Creativity as a psychological concept and its implications for psychological methodology

Abstract

There is a role for philosophy within psychology, in that the ways in which human beings structure their understanding of the world have direct implications for the sorts of explanation that psychology should be aiming to provide.

Consideration is given to what is involved in the ascription of creativity to a person, taking into account what empirical researches have contributed to the enrichment and clarification of this area: attention is drawn to the need for some definite performance which acts as evidence for the ascription; for the performance to be an original effort on the part of the creator; for the performance to be by 'A' in the sense that it is an intentional action and not a random or a rote occurrence; and for the presence of another person 'B' to provide social context for the ascription. These criteria are indispensable to the adequate psychological investigation of creativity, and where they are not sufficiently taken into account, the value of research findings is vitiated. It becomes clear that the investigation of creativity is at odds with a strictly objectivist methodological approach, in that to enquire in a systematic way into. creativity is not to analyse facts but to explore judgments; that it is also at odds with a strictly deterministic methodological approach, in that choice of action is a necessary element; and that the use of statistics is also curtailed. As a psychological concept, creativity thus undermines much orthodox psychological methodology; and supports the development of an alternative approach, emphasising the need for shaping and reshaping partial and provisional explanatory patterns which attempt to make human behaviour coherent. Use