Limits of liberal plurality: from political identity to strong recognition
dc.contributor.advisor
Kemp, Stephen
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dc.contributor.advisor
Holmes, Mary
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dc.contributor.author
Alvarado Guerra, Mario Alberto
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dc.contributor.sponsor
other
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dc.date.accessioned
2020-06-26T11:28:39Z
dc.date.available
2020-06-26T11:28:39Z
dc.date.issued
2020-07-06
dc.description.abstract
Through the analysis of liberal theories of plurality and diversity –multiculturalism,
interculturalism, nationalisms, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism-, I make a series
of arguments regarding the positive recognition of difference. I acknowledge the
merits and benefits of these theories in providing political recognition to minority
groups. However, I introduce the notions of strong identity and recognition that could
open the door for solutions to some puzzles left unsolved by the theories that
promote political recognition, including claims of essentialism, issues on the
categorisation of minorities and majorities, problems related to social cohesion,
integration and liberalisation of minorities, and of course issues on recognition of
cultural value and identity.
Constant with the analysis. I portray the concept of identity from an ontological
perspective. I argue that identity mainly refers to what we are. In the strict sense, it
is not a property or something we can instrumentally use to deal with the issues of
everyday life. Identity also can be understood as membership, belonging, something
socially constructed, and the social glue in modern societies while nevertheless
being more than that. We do not have multiple identities, but a complex unified
identity that includes everything that we are. To develop this part of the argument, I
draw on Charles Taylor’s theory of the modern self. Finally, I suggest that strong
recognition is pre-dialogical, and does not lead to the direct integration of minorities
into the main culture. Further, it fosters internal social change, supports a stronger
idea of collective autonomy, and is not mediated by institutions.
These notions of strong identity and recognition allow us to move beyond some
limitations of the liberal theories, while at the same time valuing the benefits of
political recognition. I argue that strong recognition does not contravene political
recognition but, in fact, enables it.
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dc.identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1842/37187
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/488
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
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dc.subject
identity
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dc.subject
recognition
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dc.subject
political plurality
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dc.subject
liberalism
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dc.subject
social cohesion
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dc.title
Limits of liberal plurality: from political identity to strong recognition
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dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
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dc.type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
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dc.type.qualificationname
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
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