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Minimal Rationalism

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MinRation.pdf (1.349Mb)
Date
1993
Author
Clark, Andy
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Abstract
Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory (perhaps only tacitly endorsed) concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options (concerning the nature and extent of innate knowledge) accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms.
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doi:10.1093/mind/102.408.587

http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1328
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  • Philosophy research publications

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