Abstract
This thesis attempts to examine the proposition that a
surprise attack, in which one body politic tries to overwhelm
another, is a process and not a happening. The method applied -
an analysis of a complex of systems involved in the preparation
and execution of a total violent encounter - in itself implies
that there can be no over-simplified, one facet explanation for
the failure to perceive and anticipate an unexpected onslaught.
The first chapter attempts to show the difficulties which
Soviet historigraphy encountered when it grappled with the titter
awareness that the first months of the war were a humiliating and
perhaps an unnecessary defeat. The second chapter is an attempt
to elaborate on the theoretical background from which Soviet
military doctrine evolved. It also provides some data about
military technology and training based on the same doctrine. The
third chapter looks at some of the effects of a belligerent
environment on a neutral but involved party. The same chapter
also dwells on the diplomatic and military moves of Germany's highly
mobilized and efficient machine as against those of the slow and
cumbersome rachine of the Soviet Union. The fourth chapter follows
the institutional and military awakening of the Soviet government to
the sense of danger and examines the tortuous policy employed
thereby. It also observes the impact of such a policy on the armed
forces. The fifth chapter analyses in some detail the effects of
surprise on military and political systems.
