This thesis proposes to come to terms with the problem which the idea of
history poses for theology, but it does so primarily through a critical
analysis of the way epistemological dualisms have pre-determined the discussion. Part One engages in a critical and methodological study which is
intended to show that the rise of modem philosophy, in attempting to provide an epistemological access to reality, provided the intellectual tools
which ultimately led to the rise of modem historical criticism. Further,
it will be seen that these epistemological dualisms (e.g., the distinction
between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact)
underlie the problem which the rise of historical criticism has put to
theology—how can historically-conditioned events which are empirically
uncertain and inconclusive serve as the frame of reference for Christian
faith with its claim to universal and absolute validity? This question
which presupposes a dualistic epistemology is the fundamental and recurring
issue in this thesis. For example, modern philosophy (beginning with
Descartes) sought to establish a basis for the absolute truths of reason
in contrast to the incertitudes of historical knowledge. This quest for
absolute certainty in regard to philosophical knowledge led to such
epistemological dualisms as body-mind, thought and extension, truths of
reason and truths of fact. The consequence of these dualisms led to the
recognition history is characterised by the categories of relativity and
probability. That is, historical events are conditioned according to their
historical setting, and the knowledge of these events are characterised by
varying degrees of probability in sharp contrast to the absolute certainty
of the necessary truths of reason. Thus, the epistemological dualisms
to be considered in Part One provide the central twofold question which
historical criticism has posed to theology—how can historically-conditioned
events (i.e., historical relativity) serve as the point of departure for
Christian faith with its claim to universal and absolute truth? That is
to say, how can historical relativity be reconciled with the claim of
Christian faith that a single event can be absolutely unique? And, how
can the probabilities of historical knowledge be reconciled with the claim
of Christian faith as a historical revelation to have absolute truth?
That is, how can the certitude of faith be maintained over against the
incertitude of historical knowledge?
Part Two is concerned with dualisms in religious epistemology, which
correspond somewhat to the philosophical dualisms articulated in Part One.
That is, even as modern philosophy sought to provide a basis for the
absolute certainty of truth through such distinctions as thought and
extension, truths of reason and truths of fact, even so theology has sought
to provide a basis for the absolute certainty of religious knowledge
through such distinctions as faith and knowledge, Hlstorie and Geschichte,
inner history and outer history, nature and history. The intent of these
related dualisms in religious epistemology is to make room for the
certainty of faith which is threatened by the incertitude of historical
knowledge and the relativity (i.e., the causal nexus) of the historical
process. Thus, these two categories of historical criticism - i.e.,
historical relativity and the probability of historical knowledge -
presuppose the delineation of a dualistic epistemology. For example,
with the sharp distinction between the truths of reason and truths of fact,
it was seen that history is characterised by (1) historical relativity (or
contingency) as opposed to the necessary truths of reason and (2) more or
less degrees of probability concerning historical knowledge as opposed to
the absolute certainty of the truths of reason. On the other hand, religious
epistemology developed into a dualism of its own in an attempt to cope
with these two categories of relativity and probability with the result
that the certainty of faith was made independent of the uncertainty of history.
Part Three offers a constructive proposal to integrate the twofold aspect
of religious epistemology. It is argued that theology cannot tolerate a
divorce between Historie and Geschichte, faith and knowledge, inner history
and outer history, even as philosophy cannot endure the Kantian divorce
between noumenon and phenomenon. Also, even as theology must not divorce
inner history from outer history, i.e., historical meanings cannot be
divorced from historical facts, even so hermeneutics cannot be divorced
from historical research. Thus, it is argued that the kerygma must be
based upon temporal events which can at least be theoretically verifiable.
This is to acknowledge that the biblical texts intend to "report" events
which really happened. Thus, Part Three is an attempt to "overcome" a
dualistic epistemology. In so doing, it proposes to integrate the hermeneutical
and historical aspects of the idea of revelation, as well as
integrating faith and history, in terms of a theology of universal history.
The term, "hermeneutical," is intended to focus attention upon: (l) the
biblical texts themselves as the linguistic bearers of the interpretation
of certain events which are revelatory, (2) the distance that separates
the biblical texts from the modern age, (3) the resulting necessity for
bridging the distance between the biblical texts and the modern age, and
(4) the epistemological problem of history. The term, "historical," is
intended to focus attention upon: (l) the objective, temporal quality of
history as the bearer of revelatory events, and (2) the necessity for
ascertaining the historical reliability of the events recorded in the
biblical texts. The term, "universal history," is a more comprehensive
concept which intends to bring together both the historical and the hermeneutical aspects of revelation.
