dc.contributor.author | Yajima, Naoki | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-29T12:21:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-29T12:21:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/29432 | |
dc.description.abstract | | en |
dc.description.abstract | My dissertation attempts to read David Hume's "A Treatise of Human Nature: an
attempt of introducing an experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects", as
a consistent moral theory, by showing the underlying unity of the three Books of the
Treatise. In particular, I argue that the concept of the "general point of view" plays a
central role in unifying the Treatise, which in the final instance proves to be about
normativity. Most of all, I clarify the parallel between Hume's epistemology and his
moral theory. I attempt to present Hume's moral theory as what I call "a
constructivism of perceptions". | en |
dc.description.abstract | I start by exploring Hume's epistemology and his concept of custom,
fundamentally understood as a principle of stability. I clarify that custom consists in
recognizing a particular perception in association with other resembling perceptions.
I claim this is what it means to take the general point of view. I then show that
custom is the basis of Hume's theory of causation, where the concept of custom
plays the central role of embodying the general point of view. I show that because of
the development of custom Hume's theory of causation is related to his theory of the
perception of external bodies, which completes our perception of physical
circumstances. | en |
dc.description.abstract | In the later chapters I argue that Hume's theory of sympathy should be
understood as a principle of sociability that confers shared value on both possessions
and human behaviour. I next explain Hume's theory of justice as a regulating
principle of social interaction that centres on property as causation. I argue that
justice exerts a binding force beyond personal interests because its normative force
derives from the sense of stability acquired in physical perceptions. Then, I discuss
Hume's theory ofpromise regulates future interaction between people. Finally, I
show that because of the authority of custom, government is allowed to demand
people's allegiance, just as an external body is required to stabilise causal perception. | en |
dc.description.abstract | My dissertation shows that the general point of view provides the foundation
ofmorality by establishing a stable relationship between human beings and their
circumstances: physical, psychological, moral, and political. | en |
dc.publisher | The University of Edinburgh | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Annexe Thesis Digitisation Project 2018 Block 17 | en |
dc.relation.isreferencedby | Already catalogued | en |
dc.title | The general point of view as the normative and unifying concept in Hume's Treatise | en |
dc.type | Thesis or Dissertation | en |
dc.type.qualificationlevel | Doctoral | en |
dc.type.qualificationname | PhD Doctor of Philosophy | en |