State Participation and the Corporate Value of Natural Resource Economic Rents
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Abstract
The asset participation relationship between the state and the corporate entity is an
essential determinant of corporate value in the natural resource sector. Natural resources
deplete, with the result that oil reserve replacement is an accepted imperative
for companies that derive earnings and balance sheet values from global resource assets.
Corporate asset values in the sector are underpinned by entitlement to future reserves.
Specifically, I show that the global nature of government participation varies and that
it matters in which country reserves are held since entitlement structures directly determine
how the state and corporate producers share economic rents from resource assets.
My global Oil and Gas (O&G) sector study provides market evidence of economic and
state variable limits on the value of globalization.
Findings revise the low oil price paradigm covered in prior studies and provide evidence
that, for O&G producers concerned with reserve replacement, global asset values
are directly affected by state entitlement terms. In developed OECD countries, state
and corporate agent participation terms are price insensitive, and take the form of
concession contracts with royalty or profit taxation terms. By contrast, in emerging
NON-OECD countries state agents participate on production sharing terms that are
linked to the market price of oil. Relative to comparable OECD oil assets, the value
of corporate agent participation in Non-OECD O&G assets is limited by explicit and
progressive state agent participation terms that favour sovereign state agent returns.I
show that unless price sensitive entitlement clauses are is included in the value of cash
flow expectations, state participation terms potentially invert risk return convention
under conditions of increasing oil prices. The Fama and French (1993) framework is
used to provide market evidence of economic state variable limits on the returns for
O&G companies with relatively high asset holdings in Non-OECD countries.
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