Time of termination

Abstract

This thesis provides an investigation into whether the viability of the Termination Thesis (TERM) is affected by the kind of theory of time that one adopts. In other words, the chief motivation for this project is the question: does a subscription to the A theory or B theory dictate whether one can hold the TERM? The answer to which has implications not only for the greater question regarding the fit between A theoretic versus B theoretic models of time and the TERM but also for the secondary motivating question for this project: how are the normative claims that are typically associated with the TERM affected by one’s temporal subscriptions?

Chapter one lays the foundation of the project by deriving three interpretations of the TERM and providing a temporal analysis of each which reveals that the temporal notions of cessation, simultaneity, and change are requisite for the TERM. The ethical theses that are typically associated with the TERM and the connections between them are also presented. Chapter two focuses on the TERM in light of McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time—more specifically, whether the viability of the TERM is affected by said argument.

Broadly, the resulting tension between McTaggart’s argument and the TERM signals an incompatibility between death as the cessation of existence and the absence of time, which serves as a good starting point for the considerations in chapters three and four. Chapters three and four analyze the potential for the A theory and B theory to account for the relevant temporal notions in such a way as to allow for a formulation of the TERM that significantly overlaps and serves the same function as the classical TERM, thereby exploring the viability of the TERM in light of both the A and B theory. A close inspection of the features of the main A theoretic and B theoretic models of time in conjunction with the three TERM interpretations reveals that the viability of the interpretations is affected by said theories.

Chapter five marks a return to the normative implications of the TERM in light of the results from chapters one through four. The primary focus centers on the question: what is the rational attitude toward death and how is the prescription regarding whether one ought to fear death shaped by one’s temporal subscriptions? Additionally, on a metaphilosophical level, chapter five also serves as an illustration of how one’s metaphysical commitments can inform one’s ethical views.