At the close of the Parliament of 1663 the stage was set
for the struggle which ended in a compromise settlement after the
revolution of 1688, when both monarchy and church had given up
their absolutist claims. The effective resistance to the settlement
was carried on by the Protesters, and Sharp was not wrong in
his opinion that very few Resolutioners would refuse to accept
episcopacy. He is reported to have told the King that not twenty
of them would oppose the new establishment. There was some
exaggeration in the statement, for, according to an authority with
strong covenanting sympathies the actual number was forty; but
that is not a very large proportion of some six or seven hundred
ministers. They included, however, the majority of the leading
and most respected men of the party. They were the older men who
had taken an active part in all proceedings since 1637, and there
seems to have been a widespread reaction against the Covenant in
the ranks of the younger ministers: With the Protesters, on the
other hand, it was the young men who were the most zealous, and
and many of the older ministers were submissive.4 That there was
a strong reaction among the general population also is clear, and
even some of those who had been zealous for the Covenant had become
doubtful of its wisdom and unable to justify it entirely. Alexander
Brodie of Brodie and Alexander Jaffrey, both of whom had been
prominent covenanters, discussed the subject in June 1662. They agreed that there were some things in the Covenant unlawful,
and they were bound to repent of this, that, as God's name was
interposed, it was not to be broken lightly, but were it to swear
again it would stumble many, seeing what had ensued. Brodie's position
with regard to episcopacy was that he disliked the change but he would
be obedient to the laws. Jaffrey had become a quaker.
The King had expressed his intention of employing moderate
men to carry out the church settlement. Sharp also declared himself
to be in favour of moderation, and at the first appearance of
opposition he had told Lauderdale that he was prepared to wait
with patience to give men time "to make the retreat with credit."
Some men who had at first resisted did conform; but it was of no avail
to give time to men who were ready to sacrifice everything for the
sake of conscience. Since about two thirds of the Population
acquiesced in episcopacy, it had not been anticipated that it would
be so difficult to suppress the resistance of the rest. The act
of Glasgow was much blamed for the troubles by the supporters of
the government, and their opponents agreed with them. The historian,
Kirkton, wrote in justification of the ministers who left their
congregations without waiting to be ejected, "Had they stayed till
they had been turned out forcibly one by one, and their places planted
immediately, as Bishop Sharp designed, the change had never been so
sensible, nor the opposition to Bishops so considerable; whereas
Providence made the course ministers took the first act of clear
opposition to that course, by the alienation it made upon the people, and the break it made upon the country, the bishops and all their
might was never able to heal."
Sharp's policy was the same as that of Clarendon and the
the English bishops in England, the.strict enforcement of the law,
but this policy he was never able to carry out. His letters, and
those of Alexander Burnet, Archbishop of Glasgow, to Lauderdale and
Sheldon are full of complaints that they did not receive the help
they should have had from the other members of the Privy Council.
There was much discontent among the Scottish nobility, who often
showed their dissatisfaction with the government and their dislike
of the bishops by neglecting to take effective action to restrain
disorders. Sharp seems to have been proved right by the fact that
the policy of leniency tried by Lauderdale after the Pentland rising
was a failure and Lauderdale founds it necessary to adopt repressive
measures once again. Robert Leighton, Bishop of Dunblane, whose
great desire was for reconciliation, found the explanation of the
fact
government's failure in the fact that there was too great rigour on the
one hand and top many relaxations and indulgences on the other. He
blamed also the cessation of kirk sessions and presbyteries from
January to October 1662, which meant a relaxation of discipline for
that period, and also the "fatal act of Glasgow".
For Sharp the only possible policy was the enforcement of
the law, for he could not conciliate the presbyterians, who regarded him as a traitor to the Kirk of Scotland, to the Covenant and his
own convictions. It seems most probable, however, that so long
as episcopacy was maintained nothing would have prevented the
extremists from resisting the law. The real reason of the government's
failure was the self sacrificing zeal and fanaticism of the
Protesters of the west.
