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dc.contributor.authorToribio, Josefaen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-31T09:00:00Z
dc.date.available2007-07-31T09:00:00Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1386-9795
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/1804
dc.descriptionTo appear in Philosophical Explorations March 2008en
dc.description.abstractI raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson’s view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson’s position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, which then fails to demarcate any clear class of cases. I conclude with a brief discussion of the nature and role of knowledge-how, and its relation to the important, but less explored, notion of expertise.en
dc.format.extent320250 bytesen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherTaylor and Francisen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.titleHow do we know how?en
dc.typeArticleen


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