Minimal Rationalism
dc.contributor.author | Clark, Andy | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-06-30T15:08:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-06-30T15:08:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1993 | |
dc.identifier.uri | doi:10.1093/mind/102.408.587 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1328 | |
dc.description.abstract | Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory (perhaps only tacitly endorsed) concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options (concerning the nature and extent of innate knowledge) accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms. | en |
dc.format.extent | 1415569 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en |
dc.title | Minimal Rationalism | en |
dc.type | Article | en |