There can be little doubt that Sharp was betraying his
colleagues in the early months of 1661. It seems improbable,
however, that he Was betraying his own convictions. Tre fact
that the covenanting movement produced in him its traitor may be
regarded as a.just retribution for the intolerance which compelled
many men to live lives of dissimulation. Like many others,Sharp
had in his youth been accept the Covenant and presbytery
or give up his means of livelihood and his career. That he subscribed
the National Covenant after Charles I had ratified it was not
inconsistent with the principles in which he had been educated by
the Aberdeen doctors, who did not consider presbytery unlawful, but,
if he was to satisfy his ambition to succeed, or even be certain of
keeping his position, he must conceal any episcopalian tendencies
he may have retained and obey unquestioningly the decisions of the
General Assembly. When divisions arose in'the church he naturally
joined the moderate party, and he found no difficulty in maintaining
loyalty to them during the commonwealth. As agent of both Monck
and the Resolutioners he had to try and reconcile two loyalties.
It soon seems to have become clear to him that the aim of the
Resolutioners to bring in the King on Covenant terms was impracticable and that, if they continued to insist upon it, they were likely to
destroy all possibility of retaining the presbyterian settlement in
Scotland. He was not completely frank with them, for he did not
let them know that Lauderdale and he were encouraging the English
presbyterians to accept an accommodation with episcopacy. If he
had done so he would have had no further influence with them, and he
would not have been able to perform the services desired of him by
Monck, Lauderdale and the King.
There is, however, no reason to believe that he was not then co-operating loyally with Lauderdale to bring
about the presbyterian settlement which Lauderdale desired. The
settlement contemplated would doubtless have involved a managed
General Assembly subservient to the state, but probably it would
have been accepted by the Resolutioners in their anxiety to prove
that presbytery was consistent with monarchy. In any case they
did not really want a free Assembly, for they wished to exclude the
Protesters. It would have been a more satisfactory settlement.
There would have been trouble with the Protesters, the majority of
whom would have been deposed, but the opposition would have appeared
less reasonable and would have been less widespread and, therefore,
more easily dealt with. The episcopalians would still have been
persecuted, but, as they were less fanatical than the Protesters
they would have suffered less, and they might have been provided
with livings in England.
In spite of rumours. to the contrary it seems probable
enough that Sharp was still working loyally with Lauderdale until
the end of the year, for everything he wrote at this time and
everything that is reported of his words and actions is quite consistent
with this theory. He seems to have been able to persuade the
moderate presbyterians to make no mention of the Solemn League and
Covenant and to have been trying to bring them to the point of repudiating
the General Assembly's attitude to the Engagement of 1648, on the
ground that they were carried away by the extremists. He was
apparently not completely successful in this, and Middleton seems
to have convinced him in January 1661 that the King was not able
to trust the presbyterians to the extent of granting them a
General Assembly and that the establishment of episcopacy was
inevitable. Sharp then entered wholeheartedly into Middleton's
plans, at the same time trying to retain the confidence of Lauderdale
and win him over to the episcopal solution.
His co-operation with Middleton involved him in treachery
to his colleagues, who, as Robert Baillie wrote, trusted him as their
own souls. He realised fully what it meant to them, as is shown
by his assertion to Patrick Drummond that he would not be accessory
to bringing in bishops, or even constant moderators, because of the
suffering it would cause to many. Nevertheless he decided to
betray his friends in order to realise his ambition. In so doing
he entered upon a life of unremitting toil,in which he experienced
much disappointment and many humiliations, and which ended in his
cruel murder by some of the most extreme and desperate fanatics
whom he was oppressing. He would have been happier if, in accordance with the intention he expressed, probably not sincerely,
to Patrick Drummond, he had retired from public life in the spring
of 1661. and devoted himself to the duties of his professorship at
St. Andrews, where he might have lived a useful and honoured life.
From the point of view of the episcopalian church Sharp's
appointment as Archbishop was probably a mistake. It was no doubt
due to the great ability and experience which made his services
invaluable to the unscrupulous men who governed the country, but
owing to the prejudice created by his treachery it tended to defeat
the aims of those who wished to win over the more moderate Presbyterians
by methods of conciliation.
