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dc.contributor.advisorVierkant, Tillmanen
dc.contributor.advisorWard, Daveen
dc.contributor.advisorMason, Elinoren
dc.contributor.authorHardt, Rosa Ericaen
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-15T15:35:13Z
dc.date.available2017-12-15T15:35:13Z
dc.date.issued2017-12-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/25754
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis I propose that emotions and rationality are integrated, and jointly constitute our moral agency. I argue against the influential ‘sentimentalist’ claim that emotions are the only constituents of the moral reasons for which we act, by showing that emotions are inextricably bound up with our sensory and conceptual capacities. In contrast, I propose we act for moral reasons when we act in light of the narratives we create and understand. Narrative understanding here is the capacity to inhabit a chain of events. It is embodied and action-­‐ orientated, and is co-­‐constituted through our emotional, conceptual and sensory capacities.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherThe University of Edinburghen
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectemotionen
dc.subjectmoral judgementen
dc.subjectnarrativeen
dc.subjectagencyen
dc.titleMoral agency: an embodied narrative approachen
dc.typeThesis or Dissertationen
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen


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