Edinburgh Research Archive

God who speaks with/out words: the philosophical problem of revelation in contemporary Muslim theology

dc.contributor.advisor
Newman, Andrew
en
dc.contributor.advisor
Pritchard, Duncan
en
dc.contributor.author
Mirdamadi, Yaser
en
dc.contributor.sponsor
other
en
dc.date.accessioned
2019-09-20T10:26:43Z
dc.date.available
2019-09-20T10:26:43Z
dc.date.issued
2019-11-29
dc.description.abstract
This thesis explores the philosophical problem of divine revelation in contemporary Muslim theology by focusing critically on the works of ‘Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945) an Iranian philosopher, modern theologian, and public intellectual. In a nutshell, the philosophical problem of divine revelation, as specifically related to Islam, centres around making sense of the paradox of the transcendent God who has supposedly spoken like human beings, mainly through the Qur’an. While God is, by definition, the meta-historical Being, the Qur’an is taken to be a book that at least partially reacts to historical events, and therefore not a meta-historical entity. To solve this problem, Soroush argues that the Qur’an, in both content and form, is literally a Muhammadan speech, and only figurately divine speech. Soroush also argues that the Qur’anic speech of Muhammad is, phenomenologically, dreamlike in nature. In this thesis I argue that Muslim theories of revelation can be divided into internalist and externalist theories. While internalist theories recognize, at least in principle, the agency of the prophet in the process of revelation, the externalists refrain from doing so. The Soroushian theory of the Qur’anic revelation is one of the most radical internalist theories of revelation in which the full agency in the process of revelation is given to Muhammad. I also argue in this thesis that the Soroushian theory of the Qur’anic revelation seems to be positioned in the middle between realism and irrealism. For realists, God, as independent being, can be known and talked about cognitively (i.e. in a way that is capable of being true or false). For irrealists, which come in various forms however, either independent God does not exist (ontological anti-realism), or God’s existence or non-existence cannot be known (epistemological anti-realism), or talk of God is not cognitive (non-realism). I argue that while Soroush claims that his theory of religion is realistic, it seems more like a hybrid position between realism and irrealism which at the end laps into irrealism or ends up being not far from it. Specifically, his theory of the Qur’anic revelation seems irrealistic. His theory of religion at the end, then, seems inconsistent: it claims to be realistic but seemingly it is not finally so.
en
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/36189
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
en
dc.relation.hasversion
Mirdamadi, Yaser. “Rushanfikran-i Dini: Bazsazi-Yi Fikr-i Dini Ya Din-Sazi? [Religious Intellectuals: The Reconstruction of Religious Thought or Inventing a New Religion?].” BBC Persian Website, October 27, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-viewpoints- 37789276.
en
dc.subject
Qur’anic concept of revelation
en
dc.subject
‘Abdolkarim Soroush
en
dc.subject
Muhmmad as prophet
en
dc.title
God who speaks with/out words: the philosophical problem of revelation in contemporary Muslim theology
en
dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
en
dc.type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
en
dc.type.qualificationname
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
en

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Name:
Mirdamadi2019.pdf
Size:
2.78 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

This item appears in the following Collection(s)