Ethics of economic sanctions
dc.contributor.advisor
Brown, Campbell
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dc.contributor.advisor
Fabre, Cecile
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dc.contributor.advisor
Cripps, Elizabeth
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dc.contributor.advisor
Haksar, Vinit
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dc.contributor.author
Ellis, Elizabeth Anne
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dc.date.accessioned
2013-09-25T13:45:00Z
dc.date.available
2013-09-25T13:45:00Z
dc.date.issued
2013-07-02
dc.description.abstract
The ethics of economic sanctions is an issue that has been curiously neglected
by philosophers and political theorists. Only a handful of philosophical journal
articles and book chapters have ever been published on the subject; yet economic
sanctions, as I will show, are significantly morally problematic and their use stands
in need of moral justification. The aim of this thesis then is to consider how
economic sanctions might be morally justified.
Of the few writers who have considered this issue, the majority point to the
analogies between economic sanctions and war and use the just war principles (just
cause, proportionality etc.) as a framework within which to assess their moral
permissibility. I argue that this is a mistake. The just war principles are derived
from a set of complex and detailed arguments all planted firmly within the context of
war. These arguments contain premises that, whilst they may hold true in the case of
war, do not always hold true in the case of economic sanctions.
Nevertheless, the rich just war tradition does offer a valuable starting point
for theorising about economic sanctions and in the thesis I consider how the wider
just war tradition might be brought to bear on the case of economic sanctions,
beginning, not with the just war principles, but with the underlying arguments for
those principles.
In particular, I consider whether economic sanctions can be justified on the
grounds that they are a form of self- or other-defence, that they are the ‘lesser evil’
and that they are a form of punishment. I argue that certain types of economic
sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are a form of self- or other- defence
and that, in extreme circumstances, certain types of economic sanctions can
be justified as the ‘lesser evil’. However, I argue that economic sanctions cannot be
justified on the grounds of punishment.
I also develop a ‘clean hands’ argument for economic sanctions that is
unavailable to the just war theorist; I argue that where the goods and services to be
supplied would contribute to human rights violations or other wrongful acts, there is
a duty to impose economic sanctions to avoid complicity in this wrongdoing.
en
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7879
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
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dc.subject
economic sanctions
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dc.subject
ethics
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dc.subject
just war theory
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dc.subject
morality
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dc.subject
clean hands
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dc.title
Ethics of economic sanctions
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dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
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dc.type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
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dc.type.qualificationname
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
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