيرجع (١٩) النفي (١٩) في (٢٠) الجواب
 الى السؤال (٢٠) .

وما سأل موسى (٢١) عليه السلام (٢١) (ره) (٢٢) رؤية (٢٢)
 في الدنيا ، لينصرف (٢٣) النفي اليها (٢٤) ، والجواب نزل (٢٥)
 على قضية الخطاب .

زيادة من ب	٢
ب : " متقدس "	٣
(٧ / ١٤٣ الاعراف)	٤
ب : " وزعموا "	٥
ب : " فهي "	٦
ب : " معتقدها " وفي ش : " معتقد جواز الرؤية . "	٧ ٥ ٧
ساقط من ب	٨
ب " فكيف "	٩
ساقط في ش .	١٠
ش : " لنبوته واختاره لرسالته "	١١ ٥ ١١
ب : " بكرامته وشرفه بتكريمه " وفي ش : " شرفه بتكليمه "	١٢ ٥ ١٢
ش : " فكيف "	١٣
ساقط في ب	١٤ ٥ ١٤
ب : " اعتقده موسى عليه السلام "	١٥
ب : " ولكنه "	١٦
زيادة من ب	١٧
ب : " ناجزا "	١٨
ب : " فرجع المنع "	١٩ ٥ ١٩
ش : " الى الايجاب "	٢٠ ٥ ٢٠
ساقط من ب :	٢١ ٥ ٢١
زيادة من ب	٢٢
ب ، ش : " الرؤية في المال فينصرف . . . "	٢٣ ٥ ٢٣
ش " اليه " .	٢٤
ب : " يجيب " . ش : " يدل " .	٢٥

٥ - الرب والخلق

فصل

الرب (١) سبحانه (٢) متفرد بخلق المخلوقات (٣) ، فلا خالق سواه ، ولا مبدع غيره ، وكل حادث ، فالله تعالى (٤) محدثه .
وقالت المعتزلة :

المحدثون يخترعون (٥) افعالهم بقدرهم (٦) ويخلقونها (٧)
والرب (٨) سبحانه وتعالى (٨) غير موصوف بالاقتدار على افعال العباد
والدليل على تفرد الرب (٩) تعالى بالخلق : قوله (١٠) تعالى :
" امن يخلق كمن (١١) ولا يخلق افلا تذكرون " (١١)

(١٢) وجه الاستدلال بالاية :

ان الله تعالى (١٢) تمدح (١٣) بالخلق واتنى على نفسه (بذلك) (١٤)
ولو شاركه فيه غيره (١٥) لبطلت فائدة التمدح (١٦)

(١٧) وكذلك يستدل بقوله تعالى : (١٧)

" خالق كل شي " فاعبدوه " (١٨)

وقوله (١٩) تعالى :

" قل : الله خالق كل شي " وهو الواحد القهار "

ثم الدليل - من حيث العقل - على ان الرب تعالى منفرد
بالايجاد والاختراع (١٩)

ان (٢٠) الافعال دالة (٢١) على علم فاعلمها ، والافعال الصادرة

من (٢٢) العباد لا يحيطون بمعظم صفاتها ولو كانوا خالقين لها

لكانوا محيطين بجملة صفاتها

-
- ٢ - كانت في ق : "منفرد"
- ٣ - ب : "لا" و"ش" . "ولا"
- ٤ - ساقط في ب . وفي ش : "فانه"
- ٥ - ش : "مخترعون"
- ٦ - ب : "بقدرتهم"
- ٧ - ش : "وخالقونها"
- ٨ ٥ ٨ - ب - "عزوجل" وفي ش : "تعالى"
- ٩ - ش : "الرب سبحانه"
- ١٠ - ساقط في ش .
- ١١ ٥ ١١ - ساقط في ب و ش : "وهي الاية (١٢/١٦ النمل)
- ١٢ ٥ ١٢ - ب : "فتمدح تعالى" وفي ش ساقط .
- ١٣ ٥ ١٣ - ش : "متمدح تعالى"
- ١٤ - زيادة من ب
- ١٥ - ش : "نجده في الخلق"
- ١٦ - ب : "المدح"
- ١٧ ٥ ١٧ - ب : "وقال" وفي ش : ساقط
- ١٨ - ب و ش : (الله خالق كل شي" وهي (١٢/١٦ الانعام)
- ١٩ ٥ ١٩ - ساقط في ب وص الاية (١٦/١٣ الرعد)
- ٢٠ - ب : "ثم" ش : "و"
- ٢١ - ب "دليله"
- ٢٢ - ب و ش : "عن"

