|dc.description.abstract||Many evolutionary game theory papers have obtained their results
when the bounded rationality which creates change vanishes. In our first
chapter we consider whether such results are actually a good reflection
of a population whose bounded rationality is small yet persistent. Our
model consists of a two type population with three stable equilibria.
Firstly we find that results from the standard vanishing noise approach
can be very different from those obtained when noise is small but constant.
Secondly when the results differ the small and persistent noise
approach selects an equilibrium with a co-existence of conventions.
Our second chapter generalises the model of our first chapter to a population
of many player types and several stable equilibria. Firstly we
produce the characteristics of the long run equilibria under vanishing
noise analysis. Secondly we find that the introduction of a small neutral
group into a divided society can produce a welfare improving switch in
the long run equilibrium towards social co-ordination.
Our third chapter combines the model of the second chapter with the
message of the first. We show numerically that the long run location
of a heterogenous population with extremely low levels of bounded rationality
can be completely different to the equilibria selected through
vanishing noise analysis. We also show that such an event is not a rare
occurrence and find that over a third of populations are misrepresented
by stochastic stability.
Our final chapter conducts a review of the literature on social threshold
models. We give a thorough description of each paper and discuss the
main assumptions that drive the key results.||en
|dc.publisher||The University of Edinburgh||en
|dc.title||Essays on the evolution of social co-ordination and bounded rationality||en
|dc.type||Thesis or Dissertation||en
|dc.type.qualificationname||PhD Doctor of Philosophy||en