End of agency and the origin of morality

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel path towards a metaethical theory based on a substantive, universal, fundamental value. This proposal is developed out of critiques of Christine Korsgaard’s, Sharon Street’s, and Dale Dorsey’s constructivist theories, specifi cally the critiques of ‘empty formalism’ (applied to Kantian Constitutivism), ‘radical contingency’ (applied to Humean Constitutivism), and an amoralist or skeptical challenge (applied to Perfectionist Humean Constitutivism). These critiques will be shown to lead ultimately, from one theory to another, to the conclusion that everyone naturally holds, as their most fundamental value and thus goal, a shared vision of goodness. It is with reference to this goal that we judge actions as right and wrong, and thus this goal constitutes a moral system with both motivational and normative force. Some objections and implications will be considered at the end.