فصل

- العبد (١) (غير) مجبر (١) على انعاله ،
 بل هو قادر عليها مكتسب لها .
 والدليل (٢) على اثبات القدرة للعبد (٢)
 ان العاقل يفرق بين ان (٣) ترتعد يده (٣) ، وبين ان يحركها
 قصدا .
 ومعنى كونه مكتسبا - انه قادر على فعله - وان لم تكن
 قدرته مؤثرة في (٤) ايضاح المقدور (٤) .
 وذلك (٥) بمثابة الفرق (بين ما يقع مرادا و) (٥) بين ما يقع غير مراد
 وان كانت الارادة لا تؤثر في المراد (٦) .

١٥١ - كانت في ق : " مختر " ما بين القوسين زيادة عن الاصل

ليستقيم النص

٢٥٢ - ب : " عليه " وش : " عليها "

٣٥٣ - ش : " يحرك يده ضرورة "

٤٥٤ - ش : " ايضاحه "

٥ -

٦ -

٧ -

٨ -

٩ - زيادة من ش ب

٦٥٦ - ب : " غير مؤثر " "

فصل

لا يجب على الله تعالى شي* ،
 وما انعم به فهو فضل منه* ،
 وما عاقب به : فهو عدل منه* ،^(١)
^(٢)

ويجب على العبد ما يوجهه الله تعالى عليه^(٣)

ولا يستفاد - بمجرد العقول - وجوب شي* ،^(٤)

بل جميع الاحكام المتعلقة بالتكليف : متلقاة

من قضية الشرح ، وموجب السمع .

والدليل على انه لا يجب على الله شي* :

أن حقيقة الواجب : ما يستوجب اللوم بتركه^(٥)

والرب - سبحانه وتعالى^(٦) - يتعالى^(٧) عن ~~التعريف~~ ^{التعريف} ^(٨) لذلك .

والذي يوضح ذلك :

ان طاعات المكلفين تجب - عند المعتزلة - شكرا للرب^(٩)

ما اولاه^(١٠) من آلائه .

-
- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| ١ - سا ق ط في : ق ، ش | ٣ - سا ق ط في ش . |
| ٢ - سا ق ط في : ب | ٦٤٦ - سا ق ط في ش وب "تعالى" |
| ٤ - ب العقل | ٧ - ش : "متعالى" وب "بتدبره" |
| ٥ - ب : يستحق | ٨ - ش : "التعريف" المتعريف |
| | ٩ - ش وب "لله تعالى" |
| | ١٠ - ق : "اولاه" |

فان كانت (١) الطاعات واجبة (١) = (٢) عوضا من النعم (٢) :-
لم يستحيل (٣) ان يستحق مؤدى الواجب : ثوبا .
ولو جاز ان يستحق العبد على اداء الواجب عوضا (٤) لجاز ان
يستحق الرب على الثواب : شكرا - (٥) وان كان مستحقا (٥) .

١ - ل ساقط في ش .

٢ - ش : " عوض للنعم "
٣ - ب : فيسه تحيل
~~٤ - ش : ساقط في ش :~~
٤ - ب : " واجب عليه "
٥ - ساقط في ش "

فصل (١)

لله تعالى^(٢) - ان يرسل الرسل ، ويبعث الانبياء

• مبشرين ومنذرين •

• وانكرت الراهمة : النبوة •

• وضعوا جواز اتباع الرسل •

وقالوا :

ان جاءت الرسل بما يدرك عقلا ، لم يكن في ارسالهم

فائدة ، وكان في قضايا العقل^(٣) مندوحة^(٤) عن^(٥)

غيرها^(٤)

^(٥) وان جاءت الرسل بما لا يدرك عقلا^(٥) : فلا يقبل ما

يخالف العقل •

^(٦) قلنا :

الشرع يرشد الى ما^(٩) لا يستدرك بمحض العقول - ^(٧) ولا

يرد بما يقضى العقل بخلافه^(٧) -

وانما لم يكن في ارسال الرسل استحالة ، او^(٧) خروج عن

الحقيقة ، فيجب^(٩) الحكم بجوازه •

١ - ش ر ب "القول في اثبات النبوات"

