Idealism and foreign policy: a study of the relations of Great Britain with Germany and France, 1860-1878

Abstract

We have seen what high hopes were cherished in. Britain of the future of United Germany. How were they fulfilled?

There were not wanting already sinister indications. In 1870 Morier had been startled to find his old friends, the. German Liberals developing qualities which he had not known, they possessed. The disillusionment was great; but he was too honest not to face it. "I never dreamt," he wrote,'that...the dangers civilisation would face within three years after the conclusion of peace, be directly traceable to Germany's having learnt and exaggerated the besetting vice of the people she had conquered. For there is no denying that the malady under which Europe is at present suffering is caused by German Chauvinism, a new and far more formidable type of the disease than the French, because instead of. being spasmodical and undisciplined, it is methodical, calculating, cold-blooded, and self-contained."

For German Liberalism there was no future. That party had given whole-hearted support to Bismarck in 1870, and the years that followed saw their final collapse as a living factor in German politics. In 1877, several assassination plots, chiefly forded by extreme socialists, against Bismarck and the King, aroused general indignation. The Chancellor had long wished for an opportunity of passing repressive laws against the socialists. Since 1866 he had .relied an an alliance with the Liberals to carry on the government, but now he was sufficiently assured of his position to be able to dispense with their support, and for some years he had been tending to a reconciliation with his old friends the Conservatives. The Liberal party was sensible of the growing weakness of their position. To obtain a. dominating power for Germany in Europe, they had sacrificed many of their principles, and the result had been a continuous loss of moral strength and independence. They now consented to pass the laws against the socialists, and it was the signal for their dissolution. The powers thus placed in the hands of the government were the negation of freedom of thought in Germany. Within one month, 135 socialist associations 35 journals, and 100 books and pamphlets, had been suppressed. The Liberal party did not survive this exhibition of moral weakness. It split in two, one part being assimilated by the Progressists, while the majority followed Bismarck to the Right. Bennigsen retired; there was nothing else left for him to do. The Liberals had failed far more disastrously than in 1848: then they had only shown that they lacked constructive faculty; now, that they lacked moral strength.

With the opposition so maimed, the expected development of English constitutionalism in Germany was not likely to appear. Far from progressing in the direction of responsible self-government, Germany appeared to have resigned herself to remain under the old system.

The constitution of the new German empire was a slightly modified version of that of the late North German Confederation. The Reichstag had not been allowed to have any real say in this matter, for before the debates began Bismarck had induced the Liberal leaders to consent to his plans. The Constitution was drawn up on principles strange to English politics. The Emperor held the Presidency; his coadjutors were the Federal Council and the Reichstag. The summoning and dissolution of the Reichstag, the making of war and peace and treaties, were in-his hands. His consent was not necessary, however, to (federal) legislation or taxation, which were handled by Council and Reichstag. The Council was formed of delegates from the various states, which voted as units; Prussia held 17 votes, and so controlled the voting, as rejection by 14 votes vetoed any constitutional change. The proceedings, of the Council were secret. They initiated laws, and could reject those passed by the Reichstag. The Council had also considerable executive powers.

The Reichstag, chosen by manhood suffrage, gave an illusion of democratic control. Its consent was necessary to all legislation, but its powers were really very limited. Its function was rather to assent to than to initiate legislation, its control was as imperfect'as that of an assembly elected by universal suffrage must ever be, and its voting had little real effect on the government, because there was no ministerial responsibility. The Chancellor, who held a somewhat ill-defined position, was the connecting link between the three parts. He was head of the Council. He could only be appointed and dismissed by the Emperor, and was responsible only to him. He might thus hold office for an indefinite period, and there was no such thing as party government.

The constitutions of the individual states dealt with their personal affairs. Some of the southern states devised liberal and enlightened systems; but that of Prussia was as like a despotism as a constitutional state could well be, and Prussia, as we have seen, really dominated the federal government. Those who regret that in many cases constitutional rights have been obtained by revolution and the use of force, might find consolation in observing Prussia: her constitution was Octroye, the free gift of her king; and she was not allowed to forget it.

Equal disappointment awaited those who had hoped that Germany, once securely established, would become one of the pillars of European peace. Far from reducing her forces in 1871, Germany increased them. The Government succeeded in keeping the military expenditure practically under its own control, and by one "temporary" arrangement after another, the peace strength of the. army was added to, till in 1888 Sir Charles Dilke estimated, from the official statements of the German gencral staff, that in case of war Germany would be able to place 7,000,000 troops in the field.

By maintaining her army in such strength in time of peace, Germany forced her neighbours in self-defence to adopt a similar policy. Even Belgium began to strengthen her defences. It was the beginning of that wasteful and pernicious system. of great armaments, which was to strain the resources of great powers like Britain, and almost ruin weaker powers like Italy.

Whether Germany was likely to be pacific in international affairs---whether this armament was meant only for purposes of defence---was demonstrated by the War Scare of 1875, the Schnaebele incident, and the other War Scare of 1887. Germany, it was seen, was ready to bully and browbeat her weaker neighbours, to use her strength to enforce unjust demands, and to make war without provocation, whenever she found It convenient, if she were not restrained by the intervention of other great powers.

