Relevance to the theory of intelligence testing of the stugy of errors in thinking
dc.contributor.author
Donaldson, Margaret C.
en
dc.date.accessioned
2018-09-13T15:46:35Z
dc.date.available
2018-09-13T15:46:35Z
dc.date.issued
1956
dc.description.abstract
en
dc.description.abstract
In such a study as this it is impossible strictly to separate
the statement of results and the discussion of them, and much that
belongs under the heading of discussion is already contained in the
preceding pages. The function of the final section must therefore
be to draw together these earlier scattered discussions and
summarise the conclusions and questions that emerge from the work as
a whole. This purpose can perhaps best be served by a consideration
of the errors that were found to recur most frequently in a variety
of problems; and by an attempt to relate findings to the opinion
expressed in Chapter III that the study of errors may be of direct
service in the development of intelligence testing in three main
ways.
en
dc.description.abstract
The main recurrent errors were:
en
dc.description.abstract
(1) Rigid separation of the "components" of a problem in
such a way that no allowance is made for the possibility
of overlap or inclusion of one within the other.
en
dc.description.abstract
(2) Failure to handle asymmetrical relationships
successfully and with understanding of the equivalence of
different statements.
en
dc.description.abstract
(3) Abandonment of reasoning at a point in a problem
where there are two possibilities,1 one of which must be
rejected. This might be (a) more or less conscious; or
(b) apparently unaccompanied by any awareness of an inadequacy of reasoning.
en
dc.description.abstract
(4) Failure to reconsider a conclusion once reached, even
if it led to evident contradiction.
en
dc.description.abstract
The second contribution to intelligence testing that we might
look to the study of errors to make was said in Chapter III to be the
augmenting of our ability to make direct inferences from final
solutions to "underlying events ", the advantage to be derived being,
of course, that we might then assess a child's mental powers on the evidence of his written answers with more precision and confidence than are possible to us in the present state of our knowledge. This is a more ambitious suggestion than the first one;
and the opinion that we can never make such inferences with perfect
confidence has already been expressed. (See page 37 ) We
may study five hundred children and find that in every case where a certain wrong solution is offered it seems to be due to the same defect in understanding. But we must recognise that it is never
impossible for another child to come along and arrive at this same solution in a different way.
en
dc.description.abstract
This reservation made, however, the work so far done would seem
to give some indication of what it might be possible to achieve.
en
dc.description.abstract
There are in fact two possibilities: to be content with
classifying wrong solutions according to the errors which are found commonly to underlie them; or deliberately to construct
questions so as to invite certain errors and render less probable the occurrence of others. Now obviously if follow -up shows the occurrence
of some kinds of error to be more significant than that of others,
control of errors by deliberate question construction will be very
desirable; for if the purpose of a question is to assess the child's
freedom from or liability to a certain sort of error and he solves
the question wrongly because of a different incompetence that purpose
will not have been served. Ways of exercising this control are therefore important to consider; and the most obvious is by informed
choice of exact wording and manner of presentation; though again
there is a reservation to make, because it is of great importance to
remember that children are active in the interpretation of problems,
and however skilfully they are constructed we can never be sure that
each child will be affected by variations in the same way. This,
however, does not make it unimportant to have knowledge of the most
common effects of certain sorts of change. To investigate these
fully, numerous comparative studied would have to be undertaken;
but the results of the present study provide some suggestions of the
kind of difference which it might be important to consider. For
instance, the premisses of Problems L and M were stated in hypothetical
or conditional form, while those of Problem N were stated categorically,
and it has already been suggested (page 119) that this may have had
the effect of making the common -sense distractors in the latter
problem particularly attractive. Again, in Problem A the possible
importance of using names which readily form a set was mentioned (page 69); and the significance of the wording of the negative statement "Tom has
never been inside Central School" was considered on pages 72 and 73
The footnote to page 93 has suggested that in Problem D the statement
"Niay is older than Jean" may have, in its context, an effect different
from that of the statement "Jean is younger than May "; just as, in
Problem J, the substitution of "Tom is smaller than Harry" for "Harry
is taller than Tom" might make errors of asymmetry less likely to occur by firmly associating Tom with the smaller end of the scale.
Further, in both D and J, the effect of syntactical changes might be
considerable. In each case the relationships on which the problem
mainly depends are stated in a rather long and involved sentence.
If two or even three sentences had been used to give the same information, so that there was less risk of losing sight of the
grammatical subject, some of the overlap errors might not have
occurred. This possibility was mentioned on page 100.
en
dc.description.abstract
The conclusion to which this argument leads, then, is that the
differences between the failures of reasoning and the failures to reason are such that attempts should be made to assess their occurrence separately, for
purposes both of prediction and of finding ways of helping children to overcome them. Whether we choose to call them both failures of intelligence
or to reserve this name for the failures of reasoning alone is unimportant.
What is important is that the existence of a distinction between them should
be recognised, that the existence of similar distinctions involving other
categories of error should be explored, and that further study should be
directed to their nature and significance.
en
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31692
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
en
dc.relation.ispartof
Annexe Thesis Digitisation Project 2018 Block 20
en
dc.relation.isreferencedby
en
dc.title
Relevance to the theory of intelligence testing of the stugy of errors in thinking
en
dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
en
dc.type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
en
dc.type.qualificationname
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
en
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1
- Name:
- DonaldsonMC_1956redux.pdf
- Size:
- 18.85 MB
- Format:
- Adobe Portable Document Format
This item appears in the following Collection(s)

