Representationism and Phenomenism: A critique of two approaches to explaining the relation between representational and phenomenal content
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Date
06/2001Author
Thompson, Hamish D.
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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to critique two approaches to explaining the
relation between representational and phenomenal content. The first
approach, representationism, holds that phenomenal content is entirely
constituted by intentional or representational content. The second approach,
phenomenism, holds that phenomenal content is not entirely constituted by
intentional or representational content. There is something ’more’ to
phenomenal content than just intentional content. Two types of
consideration are considered in order to evaluate these two approaches as
follows: The first, considers two ’metaphysical speculations’, inverted
spectra and inverted earth: The second, considers causal and explanatory
implications of adopting either of these two approaches. Inverted spectrums
and inverted earth provide prima facie grounds for rejecting
representationism(Block, 1990, 1996; Shoemaker; 199 1); however, it will
be demonstrated that both ‘speculations’ do not demonstrate
representationism to fail. This thesis will argue that existing responses to
inverted earth, for example, Lalor (1999), Lycan (1996), and Tye (1994,
1995b, 1998b) are inadequate. However, it provides a new response to
inverted earth on behalf of the wide representationist. Narrow content
representationism, which holds that phenomenal contents are functions that
map contexts onto contents, will be demonstrated to fail. Doubt is also
cast upon teleological approaches to phenomenal content. Causal and
explanatory constraints present a problem to both wide representationism
and phenomenism. Wide representationalist theories have traditionally
faced a challenge from attempting to explain how relational properties can
be casually relevant (Fodor, 1987). These problems apply also to
representationist theories of phenomenal content. Two current proponents
of wide causation are considered, Wilson (1997) and Yablo (1997); their
accounts are found to be problematic. Phenomenism either faces a
troublesome ‘explanatory gap’ or a problematic commitment to type-type
physicalist identity theories. Finally a proposed future direction for these
two theories is suggested.