High representative of the Union : the constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy
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Date
26/11/2014Author
Helwig, Niklas
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Abstract
This study argues that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy is a constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy. The 2009 Lisbon
Treaty reform created the remodelled version of the High Representative of the
Union as a potentially powerful agent to represent and coordinate Europe’s foreign
policy. However, the analysis shows how and why the member states granted only
limited discretion to the new foreign policy actor during the first years of the post’s
existence. The aim of the study is to reveal the conditions of discretion of the High
Representative. With the use of a principal-agent (PA) approach, the study shows
that conflicting preferences of the member states, tight control mechanisms, as well
as inadequate cooperation with the European Commission limited the High
Representative’s room for manoeuvre. The findings suggest that the PA approach
can be developed further in the future in order to better explain limited discretion of
agents in matters of foreign policy. Based on the findings, the study also puts
forward a number of characteristics of a ‘constrained agent’. It is suggested that the
post of High Representative has the potential to emancipate from its status of a
constrained agent over time, and to gain credibility as a foreign policy actor.