For a social ontology with a self-reflective knowing subject: towards the articulation of the epistemic criterion of reflexivity
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02/07/2013Author
Bouzanis, Christoforos
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Abstract
This thesis argues for the idea that there are deep interconnections between the
notions of ontology and reflexivity. It starts from the idea that ontological claims are
cognitionally prior to epistemological and methodological accounts. It is argued that
ontology is of particular importance to social science because the boundary between
the substantive and the ontological is less clear than in natural science. Furthermore,
because social science is located within its object, society, it is argued that self-referential
questions about the epistemic status of every social ontology emerge. In
the face of these self-referential questions concerning ontological coherence, the
‘epistemic criterion of reflexivity’ is proposed in this thesis. Meeting this criterion is
required to deal successfully with the self-referential problem emerging from the fact
that the knowing subject is part of her object. I argue that it is only by
conceptualizing agents as self-reflective knowing subjects that an ontology has a
chance of satisfying the criterion of epistemic reflexivity which is proposed by this
thesis.
In Chapters 1 to 3, the works of Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, Jügen Habermas,
Alvin Gouldner and Andrew Sayer, as well as of several social constructionists and
ethnomethodologists are examined, considering their contribution to the notions of
ontology and epistemic reflexivity. It is argued that proponents of both relativistic
and deterministic social theories cannot satisfy the criterion of epistemic reflexivity
because they cannot coherently account for their knowledge-claims using their own
ontologies. I thus argue that it is not enough for a social theory to provide an account
of self-reflection – for the wider ontology in which it is situated may itself deny the
possibility of such a self-reflective activity. It is in this sense that I argue for the need
for an improved conceptualization of self-reflection in which agents are
conceptualized as having the capacity of self-objectivation within context. It is
through having such a presupposition that ontologies can fulfill the epistemic
criterion of reflexivity proposed. The need for such a conceptualization of self-reflection
leads me to explore two relevant approaches in Chapters 4 and 5, those of
Archer and Castoriadis. I begin by looking at Margaret Archer’s account of the
‘internal conversation’. However, Archer’s internal dialogue will be shown
problematic in the sense that it results in various contradictory claims. The thesis
then considers Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of self-reflective imagination which
partially meets the epistemic criterion of reflexivity proposed in this thesis.