The Ontology of Knowledge and Belief in Republic V
dc.contributor.author | Scaltsas, Dory | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-08-30T15:06:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-08-30T15:06:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-08-30 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1964 | |
dc.description.abstract | In Republic V, Plato makes the astonishing claim that knowledge is a different and independent power from belief, in the way, for example, that sight differs from hearing. I will argue that this is a fundamentally different conception of knowledge than the, also Platonic, conception of knowledge as 'true belief with an account'. I examine the reasons why Plato holds this position, and the ontology and epistemology which sustain its claims. | en |
dc.format.extent | 81701 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 90624 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/msword | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en |
dc.subject | Plato | en |
dc.subject | Fallibility | en |
dc.subject | Republic V | en |
dc.subject | Knowledge | en |
dc.subject | Belief | en |
dc.title | The Ontology of Knowledge and Belief in Republic V | en |
dc.type | Article | en |