٢ - ش ر ب "القول في"

٣ - ش ر ب "العقول"

٤ - ش : "عنهم"

٥ - ش ر ب "وان كان ما جاءت به الرسل غير مدرك بالعقل"

٦ - ش : "وقال ان الرب انما يرسل لما"

٧ - ش : وانا يقضى للعقل بجوازه

٨ - ش ر ب "و" ← ب : حقيقة

٩ - ش : "وجب"

٦ - الرسالة والنبوة والمعجزة

فصل

انما يثبت صدق مدعى النبوة - بالمعجزات :

(١) وهي افعال الله تعالى خارقة للعادة (١٢١ ظ) المستهجرة
 (٢) وظاهرها (٢) - على حسب دعوى النبوة (٣) : هو تحديه (٤)
 ويعجز عن الاتيان بامثالها، الذين يتحداهم النبي .

ووجه دلالتها على صدق النبي :

انها تنزل منزلة التصديق بالقول .

(٥) ونظيرها في (٥) الشاهد :

ان يتصدى ملك للناس، ويأذن لهم بالولوج (٦) عليه فلما (٧) احتفوا
 به ، واخذ كل محله (٨) - (٩) قام لاهل الجمع قائم (٩) وقال :
 (١٠) يأيها الملا (١٠) : اني رسول الملك اليكم ، وقد ادعيت الرسالة

بمراى منه وسمع

وأية الرسالة (١١) : ان الملك يخالف عاداته ، ويقوم ، ويقعد ، -

ان استدعيته (١٢) .

ثم يقول (١٣) :

(١٤) يأيها الملك : صدقني وقم ، واقعد ؟

فاذا فعل الملك ما استدعاه منه (١٥) كان ذلك تصديقا (١٦)

(١٨) نازلا منزلة (١٨) قوله : صدقت .

١	- ساقط في ش
٢	- ش : "ظاهرة" ب "الظاهرة"
٣	- ش : "النبوة"
٤	- ش : "ونظيره من" ب : "ونظيرها"
٥	- ب : "في الولوج"

ش: "فانذا" كحل واحد منهنه مجلسه	ش: -	٧
ب: "فانذا" كحل واحد منهنه مجلسه	ب: -	٨٤
ش: "رجل من اهل الجمع" وب "قام قائم من اهل الجمع"	ش: -	٩٦٩
ساقط من ش وب	-	٢٠٦٢٠
ب: "رسالتى" وب: "كونى رسولا اليكم"	ب: -	١١
ش: "رسالتى" وب: "كونى رسولا اليكم"	ش: -	١٥
ش: "استدعيته منه ذلك"	ش: -	١٣
ب: "استدعيته منه ذلك"	ب: -	١٤
ساقط في ش وفي ب: "ايها"	-	١٥
زيادته في ش وفي ب: "ايها"	-	١٦
ش: "بمنزلة" ساقط في "ب"	-	١٧
ش: "بمنزلة"	-	١٨٠١٨

فصل

الدليل على ثبوت (١) نبوة نبينا محمد عليه الصلاة والسلام : المعجزات (٢) ومن (٣) آياته : القرآن - وفيه وجوه من الاعجاز منها : ما اختصره من الجزالة ، والنظم الخارج عن جميع اساليب كلام العرب .

وتحدى العرب بان يعارضوه فيه (٤) سورة

(٥) وذكر : انهم لو عارضوه (٥) - لبطلت دعواه ، وانكف عن التعرض لهم ؟ (٦) فحاولوا معارضته - (٧) وهم اللد البلاغ ، واللسن الفصحاء (٧) - نيف (٨) وعشرين سنة : فلم (٩) يتأت لهم معارضة . ومن وجوه الاعجاز (١٠) :

(١١) استعمل القرآن (١٢) على قصص الاولين ، مع القطع بان النبي عليه السلام كان اميا - (١٣) لا يقرأ ولا يكتب (١٤) ولم يعهد في جميع زمانه : متعاطيا لدراسة كتب الاولين وتعلمها . ولم يسبق (١٥) له نهضة يتوقع في مثلها دراسة الكتب (١٦) ثم اشتمل القرآن على غيوب متعلقة (١٧) بالمستقبل وافق انباء القرآن عنها (١٨)

