The Ontology of Knowledge and Belief in Republic V

dc.contributor.author	Scaltsas, Dory
dc.date.accessioned	2007-08-30T15:06:41Z
dc.date.available	2007-08-30T15:06:41Z
dc.date.issued	2007-08-30
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1964
dc.description.abstract	In Republic V, Plato makes the astonishing claim that knowledge is a different and independent power from belief, in the way, for example, that sight differs from hearing. I will argue that this is a fundamentally different conception of knowledge than the, also Platonic, conception of knowledge as 'true belief with an account'. I examine the reasons why Plato holds this position, and the ontology and epistemology which sustain its claims.	en
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dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Philosophy	en
dc.subject	Plato	en
dc.subject	Fallibility	en
dc.subject	Republic V	en
dc.subject	Knowledge	en
dc.subject	Belief	en
dc.title	The Ontology of Knowledge and Belief in Republic V	en
dc.type	Article	en