Edinburgh Research Archive logo

Edinburgh Research Archive

University of Edinburgh homecrest
View Item 
  •   ERA Home
  • Business School
  • Business and Management thesis and dissertation collection
  • View Item
  •   ERA Home
  • Business School
  • Business and Management thesis and dissertation collection
  • View Item
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Essays on banking

View/Open
Lim2018.pdf (2.085Mb)
Date
07/07/2018
Item status
Restricted Access
Embargo end date
07/07/2019
Author
Lim, Ivan Wen Yan
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on banking in the U.S. The first two chapters study how supervisors and regulators influence bank behavior. The third chapter explores how bank CEOs allocate credit. The first chapter uses a quasi-natural experiment, the closure of regulatory offices, to identify the effects of supervision on bank behavior. Under the decentralized structure of U.S. bank supervision, banks in the same geographic area may be supervised by different regulatory offices. The chapter shows that, following the closure of a regulatory office, banks previously supervised by that office increase their solvency risk and lending compared with banks in the same counties that are supervised by a different regulatory office. Further, these banks exhibit lower risk-adjusted returns, lower asset quality, and opportunistic provisioning behavior for loan losses. Information asymmetry between banks and supervisors partly explains the results. The second chapter documents that nearly 30% of U.S. banks employ at least one board member who currently or previously served on a regulator’s advisory council or on the board of a regulator as a form of public service. The chapter shows that connections to regulators undermine regulatory discipline by decreasing the sensitivity of bank risk to capital. Connected banks are able to extract larger public subsidies than non-connected banks by shifting risk to the financial safety-net, resulting in wealth transfers from taxpayers to shareholders of risk-shifting connected banks. One potential reason for these effects is that connected banks receive preferential treatment in supervision from regulators. The third chapter uses the birthplace of U.S. bank CEOs to investigate the effect of hometown favoritism on bank business policies. Exploiting within-bank variation in distances to a CEO’s hometown, the chapter shows that banks make more mortgage and small business lending as well as branch expansions in counties that are proximate to the hometown of the CEO. This is due to the CEO’s altruistic attachment to her hometown; the effects are stronger during economic downturns, among altruistic CEOs, in poorer counties and marginal mortgage applicants. Further, hometown favoritism does not lead to worst bank performance. However, it is associated with positive economic outcomes in counties exposed to greater favoritism.
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31107
Collections
  • Business and Management thesis and dissertation collection

Library & University Collections HomeUniversity of Edinburgh Information Services Home
Privacy & Cookies | Takedown Policy | Accessibility | Contact
Privacy & Cookies
Takedown Policy
Accessibility
Contact
feed RSS Feeds

RSS Feed not available for this page

 

 

All of ERACommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsPublication TypeSponsorSupervisorsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsPublication TypeSponsorSupervisors
LoginRegister

Library & University Collections HomeUniversity of Edinburgh Information Services Home
Privacy & Cookies | Takedown Policy | Accessibility | Contact
Privacy & Cookies
Takedown Policy
Accessibility
Contact
feed RSS Feeds

RSS Feed not available for this page