Surprise Attack: Soviet response to German threats, December 1940 - June 1941

Abstract

This thesis attempts to examine the proposition that a surprise attack, in which one body politic tries to overwhelm another, is a process and not a happening. The method applied - an analysis of a complex of systems involved in the preparation and execution of a total violent encounter - in itself implies that there can be no over-simplified, one facet explanation for the failure to perceive and anticipate an unexpected onslaught.The first chapter attempts to show the difficulties which Soviet historigraphy encountered when it grappled with the titter awareness that the first months of the war were a humiliating and perhaps an unnecessary defeat. The second chapter is an attempt to elaborate on the theoretical background from which Soviet military doctrine evolved. It also provides some data about military technology and training based on the same doctrine. The third chapter looks at some of the effects of a belligerent environment on a neutral but involved party. The same chapter also dwells on the diplomatic and military moves of Germany's highly mobilized and efficient machine as against those of the slow and cumbersome rachine of the Soviet Union. The fourth chapter follows the institutional and military awakening of the Soviet government to the sense of danger and examines the tortuous policy employed thereby. It also observes the impact of such a policy on the armed forces. The fifth chapter analyses in some detail the effects of surprise on military and political systems.