Understanding Nietzsche’s perspectivism and reconciling it with perspectival realism
dc.contributor.advisor
Smith, Martin
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dc.contributor.author
Beckerley, Alexander
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dc.date.accessioned
2019-07-02T09:58:10Z
dc.date.available
2019-07-02T09:58:10Z
dc.date.issued
2018
dc.description.abstract
Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche often suggest that he is some form of anti-realist, i.e. he does not affirm objective scientific truth or understanding of the world. Nietzsche advocates a viewpoint known as perspectivism, which may seem to cement this anti-realist interpretation, insofar as it emphasises the perspectival nature of understanding. Similarly, Justin Remhof interprets Nietzsche as an object constructivist, i.e. that objects within the world are constructed by human concepts, and this also seems to align neatly with anti-realist interpretations. This essay will show how both Nietzsche’s perspectivism and object constructivism are compatible with a realist understanding of the world, in relation to a position known as perspectival realism. Furthermore, this essay will clarify the exact ‘world’ that Nietzsche believes one can understand, as the non-transcendent world of appearance.
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dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/35665
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
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dc.subject
perspectival realism
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dc.subject
non-relativistic truth
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dc.title
Understanding Nietzsche’s perspectivism and reconciling it with perspectival realism
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dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
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dc.type.qualificationlevel
Masters
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dc.type.qualificationname
MSc Master of Science
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