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dc.contributor.authorScaltsas, Dory
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-30T15:06:41Z
dc.date.available2007-08-30T15:06:41Z
dc.date.issued2007-08-30
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/1964
dc.description.abstractIn Republic V, Plato makes the astonishing claim that knowledge is a different and independent power from belief, in the way, for example, that sight differs from hearing. I will argue that this is a fundamentally different conception of knowledge than the, also Platonic, conception of knowledge as 'true belief with an account'. I examine the reasons why Plato holds this position, and the ontology and epistemology which sustain its claims.en
dc.format.extent81701 bytes
dc.format.extent90624 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/msword
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.subjectPlatoen
dc.subjectFallibilityen
dc.subjectRepublic Ven
dc.subjectKnowledgeen
dc.subjectBeliefen
dc.titleThe Ontology of Knowledge and Belief in Republic Ven
dc.typeArticleen


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