At the scene time she had failed to justify her earlier wars and forcible annexations by reconciling the conquered populations through a wise and sympathetic rule. Alsace and Lorraine continued to preserve their loyalty to France notwithstanding an advance in material wealth which .night have served to compensate them for the change. Had the provinces been constituted a German state, a full member of the Empire, they might have been reconciled: but Bisrnarck and the general staff regarded the new acquisition from a military point of view. Alsace-Lorraine was prepared as a base for a future war, and an elaborate system of fortification at once commenced. For this the provinces mast be absolutely under the control of the central government, and they were therefore constituted as an imperial Territory (Reichsland). Later they were given 15 seats in the Reichstag, and were to be administered by a governor. One of the governors attempted a conciliatory policy, but without success, and in general a system of repression was followed, in which incidents of brutality occurred frequently enough to transform the first indignation into a steady and enduring hatred of the-new "Fatherland".

The management of Alsace might be dictated by a fear of France attempting to reccver her lost provinces; but the possession of Slesvig was perfectly secure, for Denmark was no more likely to attack Germany than a mouse would attack a tiger. Yet, in spite of persistent propaganda and several attempts at jerrymandering, North Slesvig continued to return two Danish candidates to make their ineffectual protests in the Reichstag, and indeed the number of "Danish" votes actually increased with time.

There was one quarter where German methods in dealing with an alien population could be observed more fairly than in either Alsace or Slesvig: a province that. Germany had held for a hundred years, which had no independent mother-country yearning for its recovery, and scarcely anyone who believed in the possibility of its future redemption. Would the German Empire do what Prussia had never done, and reconcile the Poles to German_ rule?

A new Polish policy was in fact undertaken in 1871, but it was not more sympathetic: it was the most persistent and violent attack on Polish nationality that had yet been made. It was an an attempt, to stamp out their individuality and submerge them in a German population. "You are not a people," said Bismarck, "You have nothing behind you but your illusion; and fictions." The attempt met with the success common to such-systems: it degraded conquerors and conquered alike, and sowed new seeds of hatred in the breasts of the Poles.

As we have seen the economic policy of Germany developed on lines equally remote from what had been predicted in Britain. Germany had adopted a system of high protection, which in some cases was directed especially against British goods.

She bad äcquired a great overseas empire, which gave her a contiguous land frontier with Britain in several parts of the world. In the acquisition of this empire she displayed an insolent anti aggressive spirit, and obliged Britain to refrain from opposition by threatening to attack her in other quarters.

Finally, she began to plan the development, of a strong navy, which would enable her to meet Britain on equal terms on the sea.

In the light of all this, how stood the Victorian theory of Germany as the peace-loving, anti-militaristic, Liberal power, the second pillar of Free Trade, the "natural ally" whose interests could never come into conflict with those of Great Britain?

Germany had obtained for herself a supreme position in Europe, by setting her own material interests before all.other considerations. The principle of her policy had been to destroy everything that might obstruct the .course of her development, and to seize by force whatever was desirable for her own power or security.

In struggling for unity in herself and supremacy in Europe, Germany had been hindered by three states, Denmark, Austria, and France, and she had removed then successively from her path, "by blood and iron." Having established herself as the dominant power in Europe, she now wished to become the dominant power in the world, and she found herself face to face with a fourth power, more formidable than any of the others.

Germany was the strongest military power in Europe, and was rapidly becoming one of the greatest industrial powers. Her next necessity was an outlet for her superfluous capital and energy. She must have a commercial marine, foreign markets, colonies.

As she the strongest power on land, she must not remain the weakest power at sea. She must have a navy.

The state which in all these aspects was now Germany's rival was the world's greatest commercial, colonial, and naval power---Great Britain.

A compromise was possible: but a compromise meant the reversal of Germany's chosen policy.

That sacrifice the statesmen who guided her policy could not or would not make. As Germany had once created an army that was to destroy the military supremacy of France, so she now set to work to create a navy that was to destroy the naval supremacy of Britain.

This was essentially the continuation of the policy initiated by Bismarck thirty years before: it was only carried out less skillfully. Bismarck would never have made the mistake of alienating Britain and Russia simultaneously. His successors, full of self-confidence, did not hesitate to do so.

Germany had been too deeply influenced by the personality of Bismarck, had learned too well the lesson he taught her, to change her course even when it led her by dangerous ways. The triumph of materialism, the glory of success, had blunted her sensibilities and deadened those instincts that might have warned her. It was not so much that she overrated her own strength, as that she. underrated both the material strength of her rivals, and the influence of moral considerations which she was now incapable of understanding. Her history for the next thirty years was the. inevitable outcome of her history for the last thirty years. Success, however, cannot be continually attained by repeating' the same process. Only the genius of a Bismarck could have ensured to this policy a new triumph: only a complete spiritual change in the German people could have procured its abandonment.