Edinburgh Research Archive

Epicurus' insufficient arguments for sovereign freedom

dc.contributor.advisor
Kupreeva, Inna
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dc.contributor.author
Swob, Alexander
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dc.date.accessioned
2012-07-06T13:09:46Z
dc.date.available
2012-07-06T13:09:46Z
dc.date.issued
2011-11-23
dc.description.abstract
This essay analyzes and criticizes Epicurus’ arguments for sovereign freedom. Epicurus argues for a type of libertarianism in which one is the ultimate and sovereign source of his or her actions. By arguing for physical indeterminacy, Epicurus attempts to salvage free will from physical necessity. However, I argue that his arguments for sovereign freedom fail on three levels: Firstly, mental states are supervenient upon atomic conglomerates, and are therefore permanent and determinate in their nature, thereby emphasizing the impossibility of sovereign freedom. Secondly, Epicurus fails in his arguments regarding emergent mental states, since he posits that emergent mental states are the cause and effect of sovereign freedom, thereby refuting himself. Thirdly, Epicurus undermines sovereign freedom by his epistemology; one cannot have self-originating freedom if all knowledge is acquired through the senses. My arguments against Epicurus show that Epicurus, unintentionally, puts forth a philosophy of “inverse compatibilism,” which combines physical indeterminism with psychological determinism.
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dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6091
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
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dc.subject
Sovereign Freedom
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dc.subject
Epicurus
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dc.title
Epicurus' insufficient arguments for sovereign freedom
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dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
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dc.type.qualificationlevel
Masters
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dc.type.qualificationname
MSc Master of Science
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dcterms.accessRights
RESTRICTED ACCESS
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