Hamas-Egypt relations: tactical cooperation in the margins of strategic differences due to regime survival concerns
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Date
24/11/2016Item status
Restricted AccessEmbargo end date
31/12/2100Author
Rigas, Georgios
Metadata
Abstract
Egypt is a geographically large, populous and internationally-recognised state with an
organised bureaucracy and armed forces. In contrast, Hamas is an armed social
movement, which, after its electoral victory in January 2006 and, more importantly,
after acquiring full control over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, emerged as a quasi-state
with internal sovereignty. Egypt enjoys a peace treaty with Israel and a strategic
alliance with the US, whereas Hamas is in conflict with Israel, and is designated by
the US as a terrorist group. This thesis traces the interactions between Hamas and
Egypt during the 2006-2014 period, with a focus on the Mubarak era. The
dissertation’s main aim is not only to present how and when asymmetry and strategic
differences between Hamas and Egypt were reflected in their relations, but also to
explain why and how on certain occasions their interactions took on the form of tactical
cooperation. Hence, I show that small or quasi-states in the contemporary Middle East
are in position to extract political gains from larger neighbouring state actors even in
the presence of strategic differences. This thesis contextualises the situations it
discusses through Omni Balancing Theory (OBT), which understands an actor’s
foreign policy as the outcome of the efforts of its leader to survive politically by
balancing between external and internal threats. In this regard, Egypt’s approach
towards Hamas and vice versa at a given time is seen as the result of a cost-benefit
calculation that has assessed the value of simultaneous foreign and domestic threats.
Accordingly, the dissertation looks at Hamas-Egypt relations through three lenses:
firstly, through the impact of international and regional pressures; secondly, through
cross-border interactions; and thirdly, through the effect of domestic pressures.
Finally, the thesis separately discusses the course of Hamas-Egypt relations between
February 2011 and August 2014. This is due to the density of the political
developments during this period. To be precise, the three weak post-Mubarak Egyptian
governments faced quite diverse threats the dealing of which generated considerable
fluctuations in Cairo’s approach towards Hamas.