١	ش : " ان "
٢	ب : " صديق الله عليه "
٣	ش : " فمن "
٤	ش : " يعارضوه فيه " ب : " يعارضوها "
٥	ش : " ولو انهم عارضوه " و ق : " انهم لو عارضوها "
٦	ش : " وحاولوا "
٧	جاءت العبارة في ش : " بعد " فلم يأت لهم معارضة .
٨	ش : " في "
٩	ش : " لهم "
١٠	ش : " اعجاز القرآن " وفي ب : " الاعجاز في القرآن "

٢٩x

-
- ١٢٥١٢ - ش: اشتماله
١٣٥١٣ - ش: لا يقرب ولاعراض
١٤٥١٤ - ش: يتفق
١٣٥١٣ - ~~ش: اشتماله~~
١٥ - ش: مختلفة - مختلفة
١٩ - في ب: و اتفقت كما أنبا عنها القرآن

فصل (١)

ولرسول الله ^(٢) عليه السلام ^(٢): (آيات و) ^(٣) معجزات سوى القرآن :
كانفلاق القمر
وتسبيح الحصى
وانطاق العجما
ونبع ^(٤) الماء من بين الاصابع ^(٥)
ونحوها ^(٦)

-
- ١ - زيادة من ش .
٢٦٢ - ب : " صلى الله عليه وسلم "
٣ - زيادة من ب
٤ - ب : " ونبوع "
٥ - ب : " اصابعه "
٦ - ش : وغيرها

فصل

كل ما جوزه العقل ، وورد (١) به الشرع (١) :

• وجب القضاء بشبوته

فمما (٢) ورد الشرع به :

• عذاب القبر

وسؤال منكر وكبير

• ورد الروح الى الميت في قبره

ومنها :

المصراط

والميزان

والحوض

والشفاعة للذنبيين

كل ذلك : حق

والجنة ، والنار مذلولقتان - (٣) في وقتنا (٣) -

قال الله تعالى (٤) :

• (٥) وجنة (٥) عرضها السموات والارض اعدت للمتقين " (٦)

١ ٥ ١ - ب : " الشرع به " •

٢ - ب : " ومما " •

٣ ٥ ٣ - ساقط في ش •

٤ - ش : " عز وجل "

٥ ٥ ٥ - ساقط في ش •

٦ - (١٣٣/٣ آل عمران)

(١) امامة المسلمين (١)

(٢) وامير المؤمنين - من (٢) بعد رسول الله (٣) عليه الصلاة والسلام : (٣)

ابوبكر الصديق (رضي الله عنه) (٤)

(٥) ثم الفاروق - بعده (٥)

ثم عثمان (٦)

ثم علي (٧)

رضي الله عنهم (٨)

وما نص (٩) النبي عليه السلام (٩) على امامة (١٠) احد بعده ،

وتوليته (١٠) اذ لو نص على ذلك (١١) ، لظهر وانتشر (كما

(١٢) اشتهرت تولية رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم سائر ولاته و)

كما اشتهر كل امر خطير (١٣) .

(١٤) واذا ثبت (١٥) ان الامامة لم تثبت نصا لاحد (١٦) :

دل (١٧) انها ثبتت اختيارا (١٧)

(١٨) ثم المسلمون (١٨) اجمعوا على امامة ابي بكر (رضي الله عنه) (١٩)

وانقادوا - باجمعهم - له (من غير مخالفة) (٢٠)

١ ١٤ - ساقط في ب . وفي ش " امام المسلمين "

٢ ٢٤ - ساقط في ب ٤ ش

٣ ٣٤ - ب : " صلى الله عليه "

٤ - زيادة من ب

-
- ٥٥٥ - ب : "ثم عمر" و ش : "ثم الامام بن عمر"
- ٦ - ش : "ثم الامام بعده"
- ٧ - ش : "ثم الامام"
- ٨ - ش : "عنهم اجمعين"
- ٩٥٩ - ب : "رسول الله على الله"
- ١٠٥١٠ - ب : "على وتوليته بعد" ش : "وتولية" وقد اعتمدنا ق .
لعدم ذكر معين . بالذات .
- ١١ - ساقط في ش
- ١٢ - زيادة من ب .
- ١٣ - ب و ش : "عظيم خطره"
- ١٤ - ب : "فاذا"
- ١٥ - ش : "نين"
- ١٦ - ساقط في ش .
- ١٧٥١٧ - ش : "على اثبات الامامة اجتهادا"
- ١٨٥١٨ - ب : "غير ان المسلمين"
- ١٩ - زيادة من ب و ش
- ٢٠ - زيادة من ب و ش .

