Free will, punishment and criminal responsibility
dc.contributor.advisor
Duff, Anthony
en
dc.contributor.advisor
Chalmers, James
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dc.contributor.advisor
Maher, Gerry
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dc.contributor.author
Shaw, Elizabeth
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dc.contributor.sponsor
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)
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dc.contributor.sponsor
Clark Foundation for Legal Education
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dc.date.accessioned
2014-10-22T15:00:28Z
dc.date.available
2014-10-22T15:00:28Z
dc.date.issued
2014-07-02
dc.description.abstract
Retributive attitudes are deeply held and widespread in the general population and
most legal systems incorporate retributive elements. It is probably also the dominant
theory of punishment among contemporary philosophers of criminal justice.
However, retributivism relies on conceptions of free will and responsibility that
have, for millennia, fundamentally divided those who have thought seriously about
the subject.
Our legal system upholds the principle that the responsibility of the offender has to
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused can be punished. In view of
the intractable doubts surrounding the soundness of retributivism’s very conception
of responsibility, my thesis argues that it is ethically dubious to punish individuals
for solely retributive reasons. Instead, my thesis proposes that a person should only
be punished if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is
appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. This approach, I argue, is in
accordance with the considerations underlying the beyond reasonable doubt standard.
In addition to considering the question of ‘whom to punish’ my thesis considers what
methods of responding to criminal behaviour are acceptable. In particular, it attempts
to explain, without appealing to the contested notions of free will or retributive
desert, what is problematic about ‘manipulative’ methods of dealing with criminal
offenders (focussing in particular on the possibility of modifying their behaviour
through neurological interventions). The final part of this thesis also gives an
overview of some of the practical implications for Scots criminal law of taking
doubts about free will and retributivism seriously. Given the severe treatment that
offenders undergo within the Scottish penal system (e.g. deprivation of liberty,
stigma) and the high rate of recidivism, it is important to consider whether our
current penal practices are justified, what alternatives are available and what goals
and values should guide attempts at reforming the system.
en
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9590
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
The University of Edinburgh
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dc.relation.hasversion
Shaw E, 'Direct Brain interventions and Responsibility Enhancement’ (2012) Criminal Law and Philosophy, DOI: 10.1007/s11572-012-9152-2
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dc.relation.hasversion
E Shaw, ‘Free Will, Punishment and Neurotechnologies’ in van den Berg B and Klaming L (eds), Technologies on the Stand: Legal and Ethical Questions in Neuroscience and Robotics (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2011) 177-194.
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dc.relation.hasversion
E Shaw, ‘Cognitive Enhancement and Criminal Behaviour’ in E Hildt and A Franke (eds), Cognitive Enhancement: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Springer, Dordrecht 2013).
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dc.relation.hasversion
Shaw E, ‘Psychopaths and Criminal Responsibility’ (2009) 13(3) Edinburgh Law Review 497.
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dc.subject
punishment
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dc.subject
free will
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dc.subject
determinism
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dc.subject
criminal responsibility
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dc.subject
retribution
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dc.title
Free will, punishment and criminal responsibility
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dc.type
Thesis or Dissertation
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dc.type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
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dc.type.qualificationname
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
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