Social costs of auto-enrolment in workplace pensions and possible remedies
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Authors
Wyper, Amanda Jayne
Abstract
This research examines the different social costs that have a bearing on the form and content
of regulatory intervention underpinning the Auto-Enrolment (AE) pensions’ regime and
whether these are recognised within current UK legislation. AE requires employers to assess
the workforce and, subject to qualifying criteria, enrol them into a pension and make
contributions to the pension. Workers are also required to contribute to the pension although
they can choose to leave the scheme, Since its introduction in 2012, more than 4.7 million
workers in the UK have now been enrolled into a pension which they did not choose
highlighting the impact of the regulatory intervention.
The starting point for my research is to consider the history of pension legislation in the UK
and the circumstances leading up to the introduction of AE. The next step is to consider
whether this legislative intervention is paternalistic and, if so, whether justified. I then
consider whether the implementing legislation functions as it was intended or whether there
are any unintended consequences. Parliamentary debate at the inception of AE illustrates an
intention to ensure that individuals save more for themselves for their own good.
Behavioural economics was widely referred to as authority on the hypothesis that individuals
do not make rational financial decisions for themselves, justifying legislative intervention to
ensure that private pension saving is the default position for all workers in the UK.
Paternalistic legislation can be difficult to justify where individual choice is overridden
entirely and so the legislation allows for individuals to opt out – soft paternalism or nudge.
There is an assumption that low opt-out rates indicate that individuals now agree that the
pension saving is in their best interests, justifying the intervention.
However, there has been a marked dearth of research into AE savers' actual perceptions of
how the schemes work for them. My research has come to close this gap and also allows
drawing up some normative conclusions regarding the proper framework for offering and
regulating AE in the UK. In particular, participants were asked to discuss their own choices
and actions within their workplace pension and understanding of pensions’ information.
Employers and professional advisers were also interviewed to build a complete picture of the
practical implementation of AE. In considering these findings my work considers whether
there are negative or unintended consequences of the policy change and how these are dealt
with.
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