Herbert Spencer's theory of social justice

Abstract

Our one clear purpose in this thesis is to expound and criticise Spencer’s theory of social justice. We do not use his theory as a peg on whieh to hang all, or nearly all, that has been said and written on the vital problem of social justice. Neither do we use it as an excuse for propounding a totally different and i independent view of social justice.All this does not exclude, however, a careful examination and appreciation of Spencer's theory in the light of other theories; nor does it prevent us from indicating clearly the direction in which our personal convictions lie. We examine Spencer to discover what help he can give us in finding a satisfactory solution of the problems arising out of our complex social relationships, and to find how far he succeeds in justifying the many claims that he makes for himself as against other ethical writers.In Part I, which is mainly expository, we aim at stating concisely, and largely in Spencer's own words, his views on the subject; and we incidentally direct attention to some of the features which seem to characterise much of his social and ethical writings, such as internal inconsistencies, ambiguities, and tendency to argue in a circle. We also note the chief points of criticism which we develop in Part II. In the nature of the case, a considerable part of our thesis must appear to be negative in character. But we believe that in following carefully, from step step, the argument of a great thinker like Spencer, and in examining critically the many claims made by him in support of his universal and abstract formula of justice, we are able to discover where not to look for a solution of the problem of the individual in his relation to society.The outline which we follow in both the expository and the critical parts is the same. In Section I of both parts, we first deal with the relation, on which Spencer insists, between social justice and his peculiar view regarding the "ideal" state, with a view to seeing whether, because of this connection, his particular doctrine of social justice is really of more permanent value than the doctrines of others. We then concern ourselves with the way in which Spencer deduces his principle of social justice (l) from the doctrine of the Moral Sense or Intuition, and (2) from the principles of biology. Thereafter we pass to a consideration of the particular meaning that Spencer assigns to justice from his Utilitarian point of view, bringing out at the same time, as clearly as we can, the relation that he maintains between justice and its twin-principle of beneficence. We devote Section II of both parts to the many applications to the practical questions of social life that Spencer makes of his fundamental formula. Our reason for devoting a whole section to this division of our thesis is the conviction that, in the case of such an intensely practical subject as social justice, even though any particular theory of it may be Philosophically defective, the results derived from the application °f this theory to practical issues may be highly valuable, as in the case of the Utilitarianism of Bentham and his followers.The two chief writings of Spencer which we have studied in detail, and which we use as the basis of our discussion, are "Social Statics" (1350 edition as well as the abridged and revised edition of 1892) and the "Principles of Ethics" (particularly Parts I and IV entitled the "Data of Ethics" and "Justice"). Some of the other writings of Spencer, we use only as reference.