Edinburgh Research Archive

Gratia Plena: the Catholic feminist possibilities of the Immaculate Conception dogma

Abstract

Mary, the mother of Jesus, has been an important role model for Catholic women for centuries. However, in second- and third-wave feminist Mariology, scholars like Tina Beattie and Elizabeth Johnson, CSJ argue that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception (the belief that Mary was conceived without original sin) is an impediment to Mary and women’s relationship. Simultaneously, since at least the Middle Ages, Aristotelean biology has been influential on the Roman Catholic Church. Aristotle purported that men were synonymous with the active principle and women with the passive principle. This has been a major impediment to women’s place in the Church as scholars like Maryanne Cline Horowitz and Rosemary Radford Ruether argue. In this thesis I construct a positive formulation of the Immaculate Conception that frames Mary as full of grace [gratia plena] for the benefit of Catholic women facing the unfounded misogyny in Aristotelean biology such that it cannot be denied within the bounds of orthodox Catholic theology. I use a tripartite anthropology of mind, heart, and body (which I identified as the main areas of Aristotle’s biology) to develop this constructive theology. This thesis is an inter-disciplinary work and thus relies on a blend of different methods in scholarship. I use a feminist methodology like that of Johnson and Beattie and center Mary and women’s experiences in the thesis. I also draw significantly from the Thomistic tradition that focuses on grace [gratia] and human nature because – as Mary Daly argued – Thomas Aquinas is both a promoter of and the solution to Aristotelean biology. Inspired by the Thomistic Mariology of Édouard Hugon, OP and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, I apply a Thomistic intellectual and emotional anthropology to Mary to emphasize women’s full humanity to contrast Aristotelean biology. I also use a literary-Biblical methodology as Johnson does and examine Biblical passages of Mary’s life to argue that immaculateness does not prevent her from living a fully human life. To illustrate these themes, I use works of art to demonstrate how traditional depictions of Mary should not be dismissed but rather are made new with a feminist lens. Chapter one frames Mary’s immaculate mind [nous/mens] as the seat of her will and intellect. I examine verses depicting her self-identity (Luke 1:46-55 and Acts 1:14;2:1-4), her pondering (Luke 2:19,33), and her making decisions (Luke 1:26-38 and John 2:1-11) to show that Mary is intellectually active in the salvific narrative. In chapter two I consider Mary’s immaculate heart [kardia/cor] as the seat her love and emotions, and I argue that Mary is neither overly emotional nor blandly emotionless. I examine Mary’s love alone (Luke 2:51), and then her love in relation to anger (Luke 2:48) and sorrow (Luke 2:35 and John 19:26-27). In chapter three, I focus on Mary’s immaculate body as her physical self and demonstrate that she has a fully human body. I argue that Mary was conceived by sexual intercourse (Protoevangelium of James 2-4), that she had a painful labor (Isaiah 66:7, Revelation 12:1-2, and Genesis 3:16), that her hymen was torn while giving birth and is irrelevant to her virginity (Protoevangelium of James 20), and that she menstruated (Protoevangelium of James 8). In chapter four I argue that in the twentieth century, Aristotelean biology developed into romantic feminism as defined by Ruether. Building on the arguments outlined in the earlier chapters, I deconstruct recent misogynistic theologies about women’s minds, hearts, and bodies. Far from being an impediment to feminist Mariology, I demonstrate how the Immaculate Conception dismantles Aristotelean biology and its resulting problems for Mary and women.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)