1. Wittgenstein, in his discussion of the relation
between the positive and the negative propositions, makes
the meaningfulness of the latter depend on that of the
former, but not vice versa. In his discussion of denial
and assertion, admitting or realising that neither is
possible without the other makes the meaningfulness of
the negative a condition of that of the positive and
vice versa. His account is thus inconsistent.
2. There is no reason for every language system
(a) to have positive propositions correlated with
' positive ' facts
(b) to have complex sentences
(c) to use names.
3. The account given of a type of language, atomic
language, to which all language must be reducible, is
wrong because it is far too simple. The semantic, syntactic
and act categories of ordinary language are not reducible
to compounds of the categories of his atomic language.
4. Since we can make statements by using words for
relations and by using names for complexes, there is
nothing logically wrong with this. There is thus no
need to believe in an atomic language of the sort
5. Wittgenstein's Picture Theory does not explain
language, and is in fact at odds with it. The theory is
the rigo,4rous working out of theories held by Moore
and Russell. It succeeds in solving the problem of
the similarity of language and reality, but only at
the expense of distorting both language and reality.