وكذلك^(١) جرى الامر في زمن عمر، وثمان، وعلي، رضي الله عنهم .
ومعاوية - وان قاتل عليا - فانه كان لا ينكر امامته ، ولا يدعيها
لنفسه ، وانما كان يطلب قتله عثمان (رضي الله عنه) ^(٢) ظاناً انه
مصيب ، وكان مخطئاً ، وعلي - رضي الله عنهم ^(٣) عنه - (٢٢ او)
(٤) متمسك بالحق . (٤)

١ - ش : " كذا "

٢ - زيادة من ب

٣ - ساقط في ب و ش

٤٤ - ب : " بالحق متمسك " .

فصل

الخلفاء (١) الراشدون (١) كما (٢) ترتبوا في الامامة (٣) ، فالظاهر

ترتيبهم في الفضيلة :

فخير (٤) الناس - بعد رسول الله (صلى الله عليه) (٥) :

ابوبكر ،

ثم عمر ،

ثم عثمان ،

ثم علي ،

رضى الله عنهم اجمعين (٦) ،

اذا المسلمون كانوا لا يقدمون للامامة (٧) احد تشهيا منهم ،

وانما (٨) قدموا من قدموه (٨) ، لاعتقادهم كونه (٩) افضل واصح

للامامة من غيره .

١٤١	- زيادة من ب
٢	- ق : " لما "
٣	- ش : " الخلافة "
٤	- ش : " و "
٥	- زيادة من ب
٦	ساقط في ش
٧	- ساقط في ب
٨ ، ٨	- ش : " قدموه "
٩	- ب و ش : " انه "

لا يصلح للامامة الا من يجتمع فيه شرائط :

احداها - ان يكون : قرشيا ،

فان رسول الله ^(١) عليه السلام ^(١) قال : " الاثمة من قریش "

والاخرى - (ان يكون مجتهدا - من اهل الفتوى) ^(٢)

(و) ان يكون : ذا نجدة ، وكفاية ، وتمهد ^(٣) لسياسة ^(٤) الامور

وايالتها (متهديا الى رئاسة الامور) ^(٥)

(وان) ^(٦) يكون حرا ، ورعا في دينه .

^(٧) وكل هذه الشرائط كانت موجودة في خلفاء رسول الله ^(٨)

عليه السلام ^(٨)

وقد قال ^(٨) عليه السلام ^(٨)

" الخلافة بعدى ^(٩) ثلاثون سنة ، ثم يصير ملكا عضوا "

وكانت ايام الخلفاء هذا القدر ،

^(١٠) والله الهادي ^(١٠) .

١ ٤ ١ - ب : " صلى الله عليه "

٢ - زيادة من ب

٣ - ش : " يهتدى "

٤ - ب : " الى سياسة "

٥ - زيادة من ب

٦ - زيادة من ب

٧ - ساقط في ب

٨ ٤ ٨ - ب : " صلى الله عليه "

٩ - ساقط في ش

١٠ ٤ ١٠ - ساقط في ب ، ش

(١) تم كتاب اللمع في الكلام بحمد الله وحسن توفيقه على (يد)
العبد الضعيف الفقير الى عفو الله تعالى محمد بن سليمان بن
يوسف الشافعي غفر الله له ، ولمن قرأ فيه ودعا له بالمغفرة
والرضوان .

نقلت هذه النسخة عن النسخة المخطوطة المحفوظة بدار
الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة برقم ٦١٨ مجاميع .

١ - جاء بنهاية نسخة ب الاتي :

" نجز هذا الكتاب وهو اللمع من تصنيف الامام اطم الحرمين
ابي المعالي عبدالملك بن عبدالله الجويني طيب الله تربته .
فرغ من نسخة ليلة الاحد الثالث والعشرين من شهر ربيع الاول
من سنة سبع واربعين وخمسمائة والحمد لله على - والصلاة على
محمد خاتم انبيائه - حسبنا ونعم الوكيل . "

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