Extesionalism and veridicalism
Many philosophers hold that we experience the passing of time. It is by far the most popular view concerning temporal experiences of time. There is a small minority of philosophers, veridicalists, who reject the phenomenology of time passage. But are there accounts of temporal experiences that could support this view? I think so. I will examine one particular view of veridicalism, by Christopher Hoerl, and examine how extensionalism, a view about our temporal experiences and how we perceive change, can offer such account. With extensionalism, and a few modifications to the general debate, I think veridicalism is a strong contender against B-theorist philosophers, philosophers who reject an objective passing of time, who do accept the phenomenology of time passage. To build a case for the veridicalist view, I will rely on extensionalism as an account of the temporal present and as an account of how we become aware of change. I will, also, suggest there is a reasonable case to be made for the veridicalist view depending on how we view the temporal present in relation to the metaphysics of the B-theory.