Wittgenstein and semantic presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in subject-position
Date
06/1992Author
Margutti Pinto, Paulo Roberto
Metadata
Abstract
The purpose of this work is to characterize the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position in the light of a
reassessment of the semantic framework of the Russell/
Strawson controversy and analyze what would be the early
and the later Wittgenstein's solution to such a problem.
In the first part, the Russell/Strawson controversy
is characterized. On the basis of Strawson's account, a
general concept of semantic presupposition against which
other theories may be tested is constructed. This allows
the formulation of the problem above mentioned. Further
analysis of the accounts involved reveals that Frege's
concept of a 'semantic prerequisite' generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position is an instance of the
general concept. But Frege also held the view that simple
proper names do not generate semantic prerequisites. The
Fregean referential dualism suggests that the Russell/
Strawson controversy, as far as only these authors'
accounts are involved, is undecidable at the purely
semantic level. This is the semantic framework against
which Wittgenstein's philosophies are tested in the second
part.
The "Tractatus" adopts a modified version of the
Russellian Theory of Descriptions. Even so, the Tractarian
account seems to be ultimately equivalent to Russell's.
Further analysis reveals that the doctrine of simple signs
in isolation, but not its conjunction with the picture
theory, is consistent with the general concept of semantic
presupposition.
The "Investigations " adopts the programmatic
principle of searching for the use of the words. But the
question about the 'referring use' of descriptions in a
specific language-game is consistent with, and in the
spirit of, the "Investigations". The framework of the
question involves the appeal to the Kripkean notions of
'semantic referent' and 'speaker's referent'. The analysis
of the referring use in the language-game of reporting an
event reveals that the later Wittgenstein tends to reject
the semantic concept of presupposition. Further analysis
reveals that he would tend to reject Russell's Theory of
Descriptions and most of the variants of the pragmatic
concept. The analysis seems to confirm that the Russell
/Strawson dispute is idle at the purely semantic level.
Even so, the later Wittgenstein's account of language is
such that it is possible to imagine some particular
language-games in which relationships occur that bear some
analogies with the one of semantic presupposition.