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dc.contributor.advisorSprevak, Marken
dc.contributor.authorDewhurst, Joeen
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-26T16:13:18Z
dc.date.available2014-03-26T16:13:18Z
dc.date.issued2013-11-27
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/8633
dc.description.abstractRepresentational or semantic content plays an essential role in classical accounts of computation and cognition. Both cognitive science and computer science share philosophical foundations that endorse such a view. This has led quite naturally to a situation where computational theories of mind, theories which unite computation with cognition, have almost unanimously assumed that mental computation must also involve semantic content (see Pitt 2013). I will argue that mechanistic computationalism, as presented by Piccinini, can offer a genuinely non-semantic account of mental computation. Furthermore, I claim that if this account is correct it would provide important constraints on any theory of mental content. This is in contrast with Piccinini's position, which is that mechanistic computationalism should simply remain neutral on which theory of semantic content, if any, we should prefer.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherThe University of Edinburghen
dc.subjectcomputationalismen
dc.subjectnon-semanticen
dc.titleMeaning in the Mechanistic Minden
dc.title.alternativeA non-semantic theory of mental computationen
dc.typeThesis or Dissertationen
dc.type.qualificationlevelMastersen
dc.type.qualificationnameMSc Master of Scienceen
dcterms.accessRightsRestricted Accessen


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