The thesis is an attempt to reconcile law's dual nature, its factual dimension (its facticity)
and its normative/evaluative dimension (its normativity), in a non-reductive manner. The
tension between those two dimensions appears particularly acute when we try to discern
some object of reference for our normative talk/discourse. Then the possibility of absence of
such objects poses a high threat to the meaningfulness of the enterprise of law tout court.
Faced with this danger lawyers usually end up reducing legal referents to physical, nonnormative
entities. Palpable for our senses as those entities may be, they do not seem to
eliminate the threat of meaninglessness posed to the legal enterprise, as they end up
eliminating law's normativity.
In contrast I argue that legal and broader practical norms can be reconstructed as
abstract objects that are available to knowledge. The method employed, relies predominantly
on a semantic explication of the 'objecthood' of norms along the lines of a neo-Fregean
theory of mental content. Further, I employ an analysis of the meaning of legal expressions
in order to show that a semantic account of legal 'objecthood' will be demarcated by the
pragmatic-normative requirements that support the relevant practices in which legal meaning
is generated (as is specified by some version of Wittgenstein's 'meaning as use' theory of
meaning). I proceed to argue that those pragmatic requirements include some transcendental
pragmatic norms which specify an ultimate practical or moral point of view against the
background of which practical meaning is possible. Later, this point of view is specified as a
Super-norm or Principle of Autonomy. This norm bestows an evaluative element upon the
meaning of all practical expressions/sentences and, via the semantic explication of ontology,
into the normative objects (rules, properties and so on) that correspond to them.
Finally, it is claimed that legal norms are a species of practical norms, to the extent
that both fall under the same criteria of validity that are specified by the point of view of the