Edinburgh Research Archive

The Competition for Control in Sinjar: How External Actors and Local Interests Inhibit the Sinjar Agreement

dc.contributor.author
Saleem, Zmkan Ali
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dc.date.accessioned
2024-10-31T13:43:41Z
dc.date.available
2024-10-31T13:43:41Z
dc.date.issued
2024-01-18
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dc.description.abstract
Located in western Iraq’s Nineveh Governorate, Sinjar is arguably the most volatile of the country’s territories, disputed between the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In 2020, the GoI and the KRG signed the Sinjar Agreement in a bid to stabilise the district, but it is yet to be implemented. This paper examines the factors that have contributed to upholding the status quo in Sinjar, thus preventing change through the implementation of the provisions of the Sinjar Agreement. It argues that generating change has been made difficult by intense competition between local, national and regional actors seeking to control Sinjar. While the implementation of the Agreement is difficult under the current conditions, the Iraqi government and the international community are advised to take measures to reduce the security and governance challenges faced by the people of Sinjar as a result of the continuing status quo.
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dc.identifier.citation
Saleem, Z. A. (2024). The Competition for Control in Sinjar: How External Actors and Local Interests Inhibit the Sinjar Agreement (PeaceRep report). Middle East Centre, London School of Economics.
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dc.identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1842/42399
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5093
dc.subject
Peace Processes
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dc.subject
Iraq
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dc.title
The Competition for Control in Sinjar: How External Actors and Local Interests Inhibit the Sinjar Agreement
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dc.type
Publication
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